Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Dr. Paul Wilson, Committee Chair
Dr. Patrick Warren
Dr. Howard Bodenhorn
Dr. Dan Miller
The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation is a study into the eﬀects of geographic diversiﬁcation on insolvency risk for commercial banks in the United States. Using a logit model, this paper ﬁnds that, ceteris paribus, more geographically diversiﬁed banks exhibited a lower probability of insol-vency during both banking crises, with the magnitude of these eﬀects being smaller in the recent banking crisis. Furthermore, allowing for portfolio choices to vary, and holding commercial bank size constant, banks with greater geographic diversiﬁcation during the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s were overall less likely to become insolvent, while there is no systematic diﬀerence in the overall probability of insolvency during the recent crisis. Using data from the non-equity crowdfunding website Kickstarter.com, the second chapter of this dissertation analyzes the behavior of potential crowdfunders in committing funds to projects in or-der to increase the probability that said projects will be successfully funded, and thus come into existence. This study ﬁnds evidence that while potential funders are aware of, and react to, possi-bilities for increasing the probability of project success, these eﬀects are economically small. These results suggest that most funders contribute to non-equity crowdfunding projects for either altruistic reasons, or in order to purchase some non-equity reward being oﬀered by the project creator. The third chapter develops a simple subscription game in order to analyze the ex ante ineﬃciencies of the voluntary provision of a discrete public good in the presence of incomplete information and a monopoly provider. Symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria are established as solu-tions to the subscription game. All considerations of the subscription game are ex ante ineﬃcient. Ineﬃciencies are reduced with increased market size, and greater with increasing public good cost. Ineﬃciencies increase with the scale of the public good, suggesting that high cost public goods ben-eﬁting many individuals may be diﬃcult to provide through a subscription game similar to the one presented in this paper. Ineﬃciency is also increased when the provider of the public good is a proﬁt maximizing monopoly, with the relative ineﬃciencies between a monopoly and benevolent provider remaining consistent across economic conditions considered.
Swanson, Andrew, "Geographic Diversification and Commercial Bank Insolvency Risk and Essays on Crowdfunding and Subscription Games" (2016). All Dissertations. 1695.