A Survey of Indicators of Zionism, Antisemitism, and their Convergence with American Christian Nationalism

Jessica Liberman
jliberm@clemson.edu

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1970s, the American Christian right has favored U.S. involvement with the state of Israel, supporting it through decades of conflict with its Muslim-majority neighbor, Palestine. Antisemitism in the United States has surged since the 2016 election of Donald Trump, along with growing research interest among sociologists in a theopolitical phenomenon called Christian nationalism. Building upon research documenting the civic, racial, and ethnic exclusivism of Christian nationalist ideology as well as theory suggesting Christian Zionism, despite appearing philosemitic, is structured by antisemitism that views Israel and Jews as artifacts of biblical prophecies, I theorize that such factors are associated with individuals’ support of Israel as well as belief in antisemitic stereotypes that racialize and other Jewish diaspora. Drawing upon data from a survey I designed and distributed to undergraduates at two U.S. universities during the spring semester of 2022, I find that (1) Christian nationalism was the fourth strongest predictor of respondents’ support of Israel, decreasing their odds of support, but was tied for the strongest predictor increasing odds that respondents support neither Israel or Palestine, and (2) Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of increased antisemitic beliefs among respondents, even when controlling for support of Israel. Findings suggest that Christian Zionism may not overlap with Christian nationalism as previously theorized, yet Christian nationalism maintains religious and ethnic boundaries via prejudiced, antisemitic beliefs towards Jews.
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INTRODUCTION

Cultural divides have become increasingly apparent and harder to bridge in the years since Donald Trump’s successful presidential campaign in 2016. Contentions regarding the state of Israel predate Trump’s term due to Christian Zionist bases, but his actions and administration’s policies involving the country kept it ever-relevant alongside some of the highest rates of antisemitic incidents in the U.S. since the 1970s (Anti-Defamation League, 2019). The first year of President Biden’s term saw historic escalations in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, resulting in a ceasefire called May 21st of 2021 (Dominy, 2021); However, continued debate regarding the role of the United States in moderating this conflict indicates that Israel will continue to be a pivotal issue in American politics. A growing undercurrent to these divides has been a conservative theopolitical ideology referred to as Christian Nationalism (Whitehead & Perry, 2020). I have designed and distributed a survey to identify relationships between Christian Nationalist beliefs, belief in antisemitic stereotypes, and support of Israel among students at two U.S.-based university campuses, and this thesis will detail my initial findings.

Little empirical research of Christian nationalism explores its relation to antisemitism, while empirical research of Christian Zionism, perhaps influenced by its subject, often addresses Jews in the abstract, synonymous with Israel as biblical artifacts in the overarching narrative of Christian eschatology. In my approach, I aim to survey opinions and perceptions of both Jews and Israel in effort to illuminate the relationship between Christian nationalism, Christian Zionism, and antisemitism. To this end, the following research questions need addressed:

1. How do believers of Christian nationalism perceive and conceptualize Jews?
2. Do indicators of Christian Zionism overlap with Christian nationalism?
Christian nationalism

Christian nationalism is neither purely a civil nor religious ideology. Belief in Christian nationalist sentiment extends beyond civil religion in its explicit references to the Christian God and Jesus (Whitehead et al., 2018), yet it does not always correlate with an individual’s religiosity (Perry et al., 2020). Rather, Whitehead and Perry (2020, pp. ix–x) define Christian nationalism as “an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of American civic life with a particular type of Christian identity and culture.” Whitehead and Perry (2020) identify followers of Christian Nationalism as holding such beliefs as “the President of the United States should be a Christian,” “The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation,” and among white believers of Christian nationalism, fears that whites may no longer be the majority in the United States. It is cultural framework fusing aspects religious fundamentalism, political conservatism, American exceptionalism, and nationalism.

Research has identified three primary elements of the ideology: 1) a moral traditionalism that upholds hierarchal social arrangements (Bjork-James, 2020; Perry & Whitehead, 2020; Whitehead & Perry, 2015), 2) authoritarian approaches to social control (Baker et al., 2020a; J. T. Davis & Perry, 2020; Perry et al., 2019), and 3) perceived ethnic and racial boundaries that restrict civic membership, national identity, and belonging (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori, 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Perry & Whitehead, 2015a). My research is concerned with this third element; how Christian nationalism perceives Jewish identity in America, whether Jewish Americans are truly Americans in this framework, and how Israel, as a nation-state, is conceptualized similarly to or different from Jewish people.
Christian Zionism

The existence of both Jewish and Christian Zionism predates the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 but has gained increasing traction within American politics in the years since (Haija, 2006). Christian Zionism is an ideology informed primarily by literalist interpretations of the bible regarding the role of Jews and Israel in messianic traditions (Ariel, 2006), sometimes including the apocalyptic belief that Christ will return before his millennial rule, also known as “premillennial dispensationalism” (Durbin, 2018; Haija, 2006). The return of the Jewish people to Israel, and its subsequent fall is believed to be the causal event in this prophesized day of reckoning. Other expressions of Christian Zionism include a belief that Christians have a sort of deep-seated connection to state of Israel for being the biblical birthplace of Christianity, thus have a say in its government’s politics and a claim to shared identity, or heritage with Israel or Jews. These claims often propose a shared “Judeo-Christian” tradition.

Although Cohen (1969) contested early uses of “Judeo-Christian” to imply religious consensus among the traditions, he had visions of social and political coexistence. Perhaps to that end, “Judeo-Christian values” became a sort of rallying point for many in conservative and Evangelical circles in the United States during the late 70s (Hartmann et al., 2005), and it continues to be used hand-in-hand with Christian Zionist rhetoric. In the United States today, many Christian-led organizations lobby in the interest of Israel alongside Jewish organizations, although a recent report by the Pew Research Center indicated that American Jews are less likely to express support for the state of Israel than Christians (Smith, 2019).

In empirical research exploring Evangelical support of Israel, partisanship and conservative ideology were identified as significant predictors of support (Mayer, 2004), while a survey of 2,002 Evangelical U.S. adults by LifeWay Research found that black and younger
Evangelicals more frequently report having “no strong views” on Israel (Rosenberg, 2017). LifeWay’s survey also found that two of the most frequently reported primary reason that respondents had for supporting Israel were faith-based, such as belief that “The Bible says God gave the land of Israel to the Jewish people,” and “The Bible says Christians should support Israel”. More recently, Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2021) hypothesized that Evangelical survey respondents would be motivated by Christian eschatology (e.g. premillennial expectations about Christ’s return and belief that Jews are God’s “chosen people”), geopolitical and security concerns (Israel as a guarantor of Western security and Christian access to holy sites in the Middle East), the frequency at which they hear support of Israel from other Christians, as well as their personal religiosity. All but the common geopolitical and security concerns were found to be significant predictors of Evangelical support, and contrary to prior research, there are significant relationships between support of Israel and respondents’ age even when controlling for religiosity. While Lifeway Research, and particularly Inbari et al. (2021), provide a variety of hypothetical motivations for Evangelical support of Israel, I am aware of no research to date that has explored the relationship between any number of these motivations with Christian nationalism.

Antisemitism

American Jews were largely perceived as assimilated to white gentile culture for the past half century (Ratskoff, 2020), despite the persistence of antisemitism, often coupled with conspiracy, in what was considered fringe circles. However, according to Porter-Szücs (2021), racialized and nationalist antisemitism proliferates when Jewish diaspora are no longer “easily identifiable” or distinguishable from white gentiles in terms of their socioeconomic status. It follows that, amid increasing “fringe” white nationalist activity in public spheres (e.g., 2016 chants of “Jews will
not replace us” at the Charlottesville Unite the Right Rally), discourse surrounding Jewish whiteness has been renewed among the general populace (Franco, 2020). Research prior to the 2020 election found that ardent embracers of Christian nationalism believe on average four antisemitic stereotypes often incorporated into conspiracies, a number that doubled when accounting for support of additional QAnon conspiracies (Djupe & Dennen, 2021).

Such conspiracies must also be understood for their role in racially and ethnically othering Jews (Porter-Szűcs, 2021). For example, the 1970s also saw the rise of a “porn conspiracy,” which posited that Jews were undermining white Christian racial purity by producing pornography depicting interracial relations (Kerl, 2020). In the time since, Jews, either individual Jews such as George Soros (Lavin, 2018), or Israel as a chimerical “collective Jew” (Klug, 2003), have found themselves at the heart of conspiracies such as globalism (Barkun, 2013; Rensmann, 2011) blood libel, and dual loyalty.

Inversely, antisemitism may be perpetuated under the guise of “philosemitism” from Christian Zionists, which are ultimately fetishizations that conflate Israel and Jewish identity (O’Donnell, 2021; see also Sturm, 2017). This conflation can also inadvertently promote stereotypes of Jewish dual loyalty, a conspiracy that Jews are ultimately loyal to Israel, wherever they are in the world (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-a; Kampeas, 2020).

Empirical research has shown how Christian nationalism engages in conspiracy and stereotypes regarding Jews (Djupe & Dennen, 2021), and provided evidence that there is a difference in how adherents perceive Israel and Jews- supporting the country while perceiving Jewish people as a threat (Whitehead & Perry, 2020, p. 112). However, researchers have yet to explore the motivations for these differences among followers of Christian nationalism and how they may inform the basis of their stereotypical beliefs in unprecedented ways.
Anderson (1983/2016) is credited with providing the framework for how nationalism is often conceptualized today. He argues that nationalism is not based in or necessarily preceded by collectivity, rather that it is ideologically constructed during the process of modernization. Anderson further states that nationalism replaces other ideologies of identity during this modernization process (e.g., religious, imperial, or local identities). Rather than coming from these social, ethnic, or historic communities “organically”, nationalism, as an ideological and cultural force, creates those identities (Porter-Szücs, 2021). In this sense, a nation itself comes to mean an “imagined political community,” distinct from other “imagined” communities by the ways in which it is imagined; limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1983/2016, p. 6). Porter-Szücs supplements Anderson by noting this conception of nationalism identifies its core as a “tool of political mobilization, as a means to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion around communities, and as the core concept in a ‘discourse’ of power” (2021, p. 165).

Anderson (1983/2016) states that nation is limited, which is to say it has boundaries, and by design, will always mean to exclude some group or another. Nations are sovereign, because there arose times where ontological claims and territory had to be derived from somewhere other than dynasties and religion, and the “freedom” of the nation fills this need (however; he is not attempting to provide a historical explanation for various nationalisms a priori). Lastly, nations are a community because it is always conceptualized “horizontally,” despite whatever hierarchies of inequality and exploitation exist within it.

If, as Anderson (1983/2016) asserts, nationalism overtakes religious identity as “tools” of political power, how can Christian nationalism come to be? Moreover, how can Christian Zionism be a nationalist endeavor? How do both relate to various frameworks of antisemitism,
and are the ways in which they do truly nationalist? While I first argue that Anderson’s conception of nationalism is not as incompatible with Christian nationalism as it appears on its face, it must be augmented and updated to proceed with Christian Zionism, before explaining the role of antisemitism. To this end, there are a few additional theoretical explanations that thread back between the two concepts.

**Theoretically substantiating the “nationalism” of Christian Nationalism**

Anderson (1983/2016) is very concerned with the cognitive process of nationalism, how the imagined nation becomes a legacy and destiny that one is willing to die for- a cultural system of mythic connectivity, fortuity, fatality, and continuity. Whitehead and Perry (2020) are similarly interested in not whether the United States is a Christian nation or not (as Anderson might say, having a universal religion), rather how Christian nationalism becomes a cultural framework that informs how those who embrace it view the world and mobilize to preserve its perceived order. The definition of “Christian” for Christian nationalism is better understood as an “active process of socially-shared identity formation” rather than individual religious practice or belief system (Miller, 2021), which serves to differentiate the religious components of Christian nationalism from how Anderson defines religion.

Anderson’s fatalistic conceptions of national identity are not dissimilar from how Whitehead and Perry identify adherents of Christian nationalism as believing “God requires the faithful to wage wars for good,” (2020, p. 14), or how Gorski (2017, 2018) characterizes Christian nationalism as justifying “bloody” conquest and purity. Arguably, the Christian ontology identified by Whitehead, Perry, and Gorski fits Anderson’s (1983/2016) definition of nationalism for its “imagined” Christian community and history for the American nation, despite the United States’ religious pluralities and violent, historical inequalities.
Whitehead et al. further cite Gorski (2016/2020) to state current manifestations of Christian nationalism emphasize “only [Christianity’s] notions of exclusion [emphasis added] and apocalyptic war and conquest” (2018, p. 150), which echoes the utilities of nationalism per Porter-Szűcs (2021) and Anderson (1983/2016). This ontology comes with a distinct insecurity over the nation’s Christian past and future (Whitehead et al., 2018) (c.f. “legacy” and “destiny” apropos Anderson). This fear is described by both Whitehead and Perry (2020) and Gorski (2018) as premillennial, compelling Christians to delay America’s moral decline until the biblical Rapture.

**Premillennialism and Christian Zionism as Christian nationalism**

Premillennialism, or End-times Christianity (Duff, 2021), is a connecting thread between Christian nationalism and Christian Zionism. While premillennialism is at its core based on interpretations of Christian biblical texts as prophecies, Duff notes that these interpretations often serve a “crass utilitarianism” wherein efforts towards righteous or holy ends can justify nearly any means. For many End-times Christians, these means often center Israel and U.S. intervention in its conflict with Israel’s neighboring Muslim-majority countries.

Käsemann claims the fundamental question of apocalypticism “To whom does the sovereignty of the world belong?” (1969, as cited in Duff, 2021, p. 475), which Duff contrasts with the first commandment ‘Have no other gods before me’. She claims Christian nationalism breaks this commandment by worshipping the nation before God while framing Christian salvation as reserved for the United States alone. However, while the answer of Christian nationalism to this question of sovereignty posed by Käsemann may be contradictory to the Christian faith, it falls right in line with Anderson’s (1983/2016) sovereignty of the nation per nationalists.
Just as Gorski and Perry (2020, para. 16) note Christian nationalism “reveres” power, boundaries, and order when it comes to race, Sturm (2017, 2018) has argued that the fervor of American Christian Zionists is a religious nationalism, with not only a national sense of territoriality, but religious territoriality that ports racial categories onto religious ones through increasing insistence upon ideas such as “Judeo-Christian values”. Political mobilization to preserve “Judeo-Christian values” in Israel was quickly understood as synonymous with preservation of “Western culture”. Such conflation was captured perfectly by Lind (1991, p. 48), who wrote “Western culture is unusual in having no ethnic requirement for membership-anyone who accepts traditional Judeo-Christian values can be Western.”

Despite such egalitarian promises by Lind, “Western culture” has been interpreted as a white, ethno-nationalist construct (Hartmann et al., 2005; Haynes, 2017), if not for the inherent exclusion of the second largest Abrahamic faith, Islam from its implicit “Judeo-Christian values”. Sturm (2018) attributes its popularity to increasing Islamophobia and an effort on its users’ part to distance themselves from associations with antisemitism, thus becoming an empty signifier of wider conclusion. Indeed, to the first point of Islamophobia, Lind speculated that Islamic immigration to France may have already “reversed Charles Martel's victory in 732 at the battle of Tours” (p. 45), while also warning of a “moral decline” in U.S. excellence and community that might only be saved through “defense of Western culture abroad as at home” (1991, p. 47). For Christian Zionists, like Christian nationalists mentioned previously, the erosion of American culture and civic nationalism is a fearful sign of the end times (Sturm, 2018).
The role of racialized and nationalist antisemitism in apocalyptic philosemitism

O’Donnell (2021) recounts historical antisemitism in Christian Zionism, stating that antisemitism, as a discursive tradition, is a structuring influence on Christian Zionism evident in its constructions of Jewish identity, history, and tradition. Duff (2021) outlines these antisemitic constructions, such as Christian supersessionism, the premillennial belief that “the Old Age” that God replaces after apocalypse may include Judaism, specifically Jews who do not convert to Christianity. Additionally, since the prophesized Rapture requires Jews to return to Israel and the victory of Israel over its enemies, end-times Christians become fervent supporters of Zionist politics and politicians who stoke conflict in the region. Sturm (2017) suggests the antisemitism of these constructions has been recognized by contemporary Christian Zionists, and that a movement towards a more discursive, philosemitic set of relations with Jews away from this functional one has gained traction. He describes Christian Zionist recognition of Judaism and Israelis as an “unattainable higher tier” in their religious hierarchy as such an example (Sturm, 2017, p. 10); However, these philosemitic claims will be revisited shortly.

In another work, Sturm describes a Christian tradition of exclusion, where Jews are the ‘outsiders within’ and Muslims the ‘outsiders outside’ (Buchanan & Moore, 2003, as cited in Sturm, 2018), which bleeds into the apocalyptic battle of “us” versus “them”. This fear of outsiders once more serves a utilitarian purpose of maintaining moral order and racialized, religious boundaries. Anderson differentiates racism, “dreams of eternal contaminations”, from nationalism, which is concerned with “historical destinies” (1983/2016, p. 149). Sturm (2018, p. 313) links back to this idea by characterizing Christian Zionism and its conception of “Judeo-Christian values” as an ethno-religious nationalism that operates from a framework of
anticipation for its “future history,” or destiny, of prophesized Rapture (see also Schüssler Fiorenza, 1985, p. 40).

However, Anderson (1983/2016) appears to claim racism and antisemitism manifest within national boundaries, not across, and thus, are not a priori expressions of nationalism. Here Porter-Szűcs (2021) offers a necessary augmentation of Anderson; In the case of Jews, conspiracies of international Jewish control at the start of the twentieth century allowed for the framing of diaspora as ‘a nation within a nation’ (the ‘outsiders within’). Jews become targets of racialized nationalism when they are most assimilated, no longer distinguishable from white gentiles in terms of their socioeconomic status, allowing clams of their covert “infestation” to gain traction. By framing Jewishness as incompatible with any other national identity, according to Porter-Szűcs, racialized antisemitism is reconciled with nationalist frameworks such as Anderson’s. I argue that following this logic, the racialization of Jews as ‘outsiders within’ complements the racialization of Muslims in their nationalist framing as the ‘outsiders outside’ in modern Christian Zionism and Christian nationalism.

However, these understandings of antisemitism, racialized, nationalist, and Christian, seem to come from different philosophies. Together, they are not straightforwardly compatible in explaining how Christian Zionism’s and Christian nationalism’s premillennialism is also a nationalist antisemitism, nor how it reconciles supporting Israel (the ultimate ‘collective Jew’ [see Klug, 2003] and ‘outsider’ nation) with traditional antisemitic nationalism. O’Donnell (2021) points out that traditional antisemitic conspiracies of global control which portray Israel as a ‘collective Jew’ are seemingly contradictory to Christian Zionist narratives that situate Israel in opposition to ‘globalist’ threats to America. In the same confusing vein, Whitehead and Perry (2020, p. 112) found that followers of Christian Nationalism are likely to perceive Jewish people
as a threat (albeit less likely than Muslims, as well as other ethno-racial & political groups) yet also view American political support of Israel as instrumental to the success of the United States. Further, Barreto & Kim (2021) describe protestors waving of Israeli flags and use of other Jewish iconography at the January 6th Capitol riot in 2021 as an objectification of national identity by Christian nationalists and a message of Christian triumph.

In an effort to reconcile how these ideologies might coexist, O’Donnell (2021) builds off Klug’s (2003) theoretical framework for antisemitism, “the Jew” as not a Jewish person, but an imagined chimerical figure with collective interests akin to that of the ‘nation within’ described by Porter-Szűcs (2021), to explore the Christian Zionist relationship to Judaism and Jews. O’Donnell describes a Christian Zionist figure of “‘the Jew’ [sic] — a demonological figure that both is and is not ‘the Jew’ of classical antisemitism,” (O’Donnell, 2021, p. 41). “The Jew” is a figure whose individual Jewishness is erased at the same time as its chimerical “Jewishness” is, and in Christian Zionism, its antisemitic properties are characterized by this invisible operation. This framework of “the Jew” underwrites American Christian Zionist theo/geopolitics, mobilizing them to disavow classical antisemitism while supporting a specific form of “Israel”. This figuration of Israel is one that secures a political and cosmic legitimacy for Christian Americans, contingent upon the expulsion of Muslims from an Israeli ethno-state.

These theo/geopolitical discourses echo Christian nationalism both in terms of desired political action and underlying motivations. Gorski and Perry (2020, para. 22) allude to these potential motivations for Christian nationalist support for Israel, in which an “idealized” form of Israel is invoked, albeit less religiously derived. In their dialogue, Gorski proposes that Christian Zionists have nurtured fantasies of Israel’s own nationalist leanings as a militarily strong country with highly defended borders and (until recent elections) an uncompromisingly ruthless leader in
Netanyahu, which has an aspirational allure for what America could be under Christian Nationalism. O’Donnell (2021) and Durbin (2018) explore this authoritarian fantasy as another element of Israeli government support for Christian Zionists as well. Duff (2021) frames this, along with a combination of classical antisemitism and premillennial Zionism (similar to the ‘Jewish’ juxtaposition O’Donnell, 2021 proposes) as allowing end-times Christians, understood by Duff as adherents of Christian Nationalism, to both support Israel (the nation), and fall into nationalist antisemitic conspiracies, such as Jewish controlled space lasers or secret, cabbalistic world governments (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-b).

When considering Durbin (2018), O’Donnell’s (2021) framework of “the Jew” also allows for the new philosemitic alignment of Christian Zionists described by Sturm (2017) earlier. According to Durbin, such Christian Zionists are not concerned with the interests of Jewish people so much as understanding both Jews and Israel as “empty signifiers,” (2018, p. 12). O’Donnell likens these understandings to fetish objects (2021, p. 44) which echoes the role of fetishization in racialization and ethnic othering of other groups (Cheng, 2006). Durbin contends these constructions are reflective of neither Judaism or Israelis but “Christianized form of Judaism that is used in the service of ‘proving’ the ultimate truth of Christianity” (2018, p. 219). Thus, at its best, the antisemitism of Christian Zionism is a “philosemitic” fetishization which may inadvertently serve to racialize and other American Jews by taking for granted their otherness and equivocating individual Jews with the state of Israel.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Christian Nationalism has a growing body of research, and similarly, the nature of Christian support for Israel and its implications for U.S. policy continues to be explored. However, I believe the nuances motivating an ontological framework that combines Christian nationalism,
Christian Zionism, and antisemitic beliefs has been underexplored. Despite a sizeable Christian Zionist base in the U.S. with philosemitic positions, antisemitic conspiracy theories are more readily engaged with in Christian nationalist discourses (Djupe & Dennen, 2021; O’Donnell, 2020). This is of pragmatic interest as antisemitism has been identified as a precursor to extremist violence (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020).

Further, I am interested in the implications of these ideologies for the stability of American Jewish identity in the public sphere. Considered together, O’Donnell (2021), Porter-Szücs (2021), Klug (2003), Duff (2021) and Durbin (2018), seem to suggest there are multiple ontological framings of Jews engaged with by gentiles, wherein Jewish people can be “the Jews,” the collective Semite or nation which is the target of antisemitic hostility, or they can become the fetishized vehicle of Christian Zionism, objects of antisemitic philosemitism. However, these conceptualizations appear able to coexist within both the Zionist and the hostile anti-Semite, creating two fictionalized “Jews” divorced from the living people. The nature of such seemingly contradictory frameworks warrants more empirical research than currently exists, as it seems reflect changes in the modern-day conceptualization of Jewish diaspora as the ‘outsiders within’ and ‘nation within a nation’.

OBJECTIVES

My research aims to combine measures of Zionism, secular support for Israel, and Christian nationalism so their relationships with antisemitic beliefs may be explored. A long-term goal of this thesis research is to develop a more comprehensive battery of survey questions that measure Christian nationalism, Zionism, and antisemitism for broader distribution to a nationally representative population. This should be of interest to scholars of religion, sociologists, and survey practitioners.
Additionally, insights gained from this research will contribute to the understanding of Christian nationalism as racializing social force. The identification of new or previously understudied expressions of antisemitism will aid in the combatting of prejudice.

HYPOTHESES

1. Respondents who score higher on the Christian nationalism index will be more likely to support Israel than those who score lower on the index.

Whitehead and Perry (2020) identify how white Christian nationalism strives for clear racial and ethnic boundaries to secure a hierarchical order in society, with a specific figuration placing white Christians at the top. Nationalism also serves as a tool for political legitimacy and mobilization (Anderson, 1983/2016). In line with both, Sturm (2018) theorizes that fear of Muslims as ethno-racial outsiders and threat to Christian America’s security of eschatological salvation serves as motivating factors for nationalistic Christian Zionist support of U.S. intervention in Israeli conflict with Muslim-majority countries.

Gorski and Perry (2020) propose that those aligned with Christian nationalism may in some part support Israel due to the nation-oriented belief that Israel models the authoritarian solution for the present moral decline threatening the United States, similarly to some Christian Zionists (Durbin, 2018; O’Donnell, 2021). This belief allows for support of Israel that is not explicitly religious or premillennial in nature, though still motivated by support of a social hierarchy prioritizing Christianity and Christians. Thus, I expect that survey respondents’ support for Israel will differ based on their scores on the Christian nationalism scale.

2. Respondents who score higher on the Christian nationalism index will be more likely to believe more antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish people than those with lower scores, regardless of their support for Israel.
O’Donnell (2021) and Durbin (2018) theorize Christian Zionist constructions of Jews and Israel conflate the two for Christian ontological purposes, and in O’Donnell’s framework of “the Jew” Christian Zionists are compelled to let their implicit antisemitic assumptions go unexamined. I believe this framework serves to mysticize, fetishize, and other Jewish people similar to how other ethnic and racial groups have been in America (Cheng, 2006). Just as racialized nationalist antisemitism explicitly promotes myths and conspiracy of Jewish dual loyalty to Israel (Porter-Szűcs, 2021), I contend these fetishistic beliefs implicitly promote these same myths. This is complemented by Whitehead and Perry’s (2020) claim that adherents of Christian nationalism often hold beliefs that “true” Americans must also be Christian Americans.

Thus, I hypothesize that survey respondents who score highly on the Christian Nationalism scale will be more likely to report believing in stereotypes of dual loyalty than those who score lower, even when they express support for Israel.

METHODS

Survey Data

A pilot survey approved by Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board was designed and distributed to collect data enrolled undergraduate students aged 18 years or older from two public universities in the United States. The survey included a broad range of questions pertaining to respondents’ perceptions and opinions on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, belief in Jewish stereotypes and discrimination, as well as their political and religious values. The complete survey instrument can be found in Appendix A (p. 51). Prior to release of the survey, committee members provided feedback on question formatting and construction. Several Social Science graduate students assisted in informal testing of the survey instrument for proper skip logic and display formatting. Email invitations with links to the web survey were sent to sampled
undergraduate students on February 15th, 2022, and they were allowed to respond until March 15th, 2022. Data analyzed in this thesis were collected between February 15th and March 1st, 2022, at which point 501 responses were completed, equaling a 6.3% response rate. Future publications based on this research will use all responses collected from February 15th through March 15th. Descriptive statistics for valid, nonmissing responses used in analyses and collected by March 1st are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Site 1 (n = 348)</th>
<th>Site 2 (n = 123)</th>
<th>Total (N = 471)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additive CN index (0-19)</td>
<td>7.03 (4.78)</td>
<td>7.55 (4.67)</td>
<td>7.16 (4.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additive antisemitic stereotype index (0-32)</td>
<td>10.10 (4.87)</td>
<td>11.24 (5.50)</td>
<td>10.40 (5.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Palestinians</td>
<td>110 (32%)</td>
<td>40 (33%)</td>
<td>150 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Neither</td>
<td>136 (39%)</td>
<td>53 (43%)</td>
<td>189 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Israel</td>
<td>102 (29%)</td>
<td>30 (24%)</td>
<td>132 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>295 (85%)</td>
<td>88 (72%)</td>
<td>383 (81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>16 (5%)</td>
<td>9 (7%)</td>
<td>25 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-racial/other</td>
<td>21 (6%)</td>
<td>10 (8%)</td>
<td>31 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic, any race</td>
<td>16 (5%)</td>
<td>16 (13%)</td>
<td>32 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman, non-binary, or other</td>
<td>199 (57%)</td>
<td>76 (62%)</td>
<td>275 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>149 (43%)</td>
<td>47 (38%)</td>
<td>196 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>20.45 (2.07)</td>
<td>20.52 (3.81)</td>
<td>20.46 (2.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zero – $14,999</td>
<td>298 (86%)</td>
<td>109 (89%)</td>
<td>407 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000–$29,999</td>
<td>37 (11%)</td>
<td>14 (11%)</td>
<td>51 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$45,000–$59,000</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 or more</td>
<td>9 (3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest Region</td>
<td>17 (5%)</td>
<td>110 (89%)</td>
<td>127 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td>44 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>45 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Region</td>
<td>269 (77%)</td>
<td>10 (8%)</td>
<td>279 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Region</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not from US</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>12 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>13 (4%)</td>
<td>16 (13%)</td>
<td>29 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>284 (82%)</td>
<td>47 (38%)</td>
<td>331 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>51 (15%)</td>
<td>60 (49%)</td>
<td>111 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberal Protestants</td>
<td>27 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>29 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate &amp; Other Protestants</td>
<td>83 (24%)</td>
<td>29 (24%)</td>
<td>112 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarians &amp; Baptists</td>
<td>39 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
<td>47 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>69 (20%)</td>
<td>28 (23%)</td>
<td>97 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other religions</td>
<td>12 (3%)</td>
<td>12 (10%)</td>
<td>24 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none/nonreligious</td>
<td>118 (34%)</td>
<td>44 (36%)</td>
<td>162 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings about the Bible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belief</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word of God</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired word</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book of fables</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent not asked</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church attendance</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times a year</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice a month</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than once a week</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prayer frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times a month</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times a week</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a day</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a day</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party affiliation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent or other</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political views</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Continuous variables include mean and standard deviation in parentheses. Binary/categorical variables include count and column percentage in parentheses.

* Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To include the variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.

**Sampling design**

The survey population consists of U.S. undergraduate students aged 18 years and older. A combination of convenience and simple random sampling were used to construct a sampling frame from two U.S. university campuses: one southeastern land-grant university and one midwestern state university. The enrolled undergraduate populations of the schools in Fall 2021 were 21,577 and 8,147 respectively. Convenience sampling was used to select the university sites, and simple random sampling was used to select 4000 undergraduate students from each site.
This survey population and sampling methods were chosen for three primary reasons: First, prior research and public policy has highlighted the public university setting and younger generations in discourses surrounding Israeli-Palestinian conflict and support (Inbari et al., 2021; Anti-Semitism Awareness Act of 2019, 2019), though policy has often approached from the angle that this environment and population trend towards support of Palestine and an end of Israeli occupation. Second, two sites may help in addressing overrepresentation of demographic characteristics such as region, student geographic origin, race, et cetera that would be present in a sample of students from a single university. Both sites have higher proportions of in-state students and students from neighboring or regional U.S. states and territories represented among undergraduates. Though both sites are predominantly white institutions, the midwestern university, while being smaller, has an undergraduate population with a racial distribution more similar to the U.S. Census. Third, limited resources, the context of myself as a student researcher and this survey being conducted as part of a master’s thesis make university students the most accessible study population that allows for some application of probabilistic sampling.

Survey type

Considering the time constraints of this program and thesis and my resources, a cross-sectional survey type has been selected for this research. This approach allows for insight into college-age populations views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the ceasefire that came into effect on May 21st, 2021. It should be noted that a longitudinal study tracking this thesis’s survey variables would provide insights into these attitudes and their effects over time as well track the development of theopolitical opinions in young adults, and future research should consider this when designing surveys measuring Christian nationalism.
Data collection mode

The web survey was distributed to 8000 total students on February 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2022 via email. Emails directed respondents to Qualtrics to complete the survey. Care was taken to format this survey both visually and functionally for web and mobile completion, per social exchange theory-informed guidelines (Dillman et al., 2014). Server-wide issues with the Qualtrics platform email distribution service occurred on February 28\textsuperscript{nd}, the date first reminder emails were to be sent to unfinished respondents, resulting in over 3,000 emails failing to send. The issue was not resolved until March 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2022. I suspect this contributes to the lower than anticipated response rate at this stage of collection. Copies of contact emails are included in Appendix B (p. 92).

A sweepstakes incentive was utilized as pragmatic and cost-effective way to increase response rates and compensate respondents for their time. This incentive type has been shown to be particularly effective among university study populations (Laguilles et al., 2011). Amazon gift cards equivalent in value to $15 and $50 were rewarded to twenty randomly drawn respondents, with funding provided by Clemson’s Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice. Respondents were able to voluntarily enter the drawing by providing their name and email in a separate survey upon completion of the primary survey.

Measurement

Christian Nationalism

To measure Christian Nationalism, an additive index was adapted from five of six questions from the Baylor Religion Survey (BRS), also utilized by Whitehead and Perry (2020). The index measures respondents’ agreement with five statements: The federal government should allow prayer in public schools; The federal government should declare the United States a Christian
nation; The success of the United States is part of God’s plan; The federal government should allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces; and The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state. The first item was revised to explicitly refer Christian prayer in public schools, based on criticism that the original wording may be ambiguously interpreted as support for general religious freedoms by respondents (N. Davis, 2021). Adapting wording from a similar question used in the General Social Survey, respondents were instead asked “The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. Do you agree or disagree with the court ruling?”. Agreement for all 5 items is measured on 5-point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5), with the neutral option coded as a midpoint (3). The items concerning separation of church and state and prayer in public schools were reverse coded so that 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. Table 2 describes the mean and standard deviations for each item.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces.</td>
<td>1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The success of the United States is part of God’s plan.</td>
<td>1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should advocate Christian values.</td>
<td>1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state.</td>
<td>1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. Do you agree or disagree with the court ruling?</td>
<td>1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.

* Item reverse coded in additive index

Alpha tests of the five items yielded a Cronbach’s alpha = .81, indicating high reliability of the index. Principal component factor analysis suggests the five items load onto a single factor after varimax rotation. The additive index was set to zero, and observed scores range from 0 to
19 (mean = 7.22, SD = 4.75). Cronbach alpha coefficients of the six original index items were also acceptable for both the 2007 and 2017 waves of the BRS (.87 and .85, respectively), and items similarly loaded onto a single factor using exploratory factor analysis (Whitehead & Perry, 2020, p. 170). This scale has demonstrated predictive validity with data from several surveys, predicting voting for Donald Trump in elections (Baker et al., 2020b; Whitehead et al., 2018), COVID-19 attitudes and behaviors (Perry et al., 2020), opposition to interracial marriage and adoption (Perry & Whitehead, 2015a, 2015b), as well as support for police and punitive justice (Perry et al., 2019). It’s predictive ability in determining fear of ethnoracial outsiders such as Muslims (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori, 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018) is of particular interest for my current research.

Dependent Variable 1. Israeli-Palestinian Support

Questions developed by the Anti-Defamation League, Pew Research Center, as well as Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2021) were used to gauge broad support of Israel, its government and citizens. First, one of two pairs of questions gauging support for either Israeli and Palestinian governments or Israeli and Palestinian people on bimodal scales ranging from 1 “Very unfavorable to 5 “Very favorable” were evenly presented to respondents at random, as Pew Research Center had done for a panel survey of U.S. adults (Pew Research Center, 2019). Then, a 7-point question used by Inbari et al. (2021) measured support overall support for either Israel or Palestine which forced respondents to choose on a range from 1 “Very strong support for Palestinians” 4 “Support Neither” and 7 “Very strong support for Israel”. Means and standard deviations for these questions are available in Table 3 (p. 23).
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for Israel-Palestine support variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considering the situation between Israel and Palestine overall, where do you place your support?</td>
<td>1 (Very Strong support for Palestinians) to 7 (Very Strong support for Israel)</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of [The Palestinian people]?</td>
<td>1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very Favorable)</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of [The Israeli people]?</td>
<td>1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very Favorable)</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of [The Palestinian government]?</td>
<td>1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very Favorable)</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of [The Israeli government]?</td>
<td>1 (Very Unfavorable) to 5 (Very Favorable)</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.  

* These 2 questions were set to be evenly presented randomly to 50% of respondents  

* These 2 questions were set to be evenly presented randomly to 50% of respondents

While Inbari et al. (2021) tested their 7-point support measure in ordinal logistic regression, I suspect that overall support for Israel and Palestine may not follow an ordered progression along the scale’s points. First, the random pairs of questions assessing support for people and government indicate that respondents rate both governments somewhat unfavorably on average, and are neutral about both country’s people on average, suggesting that respondents can view both Israeli and Palestinian people or their governments similarly. Second, when asked why they supported neither overall using reasons from Inbari and Bumin (2020), the vast majority of neutral respondents said they felt they did not know enough about the issue (Figure 1, p. 24). This suggests the midpoint of Inbari et al.’s scale may not be reliably interpreted as representing a truly neutral position. Thus, to test my first hypotheses, overall support has been recoded into three dummy variables (support for Israel, support for Palestine, and support for neither) that were tested separately as dependent variables in logistic regressions.
Dependent Variable 2. Jewish Stereotypes

Selznick and Steinberg (1971) measured beliefs in 24 antisemitic stereotypes relating to Jewish dual loyalty, influence in business, government, and Christian deicide, and retained 11 items in their final index. Today the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) incorporates these items in their biannual Survey of Attitudes Towards Jews (Anti-Defamation League, 2020). These include stereotypes such as “Jews are more loyal to Israel than America”; “Jews have too much power in the United States today”; and “Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of Christ”. The ADL has also assessed belief in positive statements about Jewish people, and I included 2 of these statements.
Multiple items assess antisemitic belief about Jewish business practices or substantively ambiguous beliefs (such as “Jews have a lot of irritating faults”), so I selected only 8 of these items to include in my survey for clarity and to avoid redundancy. While the ADL has respondents rate whether they believe each statement is “probably true” or “probably false,” I expanded the response options to 5 points, forming a Likert scale that ranges from “certainly false” (0) to “certainly true” (5), with a midpoint of “I am unsure whether this statement is true or false” (3). This was done to better assess reliability of the measures and make their response metrics more comparable to the measures of Christian Nationalism. All 10 statements included in my survey and their means and standard deviations are listed in Table 4.

Table 4. Means and standard deviations for Jewish stereotype variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews stick together more than other Americans.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews always like to be at the head of things.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are more loyal to Israel than America.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the business world.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the United States today.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews want to weaken our national culture by supporting more immigrants coming to our country.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of Christ.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews place a strong emphasis on the importance of family life.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have contributed much to the cultural life of America.</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are just as honest as other businesspeople</td>
<td>1(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true)</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.*

a These items were not included in the final additive index of Jewish stereotypes

b In order to measure the stereotype referenced, that Jews are dishonest businesspeople, this variable has been reverse coded in the final index
The 8 statements I retained for the additive index (set to zero) had high reliability, Crohnbach’s alpha = .83. Observed scores for the 495 valid cases range from 0 to 32 (mean = 10.48, SD = 5.08). The ADL does not publish the psychometric properties of the 11 index items in their survey reports. Selznick and Steinberg (1971) report limited validity measures, such as the 11 retained items’ external validity via 6 other measures of antisemitism, and the rotated factor loadings of the original 24 items in a principal component factor analysis. Selznick and Steinberg retained 4 factors after rotation, which they categorize as conventional antisemitism, political antisemitism, positive stereotypes, and quasi-factual beliefs. My principal component analysis retained two factors after rotation (X^2(36) = 1457.95 ; p < .001) which explain 56.08% of the variance for the entire set of variables (Table 5). I believe these two factors can be straightforwardly connected to more contemporary theoretical constructions of antisemitism.

Table 5. Factor loadings of antisemitic stereotype variables (first two varimax rotated principal components showing values > 0.500)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews stick together more than other Americans.</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.85</strong></td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are more loyal to Israel than America.</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td><strong>0.61</strong></td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews.</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td><strong>0.65</strong></td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are responsible for the crucifixion of Christ.</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews always like to be at the head of things.</td>
<td><strong>0.66</strong></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are just as honest as other businesspeople*</td>
<td><strong>0.73</strong></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews want to weaken our national culture by supporting more immigrants coming to our country.</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the business world.</td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the United States today.</td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Variance</td>
<td>36.75</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance Explained</td>
<td><strong>56.08%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This item was reverse-coded

The first factor includes statements such as Jews have too much power in the business world; Jews have too much power in the United States today; and Jews want to weaken our national culture by supporting more immigrants coming to our country. I believe these are conceptually connected to the antisemitic conspiracies of Jewish world control and domination.
The second factor includes statements such as “Jews stick together more than other Americans” and “Jews are more loyal to Israel than America” which speaks to the idea that Jews are a “nation within a nation” only loyal to each other and ultimately, Israel (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.-a; Porter-Szücs, 2021).

Controls

A battery of controls relevant to a student population and my research questions were included to ensure observed relationships are nonspurious. Sociodemographic controls include age in years, a dummy variable for gender (0 = women, nonbinary and others, 1 = men), race/ethnicity (Hispanic of any race, white [reference category], black or African American, Asian, and multiracial or other), income (1 = “zero – $14,999” to 6 “$100,000 or more”), and type of area growing up (rural [reference category], suburban, and urban) and region (Midwest U.S., Northeast, South [reference category], West, and outside the U.S.). The respondents’ university was also included in controls. Political conservatism was controlled for by asking respondent’s political ideology (liberal, moderate, and conservative [reference category]) and party identification (Republican [reference category], Democrat, and Independent or other). Religious identity was controlled for by adapting a short-form of the categories in Lehman and Sherkat’s religious identification scheme, RELID, which categorizes Protestant denominations of Christianity based on a ‘continuum of theological exclusivism-universalism’ (2018). The shortened taxonomy classifies liberal Protestants, who tend to be more universal in their beliefs, Moderate and other Protestants, Sectarians and Baptists (reference category), who tend to be more exclusivist in their denominationalism, Catholics, other religions, and the nonreligious or ‘nones’. Religiosity was controlled for through measures of religious service attendance (0 = never to 5 = several times a week) and prayer frequency (0 = never to 6 = several times a day).
The religious fundamentalism of Christian respondents’ beliefs were measured via their sense of biblical literalism (Word of God [reference category], inspired word, book of fables, and non-Christians).

Respondents who did not identify as a Christian generally or a particular denomination, consider themselves culturally or ethnically Catholic or Mormon, or report being raised in Catholic or Mormon households were not asked their feelings about the Bible. These cases have not been counted as missing so that non-Christian respondents are not removed from analyses, though this causes collinearity with other religions and/or nones. It is debatable whether the category representing those who were not asked their feelings about the Bible is substantively interpretable, though its significance in models could be understood as proxy for non-Christian religions and nones. For the time being, I have erred away from interpreting model coefficients for this category in results.

RESULTS
Survey data were analyzed in Stata 17 Standard Edition (https://www.stata.com), with assistance from the user command packages asdocx for Stata (Shah, 2018) to construct tables, spost13 for data analysis (Long & Freese, 2014), and the pystata package for Python (Stata.com, n.d.) for data cleaning. The following tables include all valid cases from both survey sites (n = 471). Overall, three multiple logistic regression models were tested for my first hypothesis, while four multiple linear regression models were tested for the second hypotheses predicting antisemitic beliefs.

Although principal component analysis produced two factors from the antisemitic stereotype index, linear regression analyses used the full index. This allows for a more complete picture of the sample’s belief in antisemitic stereotypes, as my analysis is not yet intended to
assess differences in the types of antisemitic beliefs held by believers of Christian nationalism. Although the sample at this stage is smaller, it is large enough to draw statistically powerful inferences from, however results may not be generalizable to all students at either universities or national university student populations. Significance of modeled relationships should instead be interpreted as speaking to the strength of any observed differences. I periodically report standardized coefficients of model variables in this section to further compare the strength of predictors.

**Hypothesis 1. Multivariate logistic regression results**

Table 6 (p. 31) presents odds ratios from binary logistic regression models predicting respondents’ support for Israel, Palestine, or neither in Israeli-Palestinian conflict overall. Socio-demographic, religious, and political controls are used in each model. All three models are significant at the $p < .001$ level. The first model predicts the odds that respondents support Israel overall. The effect of Christian nationalism is significant (OR = 0.92; $p < .05$), and the odds ratio indicates that for every unit increase in the index (nineteen possible units), the likelihood that a respondent supports Israel overall decreases by 8%. Both respondents with liberal (OR = .15; $p < .001$) and moderate (OR = 0.35; $p < .01$) political views are significantly less likely than conservative respondents to support Israel. Liberal respondents are 85% less likely than conservative respondents to support Israel, and moderates are 65% less likely than conservative respondents to support Israel overall. Hispanic respondents significantly differ from white respondents in support for Israel (OR = 2.56; $p < .05$), that is, the odds that Hispanic respondents support Israel are 2.56 times that of white respondents. Men have 2.22 times the odds of supporting Israel compared to women, nonbinary, and other genders (OR = 2.22; $p < .01$).
Fully standardized regression coefficients can be used to compare the magnitude of effect for significant predictors in logistic regression models (Menard, 2002). The standardized coefficients of the first model indicate that liberal ideology, relative to conservative, has a bigger role in determining whether respondents support Israel or not overall ($\beta = -0.53$). Christian nationalism is the fourth strongest predictor of support for Israel ($\beta = -0.24$), behind moderate political views ($\beta = -0.27$) and those who were not asked their feelings about the Bible ($\beta = -0.48$), although the lattermost is not a substantively interpretable category in terms of respondents’ religious fundamentalism and may instead represent the magnitude of effect for non-Christian respondents.

Model 2 predicts probabilities of respondent’s overall support for Palestine. Christian nationalism was not significant in predicting odds of supporting Palestine, though the odds ratio (OR = 0.93; $p > 0.05$) was almost identical to those predicting support for Israel. The effect of respondents having liberal political views is very significant, and the odds ratio (OR = 10.63; $p < 0.001$) means that liberal respondents have 10.63 times the estimated odds of supporting Palestine than conservatives. The effect of income is significant (OR = 1.51; $p < 0.01$), suggesting that as respondents’ income increases, the odds of respondents supporting Palestine increase by 51%.

Interestingly, in the third model, Christian nationalism had a very significant effect on the odds of respondent’s supporting neither Israel or Palestine, and the odds ratio (OR = 1.13; $p < 0.001$) indicates that for every unit increase in the Christian nationalism index, the likelihood a respondent supports neither state increases by 13%. This was the only significant effect at the level of $p < 0.001$, with by far the greatest magnitude of effect ($\beta = 0.43$), although political moderates and those from urban areas had greater odds of supporting neither Israel nor Palestine than conservative and rural respondents, respectively.
Table 6. Logistic regression analysis of overall support for Israel, Palestine, or neither

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OR (SE)</td>
<td>OR (SE)</td>
<td>OR (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additive CN Index</td>
<td>0.92** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.93 (0.04)</td>
<td>1.13*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.97 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.77 (0.4)</td>
<td>1.76 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent or other</td>
<td>0.7 (0.24)</td>
<td>1.61 (0.72)</td>
<td>1 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically moderate</td>
<td>.35** (0.12)</td>
<td>2.24 (1.03)</td>
<td>1.93* (0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically liberal</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.07)</td>
<td>10.63*** (5.65)</td>
<td>1.23 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-demographic controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey site</td>
<td>0.5 (0.28)</td>
<td>1.35 (0.73)</td>
<td>1.23 (0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>0.36 (0.26)</td>
<td>1.11 (0.59)</td>
<td>1.67 (0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-racial/other</td>
<td>0.8 (0.5)</td>
<td>1.55 (0.71)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic, any race</td>
<td>2.56* (1.21)</td>
<td>0.95 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.22** (0.58)</td>
<td>0.75 (0.2)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.05 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.04)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.92 (0.14)</td>
<td>1.51** (0.23)</td>
<td>0.74 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest Region</td>
<td>1.85 (0.98)</td>
<td>0.41 (0.22)</td>
<td>1.25 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td>0.94 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.44 (0.21)</td>
<td>1.91 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Region</td>
<td>0.24 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.53 (0.54)</td>
<td>4.27 (3.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not from US</td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
<td>1.15 (0.87)</td>
<td>1.97 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.39 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.21)</td>
<td>3.31* (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>0.86 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.66 (0.22)</td>
<td>1.51 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal protestants</td>
<td>1.71 (0.97)</td>
<td>0.48 (0.35)</td>
<td>1.05 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate and other Protestants</td>
<td>1.3 (0.53)</td>
<td>1.18 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.74 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>0.53 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.92 (0.53)</td>
<td>1.88 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other religions</td>
<td>1.3 (1.08)</td>
<td>1.44 (1.1)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>1.07 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.9 (0.56)</td>
<td>1.12 (0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired word</td>
<td>0.8 (0.33)</td>
<td>1.65 (1.14)</td>
<td>1.07 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book of fables</td>
<td>0.54 (0.35)</td>
<td>1.46 (1.2)</td>
<td>1.48 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Christian</td>
<td>0.14** (0.1)</td>
<td>2.57 (2.11)</td>
<td>1.62 (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.99 (0.13)</td>
<td>1.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.99 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer frequency</td>
<td>1.17 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.99 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.88 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.7 (2.5)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR chi2</td>
<td>127.84*</td>
<td>147.88*</td>
<td>75.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. OR = Odds Ratio; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

a White (race), Women, non-binary and others (gender), South (region), Rural (area), Sectarians and Baptists (religion), Word of God (feelings about the Bible), Republican (party), and Conservative (political views) are the contrast categories.

b 12 observations predicted failure perfectly and were omitted.

c Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To include the variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.

The predicted probabilities of each model’s support of Israel, Palestine, or neither across levels of support for Christian nationalism are charted in Figure 2 (p. 32) to illustrate the relationship. In sum, these findings suggest that although Christian nationalism has a significant
effect on the odds that respondents in the sample support Israel overall, it is in the opposite
direction than expected, leading to rejection of my first hypothesis. That said, the effect of
Christian nationalism on overall support for Israel despite religious, political, and socio-
demographic controls suggest Christian nationalism is not just an effect of Christianity or
political conservativism.

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of overall support for Israel, Palestine, or neither state by score
on Christian Nationalism index

While prior survey research on Christian nationalism and support for Israel is limited,
Whitehead and Perry (2020, pp. 109–110) and Barreto and Kim (2021) suggest that Christian
nationalism is associated with a type of support for Israel that both objectifies its biblical role in
Christian theology and ports authoritarian ideals of America onto the state. The relationships of
the other covariates more closely resemble prior research findings that conservatives more often
support Israel than liberals or moderates (Inbari et al., 2021; Pew Research Center, 2014, 2019), as well as that more religious Christians tend to support Israel (Inbari et al., 2021). Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2021) also find that younger participants in the 18 to 29 years cohort are more likely to support neither Israel or Palestine, and considering the average age of this survey’s college-enrolled participants (20.68 years), the higher number of neutral responses is similar to these prior findings.

**Hypothesis 2. Multivariate linear regression results**

Table 7 (p. 35) presents results from multiple linear regression analyses predicting belief in antisemitic stereotypes. The dependent variable is the antisemitism stereotype index (32 units), in which higher scores represent greater belief in antisemitic stereotypes. Model 1 only includes socio-demographic and religious variables. Results indicate that when controlling for other sociodemographic and religious factors, Black respondents score 2.93 ($p < .01$) units higher on average for the antisemitic stereotype index than white respondents, and men score 1 unit higher than women, nonbinary and other respondents ($p < .05$). In terms of religious predictors, when controlling for other religious and socio-demographic predictors, liberal Protestants score on average, 3.3 units lower on the antisemitic index than sectarian and Baptist respondents ($p < .01$), moderate and other Protestants respondents score 1.68 units lower on the antisemitic stereotype index than Sectarians and Baptists ($p < .05$). On average, those who believe the Bible is a book of fables score 3.41 points lower than those who believe it is the literal word of God ($p < .01$), and as respondents pray more frequently, their scores increase by .36 units ($p < .05$).

Model 2 includes controls for political party and ideology which improves the overall model fit, and while all previously significant predictors wash out except respondents’ race being Black and being a part of a liberal Protestant denomination, a few newly significant predictors
are noteworthy. Respondents who are politically moderate and liberal score 2.61 and 5.08 units less on the antisemitic index than political conservatives, respectively ($p < .001$). The effect the survey site became significant ($p < .05$), with scores on the antisemitic index for respondents at the second university being 1.97 units higher than at the first university. This effect is not significant in the other models and is likely spurious.

Model 3 adds Christian nationalism, which has a significant positive relationship with respondents’ scores on the antisemitic stereotype index ($p < .001$). Net of sociodemographic, religious, and political controls, for every unit increase in the Christian nationalism index (19 units), respondents’ scores on the antisemitism stereotype index increase by .43 units. The significance of moderate respondents’ political views relative to conservatives lessens ($p < .01$). On average, respondents who grew up in suburban areas score 1.2 units higher on the antisemitic index than those who grew up in rural areas ($p < .05$).

Model 4 introduces respondent’s support of Palestine or neither state compared to Israel, since I hypothesized belief in Christian nationalism would be associated with antisemitic belief regardless of whether respondents support Israel. Coefficients of this model largely mirror Model 3, and the indicator variables for Palestine and neither are nonsignificant. Both models 3 and 4 suggest that controlling for all other factors, the more a respondent believes Christian nationalism, the more likely they are to believe antisemitic stereotypes. The interaction of support in Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Christian nationalism were tested, but since increase in R-squared between Model 4 and the interaction model was nominal, little explanatory value power is gained, thus the interaction was dropped. Standardized coefficients for Model 4 indicate Christian nationalism ($\beta = .38$) is tied for strongest predictor of belief in antisemitic stereotypes in the model with liberal political views ($\beta = -.38$), albeit in opposite directions.
Table 7. Linear regression analysis of respondent scores on additive antisemitic stereotype index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additive CN Index</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bezio</td>
<td>( b ) (SE)</td>
<td>( b ) (SE)</td>
<td>( b ) (SE)</td>
<td>( b ) (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel-Palestinian Support</strong></td>
<td>0.42** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.43** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.95 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Palestine</td>
<td>1.33 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.97* (0.92)</td>
<td>1.72 (0.89)</td>
<td>1.66 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Neither</td>
<td>2.93** (1.04)</td>
<td>3.27** (1)</td>
<td>3.22** (0.96)</td>
<td>3.09** (0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political controls</strong></td>
<td>1.44 (0.94)</td>
<td>1.3 (0.89)</td>
<td>1.29 (0.85)</td>
<td>1.31 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.07 (0.81)</td>
<td>.98 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.9 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.9 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent or other</td>
<td>-0.38 (0.64)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically moderate</td>
<td>-2.62** (0.66)</td>
<td>-2.08** (0.64)</td>
<td>-2.24** (0.65)</td>
<td>-2.24** (0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically liberal</td>
<td>-5.11*** (0.82)</td>
<td>-3.86** (0.81)</td>
<td>-3.91*** (0.84)</td>
<td>-3.91*** (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic controls</strong></td>
<td>0.59 (1.04)</td>
<td>1.1 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.06 (0.94)</td>
<td>0.87 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey site</td>
<td>0.65 (0.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>1.2* (0.55)</td>
<td>1.15* (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>-3.3** (1.26)</td>
<td>-2.54* (1.1)</td>
<td>-2.25* (1.01)</td>
<td>-2.23* (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-racial/other</td>
<td>-1.68* (0.85)</td>
<td>-1.1 (0.8)</td>
<td>-1.12 (0.76)</td>
<td>-1.08 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic, any race</td>
<td>-0.71 (0.92)</td>
<td>-0.59 (0.87)</td>
<td>-0.61 (0.83)</td>
<td>-0.74 (0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-1.35 (1.42)</td>
<td>-0.71 (1.36)</td>
<td>-0.23 (1.3)</td>
<td>-0.2 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-1.69 (1.08)</td>
<td>-1.24 (1.02)</td>
<td>-0.68 (0.98)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.57 (0.83)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.81)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.78)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Region</td>
<td>0.24 (0.96)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.9)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.86)</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td>1.09 (0.81)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.77)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.74)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious controls</td>
<td>-3.41** (1.17)</td>
<td>-0.83 (1.15)</td>
<td>-0.06 (1.11)</td>
<td>-0.15 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal protestants</td>
<td>-2.6* (1.19)</td>
<td>-0.00 (1.17)</td>
<td>0.71 (1.13)</td>
<td>0.57 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate and other Protestants</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>-1.57 (0.83)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.81)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.78)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspired word</td>
<td>-3.41** (1.17)</td>
<td>-0.83 (1.15)</td>
<td>-0.06 (1.11)</td>
<td>-0.15 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book of fables</td>
<td>-2.6* (1.19)</td>
<td>-0.00 (1.17)</td>
<td>0.71 (1.13)</td>
<td>0.57 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Christian(^b)</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.35* (0.17)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer frequency</td>
<td>11.01*** (2.51)</td>
<td>10.73*** (2.36)</td>
<td>6.12* (2.37)</td>
<td>5.9* (2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. \( b \) = unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** \( p<.001 \), ** \( p<.01 \), * \( p<.05 \)

\(^a\) White (race), Women, non-binary and others (gender), South (region), Rural (area), Sectarians and Baptists (religion), Word of God (feelings about the Bible), Republican (party), and Conservative (political views) are the contrast categories.

\(^b\) Respondents who did not identify as Christian of any denomination or generally were not asked their feelings about the Bible. To include the variable as a control for Christian fundamentalism, they are not counted missing. This is not an interpretable category.
In sum, these linear regression analyses demonstrate that respondents who hold stronger Christian nationalist beliefs tend to believe more antisemitic stereotypes, and those with liberal political views are less likely to believe such stereotypes. Results of Model 4 confirm my hypothesis that as respondents score more highly on the Christian nationalism index, they will believe more antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish people than those with lower scores, regardless of their support for Israel.

DISCUSSION

This research is built upon three core ideas from prior research and theory. First, Christian nationalism, as an ideology, serves to ensure adherents perceived hierarchical ethnic and racial boundaries that prioritize white Christian Americans and limit civic and national belonging of others (Baker et al., 2020b; Dahab & Omori, 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Perry & Whitehead, 2015a). Second, American Christian Zionism, or support of modern-day Israel, is often based on desire for similarly authoritarian political leaders in the U.S. (Durbin, 2018; O’Donnell, 2021) and/or reductive conceptualizations of Judaism, Jews, and Israel as utilitarian signifiers of biblical prophecy (Durbin, 2018; Inbari et al., 2021; O’Donnell, 2021), which serves to other and racialize diasporic Jews. Third, both of these factors strengthen nationalist and racialized antisemitism against Jewish diaspora, which is often expressed as stereotypes and conspiracies about Jewish power, control, and infiltration (Duff, 2021; Porter-Szűcs, 2021).

I hypothesized that more strongly adhering to Christian nationalism would be associated with supporting Israel overall in modern-day Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Results of these analyses were inconsistent with my expectation and prior research (Barreto & Kim, 2021; Whitehead & Perry, 2020), instead suggesting that greater adherence to Christian nationalism is weakly associated with decreased odds that respondents support Israel, and more strongly
associated with increased odds of supporting *neither* Israel nor Palestine. These relationships are present even with relevant socio-demographic, religious, and political controls. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often framed as a conflict between Muslims and Jews, these findings may suggest a more isolationist desire of Christian nationalism, where the U.S. supports neither state of ethnoracial outsiders. Another possible explanation for my contrasting findings could be this skew towards neutral responses, when as shown in Figure 1 (p. 24), rather than feeling neutral towards both Israel and Palestine, most respondents did not feel informed enough to take a stance on the conflict. This lack of knowledge could be associated with the sample population, being younger adults, overwhelmingly U.S.-born college students. Inbari and Bumin (2020, p. 625) suggest another explanation for neutral responses among Evangelical Christians; Some Christian respondents may select neutrality out of their belief that they are not in a position to affect the will of God concerning the End Days or time of Revelations. Whether this explanation is true of neutral believers of Christian nationalism is still unanswered.

My second hypothesis predicted that stronger adherence to Christian nationalism, as a means of enforcing exclusivist religious, racial, and ethnic boundaries, would be associated with belief in antisemitic stereotypes, even if respondents support Israel, a potential indicator of Christian Zionist belief. The results of my analyses were consistent with my expectation in this case, supporting that even when controlling for relevant socio-demographic, religious, and political predictors, as well as respondents’ support for Israel, greater adherence to Christian nationalism is strongly associated with more antisemitic beliefs. These findings suggest that for believers of Christian nationalism, religious and ethnoracial boundaries with Jews are maintained through antisemitic rhetoric that promotes myths of dual loyalty and Jewish world control.
Limitations

There are a few important methodological limitations to consider with this research. First, data used were collected only the first 2 weeks of response collection (February 15th through March 1st, 2022), resulting in a smaller sample size, which may adversely affect the reliability of coefficients for more disaggregated variables in models. I often resorted to collapsing response categories where differences may be substantively important due to having too few responses (e.g., Jews and Muslims being counted together as ‘other’ religious identities). Second, since my sampling frame was constructed using simple random sampling of students at two universities, it is likely the sample is not representative of either student populations in terms of socio-demographic traits or college students nationally. Respondents are overwhelmingly white and Christian in my sample. I will be using the complete data, collected from February 15th through March 15th, in future research, which may account for some of the issues posed by the present sample size and characteristics. Other researchers should aim to replicate these results on a larger sample, ideally representative of the U.S. adult population. Additionally, support for Israel is just one potential indicator of Zionism, and future research should test additional measures of Christian Zionism, such as Christian eschatological beliefs concerning Israel (Inbari et al., 2021; Rosenberg, 2017) and support for Israeli government leaders and policies.

Conclusions and suggestions for future research

Limitations notwithstanding, my research has taken a step towards expanding the research of American Christian nationalism with respect to geopolitics, Christian Zionism, and antisemitism. My findings appear to contrast prior research suggesting that adherents of Christian nationalism would tend to support Israel (Barreto & Kim, 2021; Whitehead & Perry, 2020), suggesting that
stronger adherents of Christian nationalism may in fact be significantly more likely to support neither Israel nor Palestine. This may suggest Christian nationalism does not have as much ideological overlap with Christian Zionism as previously thought. Future research should explore if particular motivations for support for Israel, such as support for its leaders, role in biblical prophecies, or anti-Muslim sentiments, are similarly or differently associated with both Christian Zionism and nationalism.

My research also demonstrates strong positive associations between Christian nationalist belief and antisemitism, which is supported by prior research by Whitehead and Perry finding that adherents of Christian nationalism view Jewish people as a threat (2020, p. 110) and research by Djupe and Dennen (2021) finding significant associations between Christian nationalism, QAnon conspiracy, and several of the same measures of antisemitic stereotypes used in my study. This affirms the larger body of literature finding support for Christian nationalism’s maintenance of exclusive national and civic identity based on strict religious and ethnoracial boundaries. Future research should aim to incorporate a more recent and larger variety of measures of antisemitism, such as the AzAs scale of Anti-Zionist antisemitism (Allington & Hirsh, 2019), to allow for more comprehensive understandings of the types of antisemitic rhetoric engaged within Christian Zionism and nationalism.

Overall, my research serves as a successful pilot study bringing together measures of three constructs theorized to be associated, though prior quantitative research had yet to address wholistically. The continued testing and improvement of these measures for Christian nationalism, Zionism, and antisemitism should be of interest to scholars of each. This thesis should make clear the importance of understanding the association of Christian nationalism with
all forms of exclusivist and prejudicial beliefs, as my findings suggest that these prejudicial beliefs inform the political positions adherents of Christian nationalism take.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Qualtrics Survey

Start of Block: Informed Consent

Survey: Clemson University Thesis Research
My name is Jessica Liberman. I am a graduate student in the department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University. I am asking you to participate in my research study. The purpose of my study is to better understand college students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their general political views, and religious values.

The minimum age to participate is 18 years of age. Participation is voluntary, and you have the option to not participate. There is no penalty for not participating or for withdrawing from the study. If you want to withdraw, you can close your browser at any time. You may stop and continue the survey at a later point in time. The survey will be accessible until 11:59PM EST, March 15th, 2022.

If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time. You will answer survey questions related to political views on various topics including Israeli-Palestinian conflict and United States politics, your sociodemographic traits and religious values. Some questions require response in order to determine your eligibility to participate in the study, and will be indicated as such, but otherwise you may skip questions that you would prefer not to answer.

We do not know of any risks or discomforts to you in this research study. There are no direct benefits to you for participating, aside from an opportunity to enter into a drawing for a monetary incentive upon completion of the survey. However, your contribution will help advance our broader understanding of how college students engage with geo-politics.

Incentives
At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would like to enter into a random drawing for one of either fifteen (15) $15 or five (5) $50 gift cards. Having your name entered into this drawing is conditional upon completing the survey. Names and emails will be voluntarily collected in a separate form and will not be linked to your survey response.

Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality
No identifiable information will be collected in this survey. Any volunteered names and email addresses will be kept on file until the completion of data collection and distribution of the gift cards. After this, identifiable data will be deleted.

The results of this study may be published in scientific journals, professional publications, or educational presentations. Published results will be aggregated and de-identified, meaning survey responses can not be connected to any individuals. All your responses will be kept
confidential within reasonable limits. Only those directly involved with this project will have access to the data. I will take all reasonable steps to protect your identity.

We might be required to share the information we collect from you with the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance and the federal Office for Human Research Protections. If this happens, the information would only be used to find out if we ran this study properly and protected your rights as a participant.

If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:
Jessica Liberman, Clemson University
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu

Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research.

By clicking the NEXT ARROW below, I affirm that I am 18 years of age and voluntarily consent to participate in this survey on ${date://CurrentDate/SL}.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406, Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu

End of Block: Informed Consent

Start of Block: screen

Q2.1 Are you a current undergraduate student at a U.S. college or university?

○ Yes

○ No

End of Block: screen

Start of Block: site_id

52
Q2.2 Which university do you attend for undergraduate studies?

Select from dropdown menu

- Clemson University
- South Carolina State University
- Southern Illinois University Carbondale
- University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana
- University of Nevada Reno
- University of Texas Austin
- Tarleton State University
- None of these

End of Block: site_id

Start of Block: ME support gov

Q4a The following questions are about your political beliefs generally, and regarding current issues.

Thinking about the situation between Israel and Palestine these days… Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unfavorable</th>
<th>Somewhat unfavorable</th>
<th>Neither favorable or unfavorable</th>
<th>Somewhat favorable</th>
<th>Very favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli government</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian government</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q4b The following questions are about your political beliefs generally, and regarding current issues.
Thinking about the situation between Israel and Palestine these days… Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unfavorable</th>
<th>Somewhat unfavorable</th>
<th>Neither favorable or unfavorable</th>
<th>Somewhat favorable</th>
<th>Very favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli people</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian people</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End of Block: ME support people

Start of Block: ME overall support

Q5 Considering the situation between Israel and Palestine overall, where do you place your support?

- ○ Very Strong support for Palestinians
- ○ Support Palestinians
- ○ Lean toward support for Palestinians
- ○ Support Neither
- ○ Lean toward support for Israel
- ○ Support Israel
- ○ Very Strong support for Israel

End of Block: ME overall support

Start of Block: Israeli support
Q5.1b Do you agree or disagree with the following reasons for supporting Israel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel because of my shared political or democratic values.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel because of my shared cultural and/or religious values.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel because Jews suffered discrimination and extermination at the hands of other nations in the past.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel because a thriving State of Israel is vital for the long-term future of the Jewish people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support Israel because its existence is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
proof of the fulfillment of prophesy regarding the nearing of Jesus’ Second Coming.

I support Israel because Jews are God’s chosen people.

Israel needs to build a temple for God on the Temple Mount in the near future.

I support Israel because it protects the holy sites and is the only guarantor of Christian access to them.
Q5.2b In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Israel? 
*Select all that apply*

- [ ] I have sympathized with Israel
- [ ] I have expressed my support of Israel to friends
- [ ] I have expressed my support of Israel on social media
- [ ] I have made donations to pro-Israel causes
- [ ] I have contacted my representatives in order to support Israel
- [ ] I voted for representatives who pledged to support Israel
- [ ] None of these, I have not expressed my support for Israel
- [ ] Other *Please explain*

__________________________________________

End of Block: Israeli support

Start of Block: Palestinian support
Q5.1a Which, if any, of the following are reasons for having little or no support for Israel?
Select all that apply

☐ Israel’s policy towards Palestinians

☐ Israel’s settlements built in the Palestinian territories

☐ Israel’s military occupation of Palestinians

☐ Jews are a privileged group who oppress the Palestinians

☐ I oppose Israel and its policies for religious reasons

☐ Other Please explain

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q5.2a In what ways, if any, have you expressed your support for Palestine?

Select all that apply

- I have sympathized with Palestinians and pro-Palestinian sentiments
- I have expressed my support of Palestinians to friends
- I have expressed my support of Palestinians on social media
- I have made donations to pro-Palestinian causes
- I have contacted my representatives in order to support Palestinians
- I voted for representatives who pledged to support Palestinians
- I have joined or supported an organization(s) that pledges to boycott, divest from or sanction Israel (e.g. BDS movement)
- None of these, I have not expressed my support for Palestine
- Other Please explain

End of Block: Palestinian support

Start of Block: No support
Q5.1c Which, if any, of the following are your reasons for supporting neither Israel or Palestine?
Select all that apply

☐ I do not want to pick a side

☐ Both of them deserve support

☐ Neither of them deserve support

☐ I do not know enough about the dispute

☐ Other Please explain

End of Block: No support

Start of Block: Political Views

Q9.2 Do you think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other?

☐ No, cannot coexist peacefully

☐ Yes, can coexist peacefully
Q9.3 Which of the following best describes your views on American involvement in Israel?

- The U.S. does not do enough to help Israel
- The U.S. is doing the right amount to help Israel
- The U.S. does too much to help Israel

Q9.4 About how often do you hear others expressing the importance of supporting Israel and/or Palestine?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support expressed for Israel</th>
<th></th>
<th>Support expressed for Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every week</td>
<td></td>
<td>Every week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td></td>
<td>Once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seldom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q9.5 Which of the following have influenced your opinions about the current issues between Israel and Palestine? 
*Select up to three (3) most influential.*

- Teachers or professors
- Media coverage
- Friends and family
- Your faith’s religious texts
- Your local church
- Personal experiences with Muslim people
- Personal experiences with Jewish people
- Religious leaders of your faith
- Religious leaders of other faiths
- Positions of elected officials
- Something else, *please specify*
Q9.6 Compared to a year ago, is the climate on your college campus less hostile or more hostile toward pro-Israel students?

- Less hostile than a year ago
- About the same as a year ago
- More hostile than a year ago

Q9.7 In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Moderate
- Conservative
- Very Conservative
Q9.8 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Something else, please specify

________________________________________________

End of Block: Political Views

Start of Block: Culture
Q10.1 Next, we have some questions about groups of people in the United States. How much discrimination do you think there is against each of the following groups in the United States today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>None at all</th>
<th>Only a little</th>
<th>Some discrimination</th>
<th>A lot of discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transgender people, that is people who identify as a gender that is different from the sex they were assigned at birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbian, gay, or bisexual people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q10.3 Suppose there were a fundamental conflict between the national interest of Israel and that of the United States--do you think that most Jewish-Americans would probably back Israel or the United States?

- Probably back United States
- Probably back Israel

Q10.4 Do you feel that Jewish-Americans are too inclined to defend Israel even when they disagree with its policies, or do you feel that Jewish-Americans are willing to criticize Israel when they disagree with its policies?

- Jewish-Americans are too inclined to defend Israel
- Jewish-Americans do criticize Israel

End of Block: Culture

Start of Block: Christian nationalism

Q3 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<p>| The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. Do you agree or disagree? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Somewhat agree | Strongly agree |
| o | o | o | o | o | o |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disagree with the court ruling?</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces.</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state.</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government should advocate Christian values.</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The success of the United States is part of God’s plan.</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End of Block: Christian nationalism
Q11 Below is a list of statements about Jews, including several that were made many years ago. Do you think that the following statements are probably true or probably false?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certainly false</th>
<th>Probably false</th>
<th>I am uncertain whether this is true or false</th>
<th>Probably true</th>
<th>Certainly true</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews stick together more than other Americans.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews always like to be at the head of things.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are more loyal to Israel than America.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the business world.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the United States today.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews want to weaken our national culture by supporting more immigrants coming to our country.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are responsible for</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the crucifixion of Christ.

Jews place a strong emphasis on the importance of family life.

Jews have contributed much to the cultural life of America.

Jews are just as honest as other businesspeople

---

End of Block: Jewish stereotypes

Start of Block: Demographics

Q12.2 Next, we have some questions about you. What is your age, in years?

____________________________________________________________________________
Q12.3 What is your classification in college?

- Freshman/first-year
- Sophomore
- Junior
- Senior
- Unclassified

---

Q12.6 What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

- White or Caucasian
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino/Latina
- Asian, Asian-American, Pacific Islander, or South Asian
- Indigenous or Native American
- Middle Eastern
- two or more races
- other, please specify______________________________
Display This Question:
If Q12.6 = two or more races

Q12.7 Which racial or ethnic groups best describe you?
Select all that apply

☐ White or Caucasian
☐ Black or African-American
☐ Hispanic or Latino/Latina
☐ Asian or Asian-American
☐ Indigenous or Native American
☐ Middle Eastern
☐ other, please specify

Page Break

Display This Question:
If Q12.6 != Hispanic or Latino/Latina
And If Q12.7 != Hispanic or Latino/Latina

Q12.8 Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?

☐ Yes
☐ No

Page Break
Q12.4 Have you ever undergone any part of a process (including any thought or action) to change your gender / perceived gender from the one you were assigned at birth? 
This may include steps such as changing the type of clothes you wear, name you are known by or undergoing surgery.

○ Yes
○ No
○ Prefer not to say

Q12.5 What is your gender?

○ Man
○ Woman
○ Non-binary

○ other, please specify _____________________________________________________________

○ Prefer not to say
Q12.13 Which of the following best describes your sexuality?

- Heterosexual / straight
  
  **Display This Choice:**
  
  **If Q12.5 != Man**

- Lesbian / gay woman
  
  **Display This Choice:**
  
  **If Q12.5 != Woman**

- Gay man

- Bisexual

- Other, please specify ______________________________

- Prefer not to say

Q12.9 Currently, about how many hours per week do you spend working on a job for pay?

- None

- 1-10 hours a week

- 11-20 hours a week

- 21-30 hours a week

- 31-40 hours a week

- 40 or more hours a week
Q12.10 Which of the following best describes why you do not currently work a job for pay?

- Focusing on academic studies
- Temporarily laid off
- Taking care of home or family
- Permanently disabled
- Retired
- Something else, please specify

Q12.11 Thinking back over the last year, what was your individual annual income?

- zero – $14,999
- $15,000–$29,999
- $30,000–$44,999
- $45,000–$59,000
- $60,000–$99,999
- $100,000 or more
Q12.12 What is your marital status?

- Married
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Never married
- Domestic / civil partnership

Page Break

Q12.14 Are you the parent or guardian of any children under the age of 18?

- Yes
- No

Page Break
Q12.15 Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- zero – $14,999
- $15,000–$29,999
- $30,000–$44,999
- $45,000–$59,999
- $60,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 or more

Q12.16 Which of the following best describes the area you grew up or spent the majority of your life in?

- Urban
- Suburban
- Rural
Q12.17 Are you a citizen of the United States?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to say

Page Break

End of Block: Demographics

Start of Block: Citizen

Q12.18 Which of these statements best describes you?

- I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen.
- I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant.
- My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant.
- My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA.

Display This Choice:

If Q12.17 = Prefer not to say

- I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen.

Page Break
If Q12.18 != I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen.
And Q12.18 != I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen.

Q12.19 Which U.S. state are you from? You may either use abbreviations (e.g., AL, MI, IL) or the full name of the state.

End of Block: Citizen

Start of Block: Religious Behaviors & Attitudes

Q13.1 How important is religion in your life?

- Not at all important
- Not too important
- Somewhat important
- Very important

Page Break
Q13.2 Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

- Never
- Seldom
- A few times a year
- Once or twice a month
- Once a week
- More than once a week

Q13.3 People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?

- Never
- Seldom
- A few times a month
- Once a week
- A few times a week
- Once a day
- Several times a day
Q13.4 What is your present religion, if any?

- Protestant
- Roman Catholic
- Mormon
- Eastern or Greek Orthodox
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Atheist
- Agnostic
- Nothing in particular
- Something else, please specify

________________________________________________
Q13.5 To which Protestant church or group do you belong?

- Baptist
- Methodist
- Independent Church
- Lutheran
- Presbyterian
- Pentecostal
- Episcopalian
- Church of Christ or Disciples of Christ
- Congregational or United Church of Christ
- Holiness
- Reformed
- Adventist
- Jehovah's Witness
- Nondenominational
- Something else, please specify

__________________________________________________________
Q13.6
To which Catholic church do you belong?

- Roman Catholic Church
- National Polish Catholic Church
- Greek-rite Catholic
- Armenian Catholic
- Old Catholic
- Other Catholic, please specify

Q13.7
To which Mormon church do you belong?

- The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
- Community of Christ
- Other Mormon, please specify
Q13.8 To which Orthodox church do you belong?

- [ ] Greek Orthodox
- [ ] Russian Orthodox
- [ ] Orthodox Church in America
- [ ] Armenian Orthodox
- [ ] Eastern Orthodox
- [ ] Serbian Orthodox
- [ ] Other Orthodox, please specify

Q13.9 To which Jewish group do you belong?

- [ ] Reform
- [ ] Conservative
- [ ] Orthodox
- [ ] Reconstructionist
- [ ] Other Jewish, please specify
Q13.10 To which Muslim group do you belong?

- Sunni
- Shia
- Nation of Islam (Black Muslim)
- Other Muslim, please specify

- Other Muslim, please specify

Q13.11 To which Buddhist group do you belong?

- Theravada (Vipassana) Buddhism
- Mahayana (Zen) Buddhism
- Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism
- Other Buddhist, please specify

- Other Buddhist, please specify
Q13.12 With which of the following Hindu groups, if any, do you identify with most closely?

- ○ Vaishnava Hinduism
- ○ Shaivite Hinduism
- ○ Shaktism Hinduism
- ○ Other Hindu, please specify ____________________________________________________________

Q13.13 Do you think of yourself as a Christian, whether religiously or spiritually or not?

- ○ Yes, think of self as Christian
- ○ No, do not think of self as Christian
Q13.14 Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian, or not?

- Yes, born-again or evangelical Christian
- No, not born-again or evangelical Christian
Q13.15 **Aside** from religion, do you consider yourself to be any of the following in any way? For example you may identify ethnically, culturally or because of your family’s background. *Select all that apply.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes, consider myself this</th>
<th>No, do not consider myself this</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Display This Choice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Jewish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Jewish</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Mormon</td>
<td>Mormon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Muslim</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Carry Forward Unselected Choices from “Q13.15”**
Q13.16 Please indicate whether you were raised in any of the following traditions or had a parent from any of the following backgrounds. Select all that apply.

Display This Choice:
  If Q13.4 != Jewish
Display This Choice:
  If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic
Display This Choice:
  If Q13.4 != Mormon
Display This Choice:
  If Q13.4 != Muslim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background</th>
<th>No, was not raised in this tradition and did not have a parent from this background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Jewish</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Roman Catholic</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Mormon</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display This Choice:</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Q13.4 != Muslim</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Display This Question:

If Q13.4 = Protestant
Or Q13.4 = Roman Catholic
Or Q13.4 = Mormon
Or Q13.4 = Eastern or Greek Orthodox
Or if
Q13.13 = Yes, think of self as Christian
Or if
Q13.15 = Catholic [Yes, consider myself this]
Or Q13.15 = Mormon [Yes, consider myself this]
Or if
If reraised Catholic - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is Selected
Or Or reraised Mormon - Yes, was raised in this tradition or had a parent from this background Is Selected

Q13.17 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Bible is the highest authority for what I believe.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
Q13.18 Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

- The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
- The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
- The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by man.
Q14.2 Are you interested in entering into a random drawing for one of fifteen (15) $15 gift cards, or one of five (5) $50 gift cards? Your response will still remain anonymous.

If you answer yes, once you click next you will be directed to another survey to enter the drawing.

☐ Yes, I would like to be entered into the drawing.

☐ No, take me to the end of the survey.

End of Block: Closing
Appendix B. Survey invitation and follow-up emails

Subject: Invitation to Participate in Thesis Research: Students' Opinions on U.S. in Global Politics

Dear ${m://FirstName},

My name is Jessica Liberman. I am a graduate student in the department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University, and I am inviting you to participate in my thesis research. The purpose of my study is to better understand college students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their general political views, and religious values.

You were randomly selected to participate in this study due to your enrollment at ${m://ExternalDataReference}. The minimum age to participate is 18 years of age. Participation is voluntary, meaning there is no penalty for not participating or for withdrawing from the study.

If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time, and you may stop and continue the survey at a later time. You will answer survey questions related to social and political views on various topics including Israeli-Palestinian conflict and United States politics, your demographic characteristics, and your religious values.

At the end of the survey, you will have an opportunity to enter a random drawing for one of fifteen (15) $15 or one of five (5) $50 Amazon gift cards. Entering this drawing is conditional upon completing the survey.

Follow this link to the Survey:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey}

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}

If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:
Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu

Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research.

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This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406, Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu

You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data; or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberm@clemson.edu)
You will be contacted again with this request two (2) more times during the next four (4) weeks. If you would prefer not to be contacted again: ${l://OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe}

Subject: Help a Graduate Researcher Understand Student Opinions on Israel-Palestine Conflict

Dear ${m://FirstName},

Earlier in February I emailed you regarding my thesis research in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Clemson University. The purpose of my study is to better understand college students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as opinions about U.S. politics, various social groups, and how these opinions may inform or affect one another. If you have already taken the survey, thank you, and you may disregard this email.

If you have not yet completed the survey, I hope that providing a link to it below will allow you to respond more easily:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Click here to take the Survey}

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}

If you choose to participate in the study, it will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time. If you've already started the survey, you will be able to continue from where you left off. Your participation will help contribute to our broader understanding of how students form opinions on current events and how they share those opinions with others.

If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:
Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberman@clemson.edu

Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Your response is voluntary, and I thank you for considering my request.
Jessica Liberman

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You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data; or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberman@clemson.edu)

If you would prefer not to be contacted again: ${l://OptOutLink?d=Click here to unsubscribe}
Subject: Last Chance to Help in Thesis Research!

Dear {m://FirstName},

I'm writing to follow up on the message I sent in February asking if you would participate in my survey of U.S. university students' perceptions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as their opinions about U.S. politics and various social groups. **This survey closes tomorrow, on March 15th**, and this is the last reminder I will be sending about the study.

The survey link is provided below:
${l://SurveyLink?d=Click here to take the Survey}

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}

As a thank you for your time and answers, at the end of the survey, you will have an opportunity to enter into a **random drawing for one of fifteen (15) $15 or one of five (5) $50 Amazon gift cards**.

If you have any questions about the study, please contact me or my advisor:
Jessica Liberman, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
jliberm@clemson.edu

Dr. Matthew Costello, Clemson University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice
mjcoste@clemson.edu
(864) 656-2026

Thank you for taking the time to assist me with this research, and I wish you an enjoyable rest of your semester.

Sincerely,
Jessica Liberman

--

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Institutional Review Board. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the committee chairperson, Clemson Centre, 391 College Avenue, Suite 406, Clemson, SC 29631. Phone (864) 656-0636. E-mail: irb@clemson.edu

You can always contact me if you would like to: review, change or delete the data you have supplied us with (to the extent I am not otherwise permitted or required to keep such data); receive a copy of your data; ask me questions related to the protection of your data; or lodge a complaint. You may view the data management plan for this survey by following this link. If you have any questions, please contact: (Name: Jessica Liberman, Email: jliberm@clemson.edu)

${l://OptOutLink?d=This%20is%20the%20final%20message%20regarding%20this%20survey.}