Rhetorical Inventions/Inventional Rhetorics: Opening Possibilities

Justin Hodgson
Clemson University, hodgson@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Rhetoric and Composition Commons

Recommended Citation
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/383

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
RHETORICAL INVENTIONS/INVENTIONAL RHETORICS
OPENING POSSIBILITIES

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Rhetorics, Communication and Information Design

by
Justin Dale Hodgson
May 2009

Accepted by:
Victor J. Vitanza, Committee Chair
Cynthia Haynes
Todd May
Christina Hung
ABSTRACT

This work seeks to open possibilities for rhetorical invention, or perhaps more accurately, to indicate how changes in technology (and the essences of technology) are opening radical possibilities not just for rhetorical invention but also for how we speak, how we think, or even how we live in our worlds. It traces shifts in rhetorical invention: beginning from primary oral cultures, which made linkages via a process of "AND" or divine inspiration, represented by the +, to literate cultures (or print-cultures), which predominantly invent via analogy and discovery, represented by the =, and to electronic cultures, which revel in the avant-garde art technique of juxtaposition as inventive strategy, represented by the /. Working then with this / as guiding invention strategy, and turning to Gregory L. Ulmer's conductive logic, puncepts, and chorography as / possibilities, this work attempts to re-envision classical rhetoric concepts *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* in order to open new considerations and complexities for rhetoric (and for the university) as we move out of 19th century academic traditions and unfold into the 21st century possibilities.

More specifically, using the / as inventionnal process, and working with Ulmer's corpus, this work attempts to open radical possibilities for rhetorical invention by seeking to move it out of restrictive economies that limit inventive potential and into more generative (general) economies of possibilities. In doing so, it opens the conversation to issues of absence and "absencing" (in counter-distinction to Martin Heidegger's notions of presencing), to unstable electrate schizo-nomadic "sub/ject" possibilities (which become generative, in nomadic/tourism fashion), and to the catastrophic (introducing radical possibilities for restrictive economies).
Additionally, what this work does, aside from reconstituting rhetorical invention as a mix of Ulmer's conductive logic, Lyotard's paralogy, and Leibniz-Borges-Deleuze's vice-diction, is that it works with an inventive methodology. This print-culture product sits on one side of the slash, and an/other, an alternative, rendered in the electronic assemblage platform Sophie2, sits on the other side of the slash. In their juxtaposition, this dissertation and its digital/electronic other, they perform the very possibilities of rhetorical invention being critically offered in this work.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to my parents, who provided just enough support for me to believe anything was possible and who gave me just enough spite to see if that was true; to my son Gavin, who added a good kind of pressure and drive; and to my lovely wife, Nicole, who is without measure—for without her, nothing in my life would be possible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the Institute for the Future of the Book (if:book) and the Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the University of Southern California for an honorarium to attend a workshop on Sophie2 in May 2008. Specifically, I would like to acknowledge Bob Stein and Virginia Kuhn for their insight during the workshop, helping me develop a fairly exacting understanding of how to exploit the programs (inventive) possibilities.

Additionally, I would like to thank the College of Architecture, Arts and Humanities and the Rhetorics, Communication and Information Design program at Clemson University for providing me the opportunity to spend a summer semester studying at the European Graduate School in Saas Fee, Switzerland. It was an educational experience that has come to bear on this dissertation in ways I cannot even begin to articulate.

It is with the deepest of gratitude that I also acknowledge the time, effort, and expertise my committee members provided in order for this dissertation to be possible. As such, I would like to thank Todd May, Cynthia Haynes, and Christina Hung.

And in a less official role, this work would not have been possible without the extended conversations of my fellow RCIDers. Specifically, I am indebted to intellectual exchanges with Joshua Abboud, Sergio Figueiredo, Joshua Hilst, Jason Helms, and Amanda Booher.

One final acknowledgement, to my committee chair: thanks for everything VV—you pushed me to be better than I ever thought possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.  Exigence: Naming/Inventing the Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Conduct(Ion) Unbecoming</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Logos: Inventing (with) Logoi</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.  Ethos: Ethea of Invention</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.   Pathos: Inventing (with) Catastrophe</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.  Pedagogy: Inventive (Un)learning</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENDNOTES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORK CITED</strong></td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I

Exigence: Naming/Inventing the Problem

I

In April 2006, the Chronicle of Higher Education ran an article called "Digital Dust Up," written by Peter Monaghan. In the article, Monaghan discusses the troubles Virginia Kuhn encountered in trying to get her successfully defended dissertation published through the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee system.¹ The issues Kuhn kept running into revolved not around content, which is often the holdup with doctoral work, but around form (even format): her dissertation was "digital," but far more than just an Adobe (pdf) version of a print-based document. Her work, constructed in TK3,² used images (moving and still), hyperlinks, pop-up boxes, and so on and introduced possibilities and functions more in keeping with digital media than the traditional print-culture associated with the dissertation. In the article, Kuhn is quoted as saying, "As I did my research, I became convinced that I had to put it in this digital format, because the subject is what happens to writing, now, in this digital age. I couldn't make the argument without the digital format" (A42). The digital format was not only integral but necessary for her work on multimodal literacy: it had to be done in a medium that allowed for things not possible in print-literacy media. But Kuhn's work is not the first to transgress or push the print-literacy boundaries of doctoral scholarship.
In 1998, Christine Boese submitted to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute her Web-text dissertation, which used an ethnographic approach to study *Xenaverse*, the cyberworld fan consortium for "Xena: Warrior Princess." She adopted a medium (working in hypertext) that allowed her to do an integrated ethnographic study of *Xenaverse*’s online culture, where Boese was a participant-observer of the culture and where the culture itself commented on and participated with her dissertation as it developed and after it was "completed"—this level of ethnographical operation is not available, or significantly more difficult, in traditional text-based approaches or text-based critiques and analyses of "cultures."

So we have two, officially. Two. That is where the number currently stands. We are nearly a decade into the 21st century and all indications are that these are the two who have had digital dissertations accepted by American universities. Granted, there are others who have done or are doing digital or multimedia things with their dissertations, pushing the "accepted" boundaries of doctoral work, but these are the two.

While their contents and forms vary significantly, these two open significant issues that will have to be addressed by the academy. Whether dealing with the publication of these works, which cannot be done in traditional dissertation-publication houses, at least not yet, or addressing copyright issues (specifically, Kuhn's work), the University, as genus, will have to wrestle with these issues sooner rather than later, most likely yielding some of the controlling dominance of print-literacy to other media. These issues of literacy-politics are interesting in their own right, and could use their own significant exploration, but what these two do that is of specific importance to my work is that they open us to something else, to an/other way of approaching scholarship.

Whether as ethnography (Boese) or multimedia pedagogy (Kuhn), the two digital works engage/necessitate a *different way of thinking*—they are critical engagements of
scholarship that function outside/beyond the restrictions of print-literacy. They work from various media and from various perspectives. More specifically, they put on display the limits of literate scholarly practices as both Kuhn and Boese encounter resistance (and reluctance) and strain the boundaries of the university—pushing at the borders of the capstone of the educational system: the doctoral dissertation.

Both Kuhn and Boese operate in a digital medium, in an electronic apparatus, and in so doing they radically alter the potentialities of (the game of) their scholarship; they create something other, something different than the expected print-literacy alphabetic text, and the issues raised by this are fundamental to this work: What does this digital form of scholarship open? What does it allow to be said, to be thought, to be created, invented, generated? How vitally important is this medium/message relationship?

I mention Kuhn and Boese not because they will be the focus here but rather because they raise particular issues that must be addressed in this work and in the academy in general: what are the implications, even possibilities, of digital scholarship, and what can digital scholarship help us unfold? Thus, to take these works (and their author’s efforts) a step further, I too will pursue this other form(at); I too will work in a digital medium to create my work, but I will and/or must also write a traditional print-based dissertation.

Two, then, it shall be. I will create two doctoral works: this print-based version and its other, its always present other, a digital version. This will not only provide for comparative, integral, and layered examinations of what these two different approaches can/will produce, but also provide a way to address the general resistance my ideas and scholarship may encounter from the digitally-less-affluent or the print-based ideologues.

Since much of my work will focus on moving beyond/ across/through the boundaries of literacy—among other restrictive economies—as a way to open other
possibilities for rhetorical invention, or to allow other to come forth, I cannot work strictly within the literacy apparatus (e.g., print-culture dissertation) as all of my scholarship on the matter would be practicing a performative contradiction. Many "traditional scholars," who might take issue with my work, would indicate (i.e., "sink their claws into") this contradiction and write-off my efforts as naïve scholarship or faulty logic, despite my open acknowledgement of this inherent performative contradiction. Thus, if I work only in printed-text, only within the bonds of literacy, I would not be able to escape the medium-imposed prison that holds the pulpit from where I would speak in this traditional form.

Thus, to move out of this performative contradiction, to help open other potentialities, and to allow me to work in multiplicities and multiple media that do not adhere to strict literate logoi, I will also create digitally—the always present other to this print-based dissertation. For this digital creation, I will work in Sophie2, a software application that is the most recent evolution of the TK3 format Kuhn utilized.

In May 2008, I was selected and received an honorarium to attend a workshop on Sophie2 at the Institute for Multimedia Literacy (IML) in the Annenberg Center at the University of Southern California. The workshop was led by Bob Stein of the Institute for the Future of the Book (if:book), which co-sponsored the workshop with the IML. At this workshop, I learned not only how to operate the software—itself conceived as an electronic book (e-book) platform—but engaged/conversed with other participants on the potentialities the application opened for digital scholarship: it functions not only as an assemblage application, an architectonic art, but also actively forces users to rethink and reconsider how they make linkages, how they connect ideas, or how information/knowledge is to "flow" in and from the creation. Sophie2 is fundamentally so much more than a book
or even e-book; it allows for connections and moves that simply are not possible in print or even with print metaphors.

As the relationship between technology and rhetorical invention is of crucial importance to what this discussion hopes to accomplish, my using Sophie2 to create another dissertation, one silently working alongside this print version, allow for more effective and more dynamic explorations of the possibilities for rhetorical invention in an electronic/digital age. My work, which includes the illustration or performance of the difference between print and digital/multimedia technologies, is, on some level, a process of *ephrasis*, and it cannot be done simply in print-culture alone. That would only imitate, at best, the rhetorical invention possibilities the digital allows, and I am not interested in mimesis here, especially the 19th century notion. Rather, following Gregory L. Ulmer’s shift in "The Object of Post-Criticism," I am, on another—though perhaps same—level/layer, breaking from mimesis to mechanical reproduction (as Walter Benjamin constructed it) as a means of representation, which is a move by post-modernist/post-structuralist critics and theorists to embrace the avant-garde art revolution of collage/montage (a technique I will more specifically address later).

Additionally, my two-fold approach allows me to satisfy the degree requirements established by my institution, Clemson University, which does accept digital dissertations, but this digital is limited to Adobe (pdf) versions of printed documents, with strict formatting requirements that meet the needs/restrictions of the dissertation storehouses. Also, working in this other medium, this other, digital apparatus (Sophie2), allows me to work more progressively, to allow for other possibilities, and to make scholarly comments and contributions in ways print-culture cannot.
What this beginning has shown, hopefully, is the importance of (re)considering container and contained, medium and message. Marshall McLuhan told us that the medium is both the message and the massage: "This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology" (Understanding Media 7). What I am trying to "extend" here, from myself and in relation to technology, asks that I work in, and work to introduce, a "new scale." But how does one introduce a "new scale" when the form/medium one must use resists the "new scale?" I, a 21st century scholar, am asked to compose 21st century scholarship in 19th century tradition: the text-based dissertation, a practice that is part of the very issues I am attempting to address/resist.

McLuhan and Quentin Fiore tell us, "The extension of any one sense alters the way we think and act—the way we perceive the world," (41). It is difficult, nearly impossible, to express/generate the implications of these extensions when hemmed in by literate logoi, when forced to operate within literate "extensions" or restrictions.

In Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, Walter J. Ong tells us, "Once the word is technologized [by writing, print, or computer], there is no effective way to criticize what technology has done with it without the aid of the highest technology available" (80). If this is true, then to work only in print-culture (i.e., traditional dissertation) while focusing on the implications/palpitations of rhetorical invention in relation to emerging multimedia communication technologies—or, more generally, in relation to electronic discourses—seems to be an exercise in futility, for to critically engage this particular technologization of the word, as Ong indicates, would require working in/with that technological apparatus,
which here *is* and *is not* nothing technological, echoing (or rather shadowing) Heidegger's implications in "The Question Concerning Technology" (3-12).

But the doctoral degree—which requires a dissertation: this dissertation—is a product/process of the institution of literacy (school/university), and so I cannot simply abandon the print-based medium as doing so would be to abandon the institution, which is not a viable option for one who wants a career within/of the institution itself. Thus, the need for creating two dissertations: this work in the expected print-based medium for dissertations and an/other rendered in a medium of the "highest technology available"—rendered in electronic discourse: specifically, working in Sophie2.

You might still ask why? Why two dissertations? (Anticipated) Response: Because emerging technologies—and continual technologizations of the word—open possibilities and potentialities to thought, to invention, to linking that simply cannot occur in the horizon of literate logoi. Or, maybe more accurately, literacy, as it stretches (extends?) its long-arm into this new technological world, tries to exclude, restrict, or eliminate, and what I seek is to unfold the marginalized, the excluded, the eliminated, the abject in relation to rhetorical invention, opening up possibilities, impossibilities, compossibilities, and even the incompossible; or, put yet another way, I am attempting to unpack, unfold, and/or generate possibilities for invention rhetoric, which are intimately intertwined with technology (and questions concerning such).

III

The "long-arm of the law," in this case the "literate arm," attempts to continue (with) its infection (c.f. Victor J. Vitanza's "Critical Sub/ Versions" 47), pushing its ontotheological
strictures (perhaps scriptures) onto the possibilities of new technologies. We can see an example of this issue with *Wikipedia*,¹³ which falls prey to operative literate logics when it engages in disambiguation: "disambiguations are paths leading to the different article pages [with] the same term as their title" (*Wikipedia: Disambiguation*). These disambiguations provide *Wikipedia* a way for dealing with entries that have multiplicities of meanings.

Specifically, as further illustration of this example, the term "cutter" has a *Wikipedia* disambiguation page with 32 links (paths) to possible *Wikipedia* "articles," and it also has links to 3 other disambiguation pages (related terms "cut," "cutting," and "Qatar").¹⁴ By separating this ambiguated term with its various meanings and usages, by dividing them into incompatible spaces, essentially considering them oppositional in nature, *Wikipedia* creates *clarity*—which is a trope that attempts a part/whole relation through classification of meaning and usage. We have come to expect such tropological divisions as customary (literacy interpellations), but if we play freely with these potential meanings and approach them as appositional instead of oppositional, we can use the ambiguity in, as well as semiotically across, these meanings as ways to invent, to discover, to make linkages in unexpectedly revealing ways. If we focus on some of the apparently disparate subjects that exist in the entry "cutter," we can work through electrate logoi, connect them through a logic of what Gregory Ulmer calls *conduction*,¹⁵ which is a *paralogic* of associations based, in part, on puns and homonyms and just simple linguistic *accidents* (what Aristotle might refer to as *tuché*):

The character Cutter John from Berke Breathed's 1980s comic *Bloom County* was a wheelchair-bound Vietnam Veteran; in *Cutter & Bone*, the 1976 thriller by Newton Thornburg, one of the main characters (Bone) is
a Vietnam Veteran who tries to convince his friend (Cutter) that he
witnesses a murder; in the film *Cutter's Way*, an adaptation of Thornburg's
novel, Cutter becomes so obsessed with the murder (and his subsequent
conspiracy theories) that finding the truth in the mystery is his driving
force; in [finally, yet rebeginningly] the comic book *Elfquest*, created by
Wendy and Richard Pini in 1978, Cutter is the main hero and his name
comes from "his skill with a sword, but also from his desire to *cut through*
*lies and deception and uncover the truth.*" (*Wikipedia*: Wolfrider; my emphasis).

While the various Cutters are separate, in some single Aristotelian possible world,
determined by the principle of non-contradiction, they can also appear co-extensively and
semiotically together across myriad Leibnizian-Borgesian-Deleuzian incompossible worlds,
overdetermined by the principle of vice-diction (see Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and
Repetition*). These various incompossible worlds are not cut off necessarily from each other,
as the classical Leibnizian view initially demanded. With Borges and Deleuze's rethinking of
Leibniz, there can be movement (or communication) between and among the incompossible
worlds, or monads. The principle of non-contradiction is replaced by the principle of vice-
diction, a shift from restrictive to generative practices.

One remix, among others, therefore, that we can develop from this sampling of
"cutters" in terms of incompossible worlds is that *Cutter*, now our hero, is a wheelchair-
bound Vietnam Veteran dedicated to *uncovering the truth*. We could keep building on the
conductive linkages in free-play writing that (can) exist across these terms by working more
figuratively with the uses of "cutter," more ambiguously, more linearly, or even radically
less linear and with more quasi-schizophrenic, or paralogical, linkages:
He was in a cutter, sails high, slicing across the ocean of flesh, leaving a wake of blood behind, hoping, praying to find the Cutter, the back alley "surgeon" known as the Butcher of Baker Street, who would rescue him by severing him from his own disfigurement; no longer sure if he was subject or object (patient or knife), he kept echoing the song lyrics of The Cutter: "Come to the free-for-all with celo-tape and knives, something something, we will escape our lives, spare us the cutter, spare us the cutter."

But Wikipedia's disambiguation, of course, does the exact opposite of these types of conductive linkages; rather than build/create with the multiple possibilities (or incom- possibilities) of "identities" that exist for any given entry, Wikipedia falls into an operational logic of its print-based ancestors (the dictionary and encyclopedia). It uses disambiguation to separate the possibilities, to disconnect the intermingled layers which develop from definitional, social, cultural, even personal use, and it attempts to produce exact (part/whole or part/part) meanings that can ensure "perfect" communication between rhetors and audience—of course, this assumes that "perfect" communication is possible and that it is the goal of communication, both of which are suspect. What our remix attempts, however, is exploratory ways of creating counterfactual, or a plurality of, worlds (cf. David Lewis, Counterfactuals and On the Plurality; Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities 177-271), but doing so through rhetorical invention and in terms of euretics, which is differentiated from hermeneutics. Euretics makes something with while hermeneutics makes something of (see Michael Jarrett, Drifting on a Read 3-20), a difference not unrelated to Nietzsche's distinction of active forces and reactive forces (see Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy 57-59).
Whether electric, print, or oral—*Wikipedia, Britannica*, or professorial (sticking with
the institution in which this work finds itself)—any attempts to "fix" meaning, perhaps
"affix" would be a less ambiguous term, only furthers the quasi-elitist practices of the logics
of high literacy (or the logics of the alphabet) by marginalizing all forms of communication
that function specifically within pluralisms (i.e., the pun/puncept or homonym as well as
improper proper signatures/naming). Of course, in the reign of print literacy, marginalizing
(and/or excluding) these other possibilities from general academic considerations was
relatively easy, but as cultures of electronic discourses have emerged so have the possibilities
(and need) of other logics—logics that will account for, utilize, and embrace the previously
excluded. While deduction, induction, and abduction (inference) tell us a great deal about
our places in the world, they, by design, exclude much that would be counter to what goes
for thinking. Hence, the need, given the possibilities, of a counter-logic, or paralogic, of
conduction, which takes up with the vocabulary of electricity, or digital studies. Hence, the
need, given the possibilities, of an other dissertation, which moves out of the strictures of
literacy and engages vocabulary and logoi of electricity—a move beyond the grid (*grund* or
premises) of the "city state" (the anticipated polis) of "reason" and into the electri.city state
of *abgrunding*, of intuition.

IV

As should be indicative from the play above, we will follow a rhetoric more akin to
Vitanza's Sub/Versive Sophistic Rhetoric (a.k.a. the Antibody Rhetoric), and work to
counter the infection of the philosophical tradition on Rhetoric (and the septinium in
general). Additional, this is a move from the "old" rhetoric—Aristotle's influenza with a

11
focus on persuasion—and even a move from the "new" rhetoric—Kenneth Burke's influence with a focus on identification—and instead a drifting in Jean François Lyotard's paralogism, with a focus on instabilities, marginalia (marginals), de/stabilization and dis/placements, among other (sub/verting or perverting) connections.

We must, then, as Jacques Derrida tells us in "Psyche: Inventing the Other," work to "unsettle the givens," to subvert the anticipated conventions of this work:

It is certainly expected of a discourse on invention that it should fulfill its own promise or honor its contract: it will deal with invention. But it is also hoped (the letter of the contract implies this) that it will put forth something brand new—in terms of words or things, in its utterance or its enunciation—on the subject of invention [...] To however limited an extent, in order not to disappoint its audience, it ought to invent. We expect that it state the unexpected. (315)

But we must also keep in mind that we are not only pursuing a discourse on invention but also that we are (or should be) working in terms of invention—that is, the occurrence of invention—with the singular (unique) structure of an event that seems to produce itself by speaking of itself, by the fact of speaking of itself, once it has begun to invent on the subject of invention, paving the way for it, inaugurating or signing its uniqueness, bringing it about, as it were, at the same moment as it also names and describes the generality of its
genre and the genealogy of its *topos: de inventione*, sustaining our memory of the tradition of a genre and its practitioners. (317)

Therefore, this subversive, counter-inventional rhetoric must "write the paradigm" or, to follow Gregory Ulmer's approach in *Heuritics: The Logic of Invention*, this intentional rhetoric must "use the method that I am inventing while I am inventing it, hence to practice hyperrhetoric" (17).

To practice hyperrhetoric, following Ulmer's use as he traces it from the area of design of hypermedia interface, is to "replace the logic governing argumentative writing with associational networks"(18). Working hyperrhetorically—in both print-based and electronic apparatuses—we shall invent the other, the impossible, but not in the same manner as Derrida's "inventing the other." Rather, our other will be other in counterdistinction to the same/other dichotomy, which Derrida uses purposefully to limit moves in his text and to advance the deconstructive reading. We will follow the line of opening avenues to allow other to come forth, but this will not be a bringing impossible into the possible—for this too is a limited construction, working in an *a priori* horizon (of possibility). Rather, we will open a gate to the *abgrund*, letting monsters of all sorts come as they may, in whatever form they can; it is an attempt to provide generative access to the world of difference (perhaps even *differance*).

V

The gate (perhaps our gait) is being opened, if not blown off its hinges, by technology, by the possibilities technology opens. Much in the way that alphabetic writing,
and its later offshoot the printing press, opened us to worlds of literate logoi, "new" technological apparatuses are opening us to something else, something other, that is and is not our other. And this unfolding comes with inquiries: What other ways of thinking, what other ways of linking, what other possibilities for rhetorical invention emerge for us at the beginning of the 21st century? What other avenues for thought are technologies opening for us as we further unfold into McLuhan's electric age or as we fully become ensconced in Ulmer's electacy? While what is sought here resists being put (in)to questions, these questions nonetheless float near the heart of the matter, and as such, I will revisit these throughout this work—often working in the margins or peripheries of these questions (and questionings).

It is important, though, at this point that I acknowledge/address, briefly, Ulmer's term electacy, mentioned above, which is a key term in this work. Electacy "is to digital media what literacy is to print" (Ulmer, Internet Invention xii). But more than that, as "new" term, it provides a way for engaging discussions on electronic discourses and related developments of rhetorical invention without housing the entire discussion inside literacy terminology (i.e., multimedia literacy or digital literacy, which further the extension of the "literate arm"—see also "The NCTE Definition of 21st Century Literacies," adopted by the Executive Committee of the National Council of Teachers of English [NCTE] in February 2008).

Electacy allows (an other) space to think about rhetorical invention in relation to "new" technologies. But electacy itself, as concept or puncept, did not just appear, not even for Ulmer (as some of its beginnings can be found in his "vidocy" in Teletheory). Call it history, past, virtual, memory, what have you, there is a traceable arc (both here and in the Sophie2 other) that can provide access to some of the issues of rhetorical invention that I will be exploring—an arc that flows from primary orality to literacy to electacy.
This arc, perhaps an ark, will provide some guiding "historical" grounds (maybe better thought of as shifting *grund*) as I examine/explicate rhetorical invention in primary oral cultures, literate cultures, and electrate cultures. I will traverse this arc/ark (and develop this work on rhetorical invention) by exploring the major proofs of *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*, and their (re)conceptualizations through these "historical/cultural" constructions (to be covered in Chapters III-V). For now, what is of value to this discussion is to trace (and retain), even s/lightly, the permeations of rhetorical invention from primary orality through literacy to electracy.

Primary Orality

Often in print culture, we make a distinction between individual and singular, with the former being a part of some whole (collective), while the latter becomes a part of nothing since it is singular, that is, peculiar, because it is *exilic*, as in exiled from the part/whole or part/part dominant logic. However, in primary orality, the very idea of an individual/whole identity may have been laughable as the world was communicated as a free-flowing wildness, be-wilderness, composed not of stable sub-jects/obj-ects but with protean shapes perhaps best understood in terms of not *ethos* (relatively fixed characters, proper personae) but *etbea* (relatively unfixed, ever-shifting, therefore, un-subjected entities) for rhetoric in the most positive sense. This is because rhetorical invention in primarily orality was not fixed since guided by *mythos* rather than *logos* (not unlike the approach we indicated in the free play of the *Wikipedia* "cutter" example).

Primary oral cultures were additive rather than subordinate, aggregative rather than analytic, and situational not abstract (cf. Ong 36-50). Rhetorical invention, during this time, had many associative constructs: from its connections to inspiration (via the muses), to
listening to the *logos* (Heraclitus's Sybils), to narrative building blocks (Homeric poets/bards) (Havelock 11). As such, rhetorical invention in primary orality was predominantly one of method not one of content—the poet connected the parts perhaps more so than manipulating language (though that was an integral component as well). Rhetorical invention allowed/aided something to come into existence, whether from muse, *logos*, or story—with narrative having (at least) a dual role of this aiding something into existence as well as being the predominant mode of (cultural) memory of the time.

Rhetorical invention in primary orality operated by a process of "AND," a linking by "AND," shown most evidently in the bardic narrative. Bards built narratives by adding together narrative chunks and/or preexisting epithets to create a narrative flow. Thus, we might be able to construct primary orality as a culture of the + symbol, a process of perpetual plus signs, representing the rhetorical invention of "AND." This is how they generated stories, how they passed on cultural memory (generation plus generation plus generation), but this is also representative of an intersection. If we think of the vertical line of the plus ( | ) as "divine" and the horizontal ( — ) as human, we get rhetorical invention where they meet: "divine inspiration" (+). As Havelock has discussed, there was an inventive flow in primary orality attributed to the Muses (a vertical); similarly, we could also view this as Heraclitus's "listening to the logos" in the Sybils utterances (also a vertical). These are, of course, just two among the many + (in)(com)possibilities.

*Literacy*

During the shift from primary orality to literacy, a period Ulmer refers to as orality, rhetorical invention develops strong associations with discovery. For example, in Aristotelian rhetoric, rhetorical invention deals with the discovery of points of contention,
like "finding" the assumptions underlying the enthymeme, or discovering basic areas of argument, outlined by the topoi, or more simply discovering the best available means of persuasion (through basic proofs or appeals of *ethos, pathos*, and *logos*). This is the beginning of the most prevalent understanding of rhetorical invention for the past 2000+ years: rhetorical invention as act of discovery.

As literacy's influence infiltrated all manner of thinking, there was a shift away from the *euretic* (inventive) and toward a more oppositional construct of *hermeneutics* (interpretation and definition). Specifically, we can see the shift illustrated in Augustinian rhetoric, where invention became relevant to the interpretation of scripture—one still "discovered," but did so in restriction to (The) text. This shift to hermeneutics took over as literacy exploded into (and through) the Gutenberg era and we moved into cultures of print-literacy.

The advent of literacy literally altered everything as it shifted us out of the mythic and into the analytic, the philosophic, the logical. First, literacy externalized thought; it moved memory onto the page (part of why Plato didn’t trust it). Literacy also created what Deleuze and Guattari would call "organs": roads, aqueducts, grammars—things that control flow (and potentially desire). It shifted us out of the additive/situational/temporal of primary orality and into cultures of more restrictive/abstract thinkers, operative from a genus-species analytic—or what Deleuze and Guattari might call being "arborous" thinkers given our new found propensity for tree diagrams. With literacy, particularly after Aristotle, we were taught to think/link by categories, divisions, cause/effect (or effect/cause) logics: we shifted from the + to the =, with analogy, not narrative, being the guiding premise ([something of] a is = to [something of] b). With literacy, and this illusory ability to fix meaning/identity, to pin/pen down, we were able to construct term on one side of the
equation and "true" meaning on the other. Thought began to work in closed systems, restricted systems, with limits (the equal sign puts a finite moment onto the culture of the plus).

Electracy

As Vitanza has told us, "The movement from orality to literacy is now rushing to a third place" ("Writing the Paradigm"). (I include this here because of Vitanza's specific label "third place"). Electracy is/as the third, the emergence of communicative space or construction for the other, the excluded middle, the absurd, the horrendous, the contradictory, and so on—it signals performative possibilities (and compossibilities and even the incompossible). This shift to a "third place" works counter to the operatives of literacy; it is an emerging counter-logic, as Ulmer has told us, "not against literacy, [but rather] is a new and different kind of intelligence and reasoning and practice" (In Bumb Halbritter and Todd Taylor's film, Remembering Composition).

Electracy does not work from consumptive (masculine) logics; it is not governed by the "kill the father" mantra of "Father Time" or "father Freud." Rather, it works from the feminine. While the masculine/feminine form a binary, the reference to "feminine" is not "biological," for the "feminine" (as in chora, or khora) alluded to is a third term itself, in search of an improper proper name for the sake of performativity.36 The chora, Ulmer explains, is "between" being and becoming and thus "a third kind of nature," "a third gender/genus" (Heuretics 63, 65).

I will more explicitly revisit this notion of chora in Chapter II, but for now it is important to see this "third place" as that which is "between," as the space of the threshold, as that which separates yet binds. This is a double-reading, or what Derrida would call
double session, as it is always both separation and connection. Relatedly, Ulmer's work on
the post-critical object (as mentioned in section I) and his use of the avant-garde tradition of
collage/montage, which is the *art of juxtaposition*, further opens the dualistic nature of this
kind of connection or linking to which I will turn: to juxtapose, to place in relation to one
another while retaining separation. This linking is tropological: as Hayden White has
discussed, troping is the simultaneous deviation toward and deviation away from certain
possibilities (*Tropics of Discourse* 2).

I am unfolding the logic of the cut, or the art of the /. There are echoes of this turn
toward the slash in Virgil Lokke's "virgule" (a linguistic/extralinguistic relationship), which
he tells us *separates yet binds*, but this is "an unspecified binding that is always more than pure
adjacency" (315). Linking via the slash—which Lokke unfolds in the works of many notable
figures, and which proliferates in electronic environments (http://)—opens spaces for
hystericities and schizo-linkages, putting irrational and even unreasonable on par with the
rational or reasonable; it adds equal emphasis to both the logical and nonlogical topoi. It is
opening up a world of infinite connections. Thus, I offer a view of us having moved from
the + (additive; oral) to the = (analogy; literate) and now to the / (juxtaposition; electrate).

VI

Of interest within these shifts is the move away from the millennial/bi-millenial
dominance of the hermeneutic position (and its logoi of subjugation, including its subjugated
inventional concept of heuristics) to a position more in the horizon of the heuretic—this is a
move from interpretation to invention. This shift from = to / exposes how cultures of
literacy (and the "traditional" logoi that govern them) limit/reduce inventive potential by
breaking/separating the linkages amongst the layers of meaning; while cultures of electracy, operationalized primarily by conductive logics (more fully explored in Chapter II), open new avenues for making linkages. Emerging here is a paralogic, in Jean-François Lyotard's sense—what is import is not how you link, but rather that you link. Or, in more expansive terms, in Lyotard's words: "It is necessary to link, but the mode of linkage is never necessary" (Differend 29).

By examining logoi that underlie electracy (conductive as well as modal logoi), I intend to open avenues to thought not founded on principles of reason (identification, non-contradiction, and excluded middle)—thought that can temporarily suspend or allay those restrictive principles, thought that can open other possibilities, other logics, heretofore, generally viewed as sophisties. Through electracy, we can see that logoi of literacy (or of alphabetic cultures) are not—I would say, should not be—monolithic, for there simply are thoughts that "traditional" logoi do not and cannot account for: e.g., thoughts that come from homophonic resonances (from homonyms resonating together).

In pursuing these issues through this literate, discursive process (e.g., this print-based dissertation), I must provide some structure (dispositio), but I want to avoid the "traditional" conception of chapters (categories) and instead think of the "sections" as gravitational points. These centers of gravity have no predetermined boarders and are not (and cannot be) mutually exclusive. There will be clear areas of overlap and contradiction, unfolding, refolding, and enfolding, and so on, as I attempt to conflate terms, undo and redo various rhetorical constructs, and alter landscapes and perspectives of rhetorical invention.

Chapter II - Conduct(Ion) Unbecoming will unpack Ulmer's construction of conduction and conductive logic, along with his chorography, to open the conversation to logoi and/or possibilities of thought that function in ways that are performative and that resist
"traditional" logics (or the mainstays of logocentrism: induction, deduction, and abduction). This will work us from paralogy to hyperlinking and even into and through hysteric[s] and logics of the unconscious or dream reasoning (in the Freudian sense, and Ulmer's uses of such). It also will expose us to joke logics and working in punceptual (rather than conceptual) registers. By opening up punceptualities, chorographical ranges, and generally possibilities of/for other logics and other ways of approaching scholarship (working across knowing, doing, making), I can revisit some foundational rhetorical concepts/principles and work to add layers of complexity to these possibilities, which is to bring them more into the fullness of the densities that already reside in these classical terms (like logos, ethos, and pathos).

Chapter III - Logos: Inventing (with) Logoi will trace the concept of logos (rhetorically, philosophically, sophistically) as it has developed, or rather become marred, from primary orality through literacy to electracy. Following Heidegger's work on this term, as well as the work of Andrea Nye, and revisiting logos in the Sophistic tradition, I work to open rhetorical invention to different possibilities; for example, the radically different constructions that occur from the alteration of logos as reason to logos as the power to name. By conflating the meanings of logos, opening the conversation to a multivocal understanding of this term, one perhaps prior to the influence of metaphysics, I hope to build clear and strong (or stronger) connections to rhetorical invention. Again, it is a matter of linking—merging terms like apophasis, legein, aletheia, and others to radically alter how logos gets constructed/used and to add significance to rhetorical invention (as process, concept, and puncept).

Chapter IV - Ethos: Ethea of Inventing will follow the pattern established in Chapter III of working via a form of archeological etymology, here in specific regard to the classical rhetoric term ethos, beginning with a shift to its plural form: ethea. This is an attempt to open the multiplicities of identities associated with this term, which includes the concept of
"identity" itself (among others). By working through *ethos* this way, I resituate approaches to engaging this classical rhetoric concept: Starting from the important implications of the marginalization of *etbea* in relation to *ethos*, and then making connections with terms like ethic, subject, agent, self, and so on, I continue to shift how this term relates to and impacts rhetorical invention. But also, as these restructurings open infinitely new layers of rhetorical invention in relation to the traditional conception of *ethos*, I use these emerging other potentialities within the term as avenues for inventing, via *etbea*, rhetorical possibilities.

*Chapter V - Pathos: Inventing (with) Catastrophe* follows the pattern of Chapters II and III, conflating the many meanings (directly or associatively) of *pathos*. Emerging from Greek word πάθος, meaning "experience," and later meanings associated with *pas/sein*, *pathos* brings together terms like suffer, disease (dis/case), anguish, animosity, loss, accident, and occurrence, among others, and this complicates the possibilities of working with *pathos* in relation to rhetorical invention. It becomes more than just emotional appeal, and instead can be a way for entering into conversations on suffering, rhetorically inventing with dis/case (working schizophrenically or in hystericıs), or even inventing the catastrophe.

*Chapter VI – Pedagogies: Inventive (Un)learning* will discuss how reconstituted understandings of rhetorical invention, in light of my pursuit of opening possibilities, can become applicable in educational settings. Specifically, following the *themata* of the work, it will undo some of the restrictive expectations the university has developed in order to allow for yet other ways of thinking (other logics) to take up residence within the university culture. It will look at how this work can help shift the university back to a culture of invention, to a space for/of creating/inventing cultures and realities. Also, in providing a theoretical "grounding" for the value of pedagogy for electronic discourses, this "gravitational center" hopes to open gates for other pedagogies. Thus, building from
Ulmer’s works, I will attempt to articulate a post-pedagogy of rhetorical invention designed specifically for embracing possibilities and for the inclusion of electronic discourse as an integral part of the academic setting/experience.

The movement toward electracy asks for a re-envisioning and revisiting of rhetorical invention because its possibilities are radically altered (altering) in relation to (changes in) technologies—a movement impacting our words, our thoughts, even our lives (how we might live): saying, thinking, being. In this emerging space of multimodal creations, lying just beyond our fingertips, and rapidly becoming an integral part of the university, not only is there the possibilities to rethink rhetorical invention, but to *remake* it, to help it move from restrictive economies into more generative, inventive approaches—not to provide some new "final solution" or create some new philosopher king, but rather to open up yet other possibilities.
An exchange from Plato's *Ion* (~535c; emphases added):

**Socrates.** I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,—are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?

**Ion.** That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

**Socrates.** Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire and has golden crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears sweeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one despoothing or wronging him;—is he in his right
mind or is be not?

Ion. No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind.

Socrates. And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most spectators?

Ion. Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking; and I am obliged to give my very best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives.

This opening passage from Plato's Ion has resonance throughout this chapter, especially in relation to "right mind" and "going out of oneself," and as such is the "Ion" of the conduction here in many ways. But I will let those connections unfold as they may. What is important to note here in this (re)beginning is the title: "Conduct(Ion) Unbecoming." This chapter is on conduction and the plethora of possibilities that live within that term and its root "conduct." As such, it examines issues of connection, relay, behavior, passageway, direction, guidance, and the like. What's more, this chapter will seemingly try to perpetually rebegin—as beginnings are often inventive moments—as well as fold back in on itself. Thus, pulsating back and forth, electric leaps to previous and future moments, should be expected, though not anticipated.

As this leaps and/or pulses, it will be important to keep in mind that here, as well as in the Sophie2 other, that I am working to navigate or engage (spaces of) performative contradictions. This occurs not only in producing a digital-other to emerge alongside this print
version, demonstrating an/other space for these kinds of contradictions to develop, productively so, but also occurs within language itself. Thus, this work of words, words, words will also require a certain performativity—working from a position of the object of post-criticism—and it will be in this play, of making of/making with words, and what this opens, that I begin to unfold possibilities conductively through/across performative contradictions.

My focus on making with performative contradictions stems from being a product of the Rhetorics, Communication and Information Design program at Clemson University, which is based in the triad of knowing, doing, and making. As such, rather than follow the traditional (if not singular) approach of knowing, I attempt to rebegin with making first, not exclusively via Aristotle's Poetics but more so by way of Ulmer's Heuretics, or Euretics—as we might see Ulmer as an "extension of Aristotle's Poetics, but with the perverse addition of comedy over tragedy" (Vitanza, "Writing the Paradigm"). For this work, I hold Ulmer to electronic culture what Aristotle is to print culture; thus, I will move within the possibilities of comedy, of joke-logic, which, among other comedic turns and returns, involves a logic of the pun, which is choragographical and conductive (introduced in the Exigence and to which I will return later in this chapter).

Therefore, I will begin with the third in this line of knowing, doing, making—there being more than coincidence in its positional number—and work after the neo-Kantian sublime, letting it back up through practice-pedagogy to theory, turning theory into making a spectacle (of one's others). Part of that spectacle will include working in performative contradictions as well as enacting the paradigm, which here is conductive logic and joke logic. But within these moves there must remain a certain sense of oscillation (working eternally
across/through the slash), a shifting between critical and performative (de)composing, with both often occurring in the same instances, and so I will toggle us through, stylistically.

Thus, with this chapter focused on conductive logics, and on playing with performative possibilities in language, it will be littered and lettered with electric language: an attempt to "write the conductive paradigm." It will move conductively (at times, *tic[k]*)). It will sound electric (at times, *tock*). But it will not do these freely as this would be a *tic* (heretofore, sans "k") for the literate apparatus, a violent/violating *tic*, causing people to avoid these dis/orders. Th *tic* can be worked more freely in the Sophie2 other, but here, in print, it will be more *tock* than *tic*, with *tock* referencing to the game *Tock* (a board game like *Sorry!*), where the object is for each player to get all his/her tokens home.

Continuing this conductive metaphor: in *Sorry!* the start and home are the same location, a closed circuit of logic, and only a 1 or 2 (card) can release the tokens initially. What I seek requires at least a 3 to get us started—my *tic*, a third play, a third Sophistic—and thus why the *tock* here (1 or 2) prevents this *tic* (3) of electric time. And the token-home is the river of Heraclitus and Cratylus. Or, like Ovid in *Metamorphoses*, "My intention is to tell of bodies changed/To different forms" (3)

Electric rivers notwithstanding, and attempting to avoid games of *Sorry!* what emerges then, conductively here, is potential relations between registers of rhetorical invention. For example, one thinking of the game of *Sorry!* might be to think of apology (a rhetorical game in its own right), and perhaps then to think it an *Apollo-g Apollo-god* of light, an important figure when thinking conductively of electracy, which may be likened to a "writing with light" (in both McLuhan's construction in *Understanding Media* and Vitanza's in Halbritter and Taylor's *Remembering Composition*) and likened to the nine muses dancing around Apollo,¹ opening an orality (re)connection. Thus, the muses (the great inspirers)
return, dancing around a "god of light," extending linkages for Father Ong's "Secondary Orality." Of course, the muses also passed judgment (they judged the contest that cost Marsyas his life), which is something traditionally not associated with invention. This is "judgment" by the relay, the mediators between the other-divine and the inventor-mortal, and as such is a different kind of judgment, though I doubt Marsyas would agree.

What I am opening, then, is invention that can access the "writing machine of judgment," but not in the sense of the incorporeal transformation that occurs within law courts, but judgment "that determines my intuitions, what 'feels' right and proper, or wrong and improper, not to leave these feelings in place but to make them available for writing" (Ulmer, *Heuretics* 145). Thus, this rhetorical invention seeks to get us out of, even if only temporarily, judiciary logics—a most difficult task, especially in the literate apparatus; I will write with Apollo- gy, *Sorry!* for my *tics*, on which Vitanza has done much work.²

II

In 1989, Ulmer told us, "During the Renaissance, humanists led the educational reforms associated with the rise of literacy and the new technology of the press. Humanists today are no less responsible for developing the educational potential of the new technologies of memory and communication" (*Teletheory* 8-9). Now 20 years removed from this statement, we are fully immersed in the educational moment where the humanists are, in fact, attempting to take on this responsibility—just look at the plethora of work, statements, calls, directions, pursuits, and the like focusing on digital or multimedia literacy (again, I reference NCTE's statement, "The NCTE Definition of 21st Century Literacies"). We are firmly in the flow of a great humanistic opportunity, but what will our moment be? How will
it be remembered? If we continue to apply literate models or alphabetic logic(s) to the
apparatuses of the new technologies of communication, we may be remembered simply as
the humanists "who just didn't get it."³

What is opening, or what has opened, in the emerging electronic-oriented
technologies of communication is not literacy-based. Yes, it is a technology of
communication, one as much ensconced in "words," in language, as its predecessor literacy,
or its predecessor orality—here not necessarily a chronological relationship, following
Derrida’s problematizing it (see Of Grammatology)—but this technology of communication is
not literacy, nor orality (nor secondary orality for that matter), and therefore it should be
approached from an/other lens. The new instauration is opening us to thinking and
communicating in and with images and video and audio, among others, bringing more (and
perhaps yet some more) into the repertoire of communicative potential than what literacy or
orality allow. As such, this asks for a break from the controlling modes of "reason," or what
Timothy Reiss might label the dominant analytico-referential discursive structure and
method for thought (23), and pursue a different kind of thought: Paul Feyerabend, in
Against Method, says,

We must invent a new conceptual system that suspends, or clashes with
the most carefully established observational results, confounds the most
plausible theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot
form part of the existing perceptual world. This step is counterinductive.
Counterinduction is therefore always reasonable and it has always a
chance of success. (32)

What is sought is the counterinductive, but in a way that is in greater relation to otherness
than to inversion—for it makes sense that counterinduction "always has a chance of

29
"success" and is "reasonable" because it sits relationally to an *a priori*. Thus, what I seek is a different mode of reasoning altogether, not a dialectical change (negative or affirmative) but something else, something "not in relation to."

I will utilize Ulmer's work, both on conduction and on his turn to chora, as well as an underlying guidance of Lyotard's paralogy, to open possibilities in this work—these dual works—and thus to engage this "something else." I will, if one will allow the analogy, ride the paralogical "chimera" through the gateway Ulmer has constructed—a gateway that opens a previously uncharted garden, perhaps a (not-so) secret garden, one which cannot be plotted as it is a garden of wildness (*etbea* perhaps), a (be)wilderness even, eternally growing/flowing. The entrance to this garden will be through Ulmer's gate (perhaps his gait—following Aristotle's Peripatetic tradition), but I will not necessarily follow (in mimetic fashion) the path(s) he made into this "wildness;" rather, like him, I will merely play in the weeds: "Discovery [. . .] requires the tolerance of weeds—of things that are out of place" (Ulmer, *Teletheory* 171). The weeds here may not be weeds at all, as is the case with all weeds, and this may be the greatest asset of this "garden of weeds."

Following this line, it is necessary to explore Ulmer's efforts, but not as answer to a(ny) research question or a(ny) given problem for rhetoric and composition, but rather as relay to something else, something *other*. And it should be noted that this *other* is not the other of the other/same binary, but *is still yet something other*—a "yet other" which I will "make sing" up and down the chain of signifiers, listening for what resonates. But to do this (any of this, really), I must take us drifting: be adrift, let drift.

Drifting in this manner will put us on a course to nowhere/everywhere. I am not drifting us to any place, but rather to/through events, or occurrences, perhaps even styles,
which have major import for this conversation. My taking us adrift, however, will not be
without a guide, as, like Plato, I too have an E-stranger."

_E-Stranged_

I speak, of course, of Plato's Eleatic Stranger (from his _Sophist_), but something still
stranger yet: the Electric Stranger (E-Stranger). The E-Stranged, like the Eleatic Stranger,
will take us on a wandering (a drifting) to "find" that which we cannot know before we know
it—it is a discovery that is also an invention, a production/realization resulting from the
medium (of activity). This "mapping" (to borrow from Deleuze & Guattari in _A Thousand
Plateaus_) will ultimately shape what, if anything, can be located from these efforts; this is not
unlike the potentials I hope to "unconceal" from my dual dissertation approach: the _bow of_
each allowing for fundamentally different "maps," even if covering similar terrain. But this
"mapping" is not of that which _is_, not of that which sits "always already" in time, waiting for
our electric wanderings, but rather is a co-extensive simultaneity that develops in the very
moment—an eternal kairotic moment—as our encounter with it.

In this sense, the E-Stranger helping us drift is not unlike Roy Wagner's
anthropologist, who "in the act of inventing another culture, [. . .] invents his [sic] own, and
in fact he reinvents the notion of culture itself" (_Invention of Culture_ 4). Thus, both "mapping"
and "cultures" may be thought as rhetorical inventions.

_Electrate Anthropology_

What I am exploring in this work is not just technologies of communication but
cultures—cultures of thought, cultures of thinking and linking, cultures of invention—
composed of people, people whose very ways of living (thus, questions of "how might one
live?" ) are directly influenced and altered by these technologies. There is a cultural shift occurring—or rather one, two, or three+ shifts have already occurred—and we are still trying to grasp the complexities of that change. I do not pretend to be able to explain those complexities, not in any singularity or entirety, but rather I offer a look at what possibilities start to unfold for us within these changes: in this approach, with the cultures I am examining, my work might be considered conducting anthropology.

The anthropologist, borrowing from Wagner's work, acts as cultural translator, for his own as well as well as the other(s)—anthropologist as mediator (medium) between two (or more) cultures: the anthropologist experiences or encounters an/other culture and then translates/mediates that into a native tongue, acting as relay. What we are in need of then are relays, mediators, thinkers who occupy this "middle space," helping to invent both the emerging culture of electracy and to (re)invent the previous—yet simultaneously available—cultures of literacy and orality. (I will return to these relays throughout this work, as the relay here may in fact be what this entire unfolding is about.)

What Wagner further opens is this idea that we cannot see our own culture(s), to which I would also add our own ideologies, following James Berlin's work in *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures*. We are essentially blind to our own culture(s) until we encounter other(s):

"Culture is made visible by culture-shock, by subjecting oneself to situations beyond one's normal interpersonal competence and objectifying the discrepancy as an entity" (Wagner 9). Culture made possible by encountering the other. Culture made visible by articulating difference (or differance).

The prominent model offered by Wagner in this articulation of difference (or differance) is where one sees the other (other culture) and attempts to describe/translate it in terms of the same (one's own culture)—even if actually inventing both in the same moment,
as Wagner indicates. This is the extending, controlling, equation-ending game of literacy, extending same onto other—and this is also the problem of trying to communicate that which is other, that which cannot be communicated (here drifting to Gorgias's negative trilemma). This practice can be seen in the Wikipedia example I provided in the Exigence, as well as in works that use phrases like "digital literacies" or "multimodal literacies." These essentially create differends—two positions in need of a third for adjudication (see Lyotard, Differend)—placing new/other within the framework of the same, constructed within the language itself, the words, words, words used to name.

What is needed is something else, perhaps an electrate anthropology, a model performing difference (or differance), a model where the focus is not to describe difference (or differance), to translate otherness, but rather to let these "cultures" share space, to juxtapose them, relate them to one another conductively, let them vibrate against (alongside) one another, in a way that reveals what chirographic works (alone) cannot. See, for example, the film The 5 Obstructions, particularly the scene where Jørgen Leth is eating the lavish meal in the streets of the red light district in Bombay, India. Letting cultures resonate in shared space—"culture shock" without explanation/interpretation.

And yet, even here, despite Lars Von Trier's obstructions/instructions to the contrary, Leth still feels a need for separation—using a translucent screen in the backdrop. His screen of demarcation. Of difference. This translucent screen, itself a double-reading, acts as resistor, resisting/restricting the flow of electrical current or conductive linkages between guest/host (host/guest). It is both the / of the scene and that which destroys the /.

Conductively, then, what is emerging in this discussion are issues of guest/host relationships, resistors, and screens, which I shall address in turn for each has importance for exploring possibilities, for thinking possibilities.
Guest/Host

It can be argued that this other into same anthropological translation, and the pursuit of interconnectedness of same and difference, only "places" this exploration within the horizon of the same, within a game of reproduction (cf. Muckelbauer's "singular rhythms" 57-72), but I think there is something else here, something more.

The medium here, the "anthropologist," our electrate anthropologist, is inventing both cultures (same and other) simultaneously in this moment. Not one in relation to the other, as an a priori relationship, but as in "together emerging," with each infecting the other. This is the drifting of the Eleatic/Electric Stranger, and the drifting of "the medium is the message" and "massage" of McLuhan—reciprocal infection.

As such, the electrate anthropologist maybe likened to that of the parasite: the point of infection for both cultures (literacy and electracy). The electrate anthropologist, our /, the "site" of infection: "The parasite is a microbe, an insidious infection that takes without giving and weakens without killing. The parasite is also a guest, who exchanges his talk, praise, and flattery for food. The parasite is noise as well, the static in a system or the interference in a channel" (Michel Serres, Parasite x). The parasite is all three of these; it is a thermal exciter, unavoidably producing change: creating fevers, providing entertainment, creating instabilities in attempts at consensus.

We can see a performative example of this electrate anthropologist as parasite, at least in print-cultural production, in Stephen Pfohl's Death at the Parasite Café: Social Science (Fictions) & The Postmodern, where Pfohl's work "explores the bodily invasion of an expanding host of fleshy human animals by a cold, uncanny and consumptive addiction to a seemingly endless flow of informational bits and pieces, fragments of a world that never existed, electronic memories of fears and attractions that have no substance" (7). But more than just
its critical engagement with the content of the work, Přhol's style is exemplar of this parasitic electrate anthropological infection as it flows in a wild(e) mix of montages and mashups as well as "standard academic prose" (whatever beast that may be).

But without moving as far to the performative as Přhol's work, the parasite as invention is really quite a common engagement or strategy for compositionists (or any academic writer for that matter) as the parasite is a fundamental core for academic work.10 We engage the parasite, perhaps better thought as para/cite,11 excising the words and dis/eases of others and include them in our own (or perhaps vice versa) in order to let them create change in our own—to either inoculate us to viral responses (by housing our line of thought in a particular infection) or to ignite the antibodies (the Antibody rhetoric á la Vitanza) our works must produce to fight them off. 12

This act of para/citing (citations that work alongside our texts) might also be seen as creating conductive linkages, electrical resonances, between "all that is" of the host work and "all that is" of the guest work (whichever each may be). Or, to push this even more dangerously, this para/citation may be the act of "inventing" the very illusory "conversation" we hope to engage with our works/words—yes, a revealing of the "tricks" of the "magician."13

Additionally, another conductive aspect emerges in the infectious game of para/citation, and that is cite/site as conduit, as passageway into an entire other "circuit" of work(s). This is how much of the scholarship found in this work was encountered—existing as cite in another text, leading me to explore yet other texts, which house yet other cites, and so on as I infectiously followed the conductive path.

Thus, this act of scholarship, specifically as an act traversing cultures—working within and across print-culture and electrate-culture (i.e., the Sophie2 other), inventing both
cultures and conversations—is also a para/critical relationship, and one that exists on the slash (as at least one possibility). This para/critical space, the slash, is a space of conduction, where "germs" pass from host/guest to guest/host and back. This "in-between" (though it may just as easily extend "out-beyond" as well—thinking of air-borne pathogens and guests) will resonate with my later explorations of chora, but for now I must delay the choral noise\textsuperscript{14} as there are yet other conduction-related avenues, like resistors and screens, that I set up to explore before making this connection. Granted, my explorations of screens will link us directly to chora, but for now, in this apparatus, I must resist (though, in Sophie2 this resistance is not necessary as "readers" can navigate these issues with a bit more conductive flexibility).

\textit{Resistors}

Resistors are a vital component of electrical systems (and electrical discourse). They restrict the flow of current, which can be crucial for many components connected to electrical currents. For example, an LED light needs a resistor to prevent too much current from damaging the light. Thus, resistance is an integral part of a conductive exploration, as without it the flow (perhaps \textit{ethos}) of electracy could damage all LEDs—which here I might offer of as Logoi of Electrate Discourses.

But resistor, this notion of resistance, also connects us to community, to Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of community, where resistance is the necessary component that binds groups together—the "in" of "in common" and an "in" that works in opposition to itself. We can see this in the resistance inherent between the individual and the community:

Following Rousseau, Nancy tells us of the modern community where resistance is integral to
its formation, "a society producing, of necessity, the solitary figure, [. . .] the citizen of a free sovereign community" (Inoperative Community 9).

Distinct from society [. . .] and opposed to emprise [. . .], community is not only intimate communication between its members, but also its organic communion with its own essence. [. . .] it is made up principally of the sharing, diffusion, or impregnation of an identity by a plurality wherein each member identifies himself only through the supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body of the community (9).

This resistance is a necessary component of the formation of each, the individual and the community—not unlike Wagner's anthropologists who invent same in the moment they are inventing other. Or, in Nancy's words, "The relation (the community) is, if it is, nothing other than what undoes, in its very principle" (4), meaning the relation of each to the other undoes each and other; we might think this the slash of individual/community. But Nancy takes this resistance a bit further, beyond the individual/community relationship. He tells us:

Community is, in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to immanence. Consequently, community is transcendence: but "transcendence," which no longer has any "sacred" meaning, signifying precisely a resistance to immanence (resistance to the communion of everyone or to the exclusive passion of one or several: to all the forms and all the violences of subjectivity). (35)
The play here of immanence and transcendence, of a resistance working across both, may be conceived correlationally to Leth's translucent screen, a separation, but one that still allows for connection—not a laceration or severing from, but an obfuscating (even if only partially) of one another. It is tropological. The resistor here restricts the flow of one into the other, allowing for both to eternally become and unbecome from the other.

III

It is important that before I move too much further into this work, and specifically before I delve into the remaining issue of "screens" opened in the previous section, that I explore conduction (and some potentials of/in conductive logic) to continue to push this work in unexpected directions. Thus, this section will palpate the possibilities of conduction.

Conductive logic works differently than traditional modes of reason—as may be seen in the previous ticking introduced, perhaps the tic one hears when standing under high voltage power lines—and this can be hard for some to follow—specifically when occurring in a literate medium not quite prepared to accommodate conductive thinking. But it is imperative that I move this way (and that), let things flow and flow where they may, as this allows for things to "come forth" (in a pseudo-Heideggerian sense) that are not possible—at least not in this way—in other modes of reason. Thus, if I am to follow Ulmer's attempts at an "invention of a new academic discourse" given the changes in technologies of communication that make us (think) electric, I must break with "the dominant forms [. . .] fostered in the alphabetic apparatus" (Teletheory 69): "a new term is needed [. . .] in order to identify the electronic properties of differential reasoning. The term is conduction" (85).
Conduction, as embraced here via Ulmer's work, is a "fourth mode of inference," which "electracy adds to the modes formalized in the apparatus of literacy (abduction, induction, deduction)" (Internet Invention 114). As it is an addition, following a logic of "AND"—explored in connection to orality in the Exigence—it does not seek to "abandon, exclude, or replace analytical thinking; [rather] it puts it in its place in a larger system of reasoning" (Ulmer, Teletheory 89). This move allows for conduction to be one of a set of choices for reasoning, and one that is more applicable to the "streets" or "paths of light" we traverse in the electracity. It is not an elimination of analytical thought, but a move that says, "and there is this too"—allowing something else to emerge, letting something else be thought. Following Lyotard's work, this allows us the opportunity to bear witness to new idioms, to bear witness to "things" not possible in previous modes of inference.

Conduction, which I utilize here as an/other way of thinking/linking, which opens yet other ways of thinking/linking (i.e., generates inventive possibilities, in paralogical fashion, with more begetting more), does more than just resonate with electronic discourses; since I am dealing with technologies of communication, working at the level of language, it also opens things within language—specifically, joke logic and joke "reason" (pun being on at least one locale of the joke spectrum, especially bad puns) as well as other letteral games: homophonic resonances, anagrammatic reinscriptions, malapropistic turns (Freudian slips), and the like, all which can be envisioned as working conductively.

I will rebegin, then, with this immersion in conduction, by returning to "reason," emotional or otherwise, because "reasoning by conduction involves [...] the flow of energy through a circuit" and short-circuiting this flow "gives us a new definition of truth as 'a relationship of conduction between disparate fields of information,' [...] illustrated here in the conduction between the vocabulary of electricity and that of logic" (Ulmer, Teletheory 86).
This conduction between the discourses of electricity and logic not only generates many connections in need of exploration but also is an example of the very possibilities that can manifest from conductive linking.

Paralogy

At work within conductive reason is a process of connection, of linking, much in the venue of Lyotard's paralogy. Similarly, in "Literature and History," Rosalie Colie writes, "anything can be made to connect with anything: the trick is to distinguish the real from the illusory connection" (20; cited in Ulmer's Teletheory 106). But if I operate under the view of Baudrillard's fourth level (Simulations 11-13), this distinction between "real" and "illusory" is an unnecessary (even impossible) step. This distinction isn't necessary because connection, linking, "anything with anything," can happen whether or not components of that connection are real, illusory, all simulacrum, or even yet something other. But what this "anything with anything" connection does open, in relation to paralogy, and specifically conductive connectivity, is an issue of some concern around linking: as Lyotard has told us, "It is necessary to link, but the mode of linkage is never necessary" (Differend 29).

This view, anything linking with anything, can generate some moral concern. As act of juxtaposition, we can connect donkey/balloons, frogs/pistols, or other seemingly nonsensical connections, but this also opens space for man/woman, man/man, woman/woman, man/woman-man, man-woman/man, man/sheep, woman/donkey, and so on. This freedom to connect can raise many a moral ire as the potentialities of this "free" connection may become "abomination" in some circles (or even circuits—perhaps the evangelical circuit; though, to be fair, there are many circuits that consider these linkages to be an abomination).
As with any system of change, it is not the potentialities themselves that are
dangerous, but rather that these potentialities can challenge the very principles or fabric
much of our society is based on; of course, we should know that whether adhering to *physis*
*or nomos* (or some "third" possibility), there is one linking that is violation across "all"
principles: the incest taboo (see Claude Levi-Strauss's *Elementary Structures*).

That is not to say that conductive logic or paralogy is opening space for the incest
taboo to no longer be violation, in any system, but rather that it is understandable that with a
desire for open, unrestricted invention also comes excessive fears that any "abnormalities"
that may occur in inventive linking may become commonplace (which could be more
fortuitous than perilous). Thus, when we generate or invent, especially when we teach these
things in composition courses, there is a tendency to want to do so with some restraint, with
some control over the potential end, hoping to create Hercules, but fearing to create
Frankenstein. The truth is that we cannot have it both ways; we cannot open invention to
"free" connectivity, working conductively across "what may come" (guided by Electric
Stranger) and expect that we won't accidentally (or purposefully) fuck a sheep along the
way—perhaps, like the Electric Stranger, it will be an electric sheep, not unlike Rick
Deckard's sheep(s); or perhaps I am entering us into yet another iteration of Philip K. Dick's
*Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*—pushing the possibilities of Deckard even further as not
only would I raise the question of whether or not androids dream, but also whether or not
those dreams are erotic?

The question is, what does this kind of "inventive intercourse" (a phrase to which I
will return) open for us that was not possible before, including a certain self-reflexive
paranoia (again, thinking of Deckard, though here thinking more of Harrison Ford's
portrayal). The key is that there is still a successful linkage even if, much like science (housed
in Popper's falsifiability), all we learn is what does not work, what connections violate particular guides of acceptability—whether by choice, by feel, by social constraint, by any number of resistant forces (a resistance to which I will return throughout this work).

Though, I am not sure if one android having sex with another, even if human android and sheep android, violates any particularly established "codes" as neither are human and the "codes" involved seem to be those strictly connected to humanity (and thus to humans only).

The joke here is not that "we" fucked a sheep, nor that it was an electric (or perhaps inflatable) version, and thus simulacra, but that "anyone in his right mind" would consider this a potentially insightful occurrence. My goal in unfolding this work on invention is to find a way to "move out of oneself" in order to allow some other to be "spoken."

Sometimes we may not end up exactly where or how we anticipated—for if we did, then invention would not have occurred. This is an affirmative wandering. Letting (be)cum what may. An "unfortunate" joke—especially for the sheep.

Jokes

Again, jokes are not the game here, but they also cannot be excluded as there is a conductive element to jokes. Both Freud and Umberto Eco have indicated a short-circuit thinking/linking that occurs between layers (or sets) as being the core component or operative to jokes. Thus, joke logic may be seen as working conductively, via short-circuiting, an arcing (to return to electronic discourse) across the layers or sets that lie juxtaposed. The "logic" works by traversing the juxtaposition in an unexpectedly revealing way: Ulmer tells us, "One of the best, and simplest, illustrations of this shortcut or switching
between unrelated or non-contiguous domains—a principle feature of jokes—is the pun. The pun, of course, is said to be the least funny of all joke types" (*Teletheory* 75).

The pun is of extreme importance to this work as it lies at the soul of Ulmer's construction of conduction. Aside from replacing the concept with the punconcept, a shift in 'ceptual' thinking, the pun itself is a language game that traverses the juxtaposition; it is, as John Allen Paulos tells us, "the intersection of two sets. A pun is a word or phrase that belongs to two or more distinct universes of discourse and thus brings both to mind" (61; cited in *Teletheory* 75). This notion of the pun as belonging in two or more sets/discourses simultaneously creates a way (or "site") to jump back and forth across various registers. The pun is "writing" the slash here: we might think of photos, images, films, books, magazines, and so on as puns, occupying personal and popular discourses, personal and expert discourses, expert and popular discourses (that is if I restrict our thinking to only working across the three levels of invention that Ulmer identifies as fundamental to his mystery, the genre of teletheory that works in conductive logic). The pun is a relationship of resonances across registers, working in the space of the slash, opening us to fits of laughter.

*Hysterics*

One additional area this connection to joke logic opens is hystéricas—as in to laugh hysterically. But there is more to the conduction of hystéricas than mere laughter. In fact, Freud’s hysteria is littered with electricity:

> I shall scarcely be suspected of identifying nervous excitation with electricity, if I return once more to the comparison with an electrical system. If the tension in such a system becomes excessively high, there is
danger of a break occurring at weak points in the insulation. Electrical phenomena then appear at abnormal points; or, if two wires lie close beside each other [juxtaposition], there is a short circuit. Since a permanent change has been produced at these points, the disturbance thus brought about may constantly recur if the tension is sufficiently increased. An abnormal 'facilitation' has taken place. *(Studies 203)*

It is this short-circuiting I am pursuing, the leaps that lead to "abnormal facilitation," for here is where unexpected possibilities begin to occur.

Freud continues, "there are resistances in normal people against the passage of cerebral excitation to the vegetative organs. These resistances correspond to the insulation of electrical conducting lines" *(Studies 203-204)*. At what he terms "weak points," or points of bad insulation—though, perhaps not weak at all—the electrical current (cerebral, affective excitation) can leap from its conduit onto another system, another path, another ground (i.e., peripheral organs); "There ensues an 'abnormal expression of emotion'" *(Studies 204)*. Again, abnormal and emotion emerge in this conversation, two which have very little value in traditional, masculine logics but which have equal importance in conductive registers.

This jumping, arcing out of/across conduits, is either due to excessive or "a high degree of intracerebral excitation" (a flooding of the circuits and lines—i.e., the nuclear catastrophe of digital culture) or due to "abnormal weaknesses of the resistances in particular paths of conduction" *(Studies 204)*. These weaknesses can derive from a person's constitution ("innate disposition"), long-term exposure to "states of excitation" (which can weaken the entire structure), or weakening influences like illness, malnourishment, or
"disposition due to states of exhaustion," (ibid)—all of which might be found in the doctoral student trying to complete a dissertation (or two).

Additionally, Freud tells us, "The resistance of particular paths of conduction may be lowered by a previous illness of the organ concerned, which has facilitated the paths to and from the brain" (Studies 204; my emphasis). Thus, infection can further help perpetuate conductive logic as it weakens the resistance to paths of conduction—or, said another way, the para/critical relationship weakens the resistors that prevent conductive flow, thus opening for greater conduction. If one suffers/experiences (pathos) illness, infection, or dis/ease, one is likelier to be susceptible to the intracerebral (electric) excitation arcing to the "organs" (which also control flow, see Deleuze & Guattari's Anti-Oedipus)—whether circulatory (networks), digestive (abject), or peripheral (sense: common, bliss, and non). Thus, to open massive channels of conductive flow, it would be in our best interest to be infected by the other—which might put us into hysteric, productively.

Taking this further, it is somewhat amazing, in my view, that we are not all already hysterical. That we all do not have hystertics, à la Vittana's tics, and perhaps the tics of heuristics and heretics. Then again, maybe we do and we just don't know it or see it (a blindness to ourselves)—like I explored in relation to the possibilities Wagner opened in The Invention of Culture.

In Freud's construction of hysterics he tells us of two basic causes of hysteria: physical trauma and psychic trauma. Of the psychic trauma, he identifies a specific kind of hysteria that emerges from blocked associations (i.e., the prevention of linkages):

The genesis of hysterical phenomena that are determined by traumas finds a perfect analogy in the hysterical conversion of the psychical
excitation which originates, not from external stimuli nor from the inhibition of normal psychical reflexes, but from the inhibition of the course of association. The simplest example and model of this afforded by the excitation which arises when we cannot recollect a name or cannot solve a riddle, and so on. [. . .] The strength of the excitation caused by the blocking of a line of associations is in direct ratio to the interest which we take in them—that is, to the degree to which they set our will in motion.

(Studies 209; my emphasis)

We experience these kinds of "blocked associations" as a "natural" part of the literate world, which Ong tells us is something even the nonliterates cannot escape as literacy has so infiltrated life that it is ingrained into (Western) thinking\textsuperscript{17}—for literacy (and literate-alphabetic logoi) privilege certain associations over others. In fact, following the principle of non-contradiction (and the law of excluded middle), it could be said that literate-alphabetic logics prevent certain associations, and as such it is a wonder we are all not (more) hysterical. Of course, we may have lived with this dis/ease for so long that to live is to live in this "mild" hysteria. All days are sunny days. Thus we no longer see the "sunny." (Perhaps the hysteria I see/feel here is "in direct ratio to the interest" I place in this issue).

What is emerging here, then, are instabilities, in thought, in logic, in linking, in/sanity. This chapter's opening excerpt from Ion is becoming more and more prevalent as, perhaps, we have never been "in our right mind"—moving outside of ourselves like the rhapsodist during primary orality and then into the blocked associations of literacy leading to mild hystérices. Thus, instead of trying to "fix" our dis/eases, I argue we should write with
them, make with them, let our *tics* do the "talking." In fact, to play further with Derrida's host/guest indistinguishability, all we may be is our dis/eases, our *tics*, our infections.

**IV**

In relation to the blocked associations that can lead to the hysterical, I must also explore another connotation of our title: conduct unbecoming. My scholarship is steeped in Ulmer's and Lyotard's work, but there is a particular hesitance in the field of rhetoric and composition to approach these two when working on rhetorical invention, which is a blocked association for me. Specifically, outside of Ulmer's students who do great things with his work, like Craig Saper in *Artificial Mythologies* and Michael Jarrett in *Drifting on a Read*, there is a tendency to marginalize Ulmer from rhetorical invention conversations, and Lyotard rarely fairs much better—with rhetoric and composition scholars preferring to adhere strictly to post-1966 canon of thinkers on rhetorical invention (i.e., Richard Young, Janice Lauer, Ann Berthoff, Alton Becker, Kenneth Pike, Robert Scott, James Berlin, Karen Burke-Lefevre, and so on). There are two recent works that engage in this particular type of conduct: Stephen Yarbrough's 2006 *Inventive Intercourse: From Rhetorical Conflict to the Ethical Creation of Novel Truth* and John Muckelbauer's 2008 *The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change*. These two texts differ drastically in their approach, treatment, and (para)tactics for pushing rhetorical invention onto new "grounds," for new ends, and as such encompass a wide spectrum of thought and style. Yet they both participate in this joke, albeit a bad one, which is the common (mis)treatment of Ulmer and Lyotard's work. I will look at Yarbrough's and Muckelbauer's work in order to unpack this
issue of conduct, but also because I need to acknowledge them if I am to participate in the

current conversation on rhetorical invention.

Yarbrough

In *Inventive Intercourse*, Yarbrough attempts to articulate a theory that allows for the
invention of something new, or what he refers to as "creating novel truth." "In order to
conceive anything new or novel, we must enter into another mode of discourse, a special
mode of interlocution," labeled "intercourse," and based on "interpretive charity," which he
borrows from Donald Davidson (xii). This approach, which emerges in relation to his "one
world view," does a couple of things that should be noted: first, it places the entirety of his
work within the interpretive tradition, and second, it places his work on invention within the
horizon of conversation (opening it to dialectic as well as paralogy). I will deal with these
issues in turn: the first and a drifting, and the second and whatever would drift from that.

For the first issue, in Yarbrough's "intercourse," interlocutors cannot move outside
of interpretation and truth, or, specifically, the principle of "interpretive charity":

Under charity, interpreters assume that what their interlocutive partners
say that doesn't make sense is nevertheless true—not error, ignorance, or
deception—and so they are motivated to enter a dialogic process of
interpretive vision and revision in search of the causes of the other's way
of using words, a search that can end in the interlocutors' reconception
of the way things are in a particular situation. (xii)
This creates a positive notion of interlocution; it hints toward the generative and changing powers of conversation, specifically in relation to problem-solving, as Yarborough's interlocution "takes place when we encounter a problem requiring the cooperation of others to resolve" (59). But what this view does not account for are those interlocutors who do not wish to (or who cannot) adhere to this principle of "interpretive charity" or to those whose *ethos* violate this principle (i.e., the hysterical, or the schizophrenic, or my 11th grade girlfriend—there was no "interpretive charity" in that relationship, as nothing I said made sense to her, and if it did she surely didn't believe any of it; in fact, it may have been the exact opposite of "interpretive charity," as she thought all my non/sense was error, ignorance, and/or especially deception).

All jokes aside, I cannot put jokes aside, as jokes also violate this principle residing at the core of Yarborough's work. Joking, which can be *in relation to* truth (novel or otherwise), is not dependent on this *in relation to*, on the belief of interlocutors' non/sense being "nevertheless true," or on any "charity" driven toward this relationship; we do not have to think the jester in good faith for that "intercourse" to produce the "novel." In *Jokes and their Relations to the Unconscious*, Freud tells us that joke-work is a deviation from normal thinking, that it works through displacement and absurdity. Joke reason does not adhere to this principle, much like I explored earlier, and it is just as likely "that other kinds of faulty reasoning may find a similar use" (Freud, *Jokes* 60; cited in Ulmer, *Teletbeory* 74). Thus, the horrendous, the absurd, the sitcom, and other excluded "kinds of reasoning"—whether faulty or not (perhaps an improper/proper distinction)—may allow for invention not possible in Yarborough's model.

Additionally, Yarborough's moves recreate the very exclusive practices that prevent invention of the new (whether novel truth or not)—a prevention he seems to want to move
out of, or, I think, at least something he intends to couch in a better system or belief; his work reproduces the same: a controlling, restrictive economy. He does not seek to open his "inventive intercourse" alongside the traditions we currently have—i.e., the grand narrative of the hermeneutic tradition of invention—but rather to subjugate this tradition and even the entirety of rhetoric to his "truth": "Interlocution, however, regards [. . . rhetoric and hermeneutics] as the poles of a single dialogic process in which persuasion and interpretation are means subordinate to an entirely different end—truth, or what Mead calls the continuation of the common world" (25; my emphasis). While these moves may lead to invention, and maybe even interesting invention, the work creates a closed, restrictive system, enslaved to Yarborough's "novel truth"—a process predicated on interpretation, subjugation, and exclusion.

Similar issues, though clearly not the same issues, can be seen emerging in Diane Davis' critical response to Steve Mailloux's work in her article, "Addressing Alterity: Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Nonappropriative Relation." Davis does not deny the claims of Mailloux's "rhetorical hermeneutics," but rather wants to open yet other spaces for consideration, which Mailloux's work perhaps denies. She writes, "I want to suggest that there is also a non-hermeneutical dimension of rhetoric that has nothing to do with meaning-making, with offering up significations to comprehension" (192). The issue is one of opening possibilities, but systems of thought that close, deny, exclude, marginalize, or subjugate establish the limits of themselves in their very becoming.

Beyond the issue of Yarborough's closed system, I also need to address his treatment of Ulmer's work—though, I should mention, that he does better than some, as he at least acknowledges Ulmer's work on invention. He tells us that Ulmer's Heuretics is designed "to build an invention 'machine' upon the logic of chance" (58). But despite giving Ulmer some
credit—i.e., being "some ground for methodic change" (58)—he ultimately uses this connection to chance to explain away the potentialities of Ulmer's work, as if chance prevents one from working inventively, or working deliberately to invent.

Additionally, Yarbrough tells us, "the postmodernist rhetor puts chance to work to invent novelty but then, in a secondary operation, must figure out what the novel concept could be about, and what it could be good for" (58-59). This is not only a reduction he applies to Ulmer, but also to all "poststructuralist rhetoricians," and I dare say he would include me in that category. The issues here are that 1) he assumes that the "novel" must be figured out, that there must be a determining to what it is (or is not) "good for," which is a game based in understanding, and 2) that all of the inventive value in this "postmodernist invention" comes in the secondary operation. The problem here is that the first, in Yarbrough's view, does not inherently apply as understanding is not necessary for rhetorical invention (c.f. Muckelbauer 127), and the second places the hermeneutic (or secondary operation) into a subjugated position to invention—creating weird parallels between Yarbrough's "novel truth" and postmodern invention, which I am sure he does not intend.

While there is clearly a correlation between aleatory methods/procedures and Ulmer's work, Heuretics is based not from chance, at least not in such simple or encapsulating terms, but rather from chora, and chorography, which Ulmer uses to produce his CATTt method—^not to be mimaetically reproduced, but followed, as relay, in inventing one's own chorography. What's more, this practice emerges as much out of patterning as chance, out of making connections, conductively, across personal, popular, expert discourses. There is more than chance at work in this invention, and more invention at work than mere chance. But even if 100% steeped in chance, that should not preclude it from being a viable approach for invention, for inventing, and for teaching invention. Chance occurrences.
Short-circuits in thinking. Accidents. The "surprise" James Britton spoke of in 1980 (see "Shaping at the Point of Utterance"). All these allow for something unexpected. Invention, at its core, is something unexpected.  

Paralogy Again

Lyotard claims, of discourse, though surely not Yarborough's discourse, that "consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy" (Postmodern 65-66). Consensus leads to systems or even games that create/perpetuate differends, conflicts between two or more parties that need a third position, a third place, for adjudication (Differend xi). Thus, the point of paralogy is not to seek consensus but rather instabilities, to be innovative and inventive, and to pursue ever-more open language-games, (always) bearing witness to new idioms. This is key to what I hope to open here, but Yarborough tells us that paralogy is a "battle for the language, since, in this view, it is the language that will constitute what world will be shared" (81)—not unrelated to the Sophistic notion of logos and the power to name (more fully explored in Chapter III).

Yarborough goes on to say, "According to the view [. . .he is] proposing here, in contrast, there is but one world, and it is, always and necessarily, already shared. Because we share our world, cases of what Lyotard calls 'le differend' signal a need not for paralogy but for the invention of new truth of our world" (81). What Yarborough fails to realize is that this view, this subjugation of Lyotard's paralogy and the differend, creates a differend. We cannot judge Lyotard's paralogy in Yarborough's "one world view" anymore than we can judge Yarborough's "one world view" or his "intercourse" or his "discourse" in terms of Lyotard's paralogy. Rather, all we can do is point out that this explanation, and thus control
over paralogy to the end of Yarbrough's truth, is much like the Australian Aborigines being
forced to defend their land claims in British courts of law, being forced to define their
relationships with land in terms of ownership and property (Western values).

For Yarbrough, theories like Derrida's differance, Stanley Fish's interpretive
communities, and even Richard Rorty's contingency of language lead us, respectively, to
never being able to "decide what a text means," to never being able to "deliberately change
our minds," and to never being able to "set out to invent something new." While I agree
with Yarbrough's intentions of finding a way out of the limits of these systems, I find that
my work on invention works in counter-distinction to his efforts—specifically, as Yarbrough
counts to 1 and I count "1, 2, and some more, always more."

Muckelbauer

A text which I think my work shares a great deal more is John Muckelbauer's *The
Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change*. Of course, not unlike
Yarbrough, his conduct in relation to Ulmer's work is also a bit unbecoming—and Lyotard
does not even garner an appearance. But I will get to these concerns in turn.

Muckelbauer tells us that postmodern propositions (and thus postmodernism) "must
be based on a style of engagement that requires the humanist category of intention," and
thus the humanist position "actually insinuates itself into the opposing position as well,
claiming to be the basis upon which postmodern critique must operate" (27). Though
undoubtedly working differently, Bruno Latour indicates as similar construction in his *We
Have Never Been Modern*, where he advocates for a move to the nonmodern, or amodern, as
we could have never been modern, nor postmodern, as the principles of modernity can be
seen as their own unfounding—here not unlike Nancy's individual/community
relationship. But this move of Latour’s is designed to help move us out from under, to move alongside this particular paradoxical dilemma, to offer something else (even if hybrid of that which we could never have been), while Muckelbauer moves for us to "inhabit immanently."

In exploring his particular brand of invention, Muckelbauer articulates a dichotomous relationship between humanism and postmodernism (for staging purposes) in which the latter hopes to overcome the former—citing Barbara Biesecker's work in *Addressing Postmodernity* as example. But the problems that emerge in this relationship are as much in relation to the communicative apparatus (the "rules" and "logics" given to us by literacy) as they are to the binary itself; the problem of "overcoming," or the negative change he indicates, may not be the result of the binary, but perhaps the very apparatus in which he "thinks" or "communicates" the binary and its relationships.

When working in literate, cause/effect, linear logics, we often work old to new (the hypotaxis contract), and thus to set up an exploration of the new/other in this manner requires revisiting the old/same (and problematically placing the exploration within the horizon of the old/same). But had what Muckelbauer refers to as Biesecker's *double gesture* emerged in a different medium, I wonder if this result would have still been the same—if the *double gesture* would have been present at all. Or, taken another way: if the medium of communication is changed, and the "rules" (or potentiality thereof) that guide that creation are changed, can there be any articulate a postmodern, or even nonmodern, approach (or any approach for that matter) that is not placed in direct "relation to" something it is trying to overcome or something it is trying to imitate (*mimesis*)?

Muckelbauer's response would seem to be no, we cannot move out of mimesis—"we cannot avoid repetition, but must inhabit its movement" and "if we cannot avoid repetition,
everything hinges on how we repeat, on the inclination within any particular encounter, and on how we modulate the rhythm of repetition” (36). (Note the counter-stance to Lyotard’s *it is not important how we link, but that we link* [c.f. *Differend* 29]). To this end, Muckelbauer provides us with three rhythms of imitative practice which co-exist with one another, integrated of sorts: 1) reproduction or the "repetition of the same," 2) variation or the "repetition of difference," and 3) inspiration or "difference and repetition." The first deals with repeating the model faithfully (attempting to do so). The second repeats the model by altering it (the sameness of difference). In the third, the model changes to responsiveness itself—it, like the magnet example we find in Plato’s *Ion*, "transmits itself through a kind of infectious quality." Again, we have invention that moves back to the act of parasite, the infection, and even the relay (as that which conducts the magnetism).

One of the key characteristics to the third level here, which seems to be the most interesting level/layer and the one Muckelbauer continues to explore throughout the text, is this idea of inspiration being connected to "going out of oneself"—as indicated in the opening selection from Plato’s *Ion*, from which Muckelbauer also draws. But inspiration, during primary orality, came from the Muses, not necessarily from the self, so here one would firmly remain "inside oneself"—it was the recitation/performance that allowed *Ion* to go out of himself; it was the story, the narrative (to which we will return).

Aside from taking issue with these considerations, which may not move the conversation forward given the stance Muckelbauer has taken in various parts of his text (even appealing to Deleuze’s refusal to engage objection23), I can look to areas that Muckelbauer does offer as ways of productively moving with the text. He provides an articulation of the process of the Eleatic Stranger—here an Electric Stranger—where inhabitation is the key to inventing ("discovering"). His "stranger," however, is couched in a
radically altered understanding of Aristotle's topos, a reconstruction coming predominantly
out of Aristotle's relatively under explored *Physics* (at least under explored in rhetoric and
composition studies). From this, Muckelbauer indicates the topoi are located:

in the reciprocal and generative fusion of body and place. In other
words, and in a very precise sense, *topoi are located in con-fusion.* But this
con-fusion would not simply be the absence of sense or understanding; it
must be thought of as the positive, immanent conjunction of place and
body that Aristotle articulates and the generative effect that constitutes
this conjunction. (137)

Thus, we might think his topoi as a generative immanent surface which one must inhabit in
order to "get outside of oneself."

Again, I do not think Muckelbauer and I are that far from each other in terms of
what we hope to reach, but we differ, decidedly so, in how we get there, which, following
either of our works, turns out to be more than just mere difference of approach—it is the
difference between topos and chora, these two related terms. He articulates his work from
the perspective of topos as place—albeit a changed sense of "place" from what we have
traditionally thought—and I work from chora as space—albeit a changed sense of space
from what we have traditionally thought. Thus, I am not unfolding this work in argument
with Muckelbauer, nor even in a counter-position to his work. Rather, my work is yet
another, emerging alongside, something "in addition to," working toward this generative
potential and trying not to fall into the literate "trap."
While there are many positives to take from Muckelbauer's work that can inform this discussion of invention, and areas to play in contrast to, like his views of an inability to get out of repetition—of course, taking the opposite argument here would only place us in the game of repetition (specifically his second level of repetition of difference)—there is one aspect I must also address as it pertains, once again, to the treatment of Ulmer's work, which resonates with how my work may be treated.

To be fair, I should acknowledge that Ulmer's work is not the only one Muckelbauer treats this way: we can see similar marginalizing of Vitanza's work on negation, which is reduced to one line (itself being negated), or even maybe more telling is the absence altogether of Lyotard's work on paralogy and libidinal intensities (see Libidinal Economy) or Baudrillard's work on the simulacra—all of which seemed likely to have contributed to his work. But for now, I will stick to the Ulmer issue, and rebegin by acknowledging that Muckelbauer does make reference to Ulmer, citing his Heuretics. But Ulmer's only appearance is in an endnote opening Chapter 7 – "Topoi: Replacing Aristotle" – "This Chapter responds, in part, to Derrida's work on the Platonic concept of chora as well as Gregory Ulmer's rather interesting deployment of this in his efforts to rethink the dynamics of invention in Heuretics: The Logic of Invention" (176). The problem is not that Ulmer only manifests one appearance in the text (as authors make these choices all the time, myself included), nor that it is in a footnote, but rather that Muckelbauer tells us Chapter 7 is a response to these concepts but never mentions chora (nor Heuretics) in the chapter (or anywhere else in the text).

The chapter is unquestionably committed to exploring topos. What is telling here is a statement indicating a relationship between topos and chora, but then no engagement of
this relationship. Perhaps we are supposed to intuit this relationship, or allow it to develop alongside, perhaps a subconscious attempt to enter the third interval, but to not at least acknowledge how these views come into relation is a failed opportunity.

Granted, Muckelbauer may respond that this is resulting from my assumptions of what should be present in the text, or that my efforts to point out what he has "left out," is only to indicate a "gap," one in need of "overcoming," and thus would place my engagement with his work in a relationship of negation or negative change, while what he seeks is affirmative change (c.f. 139), and maybe this is true—if I was working in his system—but I think there is also something else occurring here. It seems interesting and revealing for Muckelbauer to say that his "affirmative inclination encounters writing as an experimental pathway, a relay on an intensive, invention circuit" (43; my emphases) and not have made connections to Ulmer's work, which assuredly would have been beneficial here.

The point here is not to throw Muckelbauer under the bus, for his work really moves in very valuable ways, but rather to provide another example of the absence or marginalization of Ulmer's work in current scholarship. There seems to be a sort of "whisper campaign" or "unwritten rule" that leads people to exclude Ulmer's work from their scholarly efforts—or only using him in sprinkles (green and white sprinkles, I believe). There is a hesitancy among the "community"—a resistance, even, to connect back to Nancy's work—about engaging Ulmer's scholarship; of course, this hesitancy should only further indicate Ulmer's value as his work creates an instability in the field, and, following our ties to paralogy, this is what we seek: the instable, mentally or otherwise, as these are often the most "inspiring" (to latch to Muckelbauer's third level).
I have pursued a variety of interruptions since hinting at the issue of "screens," and while those leaps off the conduit were necessary, I will now arc back (and forward) to this particular concern of "screens." Of course, I should note that I will not return to the issue of "screens" directly, as if dealing with the big screen, small screen, computer screen, terministic screen, front-door screen, translucent screen, and so on, but will do so indirectly, as, in some way, nearly all I talk of in relation to chora will have to do with screens, in all the possibilities that emerge with (and within) that term.

In *Heuristics: The Logic of Invention*, Ulmer tells us that while traditional rhetorical invention has the starting places of the classical, logical, heuristics of the topoi (species, genus, cause, effect, etc.), the sophistic-postmodern, paralogical, heuristics has the chora: puns that create the conditions of not cause/effect but wondrous co-incidences that open up the possibilities of counterfactuals or multiple possible worlds based not on Aristotelian restrictive logic but on modal logics such as those informing the thinking of Leibniz, Borges, Deleuze, and Agamben (48). Ulmer explains more fully:

*Chora* is not thinkable on its own but only within a field, a diegesis, considered as my premises. 'Premises' in logic are propositions that support a conclusion, explicit or implicit assumptions, or a setting forth beforehand by way of introduction or explanation. 'Premises' may also refer to a tract of land—a building together with its grounds and other appurtenances. The creation of a field. . . . within which might emerge the surplus value of a revelation or an innovation that has not been thought as such, has something to do with the luck of these two
premises—one logical, the other architectural, combined in the phrase the "grounds of reason" (the need to reason from certain established or provisional assumptions). Here is a principle of chorography: *do not choose between the different meanings of key terms, but compose by using all the meanings* (write the paradigm). (48; emphasis added)

With the simple addition of the co-incidence of the *two notions* of the word "premise" (like those for "cutter" in the Exigence), Ulmer is able to arrive at a double-reading, or what Derrida would call a "double session"—not unlike the "double session" occurring here with this print version and its Sophie2 other. This double-reading allows for conjugating all the possible meanings in search of how they might chime up and down the chain of signifiers. And it also opens something else—as there is always something else, something other, some remainder. In great part, it is an opening of a field: a movement from closed disciplinary work to a *field* of work such as that which might be transdisciplinary. Not INTERdisciplinary, as in a crossroad (at odds), but TRANSdisciplinary, as in a third place—the third (female) nature Plato attributes to chora—improving the odds of discovering even more productive co-incidences.

Ulmer speculates that additionally what it opens to us is "what cannot be stated directly in propositions. The *Timaeus* [the dialogue in which Plato introduces chora] itself [. . .] resorts to the abyss structure as a part of the dream reasoning needed to communicate *chora*" (*Heuretics* 149). Chora is not reducible to either the sensible or intelligible (positions which have dominated Western thought), which informs why Plato attempts the "abstraction of chora as space at the level of theme" (ibid). Plato, of course, fails, though he nonetheless attempts to let be spoken what might come from the chora (cf. Julia Kristeva,
Ulmer, however, with the help of Derrida, forges on: "Since \textit{chora} may not be observed directly in philosophical terms, it must be put into a story, 'but a story going outside of story' " \cite{Henretics149}. Hence, exilic space.

What I am seeking is in/of this exilic space, this "story going outside of story," the Ion I introduced—here also an Electric Stranger. An example of this possibility can be seen, in the literate apparatus, in "\textit{Tlön, Uqbar, and Orbis Tertius}" by Borges. But it may be more easily grasp in this dissertation's digital-other where I (or even we) can quite literally create a "story" or even "self," that goes outside of "story/self" (an extension via hyperlinking that leaps out of the limits of one apparatus and into multiple others), where the "inside" and "outside" of the "story" are not demarcated boundaries but rather loosely constructed thresholds (or puns, or infections, infolding on and unfolding [or enfolding and unfolding] from one another).

Continuing from these, I might follow Julia Kristeva's construction of chora as a process (which might also be envisioned as a space) for "the passage from one sign system to another" \cite{59}. This "passage" may be likened to movement across "systems" or "sets," connecting back to the pun and the conductive logic(s) I explored earlier. But none of this really opens us to radical views, to something drastically different. Ulmer's toggle of chora/topos opens invention in interesting ways, but that was Ulmer's work, and Ulmer's project. What I seek to do is not to continue Ulmer's work, not to reproduce what he did, not to say the same things, but to seek what he sought (to follow his own approach). To do this, I need to work with chora in relation to rhetorical invention, but in a wider sense—a step back—as this can potentially open something "new," something else, something not yet explored. Without leaving Kristeva's construct—temporarily placed on hold, as if pausing a video—I will casuistically stretch\textsuperscript{24} chora as far as possible.

\textit{Revolution in Poetic Language} 25-28.)
Ambiguating Chora

Ulmer tells us, "One of the difficulties in grasping the nature of chora as genos or genesis is that [. . .] it has to be approached indirectly, by extended analogies" (Heuretics 67). Working by analogy, as I indicated briefly in the Exigence, is to work within the realm of literacy, within the illusion of being able to fix meanings and then to link them into a singular/particular relationship. This is not to say that analogy, as some, cannot exist outside of the literate apparatus, as it surely was available during primary orality (differently) and works in the electrate apparatus (differently), but rather that through the literate-perspective analogy works within the trope of clarity (a game of equation). This is a bit problematic as analogy, at its core, is ambiguous—it fundamentally resists "clarity." This notion of the unclear is something Muckelbauer picks up in his treatment of the topoi, of this beginning moment of con-fusion instead of understanding. And so in his work, which adheres to the topical, there is recognition of the very ambiguity necessary in order to push topical or even chorographical invention forward.

But there is also something else going on besides just this con-fusion, this ambiguous nonunderstanding. When linking via analogy, there is connection at the level of the singular/particular, but singular/particular that exist as part of sets. The linking that makes analogy function opens a passage between "two" (or more) components of the analogy (a move that reconnects to Kristeva's understanding of chora). But I cannot link singularities of linguistic (or even cultural) sets without bringing the entirety of the sets to bear on the relationships involved because the particular cannot be excised from the set—it always retains traces of these other things (cf. Derrida, Writing and Differance 280-281); this view of analogy is chorographical, a choranalogy, retaining all meanings available.
Thus, I am not working with literate analogy, but rather a different kind of analogy, one that cannot and does not attempt to eliminate any of the possibilities within the connections it establishes across sets, discourses, cultures, invention, et cetera. The analogy sought here is ambiguous, (re)purposefully so; it is a choral process—perhaps reconstituted and renamed as electrate analogy: to make analogies within and across ambiguity, bringing the entirety of the sets to bear on the relationship.

This is a problem/benefit of significant value for explorations of technologies of communication, as each word, if nothing else, carries with it linguistic sets: etymological histories/mysteries, popular usages, proper/improper names, and the like; this is what makes Derrida’s process of decomposition possible, as well as antonomasia, and making/generating (with) puns, homonyms, malapropisms (again, connected to Freudian slips), and so on.

More specifically, in relation to the electrate apparatuses I am exploring, this potential actually manifests in practice; it is a "realization" of a potential that has always already been available in language. Just look at Frode Hegland’s Web browser add-on Hyperwords, which "makes every single word or phrase on a [Web] page into a hyperlink—not just those chosen by a website’s authors" (The Economist). This "add-on" makes browsing choragaphical; it ripens Web navigation with inventive potentiality—it lives in the instabilities and vibrations of "key words" previously unexplored/unexploited, and shifts the underlying power relationships in surfing the web.25

But more can be done in relation to chora than just complicating analogy (whether electrate, literate, or oral). Ulmer makes reference to Richard Mohr’s The Platonic Cosmology, where Mohr connects chora to medium and not just chora as receptacle. This connection drastically alters our relationship to chora, but Ulmer only briefly mentions Mohr’s explorations in passing, on his way to another point; he doesn’t extend Mohr’s work far
enough as Mohr’s reading of Plato's chora opens many issues on rhetorical invention, 
especially with Ulmer's inventive shift of replacing topoi with chora.

Mohr Chora

For Plato, chora is that which is between being and becoming, and the traditional 
interpretation of this work is chora being a receptacle or container. The problem here, 
specifically in relation to Plato's metaphor of the winnowing-basket, is that chora, as the 
container between being and becoming, is linked to a machine, a sorting machine, which 
puts that-which-is-becoming into places, ordered/sorted places, pre-determined places: a 
place for everything and everything for its place, including the abject, which is abjected; 
Mohr tells us, "the result of the shaking [of the winnowing-basket . . .] is not chaotic motion 
but the orderly separation of phenomena according to kinds" (122; second emphasis added). 
This act of separation, of "orderly separation," is an exclusionary practice—to sort is to sort 
out, both to resolve and to remove.

Mohr backs up a step. He tells us that in the Timeaus "Plato uses two groups of 
metaphors to describe the third thing [chora]. One group of metaphors treats the third thing 
as a container and suggest a 'bucket' theory of space. The other group of metaphors treats 
the third thing as [. . .] a medium or field for receiving images" (91).

There is a necessary difference between envisioning chora as container and chora as field or space, and also, as 
space, a difference between the actual metaphor Plato uses, his winnowing basket, and the 
function of it as medium. Mohr thoroughly explores why the receptacle view isn't adequate 
as, to summarize, it indicates a placing in and taking out relationship of chora which just isn't 
in keeping with Plato's work.
But this second issue, this move to a view of chora as medium, has radical implications. One, this shift gets us out of Platonic sorting—and relatedly out of Aristotelian categories—as becoming is no longer dependent on this sorting machine but rather related to the medium through which it is conducted. This medium may be thought like the magnet example in Ion, channeling the magnetism of being into the "objects" of becoming; or it may be thought, relatedly, as infection, as the dis/ease which alters, which forces the imperfect copy of the original; or yet other things can be done with it. If the chora/medium is a screen, not unrelated to Leth's screen, it allows for undoing the distinctions between reality and virtual reality, between the "things we see" and the "things we see on screen" as both are of the same nature, even if just further simulacra (again, moving to Baudrillard's fourth level).

I do not intend to articulate (all) the possibilities of what can be done with this view, though in another work I would spend more time exploring these potentialities, specifically in relation to Baudrillard's and Slovej Žižek's work, but rather what I hope to indicate is that this change in focus (on chora as winnowing basket to chora as medium) only reifies the importance of doing this scholarship ([m]any scholarship[s]) in different mediums as each allows for a different/other/always-something-else becoming. In fact, it may even allow for an unbecoming, which might be linked to the best kind of learning—the trauma of learning (c.f. Levinas' Totality and Infinity).

What this allows is a view of chora as an instability, an unfixable entity (if entity at all), as, in one view, the / between being and becoming, but also as that which is not "in-between" but "out beyond" as the medium is not a graspable thing, a referential object in any sense, but an act, a process, an occurrence, a flow (also not unlike Heraclitus' and Cratylus' river). Here, chora is forever changing, and not, and this is where invention really begins to
open. Change the medium that conditions both being and becoming—not unlike the electrate anthropologist inventing other/same I introduced earlier—and change all we know, can know, cannot know, experience, live, breath, are. Work inventively with medium, (re)invent life (perpetually). This is the human (in)(com)possibility.
Chapter III

Logos: Inventing (with) Logoi

I

Since antiquity the Λόγος of Heraclitus has been interpreted in various ways: as Ratio, as Verbum, as cosmic law, as the logical, as necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason. Again and again a call rings out for reason to be the standard for deeds and omissions. Yet what can reason do when, along with the irrational and the antirational all on the same level, it perseveres in the same neglect, forgetting to meditate on the essential origin of reason and to let itself into its advent? What can logic, λογική (ἐπιστήμη) of any sort, do if we never begin to pay heed to the Λόγος and follow its primordial essence? (Heidegger, "Logos" 60)

Part of the necessity for revisiting logos in this work, according to Martin Heidegger, is that as it emerges in Western thought it has continued to close off our addressing the issues (and/or essence[s]) of logos from the point of view of the earlier thinking upon which it builds: meaning, as Heidegger has cautioned, this often "errored" first-step "cloaks early thought with the mantle of more recent doctrines" and thus fails "to inquire properly into the ways of hearing and frames of reference of early thinking" ("Moira" 85). The potentiality of earlier thinking gets "deprived of its own freedom of speech" and "is inevitably accommodated to the later dialogue" (85). This accommodation creates what Jean-François
Lyotard calls a differend: most drastically, the differend of positivistic history to which
Nietzsche sought and offered cures. Or, to put this in Heideggerian idiom, we might view
this as simply a "letting-lie"—as in, an ignoring (perhaps obscuring) of that which presences
or is laying-before: we "let-lie" the earlier ways of thinking/saying/being of what was said.
And the "lying" puns here are important.

To put this in more approachable terms: one key issue to working with *logos* is that
we must *inquire properly* or *hear properly* (cf. Heidegger's "Logos" 67) in regard to the earlier
ways of thinking, and to do this we must avoid placing *logos* within a restrictive, singular
literate-based system of meaning. To productively work with this issue, we must attunely
listen to the *logos* (à la Heraclitus) and all its (im)possibilities. Here, is it less about correctness
(as in "fixing" or "affixing" meaning) and more so about possibilities, about opening
possibilities around *logos*, especially as it unfolds in electrate spaces? I will *think* so and,
therefore, my first-step, aside from the opening quotation, which revisits Heraclitus (his *logos*
and Heidegger's take on it), is to affirm the *multivocality* of the term/work/concept/idea *logos*.

One such expression of this *multivocality* can be found in G. B. Kerferd's *The Sophistic
Movement*, where he indicates that in the Sophistic tradition, the term *logos* involved (involves)
retaining its multiple meanings in any given usage (83). Kerferd tells us

In the case of the word *logos* there are three main areas of its application
or use, all related by an underlying conceptual unity. These are first of all
the area of language and linguistic formulation, hence speech, discourse,
description, statement, arguments (as expressed in words) and so on;
secondly, the area of thought and mental processes, hence thinking,
reasoning, accounting for, explanation (cf. *orthos logos*), etc.; thirdly, the
area of the world, that about which we are able to speak and to think, hence structured principles, formulae, natural laws and so on, provided that in each case they are regarded as actually present in and exhibited in the world-processes. (83)

Here, as well as in Edward Schiappa's Protagoras (cf. 92), logos in the sophistic tradition, and logos as it emerges in Heraclitus, is connected with all these possibilities: it is a multivocality. And as we explored in the previous chapter, retaining and making with (or thinking with) all the co-responsible possibilities of a term, all its co-present meanings, is chorographical in nature (in Ulmer's sense of the term); thus, these moves of/toward a multivocality of logos might be seen as an Ulmerian Sophistic, one where the potential meanings which reside in the term and the potential meanings from earlier thinking are not reduced to any singularity but are retained as a multivocality, and one which readily finds home in electronic environments where multivocalities can all share space and be equally present.

This Sophistic take, of course, is not the standard view on logos, which most commonly finds expression in the reduction of logos as logic. But this reduction of logos does not occur until the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian mill (with perhaps Zeno being a fourth miller). The "millers" help logos (d)evolve into its adherence to (philosophic) (tauto)logic, and tracing the journey of logos through the "mill" (and each "millers" limits of logos) will help (re)open space to release logos from these bi-millennial binds—not to rid, exclude, or kill the binds and all the powerful things they have done (and continue to do—as their contributions are nearly immeasurable), but rather to allow the imprisoned other possibilities to run/flow freely as well. To grasp this trace, as in previous chapters, I will
performatively drift and allow that drifting to get us where we need to go, which is nowhere particular so long as we pay heed to the drifting itself.

Among other places, this drifting will take us into the River H—that is, among other things, the Heidegger/Heraclitus connection. As such, beyond engaging Heraclitus' paradox of method as part of this drifting, which was often also a Heideggerian \textit{way} (cf. Schur 88-155), we will more directly drift into some of Heidegger's works on \textit{logos}. This turn to Heidegger is valuable for a couple of reasons: 1) his works on \textit{logos} open us to \textit{logos} before its encounter with metaphysics, conceptually so—that is, a \textit{logos} not of the \textit{logos as logic} persuasion (cf. Schur 133); 2) whereas Ulmer works predominantly through Derrida, who draws from Heidegger, I want to work directly with Heidegger without Derrida as a mediator because Heidegger spends more time directly addressing \textit{logos}, which is our focus at this juncture. I should also note that with this turning to/through Heidegger I will be engaging him performatively, in a Heideggerian idiom, as it is nearly impossible to do otherwise—which both hearkens to issues of horizons and to the importance of language, of discourse, of \textit{logos} (in its \textit{multivocality}).

But before reaching the waters of the River H, I must begin with the millers, starting with the Parmenidean mill. It is important to note, however, that in this tracing of \textit{logos} I will rely noticeably on the work of Andrea Nye, specifically her work \textit{Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic}. The reasons for this are two-fold: Nye offers a feminist approach to \textit{logos as logic}, which begins from a marginalized vantage point in traditional philosophical treatments of \textit{logos}—an issue she establishes in her introduction; and her treatment of \textit{logos}, in great part, echoes approaches by other thinkers of \textit{logos}, Heidegger included.
While there are earlier thinkers that perhaps should be considered, some of which I may return to, I must (re)begin with Parmenides, at least briefly, because his work offers us the principle of noncontradiction, and this provides an infectious root for all subsequent thought and all subsequent thinkers building-upon/trying-to-improve this principle.

As Nye tells us, it is in Parmenides that we find "the self-identical kernel of logical truth," which is that the choice he faces "is between the correct way of 'what is' " and "not between 'is' and 'is not,' " as "the way of 'is not' is impossible" (11). I will return to this impossibility shortly, specifically when picking up with Heidegger, but for now what is important is that Parmenides' work attempts to provide a "correct way" of being (in the world). Perhaps it should be viewed as a "correcting way" of being. It is a logic (launched by desire\(^1\)) designed to not sway with opinion; a logic that resists contradiction; a logic that is straight and true (of sorts)—and for the world in which Parmenides existed we can understand why this attempt was necessary. But, as Nye writes,

Armed with the principle of noncontradiction, Parmenides's followers proceeded to disrupts all discussion, finding paradox and logical fallacy in even the most uncontroersial assertions. Once the way of nonbeing was forbidden, it would seem to be impossible to say any statement is untrue or true, that anything is different from anything else, or that anything does not exist. (23)

From this principle of noncontradiction, at least as it emerges here with Parmenides, there is a certain kind of resistance—an ability to disrupt or displace (un)truth-claims, to disrupt \textit{logos}
apophantikos (to which I will also return). Working from this principle, everything could refuted.

To say this another way: with the refutability of everything, truth ceases to exist. Once Parmenides had forbidden the way of nonbeing, "[t]he light of truth had gone out and false philosophers were left groping in darkness" (Nye 23; my emphases). Parmenides principle of noncontradiction left us in a world of darkness, in the space where "false philosophers" roamed. Of course, if following Nye's statement here, what is interesting is that only when the lighting (even if problematically phrased the "light of truth") ceases, were the "false philosophers" in the darkness. Thus, it would stand to reason that the false philosophers were also present (presenced) in the light or lighting. Or, and this may be more in keeping with the thought here, they were only "false" once the darkness ensued. But it seems problematic to think trueness or falsity would change with the blackout. New Yorkers did not become false New Yorkers in the great blackout of 1977.

It might be better, then, to acknowledge that the philosophers that perhaps should be listened to or take heed of, if I dare to call them philosophers, are those who groped in the darkness when the lights were on—the best kind of thinkers, those who found "darkness" in the "light of truth." Heraclitus might be thought of in this construct—a listener attuned to what the darkness or shadows wanted to say, listening intently to their saying, not what was said; letting the saying from the Sybils' utterances speak him. There are those, like Heraclitus, who sought (seek) to undergo (to suffer) this darkness—which here might be recast in Heideggerian terms and thought as that-which-is-present-but-does-not-presence. This darkness, this absence (of light), seems ripe with possibilities for thinking. Thus, I too hope to suffer this darkness (both here and in the Sophie2 other).
It would be good for me to explicate, if only briefly, what I mean by darkness or that-which-is-present-but-does-not-presence as this will be crucial to the unfolding in this work. But it is important to note that the complexities of this will emerge throughout this work and across the Sophie2 other, so this utterance will be no more than a trajectory at this juncture, and will rightly open itself to contestation. It is, however, necessary for further drifting.

**Darkness/Absence**

For Heidegger, lighting and presencing are intricately related as lighting is necessary to unconcealment (cf. Schur 127): Heidegger says, "Lighting is therefore more than illuminating, and also more than laying bare. Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open. It is the bestowal of presencing" ("Moira" 118). Whether the bestowal of presencing or necessity to unconcealment, in any sense of lighting/presencing there has to be some form of darkness or absence (of light) as necessary condition of that lighting. Without some form of relief from the light (shadows or darkness) that which is present in the light would not be visible. The only thing visible would be light—blindingly so.

Without some form of darkness/absence, there is no need for lighting/presencing. The lighting, the lighting that reveals, that un conceals, that brings-forth (a *saying* [[φάσις]]) is only a lighting if some things remain concealed, if some of "that which is present" is not presenced when others are; meaning: presencing cannot be a totality, cannot be an all-encompassing moment, even if couched in a Heideggerian Heraclitean paradox of method. If everything were lighted we would see nothing, not even the lighting of ourselves, which is both an "object" of the light and a "subject" of the light, as human beings emanate light, according to Heidegger ("Aletheia" 120).² Without some concealed, without some shadows,
disguises, darkness, absence (of light) there is nothing to be "seen," for no/thing can be seen without the contrastive relationship.

Thus, the claim, roughly, is that darkness/absence is a necessary condition for the (com)possibility of lighting/presencing. This "darkness/absence as necessary condition for/of lighting/presencing" comes in both the sense of (1) a darkness/absence upon which the lighting/presencing takes effect and (2) a darkness/absence necessary to see anything in/of the lighting/presencing (to avoid only seeing [the] light).

This provides at least a temporary ground from which to drift around/through this darkness/absence, but I want to extend the conversation here a bit further in regards to Heidegger to help push us into a particular space of gesture, which will be (and become) important as I move forward.

Gesture/Gift

Heidegger writes, "Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights everything present in its presencing. But they turn from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present, which is what immediately concerns them in their everyday commerce with each other" ("Aletheia" 122). In this passage, aside from indicating his own immortality, as he was concerned with presencing (its Ereignis) and not what is present, Heidegger reveals the game he is playing, much like the game in Being and Time or his questioning in general. He is often most concerned with the operative, the method, the way, the process of thought, perhaps even the medium (of access), and he is concerned primarily with how we have failed to grasp, or have perverted, the implications of such: as David Schur has indicated in The Way of Oblivion: Heraclitus and Kafka, for Heidegger it is our current graspings that "are the perverted ones" (116), resulting from, among other things, the
encounter of *logos* with metaphysics. Following Heidegger, to help free us from problems we encounter with thinking, that is from the perversions that have occurred for/to/of thought, we need (most often) to reconsider the ways in which we are dis/engaging in that thought.

In fact, it is generally not the content (the thought) that is necessarily wrong, for in much thinking the mind or work of thought is functioning, is rigorous and processing well, but our beginnings, our inventive openings, our starting moments to the thought processes, are often where we go awry (sometimes profoundly/productively so) and no matter how hard we work down that particular line of thought, we will always be (always already have been) "incorrect" (echoing Heidegger's description of the *esse = percipi* relationship\(^6\) [cf., "Moira" 84]).

Of course, another view that can be taken in regards to the passage above is that because Heidegger is mortal, in as much as someone of his philosophical stature can be, then he too must be concerned with everything present and must also be turning from the lighting, despite his significant development of this concept. How can this be? Because the medium and message are inextricably linked. Because Heidegger subscribes to Heraclitus' paradox of method. Because these things cannot be separated, not even in a Heideggerian tropic. To (not) concern oneself with lighting is to (not) concern oneself with what it reveals, or rather what it presences (helps presence, allows to presence, i.e., the presencing itself). Or rather, to follow McLuhan's development of lighting (as in electricity), this would be to concern oneself with lighting's content, which, in short, for McLuhan, is what it makes possible (see *Understanding Media* 8-9). But this lighting/presencing cannot occur without that which is present or that which can be presented (the medium cannot be/become without the message [and vice versa]); thus, each is a gift that gives itself to the other.
This is a gesture, perhaps the great gesture (to give, "consubstantiatedly"), and one which communicates significantly. It is a gesture from humanity/logos to logos/humanity, from medium/message to message/medium (and here these are in dissoi paralogoi relations). In this moment of gesture, the reciprocity of the relationships involved gives the gift of being and becoming to one another. If thought in terms of presence/absence or lighting/darkness, the gift is one of "sight," of the (com)possibility of unconcealment, of perceptibility (both sensible and nonsensible), of knowing—and perhaps rootly of being/Being. And the gesture itself, which is a gesture of address between these, is one that communicates the essence of the duality of Being; the gesture, the gift, emerges in our relationship with logos—with a multivocal understanding of this term. Thus, we hover near the question, "what is our relationship with the logos?" This question will perpetually lurk beneath the surface—though I will undoubtedly continue to explore it in tracing logos through the Parmenian-Platonic-Aristotelian mill.

But before returning to the "millers" and picking up this darkness/absence from the point of view of Parmenides—and using that flow to open other avenues through the milling process—I will continue to drift a bit on this River H.

III

Heidegger, working through Heraclitus' fragments, allows for connecting logos to the power/ability to name, which is a gesture of address, of acknowledgment. This act, this power to name (and to leave unnamed) is more akin to the Sophistic tradition (cf. Kerferd 68-77; Guthrie 204-219), and to this I will (eternally) return as it has much importance for this work—specifically in the generative possibilities couched in one's name, which I
perform explicitly with my own name in the Sophie2 other (see "Degree 3" of the Sophie2 Exigence). But for Heidegger, \textit{logos} and naming are more than just a bestowal of identity:

To name means to call forward. That which is gathered and laid down in the name, by means of such a laying, comes to light and comes to lie before us. The naming (\textit{όνοµα}), thought in terms of \textit{λέγειν}, is not the expressing of a word-meaning but rather the letting-lie-before in the light wherein something stands in such a way that it has a name. ("Logos" 73)

In this small passage, there are many Heideggerian strands in need of unpacking, many which this chapter (and its Sophie2 other) directly and/or indirectly comment on or generate with—none more significant than this notion of lighting, which I have already begun to unfold—but I must specifically consider this engagement with naming as it relates to the sophistics I intend to explore.

Pushing the power to name a bit, in reference to this "letting-lie-before in the light," a certain gesture can be seen at work—the gesture of address or acknowledgement of that which lies before (whether called forth by naming or otherwise). Within this is an enacting of the power of the naming, itself a gesture of address, which includes both the ability to address and not to address, to name or leave nameless (each being equally profound gestures). Additionally, within this notion of naming, as in the speech-act of giving name, of voicing (\textit{φωνή}), which might be thought as \textit{saying}, there are particular claims inherently being made in regards to validity/truth—specifically to the validity/truth of that name (the \textit{said}).

This is a game played by the Sophists (cf. Kerferd 67-72), but also one found amid the
Philosophers—see any ongoing battle over terminology; this is a view not unlike Richard Rorty's take on redescription (Contingency 7-54).

Naming, and its inherent claims, connect us to (a) logos related to logos apophantikos, of declarative statements—the result of the saying—which are statements that can be "determined" as true/false. As it relates here, we might think of the true/false distinction as one which applies to the said (the declarative statements) and not necessarily to their saying—though, as I will explore, these things cannot be separated. They are related via the slash, saying/said.

Saying/Said

Working through these issues, I will (re)begin with Thomas Sheehan's "Hermenia and Apophansis: The early Heidegger on Aristotle" as one generative/conflatable possibility. Sheehan writes:

For Heidegger, although apophantic statements certainly do co-perform the givenness of things, neither that performance nor the givenness that it achieves is original enough. Nonetheless, insofar as some modality of the givenness of entities is co-performed in a logos apophantikos, we should be able to find in the structure that underlies apophansis the clues to a more original – perhaps even the original – human co-performance of disclosedness. (69)

There are two key things in this passage. The first is that there is a human component to disclosedness, to unconcealment. No matter how far I bend and play with logos in this work,
it cannot be cut from the human factor. Second, this notion of a "more original" indicates a flaw or faultiness with current understandings and offers a view that through some miracle of archeology we will better understand all we currently know—this is yet another appeal to the archon to save/validate/improve epistemic discourse. It is an assumption of revisionist historiography. Of course, any result of "discovering" this "more original" would be what Deleuze and Guattari call an incorporeal transformation. Change our histories—revise/rewrite our beginnings—and radically change our present: through a "mere" act of decree, a declarative act, everything can be altered. This is a power of naming (a decree), and of making statements (a decree), which reiterates the importance of the connections between naming and logos. Thus, this more originary to which Sheehan alludes is something that must be considered, even if problematically couched in the "archon as savior" motif.

For Sheehan, the more originary is what he calls Hermeneia-0, which is "that which makes any and all forms of self-expression possible" (71). This, he tells us, is what Heidegger was working (us) toward (and perhaps is logos itself, but I will let that "reading" manifest as it may). To rephrase this in vocabulary more in keeping with this work: Sheehan's "0" is that which generates the conditions of (com)possibilities. But I must complicate Sheehan's work a bit for he violates Aristotelian principles, which is only problematic given that he is building this "0" from Aristotle's works—and so a certain amount of Aristotelian thinking should be taken into consideration in light of Sheehan's interpretation and expression; to not do so would only continue to fail "to inquire properly into the ways of hearing and frames of reference of earlier thinking" (Heidegger, "Moira" 85)

Sheehan constructs the following Aristotelian distinctions: Hermeneia-1 [semainein] deals with the question of the sign—"self-expression or communication in any form;" Hermeneia-2 [logain] deals with language in general—"self-expression or communication in
discourse;" *Hermeneia* 3 *apophainesthai* deals with judgment—"self-expression or communication in declarative sentences" (71). But his "0" is not "self-expression or communication;" rather, it is something else—something which makes (com)possible self-expression or communication. It is not of the same genus as "1-2-3," and therefore we might view it as "improperly" labeled according to genus-species analytics. Of course, in this work and its Sophie2 other, an "improper" label is perhaps the best kind, if one must be used at all—and thus there is the possibility of generating or playing heuristically with this "0" and exploring it as *other-genus*.

While there is a certain sequential logic (of the common/popular sort) that contributes to the genus problem mentioned above, as in a mode of "0-1-2-3," it should be acknowledged that 0 is not a number. It is neither positive- nor negative-presencing, but rather might be thought as "standing for" absence itself (gesturally or symbolically, this "0" can even link us to anomalies like black-holes). As absence, it is not the relief from which things appear (shading within the light), nor the darkness which stands in relation to a lighting (the necessary condition for the lighting)—though it may also be these things as well—but rather might be thought as the very *impossibility of presencing* (an absencing). (This is not to say that presencing is impossible, but rather that presencing is an impossibility in the space/formlessness of absence or absencing. Meaning, that in this absence or absencing, this "black hole" of sorts, there can be no lighting.)

Thus, Sheehan's "0," as "that which makes any and all forms of self-expression possible" (71; my emphasis), in this other-genus (perhaps an other-genius), might allow us to think an *impossibility of presencing* as the necessary condition allowing for (com)possibilities of presencing (and the self-expression and communication of these [com]possibilities and their conditions).
This impossibility of presencing is an other which irritates, always prods, creates tensions for any/all possibilities, never letting humanity/logos comfortably settle on any singular, fixed "self-expression/communication" as definitive, as "truth/Truth." This is the irritant of the unignorable other: The child in the car on the other side of the great, mystical, notorious, all-important seat divide—that is, on the other side of the slash—whose finger is millimeters away from his/her sibling's face. "I'm not touching you. I'm not touching you." The self-Same presses on, trying to ignore this sibling-other... searching desperately for a point upon which to affix his/her gaze in order to ignore this other. "I'm not touching you. I'm not touching you." Taught by the literate-father-mother to exclude/marginalize the irrational (the very act only spurring on "its" behavior), the self-Same sibling holds its place, its gaze, its singular focus—I must ignore the presence of the irritating finger! "I'm not touching you. I'm not touching you." The unignorable finger is so close. Hovering. There. How long can the self-Same last? How long can it resist the urge to respond? How long can the ignoring go on? "I'M NOT TOUCHING YOU!"

But I might also problematize Sheehan's "0" in another fashion: viewing it as the saying, the act, the voicing, the address itself, or as that which generates—as that which generates the said upon which Hermenia feed. Here Sheehan's "0" is a beast of yet another variety; it is a process/becoming; it resides on the other side of Plato's being-[chora]-becoming continuum. Thus, again, it is of a different genus altogether, different from the Hermenia 1-2-3 and as such is something that should not be lumped into the same category.

Of course, this saying, as I might make Sheehan's work unintentionally develop it, is not an a priori (nor a Priory) but rather a co-extensive presencing—the saying does not work in cause/effect or effect/cause logics but rather becomes in the very moment the said becomes. The saying generates the said in as much as the coming-to-be of the said gives
access to or constitutes (consustantiates) the saying. Medium/message. Message/medium. Again, they do not exist as separate monstrosities but rather are co-responsible and co-responsive to/of each other. This is also the necessity that drives these two works, this print version and the Sophie2 other, as each becomes co-responsible and co-responsive to/of the other. They occur as different/same, in a shared moment, in the same instance, perhaps in the same ear. A double-session. The great gesture. Each giving life to the other (as opposed to the death act of a singular, fixing work).

In this preceding and/or superseding moment of the saying, there are two (at least two) integral parts we should pay heed to: 1) the moment of address (the rhetorical gesture of address), which communicates profoundly before any language is spoken (cf. Davis "Addressing" 200); and 2) what the saying (as rhetorical gesture) generates (e.g., conditions for (com)possibilities), as this is what calls forth that which lies before or what Heidegger might also call the gathering.

Within the duality of the saying is the possibility for an encounter with the other (as other)—or rather, and maybe more profoundly so, the moment in which the other "speaks" (φάσις) us—as we can both undergo the gestures of address (the gesture we give to the other and it gives to us) and gather, via saying, this impossibility.

But before extending this thread, I should acknowledge an intuition at work in this act of undergoing—one that is somewhere amidst both the sensuous and the noesis (cf. Sheehan 69-70) but is not reducible to either. And it is from this undergoing that I, rather we, can work/think/invent with other. We can make from this other, this absence even, which is something we cannot know (as in to understand) but is nonetheless something we can come to know (as in to intuit or experience); this allows for generating or inventing possibilities in relation to "something" not reducible to literate-logoi (to consumptive, epistemic logoi).
Thus, in my exploration of Sheehan’s "0," I have moved us out of the hermeneutic and into the heuretic: as 1) "agent-0," if I give it agency, is nonhermeneutic (being more aligned with saying rather than said), and 2) in the heuretic we find ways/avenues to work with/invent with intuition (as opened in the previous chapter)—intuition being a form of access to the undergoing.

This might be thought as generating/inventing from an undergoing (of life)—from experiencing (the experience of) saying. Thus, what is being opened here is not a death-economy—not a hermeneutic (to "interpret" the dead, the said). Nor is it concerned with approaches, methods, ways for "dying the good death"—or even leaving memorials to commemorate one’s death. Rather, this is a making from living, an engagement with a living/life-economy (i.e., a generative [general] economy), which has nothing to do with nor a preference for living the good life or the bad life as both are equally ripe with inventive potential.9

It would seem, then, there is need to continue to complicate the saying, the act(ion) of logos. As Heidegger has told us:

Ο Λόγος, thought as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence of saying (die Sage) as thought by the Greeks. Language would be saying, Language would be the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing. In fact, the Greeks dwelt in this essential determination of language. But they never thought it—Heraclitus included." ("Aletheia" 77)

Following Heidegger, I too will try to think the saying and see what (com)possibilities open.
IV

Heidegger writes, "To learn to think the essence of language from the saying," both in the sense of letting-lie-before (Λόγος) and bringing-forward-into-view (φάσις), "remains a difficult task because that first illumination of the essence of language as saying disappears immediately into a veiling darkness and yields ascendancy to a characterization of language which relentlessly represents it in terms of ϕωνή, vocalization—a system of signs and significations, and ultimately of data and information" ("Moira" 91; my emphases). To think (and think with) the essence of language as saying is to operate from a view where the address, the gesture of saying—whether vocal or silent—itself cannot be reduced to signs and signifieds. Or if it can be done, it would be infinitely problematic as the hermeneutical filter requires a contextualization of other in a way it can never know prior to the gesture: To work hermeneutically with the address, with addressing other, asks that we "know" the other (signs and signifieds) in a particular way, but we cannot possess this knowledge. As mentioned above, and as exemplified in Diane Davis' "Addressing Altery," we can only undergo this address of/with other. And we cannot "know" the signs and signifieds (of other) in a particular way prior to experiencing them the first time. Thus, perhaps the encounter with other can never be hermeneutical/literate—at least not without creating a differend.

Following Steve Mailloux's and Diane Davis' work in reference to this hermeneutic/nonhermeneutic issue, and using the central example for both of their works—the Star Trek: Next Generation Darmok episode where the Enterprise crew tries to establish relations with the Tamaranians, an attempt that failed at least 7 times before because of an inability of other vessels and crews to communicate with the Tamaranians who speak by citing examples from their narrative history (though this is not learned until the latter part of the episode)—this work will be better served by holding a view closer to Davis' articulation.
This is a view that indicates that there is no hermeneutical position from which Picard can "rightly" interpret the gesture of the address from Dathon, the Tamarian captain, when they are beamed to the surface of a nearby planet and Dathon says, "Darmok and Jalad at Tenagra" and then tosses a dagger to Picard. Because there is no context from which Picard can draw to achieve interpretation, he can only undergo the saying of Dathon. (This is also true the other way, as in Dathon undergoing the saying of Picard.)

The only context Picard could draw from would be a self-Same, and thus any attempts to interpret this as the saying of a Picardian-Other would be either a subjugating act or a misreading (and likely both). The fact that both Picard and Dathon are beings who communicate with their own kind, via their own "uninterpretable" language (uninterpretable to one another), does not give them enough recourse to interpret the address or gesture of the saying in its first-contact.

To reiterate: to think (and think with) the essence of language as saying is to operate from a view where the address, the gesture of saying—whether vocal or silent—itself cannot be reduced to signs and signifieds. It is logos as saying, which includes prime and primal gestures (and the power to name), and that opens a number of (com)possibilities that must be reconsidered in the given technological age as we (technology users) are perpetually in encounter with other. In fact, both in the technology itself and in the varying "first contacts" we consistently encounter when coming into contact with others in electronic spaces (real time or posted ghosts), we routinely encounter other.

When playing in electronic/digital spaces, networked spaces especially, this gesture of the saying is often all we have to work from, and this process is a game of intuition; we must experience/undergo the other in order to be able to make-with (heuretic/first order/generative) or make-sense-of (hermeneutic/second order/restrictive) other.
I will return to this notion near the end of this chapter when exploring the impacts of Zeno on \textit{logos} and potential correlates in today's digital/electronic climate, but for now you may be asking why all this focus on address, on addressing or being addressed?

(1) There is a relatively unquestioned dominance of address in American Culture (having an address is crucial to having cultural access—home, credit line, etc.—as well as in reaffirming the notion of having a "place," a location where one belongs, a topos or category of sorts: i.e., "where are you from?"). Also, address is quite prolific in electronic/electrate environments: address as locale (URL address), as topoi (categories of address for search engines), as name (Website address), as contact (e-mail address), as access (IP address). We should consider this a very telling gesture.

(2) The \textit{multivocality} of logos I am working with here includes \textit{saying}, and part of \textit{saying} is the gesture itself, the address. And when experiencing an other which we cannot know—that is, an other we cannot hermeneutically know—all we can relay/relate—via (life) narratives—are recounts, retellings, recasts of the address itself, of the \textit{undergoing} of the address. Thus, there is a certain degree in which all that can be done is to bear witness to the other and then try to \textit{make}-with/\textit{make}-sense-of that which was "witnessed"—even if incomprehensible sublime.

Of course, a recounting of the \textit{undergoing} in a hermeneutic operative asks that we subjugate the other—i.e. kill it, work as anthropologist and translate it into the self-Same we are simultaneously creating (à la Wagner's inventing cultures). This renders the bearing witness, the address of the other, and the acknowledgment of this absencing as dead knowledge(s) at best and epistemic slave(s) at worse.

In counter-distinction, working in more heuretic operatives, we can participate with this bearing witness (this \textit{undergoing}) intuitively in order to build—this is a recounting of a tale
more in the way of the Cashinahua (see Lyotard, *Postmodern* 20-21). As Davis tells us of
Lyotard's reference to the Cashinahua, what matters for the Cashinahua (a tribe of
storytellers) in their cultural gestures or practices is not the narrative itself, not the
story/description, but "the bearing of it, the address, the saying" ("Addressing" 197). For
them, this "bearing" is often a retelling or a rebearing. This is a response to the address of
the other.

The Cashinahua are more concerned with what makes a good/enjoyable retelling, a
relay of this "first contact" of sorts. For them, "[t]he (performance of a) response is the
message, which doubles as an address, a return call" (Davis, "Addressing" 198). Again, I
(eternally) return to the medium/message issue. Except here also opening is the notion of
response. This is important for as we drift in electronic environments we will be/become
less concerned with the death-politic of hermeneutical accuracy/correctness (that is, the
governing body of literacy) and be/become more concerned with a life-politic of heuristical
possibilities.

The response here, both as in the ability to respond and having responsibility to
speak as hearers/bearers, is the retelling/rebearing—which is (1) a relay of the telling ("Hey,
have you seen the *Evolution of Dance* video on YouTube? It's like American history through
dance.") so that others can (re)visit the telling as a "first encounter" themselves, and (2) a
remixing/reappropriating of the telling in order to retell/rebear/recreate (somewhat) the
experience or *undergoing* of the bearing witness—though to do so in yet another manner
("What? How many people remade their own versions of that Gary Brolsma/Numa Numa
video?").

In both real and virtual spaces, analog and digital, we are consistently engaging in
kairotic moments where we encounter "Tamarians." "First contacts" abound, and all we
have to go on is (are) the *gesture(s) of the saying(s)*—whether made by plant/animal, avatar, or other protean possibilities. Each engaging their own rhetorical gestures.\(^{10}\)

Working with the gesture of address, and the duality of the *saying*, which includes this heuretic relay/rehearing of the gesture of address *(of/to other)*, I need to further unfold this notion of darkness/absence, which is connected to other, as it once again moves to the forefront in importance with the possibility for encountering it *(as other)*, for accessing this absence, for working intuitively with this *undergoing*, which might be thought of as an absencing of understanding *(in counter-distinction to the presencing of understanding occurring in epistemic engagements)*.

To continue then, I will return to the *logos* mills, and see what *(com)*possibilities unfold.

V

According to Heidegger, Parmenides tells us there is nothing outside of presencing, that "anything outside of presencing [. . .] is impossible" *("Moira" 96)*. It is this impossibility I seek, or at least am attempting to touch *(gropes around in)*—as my pursuit of *logos* may be more gesture/tactile than visual: that is, more concerned with feelings (emotional, intuitive, perhaps even gut-wrenching) than appearances *(which has dependence on the eyes/I's)*. To do this, I will—even if only temporarily—move counter to what commonly occurs in regards to this issue: rather than working from the perspective of the light, of the lighting, of letting the duality of Being "shine out of the unfolded light of the twofold" *(95)*, I will unfold *(perhaps punfold)* this duality in shadows or darkness. The reason: as indicated earlier, despite Heidegger's moves and explorations of the lighting,\(^{11}\) darkness/absence cannot be
forgotten (nor forgone) when thinking of lighting/presencing. Without darkness, without a contrastive or contra/dictory entity to that of the lighting, we would be, proverbially so, "blinded by the light." Without this darkness/absence we could not "see" what the lighting un conceals—this is the presencing (of that which is present).\(^\text{12}\)

Nearly echoing Parmenides' claim of the impossibility outside of presencing, I might argue that without this darkness/absence there would also be an impossibility inside of presencing: for in a totality of light, much like any totality, we would be incapable of acknowledging the totality;\(^\text{13}\) thus, either there is this darkness/absence, this impossibility outside of presencing which is a necessary condition to the (com)possibilities of presencing or there is equally impossibility inside of presencing; opposing/apposing impossibilities ripe with potential.

My attempts here, however, will focus on engaging absence—itself likely an impossibility. This will be a "bringing-forward-into-view" (φασίς – to say, utterance [vocal and silent]) of absence, of that which cannot be a "letting-lie-before" (Λόγος – logos). But this nonetheless can be gathered—must be gathered—in that it is still a "Laying that gathers" (λέγειν - legein) even if in such as way that we are incapable of accessing that laying or that gathering. As such, I am attempting to engage a logos of impossibility—which is itself unfolding possibility (not unlike the absence/presence relationship)—and this too is a gathering, in the sense of Heraclitus' logos, which Heidegger tells us is a "letting-lie-before as gathering" (a Λόγος / λέγειν :: a Logos/legein).

But this is a gathering of that which remains in darkness/absence, must remain in darkness/absence, and cannot "lie-before" in any sense other than as "that which cannot-lie- before." And this, following traditional logics—a very loaded phrase in this kind of work—
tells us that "gathering" is perhaps an improper term for this kind of thought, which makes it ideal for this work: it seems impossible to gather darkness/absence.

Gathering is an act/occurrence of bringing together, of making connections, a building community, which, as indicated in previous chapters in reference to Jean-Luc Nancy's work, may be based upon resistance. The gathering occurring here, this impossibility, is a "letting-lie-before as gathering" of things which resist—no greater example than absence resisting presencing and vice versa. They are gathered by their bond of resistance.

But aside from thinking these things in pairs, paradoxical pairs, Heracliting paradoxical (com)possibilities, the question becomes one of accessibility. Many works, including Heidegger's, examine accessing and engaging the lighting/presencing—this would also include works on negation, at least those working on negation in terms of the is/is not distinction as both is and is not are ways of unconcealment. But to open a logos of impossibility, I have to find an accessible avenue to the inaccessible, to this darkness/absence, to this impossibility outside of presencing.

One approach offered is in this notion of bearing witness to the gesture of address. While we may not be able to access absence in the same way we access presencing (of that which is present), we can acknowledge or bear witness to darkness/absence via the relationship it has (and has to have) with lighting/presencing. A quick example of this can be found in the digital realm, specifically working with film: we know there are gaps, caesuras, absences between frames; these absences are inaccessible, accept as absences, and we can bear witness to them as such. The acknowledgement or bearing witness to these absences gathers them, but not in such a way as to bring them forward into view—as they have no appearance, except as absence. It is a gathering of that which cannot be present or
presenced; a gathering of absence and/or the impossibility of presencing—and this bearing
witness is the only access we have or is as close as we can get to absence (at least in this
print-based work).

The impossibility that is outside presencing is only to be known by its non-light (and
non-light-ability)—perhaps even as an absence of light or that which is (in) the absence of
light. An other, gathered as other (an impossibility), and never to be brought out of
impossibility. Even if this were possible—that is, to bring this absence into presencing—it
would be a death act; it would kill absence—and reciprocally destroy presencing—and I
most assuredly am not interested in death logic, nor dying the good death, or even dying the
bad death for that matter—as these are restricting systems, finite systems, closed (or closing)
systems.

Thus, I am (and will be) at play with this "thing" which is a "gathering" in the sense
of "laying-before," but in such a way as it does not "gather" nor does it "lay-before." Rather,
this work merely intends to bear witness to absence, to absence as possibility, itself an
impossibility; and this self-eating trace is as close as I can come to any articulation of the
"thing" (which is absent of "thingness"). This darkness, this other, must always be absence
in order for presencing to be possible. And this will be a relaunching point for my
continued drifting.

This dissertation then, as it continues to (p)unfold from here, will be a palpating of
that which is (an) outside of presencing—which is important as this impossibility directly
influences and impacts both outside-of-presencing (impossibility) and the duality of
presencing (being/Being) without ever undergoing presencing (or disclosure [aletheia]). Of
course, it/we cannot do this directly, though there is only so much indirection available here
within the bonds of the literate-/print-based apparatus. (The Sophie2 other, itself an
impossible gathering of shadow/darkness/absence, will offer a bit more freedom in this regard.)

I will return to this presencing/absence relationship throughout, always working to explore or play within the absence, to allow for the darkness/absence to speak us. This is, in a sense (at least a Heraclitean one), our relationship with *logos*. Nearing the end, I will articulate the importance of this approach as it relates to the current digital/electrate climate, but before reaching that moment I must attempt to open space(s) for that articulation to emerge—even if impossibly so.

Thus, I will turn us to and through Plato's work, specifically issues that emerge in the *Sophist*, to continue this drifting through the Greeks, in order to further unfold the limitations—and/or subjugations—of restrictive economies that stem from a view where *logos* is nearly synonymous with *logos as logic*.

VI

Returning momentarily to Parmenides, when this problematic "is/is not" distinction "turns out the lights," there is an instance when (false) philosophers and thinkers may actually say something of value, actually engage in a *saying* not always already distorted by the skew of the lighting, as they are no longer guided by the deception of appearances but rather work by intuition (perhaps even by instinct). In the darkness, guided by sound and touch (and smell), much is possible that cannot be "seen" (as possibility) in the light. Thus, I will attempt to avoid enLIGHtenment logics and seek to articulate a space for those who spend time (knowingly or not) playing in the darkness: i.e., sophistics.
In the *Sophist*, aside from the necessary parricide of the Parmenidean father, Plato indicates, as Nye tells us, "The Sophists [. . .], must [also] be tracked to their *dark* hiding places and captured" (24; my emphasis). In the shadows, "hiding" in the darkness, always already concealed and impossibly unrevealable, we find sophistic work and thought, we find sophistic possibilities, we find the Sophists (an undefinable group—cf. Schiappa 39-40). But if we have learned anything from the Eleatic Stranger, these creatures are an elusive bunch and so perhaps all that can be done is to glimpse momentary silhouettes—formless shapes just on the threshold of (com)possibility, toggling in that space between being and nonbeing.

More importantly, if we hold this darkness or absence (of light) as "hiding places" for sophistics, then in any lighting there must also be sophistics: those which we cannot "see" but which are also present (the possible); those which belong to the absence—those which are always already part of that which is present but are never to be part of the revealing/presencing associated with lighting (the compossible), and then there is absence itself (perhaps incompossible). And playing with any and all of these things is impossibility. But here, these sophistics (and their untenable complexities)—and this bearing witness to them—will help (re)open (im)possibilities and the potentialities they allow.

*Plato’s Stranger*

It makes sense, of course, that Plato would need to alter this *logos-as-logic* game in order to combat the problems he had with sophistics, with their unfolding of these other (im)possibilities. But his failure, and it is a mighty one, is that he interpreted their efforts in terms of his own game and not theirs; he placed sophistics within a differend governed by *logos as logic*. They were, of course, playing a different game entirely—a name game, among
others—and so the need "to distinguish proper [. . .] from improper" or that they seemed "invulnerable to counterattack" (Nye 24) misses the point. To make these kinds of distinctions would be like bringing a bowling ball to play a basketball game. The sophists were working from a different notion of logos, one more directly tied to language, to speech, to giving-voice (or voicing), to communication (both the communicative address [the saying and the gesture of the saying] and its content [the said])—which is a different kind of empowerment.

This is not to say that Plato was not also concerned with these things, but rather that he and the Sophists were just different, using different approaches (and perhaps necessarily so, much like the split between English and Communication Studies). Nye tells us, "The point of the [Platonic] Stranger's logical innovations [. . .] is to structure a speech-practice [an enacting of logos] in which one can do more than persuade," (30)—perhaps meant as in which one can *rid the necessity of persuasion altogether*.

She continues, "With his new technique, the Stranger is able to eclipse this *other* to whom persuasion must be directed, and to establish a superior and authoritative position in the discussion" (30; my emphasis). Here is reference to one of the most destructive moments from Platonic discourse: the game of division, as the Stranger enacts it, does not have to address the other, is not designed to address the other, and, in fact, excludes the other (in terms of agency)—all these emerging as an active part of Platonic-Socratic tactics.

This is a self-serving tautological approach to "truth," which is a fine-tuning or perfecting, to a certain degree, of the law of excluded middle. It hones the law to further establish the importance, validity, purpose of what is, of being, and does not require, seek, or even need other (for its articulation). It is a singular act. A speech-act/speech-practice for/from the self. It only requires one, a "logical one," a rational/reasonable thinking man.\(^\text{14}\)
(Perhaps following the influence of technologies—here referring to the emergence of writing [as] technology—we might view this as connected to the developing "self/individual" [as opposed to the oral world's tribal community/group] that stemmed from the advent of literacy, which turned us decidedly inward.)

The only sense of other (as audience) emerging in this Platonic-Socratic trauma is the controlled (and contrived) differentiating between the restricted divisions established by the Stranger-Philosopher-King. Or, in more expansive terms, in Nye's words:

Plato's accommodation of logic to actual argumentative discussion results in a successful technique for managing dissent. The law of the excluded middle mandates a series of normatively ordered statements at the same time as it forbids the respondent to speak or think outside the categories in which these evaluations have been made. Division closes the question step by step. Now no more can be said. Argument is terminated. (30; my emphases)

This turn is a death logic. It silences the other. It removes the response-ability of the audience; reducing them to bobble-heads at best or masses of agreeable moans at worst: yes-men and yes-women (though perhaps not women in Plato's work, especially as this would introduce another—and the worst/best kind: an irrational other). Perhaps we would be better served to think the audience of the Stranger-logician as "Oh, yes!" men and women, acting as aids (AIDS?) to the logician's masturbatory practice: a sort of conglomerate of prostitutes—paid with the illusion of participatory involvement (another form of democratic currency).
For Plato’s Stranger, the choice was between two lighted possibilities, eliminating the chance of an audience bearing witness to that which was not part of the system of division, of di/ vision, of death vision. Logos as logic is machinic or programmatic. "The purpose of [logos as] logic was not to open the discussion to all viewpoints with the purpose of establishing consensus, but to establish a model of discourse that excluded what was contradictory or irrational" (Nye 49-50). To a certain extent this makes sense as the "system" is one of protocols, and contradictory protocols lead to paralysis or inaction in the "system." But humans are not machines, programs, or simply a conglomeration of protocols. We are ripe with contradiction, as well as irrationality, and functionally so.

Nonetheless, it is Plato and his avatar that help restructure communication so things flow into "approved" channels (Nye 34). The approval, or rather judgment, comes from the law of excluded middle and the principle of noncontradiction. These are the pillars upon which and from which the Stranger-Philosopher-King (p)resides.

VII

Building from and improving upon the work of his predecessors, Aristotle further mills logos to logos as logic. In Aristotle’s Greece, a different beast had emerged in relation to the law courts and there was a need to replace human credibility—"[t]he old logos, the account of an event by a witness," the act of bearing witness and giving testimonial, which had become suspect—with a new more stringent appeal to truth, which asked for a "new authoritative Logos or Reason" (Nye 45). 16 In the game of the law courts, i.e., a juridical-politic, Aristotelian Reason prevailed in ways "bearing witness" seemingly could not. Why?
Because it was a game no longer based on possibility but rather probability, one governed by the phrase "it stands to reason . . .".

Aristotle moves logic from Platonic division to the syllogism. His move shifts us from an explicit game of articulating what is already known (the Platonic-Stranger's game) and into an operation that could potentially produce "new" knowledge—but it adheres to this discovery metaphor and as such can only presence that which is present, which does not engage absence.

His syllogism does, however, radically shift us back to *logos* as speech-act, as discourse, but with (syllogistic) arrangement and cause/effect (effect/cause) logic becoming the governing bodies of this Aristotelian discourse. As such, "a new use of language appeared" in which logic "structures a learned discourse" (Nye 57). This is possibly the greatest and most treacherous impact of Aristotle's work on humanity.

In this concluding third to the "Greek miracle" (the movement from mythos to *logos* [as logic]), this Aristotelian influenza has come to strangle language, or at least to strangle our engagement with language/ *logos*. This radically alters not only how we undergo this other (language/ *logos* as being other) but paradigmatically revolutionizes our interpellational possibilities. We stopped trying to open ourselves to the potentialities within *logos*—potentialities of its living, of its play, which greatly open possibilities in actuality—and instead fell into this spell of trying to perfect *logos* into "truth-seeker," which, as I have indicated, is a tautological beast—the Ouroboros (Οὐροβόρος): a self-validation process of establishing what we *always already know* into clear exemplar of TRUTH.

The problem with the "perfecting" of *logos* into logic is that it strips *logos* of its living possibilities, of its flowing freedoms. It fixes things; kills the other. As Nye puts it, "Logic needs no respondent," needs no one with a response-ability: "it has reduced to silence
[death] any possible hearer and even the second thoughts of the logician himself” (59). In this move, the gesture of address of/to the other or of/to absence is a wasted move because the focus of *logos* becomes stringently linked to presencing of that which is present and no longer concerns itself with its other (com)possibilities; it becomes a learned discourse of reason, of "right" reason, of "proper" reason, which excludes, reduces, marginalizes, eliminates, others.

In this perfection of logic is the beginnings of the self-destruction of "man," who in this moment clearly shifts from a being who lives communally, that is tribally, one who existed in primary orality as a nonindividual, part of a larger oneness (see Ong, Havelock, Luria, Goody, to name a few)—which might be connected to the (im)possibilities of mythomorphic discourses—and instead moved to a being who lives by rules, by decrees, by protocols, but a particular brand of these rules/decrees/protocols as they are established by rationality, reason, and the "proof" of the "truth" of Aristotelian/syllogistic *Logos*.

This type of logic, as a behavior, determines in *a priori* fashion, all the possibilities of the being/saying/thinking which can be accepted (acceptable) in this exchange of the ruler-class. Driven to its fullest conclusion or extension, we reach an immobility, inaction, i.e. *rigor mortis*. This inevitable fall, to dramatize this moment further, actually tells us not that Aristotelian *logos* (via Parmenides-Plato) leads to death, to the fall, but rather that these controls, these decrees of the ruler-philosopher-king, is a fall or moment of death which has already occurred, and which perhaps has always already occurred within the inevitable compossibilities of language. Every moment following this "death" has been part of the slow progression of *rigor mortis*. But we may yet rise from the grave in pseudo-Christian fashion and/or rise from the grave as in becoming the living-dead: both being a becoming of yet something other and perhaps something more.
What is developing here with Aristotle is a shift away from "man" as guide, as model, as singular decisive leader, because of "his" corruptibility, fallibility, and general influence-ability and instead there is a turn to a system of thought—a logos as logic—that is not prey to these same types of fallibility. Logos (as syllogistic logic) becomes the guide to the ruling-class, with rhetoric being its vehicle.

But there is yet one additional turn in the milling of logos to logos as logic that needs to be heeded for it opens areas in need of reconsideration for our current electronic climate and is indicative of why there is (perpetual) resurgence of the importance of a multivocal concept like logos.

VIII

Once we reach the Stoics, specifically Zeno, there is yet another shift in logos. As Nye tells us, logos gets rearticulated as "the grammar of the cosmos: a divine law that keeps the physical world in place and a universal will to which the virtuous must conform" (66), and this change in logos coincides with a radically changing culture, a change brought by Alexander.

What made Alexander so great was his military prowess, having never lost a battle. Part of that success stemmed directly from his ability to communicate across vast distances, via sound and gesture, and via literate, written exchanges. It was literacy which drastically aids not only in Alexander's military conquests but also in his ability to maintain control on his vast empire.

What these conquests did was to open the Greeks to the world. Alexander introduces the Greeks to a perpetual encounter with other(s), and this revealed people who
did not view the Greeks as the ideal man, who did not submit, at least not willingly, to Greek views and beliefs and systems of thought. The ruling class had to accommodate this resistance.

Given the expansive empire and the new-found roles (administrative/judiciary roles) for Greeks (educated Greeks) across the lands, "the Stoics' new logic pointed the way to a idiom of control" (Nye 74). The ruling class and the ruling power was no longer one of physical prowess but one of culture, and "[t]he medium of that culture was language, Greek, but not the diverse demotic Greek spoken by tradespeople, workers, slaves, and women. The language of those in power would be a rational, logical Greek" (74).

In this melting-pot world connected by Alexander, difference was the cup of tea and there had to be a new governance, a new type of logic, because the other(s), which now had become the always present other(s), refused to accept the old way of the Greeks. Greek rule, as it applied in the city-state, no longer applied in an empire. Too much difference. Too much resistance to the city-state ideology. The empire was now littered with a growing diversity of ideals and worldviews. Thus, the need for a new logic, one that displayed the ruling-class superiority to be based on intellect and civilization/culture and not in brute strength. It became connected to "the rule of right reason, a universal language that could form the syntax of all meaning. The grammar of that language, not its substantive terms, would be the bearer of authority" (Nye 75). Thus it was this new logic and the ability to be rational, to reason, that would be the method of control for the empire.

In this short span from Parmenides through the Stoics, *logos* gets further and further refined until its connections to the *multivocality* that exists in the sophistic tradition (i.e., pre-milling) nearly vanished and *logos* becomes singularly produced/reduced as logic, as logical language, as literate-based, rational/reasoned discourse of the ruling class, "suited for use in
law courts, in political debate, and in the decrees of governors" (Nye 74). This, of course, excludes quite a large percentage of the population—then and now—and this is part of what I am attempting to resist.

*World Opening*

We have, in essence, returned to this need which launched the Stoics' divine *logos*. We are again midst a "post-Alexandrian" culture, though here our Alexander is the digital/electric revolution of networked capabilities—an entity that opens our previously literate-based nation-state view to a global-connectivity (a complexity far greater even than McLuhan's global village). We are now in or participate in electorate worlds where we perpetually encounter other—in the technology, in the others connected to those spaces, and even in the other(s) in ourselves; and this perpetual other can, will, and often does resist any "truth" we may proffer; it reacts with slander, sarcasm, criticism, praise, paralogical generativity, appropriation, remediation, and the like from our plethora of digital utterances (see any number of comments and responses [textual and video] to various YouTube videos—especially those that gain phenomenon status).

As such, much like the Greeks during Alexander's time, we once again find we are immersed in "a plurality of peoples with differing values and customs" (Nye 66). Does this mean that we need a new Zeno? No. No matter how much we would like to believe the maxim, history does not repeat itself. What is occurring is not a repetition of something we have previously seen. It is a bearing witness to yet something other, which perhaps may be hermeneutically grasped in our not-so-distant futures—that is, of course, once we have introduced even newer technologizations of the word that will allow us to critique, comment, create with the possibilities and limitations of this thing being called electracy.
Thus, what is emerging in our current climate is something different, in need of different approaches, understandings, and engagements—not a second-coming of Stoic logos as the grammar of the cosmos. While certain parallels can be drawn, limitedly so, to varying possible interpretive rememberings (i.e., histories), we cannot make the glacial mistake of thinking this a repetition of history. The distributed networks, the emerging electrate environments, the digital possibilities are not the same as Alexander's trek across Persia.

Unlike the Stoics' logic which helped create a new singular appeal for the ruling class—an appeal to a divine law, a reasoned logic and language, as cornerstone of culture—this new change asks for greater multivocality. Not to create a ruling stance but to give voice to all those who have been denied voices under the lingering remnants of these other ways of thinking.

IX

What I have attempted in this chapter is to (p)unfold the (im)possibilities within logos as a way of opening yet other possibilities. This was not to exclude or kill any previous possibilities—as that would undermine the very intent of this move—but merely to attempt to create spaces for these other things to exist as well. In doing so, I have traced the evolution of logos to logos as logic through the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian "mill" in order to (re)open critical considerations for the potential limitations placed on this all-to-important classical entity we call logos.

Working through the millers was also an attempt to articulate the importance of revisiting logos even if adhering to the (crafted) foundations or grund of Western thought: by following logos through the mill to its evolution with the Stoics, and following Nye's
articulation of the Alexandrian influence (which brought the Greeks into a tropological relationship with Others), I have tried to indicate how we (Western thinkers) once again find ourselves in a world where we all perpetually encountering other (aided by the proliferation of electronic discourse[s]). Thus, even if operating with the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian(-Zenoic) milling of *logos* to *logos* as (divine/governing) *logic*, we find a call in our given moment for yet another turn within that restrictive refinement. Of course, my argument is that we need to move out of that refinement altogether and backward/forward to a more inclusive understanding of *logos*—specifically to work with all the choral (com)possibilities of the word, which adds layers and complexities to the question, "What is (y)our relationship with *logos*?"

It is also important here in this concluding section that I acknowledge a particular movement, perhaps even method, at work within this chapter: I have been moving tropologically and chorographically, working to retain all the possibilities of the term *logos* while piecing out and critically engaging those meanings in specific, perhaps singular, uses. Of course, in terms of my exploration of Heidegger, the *multivovality* of the term nearly always remained, but otherwise I have been actively performing a method of invention of the slash: connecting the (com)possibilities of *logos* while separating these things (critically and creatively). To continue this inventive paracritique, I will conclude by returning to sophistics—working from a sophistic engagement of our "first" miller. (This is a going back to go forward.) Specifically, I will look at Gorgias's trilemma.

In *On the Nonexistent*, Gorgias claims (allegedly), that nothing exists. If it does exist, there is no way for us to know it. If we could know it, there is no way for us to communicate it. This is Gorgias' direct response to Parmenides (cf. Guthrie 180). Or, in more expansive terms, as Kerferd writes, "It is clear that he [Gorgias] was pulling apart and
separating three things which Parmenides had identified in his fragment 8.34-36, namely
being, thinking and saying" (99). These are three focal points in this work
(being/thinking/saying), with each standing in relation to the word logos. The question, then,
eternally, "What is (y)our relationship with logos?" would perhaps be bettered constructed as,
"What is (y)our relationship with being/thinking/saying?"

These relationships raise interesting issues, both here and moving forward, and to
more adequately explore them I will quote Kerferd at some length for I think his
conversation opens several key beginning points and concluding points for our discussion:

Once we have separated these three things each from the other, while
still insisting that there needs to be some kind of correspondence
maintained between all three as a requirement for truth and knowledge
we are confronted with the problem of the best way to understand logos
in relation to just these three things. For [. . .] logos seems to have,
indeed must have, a kind of foot planted in each of the three areas. The
logos of a thing is (1) the principle or nature or distinguishing mark or
constituent elements of the things itself, it is (2) what we understand it to
be, and finally it is (3) the correct (verbal) description, account or
definition of the thing. All three raise the question of being. For the
logos of a thing under heading (1) is what that thing is, under (2) it is
what we understand it to be, and under (3) it is what we say it to be. (100)

Obviously, as it stands in relation to Gorgias' trilemma, there is a critical unfolding of logos
that warrants further discussion. But this will not be our focus as (1) it has been looked at in
some depth by a wide range of scholars, Kerferd included (see also Vitanza, Guthrie, Poulakas, and Schiappa, to name a few), and (2) it is actually secondary in importance, in my view, to what Kerferd develops in this particular statement or particular thinking: *logos* is what separates being/thinking/saying, distinguishes them in some form, yet it connects them, having a foot in each (three footed—must be tri-podal, triangular, or just focused on threes—a third sophistic of sorts). Here, *logos* functions as the / in this relationship of being/thinking/saying (represented linearly merely due to the print-literacy medium).

For Kerferd, *logos* not only has meaning in each of these three (cf. 83), but connects/separates being, thinking, and *saying* in particular ways: it is, itself, topological. *Logos*, though retaining its relatedness across all three, is radically different with each of these (com)possibilities:

- For being, *logos* is a game of presencing (following Heidegger’s treatment) and absencing (following my developments in this chapter)—a gesture of giving for both the way of "that which is (present)" and the (com)possibilities of nonbeing;

- For thinking, *logos* refers to the *ways* in which we think—the possibilities of thought—which radically change with each technological shift. These changes in thought, as they relate to changes in technologies, are what I am attempting to draw attention to throughout this entire work: change the medium (of communication), change the message (communicated), and radically change the (com)possibilities of/for communication; this is an opening of possibilities of thought, rather than closing possibilities based on alphabetic-logoi—the last great impacting technological shift. And
these changes, working via this separating-but-connecting notion of *logos*, lead to radical changes in all three: being, thinking, *saying*.

- For *saying*, *logos* is both a discursive act—as in to communicate via language (oral, written, electrate, among others)—as well as the power to name, to give name, and the act of the duality of the *saying*; this is an empowering possibility and, given the shift to electraey, opens us to (1) the potentialities that (be)come with the power of naming and (2) creates access to the act/event (*Ereignis*) of the *saying*, which includes the *gesture of address*, which, as discussed, provides us momentary access (even if only peripherally) to that which is not, to nonbeing, to the acknowledgement of absence (and absence's acknowledgement of us)—e.g., all the (com)possibilities, and even the incompossible, between video frames.

Because of the linkages, via *logos*, of being/thinking/saying, we have to significantly reconsider everything when there are evolutions in technologies of the word; that is to say, when there are developments in technology which impact *saying*, these also impact thinking and being, relationally. This is also true when technologies impact being, or impact thinking, as any change, however minute, in any one of these, radically alters all three. Open a world to digital or electrate communication and open infinitely new worlds, worlds not possible (acceptably so) in one controlled by literate-logoi. It is these (com)possibilities I seek, must seek, and must be taken into consideration, in emerging electrate worlds.
Chapter IV

Ethos: Ethos of Invention

I

Most classical rhetoric treatments of ethos begin with an Aristotelian point of view, which commonly gets reduced to either the development of "character" or the projection (i.e., representation) of a speaker's qualities in terms of arete, eunoia, and phronesis. C. Jan Swearingen writes, "the aspects of imitation that are central to Aristotle's conceptualization of ethos focus on the speaker's ability to represent character" (118), or, as S. Michael Halloran has told us, "The speech is [. . .] a dramatization of the character of the speaker" (60). This representation or dramatization of character implies a view where ethos, as character (or "proper personae" or even "masks"), is both mediated (as in re-presented) and is "manipulable."

Of course, there are those who consider this "character projection" to be a bit superficial and would offer a more rigorous take on Aristotle's construction of ethos as it emerges in both his Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics (Smith; Reynolds; Kinneavy and Warshauer)—a view where character is not necessarily projected but established via habit—but this reduction of ethos to character (and the rhetorical crafting of character) is still very much a commonly held view: simply survey any number of textbooks for introductory composition or introductory speech.

If only considering ethos in terms of this "traditional" view, I would still be well served to take into consideration the impacts of changing technologies, which allow for yet
other possible ways of constructing and mediating "character" or "masks." But what I am after is a view of *ethos* that is of far greater complexity; the changes in apparatus (the shifts from oral to literate to electrate discourse, for example) necessitate a radical reconsideration of the (choral) possibilities within/of *ethos*, which include connections to "character," "personae," "subject," "identity," "self," "presence," and so on—all of which I will conflate in this game of (re)considering the "ethical."

Thus, I will begin moving us toward a more critical view of *ethos* by working out of the singular (*ethos*) toward the plural (*ethea*), which shifts us away from the conversation on the distinctions of *habit* and *character* (which, in Greek, is a difference of an *epsilon* or *eta* [εθος vs. ηθος], and so are linguistically very closely related—see Arthur Miller) and instead opens us to discourses on "haunts," "abodes," or even "places" (Scott; Miller; Chamberlain; Halloran; Jarratt and Reynolds). But there is exceedingly more to consider in this term *ethea* than just this common treatment of "haunts" or "abodes" or "places," and this will be my beginning point for approaching this classical term in the emerging electrate apparatus.

While I should acknowledge that there is much for critical thought within this particular reduction of *ethos* to "abode" or "place" (e.g., Heidegger picks up on this connection of *ethos* to "abode," unfolding *ethos* onto *dwelling* and subsequently his discussion of being/Being, a discussion to which I will return), what I seek is to unfold yet other possibilities—asking that we move more into the "fullness" of the term (its punctual/choral range).

To do this, I will follow Charles Scott's exploration of *ethea* (in "conversation" with Heidegger) as well as Charles Chamberlain's explication of *ethea* (working across varying Greek writers) as both open this conversation in particularly helpful ways that necessitate a more critical reconsidering how we come to *ethos*, "identity," "subject," and so on. And, as
this work will move critically and inventively with(in) Heidegger's plays on these issues—
ranging from *ethos* to the essence of being—it is important to note that for Heidegger there is
no "subject," but rather the beginning of "being there," or what he refers to as DaSein
(becoming Da-Sein in his later works). This is a relation with another relation (cf. Nancy,
*Being Singular Plural* 1-100) and not with a subject or entity itself, and this is why it is perhaps
better for this work that I write subject as "sub/ject," signifying, among other things, its
literal meaning of "being thrown." This, of course, is not that far from the "recoil" or
"temporal ecstasis" in reference to Heidegger's own "sub/ject" position, which Scott
indicates (115).

Additionally, this use of the slash in "sub/ject," aside from its connections to the
inventive possibilities opened in earlier chapters, is a visual reminder to the splits or divisions
(and detachments)—i.e., the instabilities—within the "sub/ject" that this work seeks, and it
also calls attention to the "sub/ject's" always already "sub/jugation": "When the Subject
writes, or chooses, the Subject is always already written, or chosen" (Vitanza, "Postclassical"
398). Plus, this slash-usage is in keeping with the style and practice we find in Vitanza's
"Critical Sub/Versions" article, and itself is not only sub/versive in that it resists the
standard approach to the textual representation of this entity, but also in that it causes
tensions within the visibility of the word itself. Thus, I will use "sub/ject" rather than the
more traditional "subject" as a way to draw attention to Heidegger's non-subject "being
there" and to work sub/versively in regards to the "positioning" and tensions always already
present in the word itself.
Opening Nomadic Ranges

Scott, in *The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Studies in Continental Thought)*, says, "The word *éthea* in Homer was used to name the places where animals belong. The animal's *éthos* is the place to which it returns, its dwelling place" (143). For Scott, there seems to be a particular "grounding" to *éthea* as it revolves around "dwelling place,"—an echo of which can be found in Heidegger's work—but as Chamberlain introduces, in "From 'Haunts' to 'Character': The Meaning of *Éthos* and its Relation to Ethics," there is a (necessary) shift from "abode" to "arena," or what might be viewed as a shift from "place" to "space." Working through Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis, Chamberlain says, "in all three writers, [there] is a common idea of *éthos* as the *arena in which people or animals move*" (99; my emphasis).

Echoing the earlier shifts I made from topos toward (Ulmer's) chora—a move from *conceptual starting places* to *punceptual starting spaces*—this movement (and/or "arena" of/for "movement") might also be conceived as a shift from the static to the nomadic, which will be at least one of the guides of this chapter's "drifting"—itself a nomadic style. This has importance for reconsidering the "sub/ject" as the shift to *éthea* opens the "sub/ject" to nomadism.

Scott, working through the connections of *nomós* (pasture) and *nómos* (law)—which is a play across choral registers (his "play" including *nomádes, nomás,* and *nomizo* as well as *nomós* and *nómos*)—indicates how the division and distribution of land (*nomás*), or ownership (*nomizo*) and possession, in contrast with the "random search for pasturage," came to be part of the series of meanings that manifest in *ethos* (143). This "landowner" view of *ethos*—the static view of "sub/ject" (especially the modern "sub/ject") in which one has "ground" upon/from which to "speak"—might be contrasted with the nomad, or what I might treat as
"sub/ject as tourist," moving (constantly). As Scott tells us, "In both words [nómo and ethos] habitual practice [. . .] struggles with nomadic, uncivilized separation" (143). Thus, the landowner (philosopher) and the nomad (sophist) are at odds, and have been at odds for centuries—especially in U.S. history (see the struggles between ranchers and free rangers).

As a tourist (foreigner/outside/abject), the "sub/ject" holds a radically different relationship to space/place (or "site") than the citizen/resident/native; these tensions, in varying ways, also proliferate my two scholarly works here as I must work through the static (that of print-based literacy; citizenship of the academy) to open us to the nomadic (an electronic wandering in search for "pasturage"; conductive tourism).

In this search for "pasturage," or perhaps even a "non-sub/ject" possibility, I (will) work toward ranges or arenas: Chamberlain writes, "one's èthea form an arena or range in which the animal naturally belongs" (97). Thus, I am not looking for the specific "character" or even "I-dentity" of the "sub/ject," but rather the "range" or "arena" of possibilities that exist for "sub/ject" (or "sub/jectivity"). Meaning, what I am concerned with, or will be concerning myself with, is not any singular "sub/ject" position, with any fixed sense of ethos, but rather the very possibility of "sub/ject" (and "sub/jectivity") at all. As such, to open possibilities in relation to ethos, I am moving us out of the restrictive limits of any singular "sub/ject" manifestation/projection and instead opening generative possibilities in relation to "sub/ject" invention (or what might be considered "ethical" invention) by trying to palpate this condition of the nomadic range.

Of course, Chamberlain's view of "arena" implies one in which all "sub/ject" positions may reside, but "arenas" outside the limits of "self" should also be considered: Kate Ronald's "A Reexamination of Personal and Public Discourse in Classical Rhetoric," proposes a view of ethos where a "sub/ject" must navigate "the tension between the [. . .]
private and public self" (39)—this offers at least two different "sub/ject" possibilities within one "sub/ject." Thus, the social/cultural impact upon the construction of "selves" and/or this distinction between the private and public selves or spheres opens considerations for "arenas," both within and outside the range of a "self."

From a related view, Nedra Reynolds, in "Ethos as Location: New Sites for Understanding Discursive Authority," writes, "As its etymological history shows, gathering or meeting is literally at the root of ethos. This crucial part of its definition emphasizes both the spatial—a gathering place—and the idea of presence, of speakers and listeners" (333). This connection to arena, especially public arena, in terms of "gathering place," as it relates to both rhetors and audiences, is important as it has never really been removed from the issue of ethos: the first "arena" (and thus part of the guide for Aristotle's construction of ethos [Smith 2]) being the Greek polis—the "site" for deliberative rhetoric.

In contrast to the Greek polis, the new emerging "arena" for deliberative rhetoric, and thus that which opens "the tension[s] between the [. . .] private and public self" (Ronald 39), is, following Ulmer, that of the Internet (see Electronic); and it is our task to develop "citizen rhetors" (to borrow from Berlin) or "EmerAgents" (to borrow from Ulmer) who can critically and creatively engage in this "arena."

But to do this, and to grasp possibilities beyond a strict literate-based sense (meaning to move the discourse out of the control of alphabetic logoi and into emergent possibilities among image reasoning and "reasoneon" [Ulmer, Electronic 58-65]) we must re-envision our relationship(s) to "arenas" or "pastures"—themselves being shifted from root imagery (associated with plant-life, as in "sites" for grazing) to rhizomic imagery (now, perhaps, fungal in nature, as in "sites" for [Derridean] de/composition) as we sprawl into electronic cultures. Or, put another way, the "arena" has become electrical current.
Before (p)unfolding the implications of this emerging nomadic "sub/ject" wandering/herding across electrate "arenas" (or electricity itself), I need to consider at least one other conflation within this notion of *ethea*, and that is its relation to opening us to hysteria.

Scott tells us, "If the animal cannot return to its *ēthos*, a violation of its particular order occurs, as when a wild horse is hobbled in a stall and cannot return to its own environment" (143). He goes on to say that in Homer's use, there was a "connotation of appropriateness for particular animals" and their *ethea*: i.e., horses and pastures (not stables/stalls) (143). Chamberlain takes this work a bit further: "The horse longs to be in his *ēthea*, feels pain at being locked at the manger and joy upon breaking free" (98). We might consider the blocking of the horse's return to its *ethea*, this "violation" as Scott calls it, as both physical and psychic trauma; these traumas can lead to the development of varying types of hysterics (as I indicated in Chapter II). Thus, working the horse's *ethea* as analogous to human *ethea*—as both are "free spirited" creatures and share any number of connections in American cultural discourse (the most iconic being the relation between the cowboy and his horse)—we find that attempts to alter human *ethea* may be traumatic and lead to particular types of hysterias.

Or, to spin it again, attempts at altering our *ethea* have already occurred in shifting us from the free-flowing, nomadic possibilities in the discourse of primary orality to the more structured ("fenced" pastures of) literate discourse. This may be part of the reason for the hysteritica we already possess as we have been "sub/jected" to the "literate-manger" (and perhaps the "Christian manger") for extensive periods of time. But with the emergence of electronic discourse, and a shift to image reasoning as well as electric wandering, we are
breaking free from the "manger"—though, to be sure, the "pastures" to which we return are by no means the same as they were during primary orality. The entire topography has been altered by the literate-machine, and now the electrate-machine, and so we return to roam, but we roam differently.

Following the shift from the fixity of ethos to an ethos-cum-etbea nomadic roaming, I will now drift us to "pastures" that focus more on the essence of this shift—opening us to being, Being, being/Being, and the essence of responding, responsiveness, and even response-ability. This will allow for an articulation of this "sub/ject" shift in more explicit terms, which has connections to the movement from the modern "sub/ject" to and through a postmodern "sub/jectivity," the latter of which itself seems a contradictory impossibility. And this will open us to a rhizomic base of relationality. But first, I will return us to the River H, which has been repeatedly visited in previous chapter.

II

Echoes of this ethos-cum-etbea nomadism can be heard in Heidegger's statements on the trucker, who is "at home on the highway," a traversing of space, but who "does not have his [sic] lodgings [or dwelling place] there" ("Building" 347). But this particular "trucker" example is not necessarily in line with much of Heidegger's other treatments of ethos,⁴ which tend to focus more on "dwelling" and/or "dwelling place": in his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger tells us, "Ethos means abode, dwelling place. The word [ethos] names the open region in which man dwells" (233).

As such, it is no surprise that treatments of Heidegger's etymological mining of ethos tend to focus on this connection to "dwelling place" (see Michael J. Hyde as example⁵) and
tend to overlook its connection to "the open region"—the "arena" or "range" (following Chamberlain). This focus is also not surprising given the often hermeneutic propensity we have for searching out fixed, identifiable, "sub/jected" grounds—locations of stasis—from which to critically engage the ideas and thoughts of others. Which may be to say: in critical hermeneutics we search for the "graves" (our final attempts at "landownership") of Roland Barthes' dead authors.

But more than just following common reduction to the "place" in which one *dwells*, I will critically consider the "open region," turning to it as an "arena" of/for human existence, which brings into consideration the essence of the duality of Being (a connection opened in Chapter III).

Hyde, in "Rhetorically, We Dwell," his introduction to *The Ethos of Rhetoric*, tells us, "Heidegger [. . .] constantly reminds us that the spatial and temporal character of human being—the way that it is 'always already' open to the objective uncertainty of the future, what is 'not yet'—is the genuine place in which Being discloses and shows itself as something that can be thought about, understood, and expressed in symbolic form" (xix; my emphasis). There are echoes here of Virgil Lokke's "virgule," which includes this same sense of leaning into the future. Unlike Lokke, however, who is interested in the relationship involved (as am I), Hyde is interested in the "genuine place" of Being's disclosure or un concealment (*aletheia*)—a return, always, to the fixity of place.

But for Heidegger, and this is crucial, there is both a relation and a separation between being human and Being: he tells us that being human "belongs to the totality of Being" but is also "the being who thinks, [who] is open to Being, [who] is face to face with Being," and thus is the "relationship of responding to Being" (*Identity and Difference* 31). This might be constructed as being/Being, with the slash indicating the "open region" of
response (and responsiveness and response-ability)—here a "space" that dislocates being from Being (even if temporally) while maintaining a particular kind of linkage. Thus, the question we should ask is not what is the essence of being, nor what is the etha of Dasein—though both are excellent "questionings" (in a Heideggerian sense)—but rather what is the essence of this "open region" of responsiveness? That is, what is the essence of this relationship of responding?

Responding Duality

Though Hyde is focused in a direction less in keeping with the trajectory here—his being a hermeneutic rendering of Heideggerian thought—his work is a place for us to open ourselves to considerations of responding as his particular way of thinking about this essence of responding is not exclusively a responding to but also (if not primarily) a responding through (xix – xx); though Hyde himself doesn't make this distinction, being might be viewed as both response and medium of response (a duality within being). Thus, being is both the response to Being and the medium of responding: to be is already to respond, and thus even before we enter into language games we are already within the horizon of responsiveness or of having response-ability. (We might view this in similar terms to the gesture of address, which I opened in the previous chapter, as we can acknowledge this "responding" without it entering into language.)

Hyde goes on to connect being, or rather Heidegger’s sense of dwelling (to which I will return later in this chapter), to a particular rhetorical perspective—indicating that responsiveness as well as being is rhetorically oriented:
We are creatures who dwell on this earth and who are thereby destined to hear and answer a call [of/from Being] that, among other things, requires a capacity for practicing the art of rhetoric. The ontological structure of existence [stemming from this relationship of responding] is such that we must learn to *dwell rhetorically.* (xxi)

To answer or respond to this "call," which, for Hyde, is a "call of conscience" (and thus seemingly in the realm of the "ethical") is also the very "*ethos* of rhetoric" to which his edited collection is devoted; and, for him, this is at "the very heart (and beyond?) of human existence" (xxii). But in his treatment of this "call of conscience," which we might view as the responsibility (and response-ability) of being, Hyde opens a "sub/ject" divided—a form of schizophrenic respondent (or being), that emerges within the very essence of being:

>The call of conscience *is* human existence dislocating itself to the one who is living it and who can and must respond to its challenge, but it is also something *other* than a human accomplishment: an alterity or otherness that lies at the heart of the self, of one's own way of living everyday existence. (xx)

This is a splitting of "self," not only dislodging being from Being (temporally), but also a dislocating multiplicity (being/Being, being who lives, being who can/must respond, and something other); it is a traumatic division of sorts, which opens our "respondent" to a plurality of selves (perhaps Vitanzian "selphs" [cf. "Postclassical" 398-399]). (One particular split that I would like to point out is the implicit division, heuctically imposed or not,
between a "sub/ject" who lives the "call" and a "sub/ject" who can/must respond to "it."

To be sure, this line can be read as a "sub/ject" who both lives and who can/must respond [being one and the same], but I think we are better served if considering these as two distinct "sub/jectivities"—as to live the "call" requires a different ethos [if dwelling rhetorically] than to respond to it: that is, being and responding to being/Being are two very different "sub/ject" positions. [I will return to this particular split of "living" and "responding" later in this chapter when unpacking considerations of "witness" and "testimony."]

But as Hyde has articulated it, to engage in the process of responding to the "call of conscience" requires us situating ourselves in relation to something other, even if that other is ourselves. In a sense, perhaps a hysterical or schizophrenic sense, the essence (or ethos) sought in our "learning to dwell rhetorically" (which, for Hyde, is the very manner in which being "responds"), is neither tied to the self (or "selfs") or other—all being "sub/ject" positions—but rather is the relation of response (and responsiveness) itself. In this nomadic wandering, the essence of being (and correlatively the essence of Being) might be viewed as the very act of "relating" (that is, of making linkages, which, as Lyotard told us, is necessary, though the mode is not [Differend 29])—and this "relating" includes a family of "related" terms like relate, relational, relationship, and relay, as well as connecting and linking, among others.

So, even if staying fairly tied to a hermeneutic approach to ethos, rhetoric, dwelling, and Heidegger—like we find in Hyde's work—a complex "sub/ject" not reducible to any singularity can be located, and one emerging within the possibilities of a Heideggerian "open range" or within the reconsiderations offered here of a movement toward "pasturage."

Perhaps this "sub/ject" is more in keeping with a postmodern "sub/ject," the likes of which might be found in Deleuze and Guattari's work: "A schizophrenic out for a [nomadic]
walk is a better model [for the postmodern subject] than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch" as "the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever" (Anti-Oedipus 2). What we find here, as well as in their great description of "it" in their opening paragraph to Anti-Oedipus, is that "the subject is not only decentered but no longer even recognizably anthropocentric" (Johnston 79). The "sub/ject," as it was known (i.e., the modern "sub/ject"), has ceased to exist—if it ever existed at all.

The postmodern "sub/ject," to which I seem to be turning, itself a nomad, "is a strange subject," as Deleuze and Guattari tell us, "with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs" (Anti-Oedipus 16). This "sub/ject" is schizophrenic, where "the desiring machine remains at the center, leaving the subject to wander on the periphery, [. . .] forever decentered, and defined only by the states through which it passes" (Johnston 85; cf. Anti-Oedipus 16-18). What is emerging then is a deterritorialized "sub/ject," one which "presents itself as the right to difference, to variation, and to metamorphosis" (Johnston 71)—or as a right to relationality, to be in relation to and relating through generative possibilities.

Thus, even if I am drifting toward something other than the postmodern "sub/ject," the emerging "sub/ject" I seek is protean, is shadow, is ever in motion, moving nomadically from possibility to possibility. It is, perhaps, not grasppable—being of the Gorgian variety of "it cannot be known." It exists as relation, or perhaps as possibility itself—as the possibility to shift, perpetually, among any number of "identity positions."

What is emerging then are flexible, protean possibilities. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's work on "absolute deterritorializations," John Johnston, in "Ideology, Representation, Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," tells us
metamorphoses of identity occur through alliances and relays that tear
the subject away from self-identity and launch him or her in a process of
becoming-other: becoming-woman, becoming-animal, and becoming-
imperceptible are the basic forms, but the possibilities are endless. (87)

In terms of the constructions of the "sub/ject" offered here, I too am interested in this
"becoming-other" as this "becoming-other" seems the very possibility at stake in a system of
fixed "identities."

Viewed in Slovaj Žižek's terms, this is "the very process of shifting among multiple
identifications [which] presupposes a kind of empty band which makes the leap from one
identity to another possible, and this empty band is the subject itself" (Žižek 141). Žižek's
"empty band" is something that can be linked to the slash, the "between" (see Karen Burke
LeFevre), the very space necessary for the possibility of movement across "identities." For
Žižek, using Lacan's terms, this "empty band" (itself a möbius strip) is the $, the void of the
"sub/ject," and it is this very void, this decentered possibility (following Deleuze and
Guattarri), that makes the toggling of varying "sub/jective identities" possible.

In this view, the "space" of the "sub/ject" seems to be that of the margins or
periphery—positioned in relation to either the $ (Lacan) or the "desiring-machine" (Deleuze
and Guattari). And thus the "sub/ject," coming to it via the "states through which it passes"
(Johnston 85), seems to only to exist—in any sort of temporal stability—as manifestations or
projections on the margins.

Thus, I shall turn our discussions toward the margins, paying particular heed to the
instabilities that manifest as a result of the void of "sub/jectivity," which is what allows for
the very passing through/to other "identity" possibilities. In this case, I am interested in the
non-center center that acts as threshold between the schizophrenic projections that the *ethos-cum-ethea* nomad finds himself/herself "belonging to."

III

There is a now well-understood view "that the overlapping categories of 'identity,' 'agency,' and 'subjectivity,' [associated with the modern "sub/ject"] are ideological constructions that serve particular power/knowledge matricies" (Ballif 76). This, of course, as Michelle Ballif tells us, in "Seducing Composition: A Challenge to Identity-Disclosing Pedagogies," leads to the privileging of a particular few, "while marginalizing all others," and this is why "postmodern theorists have sought to deconstruct the modern subject, to demonstrate how this stable, self-identical subject is a powerful fantasy of the Enlightenment" (77). The postmodern move is to open us to instabilities, to a temporality (at best) of any sense of "sub/ject"—and this is an attempt to get out of the differend of discursive practices privileging one (class, race, gender, etc.) at the expense of the other (class, race, gender, etc.).

But despite this postmodern move, I still have to deal with issues of this desire for fixity in relation to "identity" or "sub/jectivity." We long for a guarantee for Identity or Truth or Presence as to not have a guarantee causes us to question the very validity of our self (selves/"selphs"). But as I opened in the last chapter in relation to absence (and "absencing"), and as found on/in Žižek's "empty band" or with Lacan's $ or Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic (all different but all part of this same conversation), this guarantee is an impossibility.
The only choice for those who cling dearly to the modern sense of a fixed, identifiable "self" is to retain the illusion of this guarantee—that is, to live with this form of self-delusion; to not do so would place them/us all into schizophrenic states of existence, and this is frightening for the "rationale mind." To let go of the self, even if illusorily, is no less difficult and no less terrifying than letting go of God. In a Western culture predicated on both the Supreme Individual and the supremeness of the individual (as it relates to community, as in as it overcomes, leads, or represents community), to give up one's "self" is sacrificial at best, suicidal at worst. Much like Baudrillard's "after the orgy" question (see "What are you Doing After the Orgy"), I would ask after this banality: what are you doing after the suicide? Or what comes after this self-sacrifice?

I believe emerging is an impossible "sub/jectivity," one which is always in flux (and always has been in flux) moving in and out of the void of the "sub/ject" or toggling through the absence (and "absencing") of "sub/ject." Here, the "sub/ject" is more aligned with *chora* and *ethea* than *topos* and *ethos*.

But to answer the question of "what are you doing after?" is difficult because in a complete loss of "self" (sacrificial or suicidal) there is no "you" to answer the question and so the response would be silence. This is not to say that "you" would dissolve or cease to exist, as there is or would be, clearly, a remainder—always—but the question itself asks for a discursive positioning that "you" cannot take without already being "sub/jugated" to discourse, perhaps even to language, and thus to have the very "sub/jectivity" "you" gave up.

On another level, and perhaps more positively, this "giving up of the self" might be viewed as a gift, a gesture of giving, which is a displacement of "identity" as gift. The gesture is to give oneself over to something other, perhaps the non-human other within the self in Hyde's articulation, and this is the first (and perhaps only step) in a long line of steps toward
making amends for the atrocities the Same has inflicted upon the Other. Thus, this is the ultimate reparation: "I" (a problematic impossibility) give the "I" of this sentence over to the Other and become channel for Otherness, no longer "located" in a fixed "sub/ject" position. Thus, as channel/avenue/flow, the "discourse" of the Other becomes through me (the remainder of the "I" becomes medium)—and opening here is a postmodern view of language speaking us.

But I want to hesitate in jumping to this postmodern "sub/jectivity" and offer yet something else. It will not be Latour's amodern or nonmodern, but rather will be a view of "sub/jectivity" which begins with this notion of giving up one's "self," which is to say to remove oneself from discourse (and into a position of silence or even a position of non-language). This, of course, is not to say that being has been removed from its position of responding to Being—as one can "face" Being (following Heidegger's indication) without being in/of language—but rather that I am opening us (ourselves/"selves") up to the previous division indicated in Hyde's work: that of a "sub/ject" who responds via discourse (a temporal position of crafted marginalia) and that of a "non-sub/ject" without discourse who "experiences" or "undergoes" Being (and the being/Being relation). The latter of which emerges from what I would offer as the trauma of always being in relation to/with the other.

This movement to a "pasturage" of silence or "responding" via undergoing opens us to three potential figures I see emerging within this sense of an impossible "sub/ject." To get there I must return to invention, to possibilities invention opens, and then drift us slowly towards this tri-figuration.
Remainders

Ulmer tells us, in reference to Paul Virilio's work, that "every invention brings into the world its own form of accident" (Electronic 36). This is what commonly gets treated as "the negative side of invention," or what I have often referred to in previous chapters as the inventive possibility of opening ourselves up to the monstrous (equally as likely as the magnificent). But if following George Bataille's take on the General Economy, which Ulmer treats of in relation to Virilio's work, we can see that this "negative side of invention also has an important function and is not merely a remainder" (Ulmer, Electronic 36; my emphasis). Treating of this "remainder,"—what might be considered the schizophrenic, the hysterical, the absurd, or the monstrous, as well as the marginalized, excluded, or ignored—will be important to for an ethos-cum-ethea because in any system of constructing "proper personae" (in Aristotle's sense) there is always already an implied impropriety, which is a "remainder" that does not fit neatly into the confines of the category "proper." In a certain sense, I am after this "impropriety."

In treating of this "remainder," I will pay particular heed to the fact that the excluded or marginalized (i.e., the remainder—or even more disastrous, the remains) is more than just a "leftover"—it, too, is (always already) politically or socially or logically positioned. This "position" is primarily that of the victim-witness, the "sub/ject" who bears witness to trauma—to trauma of all varieties, constructed in this work prominently as the catastrophic trauma of restrictive or exclusionary practices. And then secondarily, the "position" is of one who attempts to provide testimony to that bearing witness—an "authoritative" "sub/ject" (re/ac)counting of the event(s) (which here might be thought as a particular form of Ereignis).
While in the next chapter on _pathos_ I will treat more specifically of the catastrophic traumas we _suffer_, it is important that I extend an excursion here in this section as this work turns (eternally) to Lyotard’s notion of "bearing witness to new idioms" and one of the implications in that statement is the "sub/ject" question: who is (are) the witness(es)?

As Ulmer is quick to point out, "[o]urs may be the age of testimony"—perhaps exemplified by the "eye witness" reports on television news—"but this is not to say that anyone knows _how to witness_" (Electronic xxvii; my emphasis). For Ulmer, as well as many others, including Giorgio Agamben, "The prototype of the witness [. . .] is the victim of the Holocaust" (xxvii). "Such persons," Ulmer continues, "to the extent that they suffer the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), are literally not able to testify" (xxvii). We might think of this inability to "testify" as the silencing effects of _trauma_, where the _trauma_ witnessed, meaning the _trauma_ experienced, leads to a particular kind of non-articulation.

Or, put another way, the _trauma_ of witnessing an event may cause particular types of hysteria to develop, and these hysteries, as explored in chapter one, as well as in relation to the "manger" effect earlier, can cause conductive short-circuits. These short circuits are often unexpectedly revealing (as Freud indicated, and as found in Ulmer’s heuristic movements across conductive linkages), but, as may be the case with PTSD and other "clinically defined" forms of hysteria-effects, these short circuits can also lead to an inability to put into words the _trauma_ witnessed—a sort of double victimization: the first being experiencing the _trauma_ and the second being this "silencing." (Sometimes, the _victim-witness_ is not able speak at all, developing communicative paralysis or death.)

We can see examples of these PTSD _traumas_ most often in juridical settings where victims of violent crimes are unable to recount (that is, unable to "testify") in a court, in front of the accused, to the _trauma_ they experienced. But if taken back to the Holocaust,
with its victims as prototype witnesses, and specifically thinking of Agamben's treatments in
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive—the title itself making implications to
"remainder," to "witness," and to "memory"—we find that this "silencing" may be the very
condition necessary for being "witness." This "silencing," or perhaps, this "impossibility of
testimony," may be the very essence of the victim-witness (the primary position of the
"sub/ject" "remainder").

There is a similar development in Agamben's distinction between "witness" and
"pseudo-witness"—specifically in his example of Primo Levi and the child "Hurbiniek": As
"witness," "Hurbiniek cannot bear witness, since he does not have language" (Remnants 39),
and it is Primo Levi, the "pseudo-witness," or what I would offer as the "mediated-witness,"
who bears witness "in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness" (Remnants 34)—that
is, he "bears witness" to the one who bears witness to trauma, the latter of which is a
"witness" position (the position of "Hurbiniek") incapable of providing "testimony"—
whether due to death or post-traumatic "silencing."

This move to Levi opens us to one of the tri-figures, that of the "mediated-witness,
and this opens a "sub/ject" who "bears witness" (to new idioms or traumas) in mediated
fashion. This is a type of "witnessing" that should remind us of the Cashinahua of which
Lyotard speaks, where one is granted the "sub/ject" position of narrator by having undergone
the (re)telling of story (the "testimony"): "the narrator's [testifier's] only claim to competence
for telling the story is the fact that he has heard it himself. The current narratee gains
potential access to the same authority simply by listening" (Postmodern 20). "Bearing witness"
here is in reference to an already mediated event, as the story/testimony of the Cashinahua
narrator is secondary to the experiencing of the actual (or fictional) events of the story, and
so both the Cashinahua narrator and narratee (audience) share similar access to the "sub/ject" position of "mediated-witness."

Of course, if Levi were to follow the "highly inventive" style of the Cashinahua (Lyotard, *Postmodern 20*), he would be better served by crafting an interesting story rather than adhering to the "facts." But Levi is constrained in another way: taking liberties with narratives of the Holocaust, especially narratives of children like "Hurbinek," would most likely be poorly received, if not destructive of Levi's own ethos (and/or ethos-cum-etbea). The Holocaust as atrocity, and specifically Auschwitz itself, demands a different kind of treatment than other traumas; plus, the realness of tragedy and trauma that are inherent in the event itself is far more powerful than any inventive re-rendering. Because of its marking (or even scarring) in our collective humanity identity, Auschwitz does not need to become a heroic tale—despite Hollywood's attempts at such.

This restriction on the "testimonials" of Auschwitz and the Holocaust is, perhaps, not a fair restriction, as all trauma, in some sense, deserves this kind of consideration. But "fairness" has little to do with any of these issues, least of all the "sub/ject" position of a "mediated-witness" who gives voice, in translatory fashion, to the "silenced" victim-witness of the Holocaust (i.e., "Hurbinek").

I should note that not only was it the child "Hurbinek" who drew Levi's attention, a child who "could not speak and had no name; that curious name, Hurbinek, had been given to him by us" (Levi 191; qtd in Agamben, *Remnants 37*), but it was also this sense of non-language, a position "Hurbinek" held: Agamben tells us that Levi "had already attempted to listen to and interpret an in inarticulate babble [at Auschwitz], something like a non-language or a dark and maimed language" (*Remnants 36*). Thus, these two come to share space: the
nameless child and the position of non-language (the *infans*, to which I will return more explicitly in the next chapter).

Levi's turn to the nameless child (who can be seen as void, perhaps $\emptyset$, becoming the "empty band" which links to every child or the possibility of every child) returns us to the condition where one can influence *ethos* the greatest. As Chamberlain has told us, in Sophocles' *Ajax* we learn that "the proper time for influencing the *ēthos* is childhood" (100). If I am to concern us not only with understanding *ethos* and *ethea*, but also how to shape/influence our sense of *ethos*-cum-*ethea*, then I am very much searching for the child—perhaps a babbling child or child in a position of non-language (the *infans*)—for in childhood our fantasies and *ec/stasies* have not yet been controlled/killed by the limits of "proper reality" (or "property/reality") nor the discourses on such—that is, physics and metaphysics. Rather, children are possibilities: they dream them, live them, embody them in ways adults are trained not to (a particular approach to education that I will address in my development of an *unlearning pedagogy* in the final chapter).

Here, in "Hurbinck," the second figure, there is not only a child who bears witness to a most incomprehensible atrocity, and who lacks language, but who is possibly the most exemplar "ethical" figure. His *ethea* might be viewed as the very *will to live*, or *will to life*, a *life-ethea* for *being*, all despite his devastating "position" of exceeding marginalization: encampment, devoid of language, absent of family, nameless, without language, and "paralyzed from the waist down, with atrophied legs, as thin as sticks" (Levi 191; qtd in Agamben, *Remnants* 37). But, as Levi tells us, "his eyes [ . . .] flashed *terribly alive*, full of demand, assertion, of the *will to break loose*" (*ibid*; my emphases). Like the horses breaking free from the "manger"/stable to return to their *ethea*, this exceedingly marginalized, nameless, homeless, familyless, languageless, broken child *remained*, exhibiting the will to break loose,
which is a will to escape (death), which is a will to life, and his eyes told of being "terribly alive" (and the reality, too, of his living terribly).

Levi goes on to say, "Hurbinek died in the first days of March 1945, free but not redeemed. Nothing remains of him: he bears witness through these words of mine" (192). "Hurbinek" bore witness because he underwent the silencing trauma of Auschwitz, which, ultimately for him, was death. His bearing witness has nothing to do with Levi. But it is Levi's treatment that brings him to us, that lets his remains remain. Levi is the bard, commemorating, memorializing, if not monumentalizing, the nameless child, whose bearing is brought into a sharp fold (for us) under the name "Hurbinek," and whose will to life can be found in his incomprehensible utterance matisklo.

Levi's testimony, as with all testimonies, is, as Agamben tells us, an impossibility of bearing witness because "not even the survivor can bear witness completely, can speak his [sic] own lacuna" (Remnants 39). This is why he uses the conditional descriptor of "pseudo-witness," or why I turn us toward "mediated-witness," as the survivor (Levi) cannot be a "complete witness," for to be "complete witness" is to undergo the silencing effects of this trauma (in this particular case, the silencing effect of death).

Agamben continues, "It is thus necessary that the impossibility of bearing witness, the 'lacuna' that constitutes human language, collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of bearing witness – that which does not have language" (Remnants 39). Thus, what we are perhaps in search of, and what this chapter on ethos-cum-étbea attempts to offer, is a "giving way" to a different kind of "sub/ject," one not of language, but of non-language, which is both a nomadic "sub/ject" and not a "sub/ject" at all. This is the "sub/ject" I offer here—though, in all fairness, it is not mine to offer.
But before venturing forward to more fully explicate this "sub/ject," there is something else to pay heed to in Levi's writing on "Hurbiniek," and that is that "Hurbiniek," as Levi tells us, died "free," which can be an extremely telling statement.

The victim-witness exemplar, "Hurbiniek," died free. Does this mean he was free from the conditions of his marginalization, from the various physical, social, economical, political, geographical, "linguistical" prisons in which he was held? Or that his death itself was a freedom? (Or something else, as this either/or may not be complex enough for this consideration). I would argue closer to the former, a freedom from the conditions of marginalization. (But I would also like to note that this take is not "against" the salvation or freeing death motif, as that too may be the case. I only hesitate with the latter position as this salvation view so often gets tied to dying the good death, which is to internalize and perhaps institutionalize a death-politic).

"Hurbiniek's" freedom had nothing to do with his death. His "freedom" came in the shape of his being, of his will to life, that persisted despite the greatest of odds being stacked against him—odds that should have robbed him of this will. Men, women, and children in much better physical, social, cultural and even "linguistical" shape died daily. Even those in decent health would succumb to the lingering death of Auschwitz—and the presence of the Muselmanner served as reminder (and remainder) of this lingering death.

The transition from malnourished prisoner to this state of Muselmanner had no discernable time table, and some fell to being "living dead" quicker than others (Agamben, Remnants 41). Being associated with this "living dead," the Muselmanner might be located as transitional figure between life and death and as a third figure; they were also impossibly "bearing witness" as their position was "untestifiable": those who "bore witness" to this state
all ended with "the same story, or more exactly, [...] no story" (Levi 90; qtd in Agamben, Remnants 44).

As such, I might posit the Muselmanner as appositional-image to "Hurbinek": while "Hurbinek" is very much established by a recognizable will to live, "the Muselmann of Auschwitz is instead defined by a loss of all will and consciousness" (Agamben, Remnants 45) and is given to substituting "delirious fantasies for the relations of causality to which they [the Muselmanner] no longer paid any attention" (46). What we have here, then, is the child, "terribly alive," exhibiting a will to break loose, which is a will to life, and the Muselmanner as the loss of will and consciousness, which is a detachment from reality (that is, a detachment of continuing to attempt to understand the reality of their situation and its given "reasons")—thus, their givenness to delirious fantasies (but we should also keep in mind the very realness of their bodies devouring themselves, and the brain and its activities were not immune to that "feasting").

We might think "Hurbinek" as impossible "sub/ject," or void of "sub/ject," a form of Lacanian $\$, that is prior to language and we might hold the Muselmann as impossible "sub/ject," a lost "sub/jectivity," that detaches itself from "reality" and also from the language position to which he or she has come. In both figures there is a bearing witness to the trauma of Auschwitz, and it is this bearing witness that entitles them to speak—grants them "authority" to speak—but it is this very condition that silences them both: to undergo the trauma of Auschwitz was to undergo death.

As I move forward in this work, the three figures emerging here ("Hurbinek," Muselmanner, and Levi [or "mediated-witness"]) should be kept in mind, as well as the fact that I locate all three of these figures within the multiplicity of our emerging ethos-cum-ethea schizo-nomadic "sub/ject." Within all of us lies a "Hurbinek" (the void of "sub/jectivity," a
non-language possibility, teeming with the *will to live* [which may be a will to language]), a
*Muselmanner* (the impossibility of giving testimony—a double victimization via silencing of the *victim-witness* who has come to language but who has detached himself/herself from the physical and metaphysical realm), and Levi (the "mediated-witness" who's mediated "distance" allows for an attempted impossibility of reducing *trauma* into language [whether oral, textual, visual, multimodal]).

The *"reason"* for this figural approach and this emphasis on *trauma* is that as the being who "faces" Being—who *responds to* and *responds through*—we seem to always be in relation to the other, which is a *traumatic* relation—to encounter the other challenges and/or changes the self-Same. But more than that, this relationship of being to Being, of the *undergoing* of Being, is a differend and thus the need of all three of these *"selves"* to allow for movement to, through, and beyond this differend: "Hurbiniek" is the very will to life that resides within us all—it is an unfixable will, the flow of Being within being that allows us to *become* (become-self, become-other), and in this non-language position we are Being; *Muselmanner* is the being that belongs to the totality of Being—he/she has been silenced by the very condition of *undergoing* Being and as *"witness"* gives *"testimony"* to this *"sub/jutation,"* but it is a *"testimony"* that cannot be given as the very condition that makes it possible *silences* it (i.e., death); Levi, the *"mediated-witness,"* is a detachment of self from both *"Hurbiniek"* and *Muselmanner* in order to bear witness to new idioms that allow us to move out of this being/Being or Being/being differend—the new idioms, the act of invention by the *"mediated-witness,"* which is schizophrenic *"position,"* allows for the impossibility of putting into language a *"self"* and/or its *"witnessing"* in a way that helps us nomadically wander to different pasturages where we once again find ourselves in a differend of being/Being and Being/being (but it is an altered or other differend, each and
every time—with the movement, much like Lyotard's libidinal intensities [see Libidinal Economy], being a detachment that allows for inventive possibilities that change the dynamic(s) of the differend itself). This "mediated-witness," the figure of Levi, is a "sub/ject" position (in the postmodern sense) only insofar as it resides, temporally, on the margins in order to invent/bear witness to new idioms that shift the center—which is a center that cannot be shifted yet which is always shifting via this complexity of the "sub/ject" introduced here.

Electrate Reconsiderations

As I move forward exploring how technologies impact these constructions of the "sub/ject" or of ethos-cum-etbea, I ask that we remain critically aware that the developing "sub/ject" position is an issue of bearing witness to trauma—and undergoing of being/Being—and to bearing witness to new idioms; the latter of which is an attempt to speak of (to communicate) this (mediated) trauma. For to speak of this trauma, even if impossibly so (because of both the silencing affects of trauma and because of the limitations of the language apparatus), allows new avenues for grasping both the impossibility of being and the impossibility of Being—both of which are situated relationally to the question of "sub/jectivity" or ethos-cum-etbea: which, for Heidegger and many others is a question (and questioning) of what is the essence of being (or even Being).

The most effective moment in this game of "responding" to this "questioning" is when we do not simply attempt to create discourse as "mediated-witnesses" which speaks of or to these things, but rather when we attempt to create/invent mediated-experiences themselves, where we attempt to offer a "mediated-undergoing" of our own, as this is closer to
the realm of experiencing the trauma of/in the differend—this being experiential learning (a game of making) rather than an epistemic or discursive learning (a game of knowing).

In a primary oral culture, our best access to this experiential learning came via the narrative, the story, and thus the experience of the story (of enjoying the story) is of exceeding value (much like we find in the Cashinahua). What started with entertainment via the storyteller or bard—a particular kind of guest/ host parasitical relationship—evolved in varying ways as we moved into to literate realms of entertainment: the novel (for private mediated-experiencing) and the play (for public mediated-experiencing). Thus, we might find the greatest routes/roots to accessing being and/or Being are located within entertainment and not metaphysics—if you want to understand the depths of the human condition, I suggest you turn to poets and not philosophers.

And as we shift into electronic cultures, things are no different—this is perhaps why Ulmer focuses so much on entertainment as this is a space for accessing particularly revealing understandings of our worlds, of our being in those worlds. We can see our current culture continuing to participate in this notion of narrative, attempting to render it yet closer and closer to a "non-mediated-experiencing experience"—with issues of the spectacle taking center stage (a language of entertainment) and Hollywood having nearly perfected the game of creating the narrative spectacle for mediated experience. But the "Big Screen" is the apparatus of yesteryear and we are in a much more mediated-experiential place of "small screens": video and computer games, social networks, virtual realities, and so on—all possibilities of electronic discourse.

Thus, what is or should be of interest in these examinations of the essence of being (and/or Being) is how it relates to this notion of making, which is an attempt at inventing or creating mediated-experiences. And not surprising, we find connections of these things
within Heidegger's work in his relating of dwelling and building—though I think his efforts can work as relay to help us nomadically drift toward something more in keeping with emerging technological apparatuses.

IV

For Heidegger, dwelling is the essential character of being: "[. . .] the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is baun, dwelling. To be human being means [. . .] to dwell" ("Building" 349). If dwelling is what it means to be human, then to understand the essential character of being we should attempt to understand the essential character of dwelling, which has roots, for Heidegger, in building.

Heidegger's "enfolding" of building and dwelling arises from the German baun or bauen, to build, and which has its original meaning in the term wohnen.10 As David Farrell Krell tells us, "Wohnen means to reside or stay, to dwell at peace, to be content; it is related to words that mean to grow accustomed to, or feel at home in, a place" (345; my emphases). Thus, it should be easy to see the connections between etha and buan (via wohnen).

But for Heidegger, there is more than just a linguistic relationship at work here. He tells us, "dwelling would in any case be the end that presides over all building. Dwelling and building are related as end and means" ("Building" 348). It is this relationship, this ends/means distinction, that seems culprit in most rhetorical treatments focusing on dwelling—this being at least one of the lingering effects of what we might envision as the modernist emphasis on production (cf. Ballif; Johnston)—but if dwelling, the "end that presides over all building" is connected to being, which is to say to "being in the world," then we would be well-served to pay heed to building. If for no other reason, this building can be
conceived as a way for dwelling.\textsuperscript{11}

Building, as Heidegger explores it, includes both construction and cultivation: "Both modes of building—building as cultivating, Latin \textit{colere}, \textit{culta}, and building as the raising up of edifices, \textit{aedificare}—are comprised within genuine building, that is, dwelling" ("Building" 349). Thus, there is a dualistic approach of construction and/or cultivation to this treatment of building as it relates to \textit{ethos-cum-ethea}—as in the building of "schizophrenic identities" or even the building of "selphs," which imply a constructing and/or cultivating of protean possibilities.

This dualism of building includes constructing edifices (perhaps facades; "masks") and cultivating, nurturing, preserving, caring for, and/or growth. The former (construction) might be likened to architecture (or, in terms of rhetoric, to an architectonic technē); the latter (cultivation) to nomadic herding (or, perhaps, to [artistic] invention). The former implies a Master-builder; the latter indicates a letting become. The former implies a topical (categorical) imperative; the latter a choral possibility. In this view, one seems to either construct an \textit{ethos-cum-ethea} (based on intended plan) or to cultivate an \textit{ethos-cum-ethea} (helping it grow, naturally)—a distinction with basis in the \textit{nómos/physis} dichotomy.

While the turn most want to make from Heidegger's work seems to be inclined toward \textit{nómos} and/or the construction of edifices—perhaps stemming from Heidegger's statement that "Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making anything" ("Building" 349)—I would argue that for Heidegger both most remain present, especially as it relates to \textit{building} and \textit{dwelling} (and thinking). We must think these things together—which means we should work chorographically with this notion of \textit{building} as cultivation and construction are "the ways in which dwelling is accomplished" ("Building"350).
But we should note that for Heidegger this dualism of *building* is not about the construction of "masks" (like we find in common [improper?] treatments of Aristotle) but rather about issues dealing with essences—about constructing/cultivating (i.e., *making*) a "site" that allows for an emergence of the fourfold: earth and sky, divinities and mortals.

What I think is most "revealing" of Heidegger's work on *building*, correlatively on his treatments of *dwelling*, is that *building* is a particular form of linking: Heidegger writes, "[. . .] building, by virtue of constructing locales, is a founding and joining of spaces" ("Building" 360). *Building* (and *making*), as activity, is itself a linking, a process of invention, as it not only gives rise to locales which give rise to spaces, but also is a joining of spaces—and here we might think this as a joining of sets: bringing together different sets (or choral registers), connecting banks (of data/information) separated by a flowing river. In Heidegger's treatment, the building-exemplar is the bridge: the bringing together of two previously nonexistent locations ("Building" 360). We build bridges! We make linkages! This is the necessary condition of human existence; this is what it means to *dwell*: To *build* is to *dwell*, always already so, and to *dwell* is the essential character of Being ("Building" 362).

As such, to make linkages, to *build*—either by construction (i.e., the imposition of structures onto a [meta]physical world: induction, deduction, abduction) or cultivation (i.e., allowing for intuitive connections to develop: conduction)—is what it means to be human, and this is the core of the *ethos-cum-etbea* nomadic/schizophrenic "sub/ject" (the "mediated-witness") who attempts to put into language the experiencing of other/"selves."

This bringing to language is an act of synthesis (if we follow one of the four Heideggerian possibilities for *logos*) and the nomadic/schizophrenic "sub/ject" becomes the "site" (perhaps para/"site") that links and binds and brings together the fourfold.
Thus, our "position" as *builders or makers* (i.e., *dwellers*) is to bring forth a "site" which contains the emergence of the fourfold; meaning, we give "testimony" (albeit "mediated testimony") to the fourfold and do so by our very nomadic/schizophrenic being (which includes all three figures ["Hurbinke", Levi, *Muselmanner*] thought together). And while Heidegger's thoughts on being/Being offer some avenues for drawing threads out into electronic discourse and cultures, we might be better served by turning to a different fourfold, one more applicable to the emergent electronic cultures, one offered to us by Ulmer.

Ulmer's *making* of a fourfold develops in his notion of the popcycle: Family and Entertainment, School and Discipline. And we should not forget that "subordinate institutions like STREET and CHURCH may displace FAMILY and ENTERTAINMENT respectively in some cases" ("Popcycle"; see also *Electronic* 21). What the shift to Ulmer's fourfold allows that is perhaps less accessible in Heidegger's fourfold is this *working across* the connective possibilities among these registers. In Heidegger's fourfold, each component is always already present in the others, but one doesn't typically seek to build a bridge (an actual, physical bridge) with the intent, let's say, of opening humans to connections with the divinities.  

Rather, in the Heideggerian fourfold, a lot of the connections remain present with very little critical awareness to them: in reference to the Heidelberg Bridge, he says, "From right here [via our thoughts] we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing" ("Building" 358-359). Heidegger's project, of course, is to open us to the fullness of the fourfold as it manifests in any/all manners of *building*, which is to say, to more clearly position us in relation to an under/standing of the essence of *Dasein*. For him, as opposed to Ulmer, the project is hermeneutical: working to interpret and raise critical awareness to
these possibilities—which happens in and through thought (the connections between building, dwelling, and thinking).

But Ulmer's work begins from the heuretic. Using the conductive linkages that occur across registers, Ulmer attempts to open our discourses to practical invention, to making, which opens ways for us to focus on crafting "mediated-experiences" as well as engaging new emerging communication technologies. Changes in the possibilities (and technologies) of communication open changes in the possibilities of the "mediated witness"—one such "mediated-witness" model for Ulmer being Solon, the first theorist and tourist (see Electronic).

Ulmer's shift toward touristic practices (using Solon as figure)—palpating these "sites" of connection (which may also be "sites" of infection or even "sites" of trauma) and rendering those experiences into an "electrate composition" (ranging from Ulmer's "mystery" to his uses of "widesite")—is itself a process of working nomadically, utilizing image reason and hyper-linking along with textual practices. This is an emerging form of "electrate schizo-nomadism," where the "mediated-witness" tours across the "pastures" of the fourfold to use conductive points for the (re)creation of a new form of narrative, which is a new attempt at relaying "mediated-experience." This new strategy, a heuretic strategy, allows a "site" or perhaps "space" for the "enfolding" of personal, popular, and expert discourses—a schizophrenic-bardic tale that crosses mythical and metaphysical genres; and this shift opens additional considerations for the ethos-cum-etbea nomadic/schizophrenic being I am exploring here.
In returning to the importance of the shift to *ethos-cum-etbea*, and aligning Ulmer's work within this shift—where the "mediated-witness" has become aligned with tourism (and this "ism" implies a chorographic range: retaining the notions of touring [visiting "sites" or traversing spaces], tournament [a game for intellectual "sparring," like we might find in varying works of Plato], and Tourettes [the verbal/physical manifestation of the suppressed/repressed], among other possibilities)—what we have developing is a view of "mediated-witness" or "sub/ject" as tourist (heretofore referred to as SaT for convenience); we might also find resonance of the SaT in our previous constructions (in the last chapter) of the "e-stranger." But with this emerging schizo-nomadic view, the question becomes from where does the SaT speak?

In order to "speak" on any matter, to enter the discursive world of "landownership" (a space of politics and philosophy), there is an implication that the SaT must have "ground" from which to speak (an assumption that already positions us in a particular way, and an issue to which I will return). But the SaT owns no "ground" (as in a fixed location)—rather, s/he comes to "grounding" via a form of "rentership," or what might be reconnected to the parasitical relationship between host/guest: we *dwell* here, and we *make* here, but only temporally.

This, I believe, is more akin to the approach we find in scholarly conversations—or should be what we find, especially if a transdisciplinarian like myself. We nomadically move across varying ("sites" of) conversations (sometimes parasiting our own previous conversations—a sure fire form of schizophrenic practice); we tour the "claims" of others and other "selphs" (both being always already "mediated-claims"), and we bring them together, building bridges between "mediated-testimonies" with our own further "mediated-
testimony." (But we also make linkages with our lives/experiences outside of that mediation—exemplified in Ulmer's genre of mystery.)

We, academic SaTs, speak from positions which are not fully formed and do not exclusively belong to us—but rather are "borrowed" in a particular way (cf. George Dillon's constructing of academic conversations 129-159) and always in a state of becoming.

Thus, to gain access to discursive authority—itself a questionable and problematic motive—the SaT must begin with an act of disclosure (unconcealment): indicating, however temporary, the "grounds" or "claims" from which s/he speaks. These are, of course, borrowed or rented "claims" themselves, stemming from the guest/host scholarly pattern. This is the nature of the conversation: we work in and through the "lines" (and "lines of flight" [Deleuze and Guattari]) and ideas of others, which then get (massively?) transmogrified in our "mediated-rendering." We are, in a sense, Jay Bolter's remediation, but with an eye always toward the grotesque epiphany.

This act of self-disclosure, this beginning moment of where a SaT identifies his/her position, seems to be a responsible tactic—and one we often readily "identify" with as this basis in disclosure (unconcealment) as a genre can be found in varying areas of American lives. We see echoes of this in our moves toward "open government" (as in a fully disclosed politic in relation to individual "sub/jects")—embracing the rhetorical strategy of disclosure. We see this practice in varying degrees in pop culture: ranging from "full access" exploits (and exploiting tabloids) to "The making of _____" productions; we are fairly enamored with this notion of disclosure, of revealing the magician's tricks, of learning how the movie was filmed, cut, produced (though, we seem less intrigued by video productions titled, "The making of "The making of ______."" I mean, how far down the rabbit hole dare we go?).
This practice of self-disclosure is also notably in use in varying feminist rhetorics and their treatments of ethos (Rich; hooks; Reynolds; Jarratt and Reynolds; Schmertz—as sample), which is a turn toward an act of display—a display of a critical awareness of one's own position, which 1) seems to help build "trust" in an audience (displaying one's critical awareness of self), 2) acknowledges particular limitations to one's own "positions," and 3) opens the power of "claiming marginality" (see Reynolds). But we should be cautious with fetishizing of this rhetorical tactic of "disclosure" for it may not fulfill the prophecy it offers.

According to Michelle Ballif, the positioning of disclosure and raising awareness to "the situatedness of one's subjectivity" "in no way liberates the subject from the process of subjection, the process of becoming subject, of coming to know, to be, and to have an 'identity' "(83). Thus, merely disclosing or acknowledging one's "sub[jective]" position, even if doing so critically, does not free one's "self" from the "sub[jective]."

While I am not interested in abandoning "sub[jective]" or "identity" altogether, as I have already "positioned" us into this relation via the "mediated-witness" and SaT, which are not detached by any means from the more complex ethos-cum-etbea "electrate schizonomadism," what I am interested in is a radically altered approach to these issues—a view that clearly begins yet somewhere (sometime) else, with linkages in another fashion: I want to shift out of the disclosure politics associated with the topographical and move into the messiness of the chorographical. This is an approach toward an impossible "sub[jective]," emerging from/as multiplicities and retaining all the possibilities therein—and then making with those complexities.

Thus, I turn us to Ulmer's work as it offers a different way of participating within the possibilisms of this disclosure. Of course, being as Ulmer often draws from varying theorists (and theories) located in the arena of feminist rhetorics, it is not surprising that this
notion of self-disclosure is also very present in his work: his mystery and even popcycle work in this manner. But unlike much scholarship which begins (or works) by separating the author's personal and popular lives from his/her expert discourse, a fissure or even severance of the multiple "elves" within the "sub/ject," and then which return to call attention to the "position" of a particular "self" as it relates to the discourse, Ulmer's mystery develops its very potential from blending these three "sub/jective" registers in the same discursive space, which requires perpetual awareness to the ideological and/or political "positionings" of the mystery SaT.

We can see different, albeit related, moves in Cinthia Gannett's *Gender and the Journal* where she not only begins by disclosing the position from which she writes, including indicating personal and social influencing factors, but where she also weaves her own journal passages throughout the text. This is a blending of expert and personal discourses, which we know is not a new concept to critical scholarship—just see the function of the personal anecdote—but Gannett's text, like Ulmer's, is yet another example of a more overt and distinct way of showcasing (and utilizing) these interrelated discourses. The question becomes, however, "Does this approach of self-disclosure actually gain one authority from which to speak?"

If we hold a view where *ethos-cum-ethea* is directly related to perceived trustworthiness (i.e., the rhetorical strategy involved), then this is undoubtedly an effective approach. One of the benefits of the philosophical infection upon the Septiunium (cf. Vitanza, "Critical" 47) is a development within the pedagogical paedica of Western culture that teaches us to be critically aware of the "grounds" (or "assumptions," if following an Aristotelian enthymemic move) from which we speak. Failing to heed these considerations may result in an argument that "begs the question"—not unlike the moves in this print-
dissertation, which uses the very apparatus it seems to be critiquing. (This is why at our outset I had to "position" myself in particular relation to this issue in order to continue this discourse at all—this, too, is always already trapped in the discourse of landownership.)

It seems that if one must gain access to "ground" in order to speak, then one either needs to align the SaT with particular "positions" of access or one needs to change the "ground" (and even the "ground rules") altogether. We might view Ulmer's work as the latter—though, to be sure, it may result in changes to the former. As such, using Ulmer's work, which is more in keeping with this developing sense of "electrate schizo-nomadism," I can locate at least one attempt at "parapositioning"—a moving alongside this particular encompassing position of (philosophical) "ground."

Ulmer's attempts to "write the paradigm" (see *Heuretics*) or to generate a text that mimes the theory (see "Object") are not simply games of political posturing in order to have access to a particular kind of (approved) speech, but rather can be seen as generative practices that attempt to break from the restrictions of the "grounding" system itself. But rather than break free from "ground" altogether, Ulmer works to change the very nature of the "grounds" (or "premises") themselves and/or works even to change what comes to constitute the "grounds": "grounding" via induction, deduction, and even abduction are radically different processes than by doing so via conduction. What this means for us is that when moving to new "mediated-testimonial" practices with "ground rules" set in place by a break from mimesis toward mechanical reproduction (following "Object"), a turn toward "writing the paradigm" (following *Heuretics*), and unfolding onto a radical change in the apparatus of communication (shifting to *electracy*), we need to radically reconsider what the SaT is opening to us in terms of "ethical" appeals.
VI

Ballif, in dealing with issues of "sub/jectivity" and "identity" in relation to the modernist emphasis on production and Baudrillard's spin toward seduction, writes "Our world of overproduction guarantees that we will be subject to our identity and the categorical imperatives such as race, gender, and class that order our lives" (87; emphasis added). But as we move further and further into electronic cultures, specifically of the more participatory variety (e.g., electronic social networks) instead of just the spectacle (e.g., television or movies), we find a plethora of temporary spaces in which to break free from these topographies—or at least spaces to subvert and/or resist these "categorical imperatives" by violating their limits, as when I put on or cultivate a "mask" of categories to which I do not and perhaps cannot belong in "Real Life" (RL). Of course, according to Žižek,18 it is the very improvements in technobiology that may take these "Virtual Reality" (VR) possibilities and make them very much RL possibilities: using gender reassignment, pigment alteration, cosmetic enhancements, and so on, the RL "me" can move across these categorical imperatives in very exacting and violating ways.

The difference, on at least one level, resides in the ease with which we can "try on" these different "masks." We now have electronic spaces that let us try on "identities" like we would try on shoes: we put them on, walk around in the store for a bit, and see how they fit—knowing full well that it will take some time to "break them in" properly (that is, to get comfortable in those shoes). In this sense, we now have spaces where we can free ourselves from the physical, from RL constraints. And even if only an illusory freedom, this virtual possibility has power, both virtually and in actuality.

We are now very much in a position capable of overcoming the restricting, hysteria-inducing limits of our "Real" selves. What this has done, among other things, is 1) to make
us critically aware of the social-political constraints that condition our "everyday" "identities" and our developing "e-dentities" (electronic identities); 2) to develop an awareness of the possibilities of trying on multiple "identities" via "e-dentities"—a space that encourages Dissociative Identity Disorder—which again calls into question the singular "sub/ject" of modernism; and 3) to realize that we also have multiple "masks" with varying social-political and physical constraints in RL. Thus, the play of "e-dentities" in electronic environments is a point of critical consciousness for the neopostmodern SaT emerging here.

But this can be extended further, I believe, pushing the potentiality for ethos-cum-etbea as it relates to "e-dentities,"—a trajectory that may be, contradictorily so, both a complete loss of self (the suicide and/or sacrifice alluded to earlier) and a greater adherence to the possibilities of "selphs" (moving further into the fullness of a schizophrenia of being).

Our "e-dentities" come to be possible, exemplary so, by the VR $; thus, following Žižek's "empty band," we might think the absence (not unlike the space between frames, if you will) as that which allows for the shifting between multiple "e-dentities," and this absence or "space of (im)possibility" is the condition of ethos-cum-etbea in which our SaT emerges—a form of "sub/ject," but one in a position of ecstasis.

What makes this impossible position valuable and/or what gives it rhetorical power is this ability to shift possibilities. It is becoming, allowing for the cultivating of momentary dwellings in which to shape (protean shapes) or give voice (to its rhetorical saying)—and this allows for any number of rhetorical moves, which opens any number of avenues for inventing (as well as finding) "the best available means."

But I must work critically in relation to this notion of "e-dentities" as the affordances of working electronically are not as "freeing" as they might be thought—especially if following Žižek's view which allows us to become more ourselves than our real selves.
These may allow for particular kinds of manifestations which we suppress/repress in RL, but we are not as detached as one (as Žižek) might think.

*e-dentities and you*

"e-dentities," as I indicated, refer to the electronic "identities" we "possess" or create and as such are made up of the multiplicities of "selves" we adopt/engage/project in electronic environments. But because of the connectivity of e-environs, at any given instant any "e-dentity" can be relay to all of our "e-dentities." Working via "address," (the importance of which I opened in our previous chapter), which is both a reference to our electronic "haunts" or "homes" and to an act of communication (as in "to address"), we can bring together a variety of "addresses" that can, in modified-relay fashion, help construct a sense of "e-dentity."[19]

But in a very real way, and this is something we should pay particular attention to, this "relay" is not limited to just the virtual, to just e-Cartesian manifestations of "selves." Rather, this includes the very real, very electronic/digital numerical "e-dentities" driven by magnetic strips (Credit Cards) or by government issue (Social Security Number) or both (State-issued Driver's License). Thus, in a single moment, a reply post on a blog can serve as trace, working as relay to either a user account or IP address, which leads to a service provider, who can, via billing information, help locate the very real, physical presence connected to, however loosely, the "e-dentity" that began this trace. We leave bits (and bytes) of ourselves everywhere, and so the notion that we are "free" to be more ourselves in "e-spaces" is a bit absurd as, because of the social-political issues of access, no matter how disillusioned we are to the matter, we are not severed completely from the physical.
This view of "freedom" via VR from one's RL is not quite the illusion we have been taught to believe. This is how they capture digital pedophiles. This is how they catch identity-thieves. This is how they control. This is not always a bad thing, but it is not something that should be critically ignored as if once "digital" or "electric" we are free from ourselves (or free to be ourselves).

However, that does not mean that we should not hold this "illusion" and let it help us to become more ourselves than ourselves. Rather, we (both now and in terms of future e-citizens) simply need to be critically and consciously aware that, while perhaps unlikely, it is not impossible for the social-political-cultural to learn that we prefer playing opposite gender characters in adventure games or that we are into machinic bestiality (as in robots fucking sheep or fucking robot sheep).

The real epiphany for "e-dentities" will be when we continue to do these things (virtually or otherwise) in spite of this awareness—when we let our desiring-machines drive in spite of the social-political-cultural organs. Judgment remains for those who succumb to its virtual effects, which is to say those who are impacted by its virtual possibilities. In a very weird sense, the "freedom" will occur when we find a balance between our RL and VR "Hurbaneks," when our will to life becomes a will to live possibilities. The danger, of course, is if one does such a thing without a guiding "ethic"—when we make electrate "mediated-experiences" or "mediated-creations" without regard for what the illusion opens up or what "dangers" may come from that illusion; that is, when we make in particular ways because it is possible to do so and is most appropriate for our "mediated-rhetoric."

This, of course, is a dangerous and frightening position, and because of this many would argue a need for a "guiding ethic" when working in/with these "mediated" creations. I hesitate to support this move as most "ethical" guides seem always to be "grounded" in the
political (a political-cum-ethical), and as such always already "sub/jects" (in different fashion). But I do not want to abandon this notion of a necessary "ethic," for this work is on rhetorical invention, which opens us to addressing rhetorical considerations.

A Paraethical Possibility

My turning toward absence (and "absencing") of any fixed position may allow for the possibilities of any number of "sub/ject" manifestations—here exemplified by the multiplicity of the tri-figuration of "selphs," which open us to a SaT who provides "mediated-testimony" as attempt to invent mediated-experiencing (to mechanically "mime" the trauma of being). But how does one work ethically, rhetorically with these things? And what does this word "ethical" come to mean when we have altered the game from the singularity of "classical ethos" to ethos-cum-ethea?

In counterdistinction to the characteristics of phronesis, arête, and eunoia, which Aristotle thought most fitting for his construction of ethos—which includes both the process of habitual choice and the crafting of particular "masks" for rhetorical affect, which, of course, because of the unstable nature of "audience," could at one and the same time be perfect or disastrous (cf. Smith 7)—I would offer these considerations for the emerging ethos-cum-ethea, "electrate schizo-nomadism," and SaT (all of which turn decidedly inward): Our three will be schizophrenesis, apate(tic), and euphoria.

Schizophrenesis is a sort of paranoid or disjunctive wisdom where the SaT always works in doubt of its own "claims," or what we might view as the wisdom that emerges within a split-self (or "selphs") who is always critically aware of its own-others' ideological (political) "positionings." This is, in a sense, the critical awareness we already attempt to teach our (rhetoric) students; we are no longer teaching a form of Socratic phronesis, where
students are wise because they know what they do not know, but rather we teach this schizophronesia, where students are wise because they question everything they offer and have offered to them as a "claim" to knowledge. At its core, this schizophronesia is part skepticism, part critique and critical awareness, and part self-doubt—all to be held in a productive sense of engagement.

If the SaT is not schizophrenetic, then not only has s/he failed to interrogate his/her own "selfs," but s/he has also failed to interrogate the borrowed "positions" of the "host" and/or the "pastures" from which s/he provides "mediated-testimony." But I should note that this "self" interrogation is not the same rhetorical move as "disclosure," for that would be a secondary move related to this schizophronesia. Rather, I am advocating that the emerging sense of "ethics" begins with one calling into question the unquestionables within one "self"—this "ethic," emerging out of a will to live, will be decidedly inward in that it will revolve around decisions based on what one's "selfs" can live with (an altered but related construction to Hyde's "call to conscience").

Apatetic(tic), the second on the list, is a play among 1) Apatet, the daughter of Nyx, who was the personification of deceit, 2) apatetic, which connects us to a range of meanings from protective coloration, attempts at camouflage to mislead would be attackers, to deceptive images and/or shapes, and 3) the tics (and hysteritious) that develop in relation to the traumas and/or deceptions we become conditioned to via electronic discourses—ranging from a minor disillusionment that the Internet is infinite to more persistent tics that I might liken to a form of electronic Tourette Syndrome, which includes the ever present presence (and interruption, eruption, surprise manifestation) of the conglomerate that is Internet Porn (and other "abjectalities")—we are no longer playing "six degrees of separation from Kevin Bacon" but are now into an unpredictable process of always being one click away.
(intentionally or not) from these abject possibilities, pornography especially (or other types of eruptions the political may hope to control).

These three within the *Apatetic*, taken together, open us to a form of hysteria that takes all discourse to be "mediated discourse" and all discourse (image, textual, verbal) to be access points to the abject, the horrendous, the absurd, the perverted—all equally at our fingertips.

In our mediated world, all we have are images (deceptive or otherwise) and attempted camouflages with which to interact: alphabetic text is not exempt from this either, see any treatment that includes a "looking through" the words to the ideas behind—the visuality of the text becomes camouflaged in the ideas; the signifier gets lost amidst the signified. Thus, to *make* anything for an electronic environment, to develop electronic "mediated-testimony," requires that beginning with 1) this point of deception, which is a point of re-presentation, the very basis of how we critically interact with images—thus opening us to a form of image reason or flash reason (following Ulmer); and 2) we must always critically consider the possibilities of the relay in relation to our "mediated-testimonies" (opening all our discourses to the absurd, horrendous, abject, perverted, and so on).

Thus, the *apate(tic)* as part of the "ethical guide" asks us to keep in mind the potentialities (good and bad) of the deception of images and the fact that this deception often goes critically unquestioned, and it asks that we pay particular heed to the potentialities of the relay and what other possibilities it may open for us when creating "mediated-discourse."

*Euphoria*, the last "guide," is perhaps best thought in relation to its counterpart *eunonia*. While *eunonia* tends toward a sense of "goodwill" toward others, I would offer
euphoria as sense of "goodwill" toward the self as it stems from the Greek ἐυφορία, meaning "well-bearing." Thus, the last of this emerging "ethic" asks for a kind of "well-bearing," which is connected to "well-being" and "optimal health" but most often in the sense of these things as it occurs in a sick person (see OED). As I have repeatedly attempted to offer, we are always already in a position of "sickness" as we have developed any number of hysterias related to the trauma of both the literate apparatus and its restricting logics as well as the trauma of always encountering other. As such, the euphoria we seek would be those moments of levity or ease or "well-bearing" when we feel temporary relief from these hysterias. As such, the "guide" asks our SaTs to use these moments or even syntagmatic flashes as indicators of directions to pursue—no matter how counter they may be to the "conditions as they are."

Thus, taken together, our "ethic" emerges around 1) an excessive critical awareness emerging from an approach of productive questioning (of/by self, "selphs," and other), 2) a critical and creative awareness to the potentialities of the deception inherent in all "mediated-discourse" as well as paying heed to the choral range the relay opens to any and all possibilities, and 3) working to find moments of "ease" or "well-being" in relation to the "sickness" of our everyday understanding and being (in the world). If we remain attentive to these things when working in electronic cultures, we open ourselves to not only a new guide for "ethical" rhetorics but we alter the very nature of "ethics" itself.
Chapter V

Pathos: Inventing (with) Catastrophe

I

As it comes to us in classical rhetoric, via the Aristotelian tradition, *pathos* (πάθος) often gets reduced to emotional appeals (*On Rhetoric* 1.2.2-4). This reduction stems in part from Aristotle's treatment of specific emotions, which he construes in topoi-fashion. But there is much more involved in *pathos* than simply "emotional appeals," and in this chapter I will seek to unfold these other (perhaps radical) possibilities—beginning by "schizonomadically" drifting through the choral range of *pathos*, which has as its original meaning "experience" (cf. Handler Spitz 546-547).

In "Apres-Coup: Empathy, Sympathy, Aesthetics, and Childhood: Fledgling Thoughts," Ellen Handler Spitz writes, "Construals of *pathos* have included anything that happens to a person or thing, an incident or accident, and what one has experienced, whether good or bad" (546). These "construals" stem from this more originary meaning of *pathos*, and this notion of "experiencing," at its core, opens us to certain impossibilities of language for there are "incidents and accidents" (among other *pathetic* possibilities) that one can experience but which cannot be rendered or translated into language. Meaning, there is a level of *pathetic* engagement (an Ereignis of sorts) that is outside the totalizing abjection of language—and it will be these abject possibilities I seek in this exploration of *pathos*.

But to work inventively with these "unlanguagables," or what might be considered *Pathetic Sublime*—that is, the fullness of the experience(s) that might be located within
accidents, catastrophes, disasters, atrocities, and the like—I need to approach pathos in terms of suffering or undergoing (in connection to paschein and this "experiential" core), which opens us to a different style of pathetic rhetorical invention. Instead of seeking to invent emotional appeals, I seek to invent (with) the accident, the catastrophe, the disaster, the atrocity—to open all (rhetorical) discourses to radical (unexpected) change. As such, to turn this work toward these other pathetic possibilities, I will begin, once again, by drifting on the River H.

*A Tri-folding*

In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger writes, "To undergo an experience with something means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overpowers and transforms us. When we talk of 'undergoing' an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it" (57). This positions suffering and/or undergoing as something passive (and secondary to experience), and we can find similar correlations between suffering and passivity in Maurice Blanchot's *The Writing of the Disaster* (cf. 14-15). But I want to reconsider this distinction offered by Heidegger, and even Blanchot, for these words are cut from the same cloth—or rather, following an Ulmerian turn, are cut from the same piece of felt\(^4\): pathos.

Rather than continue to follow this common view of passivity in relation to undergoing or suffering of experience—which may reduce being to passivity, or to what Blanchot coins as *le subissement* ("absolute passiveness of total abjection" [15])—I will instead fold these terms together, and retain them in the loose unity of a felt-pathos (opening us to both passive and active suffering/undergoing/experiencing—the latter of which may
actually emerge in the middle voice\(^5\). Heretofore, this tri-fold of *pathos* (of suffering, undergoing, and experiencing) will be condensed to *suffering* (for convenience).

Working conductively with *suffering*, and across the more extended choral range that can be located in *pathos*, a variety of possibilities come to bear on this conversation—a variety that includes not only suffering, undergoing, experiencing, incident, and related conditions or occurrences of disease (dis/ease), anguish, animosity, loss, and death, but also to events (forms of *Ereignis*), both real and rhetorical: more specifically, events of the accidental, disastrous, atrocious, and catastrophic. These are the traumas introduced in exploring *pathos*, and these traumas will help further unfold rhetorical invention.

As such, in the "schizo-nomadic" drifting in this chapter, I will actually seek (out), among other *pathetic* possibilisms, the traumatic: the accidental, the disastrous, the catastrophic, the atrocious, as each introduces (if not invents) unexpectedly revealing possibilities. (Each is cataclysmic invention at its rhizomic core, for if not, each would cease to be—it is an ontological imperative).

But before drifting toward considerations more in line with the traumatic, the trauma that will open us to varying hysterias, I need to step back momentarily and revisit another avenue in relation to this notion of *suffering* that actually began in Chapter III: *suffering* the encounter of the other.

*Threshold of Self/Other*

Diane Davis, working both in relation to the Heidegger passage quoted above and to the work of Levinas, writes, "The encounter [with the other] takes place, but one can only *undergo* it, and to undergo is not the same as to know" ("Addressing" 199). Following Davis' line of flight, which she extends in a follow-up response, it might be argued that to
encounter the other is to *suffer* the "immediate ‘presence’ of the other" ("The Fifth"249), and this immediacy, following Blanchot, "rules out all *mediation*" (24; emphasis added).

Blanchot continues, telling us that this immediacy "undermines and overturns everything" and becomes "violent abduction" (24) for the self ("selphs") and the other. The immediacy displaces both me and the other: "there is no longer a relation, no longer a beyond" (ibid). We no longer sit in relation, across the space of the threshold, but rather have essentially *moved into* the threshold (the slash) of self/other.

Being in this "nomadic range" of the slash—that is, being in immediacy—the self ("selphs") and the other devour one another (in perpetual "becoming" fashion). And the *suffering* involved is *being thrown* (both from and into one another, in simultaneity). It is a tearing together. It is an absolution of distinction (and distance [cf. Blanchot 13-25]). This allows for mutability ( occurring in the threshold), and *suffering* this mutability is traumatic (introducing traumatic change): we are becoming other becoming "selphs" becoming other (heretofore referred to as *becoming* for convenience).

*Suffering* this process, critically or uncritically, aware or unaware, is what might be viewed as the *pathos* of being. To be—or, more precisely, to *suffer* being—is to *suffer* this process of *becoming*, to *suffer* the trauma of perpetually losing one's "selphs" in the threshold of the *Self-Other Immediacy*.

The threshold of the *Self-Other Immediacy* is most traumatic when it occurs at the level of Real Life (RL; à la Žižek), in an everyday RL sense—perhaps positively and negatively exemplified by technobiology. But the traumatic mutability that the *Self-Other Immediacy* exposes us to is possibly most visible in the electorate, the hyper-mediated, where electric impulses of light have mutability (or even *becoming*) as their essence. Meaning, that in electorate cultures and discourses, everything is mutable, infinitely, at the speed of light.
There is no "final version" (cf. Žižek 151) and no limits (virtually) to the possibilities of use, reuse, misuse, abuse, and so on, of any temporal electronic possibility.

*Opening the Apparatus*

In an electrate culture, because of the overt condition of being, perpetually so, in immediacy with other (other technology, other "selphs," and others; all as fundamental engagement of participating as e-citizens), we face, in more radical fashion, the trauma introduced from living temporally, or in hyper-temporal fashion, which serves as perpetual reminder that nothing remains, disastrously so. This reopens us to the traumatic shock of facing our own mortality, which is a position already located in coming to language (cf. Blanchot 64-72) and triggered here, in second-blow fashion (see Lyotard, *Heidegger* 15-16). Here, the catastrophe of coming to language is the (perhaps unmourned) death of the *infans* (to which I will return).

Also, with electrate mutability, the literate-subject—the modern "self" which literacy desires, the "fixed" self of "rational" and "reasonable" "man"—is being opened, again in second-blow fashion, to its own impossibility (explored in the previous chapter). Here, the catastrophe of literacy might be seen as 1) the desire of a "self" (individual), which tears us from the collective (impossibly so), 2) a re-opening to our own mortality (exemplifying our condition or dis/ease, diagnosed as post-*infans*), and 3) a submergence, in totalizing fashion, into restrictive economies.

These traumas taken together—that is, these things reintroduced or re-exposed to us via electrate mutability and/or electrate culture—situates *suffering* electronic discourses, and the *suffering* that electronic discourses introduces, as always already placing us in a post-traumatic position. This, of course, is a dangerous position for a culture whose core
condition may, in fact, be a form of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Ulmer writes, "the extremity of PTSD [. . .] characterizes the general condition of experience in the society of the spectacle" (Electronic xxix; emphasis added). If we, the members of the society of the spectacle, are always already dis/eased with PTSD, meaning that we suffer this "condition" as a part of (Western) being, then it is no wonder why "we" (as in critical, literate academia) resist the electorate: it aggravates old, deep wounds it did not make, and does so without regard to the strictures (perhaps scriptures) those wounds set in place—like using an aborted fetus as figural image for a class project on abjection (having students specifically work to create an electronic monument or MEmorial), but unknowingly having a room full of students who have all suffered the (varying) traumas of abortion: a wound they do not wish to disclose and so must suffer, again, in silence, again, while having the trauma reaggravated/exposed in everyday fashion.

But it is important to remember that electracy operates, inventively, via the slash, the cut; it is the "cutter" (the back-alley surgeon introduced in the Exigence) who not only draws attention, painfully so, to these wounds and their (impossible) scars—the "diagnosis"—but who also attempts cosmetic (and aesthetic) "surgery" on the "body" of being; not to return these (archival) marrings and markings to their original state but to alter the very landscape of the "body" in an attempt to make the wounds and scars more bearable. This is also the premise of psychoanalysis, "surgeons" of another variety: not to cure the condition (dis/ease) but to help one learn to live with the condition (dis/ease). The altering here is one of perspective; changing the way we suffer the world.

To do this, to open being (in the world) to a new way of experiencing—that is, to alter being (paradigmatically, physically, and psychologically in terms of the "selves" engagement with the world)—we need to invent the catastrophic, the disastrous, the
atrocious, the accident, and to explore (in analyst to analyst fashion) the traumas we have always already been exposed to. In the previous chapter I did so in relation to the fixed "self"—opening us to the "self"s of the "schizo-nomadic" SaT. In Chapter III, I opened the abject potentials associated with \( \text{logos} \)—mainly unfolding "absencing" as an area of (previously excluded) possibility. In Chapter II, I introduced a way for us to move, maneuver, and/or link in this new way of experiencing—unpacking conductive logic and opening us to prevailing conditions of hysterias (and hystertici). But I still need to explore the potentials of suffering because it may be the very essence of being: to be might be thought as to suffer—to suffer being/Being.

As such, to further unfurl this notion of suffering, I will work through varying extremes, which are not only crucial for an understanding of being—especially in terms of the changes that electracy introduces—but also because these extremes have value transferable beyond the scope of this work. As such, I will start by revisiting the notion of the death of the \( \text{infans} \), then move to considerations of the Holocaust, and then open us to Ulmer's moves in relation to disasters, monuments, and the abject, which will work as relay to and through my own pursuits of inventing (with) catastrophes.

But before moving on, I should extrapolate my use of catastrophe, which here is designed in "Heideggerian primary-oneness" fashion. Much like my use of suffering, catastrophe is meant to indicate a pseudo-fourfold of catastrophe, disaster, atrocity, and accident. As such, with the enfolding occurring in this term, it would serve well for me to indicate how I am using each of these four terms—even if folding them together for convenience throughout the remainder of this work:
**Accident** – refers to chance occurrences, specifically in relation to
Ulmer's uses, but also connected to Aristotle's notion of *tuché*.

**Catastrophe** – stemming from *katastrophē*, from *katastrophein*, means to
overturn, which, working chorographically, opens us to dissoi/logoi,
inversion as invention, as well as immanent reversibility. I would also
include its connections to other possible meanings like violent changes in
the earth, momentous tragedy, overthrow or ruin, utter failure, and the
final event of a dramatic action/tragedy (Merriam-Webster). For
purposes here, catastrophe may be best thinkable on a scale of the
sublime.

**Disaster** – refers to a sudden *Ereignis*, an endocept of sorts, which
brings destruction and perhaps deconstruction.

**Atrocity** – refers to sublime-horror, operative on a scale of
incomprehensibility, and resistant to theories of identification and self-
Same appropriations as it opens us to the greatest "wounds" that being
inflicts on being/Being.

For this work, this "fourfold" will function punceptually rather than conceptually;
meaning, I intend for *catastrophe* to retain all of these possibilities simultaneously so that there
is a perpetual instability and/or impossibility of reducing this term—of disambiguating this
term—to any particular one of the four. With this in mind, I shall now "schizo-nomadically"
tour (in theoría fashion) the choral "site" of the infans.

II

As a technologically driven culture, what has been accomplished, once again, in a
very real sense, is to put into technological apparatus the very traumatic condition of being:
that is, the violent mutability of being in the immediacy of the other, of living in the
threshold of being/Being, is exemplified in the image-driven culture of electracy—opening
us to the realization of our being in a perpetual state of becoming. And this frightens us
terribly as we are equally likely to emerge monstrous as magnificent: this is why the question
is not what do we do with the Nazi Heidegger, but rather how does a Heidegger "become" a
Nazi? The danger is not in Heidegger himself, but in the mutable possibilities of everyday
life to which Heidegger's being (like every other being) is "testimony."

The trauma of becoming—perhaps of this dis/ease of becoming—is in the unknown
(and the unknowable, in Gorgian fashion); we are afraid of the "dark," so to speak, of the
possibilities of "darkness" or of the possibilities of "absencing" (see Chapter III). Those
who have come to language have lost the ability to live with the fullness of this unknown,
with the fullness of the potentialities of becoming—"we" have suffered the terrifying and
incomprehensible "ravaging joy" to which Blanchot refers:

(A primal scene?) [. . .] the child—is he seven years old, or eight perhaps?—

standing by the window, drawing the curtain and, through the pane, looking. [. . .]
Though he sees, no doubt in a child’s way, [. . .] he grows weary and slowly looks up toward the ordinary sky, with clouds, grey light—pallid daylight without depth.

What happens then: the sky, the same sky, suddenly open, absolutely black and absolutely empty, revealing (as though the pane had broken) such an absence that all has since always and forevermore been lost therein—so lost that therein is affirmed and dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is what there is, and first of all nothing beyond. The unexpected aspect of this scene (its interminable features) is the feeling of happiness that straightaway submerges the child, the ravaging joy to which he can bear witness only by tears, and endless flood of tears. He is thought to suffer a childish sorrow; attempts are made to console him. He says nothing. He will live henceforth in the secret. He will weep no more. (72)

What this "primal scene" is describing is the death of the infans, the first death we suffer as the result of coming to language (which Blanchot builds upon, working from Serge LeClaire). The child here "bears witness only by tears" to the incomprehensible "absence" opened before him—which is the "knowledge that nothing is what there is, and first of all nothing beyond" (72) This moment kills the possibilities of the unknown, kills the possibilities of (sublime) "absence": these deaths mourned by childish tears, the lasting remnants of the infans, which passed in the very moment the silent tears began. The secret the child will keep is his own death, his first death, and "[b]e says nothing" because the trauma silences him (cf. Caruth 6-7) and because there is no language for this suffering, even in the position of "mediated-witness" that I opened in the previous chapter—this is (or introduces) a blind spot for language.
But there is more to explore in the death of the *infans* as "the death of the child emblematizes the experience of being human, of what it means to enter language and become a speaking being" (Ulmer, *Electronic 148*). Thus, lying somewhere in the rhizomic center of being is the *infans* and its always already potential of *becoming*, which may be the worst kind of *becoming* as it involves death (and of *suffering* that death) without the reprieve of bodily/organic death (or second death).

To stay in keeping with the shift (perpetually so) away from a "death-politic" and toward a "life-politic," which is a move from restrictive to generative (general) economies, I will shift focus of the *infans* from this emphasis on the "death" itself—the topos of death—and instead pursue the (choral range of the) *suffering* involved: for to *suffer is to be* while to die is to *cease to be*, and I am concerned with being. Through this shift, I will re-envision or reconstitute first death and second death as first *suffering* and second *suffering*—and articulate electracy as residing in the position of the first, which may shift language, and even literacy, further down this line of simulacra death-mimesis.

*Death to Suffering*

Christopher Fynsk, in *Infant Figures: The Death of the 'Infans' and Other Scenes of Origin*, writes, "the death of the *infans*, at the level we are trying to think it, cannot be brought to any representation or figuration—it is an unfigurable figure" (72). But the limitations to this figuration may be apparatus specific. In Fynsk's case, the tie is to a "conceptual" figuring of the death of the *infans*, which connects us to "concept," and thus to literacy, the apparatus of conceptual thought. But if the apparatus changes, that is, if the medium of figuration changes—as in shifting from literacy to electracy, or perhaps moving from print-based
dissertation to Sophie2 other—then we might be able, in "mediated-witness" fashion, to 
make this "unfigurable" figuration (via the punceptual and/or visual registers).

This would, of course, have to unfold as "mediated-experience"—as a "mediated"
event one suffers—but the suffering it opens could be, in mechanical/electrate reproductive
fashion, this impossible figuration. And this would open us to a "mediated-suffering," once
again in second-blown fashion; it would open us to the (simulated) trauma of coming to
language—which might be likened, in a very small way, to forms of vertigo people
experience when technologies do things users/viewers are not prepared for: itself a felt-sense
of the catastrophic, the trauma of the unknown.

"The crucial point for learning electracy," Ulmer writes, echoing Fynsk, "is that what
the infans evokes may not be stated nor thought, neither clearly nor simply, which opens it to
the simulacrum [ . . . and ] the image category" (Electronic 150). Ulmer's projects in "Abject
Monumentality" as well as in Electronic Monuments participate in this impossible figuration by
further opening "mediated-suffering": i.e., the genre of the MEmorial operates not only on
image reasoning and reasoneon⁹ (simulacra and image categories) but also by introducing
"peripherals" to current monuments (or "sites") that open viewers (monument tourists) to
abject suffering (mediated or not)—and here the abject suffering is associated with the private
sphere. Ulmer uses suffering, in critical fashion in his MEmorial, by exposing us to particular
kinds of cultural catastrophes that work across individual and collective "sites" of mourning,
and from this he demonstrates a kind of sacrificial exchange-rate at play in the developments
of individual and collective "identity." This is yet another manifestation of our post-infans
dis/case—to which Ulmer's work draws critical attention, via forms of "mediated-suffering."

As our culture shifts to electracy, which opens Ulmerian considerations to us (like his
MEmorial, mystery, and even constructions of "wide sites"), there are points or moments of
access for providing figuration for this impossible figure, for the death of the *infans*. But in order to do so, there is also a need to shift away from focusing on the death itself and move instead toward the *suffering* involved, for it is *suffering* that is at stake here: we cannot stop the death of the *infans* anymore than we can stop electry, or literacy, or orality, or the *Ereignis* of the world, but we can find ways to live more inventively, and perhaps more comfortably, with this condition.

(Re)Introducing "Hurbinek"

To reach these "figurable" potentialities, and the considerations they allow, I first need to drift, in critical fashion, through this notion of the *infans*; and to do so, I will borrow an extended passage from Blanchot's *The Writing of the Disaster*, which I apologize for but which is crucial for engaging the "schizo-nomadic" moves being offered in this chapter.

"A child is being killed." This is the title which must at last be recalled in all its indecisive force. It is not I who would have to kill and always to kill again the *infans* that I was, so to speak, in the beginning and when I was not yet, but was at least in the dreams, the desires and the imaginary of some, and then of all. There is death and murder (words which I defy anyone seriously to distinguish and which must nonetheless be separated); but there is no designated or designatable dealer of death. It is an impersonal, inactive, and irresponsible "they" that must answer for this death and this murder. And likewise this child is a child, but one who is always undetermined and without relation to anyone at all. A child already dead is dying, of a murderous death—a child of whom we
know nothing (even if we characterize him as marvelous, terrifying, tyrannical, or indestructible) except this: that the possibility of speaking and of life depend on the fictive establishment, through death and murder, of a relation of singularity with a mute past, with a prehistory, with a past, then, which is outside the past and of which the eternal infans is the figure at the same time that he is concealed therein. "A child is being killed." Let us make no mistake about this present: it signifies that the deed cannot be done once and for all, that the operation is completed at no privileged moment in time—that inoperable, it operates and that thus it tends to be none but the very time which destroys (effaces) time. This is the effacement or destruction, or gift, which has always already been exposed in the precession of Speaking—Speaking separate from and outside anything spoken, the sheer saying of writing—whereby this effacement, far from effacing itself in its turn, perpetuates itself without end, even in the interruption that is its mark.

"A child is being killed." This silent passive, this dead eternity to which a temporal form of life must be given in order that we might separate ourselves from it by a murder—this companion, but of no one whom we seek to particularize as an absence, that we might live upon his banishment, desire with the desire he has not, and speak through and against the word he does not utter—nothing (neither knowledge nor unknowledge) can designate him, even if the simplest of sentences seems, in four or five words, to divulge him (a child is being killed). But this sentence is immediately torn from language—from every language in
which it is articulated—for it draws us outside consciousness and
unconsciousness each time we pronounce it: each time it is given us, that
is—other than ourselves and in a relation of impossibility with the
other—to pronounce the unpronounceable. (71-72)

"A child is being killed," which, much like the "Primal Scene" earlier, references the
death of the *infans*. And this may be the very "disaster" of Blanchot's writing the disaster—
as in the disaster of coming to writing. Additionally, it may serve us well to consider this, for
now, as the first catastrophe of being, a catastrophic encounter that introduces us to both suffering
and sublime: to the suffering of this (unmourned) death, and to the sublime experience of this
suffering—that is, of bearing witness to this first death. This might even be viewed as the first
sublime (the initial suffering) that backs up the Kantian (septic) system of "pure reason"—the
abjection which is the "dirty secret" necessary for rational/reasonable "man" to come to be:
to get into this "gang" of "right reason," the initiation includes killing the child—that is,
wounding oneself catastrophically. Thus, perhaps we do not begin by (a desire for) killing the
father (*Time or Freud*) but rather by (an un/desired) killing the self.

"A child is being killed," repeatedly so, and one question that should be asked,
among others, is by whom? Or rather, by what? Blanchot tells us, "there is no designated or
designatable dealer of death. It is an impersonal, inactive, and irresponsible 'they' that must
answer for this death and this murder" (71). Following the postmodernist or
poststructuralist take on *language speaking us*, which I opened in the previous chapter, I would
argue that this "interminable"10 "they" is actually the multiplicity of language: The "killing" is
done by language, which destroys the *infans* and then latches onto its remains—the
body/mind of the altered being—which it then speaks through/of/to: this is made possible
by the individual and collective desire (if not necessity) of coming to language—glorified in
the parental celebration of a child's first words.

Additionally in this passage, we are introduced to a child "who is always
undetermined and without relation to anyone at all" and "of whom we know nothing (even
if we characterize him as marvelous, terrifying, tyrannical, or indestructible)" (72). This
child's "possibility of speaking and of life depend [. . . on] a mute past, with a prehistory,
with a past, then, which is outside the past of which the eternal infans is the figure at the
same time that he is concealed therein" (ibid). The figure that should be considered in
regards to this passage is "Hurbiniek" (introduced in the previous chapter), as even his name
is not his own (among other numerous abjected "positions") and thus he is excessively
"undetermined": not only is he "without relation to anyone at all," including without relation
to language, but perhaps is even without relation to himself.

Aside from the similarities between the lines above and Primo Levi's descriptions of
Hurbiniek in *Survival in Auschwitz and the Reawakening: Two Memoirs*, my repurposed
"Hurbiniek," a figure for the will to life or for a life-etsea, who bears witness without the
possibility of "testimony," may bear witness to the "ravaging joy" one suffers when coming to
Sublime absence. But "Hurbiniek," unlike Blanchot's "child," does not (and cannot) shed the
tear from the "primal scene" (for reasons to which I will return). As such, with a mute
past—that is, an unknowable prehistory that positions his past "outside of the past,"
(meaning outside of history even, as there is no one, including himself, to provide
"testimony" to that past)—and with the ability to bear witness without "testimony," forever
remaining silent (keeping the secret), we would be well served to consider "Hurbiniek" as an
eternal *infans* figure.
In so doing, three important considerations open for this discussion: 1) as "Hurbinék" becomes figural for Blanchot's "first death" (cf. 65-67), which I repurpose as "first suffering," complexities emerge for the suffering explored here as three *ethos-cum-etbea* figures ("Hurbinék," Levi, and *Musselmanner*) introduce new levels of consideration; 2) in "Hurbinék's" utterance of *matisklo*, there is, in this *infans* babble, an expression of a *life-etbea* without a presence in language—it is a "pronounce[ment of] the unpronounceable" (Blanchot 72); and 3) we need to consider the implications of what happens in this move when the eternal *infans* experiences "second death" as "first death" (and thus why no tears [of "testimony"] from "Hurbinék").

*Three Figures*

In the first, if these three figures are thought as passages into and through being (and thought as the *suffering* one must undergo in those passages), then "Hurbinék" can be positioned as the *infans* who *suffers* the loss of the ability to bear witness; and this occurs in his *becoming* the figure of Levi (or "mediated-witness"), who then attempts to render (impossibly so) this *suffering* into language. The difference between the figures is that the *suffering* "Hurbinék" undergoes, which is a "first suffering," is that of a silencing trauma of bearing witness to being/Being and the *suffering* Levi undergoes, which is a "second suffering," is the hysteria inducing traumas of the limits of language apparatuses—exemplified in the restrictive possibilities in alphabetic-logoi.

With Blanchot's focusing on the potentials of the "present," in counterdistinction to the (im)possibilities of the "past" for the eternal *infans*—saying the present "signifies that the deed cannot be done once and for all, that the operation is completed at no privileged
moment in time" (71)—and with the instabilities of "self" opened in the previous chapter, the possibility of toggling back and forth between these suffering figures (a suffering of another variety) has opened to us.

Moving into electacy raises awareness to both the first and second sufferings, and there is something therapeutic in that acknowledgement (even if therapeutic suffering). But like orality and literacy, electacy too will introduce its own traumas, hysterias, and sufferings. However, rather than working hermeneutically to "diagnose" this dis/case (of the post-infans), I will work heuristically, inventing from/with this very condition—much like Ulmer's attempts to work with the "wide image" (see Teletheory; Internet Invention).

But before drifting to and through Ulmer, I must not forget the third figure, the Musselmanner, which opens a "third suffering." The Musselmanner brings its own kind of suffering to bear on this conversation outright, and as I work punceptually across its choral range rather than conceptually within any fixed eidos, I do not want to remove this suffering from the considerations offered. But the specific suffering sought here is that which happens when "Hurbinck"-cum-Levi becomes Musselmanner, when the dead infans who has come to language (becoming Levi) falls out of relation with language (and its grounding realities in RL).

This "third suffering," the condition of the Musselmanner, is what occurs when one has suffered Blanchot's "first death" a second time. This is the complete loss of the will to life, the total abjection of both "Hurbinck's" remains and those of Levi, who now impossibly dies a "first death" as second time in order to make possible the condition of the Musselmanner. What remains of this position is separation, a severing even, of being from Being—it is the trauma of disconnect, of becoming abjection without recourse, and an abjection that others must suffer for its abjection to be catastrophic.
At their core, all of these "deaths" and/or sufferings are catastrophic. They introduce us to cataclysmic changes in being, which not only opens radical possibilities for being, thinking, and saying, but inventively opens possibilities, impossibilities, and composibilities in the (immediacy of the) threshold of being/Being, which is a choral space.

Finding Matisklo

Fynsk writes, "there is no visible or verbal figure that could capture the death of the infans. The saying of this death cannot be 'said' (or represented) in any mode of signification. Not even a phrase such as 'a child is being killed' says this event. Or if it can say it in the mode of signification prior to any representation or signification, the phrase itself remains unpronounceable" (72). Aside from finding echoes here of a pseudo Gorgian negative trilemma, it is also important to note that I do not necessarily disagree with Fynsk in this impossibility of figuring the death of the infans. But I think the impossibility is due to the apparatus involved as well as to Fynsk's focus on the death itself (the concept involved) instead of the pathetic possibilities that exist in relation to this Ereignis. Shifting focus to suffering rather than death, opening us to the pathos involved in this (rhetorical) Ereignis, may invent access to a choral space of thought previously untenable.

Of course, in counterdistinction to Fynsk, I would offer not only "Hurbinck" as possibility for an eternal infans, but specifically consider his utterance of matisklo as the very phrase of "unpronounceability"—which here is actually pronounceable and thus perhaps we would be better served to consider this utterance not as "unpronounceable" but rather as being without signification (in any fixing way that could be associated with coming to language).
Within this utterance, we are opened to a figuration that is perpetually becoming. It is this utterance, from the will to life, that is immemorial; beyond impossible pasts and futures (and future-anterials), it stands forever in the moment in which Levi encountered it (and not in his retelling of it to us) where it is a directed utterance utterly devoid of language. It is an "unlanguageable." As such, it can be used experientially, to bear witness to suffering in only the way the eternal infans can: with eyes that flashed "terribly alive" (Levi 191; qtd in Agamben, Remnants 37) and with a "feeling of [submerging] happiness" (Blanchot 72), the likes of which even catastrophic suffering cannot squelch (that is, until we become Levi, until the "child has been killed.")

As we move into electrate spaces, the potential of matisklo is that it becomes an indication, if not emblem, of the tone I offer to working in Ulmer's "virtual" mood, which he adds to his "agents" working in the middle voice (Electronic 72); and the "virtual," following Deleuze and Guattari, is that which "is already real without yet being actual" (Kafka 48; qtd in Ulmer, Electronic 154).

Thus, I seek to invent (with) catastrophes that work in the tone of Matisklo, in the "virtual" mood, and which emerge in the middle voice, a choral voice. What this means is that as we work in and/or engage varying electrate rhetorics, or when we rhetorically invent in and for electrate discourse(s), we should attempt to retain, as guiding tone, the life-ethea of which matisklo has become emblematic, as we too are implicated in suffering the very catastrophes we are inventing. Therefore, rhetorical invention has to be about a life-ethea or "life-politic" (or generative [general] economies) lest we fall either into an (unintentional) invention of our own suicide (a problematic position examined in the previous chapter) or into the age old pursuits of introducing/inventing new ways of "dying the good death"—which is to say, new ways of controlling or restricting being (by offering systematic "ethics"
or even pedagogies to this "good death": it must, after all, be teachable!). What I hope,
then, is to rhetorically invent (with) catastrophes that open possibilities for the human
condition—and this is the tone of mātisklo, guiding pathetic appeals in favor of improving the
condition(s) of humanity (and humanities).

As such, what is sought is to introduce catastrophes that radically alter being
(punceptually and recursively so) in order to perpetually open more and more inventive
possibilities for being, in Lyotardian paralogical fashion. Thus, what I am working toward
electronically is "grounded" (in loose, conductive fashion) to what occurs in paralogy—that
is, from suffering the inventive trauma of conversation, which is an engagement that exposes
us to the catastrophe of suffering the other—emblematic of the Self-Other Immediacy opened
earlier.

"Hurbinek's" Death

It is important, before drifting away from the death of the infans, that I open one
other area of consideration to this eternal infans figure of "Hurbinek," a consideration that
revolves around "Hurbinek's" death—the very event that allows him to bear witness in a way
Levi could not. "Hurbinek's" death, however, exposes us to the catastrophe of what happens
when the infans comes to "organic" or "physical" death? Or rather, how do we make
recourse for the infans (a condition predicated on not having suffered "first death") coming to
"second death" instead of coming to language?

Of course, Blanchot may argue that this child is always already consigned to death
(68), for that is his/her position as infans, but this "dead child" view still does not remove us
from considerations of the infans, for which "Hurbinek" is our figure. Thus what happens
when "Hurbiniek" comes to "second death" as his only death, when dying before coming to
to a level of suffering which tears the fabric of being (at
least in the small collective of beings who suffer [in mourning fashion] the death of
"Hurbiniek."). The tearing here is that in this catastrophe what is mourned is not the "dead
child" but rather the (unconscious) acknowledgment of the death of the very possibility of
becoming.

With the death of "Hurbiniek," the inventive (and thus hopeful) possibilities of
becoming cease to be: what is suffered here is the trauma of mourning the "unfulfilled" or
"unmanifested" being—a being finitely limited to its position of lost possibility. And this
mourn cannot be experienced by "Hurbiniek," as death prevents a mourning of the self.
Thus, the mourning involved, in suffering fashion, is in regards to others (if not Other). The
collective mourns the death of "Hurbiniek" because, rhetorically speaking, nothing is more
traumatic than the loss of possibility: in the loss we lose hope, faith, belief, values, perhaps even
our will to live, if not being itself—for being's very essence may be to suffer becoming, where
being might be constructed as being in relation to the relation of becoming.

Of course, I speak of "Hurbiniek's" death here to help further considerations of
human existence, of the human condition, of what it means to be (electrately or otherwise),
but I tread cautiously for I do not want to treat of "Hurbiniek's" death as having any mystical
aura or treat it sacrificially, for either would, in a sense, desensitize the actual trauma
involved for "Hurbiniek" and Auschwitz. To imbue the deaths at Auschwitz or any other
interment camps with these kinds of qualities falls (unconscionably so) to grasp the
(magnitude of the) catastrophe involved.
I should extend this issue a bit further for the Holocaust might be seen as (horridic) example of the suffering of trauma predicated on abjection (particularly, practices of exclusion and/or marginalization, of a reduction to abject possibilities). As such, I will "schizo-nomadically" drift us on in this chapter and work to unfold these issues of suffering, but I must acknowledge, as clearly as I can, of a danger involved in this move. The unfolding that follows may invent or introduce a particular kind of trauma for readers, a suffering that toggles, painfully so, on the rhetorical potentialities of identification (and the desires to not have that identification). Nonetheless, what wants to be said here, or even what needs to be said here, may itself be catastrophic, in varying ways, and of varying magnitudes.

Of course, in this chapter I am working toward rhetorically inventing (with) the catastrophic, and so, in a very real way, the chapter itself is calling for the following to be said, but this "writing of the paradigm" approach in no way diminishes the dangers. So, it is of vital importance that I acknowledge the potentiality of trauma upfront and include my own hesitations in regards to the possibilities in the coming utterances—as I too am implicated in the traumas to follow (working in the middle voice). But my task as scholar, in this particular work, is to open possibilities for thought, and as such, I would be remiss if I did not pursue this potential line of flight.

III

Zachary Braiterman, in his article, "Against Holocaust-Sublime: Naïve Reference and the Generation of Memory," argues that there has been a loss of shock, if not incomprehensibility (or perhaps Pathetic Sublime, à la Friedrich Schiller), of the Holocaust. Specifically, he is working in reference to those he labels as "memorialists," arguing that this
"loss" is correlative to a (cultural/scholarly?) move from first-generation to second-
generation "memorialists," or the shift from "First-memory" to "Second-memory" (in
relation to the Holocaust). There is, of course, a glaring connection wanting to be made
between our previous "firsts" and "seconds" (death and suffering) with these "memory"
distinctions—most notably that Levi (both Primo Levi and my figure Levi) is first-generation
"memorialists"—but what is of most intrigue for me, initially so, is that Braiterman has
overlooked those who provide no or who have no "memory" for this event, those who
reside at the threshold of this suffering—"Hurbinek" and Musselmanner—which, in this
numbering system would be "Zero memorialists."

This not only reconnects us to Thomas Sheehan's agent-0 and the full implications of
those possibilities, explored in Chapter III, but it positions these two ("Hurbinek" and
Musselmanner) as absence, or even an impossibility, of "memory"—perhaps even as the
immemorial, or more negatively, and horrifically so, as abjections. In a sense, these "Zero
memorialists" get abjected twice: both in relation to their suffering of Auschwitz and in
relation to Holocaust-memory. These two most certainly should not be forgotten! For it is
their suffering that is being "testified" too—whether as "first" "mediated-witness" or "second"
(and it is important to note that Braiterman's "second" is not in terms of death, but rather
just an interval of remove from the position of the Levi figure here).

This "second" abjection stems, in part, from Braiterman rushing (rhetorically and/or
critically) to reach a point of distance that allows for his "first" and "second" distinctions, a
point (of perspective) allowing him to situate "[t]he Holocaust and its first-memory [as]
already belong[ing] to the past" (18). And this sets up his claim that "the Holocaust no
longer signifies something uncanny" (19). Using Saul Friedländer's definition of the
uncanny, which Braiterman characterizes as "the inability to distinguish [. . .] human from
inhuman" or "the mechanical nonhuman character of Nazi killers and of Musselmänner
approaching the state of automatons" (ibid), Braiterman tells us that he "cannot help but
suspect that people today" (those who fall into the category of his "second") feel more at
home with the "benign blendings of the human and inhuman" (ibid), and that now the
Holocaust-memory "constitutes a familiar room in a contemporary mental architecture"
(ibid).

While there is a recognition of the Holocaust's incomprehensibility in Braiterman's
article—"[The Holocaust] may, in fact, forever remain impervious to the human
understanding," (19)—there is still a remove, almost inhumanly so, from the human
condition. Like we may find in other works on this issue, there seems to be a view that if we
speak "academically," we are allowed to separate ourselves (and our words), whether in
"first" or "second" relation, from the trauma involved—that is, as if working "logically"
through the critical issues somehow allows for a parceling out of the immense pathetic
presence always already present, inextricably so, in this discussion.¹²

This act of separation, of disjunction, perhaps of disambiguation, or of removing
certain signifieds from the fullness of the signifying chain—that is, this move, intentional or
not, of excluding, marginalizing, or dislodging certain (pathetic) possibilities from the
punctual range (in order to work within the clarity of [logical/fixing] conceptual
thought)—opens us to participating in the same types of catastrophic (and here I remind us of
the fourfold tensions at play in this term) behaviors introduced to us by the Holocaust itself.

Braiterman may not be discrediting the "incomprehensibility" of the Holocaust, but
his moving us away from this notion of the "uncanny" because of our (cultures') increasing
levels of integration between "machine" and "man"—as if this somehow makes us less
shocked to the Holocaust catastrophes—ignores the fundamental basis of the suffering of the
Holocaust. What makes the Holocaust sublime or "uncanny" as catastrophe or as the Ereignis of suffering (in its most catastrophic sense), is not the deaths themselves, though they cannot/should not be removed from this consideration, but rather is the reduction of human life—of humanity even—to the abject.

**Abject Suffering**

Following the Sophistic possibilities introduced in previous chapters, I will begin here by exploring the name of this catastrophe as names are rhetorically powerful on a variety of levels. The word holocaust comes from the Greek term holocaustos, which means "completely burned" and, as Agamben tells us, "arises from this unconscious demand to justify a death that is sine causa – to give meaning back to what seemed incomprehensible" (Remnants 28). But as it comes to us through religious traditions, being associated with Christian martyrs and even Christ's sacrifice on the cross, the term, "gradually acquires the meaning of the 'supreme sacrifice in the sphere of a complete devotion to sacred and superior motives'" (Remnants 30). As such, to apply it to the "exterminating" that occurred at the internment camps is horribly problematic as what occurred there was not sacrificial (a point to which I will return).

Agamben draws this correlation out a bit further, indicating the problematic parallels that (unintentionally) emerge "between death in the gas chamber and the 'complete devotion to sacred and superior motives'" (Remnants 31). He goes on to say, "Not only does the term imply an unacceptable equation between crematoria and altars; it also continues a semantic heredity that is from its inception anti-Semitic.\[13\] This is why we will never make use of this term" (ibid). Thus, I too shall avoid this term, using Auschwitz (as metonym) instead.
But to get back to this notion of "sacrifice," it is important that we understand that the deaths at Auschwitz were those of what Agamben would call "bare life" or the "life of homo sacer (sacred man)," which is a life that "may be killed and yet not sacrificed" (*Homo Sacer* 8). The deaths of "Hurbinek," the Musselmanner, and all those in between and beyond, were of this variety. The Jews were not sacrificed, and we should be cautious to put such an aura on Auschwitz; they were, as Agamben has told us, "exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had announced, 'as lice,' which is to say, as bare life" (*Remnants* 114).

We need to recognize that any attempts to dramatize Auschwitz (or these deaths), to romanticize it (them), to historicize it (them), radically fails to grasp the *suffering* involved. We do not remember this *catastrophe* to honor those who have died; this is not an act of commemoration or monumentalization, nor should it be—which is what we commonly find in our literate-culture: texts (historiographic, romantic, dramatic, critical, descriptive) devoted to commemorating or memorializing (the deaths of) Auschwitz. Rather, it is, or should be, whether oral, literate, or electrate, an (im)memorialization of *suffering* of the *pathos* of Auschwitz; which is to say, we must work to retain (always retain) the *punctum* involved. Meaning, there is no distance, no "second" or "third" or even "fifteenth" "memory" position from which to remove oneself from the *punctum* of the *suffering* of Auschwitz as the *suffering* is immemorial.

Instead of trying to understand Auschwitz, to hermeneutically render its incomprehensibility, we need to work inventively, locating and inventing with that which disturbs (if not traumatizes) us most, perpetually so, from this *Pathetic Ereignis* or perhaps *Pathetic Sublime* recognized as Auschwitz (or the condition of Auschwitz). And the *punctum* here is not just that which may emerge in the deaths at Auschwitz, which are *punctuous* in
their own right, but rather the *punctum*, that which does (or should!) sting us, should emerge differently for everyone—in fact, this work may have introduced a *punctum* of its own accord.

One particular aspect that I think should "sting" many, and one that "stings" me vehemently, is what I consider the most *catastrophic* aspect of Auschwitz: the reduction of being to the abject, or even the abjection of being—that is, the rhetorical denigration of humanity in a particularly abject way, which is a rhetorical tactic that reduces, excludes, marginalizes, via the language apparatus (demonstrated excessively so in Nazi propaganda).

The same form of "reductive" or "restrictive" abjection can also be located in the varying "grand narratives" that guide/control our discourse registers (personal, popular, and expert) as well as in communication itself, which is, at its core, a process of exclusion: if nothing else, we exclude Serres' "third man" (see *Parasite*). And, in my view, the abjective-base of alphabetic logoi or the literacy apparatus may be most exemplary of this abjection found in apparatuses of communication as these are founded on the very principle of exclusion: glorified in the principle of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle (where literacy's [rational/reasonable] desire for clarity [i.e., Truth] can be located—which asks for singularity and/or a fixity of the relationship of signifier/signified).

To ignore, separate, or exterminate the abject, even rhetorically (especially rhetorically!) is to participate, albeit differently but relatedly, to the *suffering* at Auschwitz, which here is offered as extreme example to introduce a *catastrophe*; it is an inventive attempt to open us to the (traumatic) shock of such potentiality. This is not because I hope to "cure" literacy of this condition, as it cannot be "cured" (and perhaps should not be), but rather that there is something to be gained from being able to acknowledge this possibility; being aware of the dangers of *becoming*, that is, of the possible monsters we may *become*, and potential links
or paths or ways in which we open ourselves to those monstrosities, is important for helping us situate ourselves accordingly and learning to live with (not die from) this condition.

That being said, it is also important to acknowledge that there are other (perhaps more catastrophic) dangers electracy is exposing us to. For as Paul Virilio has told us, "Every technology carries its own negativity, which is invented at the same time as technical progress" (*Politics* 89); or, in Ulmer's words, "every invention brings into the world its own form of accident" (*Electronic* 36). But, much like I opened in our Exigence, following the works of Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan, we need to use the highest technology available, in regards to technologizations of the word, to open previous technologizations to rigorous critique—a potentiality improved by the distance and perspective new technologizations allow. Much like literacy provided us with distance and capabilities of critically engaging the limits and possibilities of orality, electracy is doing the same for literacy and also opening new considerations for orality. But rather than wait for the next "technologization" to come along to help us post-electracy grasp *catastrophes* electracy opens us to, we should seek these out, find and/or invent them (our "selphs"), and use them as starting points (heuristics) rather than ending positions (hermeneutics). Or, following Deleuze, the *catastrophe* (or disaster, in his words) becomes "the source rather than the target of explanation" (*The Fold* 109).

What is important to remember, so much so that I will reiterate it again, is that as we move into inventing (with) *catastrophes* in electronic cultures, we should seek to avoid perpetuating abject *suffering* and instead use the abject, *suffering*, and abject *suffering* as inventive possibilities: begin with these traumas as starting points, which not only perpetually draws attention to them (as abjections)—creating/raising the potential for critical awareness—but
also potentially allows for the emergence of ("selph")-therapeutics, where we may learn to
live with these dis/eases.

Working electronically with catastrophe as a way for opening invention to the
possibilities of suffering (or even more generally of pathos) will be where I drift next. In so
doing, I will use Ulmer's work on electronic monuments as relay to the kind of electrate-
sufferable catastrophes I hope to bring into consideration.

IV

Charles Scott says, "The question we face with regard to suffering is whether we can
care for it without the hope of curing it" (119). To care for it, in my view, is to take
ownership of it, to sit with one's hysterias and hysterics that emerge from the traumas one
suffers and then to invent around/from/through them. In order to do this, we must first
become aware of the condition or dis/ease, that is, become aware of the suffering—both at
the individual and collective levels.

Thus, in these attempts to invent (with) catastrophe, I am attempting to recognize and
learn to "write" with our PTSD condition—that is, with our always already post-traumatic
state, here equally introduced by the trauma of the "first suffering" (the complexities of "first
death" I opened up in relation to "Hurbinnek" being our figure of eternal infans) and the
trauma of being in the society of the spectacle (see Ulmer, Electronic xxviii-xxix). But this
"writing" (or providing "testimony") with/from our PTSD condition is, itself, an
impossibility; to suffer—to undergo the trauma that generates the PTSD—is silencing (as
established in the previous chapter). Those "selphs" who bear the burden of PTSD need an
other—a Levi—in order for "testimony" to be possible.
With our split "schizo-nomadic" SaT "selphs," we can be both Levi and "Hurbinek": I can give "testimony" to the other(s) within me, the other(s) who "bear witness" (who may even be the "site" of the *catastrophe* itself). But the "testimony" involved, however, is not necessarily a testimony of words; rather, it may be a testimony of feelings (thus, a doubling of the importance of *pathos*): Lyotard says, "This sudden feeling is as good as testimony, through its unsettling strangeness" (*Heidegger* 13). This "testimony" may simply be recognition, within the "selphs," of a mood or moment or fragment that recalls the shock of the *catastrophe*—thus providing "testimony" to this "unsettling strangeness" through *endocepts* or through flash reason.

I would offer that the recognition of this "unsettling strangeness," which initiates at the level of the individual, but which can find resonance across the collective, is part of the inventive potential the *catastrophe* introduces: For this "strangeness" introduces a tension—both within and without, as we prosthete memory (and emotions)—that always already forces us to work generatively, for its "unsettling strangeness" comes from the fact that it is a *catastrophe* for the limits of the system.

It is, following the work of Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, an issue of convergence (34), which often goes unnoticed until the system breaks down (cf. Ulmer, *Electronic* xxi). Of course, the *catastrophe* not only introduces us to an awareness of the limits of the system and a sense of having reached convergence, but also is the very thing that violates the system's limits. The system cannot handle the *catastrophic*-Sublime. This is what I seek: to introduce or invent (with) *catastrophes* that radically alter the system, that challenge the limits of restrictive economies, calling attention to the policies and metaphysics that govern them (and thus, that govern us).
But recognizing this "sudden feeling" and/or mood is not as easy as it sounds, especially for those who reside in a culture plagued by "compassion fatigue," which is mode or form of desensitization suffered by members of the society of the spectacle. The viewing-public, shocked momentarily by the catastrophic, moves on with a disjunctive and paratactic shift common in news broadcasts:

Female anchor says, "... and now nearly 20,000 are dead in Gaza." She looks pensive. Jump-cut to male counterpart. Pan in. "In other news, the East-High Bulldogs advance to the State Championship game for the second time in the last 4 years."

Ulmer writes, "We know more about worldwide catastrophes than ever before, and care less. Or rather, we are unable to conjoin our intellectual understanding and our emotions, and this disjunction of discursive and pathetic knowledge is systematic, structural, and seemingly irreducible" (61). We not only fail to conjoin our "intellectual understanding and our emotions," but we are even interpellated in this fashion: we come to suffering with the freedom of the disconnect, of the jump-cut, of the ability to change the channel, and/or of knowing that if we just wait a few seconds longer some other spectacle will appear—perhaps a story about kittens or puppies (perhaps one about their euthanasia, à la Ulmer's Petting [see "Abject Monumentality"]).

We became, dangerously so, accustomed to the trauma (and our condition of PTSD) as part of living in the society of the spectacle—as we "know" that we can simply "turn it off." That is, until our town, our Real, is the catastrophe on the news, and then we are equally
excited by being the "eyewitness" for the voyeuristic world as we are traumatized by the
*catastrophe* itself.

"Compassion fatigue," quite fittingly, is also known as Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder (STSD), the trauma from being exposed (perpetually) to (mediated?) trauma—it is a sort of meta-condition. Thus, it is not that difficult to see, perhaps, why Braierman makes the claims he does about "second-memory" and the loss of the uncanny; though he doesn't relate it to STSD, I think we can see connections: the "people" to who Braierman refers are those who suffer from STSD.

The STSD dis ease of Braierman's "seconds" might be viewed as being of lesser magnitude than today's youth, whose very being nearly begins with this condition—who, in fact, may develop this STSD as "first suffering" (much in the way of the death of the *infans*), as the *infans* in electrate culture come to "mediated-*catastrophe*" and "mediated-*suffering*" perhaps within minutes of being born as "mediation" is ubiquitous: labor and delivery rooms are now equipped with nearly all the electronic amenities one can desire. In fact, in the case of my own son, he "experienced" part of Michael Phelps' Olympic glory and was an Internet "star" (to family and friends) within mere "moments" of having been delivered.

But to those who suffer "compassion fatigue"—a condition I commonly find in many students, who feel/exhibit a disconnect from the *catastrophes* elsewhere in the world (even those merely beyond their own localities, and sometimes even those within those localities)—there needs to be a way to reconnect, or pull into immediacy, intellectual understanding and the *pathetic*, much like we find in relation to Auschwitz, we cannot and should not separate these two. This is, of course, one of the great appeals of working chorographically as it asks us—and students—to actively seek out these other possibilities,
these other "chimes" on the great chain of signifiers, which means inventing with all the possibilities, bringing their entirey to bear on the moves we wish to make.

This practice, which aside from working with the choral range, and moving within/across/beyond via the mode of punceptuality (and/or conductive intuition), is also not something that we do "naturally"—at least not in critical fashion. So there is an opportunity to help us find ways to engage this kind of practice, and to do so in ways that begin by recognizing this "sudden feeling" and/or mood, which acts as "testimony" to the bearing witness of the punctum and/or suffering the catastrophe of our "selphs."

To continue to open this process of inventing (with) catastrophe, then, I will turn and look at Ulmer's work and use his moves as relay to the potentialities I hope to have opened so far.

MEMorials

Ulmer's MEmorial attempts to draw attention to abject deaths, specifically those occurring in the private sphere, that he claims are (necessary) sacrifices to individual and collective identity formation: he draws attention to the euthanasia of pets as being sacrifices necessary to maintain the American family identity of pet ownership (i.e., the "family pet") and looks at traffic accidents (and the deaths that result from them) as sacrifices necessary "to maintaining the lifestyle of freedom in America. This (the ability to go anywhere, anytime) is what we actually believe in and are willing to die for" ("Abject Monumentality" 11).

Building from this, he offers a process of inventing "peripheral monuments," which work along side "memorial[s] proper" and establish "a connection between [. . . the] acknowledged value [of the memorial] and the unacknowledged but lived value of the loss in
the private sphere" (Electronic 47). The "lived value of the loss in the private sphere" is what I might recast as the suffering the "peripheral monument" is designed to call attention to.

Ulmer's MEmorials, as genre, work conductively in regards to the suffering they offer—specifically, the intuitive and punctive potentialities the intended "visitors" suffer, who now, via the MEorial, have added "the status of theoria" (Electronic 47) to their touristic practices—moving them into the figural space of Solon. MEmorial "visitors" make conductive linkages between their private spheres and public spheres.

Ulmer's MEmorials also seem to operate on a basis of suffering—that is, of exposing "visitors" to catastrophes; they are designed to radically alter how we understand (certain) abject deaths by aiding "visitors" suffering in relation to recognizing the implications of these abject deaths (individually and collectively). This is an attempt to recoil and bring into alignment understanding and emotion. As such, MEmorials work with pathos, exceptionally well—so much so that even some of their descriptions, like Petting, can introduce trauma via "virtual" empathy.

However, I think Ulmer's work has participated in a similar "one step too far" that has been located elsewhere, which is that his work, while working inventively, electronically, conductively with suffering, still focuses on death (even if abject death, found at the level of the individual or private sphere). What I will do, as a related, but perhaps backward "schizo-nomadic" drift or backward inference (à la Nietzsche), is to open, in relay fashion, some of these Ulmerian possibilities in relation to suffering—and particularly abject suffering.

Moving toward these considerations, it is important to note that Ulmer is working in the direction of the monumental, palpating the relations of culture and memory, specifically through the act of mourning (and/or the marking[s] of mourning)—and doing so at both the individual and collective levels. He says, "Monuments mark, suture, and cover the hole
in the civic sphere" (Electronic 16)—and his example is the monument in Lower Manhattan.

The "hole" here is what marks the trauma, in either a collective (as monument) or an individual (as symptom), and Ulmer's "ME:orial deconsultation" works in conjunction with traditional monumentality to remind us of the "irreparability of the hole" (ibid). Of course, this hole opens us, again, to "absencing" and Sheehan's agent-0, to the Lacanian $, to the Derridean "center without center," and even to my own "schizo-nomadic" SaT. And as such, it should be noticed that the monument, for Ulmer, marks, sutures, and covers, but it does not fill, repair, heal, or fix. The trauma remains, whether or not it is monumentalized or ME:orialized. Likewise, the absence of "self," and the traumatic instabilities this absence introduces, remain, no matter the personal monuments and/or commemoratives we create.

Following this line, which I opened in the previous chapter and encountered again in the notion of becoming, the trauma or wound here can be seen as a perpetual "site" of generation, of invention; it gives launch to inventive multiplicities as we each, individually and in relation to a collective, work to address the wound, to "suture" it, to close the caesura. But it must remain: the gaping wound, the trauma, the catastrophic reminder (and remainder)—always already functioning as inventive absence. This is the space between frames in a film; this is the gutter in comics; this is the space of the slash (and the tensions of immediacy in juxtaposition). And as such, for us, the suffering being sought here in relation to inventing (with) catastrophes is at the level of apparatus—that is, in this medium/message reconfiguration, I want to open the trauma of the medium.

Apparatus Catastrophe

As Henri Lefebvre has indicated, many of the "commonplaces" of culture emerging from an association with literacy have disappeared (or are disappearing) (25), and this itself is
a bit catastrophic as we, literate-culture, have interpellated these categories (or topoi) as being fundamental to the processes of "reason." But the real trauma for literate-culture is not that these categories are disappearing, as they are still quite available, but rather that they no longer seem to apply to our ways of being in the world as we move into cultures of electracy—or, if they do apply, it is only via radical alteration or (perpetual) reconceptualization. What is emerging in electracy, in counterdistinction, is a new set of topoi or "mode of organization and classification" (Ulmer, Electronic 120). For Ulmer, and for us, this is a tropological shift, moving from topos to chora. In fact, with the moves made in this work so far, I might offer, following Ulmer, that what conceptual categories (or topoi) are for literacy, my construction of choral "sites" of becoming will be for electracy.

Thus, what I am developing, in a very practical way, is the catastrophe as inventing emerging sets of topoi—now reconstituted as choral "sites" of becoming—which will open us to the inventive (and paralogically generative) potentialities of suffering. And here, the catastrophic need not be thought strictly in the sense of human suffering, but also works in relation to radically altering the cultural as well as technological landscapes: As example, we might view the rhizomic, hyperlinking possibilities of an electrate apparatus as being catastrophic for the fixed, root-based/arborous, linearity of print-culture.

While Ulmer looks to invent monuments to the collective identity unrecognizably forming in the private sphere—shown most evidently by abject sacrifices of human life—I seek something else: to open pathetic rhetorical invention to the generative possibilities of suffering (and not the more common focus on death). The shift to suffering, once again, is designed to move us out of death-logics and "dying the good death" mantras and into life-logics, living, and being (to be alive is to suffer [being/Being])
To bring these considerations back to the specific focus of these works, I seek to introduce a *catastrophe* (that of the electrate sublime) to the restrictive potentials of print-culture—performatively introduced in my two-dissertation approach. In so doing, I hope to open possibilities, to expose us to potentialities not previously "accepted," as the *catastrophe* itself is introduced to radically alter the limits of the system: here the alphabetic-logoi or literacy system, and specifically the limits of the 19th century dissertation. And it should be noted that my targeting of literacy is not because its limits are in any way more restrictive than other potentialities, but rather because literacy seeks, insatiably so, to extend itself (and its controlling, consumptive, governing, and excluding logics) into and onto electrate cultures. Thus, there is already a trauma or even differend at play, and what I hope to accomplish by introducing *suffering* is to bear witness to new idioms to invent either a third position from which to consider the injustice of this differend or to invent a *catastrophe* that completely alters the potentialities that make the differend possible. One way to do this is to open restrictive economies to (abject) possibilities that violate their restrictive limits.

One specific result that can be seen from inventing (with) electrate *catastrophe* is that the topoi are no longer determined in advanced (as in, in set categories). No longer are they fixed as locations or places for "discovering" arguments. Now they become *catastrophic* choral "sites" of *becoming* that bring to bear the Ulmerian Fourfold (Family and Entertainment, School and Discipline)—allowing us to invent, to generate, from across the registers of human experience, as these things relate (link to and through) varying *catastrophes* themselves. This is itself *catastrophic* for the Aristotelian topoi. And it is likely the kind of "affirmative change" John Muckelbauer’s topoi want to open (an issue raised in Chapter II).

Thus, the *catastrophe* to which the "schizo-nomadic" SaT bears witness and gives "testimony"—via his/her dislodged "selphs," in the tone of *matisklo*, in the "virtual" mood,
in the middle voice, emerging in flash reason where s/he recognizes a "sudden feeling" of "unsettling strangeness"—emerges as both the catastrophe I seek to invent (and/or "write" in multiple media) as well as a catastrophe I too must suffer.

**Concluding Shatterings**

Ulmer says, "The MEmorial addresses this gap between the disaster [...] and the ability of public policy to respond" (*Electronic* 157), and this situates his work in the realm of deliberative rhetoric (in a new form of polis). What I am attempting, however, is not to address this gap, nor draw attention to it by making inventive electronic prostheses to be added to preexisting monuments, but rather working to open the catastrophe itself; to write/invent the catastrophe that cannot be ignored by public policy nor the private sphere, and thus all three "players" (catastrophe, public policy, individual) are brought to bear on the catastrophic situation. I want to introduce a dis/ease that doesn't just cause a paradigm shift but that actually explodes the paradigm into fragments (in vice-diction fashion) that need remaking (perpetually so) in a post-catastrophic being and time—which themselves have been fragmented/interrupted (instabilitized) via the catastrophe. Outside of being, outside of time, outside of all that once was, immemorially so, this is where I hope to take us in order to come back anew, perpetually—the eternal return of (re)invention via a being thrown, catastrophically.
Chapter VI

Pedagogy: Inventive (Un)learning

I

My two-dissertation approach has attempted to engage the Aristotelian distinctions of knowing, doing, and making. The knowing, or theoretical knowledge, develops in the critical (and inventional) scholarly engagement present in the two works as well as in the actual production of this print-culture dissertation, which might be considered the "traditional" scholarly approach to epistemic knowledge. The making, or productive knowledge, is the explicit focus of the Sophie2 rendering, which focuses on performing a new paradigm, on working electronically with theories and palpitations of electronic discourse.

This attempt to "perform a new paradigm" is doubly important for it adds something new to the conversation. Ulmer's works on electacy and conductive logics, which I draw heavily upon, are predominantly, if not exclusively, enacted in alphabetic language—that is, in print-culture literacy—and what my two works attempt is not only to extend the possibilities of his paradigm but also to render or translate his work into electronic environments (specifically in Sophic2). These two works establish a new paradigm (by enacting what Ulmer opens), but this new paradigm is appositional not oppositional (a slight skewing of Thomas Kuhn's sense of the development of paradigms).

My two-dissertation approach not only is performative of what Ulmer's work may have always wanted to be—and/or what it wants to become—but also opens access to a third, to the space of immediacy (the slash) between them (print-dissertation/Sophie2-
dissertation). Thus, their greatest contribution may be what emerges in the "third interval," in the "conversations" (silent and spoken) occurring between the two creations (these two catastrophes).

As such, knowing and making have been fairly explicit throughout this work, but doing, the pedagogical or practical knowledge, has been fairly implicit. I have been developing the pedagogical possibilities throughout, but have not yet drawn attention to them in any cohesive way. This will be the focus of this chapter, bringing doing to the forefront of these considerations.

In so doing, this chapter will work differently from the others. It will introduce an interruption to the overall process the chapters have established so far—working in alternate fashion to the tenets readers/viewers have come to expect. This actually introduces, in a Burkean "casuistically stretched" sense, a form of writing the paradigm, as it will produce tensions and instabilities within the piece itself—but the instabilities will emerge mostly in regard to stylistic concerns: this chapter will be decidedly shorter in length, more compact in scope, and draw heavily upon itself (and not outside others), each of which works ideally for pedagogical explorations.

But this chapter will also follow the themata in another way, by working to undo some of the restrictive expectations the university has developed in regards to what counts as thinking or as scholarship or as teaching/learning; and it will work to create space(s) for yet other ways (perhaps electronic ways) of thinking/teaching/learning (i.e., other "logics") to take up residence within university culture. Not only is this a move to challenge the dominant "grand narratives" of education (see Lyotard's Postmodern Condition), but it would also work to challenge what Bill Readings has dubbed the "corporate model university" (see University in Ruins). What these "challenges" do, especially the latter, is to shift the focus
away from education or learning as "banking" entity\(^1\) and back to the university as the "decisive instance for intellectual activity" (Readings 55).

What my dissertations are attempting, then, pedagogically speaking, is to shift focus back to how rather than what one knows—with the how referencing the ways in which one can know anything or come to know anything (exemplified here in my knowing, doing, making approach). The difference might be viewed in terms of preparation: Are we preparing students to be critical and creative thinkers, or Jeopardy champions? These are, of course, not mutually exclusive possibilities, but rather are used to emphasize the performative difference: how versus what.

Additionally, I am attempting to create space(s) for subversive and resistant (rhetorical) pedagogies to emerge (like those associated with Ulmer and Vitanza), and to reposition us within a notion of learning as trauma (Levinas and Caruth). Or, more specifically, to offer a pedagogical stance that might be considered an "unlearning," as in to unlearn particular behaviors or strictures established by restrictive economies. This "unlearning" will focus on helping students (and myself) vary assumptions, open possibilities, and push the boundaries of thought.

In order to begin this pedagogical exploration, I will first ground us, briefly, in Ulmer’s "post(e)-pedagogy" (see Applied). Then I will move, in survey fashion, through each of the five chapters in this work and discuss how one can work pedagogically with the possibilities each opens for rhetorical invention—and I will offer a loose guide for working in the ways opened here. Lastly, I will conclude by reconsidering the Aristotelian triad of knowing, doing, and making as it relates to what this work might contribute.
Ulmer's 1985 *Applied Grammatology: Post(e) Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys* offers an entry point into the Ulmer corpus, but it also locates an (un)grounding trace for his many works that were to follow this initial contribution—and this trace emerges in relation to technology and the issues on technology that Heidegger raises.

For Heidegger, the essence of technology was, of course, nothing technological (see "The Question"); instead it was located in the notion of enframing (*Gestell*). Working to unpack this notion of enframing, Heidegger exposes us to a danger of technology, a danger which I have also attempted to address in this work: that the inherent "ordering" involved in enframing may prevent us from seeing alternative "orderings"—or, to echo Kenneth Burke's words, "a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" (*Permanence* 49). Thus, my attempts here to open inventive possibilities revolves around this danger which Heidegger introduced—and if my issues were recast in Heideggerian consideration, the danger would not be the restrictive economies themselves but rather that the blindness to their "orderings" may prevent opening (or inventing) other possibilities, including other restrictive economies that may also introduce same sorts of blindness.

For Ulmer, Heidegger's issue of enframing comes to bear in Derrida's works, which is a major (if not seminal) influence for *Applied Grammatology* (its title emerging from Derrida's own *Of Grammatology*). Derrida picks up with this notion of enframing, and its dangers, and extends the issue in relation to writing as a technology—specifically he moves us away from speech toward writing. Working deconstructively, Derrida turns the technological apparatus of writing upon itself in order to confront the blindness of writing's enframing, which he finds connected, problematically so, to logocentrism, and more explicitly to "linearity" (*Of Grammatology*). In so doing, he opens an awareness to certain
limitations for civilization that are introduced by writing's or print-culture's main product: the book (cf. Of Grammatology 8; Ulmer Applied 13-16).

Of course, for Derrida as well as for Ulmer, the emergence of electronic media along with grammatological writing open a need, if not the possibilities, of breaking from "the investiture of the book" (Ulmer, Applied 13)—even if these "new writings [. . .] allow themselves to be [. . .] encased" "within the form of the book" itself (Derrida, Of Grammatology 86); echoes of which can perhaps be seen in my dissertations. Ulmer extends this further, saying this is possible because "[t]he concept of the book in logocentrism [. . .] is essentially representation, mimetic; but the destiny of the book, as Heidegger has said about the future of technology, is not determined, is still open, free" (Applied 16).

These issues are precisely what my two-dissertation approach is calling into question. In fact, my Sophie2 dissertation is explicitly opening other "destinies" of the book—the Sophie and Sophie2 "assemblage applications," and their precursor TK3, were actually designed for making electronic books (e-books). Also, the "new writings" my works introduce break from the "investiture of the book" by "writing the paradigm"—palpating tensions that emerge across one another to generate a third, perhaps unwritten, interval, and thus open avenues for violating (introducing catastrophes to) the strictures of the linear/literate apparatusar (and they even open avenues for violating themselves).

Following this line, what Ulmer's applied grammatology opens to us is examining issues of communication at the level of apparatus or technology—beginning in Derrida's work by palpatating the limitations one might find in the often unquestioned (and problematic) view of a "mimetic" relationship between speech and writing. Ulmer, following Derrida's Of Grammatology (but working toward something different) tells us, "Grammatology, then, studies enframing, not 'literature' nor 'science,' which is to say that
ultimately it is a pedagogy rather than a system of knowing" \textit{(Applied} 15). Thus, what Ulmer attempts is not to participate in the common (perhaps presumed) Derridean "agenda" of deconstruction—at least not in any singular, reductive manner—but rather to introduce pedagogical possibilities in relation to a Derridean-cum-Ulmerian grammatology applicable to an emerging electronic culture.$^2$

Particularly, the grammatology which Ulmer develops sits in direct relation with the "paragrammatic style" in Derrida's own writing—a style which emerges most notably (if not exclusively) in Derrida's works on literary or artistic texts, and which works in mimetic fashion. What Ulmer explores, then, is the homophonic and homonymic play in Derrida's writing and the \textit{letteral} turns and swerves (cf. Ulmer, "The Object" 87-94) that open particular ranges of movement within a text: this can be seen in Derrida's working in the key of "g" in \textit{Glas} or his play with signatures (and naming) in his essay on Francis Ponge (these are, of course, just two among the many possible examples).

Additionally, Ulmer tells us, "The other major innovation of [applied grammatological] Writing$^3$ is its reliance on images. Again, Derrida's contribution is not simply the use of images, but his sustained expansion of images into models" \textit{(Applied} xii). Beginning here in \textit{Applied Grammatology}, and more extensively carried out in his later works, is Ulmer's adherence to writing and/or inventing with image categories, which become especially applicable to (visual) rhetors in the society of the spectacle. But visual rhetorics, or more generally visualization studies, nearly exclusively focus on how images communicate, and thus fail to open themselves to the kind of image reasoning and even image rhetorics at work in Ulmer's corpus, which have beginnings here in Heidegger and Derrida, but which also find life via the works of Sergei Eisenstein (film), Joseph Beuys (performance), and
Jacques Lacan (seminar) (the focal three of his post(e)-pedagogy emerging in *Applied Grammatology*).

Extending this image reason (as practice for his picto-ideo-phonographic Writing), in "The Object of Post-Criticism," Ulmer remakes this Derridean mimetic approach of "image into models" by following the avant-garde artists and breaking from mimesis toward mechanical reproduction—opening image rhetorics in yet other ways: to logics of the cut, to mashups and remixes, to image manipulation and alteration (levels of morphology), and so on. But he still retains image categories (and their ties to chorographical invention) as a guiding basis, and we can see this kind of "image logic" at work in his genres of mystery and MEmorial, as well as in his heuristic CATTt,⁴ and even more explicitly in his development of "wide sites" (building from the "wide image"⁵).

The reason for this adherence to image, aside from it prominent role in the society of the spectacle—with an even more explicit importance in a culture of electracy—is that this picto-ideo-phonographic form of Composing⁶ (a style perhaps better understood as Derridean decomposition) is foundational for Ulmer's post(e)-pedagogy and thus gets extended into the entirety of the "program" he develops.

Specifically, in post(e)-pedagogy application, Ulmer indicates a drive toward exploring "the nondiscursive levels—images and puns, or models and homophones—as an alternative mode of composition and thought applicable to academic work, or rather, play" (*Applied xi*). And this style of Writing/Composing, as post(e)-pedagogical possibility, "is not a method of analysis or criticism but of invention (and here Writing departs from deconstruction)" and *inventio* becomes "the new pedagogy associated with Writing" (*Applied xii*).
Grammatological pedagogy, Ulmer tells us, "involves a displacement of educational transmissions from the domain of truth to that of invention" (Applied 179; emphasis original). Or, put another way, "Grammatology is committed to a pedagogy [. . .] that will collapse discipline into invention" (188), and following these shifts the "classroom" evolves to a "place of invention rather than of reproduction [i.e., mimetic transmission of truth]" (164). Thus, the post(e)-pedagogy I shall follow has as guiding premise this shift from truth to invention, or what might be viewed as a shift from the philosophical to the rhetorical.

Ulmer's post(e)-pedagogy, which is both a "move beyond conventional pedagogy and a pedagogy for an era of electronic media" (Applied 157), follows Derrida in focusing on the entire scene of teaching, which Ulmer says applies "to the institution as a political organization, including its support structure (the apparatus of presses and journals), in short, to the power relations of the knowledge industry" (Applied 159-160). Thus, it opens pedagogical considerations both immediately within and immediately outside the classroom.

Ulmer goes on to say, "The entry point," of Derrida's pedagogical "deconstruction [. . .] is the (clandestine, but nonetheless 'violent') introduction of heterogeneous forces into the 'teaching body' in order to deform and transform it" (Applied 160). The necessity of this "violent" introduction of pedagogical transformation is because for Derrida (Western) pedagogy shares a relation with writing/logocentrism and thus, as Ulmer writes, Derrida's "bias against writing in logocentrism applies as well to pedagogy" (163). This is why Derrida works deconstructively, both as pedagogical approach and as critique of pedagogy. And this is also why Ulmer's pedagogy must be a "post" pedagogy, as Derrida has introduced avenues for considering the limits (and perhaps restrictive traumas) of pedagogy.

Additionally, the multimedia scholarship I am doing in my Sophie2 dissertation, in conjunction with this print-based version, is designed to "violently" introduce a new
possibility to the *scene of teaching*—meaning, what my work hopes to do, both performatively and pedagogically, is to introduce the *catastrophic* to the restrictive adherence of the "print-only" or "print-exclusive" scholarly and pedagogical realm of the (Platonic) Academy. As such, the pedagogical implications of my works will not only be to situate Writing practices more fully into this emphasis on invention—itself a perpetual form of *catastrophe*, moving us further and further away from the traumatic and dangerous adherence to (fixed, literate) truths—but also to introduce "new writings" that will break from the "investitures of the book" and "book culture" and open spaces, places, and possibilities for working electronically—that is, for designing (and da-seining) in, with, across "mediated-experiences" (or what might be viewed as the multi-tiered, multilevel, multimodal Writing "possibilisms" emerging in electronic apparatuses, specifically within the possibilities of Sophie2, but also more generally within the electrate institution and the new polis for deliberative rhetoric: the Internet).

With this in mind, I shall now trace each chapter's pedagogical implications, working specifically in relation to the inventional possibilities each opens that can be drawn into the realm of *doing*, that is, the realm of pedagogical and practical application.

### III

In *Electronic Monuments*, Ulmer writes, "The lesson of history is that there will be change in the fundamental realities of our lives associated with the transformation of the language apparatus, but this change is not determined in advance, and the specifics in equipment, institutionalization, and behaviors remain to be invented" (xiii). What my works have sought is to parcel out some of the potential "specifies" occurring in the current
"transformation of the language apparatus"—moving from literacy to electracy—and the
"specifics" which I have articulated, invented, or simply drawn attention to throughout these
works will be launching points for pedagogical possibilities emerging in electracy. Of course,
much of the pedagogical possibilities have already been implicated in each chapter, and it will
be the focus in this section to draw more explicit attention to those possibilities, working in
quick surveying fashion in order to help readers/viewers grasp the inventionals potentials
(pr)offered here.

Conduction

The chapter on conduction introduces the intuition at work in image reasoning (and
"reasonone"), which Ulmer develops in relation to his notion of conduction—which he
offers as a fourth mode of inference to be added to induction, deduction, and abduction.
This conductive movement works as relay to the realm of joke logic, which participates in
short-circuitry (Freud; Eco).

Working within joke logic, Ulmer makes connections to most basic joke: the pun,
which works primarily on the play in language (again, this work is concerned with
technological apparatuses of/for/in language). In this movement to the pun, Ulmer
exchanges the "conceptual" (the staple of alphabetic literacy) for the "punctual"—the
latter being a process of making connections (conductive linkages) across sets or registers, as
puns emerge/exist without belonging to any singular register exclusively.

In fact, the punctual is based on the very premise that its "meanings" toggle back
and forth across registers—electrate flow through the conductive circuits the puns
introduce. For Ulmer, these punctualites emerge (among other "places") in the
connections that develop across our personal, popular, and expert discourses, and he
develops his genre mystery to work specifically in this manner—mystery, of course introduces "new writings" to challenge the traditional essay (which Ulmer views as "simulacra of book" [Applied 16]).

But this chapter on conduction also introduces one of my primary guides, which is the development of chora. Thus, aside from the pedagogical possibilities of making conductive linkages via the joke logic of the pun, which again plays and/or participates in two (or more) discourse registers, this chapter also open's chorographical possibilities for pedagogical consideration.

My rendering of chorography, following Richard Mohr's work, as well as Ulmer's (who spins through Mohr, Derrida, Kristeva, and Plato), asks that students (and ourselves) learn to not exclude possibilities but rather "write" by bringing to bear the entirety of the choral range. Thus, the goal is to unlearn the print-culture principles of disambiguation (which is housed in the trope of clarity)—literate disambiguation, of course, can be found stretching into electracy, seen in Wikipedia, as I established in Chapter I. With this unlearning, the goal then becomes to retain ambiguities, to learn to use these ambiguities as effective "sites" for adding both complexity and revelation to one's "writing."

Retaining these possibilities, which the literacy apparatus excludes, I hope to open further avenues for inventing and/or locating punceptual possibilities, which emerge for Ulmer as new sets of topos. Thus, the more punceptualities generated, the more inventive possibilities introduced—this, of course, is exceedingly important in a rhetorical practice that has definitional roots in Aristotle's finding "the best available means" (On Rhetoric 1.2.1). More possibilities, more available means, more rhetorical potential—for deliberative, epideictic, and even forensic rhetorics.
Following the choral and conductive possibilities opened in the chapter on conduction, logos can be pulled back into the conversation specifically in relation to its multivocality, holding that any work I seek to invent, introduce, "write," create, make, has the potentiality of altering being and thinking and saying (as all three are interconnected: change one, change them all—this is the rhizomic potentiality within this reconstituted logos).

Aside from that, following Heidegger's work and the specific issues I introduced between "presencing" and "absencing," "absencing" might be seen as a "site" for invention or as a generative method for critical engagement. By seeking what is "absenced," rhetors introduce the pursuit of inventing, challenging, locating, and creatively/critically parceling out the foundations/assumptions that create (the conditions for) marginalized discourses/groups—and this introduces ways for critically responding to that marginalization and/or exclusion. Thus, the process introduced here, which works choragnostically, but as much in compossibilities and even the incompossible as it does in possibilities, asks that instead of focusing on the "presencing" (of that which is present) that we instead turn towards "absencing," which pulls into question "presencing" itself.

What this move attempts is to help us become critically aware of the particular blindness that develops in regards to ourselves (or our "selves," following Chapter IV) as well as the particular blindness (restrictive) systems have to their own operatives or "orderings." It is, in a sense, pursuing the dangers of enframing, attempting to confront the issues of enframing, but doing so at a level of meta-enframing. Meaning, focusing on "absencing" calls for investigating the very "absences" that make "ordering" possible, thus asking for critical (and inventive) work to open the limits of enframing's enframing.
In a more practical sense of application, this move towards "absencing" raises the importance of "absencing" in relation to designing (and da-seining) multimedia creations—reopening considerations space and spatiality, including the play of "white space" being a form of "absence" in print-culture. It also seeks out particular "absences" as area of interest, which become generative or inventive areas for critical scholarship: i.e., the postmodernists/poststructuralist "sub/ject," the gap between frames in a film, the gutter in comics, the space between 
\textit{lock} and 
\textit{tie in chronos}, and perhaps even the very essences \textit{being} and \textit{time}.

Additionally, this chapter introduces the rhetorical value of the \textit{saying}, of its rhetorical potentiality, with or without the possibility of a \textit{said} being communicated (having echoes of in the babble of the \textit{infans}), which reconnects to the medium/message mantra of McLuhan. While these things cannot be separated, much can be located in the gesture of (rhetorical) address (in the \textit{saying}) whether or not the \textit{said} can be fully engaged—that is to say, much can be gleaned from the medium even without comprehensibility of the message.

This reiterates the importance of having multiple media available for Writing/Composing as it allows for working on multiple levels, in multiple registers, when communicating, which opens yet other avenues for conveying complex ideas, ideas that may have impossible to render orally or in literacy. These ideas may find "communicability" in an alternative medium because the medium conveys part of the message itself and/or opens ways to better/greater communicable effectiveness. As example, think about what it would be like to render in literacy (that is, alphabetic-text only) critical scholarship on issues of filmic sounds. The primary approach would involve descriptions, in text, of sounds—and very particular/complex sounds at that. What if trying to describe the intricacies of a particular "flight" sound in film A compared to its evolution to "flight" sound in film B?
How would one render this effectively? Comparatively, what immense possibilities arise when the sound scholar can reproduce those sounds, in mechanical reproduction fashion, when the sounds can sit alongside text or video or images? A simple shift from print-culture protocols to an assemblage application like Sophie2 can open a entire new world (and perhaps "new writings") to the possibilities of scholarship…sound scholarship being just one of the greatly benefited areas.

Ethos

Of all the chapters, this one lends itself most to pedagogical possibilities as it has fairly prescriptive components. For starters, the shift to ethos rather than focusing on classical ethos is a break from the traditional confinements of working to establish credibility or to even "claim marginality" (a position which also needs to be justified). Following the postmodern "void of the sub/ject," which contributed to the "schizo-nomadic" sub/ject as tourist (SaT) approach I constructed, the focus shifts from crafting authorial voice to letting be said what wants to be said. The importance of this is in learning to navigate our own "nomadic ranges": meaning, learning to tour, in "schizo-nomadic" SaT fashion, the "sites" of conductive linkages that emerge across our personal, popular, and expert discourses.

Additionally within this play across these discourses is the attempt to "unlearn" the dominant strategy of the "objective" approach—which asks for a removal of self from the discourse in order to engage in critical (honest? reliable?) scholarship. Instead, following Ulmer's application, I ask that we instead begin not by the "counter-method" of critical disclosure, clearly indicating our own role in the process (following some liberation pedagogies and feminist rhetorics), but rather weave our "selphs" (and their experiences) so intricately into the process that one's "position," if it must be determined, is not only evident
but also something one is (must be) critically aware of. The idea is to Write/Compose from the "selphs"—not try to claim authority or marginality, as those things, if necessary, will come through in always already fashion from the "schizo-nomadic" SaT approach.

Following this line of flight, the move then is to make (electrate) "sites" that bring to bear the Ulmerian fourfold (his popcycle: Family and Entertainment, School and Discipline, which is a more parceled out version of the personal, popular, and expert triad he developed for his mystery). In so doing, the emphasis moves to productive knowledge, focusing on making that seeks to invent across/through these areas of specialization: Ulmer tells us, "The fact is that when it is a matter of invention, history shows that innovation almost always comes from outside a specialization" (Electronic 3). Thus, this work on invention seeks to open considerations outside of the limits of any singular (discourse) specialization by making with the inventive possibilities that occur when these areas are brought into immediacy with one another (a "site" of immediacy which also occurs within the "schizo-nomadic" SaT "selphs").

As we move further into electronic (and/or "virtual") environments, these considerations of possibilities that emerge within this ethos-cum-etnea "schizo-nomadic" SaT "selphs" introduces the importance of shifting/shuffling "e-enties." Not only does this become performative of the very "sub/ject" instabilities I tried to open, it also becomes a way to introduce a new (perhaps radical) consideration for "ethical" possibilities, relating specifically (but not exclusively) to electrate rhetoric—the platform is transferable, in reverse fashion, back to literacy and orality. The three I developed, in counterdistinction to Aristotle's three, are schizophrenosis, apate(tic), and euphoria.

The first introduces a sort of paranoid or disjunctive wisdom where the "schizo-nomadic" SaT always works in doubt of its own "claims," or what might be viewed as the
wisdom that emerges within a split-self (or "selphs") who is always critically aware of its own-others' ideological (political) "positionings." I am no longer wise because I know what I do not know (Socratic *phronesis*), but rather because I question everything we offer and receive as a "claim" to knowledge.

The second introduces a Baudrillardian world of simulacra, which takes all discourse to be "mediated discourse" and all discourse (image, textual, verbal) to be access points to the abject, the horrendous, the absurd, the perverted—electrately at our fingertips. Thus, to make anything in/for electronic environments requires that "schizo-nomadic" SaTs 1) begin with a point of "deception," which is a point of re-presentation, the very basis of how members of the society of the spectacle critically interact with images—thus opening forms of and raising the importance of image reason or flash reason (following Ulmer); and 2) always critically consider the possibilities of the (image) relay (via conductive possibilities) in relation to "mediated-testimonies" (the potential relaying which can open all discourses to the absurd, horrendous, abject, perverted, and so on).

The third introduces a sense of "goodwill" toward the "selphs," and the specific *euphoria* offered here would be those moments of "levity" or "ease" or "well-bearing" when the "selphs" feel temporary relief from their *hysterities*. As such, the "schizo-nomadic" SaTs use these moments of "ease" (as they relate to their/our perpetual states of dis/ease) as indicators of directions to be pursued—no matter how counter they may be to the "conditions as they are."

The "ethic" that emerges from these three does so as follows: 1) working with an excessive critical (self, "selphs," and other) awareness emerging from an approach of productive *questioning*, 2) maintaining critical and creative awareness to the potentialities of the deception inherent in all "mediated-discourse" as well as paying heed to the choral range
the relay opens to any and all possibilities, and 3) working to find moments of "ease" or "well-being" in relation to the "sickness" (or hysteritics) of everyday understanding and being (in the world).

Pathos

With pathos the notion of suffering moves into pedagogical consideration—which here opens a more experiential orientation than traditional approaches to epistemic knowledge. What this means is that pedagogically the interest here is in both experiential learning as well as experiential writing. The former deals with locating rhetorical exigencies that affect the "schizo-nomadic" SaTs (in the "virtual" or in the real) as opposed to the detached-from-affect heuristic learning models (i.e., skill and drill, hypothetical scenarios, etc.) found in more standard University-education fodder; while the latter is in reference to inventing and/or making "mediated-experiences," via the position of "mediated-witness," and doing so in an attempt to bring the suffering that is bearing witness—which is a trauma that silences—(impossibly) into an electrate apparatus. This, of course, is in reference to the actual ways in which people engage suffering (on a few practical levels) and thus introduces, among other things, considerations of experience design (Nathan Shedroff) and game theory (from Espen Aarseth to James Paul Gee) to these pedagogical possibilities.

Moving to the chapter's more critical contributions, pedagogy gets opened to catastrophe (thus, my Ulmerian post(e)-pedagogy), and this also opens working pedagogically with catastrophe. The former attempts to radically alter the classroom itself, by introducing features of the avant-garde theater (cf. Ulmer, Applied 173-174), which "transform[s] the neutrality and distance separating actor and audience, master and pupil" (Applied 175); the latter ask for inventing (with) catastrophes—that is, to introduce works, thoughts, possibilities
that function near or at the level of the sublime, and that challenge, in radical fashion, the
very limits of the restrictive economies into which they are introduced.

This is doubly important for it very well may be the case that while my works seek
the generative (general) economy, it may be that we can only ever break from one restrictive
economy to enter another—a position I want to resist, but one I must acknowledge. The
rhetorically inventive potential here resides in the infinite game of introducing catastrophes
that throw us, perpetually so, out of restrictive economies. Thus, being thrown (Da-sein) is our
condition.

Additionally, it is important to note that the catastrophes invented are to be guided by
the tone of matisklo and, as such, seek to improve the human condition—that is, inventing
possibilities devoted to a life-etheia rather a death-politic: meaning, helping people "live the
goal life" (or working to perpetually improve the possibilities of life) rather than "dying the
goal death." What this means pedagogically is that in inventing catastrophes there has to be a
commitment to improve being (and the conditions of being) by helping to break down or
simply challenge the restrictive possibilities being perpetually encounters.

In this view, technological inventions that are designed to improve the overall quality
of life might be seen as being of this kind of catastrophe (e.g., the automobile). Of course,
there must be a critical awareness in regard to what these possible inventions introduce for
each introduces its own catastrophe or accident (cf. Ulmer, Electronic xix, 36; Virilio 36)—and
there is much exploration of the choral catastrophe of the automobile in Ulmer's work on
traffic accidents (see "Abject Monumentality"; Electronic).
Brief Heuristic

Bringing several of these potentials together into a choral "site" might open a heuritic-heuristic (in the venue of Ulmer's CATTt) that may be extendable in particularly helpful ways. As such, some guides are as follows:

- Invent the catastrophe, and it should seek to improve the human condition.
- The catastrophe invention should be sufferable—meaning, whether as installation like Ulmer's "peripherals" or as electronic "mediation," its engagement (by audience and/or "sephs") should be one of the experiencing/undergoing/suffering variety.
- Adhere to an ethos-cum-etbea "paraethics": schizophrenesis, apate(tic), and euphoria.
- Invent punceptual and/or choragraphical "sites" that work across the Ulmerian fourfolds (Family and Entertainment, School and Discipline).
- Choose an appropriate medium to engage/create/convey the invention (and/or work in multiple media—with each opening additional possibilities for the invention/creation).
- Open one's invention to considerations of "absencing," both as potential topos within the choral "site" and in terms of pulling into question the very conditions necessary for any "presencing."
- Work punceptually—make sure your catastrophe has resonance across multiple registers (disciplines, discourses, departments, and so on).
- Work choragraphically—do not disambiguate but rather make or invent with all the possibilities, which introduces catastrophes at multiple levels for multiple registers.
Of course, this is just a sample, but as guide it might make the pedagogical possibilities a bit more graspable. Ideally, any number of "guides" could be drawn from this work (both the survey in this chapter and the more fully articulated issues throughout), and as such I will follow in Ulmer's hopes and offer this work as relay rather than reproduction: meaning, the "reduction" above is meant as one of any number of possibilities and others should seek to invent their own pedagogical guides for opening inventive possibilities.

IV

I would like to conclude this chapter, and this work, by reiterating that in my Sophie2 other you can locate the kind of practices being offered explicitly here and also practices that are implicit throughout. Additionally, while this print-based dissertation includes descriptions above of ways in which the scholarship offered can be enacted, electrately, in both print-culture and electronic constructs (following Ulmer and then my contributions), the Sophie2 version will take this one step further by knowing, doing, making, and displaying all these possibilities.

The displaying, or performative knowledge, added to the Aristotelian triad of avenues to epistemic knowledge, introduces a particularly important fourth component for the society of the spectacle. It has resonances for computers: both as in considerations of the interface and for providing information and/or graphics on the screen. It opens us to television culture, from qualities of the screen (liquid crystal display, plasma display, etc.) to the displayed images involved—especially the news, which puts the catastrophic on display. It has connections to consumer culture (i.e., window displays and/or merchandise on display)—perhaps made most notable in the French Arcades (see Benjamin, Arcades Project).
There are ties to fetish culture, like voyeurism and exhibitionism. Connections to the juridical, in the notion giving evidence and/or making manifest. It also opens issues of character: displaying X or Y quality. It can connect to expression—displaying mood (perhaps the mood Ulmer's MEmorial works to find in disasters). It can mean to spread or unfurl (connecting to Deleuze and unfolding). It can mean to demonstrate. And it even has connections to advertisement (and thus back to Ulmer's "reasoneon").

There are additional definitional and/or usage connections emerging within the choral range for the term, but I want to also consider the letteral play at work within this notion of display: dis/play. This introduces tensions in the word and generates "not"/"play," or what I might construe as indicating a scholarly level of seriousness: potential meanings for "play" include making jokes or jests, and so to "not"/"play" might be understood as to be serious or to engage in serious activities. Thus, my Sophie2 other is serious scholarship, just rendered in different form (that of multimedia).

To pun on the possibilities within display opens extensive potentialities, but this work might be well served to trace a trajectory developing across these "knowledge" considerations, as knowing has predominantly been placed into a position of authority, as being primary over the others, which is a bit problematic (if not a different). Doing only more recently moved up in prominence, specifically in the field of rhetoric and composition, following the shift in emphasis from product to process. Making, even more recently, has started to gain importance as technologies have continued to evolve, and this has shifted productive knowledge from being task-force or production-team endeavors to now being possibilities that can be done, in their entire complexities, by one rhetor (who can manipulate images, sounds, videos, texts, and so on in rapid fashion).
Of course, *making* has been the major focus of my two-dissertation approach as it allows for engaging certain performative contradictions and for bringing into critical considerations the limitations brought to us by alphabetic/literate logoi—which has major importance for current conversations as not only are we still moving into this culture of electracy but also because these logoi keep trying to extend their restrictive possibilities into electrate environments.

In my attempts to not only say but show these things, I have opened the potentialities of *display*, and opened my scholarship (and perhaps future scholarship) to a realm of consideration beyond the limits of the (nearly singular) preference for *knowing*. My Sophie2 other, which puts my "selphs" on *display*, has introduced considerations more commonly associated with news broadcasts: lighting, scripts, hair, make-up, wardrobe, teleprompters, screen presences, and so on. It also introduced elements of cinema (another kind of display) and elements of the scholarly presentation (yet another kind of display). And as each of these (and more) come to bear on the considerations of my Sophie2 dissertation, it will continue to introduce the *catastrophic* to the very limits of this "genre" itself: working to undo the 19th century strictures of the print-culture dissertation and radically open its possibilities for 21st century electrate rhetorics.
Chapter I - Exigence: Naming/Inventing the Problem

1 While Kuhn's work was accepted by the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee in terms of granting her doctoral status, it did not fall within the guides of the dissertation publisher and repository they used, now part of ProQuest Information and Learning.

2 TK3 is a drag-and-drop software for assembling rich media. Users can write/compose in the interface, on the "page," and/or import video, audio, graphics, and texts from other sources. The program also allows for importing images from a digital camera, recording sound directly onto the "page," and includes the ability for TK3 "document" readers to comment or post notes (text, audio, video comments) in the completed creation directly in the "document."

Virginia Kuhn identifies that what really makes it work is that it does not abandon the book metaphor: "Because TK3 retains the book metaphor (while not being a slave to it), it does not sacrifice print literacy for bells and whistles," which has been the knock by humanities scholars on some of the other digital programs ("TK3"). Additionally, Kuhn tells us, "The text-friendliness of TK3 is crucial for those of us who do not wish to sacrifice print literacy even as we endeavor to enhance it with other forms of expression afforded by digital technologies" ("TK3"). (For a more in-depth review, see Kuhn's review of TK3 published at Academic Commons.)

3 See Boese's work at http://www.nutball.com/dissertation

4 Boese tells us in her dissertation that her research was based on participant observation and "becoming an accepted participant-observer in an online culture" (The Ballad L26). Also, in a response to Ben Vershbow's blog post "Open Source Dissertation" on June 23, 2006 on the Institute for the Future of the Book Blog (ifiblog), Boese writes, "as part of my methods of participant observation, I deliberately made the fans my co-authors, first, by weaving the hypertext [her dissertation] into the community being studied, second, by including extensive full-text and media archives (more so than in a conventional ethnography) of the Xenites speaking and creating in their own voices" (Comment).

5 As briefly detailed Monaghan's article, Constanze M. Witt's 1997 dissertation on Celtic Art, submitted to the University of Virginia, used a multimedia platform; a more current example of a digital dissertation can be found at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, Douglas Rushkoff's approach to an "open source dissertation," using a "wikified outline" that collaborators and contributes flesh out; another current example is Bulbul Tiwari's attempt to explore the ancient Hindu tale, The Mahābhārata using the Sophie platform (Sophie is the next evolution of TK3), submitted to the University of Chicago.

6 Contrary to some views, a performative contradiction does not mean that the work is unproductive or uninformative or without value, but rather that it simply violates the principle of non-contradiction, the principles of (literate) reason—and this work does this actively as it seeks to replace the guiding restrictive "logic" of Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction with Gilles Deleuze's principle of vice-diction (an idea I will more fully explore later in this work).
The Institute for the Future of the Book is "a small think-and-do tank investigating the evolution of intellectual discourse as it shifts from printed pages to networked screens" (http://www.futureofthebook.org). It is supported by grants from the Mellon Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation and was founded "in order to create the next generation of tools for digital scholarship" (Kuhn, "TK3").

Bob Stein has been involved with e-books for nearly two decades. He founded NightKitchen, the group that developed the TK3 program that Kuhn used, the program which was the forerunner to the Sophie program I intend to use.

Ulmer explores this shift more fully in the opening section to the article (83-87).

The first requirement is to have 1.25" margins (it provides boundaries); the second is that "All content (including text, figures, tables, etc.) must fit within the margins" (Clemson). These two should be enough to indicate restrictive limitations of this page-based, print format: text, graph(ic), and image, the potentials in this static form, must fit within the guides or they will be excluded (the work will be rejected)—whether it contains the cure for cancer or not: "You can change/save the world, but it needs to be done this way."

Clemson University uses ProQuest UMI Dissertation Publishers, which is part of ProQuest digital storehouses

Ong tells us that Plato's work and thought is an example of this issue, with Plato's analytic philosophy and critique of writing coinciding (being made possible) with the effects of alphabetic literacy on mental processes. To critique writing, Plato had to write, which might be rephrased, "To engaging thinking/theory on writing, Plato had to be able to write and had to work in the written medium, for it was the highest technology available and allowed for particular ways of thinking that were necessary for the engagement itself." Or, to use Ong's words, "the new technology is not merely used to convey the critique: in fact, it brought the critique into existence" (80).

Ulmer has discussed this in several works, that the institution of literacy was that of the School (i.e., Plato's Academy), which would (d)evolve into the University. In Heuretics, Ulmer tells us that the advent of alphabetic writing "required the foundation of a new institution—School—to turn analysis into a cultural habit of mind" (140). School was a major step in transforming analytic logic, or literate logic, into logic. This "cultural habit of mind" has now become so prolific, so integral to Western culture—its developments and advancements—that, as Ong has indicated in Orality and Literacy, even if one does not "learn to write" in today's Western world (remaining illiterate), one will still develop thought patterns reflective of literate practices because society has internalized the patterns inherent in this externalized artificial practice: literate thought has become "natural thought" or "normal thought," where "to think" means "to think (literately)." We are literacy, or so literacy would have us believe.

A wiki is a set of web pages where users have the ability to generate and post content. It is a collaborative webspace. The term "wiki" is derived from the Hawaiian "wiki wiki," meaning fast. The "pedia" component comes from encyclopedia—thus, a wiki encyclopedia becomes wikipedia.
Cutter may refer to: (list below from Wikipedia: Cutter)

Cutter (ship), any of several types of small water vessel
United States Coast Guard Cutter
Cutter location, the position where a CNC milling machine has been instructed to hold a milling cutter

*Cutter v. Wilkinson*, a 2005 United States Supreme Court case
Cutter Expansive Classification, a library classification system
Charles Ammi Cutter, the man who created the system
cutter number, a suffix used in this and other library classification systems

Cookie-cutter, something unimaginative or identical to previous iterations
Cutter (body modification), an underground who performs surgical tasks that other surgeons refuse to do
Someone who practices self-injury.
Cutter Bug spray
Coors Cutter a discontinued non-alcoholic beverage from Coors

Tools:

Cookie cutter, used to cut out cookie dough in a particular shape
Box cutter, a utility knife
Glass cutter, a hand tool which aids in the cutting of flat or pane glass
Hydraulic spreader-cutter, an emergency rescue device

Businesses and organizations:

Cutter Consortium, an information technology research firm
Cutter Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company in Berkeley, California
Cutter & Buck, a manufacturer of golf apparel
Cutter's Mill, a chain of pet supply stores in New Jersey and Pennsylvania

In sport:

Cutter (baseball), a type of fastball
Cutter Bill, a quarter horse stallion
Off cutter and leg cutter, types of delivery in the sport of cricket
Cutter (professional wrestling), a professional wrestling move

In entertainment:

*John Cutter*, character name of Wesley Snipes the 2003 movie Passenger 57
John Cutter is an American computer game designer - see also Amiga
*Nick Cutter*, a character from the 2007 ITV science fiction series *Primeval*
*Cutter to Houston*, a 1983 television series
*Cutter and Bone*, a 1976 thriller novel
Cutter John, a character in the comic strip *Bloom County* by Berkeley Breathed
Cutter, the protagonist of the *Elfquest* series of graphic novels
Cutter, a minor character from the G.I. Joe universe
"The Cutter", a 1983 single by Echo & the Bunnymen
"Cutters", in the 1979 cycling movie "Breaking Away", an initially derogatory term used to refer to the local youths living in Bloomington, Indiana, by the resident Indiana college students. 'Cutters' is a reference to the local stone cutting industry of the town.
"Cutter", nickname of fictional character Captain Spaulding

See also

Cut, Cutting (disambiguation), Qatar
Conductive logic, for Ulmer, is an "electronic mode of reasoning" (Teletheory 94). Emerging from Derrida's difference, among other influences, it takes up with the language of electricity, as it offers a new term that is "needed to replace induction, deduction, and even abduction, in order to identify the electronic properties of differential reasoning" (85). Ulmer goes on to tell us, "The ground of teletheory" and relationally conduction, as it is the "cognitive style of teletheory" (97), "is the research pun, bringing together two unrelated semantic fields on the basis of one or more shared words"—thus, the connection between logic and electricity via "duction" (86).

In this practice, "Conduction [...] carries the simple form of the pun into a learned extrapolation in theory" (Teletheory 86). The pun creates connections and multiplicities in ways that metaphors, analogies, or other mimetic processes do not. Thus, working conductively, we can link in unexpectedly revealing ways, making connections via electronic flow and puns (among other ways), an operation much more akin to dream reasoning (or unconscious logic) than analytico-referential reason—and it is important to note that "electronic thinking does not abandon, exclude, or replace analytic thinking" (89). Rather, it is a different kind of reasoning emerging appositionally.

Fredric Jameson, in the Foreword to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition, tells us, "Lyotard's ultimate vision of science and knowledge today as [sic] a search, not for consensus, but very precisely for 'instabilities,' as a practice of paralogism, in which the point is not to reach agreement but to undermine from within the very framework in which the previous 'normal science' had been conducted" (xix). Vitanza, in "Three Countertheses; Or, a Critical In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedagogies," tells us Lyotard's shift to paralogy is a move away Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" (as Jameson indicates) and instead promotes Kuhn's "revolutionary science" as it attempts a move to dissension instead of consensus (cf. Lyotard, Postmodern 61). Vitanza goes on to tell us this is a break from "traditional or modern 'invention' [...] which is smooth, continuous, and controlled and accounted for by a system or a paradigm of knowledge" and instead is invention that "is 'discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical.' It (re)turns—that is, radically tropes—against the system, or paradigm of knowledge" (Vitanza, "Three Countertheses" 147).

This dissenting, discontinuous paralogy is different from Aristotle's construction of paralogy. For Lyotard, paralogy is an even new rhetorical invention, an always some more. It opens us to the necessity of linking, but not a necessity of how to link, which opens many issues I will be further exploring in this work (Lyotard, Differend 80). Paralogy, in this view, "bear[s] witness to differends by finding idioms for them"(13). It bears witness "to differences of opinion that are systematically disallowed by the dominant language game of homological science" (Vitanza, "Three Countertheses" 146).

Bearing witness to that which is disallowed moves us closer to rhetorical invention outside the bounds of restrictive categories (Aristotelian logic or literate logic). As Vitanza tells us, "It is astonishing to think of all the time we spend writing and talking about inventional categories [heuristics, topoi, etc.] only to fail to realize that true invention is born of dissension, but not a dissension accounted for and controlled by and within classical or modern homological categories. The dissension that I speak of comes from without, a dissension based not on homology, but on paralogy" (Vitanza, "Critical" 49). Vitanza tells us, "Paralogy takes on two meanings for Lyotard: That which is against homologia but in favor of (para)analogies and that
which 'means searching for and "inventing" counterexamples, in other words, the unintelligible" ("Three Countertheses 164; see also Lyotard's Postmodern 54).

17 Vice-diction is process of forming and exploring connections among differences and of undoing connections in order to form new ones. (see Deleuze's Difference and Repetition 245-247).

18 "It's the cutter that often gets New York Yankees closer Mariano Rivera out of tight jams like Fire and Rescue's hydraulic spreader-cutter."

19 "Cutters slice the surface, releasing tension and leaving a traceable path behind."

20 "A prisoner engaging in cutting behavior could cite Cutter vs. Wilkinson and have legal grounds to engage in these self-harming practices." Cutter vs. Wilkinson: This May 31, 2005, supreme court ruling states that "prisoners in facilities that accept federal funds cannot be denied accommodations necessary to engage in activities for the practice of their own religious beliefs – even if those beliefs are bizarre or repugnant" (Wikipedia: Cutter vs. Wilkinson).

21 This will help to move us from rhetoric based on intersubjectivity (Aristotle's speakers/writers communicating to listeners/readers) to an approach based "on intertextuality, with the 'desire' of language itself more so doing the speaking/writing" (Vitanza, "Critical Sub/Versions" 53).

22 It is important we note that this text ("Psyche: Inventing the Other") begins with a question: Derrida asks, "What am I going to be able to invent this time?"—a question he repeats again several pages in. This repetition, perhaps marking a fold, unfolds another beginning in this text, which is where Derrida begins with a question of the son, borrowing from Cicero's Partiones oratoriae, where the son asks the father (Cicero) to tell him of invention (among the other great arts of the doctrine of speaking), but to do so in Latin and not Greek. Derrida is not a fool; this is as much of a vital component to the rest of this text as anything else in the text. At the outset, he couches us in the frame of the question of the son (whose "burning desire," Derrida tells us, "anticipated the father's wish" of the son being "as learned as possible" [313]) and in the language of Latin, which has issues in its translation of Greek—specifically important is the translation of aletheia into veritas. What we have then is a play, a subversion even, of the unfolding of this text.

23 In "Psyche: Inventing the Other," Derrida tells us, "An invention always presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a disorder into the peaceful ordering of things, it disregards the proprieties. Apparently without the patience of a preface—it is itself a new preface—, this is how it unsettles the givens" (312).

24 This is the title Vitanza uses in his review of Ulmer's Heuretics, and it has significance both in terms of the Ulmer's work and in terms of the previous quotes in the text from Derrida's "Psyche: Inventing the Other." The contract of a discourse on invention is that one must invent something new, and to do that requires that the "newness" be created as it is being created—thus, to write on a new method, new approach, new genre, etc., nearly mandates the use of that method, approach, genre, etc. This also echoes the implications in
this work, at least in reference to this dissertation's other, its Sophie2 creation, as it is more akin to "writing the paradigm" than this print-literacy based creation. While Ulmer may have found a way to write the paradigm in literacy, as seen by his example mystery of "Derrida at Little Bighorn" (Teletheory 249-280), it is a bit difficult for us as the literacy version of this places us within a performative contradiction, which violates much of literate logic: while I am discussing, and will further explore, among others, the limitations of literate logoi, I am participating in literate logoi—doing the very thing that I am trying to resist.

25 Ulmer's use of "the" vs. "a" in this work's title (Heuristics: The Logic of Invention) implies a definitive restriction to the work itself and/or his intent, but I feel this is more accidental than purposeful—as the text itself, along with many other works by Ulmer, indicate that the restriction implied here (a definitive singularity) is not at all in keeping with his philosophies. This apparent accident can have numerous possibilities. Irony being one.

26 Invention generates its own machine or rule-governed mechanism (based upon its own conventions) that allow it (as method/mechanism) to produce others of the same type or in the same manner. The other becomes the possible, which radically alters the possible and the impossible, but never changes invention (in the "generating new" sense) from a process of inventing the other, of inventing the impossible, which is not possible, and why it is (the only) invention (Derrida, "Psyche: Inventing the Other" 334). Thus, to invent, and to continue a discourse on invention, one must invent the other. But "the other is not the possible. So it would be necessary to say that the only possible invention would be the invention of the impossible. But an invention of the impossible is impossible, the other would say. Indeed. But it is the only possible invention: an invention has to declare itself to be the invention of that which did not appear to be possible; otherwise it only makes explicit a program of possibilities within the economy of the same" (341).

27 According to Gilles Deleuze, under the world of identities is a world of difference that both produces and disrupts those identities (See Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, Deleuze's and Guattari's What is Philosophy?, or, for an introduction to Deleuze's philosophy, including difference, see Todd May's Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction).

28 Richard Rorty, in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, tells us that the importance of terminology and/or the choice of terminology is most often at the heart of the matter—even more so than the thesis involved. He writes, "Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things" (9). Thus, "[t]he method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will temp the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior" (9). The shift is not to ask us to "pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old things which we did when we spoke in the old way. Rather, it suggests that we might want to stop doing those things and do something else" (9).

Taken in relation to the move being made here, Ulmer's term electracy opens us to thinking and doing something else. It gets us out of the limits of terms tied to literacy (see also endnote 28) and instead asks us, 'think of this in this way' (to echo Rorty).
We have to pay special attention to terminology because words carry histories, baggage, restrictions, and the like. Thus, using the term literacy, even in conjunction with other terms, opens us to the weight of the literate archive (a mass of paper and graphite) while we are attempting to work in a nearly weightless environment (a mass of electric impulses and light). For example, current buzz phrases like multimodal literacies, new media literacies, digital literacies, "being literate in multimedia," and so on imply that there is something inherently similar between learning to create multimedia or create in electronic discourse environments and learning to write—thus, we inherit literate baggage—when perhaps the only similarity may be the word "learning" (and it carries vastly different meanings). See Ulmer's chapter "After Teletheory" in Teletheory (2nd Revised Edition) or James Paul Gee's What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy for implications and discussions on this issue.

For a more expansive look at this shift from ethos to ethea, see chapter 3.

For supportive work detailing these qualities of primary orality, see also Eric Havelock's The Muse Learns to Write, Jack Goody's The Domestication of the Savage Mind, and Erich Auerbach's Mimesis.

Havelock, in The Muse Learns to Write, referencing Milman Parry's work, tells us, "the course of the story would be a matter of invention; the language used for it was not" (11).

See Havelock's The Muse Learns to Write (8-24; 98-116); Auerbach's Mimesis (specifically, "Odysseus' Scar" 3-23).

In Teletheory, Ulmer refers to orality as "literate orality" (51).

See "The Desiring Machines" in Anti-Oedipus (1-50).

For more on chora, see Plato's Timaeus, Julia Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language. In Chapter 1, I also more extensively look at this term in relation to Ulmer's work and that of Richard Mohr.

Lokke traces the virgule, as linguistic/extralinguistic binary, through the works of Derrida, Bakhtin, Bourdieu, Castoriadis, Jameson, Baudrillard, Lacan, Luhmann, and Deleuze and Guattari. Perhaps why it readily finds space in all of these figures' works is because, as Lokke tells us, the virgule may be the "poststructuralist punctuation par excellence": "it can be deployed to suggest the endlessness of binariness, a serial proliferation of contrastives in horizontally endless adjacencies, as well as implicating the endless reversibility of insideness and outsideness" (316).
See painting, "The Muses dancing with Apollo," by Italian artist Baldassare Peruzzi.

The tics here stem from hysteric, in the Freudian sense, which I will explore later in this chapter, but the tic is hysterically related (a third sophistic cousin) to heretics and heuretics, perhaps thought of as a hysteritic. See Vitanza's "Writing the tic" in Kairos 12.3 for an/other glance at the tic, many of them, tics and works, where the tic is the underly/overlying (or just plain lying) pastiche...or, for a different take on tics, in the tick-tack/tack-tick swirl, see his Negation (42).

This might be likened to the Bud Light commercial where the Cavemen struggle to carry their stone beer cooler; one caveman tells the others that he has invented the wheel to help move the cooler—the next scene has the four Cavemen struggling to carry the immensely heavy stone wheel (used as platform) with the stone cooler on top of it; punch line, one caveman says to another, "Wheel Sucks."

Here I am attempting, as a correlative part to this move, to separate reasoning from its adherence to philosophic logic and instead think it as (just another) emotion, as pathetic appeal in a rhetorical game. This move is designed to get us out of the exclusionary game of masculine literate-based logics where to be emotional is often explained, and thus explained away or marginalized, by its correlations with the feminine—"the dastardly unreasonableness of the irrational, emotional woman...letting hormones and other bodily disasters affect her emotional mental state—how dare she! The physical affecting the mental? She must be weak, less than a 'reasonable' man, not keeping her emotions in check! Maybe she should see Dr. Freud" (I will return [eternally] to Dr. Freud). After all, Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" was not "I feel, and therefore I am." Though, surprisingly, in our current machinic culture, and the tendencies toward robotics, this alter(c)ation may actually be a more apt statement, with its own set of corollary, perhaps coronary, problems—"the weak heart of a woman, afflicted with a propensity for fainting"—or so the statement goes, as I've been shown a thousand times in many old movies, as well as in a certain breed of goats.

While most treatments of the dialectical change fall into a process of negation, or a thinking of negation, John Muckelbauer, in The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change, attempts to craft an affirmative sense of change. Muckelbauer wants to "invent a practical style of engagement that doesn't just repeat the structure of negation and refusal" (12). He goes on to say that the "key challenge for responding to 'the problem of change' is to both articulate and demonstrate an affirmative sense of change that is neither the same as dialectical change nor different from it" (12). My question, here and throughout this work, would be why must we work in relation to these at all? Why must we explore invention, in any sense, in relation to the dialectical change—affirmative or negative—and not pursue yet something else?

Of the many naming connections I can and will make throughout this text, one which has connection to my own name is The Secret Garden, which was authored by Frances Hodgson Burnett. While there is no immediate familial relation, much could be done with The Secret Garden as guiding theme in this text—not the least of which includes the play with the words "secret" and "garden," and Derrida's work on secrets. Here, though, it is merely a
hint at the conductive connective possibilities that can be explored in and through language, and specifically in and through an economy of names.

7 This question of "How might one live?" is a shift from the traditional philosophic question of "How should one live?" or its extension of "How should one act?" This change in focus can be seen in the works of many continental philosophers, specifically finding home in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean-Paul Sartre, and more recently traceable in the work of Gilles Deleuze. For a more extensive investigation of this (change in) question, see Todd May's *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*.

8 Though there are numerous sources to articulate Gorgias' trilemma, I find Vitanza's brief summation in his *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric* to be quite approachable: "In both doxagraphic versions of 'On the Nonexistent' [...] Gorgias allegedly says: Nothing exists; if it does exist, we cannot know it; if we could know it, we could not communicate it" (261).

9 I use "site" to indicate the many plays in this term: physical location, Website, the homophones of sight and cite (as in citation—academically or otherwise), and, more generally, as the space of an occurrence of event.

10 See Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, or more specifically his work on grafting, in *Dissemination* 355.

11 In "Signature Event Context," Derrida tells us, "Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written [...] can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable" (185; cited in Ulmer 178).

12 Vitanza's Sub/Versive Sophistic Rhetoric, undoubtedly a pervasive rhetoric, a.k.a. the Antibody Rhetoric, works to counter the infection of the philosophical tradition on Rhetoric (and the septinum in general), moving us from Rhetoric based on intersubjectivity (Aristotle's speakers/writers communicating to listeners and readers) to an approach based "on intertextuality, with the 'desire' of language itself more so doing the speaking/writing" ("Critical" 53). Additionally, this is a move from the old rhetoric, Aristotle's influence with a focus on persuasion, and even an move from the new rhetoric, Burke's influence with a focus on identification, and instead a drift in Lyotard's paralogy, with a focus on instabilities, marginia (marginals), de/stabilization and dis/placements, among other (sub/verting or perverting) connections. Or, as Vitanza says, "What the Antibody Rhetoric dreams of, then, in its struggle against author/ity," that is, in its struggle to fight the infections (Aristotle's and perhaps even Burkes), "is to enhance our abilities to tolerate the incommensurabilities that make up what cultural critics are calling 'post-modern knowledge'" (49).

13 According to George Dillon, in *Contending Rhetorics*, "academic argument often attempts to slip between [...], arguing against a position that is not quite held by anyone" (132). It is, to reference Douglas Park's work, which Dillon cites, the process of creating an exigence, of crafting a conversation within which the argument can take place. For a more extensive look at these issues, see the second half (88-159) of Dillon's text.
Michel Serres tells us, "To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion of the third-man. The most profound dialectical problem is not the problem of the Other [ . . . but rather] the problem of the third man [ . . . the demon, the prosopopeia of noise]" (Hermes 67). In dialectic, a game of exchange interwoven with the principle of non-contradiction, "the two interlocutors play on the same side; they do battle together to produce a truth on which they can agree, that is, to produce a successful communication. In a certain sense, they struggle together against interference, against the demon, against the third man. Obviously, this battle is not always successful. In the aporetic dialogues, victory rests with the powers of noise" (Hermes 67).

Thus, with consensus lying at the core to the dialectic (or even argumentation), there must be an excluded third—specifically as noise emerges from violations of the dialectic rules (i.e., literate logic)—but in paradoxical dialogues, noise, confusion, this third man, is where victory resides. As such, this print-text must fight against the noise—though not exclusively so, as some noise is necessary for the kind of work being sought—but my Sophie2 other will welcome the "third man," will welcome the noise, as I can work in productive contradiction or performative aporesis in that apparatus.

See endnote 4.

In Simulations, Baudrillard articulates successive phases of the image: (1) "it is the reflection of a basic reality"; (2) "it masks and perverts a basic reality"; (3) "it masks the absence of a basic reality"; (4) "it bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum" (11). Of these phases, he says, "In the fourth, it is no longer the order of appearance at all, but of simulation" (12). What we have reached at this phase is a view where "signs" dissimulate that there is nothing—and as such we can move beyond the distinctions between real and/or illusory that Colie emphasizes.

c.f. "Writing restructures consciousness," in Ong's Orality and Literacy (78-116).

In Heuristics: The Logic of Invention, Ulmer details his counter-method, or heuretic heuristic known by the acronym CATTt, which stands for contrast, analogy, theory, target, and tale (see 8-15).

Derek Attridge, in "Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other," writes, "The irruption of the other into the same does not and cannot sit comfortably within any of the explanatory frameworks by which we characterize the possible" (29). Attridge goes on to claim, "None of these explanations [psychological, sociological, theological] or any others, whatever their validity can claim to predict [invention]; they cannot state in advance when or how an inventive act is to take place, who is to be inventive, or what the invention is to consist of. This is not because these discourses lack the necessary power and precision but because an invention that could be fully accounted for, that could be programmed and predicted, would not be an invention" (ibid).

Yarbrough begins by removing the language/reality divide, the distinction between physis/nomos, because "[s]uch theories presuppose the necessity of an epistemology that distinguishes one set of objects functioning according to one set of laws (for example, linguistic signs, cultural artifacts) from another set of objects obeying another set of laws (for
example, physical entities, mechanical forces)" (23). He says, "I drop the concepts of language and reality (except for critical purposes) and replace them both with the term 'discourse'" (13-14). Instead, his discourse is based on intercourse and interaction. He says, "Discourse is the human mode of interacting with an environment, and environment includes things and people and the marks and noises they make to affect one another" (14).

21 For Latour, modern designates two possible sets of practices: translation and purification. Translation is hybridization, networking, creating mixtures between nature and culture. Purification is separation, division, distinction. The former creates networks, continuous chains, between everything; the latter, establishes divisions (natural world, society, and discourse). If we view the natural world, society, and discourse as separate entities, we are modern; if we view these as interrelated, as simultaneous purification and hybridization, we stop being modern and stop having ever been modern because of the inseparable (and co-dependent) nature of each of these.

In simpler terms, for Latour, modernity is the process of division, of separation, but which is inherently linked to the divisible being mixed, being networked or linked, for if they were not already mixed up there would be no need for division. And understanding that premise instantly moves one out of modern practices into a space/place that has never been modern because all the categorization that gave us modernity (and which led to the antimodern and the postmodern) never actually existed. This is the "modern paradox" Latour is attempting to understand.

Specifically, he looks at this middle space (this excluded middle voice) of the nonmodern, which views the modernist constitution and the hybrids it rejects and proliferates as simultaneously present (integrally co-dependent). Borrowing from the premoderns, the moderns, and the postmoderns (keeping some ideas/view and rejecting others), Latour creates the constitution of the nonmodern, or amodern.

22 The double gesture which Muckelbauer is referring is that Biesecker "offers a generative reading practice [. . . ] that wants to open things up" but "she does so by beginning with a movement that explicitly wants to close some things down" (31). While Muckelbauer approaches this in terms of the theoretical assumptions being made by Biesecker's first step, I think it is also linked to the medium in which she (and he) are working. To offer something new, as in a different reading or even an inventive project like Biesecker's attempt, and to do so strictly in literate-based, scholarly expression, requires that she adhere to this 'old before new' literacy contract: the way(s) in which we write and relatedly the way(s) in which we think. Her very approach to thought here, as well as Muckelbauer's treatment, adheres to a literacy-based way of thinking about these issues. Had she, however, been working in electronic spaces not controlled by this particular approach to thought, her attempt might not have been to replace a previous system ("replace conventional analyses," as Muckelbauer tells us [31]) but to simply generate an/other, yet an/other, to emerge alongside and perhaps not-in-relation-to.

23 In the Dialogues, Deleuze says, "Objections are even worse. Every time someone puts an objection to me, I want to say: 'OK, OK, let's go on to something else.' Objections have never contributed anything...getting out never happens like that. Movement always happens behind the thinkers back, or in the moment when he blinks. Getting out is already achieved or else it never will be" (1; cited in Muckelbauer 42). This move is to get out of the
structure of critique, not to reject the idea he might be wrong, as the structure of objection and argumentation is a limiting game (one often based exclusively on consensus).

24 In *Attitudes Toward History*, Kenneth Burke tells us that casuistic stretching is "[introducing] new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to old principles" (229).

25 These power relationships include the often overlooked controlling aspects of the Web designer—i.e., the individual(s) who makes the Web pages—who establishes all the possible hyperlinks a page may have. Of course, these relationships evolve a bit with collaborative Web spaces, like a wiki, but in the traditional relationships between Web designer and Web "surfer," it is the designer who determines the possibilities, and these are not nearly as "endless" as many would like to think. But when shifting to an application like *Hyperwords*, it is the "surfer," the searcher, the navigator who occupies a significantly greater portion of this relationship than before.

26 The ellipses I included here removes Mohr's inclusion of the term "mirror." The connection to mirror is important for later unfoldings of this metaphor in relation to Mohr's take on Plato's work, but I removed it from here because a few sentences later Mohr tells us, Plato "does not specifically use the term 'mirror' of the third thing, no doubt because that would entail the notion of a perceiver in accordance with his earlier analysis of mirrors (46a-c, cf. *Sophist* 266c) and he does not wish to imply that the relation between the Ideas and the receptacle implies the presence of a perceiver (see 61c-d)" (92).
Chapter III - Logos: Inventing (with) Logoi

1 For Nye, it is desire that puts Parmenides on his journey: "Desire puts him on the road to logic, leads him through and past the ordinary concerns of human life in a quest or search for something loved and lost, dreamt of but never attained" (10).

2 Heidegger tells us, "Gods and men are not only lighted by a light—even if a supersensible one—so that they can never hide themselves from it in darkness, they are luminous in their essence" ("Aletheia" 120).

3 This, of course, may be a reciprocal relationship, but the nuances of that connection are an exploration in need of much more space than what is available here in this chapter, and perhaps this work.

4 Please note that while these two things are connected by the slash, they are not synonyms. The slash, of course, as I explored in previous chapters, is a particular kind of relationship and its full complexities are intended here in the use of "lighting/presencing."

5 For lighting to be possible—or rather a necessary possibility—and for its possibilities to manifest, there needs to be an absence of light in some capacity. On the one hand, this absence might be thought simply as being devoid of light—as in no light—or it might be thought as a darkness, a condition of being dark, in which lighting removes the previous condition. On the other hand, this condition of darkness/absence might be thought as a necessity in terms of being simultaneous with lighting in order to "see" anything at all. If there is only lighting, no darkness for contrastive effect, we see nothing (nothing but light).

6 Heidegger tells us that modern thinking indicates a relationship of esse = percepri, or "Being, understood as a thoroughgoing representation," while the Greek indicates a relationship of percepri = esse, "The Greek saying assigns thinking, as apprehending which gathers, to Being, understood as presencing." He says, "Thus [following this inversion] every interpretation of the Greek saying that moves within the context of modern thinking goes away from the start" ("Moira" 84).

7 The duality here is in reference to both the distinction between Being and beings (itself a duality) and the "revealing unfolding" which "bestows on every presencing the light in which something present can appear" ("Moira" 96). The "something present" is in reference to lògoi in Heidegger's work as it is that which is a "letting-lie-before," and so the present is something that must be lying before in order to be bestowed with light—done by the Ereignis of what I would call a type of invention (a discovery/illumination/revealing).

8 I will continually reuse this term "undergo" for, as Diane Davis tells us, "to undergo is not the same as to know" ("Addressing" 199). In the sense I will continue to employ it, this undergoing is related to experiencing, suffering, and bearing witness to, but is not reducible to any one of these. Rather, I would think it as all of them. Always. This issue is more fully explored in Chapter 4: Pathos.

9 It is important that I acknowledge the performative contradiction emerging here in this print-version because readers may claim there is a certain hermeneutical necessity—and thus
founding condition—of this kind of literate work. To read a text is hermeneutical. But my
resistance here is not singularly bound to the interpretive hermeneutics revolving around
"making sense" of words—however one does such things—but with the necessary
conditions of correctness or falseness that plague the hermeneutic. Any interpretation is
subject to this construct: Is this the correct interpretation? Is your statement, if making
declarative statements (logos apophantikos), true or false? This is the act of making claims, of
interpreting and making claims, that then can be interpreted or judged as true or false
(however temporarily that may last). But this thinking places this type of "understanding,"
this second- or third-order activity (cf. Sheehan 70), into a subjugated position to truth/not-
truth—with the understanding that these kinds of assertions are made, from the ethical
speaker, with an adherence to their claim to truth. What I am attempting here is to work
outside the horizons of truth. If readers want to try to place this game back within those
horizons, then that is their prerogative and perhaps failure, but I am trying to work
heuristically, to invent, to make, and what comes out is first-order creation, and as such
exists, is, has an essence, whether this invention is real or not. This does not, cannot, and
should not be adhered to the truth-consortium. True or false is not the distinction of
essence or existence, but rather (at least) a secondary value stemming from judgment, from
juridical-politics.

10 I reference the rhetorics of plants/animals following the work of George Kennedy in
"A Hoot in the Dark" and am thinking of avatars in the sense of Žižek's work [cf. The Plague
of Fantasies 127-167] where he introduces the notion of one of my virtual identities being
more me than me.

11 Heidegger, in "Moira," tells us, "Lighting is therefore more than illuminating, and also
more than laying bare. Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open.
It is the bestowal of presencing" (118). But in this space (for lack of a better term), perhaps
this choral space, there is also a "that" or "this" which is also present but which is not
brought-before into the open. This is the relief which the presenced stands against
(alongside as well as in opposition to), and this allows us to "see" the presencing, to grasp,
however ethereally, this presencing as eidos. For without the shadows, the darkness, this
other in relation to the presencing (and in the same "space" of the presencing), there would
be only light (lighting) and this too is blinding.

12 This is not the is/is not debate, for both is and is not as distinctions would be part of
presencing—negation is also an unconcealment in this sense.

13 There is a necessity of the other for developing an awareness of either the same or
other. This idea is developed in Roy Wagner's Invention of Culture as it relates to
anthropology—where he indicates,"In the act of inventing another culture, the
anthropologist invents his own, and in fact he reinvents the notion of culture itself" (4). But
to be able to invent one's own culture (or even to recognize "culture" as it relates to the self,
as in one's own culture), there is this necessary condition of the other, of encountering other.
This kind of "condition" happens in relation to ideology (encountering other which can
force a questioning of one's own). Without the other, without the awareness the
acknowledgment of the other brings, we are forever blind to the self-Same—this is both a
critical and creative blindness.
The gender bias is purposive here as in Platonic logic, and much in philosophy and logic following Plato's work, there is a contrast of the rational man with the irrational woman—and this is an issue to which Nye's work is specifically addressed.

ibid.

Nye writes, "As Aristotle says, in his Rhetoric (I, 17; 1376a), you cannot buy off an argument from probability the way you might buy off a witness" (46).

In Orality and Literacy, Walter Ong tells us, "Once the word is technologized [by writing, print, or computer], there is no effective way to criticize what technology has done with it without the aid of the highest technology available" (80).

I should be cautious with this kind of statement as it is just as likely that we have never actually left this notion of being perpetually in encounter with other. But that exploration is beyond the scope of this particular chapter, and beyond specific address in this work.
Chapter IV - Ethos: Ethea of Invention

1 See discussion in chapter 1, page 50, for the hysterical potentials of these traumatic "blocks."

2 Charles Scott tells us that Herodotus made similar uses of ethea in terms of barbarians and the names/places the non-Greeks belonged, and that Hesiod and Theognis had similar uses (143). Thus, to imply connections between the horse and the human is not that far of a move—though, to be sure, the non-Greeks were not treated as equals to Greek citizens, which may be to imply that they too lacked a human status (and thus the analogy), but it remains, nonetheless, a connection available.

3 Not ironically, Christ's first "dwelling place" outside of the womb was a manger, and so we might see his "body and blood" sacrament as analogous to the food/nourishment in the manger for the horse—where, in the horse's case, humans used food and the horse's desire/need for such to attempt to change its ethea (Chamberlain 98).

4 Heidegger might offer the "trucker on the road" as a particular kind of dwelling, but this, in my view, fails to uphold his implicit (if not overt) emphasis on "place" in his comments on ethos—especially with his indication that place gives rise to space ("Building 356").

5 While Hyde does, at one point in his introduction to the collection of essays in The Ethos of Rhetoric, develop a particular strand around space and time, as well as attempt to fold in layers of possible connotations of ethos, he, like others, still tends to default to this emphasis on "place"—and particularly "dwelling place": "[Ethos] is a matter, at the very least, of character, ethics, Being, space and time, emotion, truth, rhetorical competence, and everyday situations that are contextualized within the dwelling place of human being—a place known to encourage metaphysical wonder" (xxi; my emphasis).

6 Deleuze and Guattari write: "It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal machine, a talking-machine, or a breathing-machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy machine: all the time, flows and interruptions" (Anti-Oedipus 1-2).

7 I would be remiss to not point out the play between "proper" (as in to behave properly, which is to say, in terms of public discourse, to behave ethically) and "property"—which should have resonance with our distinctive turn toward ethea and the nomadic [following Charles Scott's treatment]: opening us to "pastures" [nomós] as opposed to "law" [nómo]. Thus, the shift to "proper-ty" as in "ownership of" is already a move toward a particular kind of "sub/jection": in this case, nómo over physis.
8 See also Cathy Caruth's particular paradox of understating trauma, and the potential numbness that can occur (6-7).

9 It should be noted that his "lack" may derive from an excess, as he may have more sounds than he knows what to do with: Levi indicates "Hurbink" makes several utterances at night that were all variations on matisklo, a non-word (192)—even his utterances cannot achieve a "position" of language.

10 As this is dealing with ethos and "sub/ject" positions, we should also consider the common Heideggerian move being made here, which is part of his approach to crafting his own "ethos." For Heidegger, the move begins with a particular form of "etymological archeology." It is ultimately this methodology, and the rigors of methodological mining, that help establish a position from which he can speak—which is a position of having "unconcealed" a more "originary" meaning of a given term or concept and using that "forgotten" meaning as a way to reconsider the duality of Being: shown in this chapter in his treatment of bau/ bauen and in the previous chapter in his treatment of logos.

To put this another way (as amplification seems to be one of my stylistic moves), with each new foregrounding of meaning, with each new development and use of language, the "primal call" of language "falls silent." In Heidegger's view, we most often "fail to heed this silence" ("Building" 350). Heeding silence, much like Heraclitus' listening to the logos, is a telling indicator of "ethos"—Heidegger, critical-author-thinker, stands in rhetorical contrast to those others who failed to heed this silence.

Of course, following what I set up in the previous chapter, this "heeding of silence" may be seen as Heidegger palpatating meanings and usages that reside in the shadows and darknesses around a particular term/idea—the silenced or lost histories of a given identity. Or, and perhaps this may be the turn that wants to be made, we might view Heidegger as playing around in "absencing": his revisiting terms in prior usages may include equal parts of discovering meaning (as in hermeneutic invention) and inventing meaning (as in heuristics, for he is most assuredly inventing with these moves) as he cannot avoid bringing his own time, place, existence, ideas, ideologies, ethics, politics, emotions, influences, thinking, being, saying to bear (and to bear witness to) this (re)engagement of silenced terms. This is, in a certain degree, the anthropological invention of same and other cultures I explored in relation to Roy Wagner's Invention of Culture.

This does not change the importance of Heidegger's work on building and dwelling for our conversation, but rather is something to pay heed to as Heidegger, like us, brings the entirety of his ethos-cum-etnea to "bear witness" to the connections to which he is giving (mediated) "testimony."

11 It should be noted, however, that for Heidegger building is not distinctly separate from dwelling, as in a cause/effect relationship: "For building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—to build is in itself already to dwell" (Heidegger "Building" 348). What this indicates is not that one builds in order to dwell, but rather that one dwells, and building is a means of that dwelling. This is not unlike the distinction we opened in Hyde's work in relation to the essence of responding where being is not simply responding to but a responding through: it implicates itself in the response (we [eternally] return to medium/message complexities).
12 For Heidegger, the fourfold comes in the form of a *primal oneness* where each component of the fourfold (earth and sky, divinities and mortals) is already constituted in the others and brought forth in the *building* of things.

13 Heidegger's view on the relationship of place and space has space being in a sub-stance to place: "*spaces receive their essential being from locales and not from 'spaces'" (356).

14 This, of course, can be contradicted in any number of ways with people building a bridge over a river to allow them access to a new church or with other implications in language that indicate certain bridges bringing salvation or opening new hope for varying communities. But as I intend it here, I mean that I do not believe bridge builders typically sit down and consciously consider the implications of the Heideggerian fourfold while they are constructing a bridge—this does not preclude this possibility, but rather that I just don't think it part of their critical/creative repertoire. Rather, the fourfold happens (always already) because they are *building*.

15 Foucault writes, "In short, the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse" (138; qtd in Johnston 72). If this is the case, if a "subject" is a "complex and variable function of discourse," then as the possibilities of discourse change—via radical alterations in the apparatuses of communication technologies—then so too does the "sub/ject" change (as well as "sub/jectivity").

We can also hear echoes of this change in "sub/jectivity" in the previous chapter, in relation to the dynamic between thinking, *saying*, and being (112-115).

16 We should work cautiously with this sense of being responsible and/or using this "responsible tactic" as "[t]he gesture of assuming responsibility is [...] genuinely juridical and not ethical. It expresses nothing noble or luminous, but rather simply obligation, the act by which one consigned oneself as a prisoner to guarantee a debt in a context in which the legal bond was considered to inhere in the body of the person responsible. As such, responsibility is closely intertwined with the concept of *culpa* that, in a broad sense, indicates the imputability of damage" (Agamben, *Remnants* 22).

17 In his "Three Countertheses," Vitanza tells us that possibilism is defined as being against the givenness of things.

18 See *The Plague of Fantasies*, chapter 4: "Cyberspace, Or, The Unbearable Closure of Being" (127-167).

19 My faculty email address, my website, my remediatingscholarship blog, and even much of my Facebook page, taken together, project a particular "e-dentity," but this is not the same "e-dentity" as my followingthebean blog, my student email address, other parts of my Facebook page, my Netflix account, and so on, which can all, when combined in particular ways—or taken singularly—project different kinds of "e-dentities."
Chapter V - Pathos: Inventing (with) Catastrophe

1 Orgē/Praotēs, Philia/Ekhthra, Phobos/Tharsos, Aiskynē/Anaiskhyntia, Kharis/Akharistia, Eleos/Nemesan, Phthonos/Zēlos (see On Rhetoric, Book II).

2 Even Aristotle opens pathos to a bit more complexity as he makes reference in Book II of his On Rhetoric to its "undergoing change" (2.1.8). I will stay more in keeping with this notion of "undergoing."

3 Spitz locates this original meaning of "experience" in works like Aeschylus's Agamemnon (line 177), Sophocles' Ajax (line 313), and Plato's Theatetus (193c) and Republic (612a) (see 547).

4 Unlike most cloth which is weaved together—a methodological operation of systematic ordering—the felt is made by heat and compression that uses the "tangle of interlocking 'hooks and eyes'" to create a matted fabric which can be "pressed into any shape" (Ulmer, Electronic Monuments 167). Ulmer uses the felt as an image of the formal operation of his MEMorial, and it finds analogous application in several of his other works.

5 Roland Barthes, in The Rustle of Language, says of the middle voice, "by acting, the subject affects himself [sic], he always remains inside the action, even if the action involves an object" (18).

6 Vitanza's renaming "self" to "selphs" is the neologistic play of self and sylph. With his "self" being a "pre-Oedipal, pre-territorialized, pre-identified (Lacanian) 'Imaginary' or 'Schizo'" ("Concerning" 399) and his "sylph" playing on connections to invisible spirits and, more specifically, on the water sprite from Lacan's Feminine Sexuality (162-171; cited in "Concerning" 399), and with the Dionysian play Vitanza introduces, this might be thought as a "wine spirit" (or wine and spirits?). But this neologism is designed to call attention to the impossibility of a Self or Subject, or the reliable grounds upon which they can emerge (400).

My use builds from Vitanza's meaning and also adds an emphasis on an irreducible multiplicity or plurality. The additional emphasis, though perhaps not absent from Vitanza's meaning, is designed to remind us of the fragmentary nature of the (impossible) "I," which reflects the Dissociative Identity Disorder that seems tantamount to the potentialities of participating in electronic culture (though the degrees of that disorder vary, individualistically).

7 In Electronic Monuments, Ulmer tells us, "The MEMorial is a hybrid: a composite of text and image" (xiv) and it "witnesses (monitors) a disaster in progress" (xxvii). More specifically, an electronic monument, which opens "a mapping between individual and the collective," (14) is concerned with the abject: "What memorials are to ideals, MEMorials are to objects" (43).

8 This term comes from Silvano Arieti, which Ulmer utilizes in his Internet Invention, and comes to mean, in Ulmer's use, "the formless intuitions that appear in a flash" (89) and which have value not only in memory work but in relation to Barthes' "obtuse meaning."
1. For Ulmer, is the merging of critical reason with advertising practices; the latter of which finds an emblem, via Walter Benjamin (in Reflections), in the red neon sights that, as Ulmer tells us, evoke "a mood of urban setting [. . . and the] electric energy powering the sign joins the actual and virtual cities and evokes the evolving technology whose present manifestation is the Internet" (Electronic 58).

2. Here, I intentionally work in malapropistic fashion: working within the play of indeterminable and interminable—a difference playing in the key of "de."

3. For Braierman, first-generation "memorialists" include, as sample, Claude Lanzmann, Primo Levi, and Jean-François Lyotard, and second-generation include, as sample, Michael André Bernstein, Dominick LaCapra, and Jean-Luc Nancy.

4. We find in Aristotle, as Alan Gross and Marcel Dascal point out in their article, "The Conceptual Unity of Rhetoric," that there is a division or opposition, of sorts, between logos and pathos (279-280; cf. Aristotle, On Rhetoric 3.17.8).

5. This "anti-Semitic inception" to which Agamben refers is perhaps clearer in an earlier passage of his: "early on, the Church Fathers used the term in its literal sense as a polemic weapon against the Jews, to condemn the uselessness of bloody sacrifices" (Remnants 29).

6. We can perhaps the best example of this approach in comedians (which reconnects us to the joke logic opened in chapter 1), who work at both the level of the individual (see self-deprecating humor) and the collective (comedy as social commentary): the former can be seen in the comedic styles of Jim Gaffigan (making jokes of the size of his head) or Ralphie May (making reference to his weight)—and this list could continue, extensively so, as this is common comedic technique; the latter can be seen in the likes of Lewis Black, John Stewart, Steven Colbert, or Ellen DeGeneris—another tiny sample.

7. Ulmer says, "In the same way that alphabetic literacy made conceptual thinking possible, electracy requires another means for arranging diverse particulars into classes, sets, and categories. [. . . ] Choral thinking, that is, involves learning how an image gathers unrelated items into a meaningful set. A choral category works not with things and attributes but with event" (Electronic 185). Important here is that these choral modes of organization and classification work in terms of image categories (and image reasoning)—appropriate for a society of (the) spectacle—and these image categories work by sharing a "formless quality of not resembling anything, [but rather they] gather disparate items not by essential properties but by accidental features" (134). Thus, whereas "[a] topos collects entities into universal homogeneous sets based on shared essences, necessary attributes; chora gathers singular ephemeral sets of heterogeneous items based on associations of accidental details" (120).

8. The "associations of accidental details" is what Ulmer has developed as conductive logic, which is a making with intuition, rather than the topical strategy of working spatially, geographically, or conceptually in predetermined fashion (i.e., defining the scope of possibility before ever embarking on any possible excursion). And this is a move out of logic(s) of resemblance and into logics of connection, or "what Deleuze and Guattari call 'becoming' (extracted from a 'schizophrenic cogito')" (Ulmer, Electronic 134)—which might be viewed as relay to the becoming I articulate in this work.
Chapter VI - Pedagogy: Inventive (Un)learning

1 This is meant puncetually as it works both as hint toward the "corporate model" Bill Readings introduces (see *University in Ruins*) and as hint toward the "banking education" issues Paulo Freire extends in particularly helpful ways (see *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*).

2 Derrida's work was one of theoretical grammatology but Ulmer's is of applied grammatology; the former—which emerges around considerations of the *gramme* or *grapheme*, or trace, and attempts to articulate a new understanding or view of writing, particularly the relationship of writing and knowledge—works as a kind of script (or scripting) for the latter, but the latter "is meant to be the pedagogical equivalent of this scripting beyond the book" (an idea which Derrida introduced in his *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*) and is meant for "an era of interdisciplines, intermedia, electronic apparatus" (Ulmer, *Applied xiii*).

3 For Ulmer, Writing, with a capital "W," refers to the picto-ideo-phonograph style of composition that takes "into account the entire scene of writing" (*Applied* 157), a style he finds exemplified in Derrida's writing—and which he uses as relay for his own style in later works—and is "the practical extension of deconstruction into decomposition" (x).

4 In *Heuretics: The Logic of Invention*, Ulmer introduces us to the heuristic CATTt, which stands for Contrast, Analog, Theory, Target, and tale, and which he derives from "a common set of elements" (8) he finds at work in avant-garde manifestos. See also his "The Euretics of Alice's Valise."

5 The "wide image" or what Ulmer also refers to as the "image of wide scope" becomes a guide for invention and creativity (*Internet Invention* 10). Ulmer picks up this notion from Howard Gruber's work on Darwin, and indicates that these "wide images" are located within oneself, and can be found—most often postmortem—as recurring images in the works of great thinkers (e.g. Einstein and the compass his father gave him). The goal for Ulmer, then, is not to find this emblem guiding the invention in one's corpus after one is dead, but rather to seek it out and use it as beginning point. See *Teletheory* (56-60).

6 This form of Composing, as Ulmer tells us, utilizes "three levels of communication—images, puns, and discourse" (*Applied xi*).

7 In his "Three Countertheses" article, Vitanza tells us that possibilism is defined as being against the givenness of things.

8 Reasoneon, for Ulmer, is the merging of critical reason with advertising practices; the latter of which finds an emblem, via Walter Benjamin (in *Reflections*), in the red neon sights that, as Ulmer tells us, evoke "a mood of urban setting [. . . and the] electric energy powering the sign joins the actual and virtual cities and evokes the evolving technology whose present manifestation is the Internet" (*Electronic 58*).

9 Just to reiterate, the use of "selphs" stems from Vitanza's renaming of "self" to "selphs" in the merging of self and sylph. With his "self" being a "pre-Oedipal, pre-territorialized, pre-identified (Lacanian) 'Imaginary' or 'Schizo'" ("Concerning" 399) and his "sylph" playing on
connections to invisible spirits and, more specifically, on the water sprite from Lacan's *Feminine Sexuality* (162-171; cited in "Concerning" 399). I build from Vitanza's meaning and add emphasis on an irreducible multiplicity or plurality to reflect fragmentary nature of the (impossible) "I" and the Dissociative Identity Disorder that seems tantamount for electronic culture.
Works Cited


243


Von Trier, Lars and Jørgen Leth. (Film) *The Five Obstructions.* Koch Lober, 2004.


