DEMOCRATIC ORIENTATIONS AMONG ADOLESCENTS IN ASPIRING AND ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES

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DEMOCRATIC ORIENTATIONS AMONG ADOLESCENTS IN ASPIRING AND ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
International Family & Community Studies

by
Natallia Sianko
August 2012

Accepted by:
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ABSTRACT

Democratic citizen orientation – support for democratic principles and values – appears an important ingredient in making democracies work. However, there is no agreement as to what attitudes and behaviors make up a democratic citizen orientation. The main goals of this dissertation are to: (1) identify and describe factors that characterize adolescents’ democratic orientation, (2) explore cross-cultural variation in democratic orientations among adolescents in established and aspiring democracies, (3) investigate the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical legacies of their countries, (4) investigate the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientations and the current quality of democratic institutions, and (5) analyze the implications of democratic orientations among adolescents for their expected involvement in future political and social activities.

This dissertation addresses these goals through quantitative analyses of data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2009) and the Quality of Democracy Index (2008-2009). Results from this dissertation reveal that democratic orientation does not form a homogenous democratic mindset. Rather, a pro-democratic orientation contains a multidimensional pattern of democratic attitudes, with three distinct aspects consistently present in all analyzed societies. Analyses of the role of historic legacies show that in their democratic orientations, adolescents are still largely influenced by previous regimes of their respective societies. Thus, it was found that countries with a history of democratic traditions tend to have a higher proportion of democratically-oriented adolescents in comparison with countries with a history of
communism. However, the results are mixed in terms of specific factors that compose adolescents’ democratic orientation. On average, students in countries with a history of democratic tradition show a greater endorsement of civil liberties values than students from countries with a history of communism. Similarly, higher trust levels are observed among adolescents in established democracies than among their peers in aspiring democracies. At the same time, when compared with adolescents in established democracies, students from aspiring democracies are more likely to have higher scores on the measure of engagement potential.

Additional results show a strong relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries. Specifically, a positive relationship was established between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties values and trust levels. Alternatively, a negative association was documented between adolescents’ engagement potential and the quality of democratic institutions. Comparisons of the relative contributions of historical legacy and the quality of democratic orientations produced mixed results. Although historical legacy was found to be more important in determining the trust aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientations, two other aspects, civil liberties and engagement potential, were found to be influenced more by the quality of current democratic institutions than by historical legacy. Finally, specific aspects of a democratic orientation appear important factors in explaining variation in adolescents’ expectations for future participation in social and political activities.
Overall, this descriptive, comparative, and analytical study affirms the importance of adolescents’ pro-democratic orientation for democratic prospects of individual countries and whole regions. In addition, results support earlier claims that at the level of public beliefs and orientations, democracy has taken root in most transitioning societies. A better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientations should help inform policies that seek to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations

The democratic outlook of young people in today’s societies is critical for understanding and predicting developments in the political sphere as well as for analyzing a broad array of issues in the larger social and cultural domains (Forbig, 2005; Garbarino, 2011; Inglehart, 2003; Print, 2007; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001; Torney-Purta, Amadeo, & Pilotti, 2004). In the context of aspiring democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the question of democratic orientations among adolescents gains additional importance as a new generation of post-communism citizens is coming of age in societies that continue to tackle persisting challenges of the transition period (Dimitrova-Grazl & Simon, 2010; Havel, 2007; Nikolayenko, 2008, 2011a, b). Many scholars, policymakers and other experts have expressed concerns with regard to future democratization and consolidation of democratic institutions in transitioning states and have pointed to the critical role young people play in these processes. In a similar vein, scholars of democratic processes in advanced democracies have long warned that negative trends in civic attitudes and behavior patterns among youth have potentially negative implications for democracy (Dalton, 2004; Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Settersten & Ray, 2010; Smith et al., 2011).

The survival, consolidation, and advancement of democracy in all states requires the support of democratically oriented citizens, including younger generations. Learning more about democratic attitudes among adolescents across different cultures has
important implications for the fields of political science, developmental psychology, and other disciplines (Hooghe, 2004). If we can find out more about political orientations of young people, it would give us better insight into the future. As Franklin (2004) noted, “The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who react to new conditions” (p. 216).

Learning more about democratic orientation among adolescents is valuable not only because it allows one to assess the level of readiness for democratic advancement in the societies of interest, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because it provides valuable insights into the worldview that shapes adolescents’ orientations towards others within their communities and the larger society (Nikolayenko, 2008, 2011(a), 2011(c)). Gaining a greater insight into adolescents’ democratic orientation, operationalized in this research as a set of attitudes and behavioral patterns conducive to democracy, can help one understand whether adolescents perceive themselves as full members of their communities and whether they feel a sense of obligation to their communities and society as a whole.

In addition, focusing on adolescents’ democratic orientation as a value in and of itself is important from a children’s right perspective and is consistent with international scholarship and advocacy that seek to advance the status of children (Alparone & Rissotto, 2001; Freeman, 2007; Melton, 2005). A landmark phenomenon with regard to policy and research on children’s issues has been the adoption of the 1989 United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) that established a comprehensive framework for treating and protecting children. One of the most significant achievements
of the Convention is that children have begun to be viewed as active participants of their life situations, as opposed to mere recipients of adults’ protective efforts (Amna, Munk, & Zetterberg, 2004; Benson, 2003; Hart & Mojica, 2006; Melton, 2006; Smith, 2009). In a similar vein, a new emphasis on viewing children as resources to be developed rather than problems to be solved has emerged (Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 2003). In light of changes encouraged by interpretation and implementation of CRC principles, many researchers have adopted a more complex, interactive approach that considers adolescents as individuals with agency capable of independent thought and action (Benson, 2003; Lerner, 2005; Sapiro, 2004). For example, Checkoway and colleagues (2003) argued that adolescents are “competent citizens” who have the capacity and skills to participate in matters relevant to their lives within the context of their communities. Thus, taking into consideration the creation of new legal codes and the shift in international norms for viewing children, the perspective of young people with regard to democracy has important policy implications for implementing provisions of the CRC.

Finally, in the context of transitioning societies, learning about democratic attitudes is instructive for adolescents and societies themselves. As Rose (2009) noted, “For people living in a society that has been transformed, learning about change is more than academic; it is a necessity” (p. 212). In discussing different aspects of democratic transformation, an important role is given to children and young adults (Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012). On the one hand, some view underage population as being especially vulnerable to the effects of transition (Lay & Torney-Purta, 2002; McAuley & Macdonald, 2007). On the other hand, others believe that children and youth have a
higher likelihood of benefiting from the transition than older generations (Agranovitch et al., 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011; Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012). Although there are some disagreements about the effects of transition on children, there is a growing recognition that younger generations have the potential to contribute to the promotion of new democratic values and norms and help bring their communities closer to the democratic West (Blum, 2006; Brady, 2007; Cockburn, 2005; Demes & Forbig, 2007; Hart, 1997; Levitskaya, n.d.).

Consequently, knowing more about adolescents’ democratic orientation might inform policies and programs aimed at democracy promotion. Many policymakers emphasize the importance of ordinary citizens in democracy promotion and have advocated for a greater inclusion of youth in such efforts (Carothers, 2002; Marples, 2009). Some have argued that understanding and popularization of the concept of democratic political culture among the general population is a key component in shaping a prospective democratic outlook of transitioning countries (Stewart, 2009a, 2009b). However, to help young people realize their potential to contribute to democratic survival and advancement, it is first necessary to identify their democratic preferences.

Of note, children and youth of today’s transitioning states are among the first generations who grew up with no direct experience of living under a totalitarian system (Agranovitch et al., 2005; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011b). Because these new generations, in the words of Vaclav Havel “are only now emerging into adulthood,” it is unclear to what extent youths’ attitudes are shaped by new processes taking place in their contemporary societies and to what degree deeper socio-cultural norms influence their
democratic preferences and beliefs (Havel, 2007, p. 7). Thus, some have argued that young people tend to embrace cultural and societal changes more easily than older generations (Nikolayenko, 2008). At the same time, it is widely accepted that cultural values and norms, rooted in history and traditions of all societies, are “slow-moving institutions.” For example, adolescents might still be influenced by Soviet images that are part of collective memory in post-communist societies (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010, p. 209).

In sum, examining the nature of young people’s democratic orientation might help (a) describe the diverse range of democratic attitudes and behavioral patterns displayed by adolescents in different countries, (b) examine links between countries’ democratic record and adolescents’ democratic orientations, (c) reframe the research on democratization in terms of inclusion of youth, and (d) identify future directions in the development of societies in transition. In addition, analyses of the relationships between countries’ historical legacies, current functioning of democratic institutions and young people’s democratic orientations may help better describe the factors that influence young people’s decisions to endorse democratic values and principles. This is why investigating the specifics of youth attitudes towards democratic principles across cultures is crucial both in terms of theoretical inquiries and practical implementation. Hence, topics related to adolescents’ democratic orientation are worth researching.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Democratic Citizen Orientation

Many scholars of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation focus on institutions and structures within society that are essential to democratic survival and development (for example, Dahl, 1971, 1998; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003; Diamond, 1997, 1999, 2011; Inglehart, 2000, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Generally, studies that deal with elements of democratic society fall under one of the two broad categories. One stems from a minimalist definition of democracy as a system of “government of the people, by the people, for the people” and deals with formal institutions and mechanisms through which democracy operates. Studies that fall under this category emphasize free and fair elections, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and other structures within social and political domains that, when taken together, create an environment favorable for democratic functioning (e.g., Huntington, 1991).

The other broad group of democratization studies singles out norms and behavior patterns among ordinary citizens as key elements conducive to democratic advancement (Almond & Verba, 1963; Huntington, 1993; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Lipset, 1994; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011c; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Supporters of this position argue for a more expansive definition of democratic society that goes beyond its basic elements and structures. Specifically, attitudes of the general public toward formal structures of democracy along with individuals’ beliefs and behaviors are considered an inseparable component of democratic society. Both classic and modern scholars of
democracy emphasize the importance of public support for and endorsement of
democratic values. For example, De Tocqueville (1838 [2000]) considered democratic
values the foundation of civil society, and voluntary associations, the key to flourishing
democratic institutions. Nearly two centuries later Diamond (2008) wrote, “As a system
of government that requires the consent of the governed, democracy stands or falls with
citizen commitment to its norms and structures” (Introduction, p. x).

The importance of citizens’ values and beliefs for a country’s democratic
advancement was first empirically established by Almond and Verba (1963). They found
a strong link between democratization and attitudes and behaviors displayed by the
general public. Specifically, they claimed that, “… the development of a stable and
effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government
and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process –
upon the political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 498). Easton (1965) further
analyzed how citizens’ adherence to democratic principles affect country’s democratic
functioning. In his seminal work on the role of citizens’ attitudes for democracy, he
established that public appreciation of democracy as a value in itself appears the main
condition that ensures democratic continuity across different periods of economic,
political or social hardships. In a similar vein, Patrick (1996) claimed that constitutional
democracy cannot be a “machine that would go off itself” (p. 4). Rather, he argued,
democracy can function properly only when there is a certain level of public
understanding about ideas of democracy and a widespread commitment to its ideals and
principles.
Since then, a burgeoning body of literature has documented a number of supportive habits and attitudes of the general population that are essential for survival and development of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Eckstein, 1998; Inglehart, 2000; Mattes, 2010; Norris, 1999; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Almond and Verba’s (1963) work on the concept of civic culture laid the foundation for future inquiries into what democracy researchers frequently refer to as democratic culture orientation and what in this research is referred to as democratic citizen orientation. Almond was among the first scholars to offer a systematic overview of individuals’ qualities and values that facilitate democratic development. In his combination of components that matter for democracy, he emphasized such elements as “informed, analytic, and rational” involvement of citizens and their active role in the political and social life of society (p. 160).

Another prominent work on the role of citizens’ orientation for democratic development is a study by Inglehart (1988). Inglehart introduced the notion of a democratic political culture, defined broadly as a set of norms and behaviors that are conducive to democratic development. Specifically, he singled out two components that appeared important for sustainability and development of democratic institutions (a) interpersonal trust and (b) long-term commitment to democratic institutions. According to Inglehart, interpersonal trust appears a “prerequisite to the formation of secondary associations,” and is essential for “the functioning of the democratic rules of the game” (p. 1204). In his later research with Christian Welzel, he expanded these categories to include the following attitudes and qualities of democratically-oriented public: tolerance toward minority groups, interpersonal trust, a sense of well-being, political participation,
and emphasis on postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; 2006). In his subsequent works, Inglehart argued that the course of democratic survival and development is determined by the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens. Additionally, he emphasized the importance of democratically oriented citizenry for a country’s long-term development by claiming that “political culture is a better predictor of the long-term stability of democracy than it is of a society’s level of democracy at any given point in time” (Inglehart, 2003, p. 53).

Tessler and Gao (2009) further explored the concept of a pro-democratic political culture and the role of citizens’ values and behaviors in facilitating such a culture. Specifically, they investigated how citizens in non-Western societies with different histories and varying democratic institutions view elements of democratic political culture. In examining the concept of democratic political culture, they focused on six specific components: support for gender equality, tolerance, interpersonal trust, civic participation, political interest, and political knowledge. Results revealed that although distinct, these elements appeared interrelated and helped promote a democratic political culture orientation among ordinary citizens. In concluding their research, Tessler and Gao (2009) confirmed earlier findings about the significance of citizens’ democratic orientations by noting that successful democratization depends not only on commitment of government authorities to carry out democratic reforms but also on “the normative and behavioral predispositions of ordinary citizens” (p. 197). Of note, Tessler and Gao’s (2009) findings suggest that the relationship between democratic norms and the status of
democracy exists not only in established democracies but that it can also be observed among states that are moving toward democratic consolidation.

Dalton and Shin (2003) also studied democratic aspirations and endorsement of democratic ideals by ordinary citizens as essential ingredients of a democratic society. Specifically, they focused on public support for a democratic form of government and beliefs that democracy is the most effective form of government. In their article reviewing research on democratization and summarizing their work on political implications of public support for democracy, Dalton and Shin concluded that:

The course of democratization, at least over the short term, is more likely to depend on the strategic decisions of national elites than on the responses of citizens to a public opinion survey. But in the long run, a democratic system requires a democratic public to survive and function. (p. 20).

Other researchers have documented the connection between specific components of a democratically-oriented citizenry and various aspects of sociopolitical reality. For example, Gibson (1998) linked tolerance of outgroups with flourishing democracy and argued that the former is an essential ingredient in any democratic society. Inglehart (1999) believed that trust serves as a foundation for democracy and claimed that for a democratic society to function, interpersonal trust among members of society is critical. Similarly, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better government, greater economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the society. According to him, more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with lower levels of trust.
turn, Fukuyama (1995, 2000) claimed that the level of trust among the members of society was a strong predictor of economic success.

Furthermore, according to some political culture theorists, support for democracy appears an important dimension in the quality of democratic institutions (Diamond & Morlino 2005; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). Thus some have argued that attitudes of the public may appear better indicators of a country’s success on a number of social, political, and economic phenomena than traditional measures of a country’s development, such as changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003).

More generally, a number of self-expression values, such as subjective well-being, liberty aspirations, interpersonal trust, and others were found to be related to the extent to which a society has developed an effective democratic infrastructure (Inglehart & Welzel, 2006). Upon examining over 80 societies at various stages of democratic advancement, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) concluded that “mass attitudes have a powerful impact on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions” (p. 17). In more detail, they used data from the World Values Survey and Freedom House ratings to evaluate their arguments and found that such attitudes as interpersonal trust, post-materialist values, tolerance for outgroups, and others were directly related to societal-level democracy. They further suggested that support for democracy is instrumental for spreading democracy across the world. In his conceptual essay on the future of democracy, Diamond (2001) also explored the role of democratic orientations among citizens and concluded that, “One crucial dimension of consolidation involves norms and
beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy, both in principle and as it is embodied in a particular regime (p. 1).

In sum, much attention has been dedicated to researching formal and informal structures and institutions within society as key factors that facilitate processes of democratic transformation and consolidation. Of many elements that strengthen democracy, pro-democratic attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens appear to play a major role. In particular, public beliefs and attitudes toward democracy have been found to be crucial to the processes of democratic legitimation and consolidation (Mattes, 2010; Patrick, 1996).

**Democratic Citizen Orientation and Adolescence**

Because citizens do not suddenly develop democratic orientation when they reach 18 (an internationally recognized age of adulthood), pre-adult years have been identified as an important period in the formation of democracy related attitudes (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978). In particular, developmental psychologists have long singled out adolescence\(^1\) as a critical stage in human development that is particularly suitable for studying the formation and development of a variety of values and beliefs, including sociopolitical attitudes. The theory of Erikson (1968), for example, identified adolescence as a stage in human development typically defined by such processes as identity formation and self-definition.

In general, it has been established that attitudes related to social and political spheres are developed at a relatively young age and not only remain stable in later years,

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\(^1\) The word “adolescence” is of Latin origin, stemming from the verb “adolescere,” which means “to grow up,” as stated in Oxford English Dictionary.
but even “harden” with time (for example, Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002; Sears & Levy, 2003; Uslaner, 2002). According to Bandura (1986), because of the cumulative and continuous nature of human experiences, individuals’ attitudes and behaviors cannot be too dissimilar at different periods throughout a lifetime. Additionally, adolescents and young adults’ skills and capabilities have been identified as approaching those of adults (Erickson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969). In emphasizing adolescents’ potential, some have pointed to rapid cognitive and emotional development and increase in the overall maturity as main characteristics of the period of adolescence (Berman, 1997; Yates & Youniss, 1999).

Not only developmental research emphasizes the significance of adolescence for a person’s development. Researchers from other disciplines have focused on adolescence as a period that has important implications for attitudinal and behavioral preferences of future adult generations. For example, a number of political science theorists documented persistence of adolescents’ attitudes into adult years (Jennings, 2002; Jennings & Niemi, 1973, 1981). The basic premise underlying political socialization studies is that attitudes and behaviors related to political and social spheres develop in young people and persist through adulthood (Sears, 1990). In 1994, Conover and Searing described civic behavior as “a lifelong habit that begins in childhood” (p. 33).

Empirical research has found some evidence in these theoretical claims. For example, political trust, a core component of a democratic citizen orientation, has been documented to be well established by age 14 (Hooghe, 2004). According to Newton and Morris (2000), trust is as a personality trait that is formed in the early stages of
psychological development of individuals and persists throughout life. Uslaner (2002) further suggested that different types of trust are developed at a relatively young age and remain stable in later years. Easton and Dennis (1967) found that by the third grade children have developed a sense of political efficacy, another essential component in the mind of a democratically oriented citizen. In addition, they considered children and young adults important agents in political interaction processes who learn basic democratic norms and values early in life.

Other researchers analyzed the stability of political attitudes between younger and older populations and found that the level of trust in governmental institutions was sustained throughout different developmental periods in person’s life (Hooghe, 2004; Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008). For example, Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008) studied political attitudes and behaviors among adolescents and young adults from eight different countries to determine whether substantial shifts in these attitudes occurred over time. The study found that patterns of political trust were well established by age 14 among adolescents from all participating states and remained similar throughout different points in time. The analysis showed that one particular aspect of trust - generalized trust - was among the most stable attitudes and remained virtually unchanged during adolescence and early adulthood. Specifically, it was found that participants from three age cohorts – adolescents (14 year olds), late adolescents (18 year olds), and young adults (18 to 30 year olds) followed a relatively stable pattern with regard to their trust attitudes.

Furthermore, others have documented children’s understanding of basic concepts pertaining to social and political spheres (Limber, Kask, Heidmets, Kaufman, & Melton,
As highlighted by Melton and Limber (1992), children as young as of elementary school age have basic understanding of rights and responsibilities, including the right to have a say in matters relevant to their everyday activities. Torney-Purta and colleagues (2004) also pointed out to the importance of studying democratic attitudes among adolescents. In particular, they noted that “cognitive understanding of political issues bears a complex relationship throughout life” and that adolescence represents an important period to study it (p. 383). In their cross-country analysis of adolescents’ political engagement, this group of researchers concluded that a certain level of trust contributes to young people’s development of political identity, sense of civic responsibility, and political self-efficacy. Moreover, they concluded that trust in political institutions might provide a foundation for adolescents’ further involvement with political activities. Upon examining children and adolescents’ patterns of behavior in multiple contexts, Larson and Verma (2001) concluded, that “young children and especially adolescents should be considered as resources, active agents of change, and as a group that should be viewed in terms of their enormous potential for having a positive influence on a society” (p. 125).

In the context of societies in transformation, studying adolescents gains additional importance from the point of view of democratic consolidation (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010; Finkel & Smith, 2011, Nikolayenko, 2011). In the words of Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010), “Studying young people is important in the context of establishing democracy and the survival of democracy” (p. 206). Of note, adolescents coming of age at the end of the 20th century in post-communist societies of Central and
Eastern Europe are often referred to as a “unique historical generation” (Macek et al., 1998, p. 548). Growing up in post-communist societies, adolescents not only experienced a world different from that of their counterparts in democratic societies, but also a world that had little in common with experiences of their parents, older peers and even younger generations in the same societies. For many of them, adolescence was defined not only by personal transformations but also by larger transformation processes happening in their societies. As Macek and colleagues (1998) noted, “they [adolescents] were trying to form their own identity during a time when a society as a whole was searching for a new identity” (p. 549).

Adolescents’ democratic orientations are instructive not only with regard to implications for future developments in political and social domains, but they also could shed some light on the current situation in these domains. For example, Garbarino (2011) described children and youths as a “social weather vane,” meaning that they “mirror and internalize what is going on in their society, particularly with respect to issues of authority and norms of civic participation” (p. 444). Not surprisingly, political attitudes of younger generations are often granted much attention in identifying or forecasting social or political changes.

Despite a nearly universal consensus that studies of adolescents hold a significant relevance for the fields of psychology, political science, and other disciplines, this population appears to be understudied in democratization studies in comparison with adults (Hooghe, 2004). A great deal of scientific evidence on democratic orientations, including the majority of the above-noted findings, has relied on surveys and various
research experiments conducted among adults. Similarly, there is abundant research on social, psychological, and other effects of transition on adult population. However, few researchers have investigated how children and adolescents have coped with democratization. Moreover, virtually nothing is known about the nature and characteristics of the adjustment to emerging democratic regimes among adolescents and young adults with no direct experience of a communist rule (Nikolayenko, 2011).

Although research on adolescents’ perceptions of democratic attributes is limited, some important insights can be gleaned from it. Thus, a study comparing adolescents and adults’ conceptions of democracy revealed that adolescents tend to conceptualize democracy from a more self-centered perspective than adults (Menezes & Campos, 1997). In particular, it was established that adolescents associated the meaning of freedom with issues of personal autonomy while the same meaning in both young adults and adults had a more universalistic meaning. Clearly, more research is needed to look into other aspects of democratic attitudes.

Apart from the fact that expanding research on democratic orientations to include adolescents could fill in some blanks in the literature on democratization, there are other sound reasons to investigate adolescents’ democratic orientations based on policy implications of such studies. Specifically, generational differences in regard to political attitudes have been well-recognized and appear important indicators of future developments within a political domain of society (Hooghe, 2004). As Franklin (2004) noted, “The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who react to new conditions” (p. 216). Illustrative in this regard are cross-cultural comparisons
of political engagement among adolescents as expressed in voter turnout have shown that this type of political activity is especially in decline among younger generations (Franklin, 2004; Plutzer, 2002).

In sum, adolescents’ attitudes are of special interest in the discourse of democratic orientations for a number of reasons. First, it has been found that political attitudes are formed during the period of adolescence and remain relatively stable throughout a person’s life course life (Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002). This finding has important implications for policies aimed at fostering democratic values among the general populations. Secondly, adolescents’ attitudes are valuable from the perspective of their reflection of broader social norms and societal values. This is especially important in terms of assessing the status of democratic developments in a specific society and exploring the relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ democratic preferences. Finally, researching youths’ preferences and their views upon certain aspects of socio-political reality have important implications for discerning future social and political orientations of adult population and, therefore, provide better insights into future democratic developments within a specific country. Identifying potential gaps as well as asssents in adolescents’ democratic orientations might help design better policies aimed at fostering the culture of democracy. Barber (1992) argued that democratically oriented citizens are not born but made. In his later statement he added that, “We may be natural consumers and born narcissists but citizens have to be made” (Barber, 1993, p. 43).
Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation

Despite a unanimous agreement on the importance of democratic citizen orientation for democratic functioning, no consensus has been reached in terms of measuring citizens’ appreciation of democracy and their attitudes towards core components of a democratic society (Alvarez & Welzel, n.d.; Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007; Shin 2007; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). As Kaase (cited in Dalton, 2000) noted in this regard almost three decades ago, “Measuring political culture is like “trying to nail jello to the wall” (p. 914). In part, a lack of agreement on how to assess democratic political culture or people’s democratic orientations is rooted in ongoing scholarly and policy debates on how to measure democracy per se (Bollen, 1990; Diamond, 1997; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004).

Generally, a starting point in evaluating the state of democracy in a particular society is to compare the elements of an ideal form of democracy to the features of the society at focus. Thus, little or no disagreement exists in outlining a set of structural elements that constitute an ideal democracy. However, questions related to the degree to which these elements are present in a certain society and, consequently, the degree to which that society can be called democratic are likely to produce varying responses from different scholars, governmental authorities, or policy makers. For example, despite the presence of democratic institutions in most post-communist societies, Rose (2009) argued that “because of the weakness of the rule of law, no post-Soviet regime can be described as a democracy” (p. 14). Others have pointed out to the importance of distinguishing between liberal democracy and other types of democracy, such as multicultural,
consociational, or ethnic democracies (Smooha, 2002; Van Den Berghe, 2002; Zakaria, 1997). Overall, despite a universal consensus on what constitutes ideal democracy, research on concepts of actual democracy is not uniquely defined (Dahl, 1971, 1998; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). The nature and functioning of democratic institutions in society continues to be a subject of many debates that have to do with democracy promotion, democratic transition and consolidation, and other issues.

In attempts to address these concerns, some have adopted the notion of democracy as a continuous variable. According to this view, democracy is present in most countries to varying degrees (Bollen, 1990). As a result, continuous measures of democracy have been introduced and continue to be widely used by a number of agencies and individual researchers. In his article on democracy rankings, Campbell (2008) reviewed four major initiatives that measure democracies in a global context. Specifically, he analyzed methodological approaches and empirical strategies of the four democracy measurement projects (a) Freedom House, (b) Polity IV, (c) Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, and (d) Democracy Index by the Economist. In evaluating strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, Campbell pointed to inconsistent use of democracy indicators, lack of sensitivity in terms of assigning scores to countries, and questioned the validity and unbiased character of selected measures. He concluded that there is still a gap in terms of empirical assessments of the quality of democracy. A

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2 Country reports on democracy functioning in the world are available from Freedom in the World reports and can be obtained online from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
3 For country ratings, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4 Available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/
work by Collier and Levitsky (1996) further illustrates this point. In their review of approximately 150 studies of democracy, they identified over 550 subtypes of democratic societies.

Given a substantial variation in numerous measures of democracy, it is not surprising that research on citizens’ democratic attitudes is just as diverse. Most knowledge of democratic citizen orientation comes from political science studies of support for democracy and public opinion polls. A number of large-scale research initiatives have been launched to measure and track a variety of public attitudes toward democracy, from support for democratic principles and values to evaluations of democratic governance, and others. Among such measures are the World Values Survey (WVS)\textsuperscript{6}, the European Values Survey\textsuperscript{7}, the New Democracies Barometers\textsuperscript{8}, the Pew Research Center\textsuperscript{9}, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)\textsuperscript{10}, and many others. These initiatives were designed to collect information on a number of public attitudes that are relevant for democracy, including how citizens evaluate and relate to democratic institutions in their societies, to what extent mass public understand and adhere to democratic principles in their daily lives, what proportion of citizens support democracy as a form of governance, and related phenomena. These and other initiatives have produced a variety of information related to democratization processes and trends, which,

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\textsuperscript{6} The WVS contains public survey data from the largest number of countries in comparison with other initiatives. Select data from the WVS are available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
\textsuperscript{7} Available at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/
\textsuperscript{8} Available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog4_0.html, http://www.democracybarometer.org/start_en.html
\textsuperscript{9} Data available at http://pewresearch.org/
\textsuperscript{10} More details are available from the ISSP website http://www.issp.org
in turn, has resulted in an array of studies attempting to describe and analyze these phenomena. As Diamond (2001) noted, “Public opinion surveys are opening up an unprecedented analytic window onto the study of the dynamics of democratic regimes, especially what fosters democratic consolidation as opposed to stagnation, instability, or even breakdown.” (p. 2). The challenge is to analyze all the available data in a systematic way. As Schedler and Sarsfield (2004) noted, “If we wish to deepen our knowledge about citizens’ democratic ideas and ideals, the most urgent task is not to collect fresh data, but to re-analyze available data in fresh ways” (p. 8).

Although survey techniques to measure democratic attitudes vary, many researchers have relied on one method, known as a “destination model,” as the basis for their analyses (Rose, 2009). Generally, destination model surveys ask abstract questions about general preferences towards basic ideas of democracy. For example, some destination models evaluate individual or population orientations towards an idealized model of democracy with ideal market economy and other perfect attributes. Other destination approaches utilize questions from studies of older democracies in North America and Western Europe, such as support for democracy, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, trust in democratic institutions, and others (Diamond, 2008).

One of the advantages of using destination models to gauge democratic orientations among the general public is their consistency in terms of research instruments. As a rule, survey questions are phrased in a way that allows for longitudinal as well as cross-country comparisons. Indeed, surveys that rely on destination models provide a common ground for comparing states with varying degrees of democratization.
as well as comparing changes in public opinion over time. However, many have voiced concerns over this method or opposed it altogether as having many limitations. For example, Rose (2009) criticized destination models because of their over-reliance on Western values and failure to consider differences found in cultures other than those in established democracies. Others have pointed out to the fact that the concept of ideal democracy is almost unanimously accepted worldwide and thus fails to explain variation in democratic functioning among different societies (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2006). As Norris (cited in Mattes, 2010) noted, “By the end of the twentieth century, overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal form of government…” (p. 2). In a similar vein, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) argued that overt endorsement of democracy has become almost universal among citizens not only from developed democracies but also across societies with undemocratic regimes. Inglehart (2003) further argued that abstract questions about ideal democracy that generally result in favorable responses lack accuracy and appear of little value in determining public attitudes toward the actual democratic functioning.

Furthermore, in the context of post-communist societies, using ideal democracy as a reference point to gauge population attitudes fails to capture the overall picture of how the public views democracy de facto. As Rose (2009) noted, “destination surveys measure how near or far the values of a population are from goals defined in Western terms. Distinctive features of the Communist legacy are left out” (p. 200). Therefore, employing such a technique may result in an incomplete or inaccurate picture of citizen orientations toward democratic values. In addition, Rose argued that an idealist focus on
democracy fails to account for and explain changes that have occurred in a society, since the starting point for democratization is a regime that lacks many attributes of a representative democracy.

Not only destination-based surveys appear to attract some criticism on the part of researchers or policy makers. Other indicators that measure public support for democracy have been the subject of countless scholarly and policy debates as well. Similarly, many have questioned the validity of numerous democracy indicators and scores that are usually assigned to countries to denote their level of democratic advancement (for example, Campbell, 2008; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). For example, Schedler and Sarsfield (2004) in their programmatic essay on public opinion surveys of democracy analyzed and summarized major challenges that are common for such measures. Overall, they singled out four fundamental problems that arise when interpreting data from surveys that have been designed to measure democratic attitudes. First, they claimed that the so called interviewer effects, a phenomenon the authors equated with the social desirability effect, present a substantial challenge and might compromise the validity of survey data. In other words, the authors claimed that survey respondents may give favorable evaluations of democracy related issues mainly because they might perceive them as recognized social values. Of note, this problem was first addressed by Dalton (1994) who coined the term “questionnaire democrats” to refer to individuals who give such politically correct responses.

The second and third challenges common for survey measures of democratic opinions have to do with the abstract nature of democratic support and democracy per se.
In other words, people understand the concept of democracy and interpret democracy related issues based on their personal values. As Bratton (2002) noted, democracy “can be bent to mean what people want it to mean” (p. 6). Finally, the fourth challenge with using public opinion data to test various theories of democracy or provide empirical measures of democratic preferences deals with conflicting values that individuals might have. An example of such conflicting values is a possible disconnect between political preferences and political values. Thus, one might agree with some fundamental principles of a functioning democracy and reject other, often less overt, assumptions about democratic society. In sum, each of these problems or a combination of them challenges the validity of public opinion polls as measures of democratic attitudes. Schedler and Sarsfield thus concluded that a vast majority of public opinion surveys are “ill-designed to capture citizen attitudes towards democratic ideas and institutions” (p. 8). Similarly, Dalton (2000) wrote in this regard, “Public opinion is becoming more fluid and less predictable” (p. 924).

To respond to some claims that deal with measurement of democratic attitudes, Inglehart (2003) suggested that focus of such inquiries be shifted toward exploring political attitudes and public support for democratic principles beyond those that explicitly mention the most basic elements of a democratic system. Inglehart was among the first scholars to empirically document the link between public support for a democratic way of life and actual democratic indicators at the societal level. Specifically, he showed that individuals’ support for values and principles that did not explicitly relate to democracy was a better predictor of the society’s level of democratic development
than a general positive orientation toward the concept of democracy. Such support attitudes consisted of beliefs related to trust, tolerance, emphasis on self-expression values as well as on subjective well-being, and others.

In his subsequent research with Christian Welzel, Inglehart further established that public support for democratic values were more powerful indicators of a society’s level of democracy than traditional measures from political or economic fields (Inglehart & Welzel, 2006). In particular, they found that citizens’ attitudes and value orientations were significantly related to several key aspects of democratic society, such as the quality of democratic institutions, the status of women and ethnic minorities, and governance effectiveness. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2006) findings have important implications not only for the study of mass democratic attitudes and value orientations but also for the measurement of democracy per se.

In sum, although much progress has been achieved in eliciting the nature and dynamics of democratic orientations among citizens across different cultures, much remains to be uncovered. As Dalton (2000) referred to the state of research on citizen attitudes and political behavior, “Although we have greater scientific knowledge, our ability to predict and explain political behavior may actually be decreasing. . .” (p. 932). Inglehart and Welzel (2006) summarized the state of research on measures of democratic orientations in the following way:

Techniques for measuring public support for democracy are newer and less developed than techniques for measuring gross national product, but the relevant mass attitudes can be measured – and when they are, they turn out to have an
autonomous societal impact that is fully as important as that of economic factors. (p. 3).

**Democratic Citizen Orientation: Core Components**

Although there is almost unanimous agreement on the importance of pro-democratic citizenry for democratic viability, a clear consensus about the structure of democratic citizen orientation is yet to be established (Diamond, 1994; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992; Inglehart, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). This complexity is rooted, in part, in the latent nature of the concept of democratic citizen orientation, which cannot be measured directly but can only be assessed with the help of various measurement tools. Different scholars have singled out different aspects of democratic orientation in efforts to capture individuals’ beliefs and attitudes that are conducive to democratic advancement. For example, Dahl (1971) argued that to make democracy work, citizens need to have congruent attitudes about governmental effectiveness and authorities along with some willingness to compromise. Lipset and Lakin (2004) claimed that for an effective democracy, citizens need to respect the rule of law, differences in opinion, and believe in the legitimacy of a democratic regime. In turn, Schimmelfennig (2000, 2002) emphasized such qualities of democratic public as respect for human rights, equality of opportunity and racial and gender equality.

In short, a comprehensive review of literature from diverse disciplines suggests that there a number of interrelated factors that are believed to be necessary for individuals to contribute to stability and advancement of democracy. These factors range from feelings of internal political efficacy in psychological inquiries to democratic functioning
to perceptions of economic fairness and confidence in public officials. However, there are few studies, especially among youth, that involve all of these ingredients.

Recognizing the highly heterogeneous and often contested nature of democratic citizen orientation and emphasizing its interdisciplinary character, this dissertation limits the analysis of democratic citizen orientations to four components. These separate but interconnected components include the following aspects: (1) civil liberties (2) participatory orientations, (3) political efficacy, and (4) trust. The selected components are important not only because of their potential to strengthen democracy, but also because they shed light on how people treat each other within their communities and the larger society. Moreover, these elements reflect the multi-faceted nature of democratic citizen orientation and, thus, appear theoretically relevant. Finally, they have been frequently utilized in studies of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation, and can be examined with the data available from the ICCS.

The sections below describe the identified core components of democratic citizen orientation in more detail. Specifically, civil liberties component along with its subcomponents are presented first, followed by participatory orientations and political efficacy. The section ends with a description of the nature and significance of trust as another important ingredient in democratic citizen orientations.

Civil Liberties

Appreciation and endorsement of civil liberties has become inseparable from democratic discourse and is often equated with a democratic way of life. Despite differences in the way civil liberties values are understood and studied, scholars from
different disciplines agree that the concept of civil liberties is highly complex. In this dissertation, civil liberties is used as an umbrella term that encompasses self-expression values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance, and respect for diversity. The rationale for focusing on each of these components is presented below.

**Self-expression values.** One of the most robust findings in research on concepts of democracy is the confirmation of the importance of having a voice in government (for example, see Beetham, 1994; Fuchs, 1999; Held, 1996; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Walt Whitman Center, 1997). Freedom of expression is reflective of broader definitions of democracy that emphasize its representative aspect and highlight the importance of creating and facilitating fair conditions for competing for people’s votes (Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 2002). Huntington (1991) argued that freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and other freedoms are essential components of a democratic society in which citizens have an active role. Inglehart (2003) associated self-expression values with Postmaterialist emphasis on civil rights and political participation and argued that the presence of these values in society increases mass demands for democratization.

The right to have a say in political and social matters appears to be an equally recognized value among citizens in states at various stages of democratic development. At the same time, the level of importance attributed to this component varies greatly between societies with emerging democracies and societies with a well-established democratic record.
Of note, a substantial body of research supports the relationship between concepts of democracy and individual rights, justice, and freedom (Moodie, Markova, & Plichtova, 1995). For example, in their study of democratic attributes in Scotland and Slovakia, Moodie and colleagues (1995) found that among the most important terms associated with democracy were value-oriented concepts, such as individual freedom, justice, and individual rights. Similar results were demonstrated in a qualitative study that investigated what democracy means to young people in Greece (Magioglou, 2003). Thus, it was found that freedom, equality and justice, and the principles and procedures of the representative system, such as deliberation or elections, were the most frequently mentioned themes.

**Gender equality.** One of the conclusions from the literature on democratization is confirmation of the importance of equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or race. Positive attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for every citizen, independent of their gender, ethnic or racial origin are at the heart of democracy and reflect the democratic ideal of emancipation and tolerance (Hahn, 1998). Applying the concept of gender equality to democratic functioning, Tesler and Gao (2009) wrote, “Democracy is meaningless if half the citizens of a country do not have equal rights and equal access to political influence and power” (p. 198). In his analysis of democratic attitudes common for Western and Muslim societies, Norris (2003) cited a lack of widespread support for gender equality among the reasons for weak democracy in a number of Muslim societies.
A smaller body of research has been devoted to studying support for gender equality and tolerance towards outgroups among younger generations. In Australia, Kennedy and Mellor (2006) explored several concepts related to adolescent students’ perceptions of diversity and tolerance. The researchers found that female students were more likely to support women’s political rights as well as immigrants’ rights in comparison with male students. The 1999 Civic Education Study (CIVED) used a set of six items to capture students’ attitudes toward women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Both surveys found that females were more supportive of women’s rights than were males; these findings were consistent with the outcomes of other studies (Furnham & Gunter, 1989; Hahn, 1998). The CIVED further revealed that students across countries overwhelmingly tended to agree with statements in favor of and to disagree with statements against equal rights for women. However, students in countries with lower GDP per capita and higher unemployment rates were somewhat less supportive of women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et al., 2001, p. 107).

**Tolerance and respect for diversity.** Central to understanding the equality aspect of democratic citizen orientation is tolerance towards minority groups. A quick review of relevant literature suggests that tolerance is a multidimensional concept that encompasses many beliefs, values, and behaviors that are essential to a functioning democracy. Political tolerance, in particular, refers to citizens' respect for political rights and civil liberties of all groups in society, including those with completely opposite views and ideas (Brody, 1993).
Although researchers differ in their explanations of sources and consequences of effective democratic functioning, there is a general consensus that tolerance of outgroups is key to democracy. For example, Garbarino (2011) viewed diversity as foundation for pluralism, an inseparable part of a democratic society. In turn Gibson (1998) argued that the existence of meaningful opposition requires tolerance of others who have different views or disagree with a certain issue or set of norms. Tessler and Gao (2009) linked tolerance with the legitimacy of democratic regime and considered it the essence of participatory democracy. In similar vein, others considered that tolerance of outgroups may be the “litmus test” of a functioning democracy (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). Moreover, some researchers have adopted a new classification of democratic societies based on whether and in what ways states recognize minorities (Smooha 2002; Van Den Berghe 2002).

In the context of aspiring democracies, tolerance has been found to facilitate democratic consolidation by increasing citizens’ support for democratic regime. In his research on post-communist transformation, Rose (2009) established that citizens who display higher levels of political tolerance were significantly more likely to view democratic regime positively than those who had lower levels of political tolerance. In more detail, Rose found that tolerance accounted for almost a third of the variance in individuals’ support for democratic regimes, after controlling for the effect of other influences.

In sum, an important aspect of democratic orientation consists of valuation of freedoms and liberties as well as attitudes towards various groups in a larger community,
including gender equality and tolerance towards minority groups. Yet, many gaps remain in the literature about the origins of positive attitudes towards minority groups, consequences of gender equality, and related attitudes. Researchers continue to debate individual sources of these values as well as country-level indicators that might account for variation within them.

**Participatory Orientation**

Democratic citizen participation is a broad concept that encompasses a multitude of ways through which citizens can express their attitudes toward the political system as well as toward others within their communities and the larger society. Classic and contemporary scholars of democracy have emphasized the fundamental role of citizen participation in civic and political activities in effective democratic functioning. For example, Dahl (1971) claimed that citizens’ participation in political life is an essential component of democratic society. Indeed, the idea of citizen participation in political and social domains is at the heart of democracy. As Print (2007) noted, “citizen participation is the very raison d’être of democracy” (p. 327). According to Ostrom (1996), civic engagement and association “can be thought of as at the core of what it means to be a democracy” (p. 755). In a similar vein, Schulz, Ainley, and Van de Gaer (2010) viewed participation as “one of the pillars of a democracy whose functioning relies to a great extent on contributions of its citizens to the democratic process” (p. 2). Overall, active participation in social and political life has long been considered “as hallmarks of the good democratic citizen” (Madsen, 1987, p. 580). Thus individual participatory beliefs
and behaviors appear important and theoretically relevant constructs in the study of
democratic citizen orientation.

Generally, the significance and benefits of participation-oriented citizenry for a
democratic system are rarely contested. For the most part, democratization scholars agree
that structures within society that encourage citizen participation are key to sustainable
and healthy development of democratic society (Almond & Verba, 1960; Crick, 1998,
2002; International IDEA, 1999, 2002; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000). Participation and
inclusion of all citizens, including children and young adults has been increasingly
recognized as an essential ingredient in building strong families, communities, and
democratic societies (Smith, 2009). In more detail, specific benefits have been identified
as the rationale for promoting greater citizen involvement in modern societies. For
example, Putnam (1993, 2000) considered citizen participation in terms of positive
outcomes for social relations and linked it with enhanced social capital and cohesion. In a
similar vein, Mascherini, Vidoni, and Manca (2011) viewed individual engagement in
various social and political activities as a “tool for accumulating social capital and
enhancing social cohesion” (p. 791). In turn, the Power Commission, a comprehensive
initiative that sought to re-engage British citizens with democracy, outlined the following
desired outcomes of citizen participation: strengthening the dialogue between higher
authorities and the general public, addressing the increasing influence of undemocratic
forces, promoting political equality among all segments of society, increasing legitimacy
of elected governments, and other outcomes (The Power Inquiry, 2006).
In their review of civic engagement among adolescents in the U.S., Flanagan and Levine (2010) claimed that civically involved youth is important for the functioning of democracy. In more detail, they outlined a number of reasons why participation in civic matters is important to the health and performance of democracy. For example, by participating in community affairs, youth “can contribute their insights to public debates and their energies to addressing these problems” (p. 160). On a national scale, younger generations can be “a force for political change, by bringing new perspectives on political issues and offering fresh solutions” (p. 160). Furthermore, in an international context, youth can “help stabilize democratic societies by directing their discontent into constructive channels.” (p. 160). Other studies (for example, Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995) have emphasized the links between adolescent participation and later involvement as adult citizens.

Importantly, not only civic engagement among youth is important for democracies, but it also is beneficial to younger populations themselves. Among potential personal and psychological benefits of youth involvement, Flanagan and Levine (2010) noted fulfillment of the human need to belong, feeling of larger life purpose beyond the pursuit of individual gain, and others. Additionally, participation in youth organizations was found to have positive effects on internal political efficacy among lower and upper secondary students (Schulz, 2005).

Despite almost unanimous consensus with regard to benefits of citizen participation in social and political matters, there are differences in the way participation is operationalized and measured. One of the challenges of assessing and comparing
citizen participation in different settings or across time is related to the fact that many such measures employ perception based techniques rather than observations of the phenomenon of interest (Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). In addition, another limitation with regard to measuring citizen participation has to do with the fact that “identically-labeled indicators are used in different setting with rather different meanings, and it is therefore challenging to develop consistent indicators that can allow conclusions to be drawn across local, state, and national frameworks” (Cavaye, 2004, as cited in Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011, p. 792).

In addressing these challenges, different scholars have suggested different approaches to measuring citizen participation. For example, Print (2006) proposed a set of three indicators to assess citizens’ overall engagement with political and social matters. First, he focused on civic indicators that included information related to membership in civic organizations, volunteering, participation in community projects, fundraising for charities, and others. Secondly, he singled out a group of electoral indicators that gather data related to voting, involvement in political parties and contributions to political campaigns. Finally, Print distinguished a set of political engagement indicators that consisted of participation in protests, writing petitions (including email and internet engagement), boycotting products, and related activities.

Putnam’s (2000) conceptualization of democratic participation is centered around the theme of civic engagement and is viewed in tandem with social capital. Specifically, Putnam used membership in national organizations and community groups as indicators of citizen participation. Others have distinguished between different forms of citizen
democratic participation. Thus, Kaase (1990) singled out two main types of citizen engagement (a) conventional engagement, such as voting, running for office and (b) unconventional or social movement engagement, such as participation in grass-root campaigns, protest activities, and other less formal activities.

With regard to younger populations, research on participation is less uniquely defined. Given the limitations 14-year-old students face with regard to active participation, behavioral intentions for what they expect to do in the future has emerged as being of particular importance for this age group (Schulz, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 2010, p. 3).

Despite a growing attention to issues of citizen participation in political and social spheres and efforts to promote citizen engagement in many states, democratic participation has been on decline (Dalton, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Schulz, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 2010). Although declining citizen participation is a problem of many modern societies, it has become especially evident in established democracies where fewer and fewer citizens appear be actively engaged in political and social matters (Dalton, 1999). Of note, these negative trends are especially characteristic of younger populations (Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008). For example, in the United States, political scientists and sociologists have been observing the downward trend in youth voting since the 1970s (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009). Exceptions have been 2004 and 2008 presidential elections when youth turnout rate almost doubled (Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009). In their analysis of generational differences in life goals, concern for others, and civic orientation among young adults in the U.S., Twenge,
Campbell, and Freeman (2012) found that today’s young Americans were less concerned with social problems and had less interest in government in comparison with older generations. In addition, they documented that modern young people were less likely “to participate in the political process through voting, writing to a public official, participating in demonstrations or boycotts, or giving money to a political cause” than older generations (p. 12). That today’s youths “are less engaged in civic and political activities than their predecessors were 30 years ago” is supported by evidence from a number of surveys, including National Election Surveys, General Social Surveys (in the United States), that document declines in various forms of engagement among younger populations (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009, p. 1).

Similar observations were made and documented in other developed democracies. For example, in Great Britain, youth participation in national elections presents a similar picture of disengaged youth. The Electoral Commission (2005) documented that the youth vote declined to 37%, the lowest turnout on record. In Canada’s 2000 elections, only 22% of young voters cast their votes (Pammett & LeDuc, 2003). Australia, a country with compulsory voting for all citizens, shows surprisingly low levels of youth voting (Print, Saha, & Edwards, 2004). However, it is important to remember that although important, voting is just one aspect of citizen democratic participation. That is why it is critical to consider other dimensions of citizen involvement that extend beyond voting or other traditional indicators of political involvement.

Others have also documented limited interest and involvement of younger generations in public and political life (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito, & Kerr, 2008).
According to results of a recent large-scale study of young adults by Smith et al. (2011), only about 4% of modern young people are “genuinely civically and politically engaged” (p. 208). Sloam (2007) wrote about young people’s alienation from political and social processes, “The current generation of young people see themselves as individuals distanced from the state and politics, … they [youth] expect less from the state and consequently have a weaker sense of solidarity,” (p. 550). He further noted that is reflected in “the weakening of political socialization and attachment to conventional forms of politics” (p. 550).

Of note, most of the conclusions from the literature on civic participation among different populations have been drawn from empirical studies of established democracies. Information about the nature of individuals’ engagement in social and political activities of countries, other than Western Europe or is less easily available. Especially scarce in this regard is trend data. More generally, Dalton noted about a lack of international data on political behaviors and attitudes of ordinary citizens, “A notable feature for comparative politics is the limited attention to these questions in the non-American literature” (p. 921).

In sum, one of the robust findings of democratization research is that citizen participation is a vital component of a healthy democracy and is essential for its effective functioning (Smart, 2000; UNICEF, 2007). Friedland (2006) summarized the importance of politically engaged citizenry, “in a functioning legitimate democracy . . . citizens do need to vote, follow news, and that solidarity with fellow citizens in some form is necessary” (p. 2). Given that democracy can function most effectively when its citizens
show an active interest in countries’ social and political affairs, the observed declines in young people’s involvement in social and political activities is of concern and should be given more attention.

**Political Efficacy**

One of the key values associated with a democratic way of life is a feeling of political efficacy, a belief that “one has the skills to influence the political system” (Zimmerman, 1989, p. 554). Democratic theorists traditionally have emphasized the importance of citizens’ feelings of efficacy by singling it out as one of the main factors that contribute to the legitimacy of a democratic regime and its stability (Finkel, 1985; Rudolph et al., 2000). Recalling from studies reviewed above, citizens’ confidence in the legitimacy of government is positively linked to societal stability. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that political efficacy would be another influential factor in the functioning of democracy and, thus, a relevant component of citizen democratic orientation.

Early inquiries into the study of political efficacy are essential to the modern understanding of the concept. Researchers from different disciplines have contributed to theoretical accounts of political efficacy. With roots in Albert Bandura’s seminal work on self-efficacy in human behavior, the concept of political efficacy is generally used to denote a positive feeling that “political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). First efforts to operationalize the concept date back to mid-1950s, when Campbell and colleagues developed a scaled measure of political efficacy.
Specifically, they used four statements about individuals’ attitudes toward political processes, including the following items: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does”; "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on”; and "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.” Although Campbell’s conceptualization gained much popularity and was commonly used as a measure of citizen political efficacy, other researchers have adopted slightly different approaches to conceptualizing political efficacy. For example, in an effort to conceptualize political efficacy, Janowitz and Marvick (1956) proposed the term “political self-competence” and Almond and Verba (1963) used the phrase “subjective political competence” (as cited in Madsen, 1987, p. 572). In the 1990s, Bandura applied the concept of self-efficacy to political domain to define a new concept that is rooted in “the belief that one can produce effects through political action” (1993, p. 483). He also established that feelings of political efficacy were context-bound, with individuals displaying different levels of political efficacy, depending on “domains of activities, situational circumstances, and functional roles” (Bandura, 1997, p. 485).

One of the most important features of political efficacy is its multidimensional character. Two commonly used dimensions of political efficacy are (a) internal and (b) external (Anderson, 2010; Bandura, 1993; Finkel, 1985; Iyengar, 1980; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Internal political efficacy refers to a sense of efficacy or control to influence political developments. In turn, external political efficacy is understood in terms of perceptions of the effectiveness of political system or responsiveness of political
figures to the needs of the general public. Although the distinction between internal and external forms of political efficacy is the most commonly utilized classification, it is just one way of addressing the multidimensional character of the concept. Different approaches differentiate between other aspects of political efficacy. Easton and Dennis (1967), for example, singled out three aspects of political efficacy (a) normative, (b) psychological, and (c) a behavioral aspect. They argued that each aspect represented separate but interdependent elements that are key to understanding the nature of political efficacy. In more detail, the normative aspect refers to “the expectation in democracies that members will feel able to act effectively in politics” (p. 26) and that citizens will view their local or national authorities as responsive agents. Psychological aspect of political efficacy identifies “a disposition towards politics, a feeling of effectiveness and capacity in the political sphere” (p. 26). Finally, in behavioral terms, political efficacy has to do with the actual behavior of a given individual or a group of individuals. Easton and Dennis claimed that such a differentiation between three different aspects helps avoid confusion and ambiguity that are often associated with the term.

Apart from theoretical inquiries, political efficacy has been often utilized in empirical studies. In the political domain, the concept of political efficacy has been commonly used in studies of political behavior. Especially numerous in this regard are studies investigating the impact of political efficacy on political participation or lack of thereof. Citizens who display higher levels of political self-efficacy have been found to engage more frequently in various political activities (Abrams & DeMoura, 2002; Finkel, 1985; Rudolph et al., 2000). In turn, it has also been suggested that deficits of political
efficacy can result in alienation from political processes. Importantly, early research has also established the reciprocal character of political efficacy, with feelings of political efficacy influencing a number of feelings and behaviors and vice versa.

Some researchers have investigated the relationship between political efficacy and trust in political institutions. Thus, external political efficacy has been found to be associated with general trust in the functioning of the political system and institutions (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). In addition, evidence was established that individuals who report higher levels of political efficacy are psychologically engaged in political and social matters (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001).

Political efficacy has been a popular concept in comparative research. With regard to studies of transitioning democracies, a few interesting observations are of interest. For example, Rose (2009) analyzed a number of the New Russia Barometer surveys that measured citizens’ political efficacy beliefs and concluded that modern populations in post-communist societies do not perceive themselves as having more influence on government than under the former regime. At the same time, Rose noted that in spite of the continuing lack of political efficacy, the majority of people nowadays believe that the state can no longer control their lives as was the case in the previous regime. Rose’s findings are consistent with earlier research on political efficacy among citizens in transitioning societies that emphasized low levels of political efficacy among the general public. Thus, in his research on the course of democratic transformations in post-communist societies, Krastev (2007) explained that ordinary citizens experienced

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11 The New Russia Barometer has been conducting public opinions surveys in Russia since 1992. More information about surveys is available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html
transitional democracies as regimes where voters “could change governments but could not change policies” (p. 59).

Research on political efficacy among adolescents and young adults is less common in comparison with studies among adults. In part, a smaller body of research on political efficacy among adolescents can be explained by the fact that adolescents have limited opportunities to engage in political activities that contribute to the development of feelings and attitudes associated with political efficacy. At the same time, others have argued that despite some limitations and difficulties in applying political efficacy to study children and adolescents, political efficacy has been identified as a valid construct for children (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Hess & Torney, 1967). In particular, Easton and Dennis argued that “by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude..., which we could call a sense of political efficacy.” (p. 31).

Different scholars focused on different aspects of political efficacy among younger generations. For example, Salomon (1984) investigated sixth graders’ efficacy beliefs about media and found that the former was related to the amount of effort adolescents put into processing information from a specific media source, television or print. In exploring the effect of television viewing on adolescents’ civic participation, Hoffman and Thompson (2009) established a positive relationship between the two variables of interest and also found that it was mediated by adolescents’ political efficacy. Another researcher undertook a cross-cultural analysis of political efficacy among adolescents from five countries (Hahn, 1998). She discovered that adolescents from Denmark and the United States were more efficacious than their peers from Germany,
Netherlands, and England. In addition, Hahn found that adolescents from all countries reported low levels of confidence in their ability to influence explicit political decisions. By contrast, most participants reported high to moderate levels of confidence in influencing governmental decisions made by groups. An interesting gender aspect of political efficacy was documented in the initial analyses of ICCS data, which revealed that male students reported higher levels of internal political efficacy than did female students.

A significant amount of efficacy research among children and adolescents focuses on the role of schools in fostering such attitudes. Most such studies emphasize the formative role of school environment in shaping adolescents’ beliefs, including feelings of political efficacy. According to Bandura (1997), adolescents’ beliefs about their efficacy with regard to political and social situations are related to the extent to which adolescents take part in school activities.

In sum, based on earlier theoretical and empirical inquiries into key conditions necessary for democratic maintenance and development, political efficacy appears to be an important component. Therefore, it is justifiable to include adolescents’ confidence in their ability to make meaningful contributions to political and social in this research.

**Trust**

Few topics receive as much attention in democratization studies as issues related to trust. In general, there is almost a unanimous agreement that some form of trust is required for the growth and development of a democratic society (Fisher, Van Heerde, & Tucker, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer,
2010). The vast literature on trust provides various accounts of the importance of trusting citizenry. For example, Dahl (1971) considered trust among key conditions of effective “polarchy” (democracy) and Inglehart (1999) argued that trust was the foundation of a democratic society. According to Moises (2006), trust appears “necessary social cohesion required by the functioning of complex, unequal and differentiated societies” (p. 591). Other researchers have claimed that trust enhances the legitimacy and stability of the government by linking citizens with government representatives through relevant institutions (Levi & Stoker, 2000). As Blind (2006) noted, “[trust] emerges as one of the most important ingredients upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built.” (p. 3).

A growing body of research on trust has documented various relationships between the levels of trust in society and a number of social, economic, and political phenomena. For example, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better government, greater economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the society. According to him, more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with lower levels of trust. Putnam (1993) considered trust an essential component of social capital and related it to more efficient local governments. Fukuyama (1995, 2000) believed that the level of trust among the members of society was a strong predictor of economic success. A study of trust among students from states at various stages of democratic development showed that students with higher levels of trust were more likely to be involved in civic and political activities than those who were less trusting (Torney-Purta, Richardson, & Barber, 2004). Results of this study also supported earlier claims
that individuals from states with a durable and stable democratic record have higher levels of trust than those from states in aspiring democracies. Norris (1999) used Freedom House ratings to show that trust is higher in states with better records of respect to political rights and civil liberties. In addition to establishing a significant positive relationship between students’ trust and their expected civic engagement, Torney-Purta, Richardson, and Barber (2004) also found that this relationship was complex, with many covariates influencing the direction of the relationship.

Of note, research findings vary on the nature of the relationship between trust and political and civic engagement, which, in turn, are closely related to democratic developments within society (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). There is an ongoing debate whether trusting people are more likely to participate in political life or be passive citizens. A general assumption is that political trust is a necessary foundation on which citizen participation is built (Marschall, 2001; Putnam, 1993; 2000). For example, research by Torney-Purta and colleagues (2001, 2004) indicated that individuals with higher levels of trust were more likely to participate in civic and political activities than those with lower trust levels. Conversely, Uslaner and Brown (2005) suggested that it may actually be a lack of trust that leads to citizen engagement in political matters. In a similar vein, others suggested some mistrust in government may, in fact, be beneficial with regard to citizen engagement and might increase political participation, especially when combined with higher levels of political efficacy (Haste, 2004; Kahne & Westheimer, 2006). Furthermore, Levi and Stoker (2000) in their overview of literature on political trust questioned a widespread assumption that more trusting citizens were
more likely to participate in political activities. They concluded that only in combination with other more influential factors political trust can be equated with engagement in political activities. Hardin (1999) considered trust irrelevant for the functioning of the democratic government. According to him, for trust to emerge, there should be sufficient interest and knowledge on the part of the involved individual towards another individual or an institution. Therefore, Hardin claimed that distant relations often characterizing the relationship between ordinary citizens and the government are insufficient for the emergence of trust.

Despite these claims, political trust is considered an important ingredient in the functioning of modern democracies, regardless of the level of democratic advancement. By contrast, a lack or absence of trust is often viewed as a threat to sustainable development within society. Given the importance of a trusting citizenship for a country’s development, it is not surprising that many researchers and policymakers have expressed concerns about declining levels of political trust worldwide. The World Economic Forum (2002) drew the global attention to alarming declines in public trust in key institutions essential for society’s development. Drawing on the results of a Gallup International survey, conducted in 47 countries and representative of 1.4 billion citizens across the world, the Forum reiterated the fact that trust was at record low levels. Importantly, it was found that out of the 17 institutions that were examined, the principal political institution in each state (parliament, congress, etc.) was the least trusted. Unfortunately, the results of this particular survey did not come as a surprise – over the past couple of decades, political scientists, sociologists, and statisticians have registered a
steady decline in trust attitudes among world’s population (Lenard, 2005). Similarly, surveys conducted among adolescents and young adults show a consistent decline in positive responses to trust-related questions (Blind 2006; Lenard, 2005; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005). In his analysis of trust trends among youths, Dalton (2002) argued that the next generation has a likelihood of being distrusting toward political institutions. Of note, a continuing decline in citizens’ trust is a worrying trend in advanced democracies as well as those states that are at various stages of democratic transformations.

Some concerns over declining trust have been tested empirically and evidence was found that deficits of trust can cause a number of adverse impacts. A substantial body of research has linked declines in trust to various negative consequences for the government and society as a whole, such as political passivity expressed through voting behavior (Jones & Hudson, 2000), tax evasion as an expression of unwillingness to cooperate with the state (Orviska & Hudson, 2003), and excessive and inefficient managerial practices (Ruscio, 1996). In his research on social polarization in Armenia, Harutyunyan (2006) came to conclusion that low levels of social and political trust among citizens go hand-in-hand with low scores of democracy. Similarly, Mishler and Rose (2005) argued that deficits of trust in political institutions might increase support for undemocratic regimes.

In sum, there is an agreement that trust is an essential ingredient in the functioning of modern democratic societies (Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; Torney-Purta et al., 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer, 2010). Citizens with higher levels of trust have been found to be more involved in civic and political actions than those with
less trust in state institutions or authorities. However, more remains to be uncovered with regard to the nature of this relationship as well as the relationship between trust and other forms of democratic citizen orientation, particularly across different age groups and across cultures.

**Democratic Citizen Orientations in Aspiring and Established Democracies**

Over the past several decades, there has been a dramatic increase in democratic developments across the world (Damon, 1998; Geddes, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). The third wave of democratization, a term introduced by Samuel Huntington (1991) to denote a rapid expansion of democratic regimes in different parts of the world, brought many changes to the political outlook of the modern world. A defining phenomenon of this period was a substantial increase in the number of countries that began to be classified as democratic states (Diamond, 1997). Reports from the Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization that has been analyzing and promoting democratic developments globally for over seven decades, are illustrative in this regard. According to Freedom in the World 2011, the latest annual survey of the state of global political rights and civil liberties, the number of countries qualifying as free democracies stood at 87, almost a twofold increase from 1972, when there were 44 free democratic states. Overall, nearly 43% of today’s global population lives in democratic countries.

Changes in the democratic outlook of the world have been accompanied by a surge of interest on the part of scholars who have tried to explore, explain, and predict the course of democratic advancement. In many ways, a starting point of academic inquiries
into the global democratic expansion is a discussion on what democracy means for the
general population and how it is perceived (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1997; 2003a).

Generally, democracy enjoys a predominantly positive image not only among
populations of established democracies in Western Europe and the United States, but in
societies across the world. In present-day Central Europe, unlike in Europe in the 1930s,
there is no ideological alternative to democracy (Krastev, 2007). As Gilley (2009) noted,
“Democracies tend to produce polities that are more stable, wealthier, fairer, more
innovative, and better at respecting rights than any available alternatives” (p. 114). Some
have argued that democracy has become the global dominant regime (for example,
Campbell, 2008) and others consider it an emerging universal value (Diamond, 2008). A
great deal of empirical data supports these claims.

One of the most robust findings from surveys of popular support for democracy is
the persistence of favorable opinions toward democracy as the best form of government
across the globe (Diamond, 2008). Thus upon reviewing literature on democratic
progress in the world and in particular on the way citizens in different regions of the
world view democracy, Diamond (2008) concluded that the majority of citizens in every
part of the globe “consistently avow their support for democracy as a goal” (p. x). In
more detail, based on the findings of the World Values Survey, he documented that
approximately 80% of citizens in every region of the world, including transitioning
societies in Eastern and Central Europe and semi-democratic states in the Muslim Middle
East, show high support for democracy. As noted in a report of the Pew Research
Center’s Global Attitudes Project dedicated to the 20 years anniversary after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, “Eastern Europeans have largely embraced
democratic values. Most want civil liberties, competitive elections and other tenets of
democracy” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009, p. 21).

However, despite the overwhelming support democracy enjoys in the world, it
does not perform in the same way in all of the world’s regions and countries. As Berman
(2010) noted, “the disagreeable, perhaps even tragic, fact that in much of the world the
conditions most favorable to the development and maintenance of democracy are
nonexistent, or at best only weakly present” (p. 145). Rose’s (2009) observation is
particularly illustrative in this regard. He observed that “elections in the majority of post-
Soviet states routinely demonstrate that unfree and unfair practices from the Soviet era
persist through the present days” (p. 114).

Some scholars view public dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy and
a lack of confidence in the future of democracy among the major obstacles on the way to
a successful democratic consolidation (for example, Diamond, 2008). Others have
pointed to high levels of apathy and alienation among the general public as reasons for
deteriorating democratic performance in many modern societies, which adds to
frustration with democracy (Rose, 2004). For example, Flanagan and Sherrod (1998)
expressed concerns with regard to growing disparities on a number of indicators of social
and economic well-being among different population groups and argued that such all-
penetrating inequalities can lead to “civic disaffection and the lack of social integration,”
especially among younger generations (p. 450).
Alternatively, many theorists have argued that a lack of advancement in democratization processes across many societies in transition is related to inability or unwillingness of the general population to adapt to new democratic realities and their general resistance to or even incompatibility with democratic values (Chandler, 2006; Fukuyama, 2001; Huntington, 1993, 1996). In a similar vein, others have expressed an opinion that “people in certain cultures have an inherently weak desire for greater freedoms, economic opportunity, and democratic accountability” (Walker, 2011, p. 2). Indeed, public doubts about benefits and merits of democracy as applied to their societies are among the most commonly cited arguments that seek to explain failures of democratic reforms and a lack of democratic advancement. For example, according to the global survey Voice of the People 2006, citizens in Central European states are most skeptical about the merits of democracy in comparison with citizens in other regions of the world (Krastev, 2007). A persistent lack of tangible improvements in many aspects of social reality resulted in frustration with the whole concept of transition and growing skepticism about current and future democratic development.

Findings from the 2011 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project further support this point. According to this report, less than a quarter of the total population in post-communist countries, such as Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine, give positive assessment of the current state of democracy in their countries. Of note, younger generations are happier with the way democracy is working in their states than are their older counterparts. By contrast, support for democracy as the best form of government is

widespread among citizens in established democracies, although some have warned about declines in favorable attitudes toward democracy in advanced democratic states (for example, Dalton, 2004). At the same time, it is important to note that despite some disillusionment with democratic transformations, people in the majority of post-communist states still value democratic ideals and “embrace key features of democracy, such as fair judiciary and free media” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011, p. 1).

Despite obvious differences in democratic attitudes between citizens in established and aspiring democracies, there are some similarities in terms of their endorsement, or lack of thereof, of key aspects of democratic citizen orientation. For example, political efficacy, an essential component of democratically oriented citizens seems to be in deficit among both citizens in established and aspiring democracies. Thus, according to a report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2009), no modern country has a majority of citizens who agree with a statement “most elected officials care what people like me think” (p. 33). Similarly, hostile opinions towards ethnic, racial, or other minority groups are equally pervasive in established and aspiring democracies. For example, 84% of citizens in Czech Republic have an unfavorable view of the Roma minorities, the same percentage as in Italy (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009). Of note, although many citizens in post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe express negative views of specific minorities in their societies, the majority of them endorse the ideal of a pluralistic society. Thus more than half of citizens in established and new democracies agree with a statement “It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions and cultures” (p. 49).
Overall, despite a voluminous body of literature that focuses on public support for democracy within a specific nation or world region, cross-regional studies of democratic orientations are few (Mattes, 2010). Many scholars and political leaders have voiced concerns over economic and political processes in transitioning countries that might threaten democratic developments or even lead to a return to a totalitarian system (Diamond, 2001; Motyl, 2004; Walker, 2011).

In sum, democracy appears to enjoy universal support and, as Diamond (2008) suggested, the prospects for democracy seem favorable. People in different parts of the world seem to be naturally drawn to freedoms and liberties that accompany democracy as well as to basic values and principles that allow for a democratic way of life. Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of post-communist countries have adopted the democratization agenda over the past two decades. However, the process has produced mixed results with regard to citizens’ acceptance of democratic values and principles. While there are different opinions about why democracy have not yet taken root in some Eastern and Central European societies, a common theme uniting them is that of the communist past. The sections that follow briefly review the literature on historical legacies and examine links between citizen democratic orientation and different types of historical legacies.

Historical Legacies and Democratic Citizen Orientation

The historical legacies literature provides a useful framework for analyzing democratic attitudes among the general public and for comparing them across different regions. Although scholars disagree about the criteria that are used to define a historical
legacy, there is a general consensus that the past matters (Wittenberg, 2010). In the words of Joseph Schumpeter (quoted in Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006):

No decade in the history of politics, religion, technology, painting, poetry and what not ever contains its own explanation. In order to understand the religious events from 1520 to 1530 or the political events from 1790 to 1800 or the developments in painting from 1900 to 1910, you must survey a period of much wider span (p. 25).

In his programmatic essay about the role and impact of history, Tilly (2006) listed a number of reasons why “history matters” and why explanations in political field are not sufficient without a thorough historical analysis of past events, including past regimes. In a similar vein, Eckstein (cited in Dalton, 2000) wrote that, “… political cultures change only gradually and often there is a syncretism between the cultural norms of the ancien regime and the new political order” (p. 915).

Many studies of historical legacies emphasize the impact of past regimes and traditions for the development of contemporary institutions and, less often, behavioral norms and beliefs. Empirical research has documented the consistency with which older institutional arrangements and norms persist into the present (Barany & Volgyes, 1995; Bunce, 2005; Kitschelt et al., 1999). For example, Gibson (2001) argued that the legacy of totalitarianism in Russia manifests itself in people’s continued mistrust of authorities, weak civil society, overemphasis on personal networks and disregard of formal structures, among others. Analyzing the impact of Stalinism on Russia’s contemporary society, Bernhard (1996) wrote that Stalinist legacy still persists in political cultures
across post-Soviet societies and is evident in citizens’ “learned helplessness, receptivity to paternalism, and a confrontational attitude toward conflict” (p. 323). Indeed, upon analyzing obstacles to successful democratization in many transitioning states, Diamond (2008) noted a particularly weak state of the rule of law, which he partly attributed to a generally accepted proposition that informal practices of personal power often “trump” formal institutions and laws (p. 145).

Furthermore, in the case of studies focusing on democratic transitions and consolidation, historical legacies are often linked to failures or successes in the process of democratization (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004; Wittenberg, 2010). For example, in his analysis of Uruguay’s democratic development, Gillispie (1986) proposed that “the degree of restoration of the democratic ancient regime is proportional to the length of the previous democracy’s life, and inversely related to the length of the authoritarian interlude” (p. 193). In their review of post-communist political parties, Kitschelt, Mansfedova, Markowski, and Toka (1999) documented how pre-communist political infrastructure influenced the development of post-communist political arrangements.

Ishiyama (2009) further investigated the role of historical legacies with regard to political party affiliation among citizens in the former Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. Specifically, he studied how and to what extent institutional legacy of the communist regime affected the emergence of a structured party system in different societies. In more detail, Ishiyama sought to establish whether historical legacies help explain the growth of the “red-brown” phenomenon, which he identified as a political movement of extreme right voters who “glorify a national past, are often irredentist or
imperialist …, are intolerant of “aliens,” and oppose globalization” (p. 485). The results revealed that emergence of extreme right political parties and the proportion of extreme right voters was largely determined by previous pre-communist national identities as well as the legacy of the communist regime. Of note, a number of other legacies that Ishiyama included in his analysis, such as the imperial legacy, historical national identities, demographic and geographic legacies, appeared to have no significant influence on the development of political parties. One of the main implications of the study is the confirmation of the long-debated relationship between past and contemporary regimes, and specifically that more recent regime legacies have a greater influence on political arrangements within a state than its longer-term historical legacies.

Overall, a growing body of literature has documented the relationship between democratization progress on the one hand and a country’s historical legacy on the other. For example, in his examination of the course of democratic transitions in the former Soviet Union and East Central Europe, Motyl (2004) divided the societies at focus into three clustered groups according to their overall level of advancement towards democracy. The suggested categories included countries that were classified as (a) market-oriented democracies, (b) dictatorships, and (c) parasitic authoritarian regimes. In providing the rationale for such a classification, Motyl noted that “the emergence and persistence of the three clusters … [are] the product of systemic forces inherited from the communist past” (p. 52). In emphasizing the role of historic legacies for the pace of democratization, he further argued that, “The degree to which the state dominated political, economic, cultural, and social life in a particular communist country determined
the ease with which non-totalitarian institutions, such as those instantiated in democracy, the market, rule of law, and civil society, could emerge in post-totalitarian circumstances” (p. 57).

In a similar vein, Zakaria (2003) emphasized the role of historic legacies for a country’s democratic advancement. Specifically, he argued that societies with no or limited histories of democratic governance face multiple obstacles in developing effective democratic institutions, which may undermine democratizations efforts underway in such countries. More generally, in his seminal work on the role of Lenin’s rule, Jowitt (1992) argued that Leninist legacies, common for all former East Bloc countries in Europe, favor an authoritarian rather than liberal, democratic and capitalist way of life (p. 293).

In summary, one of the most common arguments in the literature on historical legacies and democratic transitions is that characteristics of previous regimes appear important elements in understanding and predicting developments in transitioning societies (Dalton, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Ishiyama, 2009; Kitschelt, 1995, 1997; Minkenberg, 2009; Motyl, 2004). Consequently, many political theorists have relied on various manifestations of historical legacies in their explanations of democratic advancement or stagnation in such states. However, there is no agreement as to what features of a specific regime should be considered. Similarly, questions on how to differentiate between various subtypes within the same regime appear a subject of many scholarly debates.
**Post-communist Legacies**

Although a substantial part of Eastern and Central European community shares a communist past, these historic legacies are not same (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010; Kitschelt, 1995, 1997). Many post-socialist countries that are often grouped together under the umbrella term socialist regime, in fact, varied substantially with regard to their overall level of political and social freedoms, access to the West, attitudes toward market reforms, and other issues (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004). As Rothschild (1989) wrote, “the persistence and resilience of distinct and diverse political cultures within the matrix of common Communist institutions is quite striking” (p. 78). In addition, pre-communist histories of these societies are diverse, with a number of distinct characteristics in political, social, economic, and cultural domains. As Barany (1995) noted with regard to people in post-communist societies, “The people of this region possess widely different cultures, traditions, histories, levels of economic development, and patterns of social relations” (p. 289). That is why it is important to distinguish between various regimes types.

One of the most comprehensive analyses of communist regimes and their influence on the development of democratic institutions in post-communist societies is work by Kitschelt (1995, 1997). Kitschelt introduced a classification of socialist regimes based on the overall restrictiveness of party systems as well as on the extent of powers exercised by the communist party elite. More specifically, he argued that communist regimes varied with regard to the following three criteria: (a) the degree of “contestation” over political issues and beyond, (b) the extent of expressing political dissent within a
party, and (c) the level of bureaucratic professionalism. Based on these criteria, Kitschelt distinguished between three types of socialism: *accommodative, patrimonial*, and *bureaucratic*. Importantly, Kitschelt emphasized the importance of political arrangements that preceded communist regimes. He argued that pre-communist experiences had an influence on the communist regime, which ultimately has an impact on contemporary arrangements in social, political, and economic spheres.

Although comprehensive from the political standpoint, Kitschelt’s typology has been criticized for its exclusion of issues that extend beyond the political arena. Thus Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) argued that analysis of communist regimes is not complete without an adequate review of economic and social aspects of the communist reality. Taking into consideration two additional criteria – the level of economic freedom and the overall restrictiveness of the regime, Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon modified Kitschelt’s classification to account for these differences. Borrowing Kitschelt’s labels for different regimes, they proposed an alternative typology that included four categories:

(a) Accommodative communist legacy – some freedoms, some dissent, some access to west; medium to low overall restrictiveness; market-oriented

(b) Bureaucratic – high level of bureaucratic institutionalization, little political freedom, medium to high restrictiveness;

(c) Patrimonial – low levels of bureaucratic professionalism, no political or economic freedoms, no access to the West, high restrictiveness and isolation;
(d) Yugoslav – self-management, free movement to the West, desire for independence from USSR ideology and its political influence, intermediate levels of contestation, and some dissent.

**Connecting Historical Legacies to Democratic Citizen Orientation**

Comparative research of trajectory of democratic states has shown that historical legacies appear important components in explaining country’s political, social, and economic outcomes (Motyl, 2004; Tilly, 2006; Wittenberg, 2010). However, the link between a country’s communist legacy and current or future democratic orientation of its population is a subject of many scholarly debates. There is little systematic research on how different population cohorts are affected by historical legacies. Even less is known about the role of various legacies on shaping democratic orientation of ordinary citizens, including younger citizens with no direct experience of living under communist regime. Rose (2009) denoted the state of the literature on historical legacies and individual’s values and beliefs in the following way, “Although devoid of generalizability, ethnographic studies serve as a reminder that attitudes and habits formed in the old regime can and do persist” (p. 200).

In speculating about implications of the communist past, Barany (1995) pointed out, “Although the Communist political institutions have been discarded with remarkable ease in the majority of East European states, the legacy that appears to be the most difficult to overcome is attitudinal rather than institutional or structural” (p. 291). He further noted that political apathy of the population in post-communist societies coupled with low levels of political sophistication and general withdrawal from politics has
created a backward political culture in the whole region. As Bermeo (1994) noted in this regard, “communism left behind a distrustful, nondemocratic civil society” (p. 160). In a similar vein, Konrad (cited in Barany 1995) wrote, “What will remain of socialism? All these socialist realist people. They are socialists because they have lived with the socialist reality for forty years; the majority for most of their lives. The lessons, traits, style, morality, and logic of these forty years cannot be dropped in the waste basket” (p. 177). In acknowledging the persistence of historic legacies, Rose (2009) noted that “the experience of being socialized into a totalitarian regime could last a lifetime” (p. 19).

Although few empirical studies have evaluated the above-stated claims, there is growing evidence that historical legacies have far-ranging consequences on various aspects of institutional and personal well-being. For example, Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) studied how the legacy of past regimes affected the level of political and interpersonal trust among young people in post-communist societies and in established democracies. Specifically, they examined how different types of communist regimes affected the degree to which young people in transitioning states placed trust in political institutions and in other people. The study tested the main proposition that more restrictive regimes will have a negative impact on trust displayed by young people in respective societies in comparison with regimes that allowed for some freedoms. Four types of communist legacies were included in the analyses (a) accommodation, (b) bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) Yugoslav legacy. An important premise of their study is a consideration of trust as a “slow-moving institution” that is rooted in cultural norms and societal values that are transmitted from generation to generation.
In general, results supported the hypothesized relationship by showing that the legacy of socialist regime in all transitioning states led to lower trust in political institutions in comparison with states with no experience of socialist regime. In addition, the study partially supported the hypothesis that different types of socialist regimes affected trust to varying degrees. Thus respondents from states with legacies of patrimonial socialism had lower trust than respondents from accommodative socialism regimes. Interestingly, former Yugoslavian regimes were documented to have a larger negative effect on trust in comparison with other types of socialist regime. However, other varieties of socialism were not significantly different from each other in their influence on trust among younger populations. In sum, the study revealed that young people from former patrimonial socialist regimes displayed the lowest levels of trust, followed by people in former bureaucratic regimes. Young adults from states with the legacy of accommodative socialist regime had the highest level of trust among all other states but lower than their counterparts from Western democracies. Overall, the study documented heterogeneous impact of socialism on trust among people from post-communist societies and reiterated the importance of including historical legacies in analyses of democratically relevant attitudes. Moreover, the study further confirmed the significance of differentiating between different regime types.

To sum, although voluminous literature described the role of historic legacies on socio-political developments within a society or across regions, less commonly examined are the effects of different legacies on citizens’ values and beliefs, especially among younger generations. In the context of post-communist states, information is especially
scarce about the impact of historical legacies on young people who grew up without a direct experience of the communist regime (for exceptions see Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010).

**Democratic Institutions and Democratic Citizen Orientation**

An alternative approach to analyzing factors influencing democratic citizen orientation deals with more immediate conditions of democratic infrastructure rather than deeply-rooted cultural norms or historical memory. According to the supporters of this approach, institutional characteristics of contemporary democratic institutions can promote or impede public endorsement of democratic orientation (for example, Anderson & Guillory, 2003; Norris, 1999). A general assumption of institutional theories of democratic support is that public perception of the effectiveness of democratic functioning is key to favorable opinions about democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2001). In other words, the sources of favorable opinions on issues relevant to democracy are found within democratic performance itself, rather than in outside forces.

The overarching question guiding research on institutional determinants of public support for democratic principles can be phrased in the following way: Which institutional characteristics can impact the way individuals view democratic principles and ideas? Different scholars provided different explanations to this question. For example, Inglehart (1997) linked favorable economic conditions with better democratic functioning and higher support for democratic values. Norris (1999) used Freedom House rating scores to show that trust, an important component of democratic citizen orientation, is higher in states with better records of respect of political rights and
liberties than in states that score lower on measures of respect of political rights and liberties. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) documented a negative correlation between the level of corruption in society and citizens’ trust. This finding suggests that public endorsement of specific elements of democratic citizen orientation influences and is being influenced by individuals’ perceptions of the fairness of relevant societal institutions.

At the same time, despite the fact that support for democracy appears at the core of political science research, studies investigating the relationship between citizens’ support for democracy in a broad sense and democratic functioning are relatively new. For many years, noticeably absent from the majority of theoretical inquiries and practical interventions has been reliable evidence on what people actually think about different aspects of democratic society and how such views vary across generations and across different regions of the world (Mattes, 2010). Especially scarce such information is with regard to states that are moving toward democratic consolidation. In concluding remarks to his presentation “How People View Democracy: Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions,” Diamond (2001) noted, “despite the extraordinary outpouring of data over the past decade, the comparative study of how mass publics in emerging democracies view and value their institutions is only now emerging into a more mature phase” (p. 19).

In sum, according to institutional approaches, individuals display varying levels of endorsement of democratic orientation based on the context in which democratic institutions function. The specifics and direction of such institutional effects are not clear,
however. Thus, no consensus has been established in terms of concrete features of institutional design that might foster democratic citizen orientation. Moreover, no research has established causal relationship between democratic functioning and democratic citizen orientation. That is, it is not yet known whether favorable democratic functioning causes people to value democracy and its principles or whether people’s appreciation of a democratic way of life leads to democratic advancement.

**Summary**

Summarizing findings from selected studies reviewed in the sections above, it can be stated that a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches have established the importance of studying democratically relevant attitudes and behaviors and advanced our understanding of how these phenomena might contribute to democracy promotion and consolidation. In general, research on democratic citizen orientation has focused on several core areas: (a) different aspects of democratic orientations and how to measure them, (b) implications of democratically-oriented citizenry for a country’s political, social, and economic development, (c) comparisons of behavior patterns between pro-democratically oriented citizens and those who are less democratically inclined, and (d) historical and institutional influences on democratic citizen orientation. While some areas have received considerable attention from scholars interested in democratic orientation, other areas have been understudied. For example, a great deal of research on democratic focuses on the relationship between democratic functioning and support for democratic governance or seeks to understand how various country characteristics, such as political regimes or economic prosperity, influence democratic attitudes. At the same time, very
little systematic research has examined the relationship between democratic orientation and democracy at the societal level (exceptions, see Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2006)

In addition, the literature on adherence to democratic principles and norms lacks a comprehensive examination of cross-cultural variation in democratic orientations among youth. Many theoretical inquires that have shaped a significant amount of research dedicated to the study of transitioning societies have primarily been tested among adult populations in emerging democracies. However, few studies have examined relevant attitudes, values, and beliefs among younger populations in transitioning societies. Even less common are comparative analyses of such attitudes among youths from societies in different stages of democratic transformation.

Thus, the identified gaps in the literature raise the following questions: What factors best describe adolescents’ democratic orientation? How do these factors relate to adolescents’ countries of origin? How are democratic orientations distributed among adolescents in emerging and established democracies? How can we explain the differences found across and within countries? And, finally, does adolescents’ democratic orientation matter for a country’s long-term democratic outlook? These are the main questions guiding this dissertation. The Chapter that follows outlines the specific research questions and anticipated hypotheses and describes the data and the methodology that are used to address these inquiries.
CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODS

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Although there are many expectations and predictions made in regard to aspiring and established democracies, there is a lack of research to guide practical interventions that might foster democratic development (Dalton, 2004; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Sloam, 2007; Stewart, 2009a, 2009b; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Additionally, many gaps remain in the literature on the nature of democratic orientation among the general public. For example, some important aspects of democratic citizen orientation, including developmental and cultural determinants of pro-democratic attitudes, have been neglected (Mattes, 2010). Consensus is also yet to be established on the relationship between historical factors and the degree to which populations endorse democratic values and the degree to which institutional characteristics influence democratic beliefs (Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005). Finally, there is a lack of research on democratic attitudes and public support for democratic values beyond those that explicitly mention the most basic elements of a democratic system (Inglehart, 2003). Especially scarce is information about democratic orientations among younger generations.

The present dissertation addresses these gaps by providing information on the democratic orientations of adolescents from states with varying economic, political, and social situations. The main goal of this dissertation is to describe and analyze democratic orientations among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies. Specifically, the dissertation compares how adolescents’ democratic attitudes differ based on the
historical legacies of the countries in which they reside and based on the quality of
democratic institutions within their countries.

This research was conducted in two stages. In the first stage a number of analyses
were carried out to prepare the dataset for statistical tests. Specifically, questions related
to the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation as well as reliability of
derived measures were explored.

The main research questions were addressed in the second stage. To organize
statistical analyses and help with the interpretation of findings, research questions and
hypotheses were subdivided into three sections. Section one describes how adolescents in
aspiring and established democracies differ in terms of their democratic worldview.
Section two examines the impact of historical legacies and the quality of contemporary
democratic institutions on each of the identified factors of adolescents’ democratic
orientation. Finally, section three explores the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientation and their intentions to participate in social and political activities
upon reaching adulthood.

Stage I: Dataset Preparation

Research Questions:

1. Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of ICCS data reliable
tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents from selected
countries?

2. What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?
Stage II: Hypotheses Testing

Section 1: Describing differences in adolescents’ democratic orientations

Research Question 1:

How do democratic orientations compare among adolescents from different countries?

Hypothesis 1:

There are significant differences in democratic orientations among adolescents from different countries.

Research Question 2:

Are there significant differences in democratic orientations between adolescents in aspiring and established democracies?

Hypothesis 2:

There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies in terms of their democratic orientations.

Section 2: Examining variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations

Research Question 1:

What is the relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation?

Hypothesis 1:

There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation.

Research Question 2:
What is the relationship between a country’s history of communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation?

Hypothesis 2:
There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of communism and adolescents’ democratic orientations.

Research Question 3:
To what extent are there significant differences in adolescents’ democratic orientation related to historical legacy?

Hypothesis 3:
Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientation differently.

Hypothesis 3a:
Adolescents in states with a Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic or an Accommodative communist legacies.

Hypothesis 3b:
Adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with an Accommodative communist legacy.

Hypothesis 3c:
Adolescents in states with an Accommodative communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of democratic tradition.
Research Question 4:

What is the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their societies?

Hypothesis 4:

There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation.

Research Question 5:

Is historical legacy or the quality of current democratic institutions more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation?

Hypothesis 5:

Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions of their countries.

Section 3: Exploring the potential consequences of democratic orientations

Research Question 1:

To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation predict their intentions to participate in future social and political activities?

Hypothesis 1:

The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the higher their intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.

Bonus Research

Bonus Research Question: Can adolescents be classified into distinct groups based on their democratic orientation?
Hypothesis: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on their democratic orientation.

**Data Sources**

To answer research questions and test the posed hypotheses, data at different levels are needed. Specifically, exploring the nature of democratic orientation among adolescents requires individual-level data on values, beliefs, and behavioral intentions. The main data source was the International Civic and Citizenship Study (2009). In turn, assessing country-level correlates of adolescents’ democratic orientations requires aggregate measures of historical legacies and measures of the quality of democratic institutions. The Quality of Democracy Index, a measure of the Quality of Democracy project was used to measure the quality of democratic institutions. To measure historical legacy, a modified version of Kitschelt’s (1995) typology of communist regimes was used.

**Background on the IEA Civic Education Studies**

Established in 1958 as a consortium of educational and social science research institutes, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) has been conducting studies of civic knowledge among adolescents from different countries since the early 1970s. The first study took place in 1971 and tested about 32,000 students from nine countries. The second wave of the study, known as the IEA Civic Education Study (CIVED), was initiated in the late 1990s and expanded its pool of international participants to include 90,000 students from 28 countries in different regions of the world. The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) presents
the third wave of a large-scale IEA initiative and is the largest international study to date to explore civic knowledge and attitudes of secondary school students in an international setting. Conducted in 2009, the ICCS gathered data from more than 140,000 adolescents in over 5,300 schools from 38 states in Europe, Asia, South America, and other parts of the world. The ICCS 2009 target population was students in the eighth grade or an equivalent grade that represents eight years of schooling. The average age of students in the 8th grade or equivalent was 13.5 years. Original datasets contained data for over 3000 students selected at random in approximately 150 schools in each country (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 2011).

Rigorous design of these multi-phase research initiatives and availability of data comparable across cultures and, in some, cases, between different points of time, has attracted much scholarly interest. Researchers from a variety of academic disciplines, including civic education scholars, political scientists, psychologists, and country specialists have analyzed IEA data from civic education studies (for example, Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz & Sibberns, 2004; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010).

This dissertation utilizes data from the most recent study, conducted in 2009. The ICCS International Database offers researchers and analysts a rich environment for examining student achievement in civic knowledge across nations. Rooted in the concepts of ecological theory of human developments, the ICCS is provides a coherent framework for analyzing adolescents’ civic knowledge and covers a wide range of topics relevant for the study of democratic attitudes. The dataset contains data that are
segregated into separate parts, according to each of the many aspects of democratic political culture – from tolerance toward outside groups and gender equality attitudes to participatory aspirations and trust in governmental institutions.

The main goal of the 2009 ICCS parallels those of the previous waves and aims to examine young people’s attitudes and beliefs about society as well as their expectations for undertaking citizenship roles and responsibilities in the future. In general, six broad research themes are studied: (a) variations in civic knowledge across cultures; (b) changes in civic knowledge since 1999; (c) students’ interest in engaging in public and political life and their disposition to do so; (d) perceptions of threats to democracy and civil society; (e) features of education systems, schools, and classrooms related to civic and citizenship education; and (f) aspects of students’ backgrounds related to the outcomes of civic and citizenship education.

Although ICCS builds on previous IEA studies of civic knowledge, there are a number of unique features that were introduced for the first time during this third wave. One such feature is the inclusion of regional modules in the design of questionnaires and other research instruments. Thus three regional modules - Asian, European, and Latin American, were developed to assess specific regional characteristics in the spheres of civic and citizenship education in 38 countries.

The ICCS design is structured around three main dimensions (a) content dimension that details the subject matter within civics and citizenship domain, (b) affective-behavioral dimension that measures students’ perceptions and activities, and (c) cognitive dimension that describes the thinking process (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito,
& Kerr, 2008). Each dimension is further subdivided into smaller sub-domains, that in turn consist of one or more aspects. This dissertation focuses on the affective-behavioral dimension consisting of value beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors within the context of civics and citizenship. The rationale for focusing on the selected attitudes is their conceptual relevance to the study of democratic values and beliefs.

The ICCS study utilized a randomized trial design that included not only adolescents but also teachers and school principles. A variety of methods were used to collect data, including a self-reported questionnaire with multiple choice items, right and wrong answers, and attitudinal scaled questions without right or wrong answers. Two types of instruments were developed to gather information from participating students. One is a student test that measures civic and citizenship knowledge and understanding of basic concepts. The other instrument represents a questionnaire that assesses students’ perceptions of ideas, constructs, and behaviors relevant to the civic and citizenship domains.

**Theoretical Framework**

A sophisticated theoretical model has been developed to organize, analyze, and explain information collected for the study (Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). ICCS theoretical framework builds on the CIVED conceptual model and reflects its major principles. In more detail, the model is based on theories of ecological development (Bronfenbrenner, 1988) and situated cognition (Lave & Wenger, 1997). By merging these two theories, the model represents “a visualization of ways in which the everyday lives of young people in homes, with peers, and at school serve as a ‘nested’
context for young people’s thinking and action n the social and political environment.” (Amadeo et al., 2002, p. 21). In addition, separate elements from political socialization theories (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998) and research on democracy (Dalton, 2000) along with relevant theoretical insights from a variety of other disciplines have been integrated into the model as well. As a result, the IEA comprehensive theoretical framework virtually presents a model of a civic world where every individual student occupies a central position and acts as both initiator and recipient of multiple actions within this world (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2008). Central to this framework is the assumption that youths learn about civics and citizenship in multiple contexts outside school and classroom instruction, such as through their interactions with civic players at different levels.

Three broad domains were selected to guide the research project. They included democracy, national identity, regional and international relationships, and social cohesion and diversity. Additionally, a domain related to economics and media and environment was introduced to test democratic knowledge and civic attitudes among upper secondary students (Amadeo et al., 2002). Each of the domains contained a number of sub-domains for a more complete assessment of variables of interest.
Figure 1: Theoretical Model of the ICCS and CIVED Studies

Source: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study: Assessment framework (Schulz et al., 2008).

**Dataset Development**

As described above, the International Civic and Citizenship Study is the largest international study to date that contains information about adolescents’ citizenship knowledge and civic values, including democratic orientation (Schulz et al., 2010). Specifically, the ICCS student questionnaire provides individual-level data relevant to adolescents’ democratic orientation, such as tolerance of outgroups, support for
democratic values and freedoms, adolescents’ trust in governmental authorities and others people, and other attitudinal measures.

Although datasets are available for 38 countries, this dissertation limits the analysis to 20 states that represent established and aspiring democracies. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on the European module that consists of 24 countries (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz, & Burge, 2010). The majority of the countries included in the analyses are European states and members of the European Union with the exception of Norway, Russia, and Switzerland. In addition to varying degrees of democratic advancement, a number of indicators at social, political, cultural, and other levels distinguish these countries and thus provide a rich context for comparing them. Theoretical and practical reasons guided the selection of countries. The practical considerations included availability of data at the country level that would enable meaningful comparisons between different states. The theoretical considerations included regional variations and system-level characteristics in the socio-political sphere that allow cross-national comparisons. Additionally, a variety of measures used to assess the state of democracy in regions across the world utilize a similar approach to classifying countries.

To make the dataset more manageable, sample reduction analysis was carried out. Specifically, 33% of all cases were randomly selected in each country and the reduced samples were then pooled together into a single dataset resulting in 21,672 cases to be analyzed.
The ICCS Research Variables

The student portion of the ICCS consists of a test of 80 items that assess civic knowledge and a 121-item student questionnaire that focuses on adolescents’ attitudes and values in the spheres of citizenship and civic engagement (Schulz et al., 2010). In more detail, the ICCS student questionnaire consists of a collection of background, civic knowledge, and attitudinal questions that provide insights into adolescents’ worldview on issues related to democracy and civil society. As part of the initial analysis of the ICCS data, several scales were constructed to help assess students’ attitudes in the spheres outlined above. Altogether, 19 scales were developed to assess students’ attitudes in the four domains (a) value beliefs, (b) attitudes, (c) behaviors, and d) behavioral intentions. All scales were constructed with the help of confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory (IRT) methods. The original scales had a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10.

This research utilizes selected attitudinal scaled items that have the most relevance to research questions prompted by the literature review. In addition, a few background variables are utilized to supplement the information obtained from scales. This section describes in detail the variables utilized in this research. Specifically, the following ICCS variables are described: demographic variables, support for democratic values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance towards outgroups, participatory orientation, trust attitudes, attitudes towards one’s country, internal political efficacy, and interest in social and political issues. In addition, Appendix A provides details about the specific wording of each instrument.
Demographic Variables

A number of ICCS questions in the students’ test gathered socio-demographic information about adolescents. Despite a large number of background variables available for analysis, this study limits demographic characteristics to two specific measures - gender and socioeconomic status. Gender presents a dichotomous variable, with 0 representing male respondents and 1 denoting female respondents. Students’ socioeconomic background was assessed using the reported number of books in the home. Specifically, the item measuring the variable of interest was phrased in the following way: “About how many books are there in your home?” (There are usually about 40 books per metre of shelving. Do not count magazines, newspapers, comic strips or your schoolbooks.) The answer options included six categories, ranging from 0 to ten books to more than 500 books. Previous analyses of other IEA studies have utilized this variable as a measure of socioeconomic status and have consistently found it to be a valid indicator of family background (Richardson, 2003; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).

Support for Democratic Values

Unlike other democracy-related concepts reviewed in the sections above, support for democratic values is directly linked to democratic citizen orientation and thus appears especially pertinent in the study of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Data from the ICCS contain a number of individual items and scaled measures of students’ attitudes toward democratic values and principles. Specifically, the student questionnaire contained nine questions that measured student beliefs about democracy. Items represented a series of statements about what a democratic society should be like.
In this research, support for democratic values was assessed using a scaled measure of five items. Some statements included in the scale were phrased in the following way: “Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely”; “All people should have their social and political rights respected”; “All citizens should have the rights to elect their leaders freely,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each of the items using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted strong agreement and 4 indicated strong disagreement. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater endorsement of basic democratic values. The scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency both in relation to individual countries and with regard to the average international sample. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the international ICCS sample was 0.65 and ranged from 0.56 to 0.78 for individual countries.

**Gender Equality Attitudes**

A portion of the ICCS assessment framework focused on equal rights attitudes, including gender equality beliefs. Seven questions about the role of men and women in society and their rights were included in the questionnaire. Sample issues included the following phrases: “Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs”; “Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government”; “Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students rated their agreement with each of the statements on a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 4 strong disagreement.
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed a one factor solution with six items grouped together into a scale of adolescents’ support for equal gender rights and responsibilities. The scale demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .79) for the ICCS pooled international sample. ICCS country reliability coefficients ranged from .67 in Russia to .87 in Finland. Higher scores on the scale indicate greater endorsement of gender equality rights.

**Tolerance toward Outgroups**

Two separate scales measured adolescents’ attitudes toward minority groups (a) tolerance toward immigrants, and (b) tolerance toward ethnic groups. Both are described in detail in the sections below.

**Tolerance toward immigrants.** Five statements about immigrants were used to construct a scale assessing adolescents’ attitudes towards this group. Sample items in this scale included the following: “Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own language”; “Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have”; “Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the country has,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate the degree to which they agree with each of the statement on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 4 strong disagreement. Reliability statistics of the instrument showed it was a reliable measure of adolescents attitudes toward immigrants, with reliability coefficients ranging from .89 to .50 in individual countries. Cronbach’s alpha for the ICCS pooled international sample was .80.
**Tolerance toward ethnic groups.** Another measure of adolescents’ attitudes toward minority groups dealt with students’ views on the rights and opportunities available for ethnic and racial groups in their societies. Sample statements developed for this purpose included: “All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get a good education in <country of test>”; “Schools should teach students to respect members of all ethnic/ racial groups,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students rated their agreement with each of the five statements, further used for the scale construction, using a 4-point Likert-type. The instrument demonstrated high internal consistency for the ICCS international pooled sample and individual countries, with alpha coefficients of .83 and up to .91, respectively.

**Participatory Orientation**

The ICCS study included 12 items that were designed to measure adolescents’ opinions about importance of different forms of citizen participation. Results of initial confirmatory factor analyses suggested a two-factor structure of students perceptions of citizen participation. Thus two scales were developed to assess these perceptions (a) support for conventional citizenship participation, and (b) support for social movement citizen participation.

**Support for conventional citizen participation.** This scale consists of six items that include statements about different kinds of conventional citizen participation. Students were asked to indicate their perceptions of importance of each form of participation/ behaviors using a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 stood for “very important” and “4” denoted “not important at all.” The question was phrased in the
following way: “How important are the following behaviors for being a good adult
citizen?” Sample behaviors ranged from following political news and engaging in
political discussions to voting in national elections and joining a political party. The scale
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .71 for the
ICCS pooled international sample and up to .77 for individual states.

**Support for social movement citizen participation.** Questions that measured
adolescents’ appreciation for social movement citizen participation dealt with less
traditional forms of citizen involvement, such as participating in activities that focus on
benefiting local communities, protecting environment, or promoting human rights (see
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Altogether, four items were included in the
scale. The scale appeared a reliable measure for the ICCS international sample
(Cronbach’s alpha = .74). Reliability coefficients for individual countries ranged from .51
to .81.

**Trust Attitudes**

As part of assessing adolescents’ civic value beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the
affective-behavioral domain, the ICCS included the measurement of trust in political and
civic institutions. The student questionnaire contained a number of items used to assess
students’ confidence in civic and political institutions in their country. These items
consisted of a series of questions about various institutions in a country of test, such as
courts, the national government, political parties, police, and others. Students were asked
to indicate the degree to which they trust each of these institutions. A Likert-type
responses with four categories were used to get this information. Responses ranged from
1 – completely trust to 4 – not at all trust. Out of 14 items available for analysis, six questions were scaled to assess students’ trust in governmental and related institutions. The scale demonstrated high internal consistency for the ICCS pooled international sample, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82. Reliability coefficients for individual countries ranged from 0.78 in Latvia to 0.89 in Sweden.

Similar to other scaled measures, the Rasch Partial Credit Model was used for creating a scale of trust in civic institutions. As a result, a scale with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 was developed for all equally weighted ICCS national samples (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke, 2011). The higher values on this scale denote greater levels of trust placed in civic and political institutions. It is important to note that although scale scores could be interpreted in terms of comparing individual or group scores with each other or with the ICCS average, the individual scores do not reveal any information about the item responses per se. Thus, it is impossible to use the obtained score for evaluating the extent to which respondents endorsed each particular item that comprised the scale.

**Attitudes towards One’s Country**

The ICCS instrument contained a series of items to explore how students feel about their countries. Out of eight items originally developed to measure students’ attitudes towards their countries, seven were used to form a scale. The scale contained statements about students’ pride in the past and present achievement of their countries, respect towards state symbols, and perceived effectiveness of state institutions (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students’ rated their agreement with each
of the statement using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 4 denoted strong disagreement. The psychometric information obtained for this scale showed that it was a reliable tool for analyzing student data from both the ICCS international pooled sample and individual states, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .82 and up to .88, respectively.

**Internal Political Efficacy**

Assessment of adolescents’ internal political efficacy was made using a 6-item scale. Sample items for this scale included the following phrases: “I know more about politics than most people of my age”; “I am able to understand political issues easily”; “When political issues or problems are discussed, I usually have something to say,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate their agreement with each statement on a four-point Likert-type scale as described above. Higher scores indicate that students feel that they are knowledgeable about politics and that they have rather high internal political efficacy. On the other hand, lower scores indicate generally low or no interest in politics and that students do not feel that they know more about political issues than their peers. This scale demonstrated high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .84 for the ICCS international sample and up to .89 for individual states. Analysis of individual countries also demonstrated good model fit and satisfactory factor loadings for the scale.

**Interest in Social and Political Issues**

Out of seven items developed to measure adolescents’ interest in social and political issues, national and international in scope, five were used to construct a scale of
such attitudes. All items had a common beginning and started in the following way:

“How interested are you in the following issues?” Students were presented with a series of issues, such as political and social issues in the country of test and political issues in other countries, and indicated their level of interest in each of the issues on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted “very interested” and 4 “not interested at all” (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of this scale was .86 for the ICCS international sample and ranged from .75 to .92 for different countries.

**The Quality of Democracy Index**

In investigating the course of democratic developments and, most importantly, people’s responses to democratization processes, understanding the nature and characteristics of each democratic system is critical. Although most societies in this research formally fall under the category of democratic states, assessing the state of democracy in these countries requires information not only about the presence of democratic institutions but also about the character and quality of democratic institutions.

As the literature review demonstrated, there are many measurements of democracy and democratic attitudes but no consensus has been achieved in terms of the best indicator of a country’s democratic development. This research utilizes the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy that evaluates countries’ democratic progress based on the quality of their democracy. First introduced by Campbell (2008), the Quality of Democracy index emphasizes the importance of measuring democracy within the context of society and integrates a number of societal characteristics in its
assessment framework. Specifically, six dimensions are included in the index: (a) political system, (b) gender, (c) economy, (d) knowledge, (e) health, and (f) the environment. Each of the dimensions is assigned a score and a weight measure and then aggregated into an average score. Of note, the political dimension accounts for 50% of the total score. Thus the Democracy Ranking presents a multidimensional measure that focuses not only on the performance of democratic institutions in the political system but also on the performance of non-political dimensions that represent different domains of society. By applying such a comprehensive framework, the Democracy Ranking adopts a broad definition of democracy. The conceptual framework for this is expressed in the following formula:

\[
\text{Quality of Democracy} = (\text{freedom and other characteristics of the political system}) + (\text{performance of non-political dimensions})^{13}
\]

\[^{13}\text{According to Campbell (2008), the rationale for adopting such a broad framework is that takes into different domains of people’s lives that are not typically included in traditional measures of democracy. In Campbell’s own words: Without reflecting on the quality of society, there cannot be a sufficient comprehension of the context for the quality of politics. And the quality of society clearly colors the quality of the life of individuals and of communities within that society” (p. 35).}\]
Figure 2: The Quality of Democratic Institutions by Country

**Historical Legacies Categories**

To measure historical legacy, two categorical groupings have been adopted: aspiring democracies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). This simplified classification mainly aims to distinguish between democratic orientations of adolescents in aspiring and established democracies. Of note, a number of measures that assess the state of democracy in regions across the world utilize
a similar approach to classifying countries (for example, Freedom in the World analytical reports compiled by Freedom House).

The categorical groupings of countries into established and aspiring democracies are further subdivided into four legacy types based on the nature of the previous communist regime. Countries are placed in the following types of historical legacy: (a) accommodative, (b) bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) democratic tradition. Table 1 summarizes these categories. The categories were adopted based on Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon’s (2010) classification of communist legacies. This study utilizes this classification to measure democratic orientation rather than other suggested typologies of communist legacies due to the following reasons. First, it accounts for political structures of the past plus some aspects of social and economic reality during the communist period. Secondly, it assumes that national conditions varied not only during the communist regime but also prior to its establishment. Thus it also takes into account pre-communist legacies. This classification was discussed in more detailed in the Literature Review in the section on Post-communist Legacies.

Table 1: Classification of Historical Legacies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy type</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative communist legacy</td>
<td>Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic communist legacy</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrimonial communist legacy</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic tradition</td>
<td>Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methods of Analysis

This research was based on quantitative analysis of secondary data from sources described in detail above. Two analytical programs were used to perform statistical procedures - the 18th version of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows and an add-on module for SPSS Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). The data analyses were carried out in two stages: (a) dataset preparation and (b) hypothesis testing. In the first stage, reliability and principal component analyses (PCA) were conducted for the purpose of establishing psychometric properties of the variables and to identify underlying dimensions, or components, in adolescents’ democratic orientation. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out to confirm that the identified model presents a good fit for data from selected ICCS countries.

The second stage included descriptive statistics that provided descriptions of adolescents’ democratic orientation and a number of inferential statistical analyses, such as correlation analyses, t-tests, analyses of variance (ANOVA), and hierarchical regressions that addressed the main research questions. Table 2 summarizes research questions, hypotheses, and the statistical analyses that were used in this research.
Table 2: Research Questions and Statistical Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage, Section</th>
<th>Research Questions and Hypotheses</th>
<th>Statistical Analyses</th>
<th>Research Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Stage I        | RQ₁: Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic orientations of adolescents from selected countries?  
RQ₂: What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
Is the model that proposes a three-component structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation a good fit for data from selected ICCS countries? | Reliability analysis  
Principal component analysis  
Confirmatory factor analysis | Support for democratic values  
Gender equality attitudes  
Equal rights for ethnic minorities  
Equal rights for immigrants  
Conventional citizenship  
Social movement citizenship  
Interest in politics and social issues  
Internal political efficacy  
Institutional trust  
Attitudes towards one’s country |
| Stage II, Section 1 | RQ₁: How do adolescents’ democratic orientations compare among different countries?  
H₁: There are significant differences in democratic orientations among adolescents from different countries.  
RQ₂: Are there differences in democratic orientations between adolescents in aspiring and established democracies?  
H₂: There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies in terms of their democratic orientations. | Descriptive statistics  
ANOVA | Dependent variables:  
- Civil liberties  
- Engagement  
- Trust  
Independent variable:  
Type of democratic advancement |
| Stage II, Section 2 | RQ\(_1\): What is the relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
H\(_1\): There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation.  
RQ\(_2\): What is the relationship between a country’s history of communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
H\(_2\): There is a negative relationship between a country’s history of communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation.  
RQ\(_3\): To what extent are there significant differences in adolescents’ democratic attitudes related to historical legacy?  
H\(_3\): Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientation differently.  
H\(_{3a}\): Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative communist legacies.  
H\(_{3b}\): Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Accommodative communist legacy. | Correlations, Descriptive statistics  
ANOVA posthoc tests | Dependent variables:  
- Civil liberties  
- Engagement  
- Trust  
Independent variable:  
- Type of historical legacy |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ4: What is the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the current quality of democratic institutions in their societies?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H4: There is a positive relationship between the current quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations, descriptive statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civil liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quality of democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ5: Is historical legacy or the quality of current democratic institution more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H5: Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANOVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civil liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quality of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Type of historical legacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage II, Section 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ1: To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation predict their intentions to participate in future social and political activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1: The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the higher their intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchical regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expected participation in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- legal protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in illegal protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- formal political activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- informal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civil liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Home literacy resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus research</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

Stage I: Dataset Preparation

Prior to running specific analyses to address the research questions and test the relationships hypothesized in this study, several transformations were made to ensure the dataset met the necessary criteria for carrying out statistical procedures. Specifically, the transformations included cleaning the data, addressing missing values issues, reviewing correlation coefficients, calculating reliability statistics, and developing new scales.

The total number of observations is 21,672, drawn from 20 countries. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices were generated as a basis for other statistic procedures. The results are presented in Appendix B.

Reliability Statistics for the ICCS Scales

Research Question 1: Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents from selected countries?

Because this study utilized data from selected countries and because only a portion of all available cases were randomly chosen to create a single dataset, a series of reliability analyses were conducted to ensure that the scales that were originally developed for the analysis of ICCS data also provide accurate measures of the concepts of interest. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated for 10 scales for the pooled sample and for individual countries. Results from the pooled sample are summarized in Table 3 below.
### Table 3: Descriptive and Reliability Statistics for Research Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research variable</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha (pooled sample)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for democratic values</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality attitudes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance toward immigrants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance toward ethnic groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for conventional citizen participation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for social-movement citizen participation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in social and political issues</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust attitudes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards one’s country</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exploratory Factor Analyses

**Research Question 2:** What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?

To answer the question about the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. An exploratory factor analysis has three main functions: (a) to explore the structure of a set of variables, (b) to develop a measure of a latent variable, and (c) to reduce a data set to a more manageable size by combining variables into specific factors (Fields, 2005). Previous theoretical research and empirical studies of democratic citizen orientation, reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, suggest that democratically oriented citizens possess a variety of characteristics, including support for basic democratic values, trust in other people and government...
institutions, willingness to participate in social and political activities. Consensus about
the accuracy and reliability of different measures of democratic beliefs remains to be
achieved. In a similar vein, no agreement exists about the relationship among these
variables. In light of the above, it is justifiable to expect that combining some of the items
available from the ICCS study might produce measures of the latent dimensions of
democratic citizen orientation, operationalized in this research as a set of attitudes and
behavioral intentions conducive to democratic advancement.

**Goodness of Fit**

Several analytical procedures necessary to ensure the goodness of fit were
conducted prior to testing the latent structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation.
First, to ensure a stable factor solution it is important to consider the sample size.
Opinions with regard to an optimal sample size for a reliable factor analysis vary. Thus,
some have argued that having 10-15 participants per variable is a necessary condition to
ensure adequate test parameters (for example, Kass & Tinsley, 1979; Nunnally, 1978;
Fields, 2005). Others have proposed a sample size of at least 300 cases for carrying out
factor analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, and Hing
(1999) indicated that determining an adequate sample size for factor analysis depends not
only on the number of variables but also on the value of communalities. In more detail,
they established that lower values of communality factor requires larger sample size.
Furthermore, Guadagnoli and Velicer (cited in Fields, 2005) argued that a factor with
four or more loadings with values .6 or higher is reliable regardless of a sample size.
Finally, another way to ensure sampling adequacy is to use the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO). The KMO statistics ranges from zero to one and represents “the ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial correlation between variables” (Fields, 2005, p. 640). In other words, a KMO value indicates whether a factor solution can be considered appropriate given a specific sample size. In general, lower KMO values suggest that there might be a problem with either a number of cases available for analysis or that the variables selected for factor analysis should be reconsidered. More specifically, values higher than .5 are considered barely acceptable, values between .5 and .7 are mediocre, values between .7 and .8 are good and values above .9 are great.

Secondly, an important consideration that ensures a reliable factor analysis deals with intercorrelation between variables. Generally, variables that do not correlate with each other as well as variables that correlate too highly (R < .9) are excluded from factor analysis. To ensure that the variables selected for the analysis satisfy necessary conditions, a bivariate correlation matrix of all variables was created (see Appendix B for correlation coefficients). Thirdly, it is important to ensure that the selected variables satisfy the assumption of normality.

**Principal Component Analysis**

Principal component analysis was used to locate underlying dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation. According to Fields (2005), principal component analysis is a “psychometrically sound procedure” and “less complex than factor analysis” (p. 631). Direct oblimin rotation, a method of oblique rotation, was used to improve
interpretation of factor solutions. Theoretical grounds for choosing oblique rotation stem largely from an argument articulated by Inglehart (2006) who claimed that “people who support democracy on one indicator, tend to support democracy on the other indicators” (p. 2003). Although the present analysis of adolescents’ democratic orientation goes beyond support for democracy as a form of government, it is expected that factors of adolescents’ democratic mindset will correlate with each other. In addition, some have argued that data from experiments involving humans should be analyzed via oblique rotations only (for example, Fields, 2005). The main argument for such claims is that there are hardly any psychological constructs that are not related to another psychological construct.

Ten variables were included in the model to explore the relationships among them and to test the possibility of locating distinct dimensions within adolescents’ democratic mindset. For a complete list of items that comprised each of the ten variables, see Appendix A. The items included in the analysis correlated with at least one item at the level of .30 or above. Correlation coefficients are shown in Table 1 in Appendix B. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was .72 demonstrating acceptable sampling adequacy.

Table 4 demonstrates a factor solution that emerged after running the analysis. Items that express support for democratic values, gender equality attitudes, and tolerance toward ethnic and immigrant groups load highly on the same factor, which can be characterized as a civil liberties orientation. Political efficacy, political interest, and values of conventional and social movement citizenship load on the second factor and can be considered as a sense of engagement. Finally, trust related variables and items
indicating adolescents’ attitudes toward their country of origin group together. However, because two items are not sufficient to define a factor, the third component, although distinct, cannot be classified as an independent factor. However, due to its conceptual relevance, it was included in subsequent analyses. In this regard, rather than being interpreted as two separate items, the two variables were analyzed together by computing the mean score. Overall, the identified components explained over 59% of the total variance. Of note, this structure solution is consistent for the international pooled sample as well as for individual countries.

Table 4: Factor Loadings for Indices Measuring Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor 1 Civil liberties</th>
<th>Factor 2 Engagement</th>
<th>Factor 3 Trust</th>
<th>Communalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for democratic values</td>
<td>.636</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>.717</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal rights for ethnic minorities</td>
<td>.780</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal rights for immigrants</td>
<td>.747</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movement citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics and social issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.849</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>.829</td>
<td>.700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards one’s country</td>
<td></td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In sum, the factor analysis revealed that adolescents’ democratic orientation presents a three-dimensional pattern of attitudinal and behavioral norms. An initial examination of items that compose each of the underlying dimensions suggests that the following factors can describe adolescents’ democratic mindset: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and (c) trust.

**Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

Results obtained from the previous analysis suggest that there are at least two distinct components in adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties and engagement. To test how well the identified dimensions fit the data utilized in the current study, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted.

According to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen (2008), the following indices were used to test the goodness-of-fit proposition: Chi-square (CMIN) ($\chi^2 > .05$), the Goodness-of-Fit statistic (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI > .96), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA < .05). The results for both models are reported in Table 5.

As the table demonstrates, the Chi-square statistics for both models were significant suggesting the models were a poor fit. However, given a number of limitations associated with the use of this measure, the results should be interpreted with caution. First, Chi-square statistic has been found to be sensitive to sample size (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980). Specifically, when large sample sizes are used, as is the case in this study, the Chi-square test tends to be significant thus rejecting the model. Secondly, the Chi-square test assumes multivariate normality (McIntosh (2006) as cited in Hooper,
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Thus due to restrictiveness of this measure, an alternative index was used to evaluate the model fit. The GFI values of .95 and above is usually interpreted as indicating a good model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). As is shown, the GFI statistics for both models are 1. Additionally, CFI and RMSEA yielded positive results, demonstrating both models are a good fit for the data.

Table 5: Model Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (factor)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reliability Statistics for Democratic Orientation Measures**

Following the confirmatory factor analysis, two scales were created reflecting the structure of each of the factors. To ensure that a two-factor classification of adolescents’ democratic orientation presents a consistent measure, reliability analyses were conducted to test psychometric properties of the derived scales. Specifically, Cronbach’s $\alpha$ coefficients were calculated to examine the extent to which the two scales measured a specific underlying factor. Results showed that both scales appeared reliable measures of civil liberties and engagement dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientations, with Cronbach’s $\alpha$ of .70 and .72, respectively.

For a more systematic analysis of democratic orientation, the variables associated with the trust component were grouped together to make a liner additive index. Thus two scales and one composite measure were created: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and
(c) trust. The scores computed from each of the measures were then used to examine variability in democratic attitudes among adolescents across countries as well as to explore possible explanations for such variation.

**Stage II: Hypotheses Testing**

**Describing Differences in Democratic Orientations**

*Hypothesis 1:* There are significant differences in democratic orientations among adolescents from different countries.

To answer the question about variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations, mean scores for each of the three dimensions of democratic orientation were calculated. Overall, the mean scores for the pooled sample were: 49.60 with a standard deviation of 7.25 for the civil liberties dimension; 48.72 ($SD = 7.27$) for the engagement dimension; and 49.8 ($SD = 9.55$) for the trust dimension. Figures 3 represents average levels of endorsement of the civil liberties dimensions among adolescents in the 20 countries analyzed in this research. Figures 4 and 5 present mean scores for the other two aspects of adolescents’ democratic orientations.
Figure 3: Average Civil Liberties Score by Country

Latvia: 47.20
The Netherlands: 47.41
Russia: 47.42
Czech Republic: 47.88
Belgium: 48.20
Estonia: 48.77
Slovakia: 49.07
Bulgaria: 49.36
Poland: 49.57
Finland: 49.68
Lithuania: 49.80
Slovenia: 49.99
Italy: 50.08
Switzerland: 50.08
Austria: 50.09
Denmark: 50.31
Greece: 50.52
Norway: 51.62
Spain: 51.75
Sweden: 52.56

Mean Civil Liberties Score
Figure 4: Average Engagement Score by Country

- Belgium: 45.46
- Finland: 45.51
- The Netherlands: 45.59
- Czech Republic: 46.03
- Sweden: 46.59
- Slovenia: 46.71
- Slovakia: 46.89
- Denmark: 47.27
- Switzerland: 48.12
- Estonia: 48.79
- Norway: 49.22
- Austria: 49.63
- Spain: 49.84
- Latvia: 50.03
- Bulgaria: 50.12
- Lithuania: 50.61
- Poland: 50.62
- Greece: 51.36
- Russia: 51.79
- Italy: 52.88

Mean Engagement Score
As the figures illustrate, there is some variation among countries in terms of democratic orientation of their younger residents. In general, countries that fall under the category of established democracy score higher on two of the three examined dimensions of democratic orientation, trust and civil liberties. At the same time, several outliers are evident in both scales. For example, Russia stands out with its high score on the trust dimension and The Netherlands and Belgium appear in the lower end of the civil liberties distribution. Scores indicating the level of engagement are distributed less uniformly. Thus there is a wide variation among countries with higher levels of engagement among adolescents. In other words, established democracies from Western Europe appear at both
ends of the score distribution. For example, Italy has the highest level of engagement and Belgium presents the case with the lowest score.

These results indicate that democratic orientation does not present a common pattern in established and aspiring democracies. Analysis of these country data in a more systematic way might yield more coherent results. One such way is to explore country differences utilizing different country categories, such as aspiring versus established democracies. The following section addresses this issue.

Hypothesis 2: There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies in terms of their democratic orientations.

A T-test analysis was conducted to find out whether adolescents in aspiring democracies and established democracies demonstrated differed significantly in: (a) civil liberties values, (b) engagement, and (c) trust. Figure 6 presents the obtained results.
Figure 6: Average Levels of Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in Aspiring and Established Democracies

Note: Mean scores are shown for adolescents in aspiring democracies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).

Analysis showed a significant difference between the two groups with regard to all three variables of interest: (a) $t(21493) = 100.83, p < .001$; (b) $t(21465) = -21.70, p < .001$; and (c) $t(21337) = 64.52, p < .001$. Results also showed that adolescents in aspiring democracies had lower endorsement of civil liberties values ($M = 48.73, SD = 1.00$) than adolescents in established democracies ($M = 50.35, SD = 1.31$). With regard to trust, the direction of the relationship between the two groups was the same: adolescents in aspiring democracies reported lower levels of trust ($M = 48.08, SD = 2.36$) than adolescents in established democracies ($M = 50.05, SD = 2.10$). Surprisingly, in the area
of democratic orientation dealing with social and political engagement, adolescents from aspiring democracies showed higher levels of engagement \( M = 49.07, SD = 2.06 \) compared to adolescents from established democracies \( M = 48.42, SD = 2.36 \). Mean levels of endorsement of each of the three democratic orientation factors are presented in Figure 6. Of note, because Levine’s test was significant \( (p < .001) \), indicating that the assumption of equality of variances was violated, a \( t \) statistic not assuming homogeneity of variance was considered. Thus the results should be interpreted with caution.

As can be seen from Figure 6, adolescents in established democracies have, on average, higher levels of democratic orientation. In contrast, adolescents in aspiring democracies tend to score lower on the identified aspects of democratic orientation, with the exception of the engagement dimension. How does a history of a country’s past regime relate to this variation in democratic orientation? How might a different, more detailed, classification of countries affect the distribution of scores? The section that follows addresses these questions.

**Examining Variation in Democratic Orientations**

*Hypothesis 1:* There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientations.

To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientations and past regimes of their countries, bivariate correlational analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for each dimension of democratic orientation and a past regime of the adolescents’ country of origin. At first glance, results seem to confirm the hypothesized relationships
and are consistent with the findings established in the first part. However, a closer look at the data revealed that the first hypothesis was supported only partially. There was a significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and a history of democratic tradition in their countries, \( r(21762) = .57, \ p < .001 \). A significant positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and a history of democratic tradition, \( r(21762) = .41, \ p < .001 \). Surprisingly, the relationship between the engagement dimension of democratic orientation and a history of democratic tradition was found to be negative, \( r(21762) = -.14, \ p < .001 \).

**Hypothesis 2:** There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation.

Correlations between dimensions of democratic orientation and a country’s history of communism indicate that a significantly negative relationship exists between two dimensions of democratic orientation, trust and civil liberties, and a history of communism, \( r(21762) = -.57, \ p < .001 \) and \( r(21762) = -.41, \ p < .001 \), respectively. Additionally, a significant positive correlation was established between a history of communism and the engagement aspect of democratic orientation, \( r(21762) = .14, \ p < .001 \).

The results presented so far indicate that history appears an important element in examining cross-cultural variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations. To what extent do different historical legacies influence this variation? This question was addressed in the following section.

**Hypothesis 3:** Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientations differently.
Hypothesis 3a: Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative communist legacies.

Hypothesis 3b: Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Accommodative communist legacy.

Hypothesis 3c: Adolescents in states with Accommodative communist legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of democratic tradition.

A one-way ANOVA was used to test the impact of different types of historical legacy on democratic orientations. Where the initial differences were established, posteriori tests were conducted to elicit specific group differences. Results are summarized below for each of three dimensions. Table 6 presents mean scores and standard deviations for each dimension by legacy.

Table 6: Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation by Historical Legacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical legacy</th>
<th>Civil liberties</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic socialism (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic)</td>
<td>48.33 (.58)</td>
<td>46.35 (.41)</td>
<td>47.05 (.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative socialism (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland)</td>
<td>49.17 (.98)</td>
<td>49.42 (1.50)</td>
<td>47.22 (1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrimonial socialism (Bulgaria, Russia)</td>
<td>48.26 (1.00)</td>
<td>51.10 (.83)</td>
<td>50.87 (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic tradition (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium)</td>
<td>50.35 (1.31)</td>
<td>48.42 (2.36)</td>
<td>50.05 (2.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Historical legacy and civil liberties.** A significant difference was found between different types of historical legacies regarding civil liberties, $F(3, 21491) = 102.11$, $p < .001$. Posteriori tests were conducted to establish group differences, using the Bonferroni post hoc criterion for significance. These tests produced mixed results. Overall, it was found that adolescents from countries with a history of democracy had significantly higher levels of endorsement of civil liberties values ($M = 50.35$, $SD = 7.62$) than adolescents from countries with all three types of socialist legacies (combined $M = 48.58$, $SD = 6.62$). The comparison of civil liberties endorsement among adolescents from states with Bureaucratic and Patrimonial socialist legacies was non-significant. All other pairwise comparisons yielded significant results. In short, hypothesis 3a was supported partially and hypotheses 3b and 3c were confirmed.

**Historical legacy and engagement.** A test of the effect of legacy types on engagement produced significant results, suggesting that adolescents from states with four different types of legacy had significantly different levels of engagement, $F(3, 21463) = 201.36$, $p < .001$. Posteriori tests further revealed that all four groups were significantly different from each other. However, the direction of these relationships differed from the hypothesized ones. For example, students in countries with the most restrictive types of socialist legacy, Patrimonial legacy, reported higher levels of engagement than students in states with less restrictive past socialist regimes. Moreover, adolescents in states with Patrimonial legacy scored higher on the engagement measure than adolescents in states with a history of democratic tradition. Overall, the results indicated that students from countries with more restrictive communist legacies had
significantly higher engagement scores than adolescents from countries with less restrictive communist legacies. Thus, all hypotheses were rejected.

**Historical legacy and trust.** Analyses of the differences in adolescents’ democratic orientations on the basis of historical legacy further showed that the effect of a specific type of the past regime had an impact on the extent to which adolescents displayed trust attitudes, $F(3, 21284) = 260.86, p < .001$. According to posthoc results, adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition scored, on average, higher ($M = 51.20, SD = 9.40$) than adolescents from countries with Accommodative ($M = 46.86, SD = 8.92$) and Bureaucratic ($M = 48.36, SD = 9.41$) communist legacies. Surprisingly, adolescents from countries with Patrimonial legacy scored, on average, higher than adolescents in countries with Accommodative and Bureaucratic previous regimes. However, the results showed no significant difference in trust levels between adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition and states with Patrimonial socialist legacy. Similarly, no significant difference was established in trust levels among adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative legacies. In sum, in regard to trust, hypothesis 3c was supported while hypotheses 3a and 3b were rejected.

**Distribution of Scores**

To find out how democratic orientations were distributed among adolescents in countries with different types of historical legacies, the sample was divided into two parts for each of the factors. The first part consisted of students who reported high levels of endorsement of civil liberties, engagement, and trust attitudes. Alternatively, the second
part included students with lower levels of endorsement of each of the three factors. For purposes of this analysis, the cutting point was the average of each scale, with lower scores assigned to those adolescents who scored below the average and higher scores to all students who scored above the average. Frequency statistics for both subgroups were generated. Table 7 presents the distribution of democratic orientation by each dimension. As is shown, countries with a history of democratic tradition have, on average, a higher proportion of democratically-oriented adolescents than do countries with communist legacies. However, this relationship is reversed when the engagement dimension of democratic orientation is considered separately.

Table 7: Distribution of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations across Historical Legacies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of democratic orientation</th>
<th>Level of endorsement</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Socialism (%)</th>
<th>Accommodative Socialism (%)</th>
<th>Patrimonial Socialism (%)</th>
<th>Established democracy (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Impact of Democratic Institutions

*Hypothesis 4*: There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation.

To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, correlational analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for each dimension of democratic orientation and the quality of democracy in adolescents’ country of origin. Hypothesis 4 was supported only partially. There was a significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, \( r(21762) = .59, p < .001 \). A small but significant positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and the quality of democracy, \( r(21762) = .12, p < .001 \). Conversely, the engagement dimension of democratic orientation appeared to be negatively related to the quality of democratic institutions, \( r(21762) = -.55, p < .001 \). The below figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate these results.
Figure 7: The Quality of Democracy and Civil Liberties
Figure 8: The Quality of Democracy and Trust
Thus far, the results demonstrate that both historical legacy and the quality of contemporary democratic institutions have an effect, to varying degrees, on adolescents’ democratic orientation. The question arises as to whether one of the two broad factors is more influential in determining adolescents’ endorsement of each of the three democratic dimensions. This question is addressed next.

Hypothesis 5: Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions.

To determine whether historical legacy or the quality of current democratic institutions is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation,
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. MANOVA is often considered an extension of simple ANOVA techniques and is used to determine group differences in models with more than one dependent variable (Field, 2005). Among advantages of this technique is that it allows to take into account several dependent variables simultaneously as well as interaction between these variables.

General linear modeling (GLM) procedure was utilized to test the effects of historical legacies and the quality of democratic institutions on each of the three dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation. In addition, a third variable denoting the gender of adolescents was added to the model. Because of the continuous nature of the variable, the Quality of Democracy Index was entered as a covariate. Altogether, two different models were run to test the hypothesis. First, individual scores were used in each predictor variable. The model was then ran again, using aggregate country scores for the dependent variables. Table 8 contains the results of both tests. The $F$ value statistics indicate the relative contribution of each predictor variable to value of the outcome variable. Higher values indicate better explanatory power.

The hypothesis was only partially supported. With the exception of trust, the results revealed that the quality of democratic institutions has a greater effect on adolescents’ democratic orientation than historical legacy (coefficients presented in bold in Table 8). Conversely, historical legacy appeared a better contributor to the trust dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Overall, the results were consistent for both individual scores and aggregate measures.
Additionally, the results revealed some differences in regard to explanatory power
of the determinant variables. Gender was found to be an important determinant of
adolescents’ democratic orientation. Despite the fact that the effect of gender was not
specified in the hypothesis, it was found to outweigh both historical legacy and the
quality of democratic institutions in its influence on civil liberties. Interestingly, the
gender effect disappeared when aggregate scores were entered in the model. Table 8
summarizes these results.

Table 8: The Impact of Historical Legacies and the Quality of Democratic
Institutions on Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinant Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>( F ) Value (individual scores)</th>
<th>( F ) Value (aggregate scores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>6717.62**</td>
<td>291999.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>13005.17**</td>
<td>313161.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>5139.25**</td>
<td>91480.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Legacy</td>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>21.97**</td>
<td>1030.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>203.04**</td>
<td>4379.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>251.45**</td>
<td>4914.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Democracy</td>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>59.46**</td>
<td>2588.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>644.81**</td>
<td>15530.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>49.13**</td>
<td>860.97**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>479.36**</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>5.56*</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * \( p < .01 \), ** \( p < .001 \).

Exploring Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation

*Hypothesis 1:* The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the
higher their intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.
Hierarchical Regressions

Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to find out whether students’ democratic orientation influences their intentions in regard to participation in future social and political activities. Specifically, the regression analyses tested to what extent each dimension of democratic orientation predicts students’ involvement in different political and social activities. Altogether, five different regressions were run for each form of expected participation: involvement in legal protest, involvement in illegal protest, electoral participation, formal political participation, and informal political participation. Of note, the primary goal of these analyses was to investigate the relationship between different aspects of adolescents’ democratic orientation and their expected involvement in social and political activities, rather than create a model that predicts factors that best explain such future involvement. That is why a limited number of independent variables were used.

Based on theoretic considerations and previous research, two indicators of students’ background, gender and home literacy resources, were entered into the model first. To find out how much each of the dimensions of democratic orientation would contribute to each form of participation, “civil liberties,” “engagement,” and “trust” variables were entered as a second, third, and fourth and steps, respectively. Regression analyses were repeated for each of the five available types of participation. \( R^2 \) statistic indicates the significance and amount of variance explained by each predictor. \( R^2 \) change statistic represents the unique amount of variance that is explained solely by the predictor entered in a specific step. Unstandardized coefficients (reported in Table 9 along with
standard errors) denote the extent to which each predictor explains variation in participatory expectations. The results are presented below for each dimension of democratic orientation. Table 9 summarizes the results and presents them in five groups, one for each type of expected participation. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Regression of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation on their Expected Participation in Future Political and Social Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Involvement in Legal Protest</th>
<th>Involvement in Illegal Protest</th>
<th>Electoral Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steps</td>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Step 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1: Home literacy resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=girl)</td>
<td>.91** (.05)</td>
<td>.67** (.05)</td>
<td>.42** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Civil liberties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3: Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4: Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Formal Political Participation</th>
<th>Informal Political Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Step 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1: Home literacy resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=girl)</td>
<td>-1.01** (.13)</td>
<td>-1.08** (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Civil liberties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.03* (.01)</td>
<td>.13** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3: Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.57** (.01)</td>
<td>.50** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4: Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001
The Effect of Civil Liberties on Prospective Citizen Participation

A series of hierarchical regressions examined whether adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties predicts their intentions to participate in political life upon reaching adulthood. Because the civil liberties variable was entered as the second step in all models, the results for all types of participation can be obtained from the row Step 2 in Table 9 below.

In general, adding the civil liberties variable resulted in modest but significant improvements to the models by increasing the proportion of total explained variance of various kinds of anticipated participation. Specifically, in the models of anticipated involvement in legal and illegal protest, civil liberties variable produced a significant change in the total explained variance, $F (3, 20892) = 489.91, p < .001$ and $F (3, 20836) = 281.40, p < .001$, respectively. In the model of prospective electoral participation, the addition of civil liberties was also significant, $F (3, 20814) = 84271, p < .001$. Finally, civil liberties was as significant contributor to in the models projecting future participation in formal and informal political activities, $F (3, 20796) = 34.17, p < .001$ and $F (3, 20759) = 177.35$, respectively.

The percentage of the unique portion of the variance explained by civil liberties ranged from 1% in formal and informal forms of participation to 7% in the involvement in legal protest. Out of five types of participation examined, civil liberties appeared to have the most influence on expected electoral participation than on other type of future participation, with $R^2 = .11, p > .001$. 

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Interestingly, civil liberties entered one model negatively, suggesting that the higher adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties, the lower their intentions with regard to participation in illegal protest in the future. These results provide initial evidence about the significance of this particular aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their future involvement.

**The Effect of Engagement on Prospective Citizen Participation**

Adding the engagement variable to the models of expected citizen participation resulted in significant change in the amount of variance associated with the models, suggesting that adolescents’ engagement appears a significant predictor of their intentions to participate in all five types of future citizen activities. The biggest contribution was observed in regard to the following two activities: (a) prospected participation in elections and (b) prospected participation in informal political activities. The unique portion of variance attributed to these models was 26% and 27%, respectively. Next, engagement appeared to increase the likelihood of holding positive views about future participation in future formal activities and legal protest, with 18% of variation explained for both models. The smallest contribution of this variable was observed in the model of expected involvement in illegal protest, where engagement accounted for 4% of total variance. In contrast to the previously analyzed aspect of civil liberties, the engagement variable did not enter any of the models negatively, suggesting that, all other variables being the same, the higher adolescents’ engagement, the higher they rate their likelihood of getting involved in political and social activities upon reaching adulthood.
The Effect of Trust on Prospective Citizen Participation

A unique contribution of the trust aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation was assessed in the 4\textsuperscript{th} step of each of the five regressions models. Similar to the other two aspects, civil liberties and engagement, trust appeared a significant predictor of all forms of future participatory activities. Also, similar to the civil liberties dimension, adding trust to the model of expected involvement in illegal protest produced a negative coefficient, suggesting that higher levels of trust among adolescents diminish their intentions to get involved in illegal protest as adults. Of note, trust was found to be the smallest contributor to all models of prospective participation in comparison with the other two dimensions. Thus, the percentage of unique variance explained by trust ranged from less than 1\% to 3\%, for models predicting involvement in legal protest and electoral participation, respectively.

Summary for Regressions

Overall, the regression analyses showed that adolescents’ democratic orientation significantly influences their expectations with regard to future participation in various political and social activities. These influences appeared significant, regardless of adolescents’ gender or home literacy resources. In more detail, it was established that the likelihood of adolescents’ future participation in social and political activities is better explained by their current levels of engagement than by their endorsement of civil liberties values or trust attitudes.
**Bonus Research**

*Bonus Research Hypothesis:* Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on their democratic orientation.

Why do cross-cultural differences in adolescents’ democratic orientation matter? Before addressing this question, it is first necessary to establish whether it is, indeed, possible to discriminate adolescents of one country, or group of countries, from adolescents in another state based on their responses to a series of questions relevant to democracy. To test this claim, a discriminant function analysis was carried out. In more detail, two discriminant function analyses utilizing both sources of democratic orientation – (a) the scores from the three dimensions of democratic orientation and (b) scores from the original ICCS scales of democratic attitudes - were run. This was done in order to compare the predictive power of each measure. Of note, only seven original scales were used because discriminant analysis allows a limited number of predictor variables (for details, see Fields, 2005, or Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996 ). Kitschelt’s historical legacies classification modified by Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) was used as a dependent variable for classifying adolescents into groups.

Overall, results revealed three significant variates that differentiate between different groups that represent historical legacies of adolescents’ countries of origin. In other words, differences between adolescents’ democratic orientations can be explained with the help of three underlying dimensions. Thus, the results established that adolescents’ attitudes toward gender equality, trust attitudes, and feelings of internal political efficacy make the largest contribution to each of the three identified variates. Of
note, the variable measuring support for gender equality makes the largest contribution in comparison with other variables in the model. Appendix C presents details on each of the variates. The distinction between different groups is seen in Figure 10 that presents a combined plot of group scores for each country. The variate scores are presented for adolescents, grouped according to the historical legacy of their country. Group centroids (shown in red in Figure 10) indicate average variate scores for each country grouping.

Additionally, the results revealed that original scales of democratic beliefs and attitudes were better at categorizing adolescents into groups with corresponding historical legacies than the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus, the discriminant analysis conducted with the original variables related to the endorsement of democratic principles correctly classified 95.5% of the original grouped cases. In turn, the three dimensions of democratic orientation were able to classify 73.1% of adolescents as belonging to a group with a specific historical legacy. The results presented above and shown in Figure 10 relate to the analysis that utilized scores from the original ICCS scales of democratic attitudes.
Note: Types of Historical Legacy: □ Bureaucratic socialism; △ Patrimonial socialism; 
× Accommodative socialism; ○ Established democracy.

**Bonus Finding**

Throughout this research, support for gender equality has consistently appeared among the most powerful variables responsible for cross-cultural variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations. In investigating the relationship between institutional characteristic and adolescents’ democratic orientation, a surprisingly strong relationship was established ($R^2$ linear = .77). The relevant scores were plotted in order to show the degree of interrelationship between the two variables. Figure 11 illustrates the results.
Figure 11: Adolescents’ Gender Equality Attitudes and the Quality of Democracy

Note: Types of Historical Legacy: □ Bureaucratic socialism; △ Patrimonial socialism;
× Accommodative socialism; ○ Established democracy.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

Summary and Analysis of Findings

Data analyses addressed the three main objectives of this research. First, an exploratory factor analysis identified the underlying dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation, followed by confirmatory and reliability analyses that verified a latent structure of democratic orientation and established construct validity of scales that measure the identified dimensions. Second, the results revealed important cross-cultural variations in the degree to which adolescents display each of the dimensions of democratic orientation. Specifically, the levels of endorsement of civil liberties values, engagement, and trust attitudes varied among adolescents’ in established and aspiring democracies. Additionally, correlational analyses established important relationships between country-level variations in adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical legacies of their countries on the one hand and the quality of contemporary democratic institutions on the other hand. Third, this study established that adolescents’ democratic orientation matters for a long-term democratic outlook of their countries. Controlling for some factors, adolescents’ democratic orientation appeared significant predictors of their intentions to participate in political and social matters upon reaching adulthood.

These results are important for several reasons. First, this study sheds light on the nature of democratic attitudes and values displayed by adolescents in countries with varying social, economic, and political situations. In doing so, the study confirms the validity of cultural theories in explaining variation in democratic attitudes among
younger generations. Additionally, the results indicate that institutional approaches to studying democratic preferences provide important insights for analyzing these attitudes among 14-15 year olds. Finally, with respect to potential consequences of adolescents’ democratic attitudes, this research contributes to the literature on democratization by projecting the extent to which the analyzed societies might have politically and socially active citizens in years to come. The sections below analyze these results in more detail and consider implications from the study for research and policy making.

**Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation: One Concept, Three Dimensions**

Similar to other concepts commonly used in social science research, the concept of a democratic citizen orientation is latent in nature and cannot be measured directly. This is reflected in a lack of consensus on the part of researchers and policymakers on how to best describe and analyze individuals’ values and attitudes associated with a democratic way of life. As a result, no single measure has been created to capture public endorsement of democratic values. Instead, researchers have employed various instruments and analytic techniques in attempts to assess different aspects of individuals’ democratic mindset. One such technique, factor analysis, was utilized in this study. By employing factor analysis techniques, one can identify underlying dimensions, or latent components, that reflect the multi-faceted concept of a democratic orientation.

Considering findings from classical and modern studies of democracy, a number of elements within democratic orientation were identified as necessary features of a democratically-oriented citizen: tolerance and respect for diversity, gender equality, interest in social and political affairs of the country and willingness to participate in them,
and trust. Variables reflecting adolescents’ democratic orientation were entered into a model and subjected to an exploratory factor analysis. The factors that emerged from this analysis could be meaningfully interpreted as supporting the initial proposition about the multidimensional character of a democratic citizen orientation. Specifically, adolescents’ democratic orientation was found to revolve around three broad themes: (1) equity, tolerance, and respect for diversity; (2) active role of citizens in a society, and (3) perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions and state authorities. Of note, the analyses conducted with individual countries versus the pooled sample produced the same results, suggesting that adolescents across countries do not possess a homogenous democratic mindset, but rather that their democratic orientation presents a multidimensional pattern of three distinct but interrelated dimensions consistently present across countries. Results from confirmatory factor analyses further supported this initial finding by indicating that the models were a good fit for the data utilized in this study.

The results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are representative of two major theoretical perspectives on democratic society. Specifically, the identified dimensions reflect the participatory, or communitarian, view of democracy as well as the perspective of liberal democratic theorists. The first perspective is evident in the engagement disposition domain, while the second is reflected in the civil liberties dimension of adolescents’ democratic worldview. Trust appears to be an important component in democratic societies from the point of view of theorists of both liberal and participatory democracy. More generally, this conceptualization of democratic orientation
is consistent with previous theoretic inquiries that established multidimensional nature of democracy (for example, Dahl, 1971).

In sum, defining a democratically-oriented citizen has been a subject of ongoing debates in academic, policy, and government circles. Despite differences in the way researchers, scholars, and even ordinary individuals perceive democratic citizenry, there is a general agreement that this notion is highly complex. This research adds to the literature by suggesting a three-dimensional way of examining attitudes, values, and behaviors of one of the younger cohorts of democratically-oriented citizens, 14-15 year-olds. Thus based on the findings, adolescents’ democratic orientation can be characterized as a complex concept that integrates three separate but interrelated components: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and (c) trust attitudes.

**Variation in Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in Aspiring and Established Democracies**

Well-established differences in democratic functioning between countries of Western Europe and North America on the one hand and post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe on the other raise the question whether these differences find reflection at the level of individuals’ adherence to democratic values and beliefs. Comparisons of democratic orientations between adolescents in aspiring and established democracies produced mixed answers to this question.

Overall, important cross-country variations were established in democratic orientations among adolescents from different states. Generally, levels of democratic orientation were higher among adolescents from established democracies than among
adolescents from aspiring democracies. However, a closer look at the data revealed that the results were not uniform across the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus, on measures of civil liberties and trust, students from more established democracies, indeed, scored higher than students from states with a less stable or consistent democratic record. Conversely, in the area dealing with political and social engagement, adolescents in aspiring democracies were found to have higher scores than adolescents in most mature democracies. Additional analyses revealed that countries with a history of democratic tradition have, on average, a higher proportion of students who score higher than average on the measures of democratic orientation than do adolescents in countries with a history of communist regime. Interestingly, the direction of this relationship was reversed if the engagement dimension of democratic orientation was considered separately.

These findings suggest that adolescents in countries that are moving toward democratic consolidation are less trusting and less likely to endorse civil liberties and values than their peers in established democracies. This is consistent with research on democratization that posits that younger democracies have a long way to go with regard to their citizens developing true democratic norms and behaviors (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Nikolayenko, 2011b; Rose, 2009).

Another possible explanation of lower levels of democratic orientation among adolescents in aspiring democracies might be reflective of a relatively recent history of democratic tradition in these societies. Generally, in consolidated democracies, the adult population undertakes the function of passing basic democratic values and behavioral
patterns to younger generations. In contrast, adult populations in post-communist societies were themselves faced with the need to learn democratic values and to be educated about basic principles of a democratic culture (Nikolayenko, 2011). Thus, this might be among the reasons why adolescents in aspiring democracies might display lower levels of certain aspects of democratic orientation than their peers in established democracies. This in turn, points to the need to investigate the processes through which adolescent’s acquire democratic values and endorse democratic principles.

However, the fact that adolescents in post-communist countries are more likely to report greater involvement and interest in political and social matters of their countries than adolescents in societies with established democratic infrastructure challenges conventional wisdom about the weakness of civil society in most post-communist states (Howard, 2003). Additionally, these relatively high levels of engagement may be considered a positive indicator of prospective democratic developments in aspiring democracies (e.g., see Dalton, 2000).

At the same time, the results indicating low levels of self-reported engagement among adolescents in established democracies supports numerous clams in the literature of low civic engagement among adolescents and young adults (for example, Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012). In contrast, the observed picture of low participation and interest in political and social issues among younger generations might be indicative of the changing political culture in established democracies, a trend that has occupied political and social science scholars over the last
several decades (for a summary see Dalton, 2000). In more detail, proponents of the changing democratic landscape, especially with regard to established democracies, argue that the general public may no longer endorse some traditional elements of a democratic political culture, but rather choose to support new structures and elements within democratic society. If this is the case, then it is possible to suggest that a relatively low level of adolescents’ engagement is, indeed, indication that they reject this aspect of democratic citizen orientation. This, in turn, calls for an expansion of the concept of political citizen engagement and, subsequently, for a more thorough investigation of alternative ways of measuring citizen engagement.

Overall, these preliminary differences call for a more thorough investigation of factors associated with variation in levels of adolescents’ democratic orientations across countries. Potential influences of historical and institutional factors on adolescents’ democratic attitudes are discussed next.

**Historical and Institutional Factors in Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation**

Democratization studies reviewed earlier suggest that at least two broad theoretical approaches are utilized in research on values, beliefs, and behavioral orientations that are relevant for the development of democracy. On the one hand, cultural theories emphasize the importance of historical legacies in analyzing and even predicting a number of democratic phenomena. On the other hand, institutional approaches point to the defining role of contemporary democratic institutions and their perceived performance in shaping attitudes and beliefs of democratically oriented citizens. This study utilized both approaches by analyzing how each of the two groups of
factors associated with variation in democratic attitudes – (1) historical legacy and (2) the quality of contemporary democratic institutions – relate to variation in democratic orientation among adolescents.

**The Influence of Historical Legacies**

To test whether historic legacies matter for adolescents’ democratic orientations, all cases were divided into four groups according to Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon’s (2010) classification of communist legacies. More specifically, this part of research examined the extent to which adolescents’ attitudes and behaviors relevant to democracy are associated with a specific type of a previous communist regime. The main hypothesis was that the degree to which younger generations in each society endorse democratic values would be related to the degree of overall restrictiveness of a specific type of historical legacy.

Overall, it was found that different types of historical legacies were associated with the degree to which adolescents (a) endorsed civil liberties values, (b) reported interest and involvement in socio-political issues, and (c) placed trust in state institutions and authorities. For the most part, the direction of this relationship supported a general hypothesis about the persisting influence of historical legacies, indicating that democratic orientation among citizens in post-communist societies, including younger generations without a direct experience of a communist regime, is still largely influenced by previous regimes of their societies. Of note, despite the fact that the hypotheses about the restrictiveness of different kinds of post-communist regimes were supported only partially, the results merit some attention. Thus, the fact that no negative relationship was
documented between adolescents’ engagement and different types of ex-communist regimes might indicate that the legacy of communism has more positive implications for democracy than what had been accepted before (Dalton, 2000). To some extent, this is consistent with earlier claims in the literature about influences of former communist regimes on contemporary democratic functioning. As Dalton observed, “The patterns of civil society and volunteerism that reinforce citizen action movements in the West are seen as reflections of the mobilized society of the Communist era” (p. 934).

In summary, the answer to the question of how adolescents in states with more restrictive former communist regimes compare to adolescents in states with less restrictive communist legacies remains unanswered, given mixed results for all three dimensions of their democratic orientation.

**The Impact of Democratic Functioning**

An alternative explanation to the question of cross-cultural variation in adolescents’ democratic attitudes considers the extent to which societies have developed an effective democratic infrastructure (Schimmelfennig, 2000). In considering institutional factors associated with adolescents’ democratic orientation, it was established that the quality of current democratic institutions was positively related to adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and levels of trust. At the same time, a negative relationship was observed between the state of democratic institutions and engagement potential of adolescents, supporting numerous claims in the literature about disengaged younger generations in developed democracies.
Another possible explanation might be that adolescents living in transitioning democracies are witnessing many rapid transformations that are still occurring in their societies and might be directly affected by them. It is possible to suggest that adolescents might experience these influences in their day-to-day activities and thus show a genuine interest and desire to take a part in these processes. In addition, given the lasting effect that historical legacy has on various public attitudes, it is possible to speculate that an adolescent might view their society’s past in a positive light by believing that a change is possible. That is, in comparison with undemocratic practices of the communist regime, adolescents might perceive the current functioning of democratic institutions as a successful outcome of citizens’ efforts to change the previous regime. At the same time, considering the relative stability of democratic regimes in most Western European and Scandinavian states analyzed in this research, adolescents might take certain participatory infrastructure for granted and consider participation in conventional political and social matters, at least in their conventional forms, less engaging.

**Historical Legacies or Democratic Functioning: What Matters More?**

When a multivariate model of democratic orientation was considered, some mixed results were produced with regard to relative contribution of institutional and historical factors to adolescents’ democratic orientation. On the one hand, historical legacy appeared more important in determining adolescents’ trust attitudes than was the quality of current democratic institutions. On the other hand, the contribution of the quality of democratic institutions to adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and engagement potential was significantly higher than that of historical legacies. In other
words, an adolescents’ being from a state with a fully developed democratic infrastructure is a more powerful indicator of their civil liberties and engagement potential than is the legacy of their country of origin.

In sum, the multivariate model highlighted the influence of historical legacies and institutional performance on shaping adolescents’ democratic orientation. The results of the multivariate analysis of variance suggest that adolescents display varying levels of engagement and civil liberties depending on institutional design and functioning of democratic institutions, whereas variation in trust levels is mainly accounted for by historical-political context of the countries in which they live. A general conclusion is that neither institutional nor cultural theories can provide uniform explanations of democratic orientation, at least as displayed by adolescents. That is, one theoretical approach might be better at explaining a specific aspect of democratic citizen orientation while an alternative theory might be better suited to explain another aspect. This, in turn, highlights the need for theoretically innovative ways of analyzing and explaining democratic attitudes. That a new explanation is needed is consistent with the current state of democratization research in a broad sense, including studies of popular support for democracy. As Diamond (2001) noted, “We are still a very long ways from being able to determine very clearly and satisfactorily what generates sustainable support for democracy” (p. 23).

**Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation**

The third stage of this research explored implications of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their potential involvement in future social and political activities. In more
detail, the three dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties, engagement, and trust, were regressed on five different forms of participation, including formal and informal political participation, participation in legal and illegal protests, and electoral participation. The results showed that the most important factor explaining variation in adolescents’ intentions to participate in future activities was related to their current levels of engagement. Thus, adolescents’ scores on the engagement scale explained over a quarter of their variation in their intent to vote in future elections or participate in informal social and political activities. Civil liberties endorsement appeared a modest but significant predictor of students’ intentions to take part in social and political life of their societies, accounting for about 7% of variation in one such intention. Interestingly, the civil liberties variable entered one regression model negatively, suggesting that the higher students’ score on this dimension the less likely they will be to participate in illegal activities in the future. Similar effect was observed in terms of trust, which produced negative coefficients, suggesting that the more trust adolescents place in their state institutions and authorities, the smaller their intentions with regard to participation in illegal protest are. However, the results from regressions should be interpreted with caution because, as stated earlier, the models were developed primarily to test the influence of democratic orientation on students’ predicted participation rather than explain factors that account for such intentions.

Overall, these results confirm one of the main hypotheses of this research about the importance of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their future roles as citizens and for the future of their countries in general. This has important implications for studies
focusing on democratic attitudes among younger generations. As noted in Chapter 2, underage populations, including adolescents, are relatively understudied in democratization research. In part, a smaller body of research on democratic attitudes among younger populations can be explained by a lack of consensus about the validity of studying this population group. Specifically, a number of authors have questioned the utility of studying political attitudes among younger generations (Newton, 2001). Some frequently brought up arguments in this regard include claims that young people’s experiences with political institutions are often limited and thus youths cannot form objective opinions with regard to certain social or political phenomena. Moreover, it is generally accepted that adolescence is a period of intense development during which a variety of attitudes, including a pro-democratic orientation, are formed and transformed (Denver & Hands, 1990; Sapiro, 2004). Therefore, it is often assumed that attitudes that characterize the period of adolescence are rarely stable and have little predictive value for future attitudes that adolescents might develop in their adult life.

With regard to the importance of young people’s attitudes for shaping their future values and behaviors, Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) noted:

People acquire in early life standing predispositions which influence their adult perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, then, they respond in a highly affective way to symbols which resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional responses were conditioned or associated in earlier life. Whether or not the issue has some tangible consequence for the adult voter’s personal life is irrelevant.
One’s relevant personal ‘stake’ in the issue is an emotional, symbolic one; it triggers long-held, habitual responses (pp. 370-371).

At the same time, as emphasized earlier, the value of young people’s perspectives on democratic issues stems not only from potential contributions to the future of democracy, but also, and even to a greater extent, because forming such a perspective is a value in itself.

**Bonus Research**

The bonus part of this research addressed the question of predictive validity of measures of democratic orientation for classifying adolescents into distinct groups based on their scores on these measures. Historical legacy was used as a grouping variable to help establish predictive validity of the measures at focus. In other words, the main goal of this analysis was to find out whether democratic orientation could be used to distinguish adolescents in countries with a history of communism from adolescents in countries with a history of democratic tradition.

Overall, it could be concluded that adolescents can, in fact, be discriminated by different aspects of democratic orientation. Specifically, the discriminant function results indicate that among major variables that discriminate between adolescents’ countries of origin in terms of their democratic orientation are the following: (a) attitudes toward gender equality, (b) trust in institutions, and (c) internal political efficacy. Interestingly, each of these three contributors are consistent with the three dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation identified earlier in this research – civil liberties, trust, and engagement.
Additionally, it can be suggested that adolescents from states with similar historical legacies would display similar democratic orientations. Thus, looking at the plot of group scores (see Figure 10 above), it can be that adolescents in Russia and Bulgaria, the two states that share the same historical legacy (according to Kitschelt (1995, 1997), have more in common with each other in terms of their democratic orientations than with adolescents in states with a different communist legacy or with history of democratic tradition.

The results of the discriminant function analysis are important because no research has tested the predictive validity of democratic attitudes for classifying individuals into different groups. Furthermore, the results have important implications for comparative research and policy. Specifically, the results might be used to support numerous claims about similarities of post-communist countries on a number of important social, economic, and political indicators. Despite obvious differences in historical and present conditions across countries in Eastern and Central Europe, adolescents in these societies display similar democratic orientations

**Implications for Research and Policy**

Implications of this study are two-fold. First, the results of this dissertation are likely to contribute to future research on democratic attitudes and democratization. Second, this study has important implications for policies and programs aimed at fostering democratic culture.

The primary goal of this dissertation was to improve the current understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientation, which adds to theoretical accounts of democracy. A
theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it expands the conceptualization of a pro-democratic citizen orientation to include youths from societies with varying degrees of democratic advancement. Through quantitative analyses of the ICCS and the Quality of Democracy data, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature on attitudes toward democratic values among younger generations by suggesting a three-dimensional model to explain adolescents’ democratic mindset. Additionally, the research extends democratization theory to account for historical legacies and the quality of contemporary democratic institutions as forces that influence adolescents’ democratic orientation. In doing so, the research confirmed the lasting effects of historical legacies by showing that democratic orientation among adolescents with no direct experience of communist regime appears constrained by their societies’ past. These findings point to the need for more a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the communist past, particularly in relation to individuals’ beliefs and values that continue to shape their attitudes towards each other and towards the state in general. Another theoretical contribution of this study is that it analyzes the potential of emerging democracies to develop successfully based on the degree to which youths internalize democratic values and adhere to democratic principles.

In sum, this study extends the previous research on democratic orientation among the general public by focusing solely on democratic attitudes among adolescents, a group that is relatively understudied in democratization research. Specifically, the dissertation adds to the literature through (a) comparing of pro-democratic attitudes and behavioral intentions among adolescents from emerging and established democracies, (b)
investigating the extent to which historical legacies affect adolescents’ democratic orientation, (c) examining links between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation, and (d) exploring the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and their expectations with regard to future political and social participation.

Consequently, a better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientation should help inform policies designed to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values, particularly in transitioning countries. Generally, a policy is most effective when it relies on valid and reliable data that provide accurate estimates with regard to the population of interest. However, in order to develop and implement effective policies that aim to foster a pro-democratic orientation among youths, it is necessary first to identify attitudes that can be targeted.

In light of the above, established cross-cultural variation in democratic attitudes elicits several policy implications. As was shown, adolescents in different countries display varying levels of trust, endorsement of civil values, and engagement potential. That historical legacy is a major force in determining adolescents’ trust levels is particularly interesting. Improving adolescents’ perceptions of legitimacy of state institutions and authorities have important consequences not only for the current state of democracy, but also for prospective societal order. As was demonstrated, adolescents who express higher levels of trust are less likely to believe that they will be engaged in illegal protest when they reach adulthood. These implications seem particularly relevant
for aspiring democracies, where (with an exception of Russia and Bulgaria) there are more distrusting adolescents than those who trust.

At the same time, relatively high levels of engagement among adolescents in most aspiring democracies point to a potential for favorable democratic prospects in these societies. As Dalton (2000) pointed out the importance of engaged citizens, “Democracy expects an active citizenry because it is through discussion, popular interest, and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a democracy” (p. 927). High levels of citizen involvement, an important attribute of effective democracies, might be considered an indicator of long-awaited democratic consolidation in states that are at various stages of democratic transformation. Such prognoses, however, are beyond the scope of this study and are only suggested as an avenue for future research.

Furthermore, high levels of involvement in social and political matters among adolescents in aspiring democracies offer some additional implications for policymaking. First of all, what many feared as obstacles in engaging post-communist citizens given decades of “ritualized engagement or actual prohibitions on participation” (Dalton, 2002, p. 930) appear to have little effect on modern populations, at least among younger cohorts. However, the challenge that remains is to channel this high level of engagement into meaningful participation. In this regard, more attention needs to be dedicated to identify factors that might be responsible for adolescents’ favorable opinions with regard to participation and interest in political and social issues. In addition, policies that build on and stimulate young people’s engagement should be given priority. Importantly, such
policies need to be reflected in concrete programs and initiatives that enable young people to develop their participatory skills and exercise their right to have a say in matters relevant to their everyday activities. Failure to do so might reverse these positive trends in democratic development. As Bandura (1982) observed, “Should change be difficult to achieve, given suitable alternatives people will desert environments that are unresponsive to their efforts and pursue their activities elsewhere” (p. 141). To some extent, increasing number of young people in many post-communist societies who choose to live permanently in other, often more developed, states further illustrate the necessity to adequately respond to young people’s needs to take part in processes affecting their lives.

In addition, knowledge of democratic orientation among younger populations might help formulate tools for a more comprehensive analysis of current and future democratic developments. In this regard, this study suggests that the position of youth, especially their values and behavioral intentions, needs explicit consideration in measures of democratic functioning. Young people’s attitudes and beliefs condition their behavior and could determine the course of democratic developments in the near future, as demonstrated by findings from regression analyses.

Finally, the results from this research might inform some policy debates that focus on democracy promotion and consolidation. Mainly because the results are not uniform but rather mixed, they can be used to support numerous claims that democracy has a long way to go in most aspiring democracies. At the same time, those who believe in a more promising course of democratic development in transitioning states might find interesting
the results suggesting high levels of engagement among adolescents in those states, which might indicate that at the level of public beliefs and expectations, democracy has, indeed, taken root even in states with the most restrictive former communist regimes. At the same time, it should be remembered that democratization is a complex multi-faceted process with public attitudes covering just one its aspect (Dalton & Shin, 2003).

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The measures utilized in this study to help explore the structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation and describe the context that might shape these attitudes present several limitations. Because the data at two levels were used, student and country, the limitations are grouped into two broad categories. The first addresses limitations that arose when analyzing and interpreting student-level data, while the second deals with country-levels indicators. In addition, a few general limitations pertaining to both levels are discussed.

In all analyses, this study utilized cross-sectional data collected from surveys or created with the help of observations and analyses of various case studies. Although the cross-sectional data used in this research possess obvious advantages (for example, the ICCS is the largest comprehensive initiative that collects attitudinal data specifically from adolescents), there are some limitations associated with the use of such data. One of the most commonly cited limitations is that cross-sectional data provide a snapshot of a specific phenomenon or group of phenomena at one specific point in time, thus, making it difficult to establish any causal relationships (Dixon, 2006).
In addition, the large sample size of this study might have introduced some bias with regard to interpretation of statistically significant results. Some of these limitation, including significance test coefficients for confirmatory factor analyses, were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, the sample size should be taken into account when citing the conclusions drawn from this study.

Some caution that should be exercised when interpreting the results of this study has to do with the fact that student data are about perceptions rather than observations. Although self-reported measures have obvious advantages, they nevertheless present limited opportunities for assessing a number of phenomena objectively (Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). For example, adolescents might answer questions about democratic principles in a certain way because they have an understanding of what the right, or socially accepted, answer should be. In other words, adolescents might give the answers that they perceive as socially desirable at cost of giving their personal opinions.

Furthermore, trust and self-efficacy variables included in the analysis of democratic orientation present subjective evaluations of the functioning democracy rather than normative attitudes toward a general concept of democratic society, such as support for freedom of expression or citizen participation in political life. For example, adolescents might view trust in governmental institutions as good for democracy, but their actual confidence in the government or governmental authorities might not be very high. Thus, it is possible that this disconnect between adolescents’ perceptions of norms and their actual evaluations of specific democratic conditions in their societies might have interfered with the analyses.
In regard to implications of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their prospective involvement in political and social activities, another limitation should be mentioned. Despite the fact that political socialization research has established relative stability of adolescents’ values and documented their persistence into adult years, the measured intentions to participate cannot take into account the possibility of future events or changes in beliefs that might occur between the time of the survey and when adolescents reach adulthood. Furthermore, the ICCS survey asked adolescents about their intentions to participate in specific types of political and social activities. Despite some diversity, the scales that were constructed from these items cannot be considered comprehensive measures of civic engagement mainly because they capture traditional forms of participation while ignoring the possibility of other, unconventional, forms of citizen involvement. In addition, measures of students’ prospective involvement in various political and social activities should be interpreted with caution because conclusions that were made with regard to future citizen involvement did not take into account the effect of many covariates at the student, family, and societal levels.

Next, country-level data used in the study possess additional limitations. First, the measures of democratic functioning and historical legacies were limited to existing indicators suggested by previous research. Common criticisms associated with the use of these measures were discussed earlier, specifically in Chapter 2, in the sections on Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation and Historical Legacies.

Additionally, a large part of this study focused on country-level rather than individual variations in adolescents’ democratic attitudes. Thus potential influence of the
so called intermediate-level factors, such as community and family effects, were not accounted for. Additionally, interaction effects between factors of the same levels were not adequately explored, which might have provided additional insights into the nature of adolescents’ democratic orientation. However, it should be noted that the ICCS datasets contain information on a number of contextual characteristics, including school- and teacher-level data, which might complement the findings obtained from this study.

Overall, these limitations emphasize the complexity of democratic citizen orientation and point to various influences that should be considered when studying these complex attitudinal phenomena. In light of these limitations, opportunities for future studies of democratization and democratic orientation are presented.

As was noted earlier, future investigations of democratic citizen orientation would benefit from theoretically innovative ways of identifying politically and culturally relevant aspects of democratic orientation specifically among adolescents. Such innovative approaches should incorporate insights from traditional theories of democratic political culture as well as elements from developmental research, sociology and other disciplines. Moreover, taking into account limitations resulting from the cross-sectional nature of this research, longitudinal studies could offer new avenues for addressing existing gaps in the current understanding of democratic citizen orientation and, thus, should be given priority. Additionally, some might consider the following questions to guide their research:

- What factors are related to students’ high scores on each of the three democratic orientation dimensions?
- What individual-level characteristics accompany positive democratic orientation? What features might hinder the development of such attitudes? What aspects of students’ background relate to differences in democratic orientation?

- What country-level characteristics account for variance in the distribution of democratic orientation?

- What are the processes through which adolescents develop commitment to democratic values?

- What conditions need to be fostered for youths to develop such commitments?

- What changes in citizens’ democratic orientations can feasibly be expected to take place in post-communist societies in the coming years, given the current state of democratic orientation among adolescents?

**Conclusion**

Democratically oriented citizens are important for a healthy development of modern democracies. In determining the course of democratic developments, younger generations are traditionally assigned important roles. As this research demonstrated, democratic citizen orientation is not just an abstract value or ideal commonly cited in democratization literature, but rather it presents a concrete set of individuals’ attitudes and behavioral intentions that can be identified and fostered at a relatively early age. A preliminary investigation of sources and consequences of adolescents’ democratic orientation offers several conclusions.
First, although by no means comprehensive, a three-dimensional structure of democratic orientation provides evidence that adolescents develop a democratic mindset based on a variety of factors, of which historical legacy and the quality of democratic institutions appear to have some weight. Secondly, mapping out components of this mindset helps establish important cross-cultural differences in the patterns of adolescents’ democratic orientations. Furthermore, this dissertation verified the utility of two major theoretical approaches to studying values and behaviors relevant for democracy – cultural and institutional. Surprisingly, the legacy of communist regimes appears to have a positive influence on adolescents’ engagement potential. Finally, the results of the study suggest that adolescents’ endorsement of democratic values and principles matter for a country’s long-term democratic outlook.

In sum, this study described the democratic worldview of adolescents from states with different stages of democratic development by suggesting a three-dimensional classification of democratic orientation. In doing so, it established that adolescents display an array of attitudes and behavioral intentions that are reflective of deeper cultural norms and values as well as of the functioning of current democratic institutions. These attitudes hold relevance for the study of democracy and practical interventions that aim to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values. To advance the current understanding of democratic attitudes among this age group, future research should identify factors that might be responsible for variation in different aspects of adolescents’ democratic orientation. From a policy perspective, researchers and policy
makers should continue to explore strategies for fostering democratic orientation among adolescents. After all, the seeds of all future democracies exist in today’s adolescents.
Appendix A: Research Instruments

Support for Democratic Values
There are different views about what a society should be like. We are interested in your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely.
2. All people should have their social and political rights respected.
3. People should always be free to criticize the government publicly.
4. All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely.
5. People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Gender Equality Attitudes
There are different views about the roles of women and men in society. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government.
2. Men and women should have the same rights in every way.
3. Women should stay out of politics.
4. When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women.
5. Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs.
6. Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Tolerance towards Immigrants
People are increasingly moving from one country to another. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about immigrants?
1. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own language.
2. Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have.
3. Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in elections.
4. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle.
5. Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the country has.

Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Tolerance towards Ethnic and Racial Minorities
There are different views on the rights and responsibilities of different ethnic/racial groups in society. How much do you agree with the following statements?

1. All ethnic/racial groups should have an equal chance to get a good education in <country of test>.
2. All ethnic/racial groups should have an equal chance to get good jobs in <country of test>.
3. Schools should teach students to respect members of all ethnic/racial groups.
4. Members of all ethnic/racial groups should be encouraged to run in elections for political office.
5. Members of all ethnic/racial groups should have the same rights and responsibilities.

Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Trust Attitudes
How much do you trust each of the following groups or institutions?
1. The national government.
2. The local government.
4. The police.
5. Political parties.

Response categories: completely, quite a lot, a little, not at all.

**Attitudes towards One’s Country**

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about <country of test>?

1. The <flag of the country of test> is important to me.
2. The political system in <country of test> works well.
3. I have great respect for <country of test>.
4. In <country of test> we should be proud of what we have achieved.
5. I am proud to live in <country of test>.
6. <Country of test> shows a lot of respect for the environment.
7. Generally speaking, <country of test> is a better country to live in than most other countries.

Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

**Interest in Political and Social Issues**

How much are you interested in the following issues?

1. Political issues within your local community.
2. Political issues in your country.
3. Social issues in your country.
4. Politics in other countries.
5. International politics.
Response categories: very interested, quite interested, not very interested, not at all interested.

**Internal Political Efficacy**
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and politics?

1. I know more about politics than most people my age.
2. When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say.
3. I am able to understand most political issues easily.
4. I have political opinions worth listening to.
5. As an adult I will be able to take part in politics.
6. I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country.

Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

**Support for Conventional Citizenship**
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?

1. Voting in every national election.
2. Joining a political party.
3. Learning about the country’s history.
4. Following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV or on the internet.
5. Showing respect for government representatives.
6. Engaging in political discussions.

Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not important at all.

**Support for Social-movement Related Citizenship**
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?

1. Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust.
2. Participating in activities to benefit people in the local community.
3. Taking part in activities promoting human rights.
4. Taking part in activities to protect the environment.
Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not important at all.

Demographic Variables

1. Are you a boy or a girl?
2. About how many books are there in your home?
Response categories: 0-10 books; 11-25 books, 26-100 books; 101-200 books; 201-500 books; more than 500 books.
### Appendix B: Correlation Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>0.</th>
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<td>1. Support for democratic values</td>
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<td>27**</td>
<td>10**</td>
<td>17**</td>
<td>30**</td>
<td>36**</td>
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<td>07**</td>
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<td>2. Support for conventional citizen participation</td>
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<td>43**</td>
<td>34**</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>22**</td>
<td>15**</td>
<td>31*</td>
<td>28**</td>
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<td>3. Support for social-movement citizen participation</td>
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<td>21**</td>
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<td>31**</td>
<td>26**</td>
<td>12**</td>
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<td>4. Interest in social and political issues</td>
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<td>02**</td>
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<td>14**</td>
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<td>16**</td>
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<td>5. Internal political efficacy</td>
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<td>16**</td>
<td>10**</td>
<td>15**</td>
<td>13**</td>
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<td>6. Gender equality attitudes</td>
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<td>40**</td>
<td>31**</td>
<td>08**</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>7. Tolerance toward ethnic groups</td>
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<td>17**</td>
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<td>8. Tolerance toward immigrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11**</td>
<td>03**</td>
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<td>9. Trust attitudes</td>
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<td>10. Attitudes towards one’s country</td>
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Note: *p < .05  ** p < .01
## Appendix C: Summary of Discriminant Function Analysis

### Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Function 1</th>
<th>Function 2</th>
<th>Function 3</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Support for democratic values</td>
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<td>Trust attitudes</td>
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<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<td>-0.76</td>
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<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tolerance toward ethnic groups</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
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</table>

### Function at Group Centroids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of historical legacy</th>
<th>Function 1</th>
<th>Function 2</th>
<th>Function 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established democracy</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic socialism</td>
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<td>Accommodative socialism</td>
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<td>-2.03</td>
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<td>Patrimonial socialism</td>
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<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Bonus Finding

![Graph showing correlation between Dem Ranking 0809 from Dem Qual and equal rights gender. R² Linear = 0.767.](image)
REFERENCES


World Economic Forum (2002, November). *Trust will be the challenge of 2003: Poll reveals a lack of trust in all institutions, including democratic institutions, large companies, NGOs and media across the world.* Retrieved September 13, 2010 from http://www.voice-of-the-people.net/ContentFiles/docs/VoP_Trust_Survey.pdf


