

Clemson University

TigerPrints

All Dissertations

Dissertations

8-2022

Drawn to Life: A Common Theory of Making

J. Ryan Garner

Clemson University, jryang@clermson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations



Part of the [Rhetoric and Composition Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Garner, J. Ryan, "Drawn to Life: A Common Theory of Making" (2022). *All Dissertations*. 3126.

https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/3126

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clermson.edu.

DRAWN TO LIFE: A COMMON THEORY OF MAKING

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Rhetoric, Communication, and Information Design

by
J. Ryan Garner
August 2022

Accepted by:
Dr. Ufuk Ersoy, Committe Chair
Dr. Cynthia Haynes
Dr. Andreea Mihalache
Dr. Gabriel Hankins

ABSTRACT

My research pivots around questions of *making*, its importance to all of life, and the challenges it faces in the contemporary world. The research is grounded in simple questions such as: what is making, what are its instruments, and can we do it on purpose? I approach these questions as if through binoculars. With one eye, I want to establish an account of making that is plain and somewhat quotidian. This will ensure the long-term viability of my study. With the other eye, I look for an account of making that is theoretically substantial and thoroughly vigorous. I apply magnification to both of these angles in order to home in on the essential features and operations of making. Though these two focal angles are arranged sequentially in the dissertation, they are conceptually reflexive. One perspective informs the other.

I start with the focal chamber that is directed towards the mundane. I take the everyday concerns of “making a living” as my point of departure and treat it as my raw sample. I then examine that sample under the fourfold lens of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. These lenses spotlight and isolate three structural principles of making. Namely, all making is comprised of **agency**, **surface**, and the process of **marking**. With a more formidable sample in view, I turn to the other binocular barrel and apply more levels of magnification. I look at “making a living” under the lenses of anthropology, phenomenology, and architecture. These rotating magnifications reveal three critical motifs for an account of making. Namely, making is inflected by number, touch, and repetition.

Finally, I speculate about the way these binocular angles and their constituent parts are held together by controlling theoretical perspectives. I claim that most making in the

modern world has been understood under the rubric of writing and has been guided by a philosophical assumption about exteriority. I assert that drawing—and its correlative assumption about interiority—can rehabilitate making and achieve the goals set out from the beginning of the dissertation. That is, drawing—both as a theory and instrument of making—elides contemporary problems whilst remaining accessible precisely because it is material, habitual, and tectonic.

DEDICATION

My research is about drawing things together and drawing people forth so that both can draw near to life. My work belongs to everyone.

Please, feel free to draw on it.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research bears witness to drawing. It takes place amongst neighbors, friends, and ideas. It is fitting to draw attention to them here.

Angela, you drew me in from the start and never drew apart. I adore you.

June and Lewis, I draw hope from you. I cherish you.

Mom and Dad, you drew me out and drew me forth. I love you.

Nan, when we needed a fix, you drew alongside us. I treasure you.

Carl, Dalton, Jill, Nathan, and Trevor you let me draw my breath. I owe you.

Finally, to every barista in town, to every dining room attendant wondering if I'll ever leave, to every librarian answering my questions: let's call it a draw.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TITLE PAGE	i
ABSTRACT	ii
DEDICATION	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
CHAPTER	
FOREWARD: OUTLINING THE PROBLEM	1
1. OUT OF THE QUESTION	9
1.1 The Community of Inquiry	9
1.2 Systematizing the Inquiry	13
1.3 Out of the Question	19
1.4 The Three Elements	25
1.5 The Structural Elements of Making	27
1.6 On Inscriptions	32
1.7 The Conjecture	42
1.8 The Architectonic	45
2. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF DRAWING	48
2.1 From Mythos to Logos	48
2.2 Anthropology is not Ethnography	49
2.3 On Material Intrageneration	53
2.4 On Technicity and Graphism	65
2.5 Of Kith and Kin	76
2.6 Scratching the Surface	83
2.7 Homo Superficialis	88
2.8 Anthropological Findings	92
3. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DRAWING	96
3.1 Digging In	96
3.2 Phenomenology	99
3.3 Ontology	115
3.4 Three Motifs	144

Table of Contents (Continued)	Page
4. THE LIFE OF DRAWING	148
4.1 All the Pieces	148
4.2 Exteriority as Phenomenologically Basic	151
4.3 Exteriority, Elements, and Motifs	155
4.4 The Abductive Turn	168
4.5 Life on the Inside	171
4.6 Diagramming Conclusions	194
5. THE ARCHITECTURE OF DRAWING	201
5.1 Case Study	201
5.2 First Joining	203
5.3 Uninhabitable	213
5.4 Tectonics of Light	224
5.5 Regional Tectonics	228
5.6 Tectonics Contra Technique	232
VI. Afterword	234
REFERENCES	239

FOREWARD

Outlining The Problem

This dissertation is about drawing. But, to set the record straight, it is not about techniques. It is not an apology for the importance of the arts. It is not about drawing as a way of thinking or being. It is about drawing as a way of being alive. It is about the ability to draw a line somewhere. It is about drawing near, drawing out, and drawing together. It is about withdrawing so that others may draw forth. It is about the way that drawing is different than writing. It is about how drawing has been lost in the wake of writing's primacy. It is about rehabilitating, recovering, and resurrecting drawing. In all, it is about how drawing is integral to the act of making a life.

But these pursuits present a real problem. To put it bluntly, I'm not sure how to write about drawing? If the final destination of the dissertation is drawing, then how do I get there by writing? It is not as if this is merely an issue of content. It is not that drawing is an unwieldy matter that simply needs to be carefully arranged and subdued in a written argument. Writing and drawing are different forms, methods, and processes. There are countless books dedicated to the subtleties and

distinctions of form and content. We do not need to consult them here. We only need to turn to the text in front of us to illustrate the problem. The dissertation itself gives us a ready-made example of how drawing differs from writing in terms of procedure and scheme—not just content.

Consider the outline. Now, consider the semantic ambiguity that is circling in your mind about that term. What does he mean by outline? Which kind? Therein lies my difficulty. Outline could mean an exercise in writing *or* drawing. But this is the decisive matter: *Both* forms would proceed along—and produce—different conceptual logics. In writing, the outline is a sequential arrangement of ideas for a written composition. This kind of writing is the gold standard for dissertations. You expect to see it right before this page. It is the first moment of the argument. This outline moves hierarchically. It progresses by linear causality. It implies a sequence of dependency. Point A leads to Point B which leads ultimately to Z. The written outline gives readers a path to follow, a metric for evaluation, and repeatability. Hence, its elevation in defenses, dissertations, and book proposals. This is not altogether inappropriate, though. But it is problematic for a thesis about drawing. My conjecture directly calls repeatability, path-making, and even causality into question. So, can I use these assumptions, even methodologically, and then discard them like scaffolding?

But this is not the whole story. We cannot forget the drawn outline. In drawing, the outline is the edge of a figure marked out by a stylus, painted, or imaged in some way. It has no starting point. Its endpoint is only the figure revealed. It can cross over and reverse itself without compromising that figure. It can change

weights and scales freely. Some lines are thicker and others thinner. It does not have a hierarchy but it is radically interdependent. The outline of the figure makes sense as a gestalt totality. This strategy, if ever used in a formal academic setting, is normally relegated to a supporting role. A table here or an illustration there reinforces the written argument. To be clear, and balanced, this is not improper or unsuitable. I even do it here. The point is that in these cases writing still governs. Drawing, taken as a core conceptual logic, is rarely applied to the overarching conjecture and demonstration. That is exactly what I want to do.

This formal problem parallels the content problem of the dissertation. Namely, that writing and drawing are at odds. Furthermore, it is hard to bring them together without one absorbing the other. Historically, they have always been a pair. They mutually implicate each other. Once again, we do not have to look very far to see this—literally. Each one of these markings in front of your eyes or being recited to your ears are themselves drawings. They have histories. These curves that form the alphabet are primordial markings enfolded into habits—a habit called text. But somewhere along the way, drawing receded to hobbyism while writing became the authority on self-expression, creativity, policy-making, law, corporate copyright, and now code. So, both in form and content, I am tasked with rebuilding drawing from the ground up. My burden is to let drawing appear amidst a sea of writing and then reacquaint the two as long-lost friends. Practically, what the dissertation needs, then, is some sort of demonstration that feels like drawing but looks like writing. It needs to be able to build a vision that can bring these two worlds of making back together.

Therefore, this dissertation is an exercise in theory building. This fact should set your expectations. The dissertation will not descend from a direct or singular problem to a direct solution. It will not have a story arc of beginning, middle, and end. It will not be a cross-comparative analysis. It will not be statistical or hierarchically dependent. It is a re-imagining. It looks a outside the given state of our thinking, assumptions, and routines to find new resources for living. It is abductive. Therefore, the study will build from the edges like the outline of a drawing. It will gather scattered insights and lump them together in an ever-evolving piece of clay. It will not be final but it will have form. It will not be original but it will be originary. It will be written but it will not follow “writing” as divorced from drawing. As the theory is drawn from the edge, the elements are drawn together, and the image of making and living is drawn out.

A final metaphor will help paint the picture. In sum, this dissertation functions like a jigsaw puzzle. As you move through it, the elements begin to come into view in relation to each other. The puzzle metaphor is not only the big picture but informs each stage of development. In the beginning, you open the puzzle in anticipation of discovery. You know what you are headed towards (from the box) but the construction itself will bring a new picture, at a new scale, with your own failures and achievements fitted into the picture. After all, you will scuffs and bend pieces in the process. In the same way, you already know what is on my box: drawing invigorates making and living. And, you already know that you will scuff up and bend the pieces I present to as you while conceptually build alongside my descriptions.

Of course, not everyone executes puzzles the same way. But for most, the next moment of puzzling is to scatter the pieces and position the target image. In the same way, my opening chapter starts with a mytheme which functions as a target image or ideal. I then scatter the pieces. The scattering feels overwhelming when we puzzle but it is necessary to organizing and aligning pieces. We simply cannot build a picture in a straight line moving from one piece to another. The same goes for theory building. The next step, for most (but not all), is to sort the edge pieces. In the sifting, the eureka moment is the discovery of the corners. This gives us traction in the face of a seemingly insurmountable array of pieces. My first chapter does this too by establishing a methodological container. It has its own four corners which constrain empirical observations (pieces) and our speculation. Once the edge is constructed, there are innumerable strategies. In my own experience, I sort puzzle pieces according to some kind of identifiable quality. For example, if the pieces share an image of colorful objects, we collect those colors together. The first chapter of the dissertation proceeds accordingly. With the edge intact, I begin to collect insights piecemeal. I find patterns these pieces share and group them. But much like the puzzle bunches, they are still piles. We must tend to them directly. In the second chapter, I stitch them together.

The next step is a major one. At this point, we are staring at a puzzle box, an edged image with a huge vacancy, an assortment of smaller sectional images, and a side pile of generic and unspecified pieces. This last pile is critical though. We need to merge these big clumps together with the liminal pieces drawn from this pile. By trial matching and error, we put one color here and another there. We try to see

which of our indefinite pieces will come to life in the puzzle and hold our other sections together. The third chapter follows suit. It is my attempt to look in the cracks of the image, in between the foregrounded ideas assembled in the prior chapter, and discern how they go together.

This puzzle analogy not only explains the scope of the study but also its rhythms and speeds. At this stage of a puzzle, two things happen to our procedural rhythm. First, things speed up. As the structure solidifies, our liminal piles get smaller. Therefore, we can insert formerly unrelated pieces very quickly. If we had not built that picture in front of us, we would stare at that piece as an unrelated anomaly and with disinterest. But as things come together, it simply “fits.” The same can happen to abstract ideas in this third chapter. They may have felt insignificant and distant early on but by the time they are put in, they do not require extensive and methodical reflection. They fit. And this implies the second thing that can happen at this point. It may not fit. And when a piece does not, we have to stop in our haste, backtrack, and rebuild. This happens to ideas and concepts as well. If they do not fit we must retrace our steps to find the error.

And this is precisely where our study takes leave of the puzzle analogy. The puzzle reconfigures according to the given image. But *we*, in this study, can actually draw a new image wherein our pieces may fit more harmoniously. With the coordinated image in front of us, we are in a position to evaluate it and change it. Do we like the image? Is there a better way to look at this? We do not typically have this opportunity in puzzling. But that is not important. What matters is that we have arrived at a stage of study that is unique to abduction and theory building. We can

evaluate this image and draw a new one. In the spirit of the metaphor, we can take the pieces and rearrange them in hopes of seeing a different picture. Though we do not recreate the image when we puzzle, we do still evaluate it and measure its qualities against our desires. We came to the puzzle wanting a social experience, a mental stimulus, or a way to bide time. Regardless of which initiative drove us to the puzzle, it stands outside it and is critical for evaluating its performance and quality. Thus, on the one hand, the study is different than a puzzle insofar as it has more modular control. On the other hand, they are similar (the puzzle and dissertation) insofar as they are both guided by some external interest. These features apply to the second part of my third chapter. We have scattered, edged, assembled, stitched, and seen a picture. We now wonder whether that picture fits our desires. This is where the puzzle stops. And, this is where theory-building reveals itself as instrumental throughout. We look, we evaluate, and we reconstruct. This is the moment where my conjecture takes viable form. But we are not done yet.

We stepped out of the puzzle analogy to establish the function of theory building but now we can step back in. With the puzzle complete, we do in fact measure what we see in our process against our other experiences of that image. If it is camping, we speculate about camping. If it is an image of Paris, we wonder about a future trip. We implicitly ask: is this puzzled image like the real one? Does it miss things? Does it add things? Does what we see actually feel like this in time and pace? What memories does this conjure? This comparison amounts to the case study of my final chapter. I turn to another field of study to see how the elements

from this study (this puzzle) work themselves out in another field (“real” life). In so doing, we can verify our findings in this study (this puzzle) according to what we observe there in that field (that real experience).

There is one final moment, the next puzzle. When we finish and store our work, we begin to anticipate the next one. We image the process, the image, the experience. Our speculations are brief and concise. After all, we are not there yet. We are only forming a basic path towards that next puzzle. This parallels the conclusion of the study. In the end, I point to the next questions waiting to be answered. I signal towards those issues which are on the horizon of drawing, making, and living.

1. OUT OF THE QUESTION

1.1 The Community of Inquiry

From the very beginning, I've been interested in seeing human life through the lens of making. Making time. Making meaning. Making furniture. Making art. Making love. Making a difference. The list goes on. And I have always been adamant that this creative capacity belongs to everyone—especially the poor. Everyone should be able to make new rules at institutions, make new buildings, or make waves in the social behaviors of a family. Humans have long been able to make a difference where they live, in how they live, and in what they collectively live for.¹ Somewhere along the way, we abdicated or abused this function. I want to recover it.²

1. I should point out that despite my emphasis on the ground, there will be very few footnotes from the outset of this study. This is because I am explicitly trying to withhold the academic conversation. I am trying to find a research space that is afforded to me rather than by colonizing an area. The footnotes and pathway markings will accumulate as our magnification increases.

2. I should also point out that this opening salvo hints at Marxist intentions. While I do in fact share Marx's concerns, I do not route my research question through him. There are three reasons for this. First, there is an enormous body of work dedicated to the problems of everyday life and Marxist positions. Most of these concern the mechanisms and relations of social production. Very few, if any, narrow in on personal operations and tools. This is my explicit focus and therefore it places me outside the received literature. Second, the term production, central to Marx, obscures my interest in making. Making, for my purposes, lies before any kind of mechanical or systemic fabrication. I am interested in the manual origins of any material birth. Third, I am

Making is at the core of my research agenda but so is its corollary: life. Throughout my study, I am trying to excavate real life. I am looking for the ground of making. I am trying to sift through daily action and discover the practices of making or unmaking. I want to explicate the material forces and decisions that shape our lives. I want to know how humans have been materially involved in developing the world that they dwell in. How that material world turns back and shapes humans. Finally, I really want to know why it's so damn hard now for everyday people to make a difference in their world—in their lives.

But it does not take a Ph.D. candidate to realize that these grandiose and ambitious interests cannot do much to help the very people they extol. At least, not in the way I have articulated them here. Philosophy does not bake bread, as they say. Regular people (scholars included) need an account of making that has public value. We need one that can be accessed, practiced, and proclaimed. We do not need one that can be delicately described but never exercised. We need one that takes root in the mundane. But, I want to make a distinction in my advocacy right here from the beginning. The mundane is not the same as humdrum. We do not just need to figure out how to do what we are already doing just “a little better.” We do not need the status quo. We do not need more skill, more class, or more writing lessons. Those approaches have only produced that acquiescent mood that circulates in maxims like “it is what it is.”³ Our world—our life—demands a model

explicitly targeting everyday people and the name Marx is front-loaded with misunderstanding. While I think that most interpretations are erroneous, I wanted to challenge myself to establish an account of making that sidesteps the trite and typical objections that are levied against Marx.

3. I want to be clear that I do not reject these idioms tout court. In the interest of thorough disclosure, these sorts of phrasings are highly instructive when establishing new theories and models of making. Though I touch on some idioms below, I do

of making that is practicable but also carefully explicated, novel, and restorative.

This is my charge. This is the impetus of my research.

I acknowledge in advance that I am not the first person to take up this burden. Both economists and academics have tried to help humans navigate making as labor, technique, or skill. But, I am not satisfied with these models. The economic strategy tells us that the way to make a life is to acquire enough wealth to manipulate the material lives of others. Then, you can “make your own world.” The academic approach has been split. On the one hand, it plays that same economic tune by endorsing more industry-recognized learning. On the other hand, if you are not an applied scientist and you want to make a difference in the world, you will need to have a poetic sensibility and carve out your own space. You will need to master language. To be fair, there is some value to academia’s linguistic account of making. Language, as a tool, can help us understand how people make a change in the world through symbols. But it cannot give us access to the things themselves. In fact, in many cases, symbols distance us from materiality. In the end, these strategies elevate us or isolate us. Neither does much to advance making on the ground.

So what is the answer? Where do we turn? How do we develop a model of making that is useful to those who need it most? Despite their insufficiency, we can actually start with these economic and academic models of making. If for no other reason than their decomposition can leave behind useful impressions. And those

not take up this one as formative. But, it is worth noting that if I had, this idiom’s highly ontological shape would be a foil to my ontic approach.

impressions can help us mold a proper theory of making. In other words, we can investigate our givens and find new possibilities. The hierarchical nature of the economic model keeps most people passive and construes making as labor. If this is a deferral of a full life, then we need to be looking for the inverse: an account of making that is radically common and perpetually actionable. Making must be shared and materially effectual. When making is limited in terms of who can do it or what it leaves behind, it is hardly making. In addition to these conditions, the linguistic accounts derived from academia suggest that a proper theory should be multidimensional. It needs to operate on two levels. Language has utility for every common user but can also be placed under theoretical scrutiny. A quality theory of making must be both a concept and a mechanism. Fortunately, this multidimensional condition safeguards the former stipulations of commonality and actionability. Making cannot be only an abstraction lest we risk it becoming uncommon and unactionable. It cannot be strictly manual lest it come under the control of a few and remain inaccessible to most. Thus by passing through these two insufficient models, we have an early sketch of the kind of theory of making that we need to build. In short, humans require a theory of making that is universally livable *and* theoretically doable.

These early insights shed light on the nature of my research agenda and its forthcoming conclusions. I am studying human making but the orientation of my study is expressly constructive. I am not qualifying or quantifying findings. I am building and building is speculative, visionary, and even tentative. What is more, I am building in, around, and on top of other structures. Therefore my project

requires careful plans, clear schematics, and repeatable blueprints in order to materialize my vision. To determine the best methods and plans for construction, I need to briefly review the building site in front of us. People on the ground need a common, active, and practicable theory of making. The theory must be inhabitable. But my theoretical construct will also face external factors. It will be surrounded by an academic atmosphere of questions and challenges. Thus, the theory will need to be a manually and conceptually sound paradigm. And, much like a building, I need to anticipate the life of my conjecture over time. I need to prepare my model to adapt and adjust according to new data and phenomena. Given this landscape, I will use SYSTEMATIC COMBINING methods and abduction to build a theory of making.⁴

1.2 Systematizing the Inquiry

SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is a constructive research method by nature. It is not one of those methods where the researcher establishes a problem and then hypothesizes a solution. It takes a phenomenon of interest and sorts out its constitutive elements. It aligns all of those elements by distributing them into four main categories. In no specific order, those four categories are the EMPIRICAL WORLD, FRAMEWORK, THEORY, and CASE STUDY. This distribution has three key benefits. First, these categories allow the researcher to observe the systemic harmony or discord of the phenomenon without privileging any single feature.

4. Anna Dubois and Lars-Erik Gadde, "Systematic Combining: an Abductive Approach to Case Research," *Journal of Business Research* 55, no. 7 (2002).

Second, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is multidirectional both in layout and logic. The researcher can analyze or synthesize. By separating a phenomenon into these four aspects, the researcher can analytically isolate causal relationships and subtle correlations. Conversely, the researcher can synthesize these categories into a picture of how a phenomenon acts, behaves, survives, or dies. In other words, they can illustrate the whole life of an idea. Lastly, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is as experimentally prescriptive as it is diagnostic. If the researcher concludes that an element (*in any of the four fields*) is disrupting the expressed purpose or holistic stability of the phenomenon, they can test an alternative arrangement by subtracting, adding, or replacing that element with another. Because this method is explicitly present throughout my examination and in diagrams, I want to narrow in on the components and their interactions.

The first category, the EMPIRICAL WORLD, provides a researcher with their basic phenomenon of interest.⁵ It is the sample for the study. As I have already intimated above, I am interested in daily life. How it is made. The habits. The procedures. The ability or inability to make a world that I live in. But the empirical category does not only provide raw information. It also reveals patterns or clusters of phenomena. We cannot possibly review every data point in an EMPIRICAL observation. But SYSTEMATIC COMBINING encourages us to take note of things we have seen, heard, tasted, smelled, or felt, more than once. At this point, if we were actively applying the method, we would have begun to organize and color these patterns. We will have now crossed into another domain, the FRAMEWORK,

5. Dubois and Gadde, 557.

which works opposite the EMPIRICAL WORLD.⁶ The framework is critical in identifying key elements for a study. But this identification has guidance. The structures that the framework provides are largely influenced by another domain, the THEORY.⁷ The THEORY category can be a collection of literature related to the phenomenon under review or drawn from a well-known conceptual model that explains why this frame applies to the empirical world. It can also, as it will in this case, produce a novel rationale from—or for—the phenomenon. Each of these categories, as a study progresses, gives rise to a fourth category, the CASE. The CASE STUDY is not a prescribed sample of the assumed THEORY.⁸ It is the evolving product of the interplay of the other three. The case offers a composite manifestation of what is concluded in each category. It gives the researcher an anchoring product.

Beyond the categories themselves, their interplay has the most influence on my study. The authors call this interplay “MATCHING⁹.” This process allows the researcher to test one field against another. For example, does the framework “match” empirical reality? Does the theory correspond to actual case examples? The questions abound because the MATCHING process does not have a prescribed beginning. It moves freely back and forth and accumulates clarity in the process. This has a direct impact on my study. It is, broadly, my entire process.

6. Dubois and Gadde, 557.

7. Throughout the study, I will use small capitals to designate the proper categories of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. This is to prevent confusion between the formal THEORY category and any use of the term “theory” to designate a coordinated concept or paradigm. Refer to the guide in the front matter for more details on textual formats.

8. Dubois and Gadde, “Systematic Combining,” 558.

9. Dubois and Gadde, 556.

Throughout what follows, I will be aligning various elements of human making in order to test their harmonics. But MATCHING also has a more acute function in my work. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, as a whole, is interested in relationality instead of hierarchy and is therefore congenial to alternatives. MATCHING does the hard work of examining that relationality. exposing discontinuities and weaknesses in certain theories, empirical samples, or frameworks. It places elements side by side and when those pieces do not align, the door is open to alternative explanations. MATCHING fuels theory generation.¹⁰

To be clear, in order for MATCHING to work it must apply a logic in this comparative moment. That is, if I put A beside B, I am using some system of reasoning to measure them. But, while matching uses logic it is not confined to one method. It can employ deduction or induction as it moves back and forth between fields. For example, from FRAMEWORK to EMPIRICAL WORLD we may deduce relations but if we moved from world to frame we may apply inductive concepts. And when these logics produce inconsistencies, MATCHING utilizes abductive reasoning. Abduction, made famous by C.S. Peirce, is a reasoning sequence that moves “off to the side.”¹¹ Any time the relationship between premises and conclusions, or rule and result, is problematic abduction steps out of that linear flow and looks for other explanations. Abduction is also less formal and more flexible

10. Kristian Philipsen, "Theory Building: Using Abductive Search Strategies," in *Collaborative Research Design*, ed. P. Freytag and L. Young (Singapore: Singer, 2017), 50.

11. Charles S. Peirce, "On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents," in *Essential Peirce v. 2* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998), 106.

than its logical siblings. It almost explicitly consults everyday discourse and experience to test and measure any logical claim or concept.¹²

Consider the beginning of the famous idiomatic conditional syllogism: “if it looks like a duck, and sounds like a duck.” Deduction would compel us to conclude that it is a duck. Abduction invites us to reconsider. If it does these things like a duck, but we are aware of another factor that does not seem “duckly,” then it might be a goose. This is abduction in a nutshell. It probes a given set of relations and, whilst trying to confirm them, opens the possibility that those relations are not well suited to one another. It allows another explanation that may provide more coherence and explanatory power. It performs these operations simultaneously. On the one hand, it strengthens relations and theories—provided they minimize internal dissonance. On the other hand, as it aligns and instinctively compares elements, the relative stability of its coordinating product provokes alternate possibilities in our imagination. Instead of forestalling those instincts and reducing them, abduction seizes upon them in full form. Thus, it is ideal for theory-building. As the engine of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, it keeps research developmental and recursive and therefore always capacious for alternate explanations for a phenomenon. What I must emphasize is that the full force of abduction is always operative in everything that follows. Abduction will not always be stated directly or declared outright, but it is always fomenting speculative insights. Namely, because this is a study in theory building. We are looking to formulate an idea rather than strictly confirm it. We are always gesturing towards novel understandings whilst

12. Dubois and Gadde, “Systematic Combining,” 555.

piecing together elements of a phenomenon. This does not mean that abduction is an open-ended platform for any hair-brained connection. Abduction is still constrained by its observations and structural commitments. It only means that abduction has a wide—but focused—lense that is critical for the early stages of a new paradigm.

As a foretaste of what abduction will produce, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will show that when we sample the empirical world, we find that making rests upon a few key foundational pillars. Those pillars are fortified or weakened by certain theories of making. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will show that those very pillars have cracks in them. This weakening of making corresponds to the prevailing theories of writing. This comes into clear view as we proceed, but at this point, we can only say that writing provides a certain conceptual basis for acts of making (even local ones unrelated to the manual act of writing) and that this basis actually undermines making. Simultaneously, as SYSTEMATIC COMBINING reveals the insufficiencies of *written* theories of making, it also points to the restorative possibilities of a *drawn* theory. These possibilities are the purpose of this paper: to flesh out a theory of making that is grounded in drawing. The remainder of this first chapter, however, is to establish the apparatus that will provide footing for these later formulations and insights.

To recap, inadequate models of making highlight the need for an accessible, fruitful, and robust theory. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will help me build a theory of making both because it makes room for theory generation (precisely what we need) and because it parallels my internal conclusions. This method will allow me

to look back and chart the elements of those insufficient models and look forward and coordinate those same elements under a new organizing theory. But that must come later. At this point, we must turn towards the ground, zoom in on the empirical world, and gather data on the common perceptions of life and making.

1.3 Out of the Question

In our EMPIRICAL examination, excavation tools arise out of questions. Questions can till the soil of hardened assumptions and reintroduce disregarded experiences. But, right here at the outset, I want to do something strategically drastic. I want to suspend all the questions I have developed here above. They are my questions. Not ours. Not the world's, so to speak. Starting with my questions would violate my core condition to situate making in the lives of common people. It would be like building a local artifice with foreign and ecologically hazardous materials. More importantly, letting the investigation arise out of my questions would have a very practical consequence for this specific set of papers in front of you. They could make this work irrelevant to the people I am trying to reach. Here at the culminating end of my conceptual journey, I fear a hard fact: no one will care about my questions. At least no one except interested parties or friends. And even these folks will not bring my questions into their own lives. My conjectures will be dead on arrival if I base my work on private interest, neologisms, or esoteric curiosities. How valuable can any scholarly contribution be if the assessing conversation remains behind closed doors or tucked within complex terms where no one can listen in? If I want the dissertation to make a dent in the world I will need to start

from scratch. If I want my conclusions to have an impact for those on the ground then I need to start from the ground up. Therefore, I will turn the dissertation inside out to establish the “so what” of my study at the very beginning. I will let the world’s questions be my point of departure. I will begin at the end.

This end cannot be deduced by a logical approach to a problem in the world. This would already have too much distance. We must follow the path of the anthropologist and listen for that “end” as it arises in a mythos.¹³ A mythos is that undercurrent or thematic that guides a series of behaviors.¹⁴ It is akin to a narrative plot but it exceeds it in intensity and depth. Mythos becomes the psychological orientation of the actors within its jurisdiction. Mythos is the *telos* of local inventions and practice. It sits somewhere between narrative and habitus.¹⁵ We might say it is their bonding agent. We experience mythos in mythemes. To wit, beginning with mythemes is not unusual in analytical research or theory building. Jacques Derrida’s famous account of the *pharmakon* or Bernard Stiegler’s series *Time and Technics* both descend from mythemes. But, a mytheme is not restricted to texts or well-known fables. A mytheme may also be a well-circulated phatic description like an idiom.

To avoid smuggling my interests back in, I must suspend any mytheme or “end” that is contained in my conjecture. Fortunately, we do not have to be very aggressive with our EMPIRICAL sampling to locate our founding mytheme. It

13. Aristotle, *Poetics* (London: Penguin, 1997), 14-20.

14. Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *The Journal of American Folklore* 68, no. 270 (1955): 430, doi:10.2307/536768.

15. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 214.

actually comes to us. The world shows itself on its own terms. Our grounding concepts arise right *out of the world's questions* (the world outside my thesis...the world this study is built for...the world who will go on living and making). And those “real world” questions come right at the end—and on the outside of—the dissertation. I am not being obtuse or indirect. I am referring to that literal and temporal end when the dissertation is printed, submitted, and defended. Where privileged study shifts to shared interest. Where the poetic becomes prosaic and the pedantic stands before the pedestrian. Where I have to face my neighbors, supporters, and family, and explain to them what I have just done for the last few years and with my life savings. This is where I encounter the actual “so what” questions of the world—not just the ones I posed for myself. This is the empirical soil that I will dig in. This is the soil where I will plant the seeds of my research.

We do not have to dig deep. We do not have to wait long for the world's questions. They are actually waiting for us at this end. And, conveniently, they point us right back to the issue of living and making. When we do encounter someone at this end, they ask two simple, but loaded, questions. One is explicit and the other is its implicit corollary. As to the first, someone will ask, or perhaps already has many times, “what are you going to do with your degree?” This all-too-familiar question may seem harmless at best and annoying at worst. But our routine consent to this question conceals what is actually at stake. When someone asks us, “what are you going to do,” they intend something very simple. What they want to know is: where are you going to get a job doing this thing you studied? This comes as no surprise. But it's precisely the fact that this interpretation is so ubiquitous that deserves

attention. There is a social ontology and behavioral psychology so deeply embedded in this question that it is hardly ever noticed. Questioners and responders alike assume that what we “do”—in our case, what we study—is primarily explicable in economic terms. If this assumption is ever academically interrogated it usually remains in economic spheres. But what is self-evident, although enervated, in the question is its focus on human activity and agency. Action is the most direct aspect of the sentence but it gets buried under the weight of economic assumption. Thus, the question both conceals and reveals the primordial purposes of human action. It is simply asking: *how will you act?*

This explicit question is always accompanied by an implicit corollary. The second—often silent—question is: *will it matter?* It is the one that haunts the respondent. Even if one can articulate what they plan to *do*, they cannot measure its effect. That part is up to the rest of the world. Others—other lands, other people, other animals, etc.—will decide whether that thing we “do” with our degree is significant. And much like the first question, that significance is measured economically and semiotically. Even if the question only circulates in the imagination, both the questioner and the respondent will anticipate "mattering" by how much money that “doing” will generate. Both imagine significance as gaining enough semiotic force to effect symbolic change—to buy a company or gain social status. Once again, though, this abstract economic interpretation obscures the plain nature of the inquiry. If we took it at face value, to *matter* would simply be effecting material change. Or perhaps more appropriately, constructing materiality. It would

be doing something embodied or sensual. Mattering would be more like making a quilt, playing with Lego, or baking. It is simply asking: *what will you change?*

As is natural with EMPIRICAL sampling, these observations help us sketch out some basic structures for a new theory of making. First, and self-evidently, the two questions share space and time. They arrive together. The first question leads to the second. They are mutually informing. Second, and more importantly, they also share an organizing principle. The force of that organizing principle affirms some interpretations and repels others. For example, The questions ostensibly ask: *what material reality (matter) will you act on (do)?* But, we feel dissonance when we take these questions in simple and plain ways because they are at odds with the prevailing motif. We are *supposed* to know that the questions mean that we should get a job (do) and earn significant capital (matter). This is the inherited and approved reading. On our way towards setting down a FRAMEWORK, these patterns point our EMPIRICAL attention to other samples to see if this governing motif is bigger than these two questions.

Let us reorient ourselves, then. We are here at the end of the dissertation mining thoroughly mundane situations for clues about the nature of making. Two standard questions have set us well on our way. But to probe further, these questions can give way to a third idiomatic question that is both more synthesized and more fecund for our purposes. It discloses a more general disposition. Someone may ask: *how do you plan to make a living.* The idiom reinforces and develops the notion of action intimated in the “doing” question above. Here, the word plan connotes more intent and purpose than simply “doing.” And, in expected

fashion, this plan is unreflectively treated as an economic strategy to get a job, secure capital, and so forth. And, in accordance with what we saw with other terms above, the term **plan**—when taken directly—does not imply economic strategy but some kind of interaction on a planar surface. Likewise, making is self-evident and clearly stands at odds with “getting a job and “living” is irreducible to money. In addition to these tensions, this idiom also expands and generalizes the prior questions by recasting doing as making and mattering as living. What was formerly characterized as a personal obligation to do something and matter is now connected to the general duty of all to make and to live. These idiomatic questions codify the basic cultural rationale.¹⁶ Before homing in on that rationale, we must turn our attention towards the FRAMEWORK field and derive the basic structures of making latent in these observations.

Let me restate what we have in front of us now. We have a clear research desire: to build a theory of making. We have a clear research agenda: that theory should be accessible, materially effectual, and conceptually viable. We responded to that desire and agenda by activating SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. We started by pointing the EMPIRICAL lens of ` COMBINING at the end of the dissertation to let the world define making in its basic questions. We observed three questions (*What are you going to do? Will it matter? Plan to make a living?*) that cluster around a basic economic motif. We also sketched out ways that those terms might be misaligned and therefore could cluster around an alternate motif. Now we must

16. To stave off any potential dismissal, idiomatic phrases are not incidental or irrelevant. They are pristine social samples. They mobilize ideals and inculcate the uninitiated. They reveal what we bury in them

investigate those terms more directly to test their flexibility and to anticipate alternate clusters (which will then lead to a tectonic theory of making centered on drawing). We turn our attention towards the FRAMEWORK field and try to distill the basic concepts that structure the terms, questions, and idioms that emerged in our EMPIRICAL observation.

1.4 The Three Elements

The FRAMEWORK will generalize what we found in the EMPIRICAL stage. It also isolates corresponding concepts that we can then work with. In the first question, “doing something” implies **agency**. Even if the status quo interpretation of the question is about jobs, the questioner still assumes that the path to power, the control over one’s future, is wrapped up in the issue of **agency**—even if that market-laden agency proves to be exsanguinating. The second question, “mattering” qualifies the scope and force of that agency. Accordingly, it assumes that agency is material in two senses. The interrogator thinks that the consequences of a job will be *empirically evident*. But this is only the first sense of “mattering.” This sense is directly physical. The question includes a second sense wherein mattering pertains to an ability to effect, change, or cause the “matters at hand.” Put together, material efficacy is those actions that redirect or shape an event. Importantly, the questioner does not evaluate efficacy—for better or worse. The questioner also does not isolate efficacy to ecologically, emotionally, or socially impact. What is important is that effectual agency is a cardinal element of making. In the third question, the “doing” and “mattering” are configured as a dyad: making

and living. They go together. To do is to matter. Making is living. **Agency** is efficacy. And, of course, any of these can be inverted. Lastly, plan combines both agency and material efficacy with manual execution. To plan is to spread out, measure, and scratch the **surface**. In simplest terms, to plan is to **mark** that surface. This is why the term has deep affinities with architecture. We will discuss this in detail in chapter 5. For now, I simply want to enumerate the elements of the framework we see. Making is a constellation of **agency, marking, and surfaces**.

This framing, lets us compare the structural elements of making against my early desires and research agenda. I wanted a theory of making that is common. These elements are general and universal and therefore common. But their universality is nevertheless experienced specifically and particularly. Though we derived them from the scholar's dissertation experience, they (agency, marking, and surfaces) are ubiquitous. They are present in most forms of "making." And they are applicable to those who would not consider themselves makers. The questions that produced these elements are asked of everyone. Whether you quit a job, acquire a skill, or fall in love, someone is asking you "what are you going to do now" or "how do you plan to make a living given x situation?" In other words, our framework is both local and distributable. These elements of making apply to me and to nearly everyone within their own field-specific situation. They satisfy the main demands of our study. Namely, to establish an account of making that is both radically common and theoretically sound. They also correspond to the original goals, as noted above. That is, to understand making in the everyday world and energize it. We need not look for analytical logics or quantifiable measurements of

these terms. We only need to see that they underwrite our daily rituals and shape-making or unmaking. This is not to say that these elements cannot still be tested under quantifiable methods or analytical philosophies. So to reiterate and conclude this section: daily interests in *making a living* or *doing* and *mattering* orbit around the foundational concepts of **agency**, **marking**, and **surfaces**.

1.5 The Structural Elements of Making

At the risk of redundancy, let us collect what we have developed so far so that we can map out the obstacles in front of us. I am trying to build a theory of making that suits everyday life. That issue, as it turns out, is not uniquely my own. By using a non-hierarchical methodology, we EMPIRICALLY examined everyday questions that center on doing, mattering, making, and living. We used the FRAMEWORK aspects of our method to distill three basic elements of making: **agency**, **surfaces**, and **markings**. At this point, these conclusions reopen a question I posed earlier we passed over. Namely, why is so damn hard to do this? If we know what making is made of, then why can we not live this out? To answer, we must use SYSTEMATIC COMBINING'S fluidity to float back over to the empirical field where we can observe the obstacles to making in everyday life.

If we return to our original EMPIRICAL sampling of questions, we can see opposition to making approaching from two fronts. Let us consider our original mundane questions in reverse. The last question we identified, about making and living, generalized the issues of doing and mattering. Living is everyone's purview. Making at this scale is threatened by the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is a

geological term that denotes an epoch of time in which humans have precedence on the earth.¹⁷ This can mean that humans have the greatest efficacy or that the world is centered around humans. For example, the Holocene precedes the Anthropocene and was defined by heat. The Pleistocene before that, ice. So, in simpler terms, humanity *defines* the earth. But that role might be destructive or constructive. That is still under debate. In fact, the very nature of the Anthropocene is always under review.¹⁸ But most of those disputes are about when the age begins not whether it has begun. But this does not yet tell us why the Anthropocene is a challenge to making. For that, we need to identify the most universally affirmed aspect of the Anthropocene.

According to the Anthropocene, whatever action the agent of change performs, they perform that action on a surface. After all, it is a geological term. And geology concerns itself with surfaces and layers of surfaces.¹⁹ Identifying the surface here does two things. First, it reaffirms our FRAMEWORK. We said earlier that the surface is a pillar in the structure of making. In direct terms, the Anthropocene agrees. Second, the surface also maps the battlefield for making. This is where the danger arises. If humans are the center of the world, and the world is on a dismal trajectory, that damage is felt at the surface²⁰. In the age of the Anthropocene, the

17. Paul J. Crutzen, "Geology of mankind," *Nature* 415, no. 6867 (2002): 23, doi:10.1038/415023a.

18. Donna Haraway et al., "Anthropologists Are Talking – About the Anthropocene," *Ethnos* 81, no. 3 (2015): 45, Bruno Latour, "Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene: A Personal View of What Is to Be Studied," *The Anthropology of Sustainability*, 2017, 38, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56636-2_2.

19. Jan Zalasiewicz et al., "The Anthropocene: Comparing Its Meaning in Geology (Chronostratigraphy) with Conceptual Approaches Arising in Other Disciplines," *Earth's Future* 9, no. 3 (2021): 5, doi:10.1029/2020ef001896.

20. Zalasiewicz, "Meaning in Geology," 10.

surface is threatened by human construction. Or, making. We dig into mountains, expunge waste from and into the ground, and we affect the surface temperatures of oceans. As a result, we are deeply afraid of damaging the world right here at the surface. And this has direct consequences for collective human making. Ecological disaster and mass extinction, we fear, are in our future if we keep making things at this rate and in this way.²¹ In other words, if we do make our life then we may not be able to live with the world we have made.

But human making gave us dental care, statuesque art, and conservation. Is it all bad? Is it humans qua humans that are destroying the earth? Since the arrival of the Anthropocene, another term has come into the geological lexicon that may more properly explain the current state of the planet. The Capitalocene affirms the dangers of human action by aligning them with capital flows.²² That is, it is not humans qua humans who destroy things but those that hold access to capital in the greatest quantities. These can be private persons, corporations, or governments. According to the Capitalocene advocates, digging in the mountain or drilling in the ocean is a derivative of the desire for capital. And the Capitalocene does not circulate and influence the world amongst elites, it bears down on the least of these.

Recall that our making a living question opened up the role of the Anthropocene. Our second question, doing-and-mattering, confirms the role of the Capitalocene. Most everyday folks do not fret about their actions having planetary

21. Susan A. Crate, "Introduction: Anthropology and Climate Change," in *Anthropology and Climate Change: From Encounters to Actions*, ed. Susan A. Crate and Mark Nuttall (London: Routledge, 2016), 24.

22. Jason W. Moore, "The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 44, no. 3 (2017): 597, doi:10.1080/03066150.2016.1235036.

consequences. They do, however, worry that their actions will—or will not—affect their relationship to capital. This produces local conflicts and competitions. Social arrangements, school decisions, city policies, and more are driven by these capital flows. The Capitalocene arranges which businesses get stitched into local soil, which skin gets which advantage, or how humans interface with each other. While the Anthropocene points to the surface of the planet and the Capitalocene points to the surface of others. The Capitalocene may or may not be the central influence on climate change, but it is certainly the most dominant force in class dynamics.

These two fronts are always lurking in our sense of making. And, once again, this is evident in our daily discourse. No, I don't have the time to build that. Time is money. That's an expensive hobby. I don't know if the soil will, will hold. I don't know if I can plant here. I don't know if I can dig here. I don't know if I have access to the wood that I need to make this. Or I don't have the financial resources. I'm not the owner. I'm not big money. I don't have the power to do that.

The Anthropocene and the Capitalocene have led many to believe that making is dangerous, impossible, or antiquated (let the machines do it). But this is precisely where EMPIRICAL samples and FRAMEWORKS need help. These two categories only tell us what the structures of a phenomenon are, not why they began or continue that way. We must open the need for a THEORY. In the THEORY field, we have some rationale or explanation for the data we have and the patterns we see therein. The THEORY explains how the elements of the framework are held together. What kind of relationship they have. Those connections allow us to stretch our understanding and imagination. We can use one element of a

FRAMEWORK to shed light on another. In so doing, we can draw inferences about dark elements. We can evaluate the quality of that bond. We can even identify the elements that are underserved by that bond. We will do all of that in chapter 3. For now, we only need to be able to say that making, living, surface, agency, materiality, and so on may not be the problems underlying the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene. The problem may lie with the way they are arranged. It may be their priority, their distribution, or their negligence. Below, we will test status quo theories directly and show that these elements can be invigorated and even undermine the Anthropocene and capital's energy.

It is worth noting that the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene are not all bad. They may reflect a disordered theory but they can also still play a diagnostic and prescriptive role in this study. As I have already noted, The Anthropocene confirms the importance of the **surface**. What we make changes the ground, our skin, and our sky. Meanwhile, the Capitalocene testifies to the centrality of **agency** (which we have observed implies material efficacy). That is, only a few people have the money to make earthly differences. Put differently, the marks we make on the earth (Anthropocene) or the marks we are allowed to make on each other (Capitalocene) underlie the everyday concepts of making a living or doing something that matters. In other words, these two obstacles still traffic in the same structural elements we distilled before. They sharpen them even further. These problems focus our attention as our study approaches the THEORY field. They confirm that any model of making will need to align surface, agency, and marking in a hospitable way. They are well suited for the abductive reasoning noted above. They appear with the logic

of doom but they inadvertently map their corrective. They convert the FRAMEWORK into the schematic of a new theory of making that restores and realigns those elements.

Most of our analysis, to this point, has concerned agency and surfaces. These are nominal in our experience. They are usually accompanied by referential bodies. We observe them naturally and therefore it is easy to conceive of them as instrumental in making. Marks are harder to isolate because they are implicitly processual. They happen. Therefore, we need to briefly touch on them here. Recall that our making a living question introduced the term plan to describe the human's role in that life. When we passed this datum through our FRAMEWORK, we said that it implies stretching out a surface and marking it. Will these marks be lost in the new model? Not at all. Quite the opposite. Marking extends the FRAMEWORK towards a more robust THEORY by offering an instrument that can operationalize agency and surfaces. It will become the chief instrument of the new model. In empirical terms, "planning" is the apparatus for living, making, doing, and mattering. In FRAMEWORK terms, marking performs but agency *and* surfaces. But this latter point will only become evident as we test these terms in the THEORY field.

1.6 On Inscriptions

To really test a theory's effect on the elements of making, we must establish a constant. Let me put it conditionally. If we want to build a theory of making that is accessible, effective, and common, then we need a way to discern when we are

closer to that goal and when we are further from it. The elements we have discovered thus far cannot give us that because they are dependent variables. They always appear (marking, surface, efficacy, agency) but their value varies based on how they are arranged. The data sampling taken from the EMPIRICAL world cannot give us that measuring stick because they are also variable. And, as we have said, both of these are arranged by theories. Is THEORY our answer? Not exactly. Theories are exceedingly hard to pin down and measure. They are nebular and amorphous. They cannot be a constant for our study. Theories are the thing *being* measured rather than doing the measuring. Therefore, they are our independent variable. We need something more concrete to tie down the study. For that, we turn to inscriptions.

My specific conjecture will arise right here at the intersection of EMPIRICAL observations, FRAMEWORK elements, and THEORETICAL alignments. But I cannot just state it without risking it to presumptive distortion or the conceptual prejudice of the reader. Without a constant to hold it still, it is subject to a wayward academic tendency. I can brace my hypothesis against that drift and establish a constant in the same stroke. First, the trend. My research tries to address a social practice and cultural transformation. It is explicitly targeting daily life and changes in the role of making. It is admittedly large. And, I have tried to narrow that through method and organization but there is still an academic impulse to go big. In fact, this is a general scholarly trend. We tend to focus on larger paradigms in order to account for more phenomena and to increase the applicability of our

contribution. But, as I noted from the beginning, this may fall flat. Therefore, I want to consult another scholar who has zeroed in on a way around this compulsion.

1.6.1 Bruno Latour, Maurizio Ferraris, and Jean-Luc Nancy

Bruno Latour is a theorist and historian of science, human culture and thought, and in some respects, politics. In his essay, *Drawing Things Together*, he points out that when the scholar becomes interested in questions of large-scale cultural formation or transformation, they tend to evaluate them from wide abstract angles.²³ They intuit all sorts of constituent problems like the ones I have laid out above. Then at the moment of establishing a conjecture, they pull back and try to provide an abstract rubric that can make sense of them. And this is dangerous because by providing that abstract hypothesis, the scholar will scissor off or eliminate phenomena that do not make sense within their broad paradigm. OR, for the more aware scholar, they have to over-explain and hegemonically assimilate things. Perhaps, more directly, the scholar does not have a singular datum to study but a series of data. So they cannot see a phenomenon all under one lens. Therefore, we conjure one. For example, we explain epochal shifts like “modernity” with inventions like “rationalism” without ever being able to pinpoint rationalism.

Latour goes on to identify two dominant modes of this wide-angle approach. The first approach is mentalist and the second is materialist.²⁴ The mentalist approach tries to explain large-scale cultural orientations or transformations by

23. Bruno Latour, "Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together," in *The Map Reader: Theories of Mapping Practice and Cartographic Representation*, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 65.

24. Latour, 66.

designating them as the product of a mind or concept. In other words, we changed the way we think about things and therefore the world looks different. Examples abound. We stopped seeing the world through a transcendental lens. We stopped seeing the world through an a priori lens. We used to think of humans as animals. The problems with the mentalist approach are well documented. They cannot account for small-scale everyday interactions. And, as we have already intimated, they neglect unsuitable data. It has to wash over, or under, them. It cannot explain how things actually change on the ground. It cannot accurately diagnose. It cannot prescribe. Of course, it will always claim to all of these things. But Latour's point is that mentalist approaches are only successful if we accept their large-scale arbitrary inventions.²⁵

Opposite the mentalist approach is the materialist. It is often more attractive because it takes up the mentalist's failures directly. It is hyper-attuned to the way actual structures, objects, and relations change in reality. Examinations of capitalism, analyses of a clock or typewriter, and forays into determinate computing are all examples of this trend. But materialist explanations have their own problems. Materialist accounts cannot explain the continuity of that phenomenon over time.²⁶ They struggle to explain how simple modes of production or simple material goods can necessitate human behaviors, emotions, visions, ambition, and so on. In some ways, they are anti-material because they press so firmly into mechanical accounts that they are not able to extrapolate out their findings.²⁷ They

25. Latour, 69.

26. Latour, 69.

27. Latour, 69.

go silent or they inadvertently become mentalist in trying to subject everything to their mechanical principle.

As a result, Latour pushes for a synthetic, or perhaps a more originally unified, option. This third option is not in between, or third at all, but is the shared ground of both mentalist and materialist tendencies. This third way, then, is what he calls inscription.²⁸ Latour claims that if we want to understand cultural transformation, we need to understand those sites where we inscribe things into reality. We need to be looking at how we actually transmit our ideas from one time to another or from one location to another.²⁹ If we are interested in knowing why culture in one age looked at things in a certain way and then looked at them another way in a different era then we need to home in on how our inscriptions have changed over time and developed new visions of reality.

His key example is a colonizing one. A Frenchman is charting an area that includes a Chinese island.³⁰ It would be easy to understand their interaction only as the result of an imperialism which is then codified in the map. It is just as easy to understand the map as the progenitor of imperialism. But, as Latour points out, the Chinese also made maps in the sand. They also projected terrain. It is not a thought or object that is significant. What is distinct here is that the map is an inscription that can spread and roam about the world. And wherever the inscription goes, material and mentalist angles are transformed by it. suddenly optical control

28. Latour, 68. The concept of inscriptions, as applied here, is an extension of the claims he made in Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

29. Latour, 72-77.

30. Latour, 67.

becomes a standardized desire. Maps beget more diagrams and more codes and so on. The original map does not simply impose a conceptual framework nor does it materialistically breed a concept. Rather, the map is a testimony to how ideas are born, travel, and grow.

Immediately we can see that in trying to understand making as a cultural orientation, my study is actually operating in the realm of inscriptions. But the more critical value here is that the changing expression of inscriptions coincides with the changing nature of society. In the same way, the elements of making in the framework and empirical world change as the theory varies. Latour goes on to illustrate this in more detail. Later in the essay, he tracks the evolution of this visualization as it morphs into written documents. What started as disparate in the imagination (the relationship of one big idea to another or one place to another) was put side by side in a drawing or diagram and became actionable. that action was maximized and expedited when the drawing became the written record.³¹ These small blocks of inscriptions are what we now know as bureaucracy. The conceptual force and material effect of these documents are that the tiny becomes really large. Little signatures rule giant nations. This pushes against those tendencies noted above. Whereas we normally want to bypass the red tape and look for other causal explanations in society, for Latour, this documentation is precisely where we should look. We will not change government, for example, by citing Derrida but by creating a form.

31. Latour, 90.

We must be careful not to take inscriptions as simply the pieces of paper in front of us or the messages of a communicator. We should consult a few voices who have carefully rounded out the full nature of inscriptions. Anyone who is familiar with Latour will recognize in these inscriptions the echoes of actors and networks. For Latour, if inscriptions are actors in a network then the power of inscriptions is measured by the size of its constituent network. For example, he says, consider capitalism. We have been approaching it from the wrong end: looking at capitalism as though it is a process that gives rise to the narrow inscriptions (paper notes) that shape our lives. But the opposite holds. Capitalism as a concept is weak without the entire network of inscriptions and record-keeping that makes it viable and visible.³² This is precisely what grounds blockchains: the ledger. Its novel achievement is that the computers are doing the record keeping. Marxism, he claims, should not look to money per se but should fixate on the “centers of calculation” wherein money papers are shuffled. To reiterate, it is the networks of these transmissible inscriptions that govern human action and daily life.

Maurizio Ferraris, the new realist philosopher, coined the notion of documentality that corroborates Latour’s insight.³³ Ferraris was not directly interested in cultural formation as much as establishing the real nature of texts against a Derridean backdrop. Nevertheless, his conclusions are closely aligned with Latour. Documentality asserts that speech acts become social objects when they are registered.³⁴ Ferraris goes so far as to say that all objects are inscribed acts

32. Latour, 93.

33. Maurizio Ferraris, *Documentality: Why it is Necessary to Leave Traces* (Commonalities, 2013), 247.

34. Ferraris, 120.

of some sort. And these inscribed acts are etched on the surface of the mind and evolve into letters and signatures. Once again, for both authors, if we want to make change in the world we must do so at the level of inscriptions.

A third voice expands even further by drawing us beyond the social dimensions of inscriptions and into their ontological implications. Jean-Luc Nancy, the French theorist, moves away from the term inscriptions and embraces a notion of exscription.³⁵ Writing is an exscription, he says. For Nancy, writing is not an attempt to approximate a reality around us but rather to found or grounds that world around by “edging” it. Writing is an exscription that gives outline or form to things which in turn makes them touchable. That exscribed world and its things still remains somewhat remote or inaccessible “in themselves,” according to Nancy, but this is mostly because as you touch each surface there is another waiting beyond it.³⁶ There is no final center. No full “it” to touch. Just ongoing exscription. Writing “matters” insofar as it is giving shape and form and sense through a kind of groping or touching. Nancy’s emphasis on exteriority has its own share of ethical difficulties and ontological pitfalls but for now, it is sufficient to point out the repetitive nature of inscriptions/exscriptions.

This notion of inscription not only isolates our constant, but it also aligns with the expressed purposes of this research. I directly that I want to stay close to the ground of daily experience and inscriptions do that. I noted that I did not want my speculations to become unclear or unmoored. Inscriptions give shape to

35. Jean-Luc Nancy and Katherine Lydon, "Exscription," *Yale French Studies*, no. 78 (1990): 47, doi:10.2307/2930115.

36. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2000), 92.

forthcoming examinations and prevent inflated irrelevance. I culled out structural features of making while considering the framework. One of those elements—surface—is intimately linked with inscriptions. I highlighted the empirical obstacles to a theory of making. Namely, the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Centers of inscriptions are critical to ratifying or reversing both. Finally, inscriptions are multifaceted. Not only are they networked but they always have a mentalist and materialist hue. From the beginning, I have cited my desire to have a theory of making that can be both concept and mechanism.

Beyond their symmetrical relationship to my purposes, inscriptions open new dimensions for a novel theory of making. One point I will expand on in chapter 3 is the nature of habit. Insofar as inscriptions are manual things that are repeated, or shared, they are entirely habitual. But this does not mean the private habit of a single person. As Ferraris claimed, inscriptions are not singular art pieces that exist in the mind of a genius and are heralded by many from afar. They are social objects which have been registered by subjects.³⁷ As Nancy pointed out, they are things that we share.³⁸ They are things that make sharing possible. And, as Latour described it, we circulate inscriptions amongst one another.³⁹ They are part of our social habits. Habits share another common feature with inscriptions. Being habitual means more than just being vainly repetitious. Habits, like inscriptions, are a double-movement. They are both willful and natural. They are purposeful and conditional. The full value of these parallels will become apparent in chapter 3 but

37. Ferraris, *Documentality*, 121.

38. Nancy, "Exscription," 48.

39. Latour, "Drawing," 91.

for now, it is enough to say that habits will provide an ontological justification for drawing as inscription.

Nancy's approach to inscriptions issues a challenge to our study. But upon closer examination, it may be ontologically fortuitous. The problem centers around the prefix: in. In short, does the marking go "in" or go "out?" Jean-Luc Nancy affirms the latter. His reversal of inscription into exscription suggests when marking occurs it does externally, even to itself. This has a certain ontological orientation. It suggests that the world and its inhabitants always remain exterior to each other. For Nancy exscriptions constantly go out to sense the edge of the world.⁴⁰ Nancy cannot use the term inscription to describe markings because it would insinuate the opposite. An inscription would be going in towards an object and at some level crossing into it. Nancy is concerned that if an inscription passed into something else, then we would have to conclude that it flowed out of an enclosed ego.⁴¹ That it flowed from an existential self. For Nancy and many others—who we will address in chapter 3—enclosed things are estranged and untenable things. If an inscription can not flow from an enclosed self unto an enclosed object, then they are both a series of surfaces continuously reaching out and touching each other. Thus, we arrive at Nancy's exscription. So does this radically undo the notion of inscription from the start? In chapter 3 I will expound upon this, but for now, I can firmly say no. Instead, it only adds dimensionality to inscriptions and opens the need for more ontological explanation. To affirm inscriptions as the key operator in

40. Nancy, "Exscription," 57.

41. Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, 44.

making, living, doing, and mattering, we must attend to the way inscriptions cross the threshold between inside and outside. More on that later.

We should regroup here and look closely at what we now have at our methodological disposal and address the questions that are emerging. In SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, the EMPIRICAL WORLD and FRAMEWORK are dependent variables. The way we live/make and the way we structure that living/making fluctuates. Inscriptions are a constant to both. In any fluctuation, we see the steady presence of inscriptions. But the nagging curiosity here is: if they are constant, and they are so ubiquitous, then where are we getting different results? What accounts for better moments of making and living or worse ones? The answer lies in THEORY. THEORY drives the FRAMEWORK and interprets the EMPIRICAL WORLD whilst pivoting on the constant. In this case, the THEORY inflects the inscriptions. To be clear, then, the purpose of the study is not to introduce inscriptions as the constant but to identify the theories that have deformed the dependent variables through this constant. In other words, to see which model of making and living has inscribed the Anthropocene and Capitalocene and then offer an alternative.

1.7 The Conjecture

I submit that the dominant theory of making in our world is best identified with the inscription of writing. Writing is a way of configuring empirical elements and a way of structuring our framework. But writing is not coextensive with inscriptions as such. They are not directly interchangeable. Writing is also not simply the

alphabetic arrangement in front of your eyes. Writing is a way of acting. Writing evokes a certain THEORY and its specific theory itself does not have a proper name. Yes, movements like deconstruction relate to writing but so does actor-network-theory, affect theory, Marxist analysis, and more. Therefore, we have to use the word writing flexibly. It is also two-sided. It means both a certain mode of inscriptions as well as the theory that informs that mode. But this is not new to our study. We have said from the beginning that a theory of making, now configured as inscriptions, must always be a concept and mechanism. Writing fits that bill. Therefore, I take writing as the status quo model and theory of making. But I introduce writing here not just to satisfy requirements but to recall that a theory can meet some conditions whilst unsettling others. Recall that I have effectively claimed that the status quo model of making is destructive. Therefore, writing must somehow deform the basic elements of making and therefore bear responsibility for the damage.

We will look more closely at writing through the remainder of the study. But, if we took a passing glance at it now, and placed it under SYSTEMATIC COMBINING's categories, we could roughly sketch its role in the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Writing emerges as a preeminent inscription when our empirical life is configured by the framework of language. So much ink has been spilled to situate all of life in language.⁴² And, consequently, more work has been done to

42. Alan D. Schrift and Claire Colbrook, "The Linguistic Turn in Continental Philosophy," in *The History of Continental Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 279.

argue for writing as a critical operator in language.⁴³ That work, in turn, has tried to understand how, or whether, every intention should be treated as an authorial act. The complementary theories have had ontological concerns about violence, otherness, difference, change, and so on. In large part, as I will exposit later, these ontologies pivot on notions of incommensurability. Therefore, writing, in its theoretical hue, trends towards separation or monistic collapse. This monism, decidedly chic, has deleterious effects on making.

I contend that such a monism cannot grant agency or surfaces and inevitably undermines writing's goal as an inscription for life. This is evident in the work of thinkers like Derrida and Blanchot who expressly focus on writing. Agency gives way to absence, touch gives way to limitrophy, and life gives way to perpetual death.⁴⁴ The consequences of writing are not confined to the abstract either. We will touch on the way that writing-as-theory underscores industrial concepts like copyright and Latour's "paperwork" insight and how both these inform the theme of ownership that structures the Capitalocene.⁴⁵ Finally, as we approach the ultimate chapter, we will see how writing is the ancestor of code and informs this historical moment when the digital tries to resolve the problems of the

43. Jacques Derrida's entire body of work could be listed here but for my purposes, the most significant ones are: Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2013), and Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021). The simple sentence also implies much of the work of Maurice Blanchot as well. The two most important for my study are Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire"* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), and Maurice Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015). Though not cited here in this work, we could trace the issues of writing in the work of Roland Barthes, Jacques Ranciere, Helene Cixous, etc.

44. Blanchot, *Space of Literature*, 95.

45. Moore, *Capitalocene*, 604-609.

Anthropocene.⁴⁶ But all is not lost in writing. It will become increasingly apparent that writing only falls when it forgets that it is always already drawing.

1.8 The Architectonic

The goal is clear. The conjecture is before us. And we have laid out our blueprint. Allow me a few sentences to review the basic features of the study. First, I am driven by a desire to understand and rehabilitate making in local and daily life. This calls for a new theory of making that is radically common, actual, and academically robust. A constructive theory demands systematic explication. I use SYSTEMATIC COMBINING to evaluate the current state of making on the ground and to discover the seeds of a new theory. I start by focusing empirical attention on the kinds of questions about jobs and living that circulate in daily life. Those questions yield patterns and conceptual motifs about making. I then filter those patterns and establish a basic and more general set of terms that give a framework to these questions. I point towards the need to test and measure the unified theory that holds these frameworks together in modern consciousness. Thus far, everything in this systematically combined layout is variable. Therefore, I establish a constant that will hold these categories together. Namely, inscriptions are the spot or site where we will see theory affect the framework or empirical world. In other words, to understand how much we make or do not make—how much we live or die—we must locate the conversation in the inscription.

46. Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2020), 43.

At this point, I must stake my claim. The groundwork of the study is in place. I have intimated my theory of making along. So let me put my conjecture out here in the open: Drawing is a superior model of making and it invigorates that making specifically through its material, habitual, and tectonic nature. Drawing ascends all the way up the ladder of prerequisites. It is materially efficacious, provides agency without violence, and is always double-sided. It is radically accessible and theoretically sustainable. It is the means by which cultural transformation and renewal become possible. It grounds an ethics of otherness and is pragmatically repeatable.

The remainder of the study is dedicated to building, or rebuilding, that *drawing* theory of making that can inscribe a full life. remainder proceeds in three steps that are directly informed by SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. I will revisit the **EMPIRICAL WORLD** and **FRAMEWORK** categories noted above and add a third—CASE STUDY. Though each step is focused, I remain committed to the fluidity of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING and will continue to flow back and forth between logics and fields in each of these steps to establish new elements and insights. But during this tour, I will apply disciplinary magnification. I will zoom in on each category using the insights of a specific faculty. In the first step, I will narrow in on making in the empirical world under the guidance of Anthropology. There I will examine the ways that making has been critical to human life from the beginning. This step will yield the first indication that the kind of inscription that will generate human flourishing is drawing. It will also demonstrate the materiality of drawing—one of my central parameters. The second step is to revisit

FRAMEWORK under the guidance of phenomenology. Here, we raise theoretical questions about the nature of drawing as a phenomenon and establish its unique and habitual ontology. The third step flows naturally from the questions that emerge from the first two. If drawing is critical to human making and thriving on the surface of the earth, and it is ontologically habitual (meaning also inhabitable) then have we ever seen these pieces come together? I answer with architecture. I take architecture as a CASE STUDY that has and continues to coordinate drawing, surface, making, living, habit, matter, agency, and the rest of the litany. there I identify the key feature of a new theory of making. Namely, to join. Drawing as habitual, and material is fundamentally tectonic and therefore the critical operator in the future making and living. In the concluding chapter, I look ahead to that future and speculate about drawing and tectonics in digital materiality.

2. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF DRAWING

2.1 From Mythos to Logos

In the first chapter, I stated my research interests directly: *to understand making in the everyday world*. I set forth a research agenda that placed parameters on that desire: *making must be common and effectual*. In turn, I initiated a research program that could discover the structures of making in that everyday world, distill them in conceptual reflection, and then evaluate their composition theoretically. The main movements of the research program were established by SYSTEMATIC COMBINING'S four categories. The first step was to observe the empirical world and listen for the nuances of making via the questions of the common person. This proved to be fruitful insofar as it yielded patterns wherein we could derive our three key concepts. But it also came with a significant weakness that you may have already recognized. Namely, *this empirical moment is anecdotal and scantily verifiable*.

I have to face this vulnerability directly. How can we erect a new theory of making on a small slice of reality? The answer lies in magnification. Our starting point, in lay questions, was just that—a starting point. It gave us an empirical

sample to observe or a place to put our pencils down. It was risky. But, I intentionally avoided the temptation to stay general and have a hermetically sealed thesis. We could have very well shut off empirical observation, avoided this difficulty, and only worked within self-referential premises. Instead, I wanted to remain consistent with my ambitions to find a theory of making that could survive and even thrive at the everyday level. But offering an anecdote back to the layperson—even with conceptual structuring from the framework—is woefully insufficient. In other words, I cannot just cite the status quo questions, poke around in them, and then call it a day. I cannot stop short of testing the integrity of our simple example. We must put it under the microscope and rotate different magnifications over it to carefully scrutinize it. Presumably, different focal lenses will not only verify our preliminary observations but should deepen them. We will apply three said lenses to the sample over the course of the next three chapters. This chapter circles back to the empirical world category and inspects it under the lens of anthropology.

2.2 Anthropology is not Ethnography

But why anthropology? Simply put, it is ideally suited and specifically useful for empirical reexamination. Two of those uses are worth noting here. First, and in accordance with the magnification metaphor above, anthropology has a very focused angle but also an exceedingly wide lens. It can be quite narrow or impossibly broad at the same time. Anthropology zooms in on practical occurrences whilst also positioning those occurrences within larger social,

geological, and historical matrices. It takes note and observes minutiae but also examines those instances for themes. Anthropology allows us to look closely at anecdotal samples like the one we established in the opening chapter. It also allows us to witness larger human patterns and test them against anthropological literature and field data. This thematic and generalizing skill is what separates anthropology from ethnography.⁴⁷ Though the two are often treated interchangeably, ethnography is focused more on the particular and narrow stories of specific people⁴⁸. It is attentive to those same stories but takes them to be part of a more general pattern that exemplifies thematics in the one world that all stories seem to inhabit. The two are not mutually exclusive or estranged. Rather, we might say that ethnography informs the larger faculty of anthropology.

But to be balanced, I must note that anthropology is not without its detractors. Still, those critiques turn out to be serendipitous for my study. The complaint leveled against anthropology is that it externally imposes order—imperial and colonial—on worlds and people groups without their consent or even interest. And while this is true for many historical applications of anthropology, it is not endemic to it as such. Trauma like this results from a certain angle, theory, or paradigm. It is only a way—a bad one—of doing anthropology. This model assumes things about the anthropologist and about the world that run counter to the descriptions above. It positions the researcher “outside” the event under observation. It also positions

47. Tim Ingold, "Anthropology is Not Ethnography," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Volume 154, 2007 Lectures, 2008, 73,

48. This deserves qualification. Ethnography is not simply folk-telling or a series of unlinked or privatized stories. It is, in fact, a kind of construction in its own right. My description here should not be taken as a dismissal or diminution of its force in modern resistance models. I only single out this feature to elevate the generalizing benefits of anthropology for my specific study,

the world's moments "outside" each other.⁴⁹ Such outsidersness produces violence even when strictly conceptual. This approach, Ingold claims, has an ontology that treats the world as a set of discrete parts that require networking or organization. In this vein, the analyst is another separate part itself.⁵⁰ Naturally, this sort of anthropologist will arrange discrete and opposable human elements on a page under an imposed and often unseen rubric. In other words, unity can and does exist in this model but it does so silently, surreptitiously, or under pressure. It does not come from the world as recognized by participants.

This distant paradigm is what most commentators are objecting to. The united and immersed approach, conversely, starts with the continuity, coherence, and intimacy of the world. An anthropologist with this model in mind will produce insights that are both determinate and developmental. They observe the world in its materiality and sense it in its gestures and processes. This sort of anthropologist does not shy away from the specific and the material nature of observation.⁵¹ Neither do they offer passive descriptions. They will give feedback that is pliable, growable, revisable, and verifiable. They will engage the multidimensional reality of the one shared world we are living and moving in.

This methodological excursus is not accidental or incidental. I do not lay out these distinctions to take up room or postpone actual anthropological insights. I include them to show that anthropology not only gives us a lens by which to closely inspect the act of making but from a procedural standpoint it coincides with my

49. Ingold, "Ethnography," 80.

50. Ingold, 87.

51. Tim Ingold, *Anthropology and/as Education* (London: Routledge, 2017), 22.

own “matching” methodology. I lean on this brand of anthropology as espoused by Ingold, his colleagues, and theoretical ancestors.⁵² For these reasons, you will not see field notes, qualitative monographs about people groups, or surveyed data in the following section. These sorts of insights are not inherently destructive but they are counterproductive with respect to my specific aims.

In addition, and as I have noted many times, I want to maintain a strong parallel and even intertwining between my form and content. According to the model laid out by Ingold, anthropology does research and investigation the way I am doing it. I have already been taking an anthropological approach, as it were. We embedded this study with the world by observing ourselves at the end of the dissertation and I am now digging into shared sensations and bearing witness to patterns. The critical outcome is that these methodological parallels have similar ontological rewards. The cursory comparison of anthropological models above implied different ontologies. Seeing the world as particularities or as atomic configured anthropological concepts and applications in a certain way. But seeing it as coherent and its elements as mutually informing opens new possible interpretations of life. The same reality applies to theories of making: specific theories have conceptual arrangements and those arrangements have material consequences. Therefore, as we wade into anthropology, the way theorists organize connection will model and inflect the empirical elements, framework components, and

52. Jerry D. Moore, "Alfred Kroeber: Configurations of Culture," in *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists* (Lanham: Rowman Altamira, 2012), 46-55. For a contemporary see Jerry D. Moore, "Phillippe Descola: Nature and Culture," in *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists* (Lanham: Rowman Altamira, 2004), 326-339.

theoretical conditions that shape—or fail to shape—making in our contemporary world.

2.3 On Material Intrageneration

Now, let us turn our attention to anthropology's content. At its introductory level, anthropology is interested in human life—its instruments, its operations, its goals. But, what exactly is living? Generally speaking, anthropology bounces its questions of human life against two registers: artifacts and landscapes.⁵³ When these poles are treated separately, the former begets disciplines like archeology, and the latter flirts with the likes of geology. Either of these subdisciplines can be examined in the lab or the field. Anthropologists can discern ancient activities from archaeological strata, pottery striations, or fieldwork observation of dance rituals. But even this simple example presents two immediate challenges. First, these registers may help sketch the outline of a human as an inert object. They may even be able to schematize daily rituals, but they do not tell us what life is. Second, the example challenges the heuristic limits and demarcations of the given registers. That is, where does an artifact end and a landscape begin? Archaeological strata are landscape slices composed of artifactual residue. Pottery is an artifact composed of landscape matter. Dance rituals are artifacts that are also performative transformations of the landscape. In short, human life and all of its constituent elements run together. As a result, contemporary scholars have synthesized these

53. Tim Ingold, "Materials Against Materiality," *Archaeological Dialogues* 14, no. 1 (2007): 3.

two registers under the rubric of “material culture” in hopes of getting a better grasp on human life.

Right here at the start of our magnifying inspection, anthropology affirms one of the conceptual pillars we identified in our framework section above. Namely, **materiality**. But, despite the synthetic value of this nomenclature, materiality is a dangerous term. It risks reducing the human interaction to some abstract substrate. As such, it may not move us any further away from the objectifying models noted above or any closer to understanding life and making. The scholars who raise these concerns opt for more enlivened terms like environment or ecology. In other words, to understand human life, they say, we should understand the materials of their interactions in an active environment. In so doing, we will treat those materials themselves as the growing, changing, and interlacing world. Or in other words, materials have a life of their own.

We should be clear about how we conceive of this term—material—and how far that conception can go towards our thesis without having to stretch it. In the spirit of the dissertation, we do not want to import a concept of material that is foreign or abstractly constructed for convenient conclusions. So, we must let *material* speak for itself insofar as it is possible. Material, in its customary and plain usage, relates to extended matter. It describes things that have heft, weight, shape, etc.⁵⁴ This would push against the idea of a “material culture” because that construction risks evacuating the heft and weight that has long characterized materials in every other usage. But material can be used adjectivally to describe that brings about a

54. "material, v.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/114924>.

difference.⁵⁵ In law, material evidence is that element that takes the case or the verdict in a different direction because of its figurative heft or weight. Thus, when we say *material* throughout this study, we do mean something with heft. Enough heft to make a difference in the world. Enough heft to be this thing or that thing and not just a raw and undefined potency. When we say making must one material we mean both in terms of tangibility and in terms of efficacious.

To return to the matter at hand, one theorist who has influenced this turn towards materials as active environment or ecological presence is James Gibson.⁵⁶ Gibson, a psychologist by training, introduced concepts about perception that have had a lasting impact on anthropology's understanding of human life and its environment. Gibson rejected the notion that the human was a brain moving through a world matching the world to its preconceived notions. Instead, he believed that man understood the world as he perceived it in real-time and in real interaction. He proposed a tripartite model of objects to explain the human's interaction with this perceived environment. In his theory, the perceived world and the lives therein are either substances, media, or surfaces.⁵⁷ Substances are resistant and solidified objects. A medium is the "stuff" that the substances pass through like wind, perhaps fluid, or other intermediate zones. Lastly, and most importantly, surfaces are the site of contact for substances and media. Wherever the wind presses against the ground or wherever the human grabs a flower, this is

55. "material, adj., n., and adv.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/114923>.

56. James J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception* (London: Psychology Press, 2013), 16-32.

57. Gibson, 22-30.

the surface. The surface, for Gibson, is where all the action happens⁵⁸. So, rather than human life interacting with landscapes or artifacts, Gibson's insight suggests that humans are always perceiving and interacting at surfaces. Their perception is in the middle of things. Their life is directed by perceptions at the center of these exchanges. Human history, then, is a record of distributed action on surfaces. Here again, anthropology has reintroduced a conceptual pillar in addition to materiality—the **surface**. But neither material nor surface has enough depth to inform or guide an understanding of theory yet. This will require the help of the aforementioned Tim Ingold.

Ingold took up Gibson's assertion and extrapolated its implications—both good and bad—for anthropology. Like Gibson, Ingold firmly believes that human life is perceptive in nature. They both wanted to conceive of the human in a non-essential way without distancing themselves from that human as such. By attending to the perceiving relations of the human and to their constructed social world they could get close to human life in a way the former models had failed. Other non-essentialist models of human understanding have proven to be detached and veer close to that particulate anthropological model decried earlier.⁵⁹ For Ingold, a la Gibson, thinking about life in terms of perception takes us along with the human on their journey. And, the reward is bountiful. Anthropology, configured by perception, reveals human life, our life, to be an exercise in way-finding.⁶⁰

58. Gibson, 31.

59. INGOLD, "Ethnography," 79-82.

60. Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Psychology Press, 2000), 220-222.

Wayfinding is not only fundamentally perceptive but it is processual. It is a discovery of location, meaning, nearness, and a whole host of other terms we use to narrate our personal histories. The affirmation of perception does not mean that the human “uses” perception or “uses” their body to move throughout a given world. Humans are not at a distance from artifacts and landscapes. In Gibson’s terms, they are at the surface of all of these things. They live at the surface of the world. Humans are touching, seeing, tasting, hearing, and smelling. To put it together, then, for Ingold human life is a movement; movement is perception; perception is a process; this process is fundamentally a commingling of surfaces. To reclaim a term from above, human life is bound up in material culture. But more than just bound up, humans participate in the *process* which *is* material culture.⁶¹ Materials, according to Gibson and now Ingold, are themselves surfaces of transformation and passage. Therefore, the human-material perceptive relationship is generative. New things are born at the site of this surface interaction.⁶² These new things are themselves part and parcel of the moving perception.

Critically, the surface is not a flat canvas. As material, it is not passive either. Ingold illustrates this in his commentary on the ground. To begin with, humans are inextricably tied to the ground. The very term, human, connotes earthling.⁶³ Even without a conclusive etymology, its shape and sound, *humus*, point to the soil.⁶⁴ And

61. Ingold, 362-372.

62. Tim Ingold, *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2013), 95-108.

63. Giambattista Vico, *New Science* (London: Penguin UK, 1999), 8.

64. "human, adj. and n.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/89262>.

this soil is actively making that human. Ingold overturns the common assumption that the ground is inert and used only to cover old and shameful misdeeds. Instead, the ground is voluminous. That is, it rotates. As the weather interacts with the ground, the top is washed away or dispersed and the oldest memories rise to the top and become “new.” Inversely, when other elements are added to the top, those surface elements settle downward and become “old.” The ground is changing and by virtue of that morphology, it transforms earthlings that move along its surface.⁶⁵ This surface defines the agent that presumes to act upon it. Likewise, the perceptive movements of the human are defining it. Ingold calls this interactive fecundity: *inragenitive*. The so-called environment is not given or inert. It is being made. In the same way, the human does not simply exist but is being made. Intrageneration is a double movement that peels *out from the surface of interaction* and perception.

At this point, Ingold has touched on two of our four critical concepts: **surface** and **material**. He has now united them in intergeneration as the act of making. Making is not the act of a mind on matter any more than living is the brain moving through space. Making is not hylomorphic. It is not the application of contained rational agenda “geniusly” applied to a material. Making is intragenerative perception.⁶⁶ For example, when a human society utilizes basket weaving or dancing, they are not applying a concept to a register but rather perceiving at a

65. Tim Ingold, "Walking the Plank: Meditations on a Process of Skill," in *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2011), xx.

66. Elizabeth Hallam and Tim Ingold, *Making and Growing: Anthropological Studies of Organisms and Artefacts* (London: Routledge, 2016), 56-58.

surface, interacting there. Weaving is a perceiving of what that surface might do and might become. As human hands tweak and turn the reeds, they too are being transformed. Both are being made and making. All of this is unfolding in order for human to find their way. Therefore, Ingold holds the highest esteem for craft, arts, architecture, and the like.⁶⁷ These are samples of this intragenerative perception. For our purposes, this account is more than descriptive. By aligning **surface** and **material** in an account of making, they may have prescriptive value in the contemporary world.

But before I jump ahead and claim victory, important questions arise for Ingold and Gibson just as they did for artifacts and landscapes. For example, what is the phenomenological shape of this making? Is it repeatable? Is it purposeful? More importantly, what is the phenomenological shape of this human that acts at surfaces? Is anything happening in their mind, will, or intent? Answers to these questions introduce additional, more complex ontological questions. If two things interact at surfaces, are the humans or things themselves substances? Are they surface-substances? Do they arrive at the interaction ready-made? If so, then what happens to intergeneration? Or, how would we describe their own internal activities? What happens inside a substance when it morphs and grows? Does it contain internal surfaces? What happens when the wind moves in a new direction due to internal temperature variations? Is making a substance? If so, what is made? Ingold does not broach these theoretical questions and neither shall we in this section. Admittedly, they can be dizzying. I list them here to keep them ready-to-

⁶⁷. Ingold, *Making*, 4-8.

hand as we proceed and compile more data for later theoretical inspection. Though Ingold does not directly answer, he does at least affirm an unexamined but ubiquitous ontology. Namely, life and its materials are surfaces all the way down.

After his work on perception, Ingold turned towards an investigation of lines.⁶⁸ At first glance, this appears to be a departure from the issue of perception and making. But, as it turns out, it is a refinement. He indirectly addresses one of our ontological questions about the nature of the substances that are interacting at surfaces. The inherited assumption, Ingold says, is to think of interactions as between blobs.⁶⁹ Therefore, perceptive making would be one blob touching another. But this raises a slew of concerns and not just curiosities about what is inside and outside those blobs. He asks: would not the insides be made of more blobs? And, if so, would we be interacting with the surfaces of those blobs ad infinitum? And if not, then what exactly is the essence of the blob? Is it undivided? How does it not swallow up things? Change in scale? And so on? In accordance with his belief that life is surfaces all the way down, then Ingold argues that the world would be better understood as being composed of lines instead of blobs.⁷⁰ Lines can go all the way down without needing insides. A line is made of more lines and so on. Not only is this philosophically consistent, but it also matches our experiences of threads, filaments, ligaments, muscles, and more. These lines are critical for explaining the perceived interactions noted above. When perceived interaction occurs—when intragenerative making happens—it is lines or threads intermingling

68. Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (London: Routledge, 2016), 25-32.

69. Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (London: Routledge, 2015), 4.

70. Ingold. 22.

and knotting. Blobs are actually knots, in other words. Therefore, the world that this paradigm yields is a meshwork. Lines are everywhere. Rain, writing, walkways, buildings, memories, skin, and so on are all conceivable under the rubric of lines.⁷¹

It is Ingold's theory of lines that brings **surface** and **material** into proximity with **marks**. Ingold presses on and suggests that every life can be read as someone *laying out a line*.⁷² Our personal histories begin with umbilical cords, proceed through interweaving threads and tense clinging, and end as decomposition into filaments. Our social histories are comprised of the same. Our texts are lines that push the eye along a path from left to right or top to bottom. Our letters are strokes. Our roads are wide lines secured by thinner ones. Our concept of history is a line. But even beyond the stretched, splayed, or extended lines, for Ingold, our laws could be conceived as knotted narratives. Our affections can be considered as tied lines. I could go on. For our purposes, the important insight is that these lines are the *operational element* of perception and intrageneration. Life is line-making. Or in our terms, line-making is **mark-making on material surfaces**.

Lines reaffirm Ingold's overall commitment to decentralization and an anti-essentialist account of making. In his later work, he polishes this concept of line-making as intragenerative perception by introducing the term correspondence.⁷³ Lines are not impositions or the product of a mind. Rather, when a human perceives at a surface, and they mark that surface with a line, then they are corresponding to the entity which is that surface material itself. This can be

71. Ingold, 51-52.

72. Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 77-87.

73. Tim Ingold, *Correspondences* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2020), 1-18.

disorienting. Ingold is trying to describe a reflexive action that occurs in real-time and without much interval if any at all. The human makes the object as the object makes the human and both do so at their intragenerative surfaces because they are both material. The mystification progresses. Furthermore, if life is material and materials are surfaces all the way down, then each line-making at a surface has another line and another and another just around the bend. What is more, the presumed surface is *also* doing line-making of its own on the reverse surface. The confounding regression applies in this direction too. Importantly, correspondence does not try to hold this befuddling expansion still. It simply means that wherever the human is in this meshwork, life requires a willingness to follow the lines as you make lines. To live, then, is the perceptive process of intragenerative line making that is characterized by a humble and attentive mutual following.

As I have noted above, Ingold elevates crafts of all sorts. But at this point, given that correspondent life is tied to line-making, Ingold narrows in on the role of writing and drawing. In Latour's terms, Ingold might say that life is inscriptive. For Ingold, writing and drawing are both inscriptions that enact the perspectival and material intragenerative act as outlined above. They are *surficial* interactions. Drawing is, however, more rudimentary insofar as it deals more directly with lines and line-making. We can draw with threads and with traces. For example, threads can be "drawn out" and snapped at surfaces to make traces. The thread can also be extended and in turn, vibrate. These pulling and stitching actions are natively perceptive and embodied.⁷⁴ Drawing begins with deistic gestures and performs a

74. Ingold, *Life of Lines*, 87.

localized version of them that “corresponds” to that gesture. Meaning, we use an instrument in our hand to pull across a surface and emulate that material gesture. In other words, it is an **inscription** that has both mentalist and materialist dimensions.

Despite their shared roots, and the assignation of inscription, writing and drawing are discernibly different. Most common people would sense that difference without being able to articulate it. Ingold explores the typical reasons given for that sensation and finds them all wanting.⁷⁵ Still, he makes a few important observations along the way. Writing, despite the modern notion of code and semiotic performance, in its original state was very much still drawing. But writing, being a form of drawing, depended on a certain relationship between agent and surface—the inscription relationship. Drawing had consistently brought the agent close to the surface for the intragenerative event. But, at some point, it shifted away from drawing’s pulling near and towards a removed notation scheme. That is, when the line-making could be distanced from the surface each set of its strokes becomes repeatable and representational.⁷⁶ This does not happen as the result of a decision. Once again, it is recursive. Just as the inscription gains distance so does the concurrent perceiving and conceptual apparatus. Ingold goes on to explore the evolution of writing according to this increasing distance from the surface. Once typography and engraving entered into practice, writing as perceptive inscription gave way to repeatable description. The consequence of this shift towards notation

75. Ingold, T. 2004. André Leroi-Gourhan and the Evolution of Writing. In *Autour de l’homme: contexte et actualité d’André Leroi-Gourhan*, eds. F. Audouze and N. Schlanger. Antibes: APDCA, pp. 109–123.

76. Ingold, “Evolution of Writing.” 117-120.

is wide-reaching and not exclusive to writing precisely because it is an inscription. This is the critical point for our purposes. Namely, that the world, its material nature and perceptive possibilities, change right alongside the human right at the threshold of inscriptions. And at this point in the survey, the inscription enfolds the **surface, material, and marking** in the operations of *writing* and *drawing*. We will explore the distinctions between writing and drawing more fully under the category that we develop in the next section. Namely, *technology*. It behooves our study to draw out this notion as it lurks in the back of Ingold's analysis.

But before we can register the full value of that investigation, let us recap and relocate our exploration. Ingold's tour from perception to writing and drawing recapitulates the blueprint laid out in Chapter 1. In the first stages of our systematic combining, we isolated four concepts from an empirical sample. Specifically, that making is comprised of **surfaces, agents, markings, and materials**. We bracketed a full exposition of those concepts in order to investigate empirical life more fully through the lens of anthropology. In response, they pushed through those restraints. Ingold expanded on each of those concepts—some directly and others indirectly. Alongside Gibson, Ingold foregrounded **surfaces** as the site of human perception and interaction with the world. What is more, these surfaces indicated a counter-movement of the world toward the human. Both of them, are treated by Ingold and Gibson as **materials**. Materials, according to both, are defined by an interactive possibility to generate something new. Or, in our terms, materials can generate something of heft and consequence given that they too are effectual. This quality is born along the surface of interaction. This is an important point that

cannot be overstated: the surface begets. The entities do not arrive at the surface from an inside or as a substance in advance. They become whatever they will be at that intragenerative event of making at the surface. Therefore, the human, the doorknob, the neuron, and even the imagination, are materials in the making. As Ingold continued, the interaction of those materials is laid out in lines. Surfaces are the active life of materials and those materials are directed and redirected by lines. Ingold and Gibson give these three—**material, markings, and surfaces**—anthropological and perceptive depth. But they also open speculation about the fourth concept—agency. Throughout both scholars’ work, agency is implicit in line-making, craft, and even perception. Still, neither ever investigate the concept directly. Therefore, we will take up both technology and agency in the next section with the help of Andre-Leroi Gourhan and his mentor, Marcel Mauss.

2.4 On Technicity and Graphism

As we approach a fuller understanding of making, we must confront a nagging question: how does the human *uniquely* figure into all of this? So many other questions are nested within this curiosity. If the world is a perceptive interplay, a meshwork of lines, then do any of the surfaced materials we call “things” have any sense of purpose or agency within themselves? Is there any reason to focus on the human? And if these things can act intentionally, then to what end? If we are all making lines, if we are threads knotting up, then what are we building? Or *are* we building? If things do not have agency then are we just floating along responding to Lucretian swerves? Can we do any of this making business on purpose? If so how

do we do it? The roadmap to answering these questions passes through the ideas of *technology* and **agency**.

Despite the fact that Ingold does not map out **agency** or technology directly, we can look to one of his inspirations, Andre Leroi-Gourhan, for a fuller understanding of both. Leroi-Gourhan, the French prehistorian, has been instrumental in more than one theory of making. Famously, Jacques Derrida derived his own concepts about writing from Leroi-Gourhan's insights into human development.⁷⁷ More recently, Bernard Stiegler has enlisted Leroi-Gourhan's thoughts in the service of a modern account of technics.⁷⁸ Leroi-Gourhan's popularity amongst all three corresponds to the way each centers their work on the notion of *techne*. For each, it is in the soil of human meaning-making, world-making, and living. *Techne* is Leroi-Gourhan's forte. For us, not only will Leroi-Gourhan give us insights into the mechanics of anthropological **agency**, he will position drawing as its critical technological instrument.

Andre Leroi-Gourhan was an interdisciplinary anthropologist and contemporary of well-known figures like Claude Levi-Strauss. But unlike the latter, Leroi-Gourhan focused his attention on the mechanics of social action rather than their systemic meanings. His most enduring idea is that man makes himself what he is through his tools.⁷⁹ He reverses the inherited assumption that what makes man unique is his conceptual advantages. This is because these conceptual advantages are not only found amongst humans. Language, rationality, socialization, or even religion

77. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2016), 83-86.

78. Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The fault of Epimetheus* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998), 54-67.

79. André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 242.

can be witnessed in animality. Man's evolutionary distinction, for Leroi-Gourhan, is positional and that position is upright.⁸⁰ By standing up, man began a process of transformation that would pass through his technical intelligence and lead to language and rationality. In sum, by standing up, man-made tools, and tools made man. Refracted through Ingold's terms, human life is mutually perceptive as it pivots around the technologies of intrageneration.

Leroi-Gourhan's notion of technology arises in paleontology and archaeology. The bones of ancient bodies show us that before being properly "human," we were simply an animal that grazed along the ground without the ability to pivot the head. The hands were preoccupied with locomotion and the head was engrossed in the function of foraging.⁸¹ Adaptation would eventually lead to a revolving head. And, at some point, this animal would develop hip changes and muscular control and soon stand up.⁸² Upon standing, the rotating cranium would expand and realign making room for brain expansion.⁸³ These changes would shorten the snout, free up the fingers from clawing and make time for dexterity. The hands and the face would establish a new perceptive position: front and back. The front would "face" the world, and the hands would be free from locomotion and empowered to reach outward towards that world.⁸⁴ But these developments would not come from some arbitrary instinct or internal desire. It would come from the mechanics of perception.

80. Leroi-Gourhan, 116.

81. Leroi-Gourhan, 26-27.

82. Leroi-Gourhan, 63.

83. Leroi-Gourhan, 46.

84. Leroi-Gourhan, 34-35.

For Leroi-Gourhan, each step in that physiological adaptation sequence above is the result of the way that organism or animal is “acting” in the world. It is not because the animal “decided” on it or was led to make a change. Bodily adaptation is on a feedback loop with bodily techniques in the world. For example, the way man moves and forages leads to his adaptation from quadruped to biped. Leroi-Gourhan dedicates his whole first section of *Gesture and Speech* to this development and there is no need to repeat it in full here.⁸⁵ But we need to emphasize that the act and the tool—conceived together as technicity—precede bodily changes. These technical acts are what Leroi-Gourhan calls gestures.⁸⁶ Therefore, technical activity, under the rubric of gestures, is in the generic proximity of **materials** (i.e. a pliable and effectual heft). Therefore, these technological acts are akin to what Ingold has called intragenerative perceptions. Leroi-Gourhan’s “technicity” is **material** insofar as change starts at the **surface** of something consequential and substantial. Technicity is perceptive insofar as it is a kind of testing and trying life at that surface. Altogether, this technicity mobilizes and habituates the creative perceptive act. It just so happens that it generates both the products of tools and formal changes in the body of the **agent** wielding the tools. The productive power of technicity folds over on itself much like meshwork. Technicity enables new things—speciation, new concepts, new bodies, new gestures, new techniques. In other words, technicity is part and parcel of life.

85. Leroi-Gourhan, sec. “Technics and Language.”

86. Leroi-Gourhan, 238-241.

Technicity, in general, shapes the objects and bodies participating in life. But technicity is not a flat category. It also shapes and orients life in a certain way. We can see this technical force more fully by narrowing in on one key outcome of the standing gesture. Namely, the introduction of exteriority.⁸⁷ As I noted, once the hominid was standing up, the mouth was free from grazing on the ground, and the hands were free from locomotion. And being free, the hand then could participate in bringing food to the mouth. It could reach out toward objects. The technical acts of the animal clearly wrought bodily changes. But these techniques also generated certain “thoughts,” orientations, or paradigms as we might call them now. The new orientation, an anterior and posterior twoness, “constructed” the very notion of the outside world. That new technical posture allowed the hand to convert its once internal instincts of consumption into exterior action. Tools like the eating utensil derived their form and function from formerly interior gestures of bringing food inward towards the teeth. The sharpened stone could, in effect, operate as a tooth at a distance. The hand was now the place where tools could develop, be operated, be extended, and eventually, be separated from the body and automated.⁸⁸ Tools exteriorized but remained continuous with the body. There was still a line of connection but that line now extended between and was configured by two new endpoints: in and out. Suddenly, there was a relationship between perceptive poles like here and there. Therefore, the interaction along that line, the technicity, of the

87. Leroi-Gourhan, 242-253.

88. Leroi-Gourhan, 264-266.

body would continue to evolve and continue to require the maturation and development of new tools to negotiate the new perceptive distance.

The face pushed exteriority even further and extended it to the overall organism. The face would become the seat of language. Once again, pushing back against the common cerebral explanations, Leroi-Gourhan reads language as a tool of the face and as a result of the technicity of the body.⁸⁹ Language is not an act of the mind but a result of mechanics. Once freed from the ground, the mouth could make sounds that exteriorized desire. Sound passed from the throat and out into the world. It could connect the animal with other animals in a way that surpassed violent competition. It could inscribe desire on the wind as calls coordinated into signifying phonemes. This naturally lends itself to social organization. The sounds of the face could produce connectivity and generate a non-physical body—a collective body. We will look at that more closely in short order. For now, what is important is that the techniques of the body introduced evolutionary change, and this change made speech possible. Speech, then, paved the way for the technicity of symbols beyond the body. Sounds could be divided and reassembled to coordinate external action. Formerly, action was connected to adaptation and adaptation was slow. Adaptation was immanent to a body and this body knew no demarcation between inside and outside. It took many thousands of years for certain bodily changes to take root. These bodily changes were critical for the organisms to achieve their desires. But when changes could be inscribed on the outside world through sounds and symbols, then the demand for bodily development is

89. Leroi-Gourhan, 112-116.

mitigated.⁹⁰ Why wait on a change in a body's physiology when the human could exteriorize their interests in another non-physical social body? The face accelerated the technical trajectory of exteriorizing all desire into the social body.

To circle back, the hand tried to catch up. In Leroi-Gourhan's scheme, everything works in two's—the world and the human, the biped, the front and the back, the mouth and the hand. Just as the mouth was exteriorizing in sound, the hand was beginning to form gestures into markings. This is the birth of what Leroi-Gourhan calls graphism. In its earliest stages, graphism is neither writing nor drawing. It is not representational. It is akin to Ingold's line-making but far more literal. It is the manual marking of surfaces to orient the body in space and time.⁹¹ It is an extension of the biped's newfound perceptive condition. Insofar as the biped now had a front a back, and a rotational head, it was “in the world” and now “faced” and exterior on all sides. Graphism was exteriorizing this position. It inscribed the rhythms of life in a series of dots or visual pathways.⁹² Once again, like most early stages of technicity, graphism was continuous with the body. Nevertheless, it had within it the capacity for separable exteriority, though, just like speech and symbol making. What the face inaugurated, the hand inflamed in graphism. If the face could project sounds forward and potentially make changes in the exterior world—in order to meet its needs—then the tools of the hand had the potential to do the same. Tools of the hand, like the eating utensils we noted, were already connecting with the exterior world by bringing food closer or grasping at resources formerly

90. Leroi-Gourhan, 258.

91. Leroi-Gourhan, 187-190.

92. Leroi-Gourhan, 190-192.

unavailable. So if the technicity of the hand could go outward to secure their interest, it may also be able to produce symbols. The human could inscribe their activity on the surfaces of the world in order to produce action at a distance.⁹³

Graphism is a significant technical achievement—for better or worse. But in its origin, graphism resisted full exteriority. Leroi-Gourhan locates this resistance in the operational mechanics of graphism. In short, its original markings were radial. It marked the world according to that positionality noted above.⁹⁴ That is, once the body had front and back, in and out, the grapheme could corroborate a new sense of centeredness visually. A dot or series of loops could exemplify the perceptive reality of being in-and-with a world. Graphism was the ground of mythemes.⁹⁵ It was the way that oral cultures could depict (exteriorize) their perceptive relation to their environment. It complemented the sounds and phonetic symbols of faces. Mythemes and phonemes converged in folk tales. It was, despite Leroi-Gourhan's misuse of the term, linear.⁹⁶ It just was not a set of straight lines. It was concentric circles. Graphism could comprise radii and vectors which extended from focal points or loci which provided a sense of place. To boot, it described life on the surface in miniature by pulling a line across a surface. It was ineluctably perceptive, surficial, and material. So how did we get from graphism to code at a distance, writing and violence, documentation and imperialism?

93. Leroi-Gourhan, 263.

94. Leroi-Gourhan, 327-335.

95. Leroi-Gourhan, 202.

96. Leroi-Gourhan, 209.

The transformative moment—notably one that Leroi-Gourhan sees as naturally continuous and even necessary—was when graphism was straightened out and made orthogonal. This is the sine qua non of writing for Leroi-Gourhan. The technics of writing enable repeatability and rhythm because they deal with discrete symbols that are lifted or distanced from a body.⁹⁷ They exteriorize actions that are quasi-automatic. The signs and symbols of graphism are now constructed in smaller pictographs that are laid out on a straight line that is to be followed. This straight line not only coordinates the movement of the internal mind, but also produces expected results. The rhythm of the follower, the reader, or the walker is scripted. This linearity became the paradigm of all graphism, including drawing.⁹⁸ In other words, writing became the grounds for even drawing. Orthogonal and geometric drawing, the basis of architecture and manufacturing, would also follow lines, read the symbols, and produce the results. That is, rather than make them. In effect, the exteriority of mechanization was taking hold. Language, and specifically external symbols, would make technicity's exit from the body complete. After all, how would an external machine perform a human service without the help of coded information laid out on a line?

These exteriorizing technics needed a way to execute actions that once occurred internally. Therefore, technicity placed action at a distance by constructing an external body—the social body. The social body could be a collectively identifiable agent which could perform techniques for the service of the

97. Leroi-Gourhan, 259.

98. Leroi-Gourhan, 254.

humans therein. Whereas the former animal was integrated into the perceptive environment, its technicity liberated it, established it as a thing facing the world, then extended that entity into a symbolic one by creating a collective that spoke in symbols, sounds, and lines.⁹⁹ That secondary body, the social one, did the “acting” in the environment in parallel to the human body whence it came. In the same way that rhythms of life became the dots and lines of graphism, now the buttons and written documents would prompt the work of the machine. The technicity of the animal could be handed over to the social body and concentrated in these machines. Eventually, these mechanisms of external technicity would be automated.¹⁰⁰ The body will have completed a shift from immanent instinct and manual engagement to passive reception and visual acquiescence. Once constrained by the body, the burden (or gift) of active making was now manipulable by ideas and power relations within that social body. Leroi-Gourhan expected this exterior evolution to continue.¹⁰¹

Leroi-Gourhan’s significance for my constructive theory of making should be rather clear. He corroborates what we had already established in Ingold, exceeds him in precision and detail, and brings the issue of **agency** to the table along with the other three structural concepts. Much like Ingold, making is at the center of what Leroi-Gourhan means by being human and what he means to be alive.

Surfaces are critical to the act, or “interact”, of making, and **materials** are defined by possible development. He exceeds Ingold’s somewhat vague notion of

99. Leroi-Gourhan, 227.

100. Leroi-Gourhan, 242.

101. Leroi-Gourhan, 249-250.

perceptive intrageneration by calling this technicity. This is a significant moment in our study. It moves beyond the descriptive to the prescriptive. Techniques can be repeated. Techniques can be learned. So, rather than just compiling the fundamental components of a theory of making, Leroi-Gourhan brings us closer to finding a way to mobilize and operationalize that theory. Leroi-Gourhan introduces this wrinkle precisely in his consideration of graphism as technicity. He raises our category of **marks** directly within his affirmation of graphism as *techné*. What is more, he gives us a general sketch of what drawing should look like if it is going to enable a restored perceptive and common life. His ability to distinguish drawing from writing without vilifying the latter is critical. It suggests that if we are to place drawing at the center of a theory of making, if it is a technique that could invigorate common making, then it will also have redemptive effects on writing. He also points us to conceptual remedies by identifying the critical points of departure between writing and drawing. Namely, as inscriptions, Leroi-Gourhan shows that their relationship and their corresponding material efficacy is continually tempered by certain views of space, time, reality, and so forth. In other words, theories are keeping them apart or subordinating one to the other. He gives us the tools to ask: which technicity breeds life? Does one do so more than the other? These lines of inquiry will push us toward the next section on the phenomenology and ontology of drawing. Before we leap into those deep waters, there are a few more dimensions to anthropological making that deserve attention and refinement.

2.5 Of Kith and Kin

Andre Leroi-Gourhan inherited many of these categories and initiatives from Marcel Mauss. Mauss was, himself, a student and family member of Emile Durkheim. The most important thing about this lineage is their well-documented interest in social life. From Durkheim to Leroi-Gourhan, they shared an expressed interest in understanding how humans interacted with otherness—whether that be people or things.¹⁰² Whereas Andre Leroi-Gourhan focused in on the narrow mechanical nature of human development, his mentor, Mauss, extrapolated the effects of technicity in developing social bonds. Mauss' insights give further shape to our budding sense that technicity is influential for comprehending making at a molecular level. Specifically, Mauss' work treats technicity always a shared activity. This was latent in the foregoing insights. Ingold's surfacial perception always assumed that at least two things were interacting. Leroi-Gourhan's twofold feedback scheme also implies some mode of exchange. Mauss will make that explicit.

Marcel Mauss is mostly known for his work, *The Gift*, which describes forms of exchange that challenge the dominant western modes of trade and competition.¹⁰³ He claims that gift exchange is a social mechanism that breeds a society of obligation that is not rooted in debt. His other works include reflections on magic and its permutations and functions in societies.¹⁰⁴ Though we are not directly

102. Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim, "Notes on the concept of Civilization," in *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, ed. Nathan Schlanger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 35-40.

103. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London: Routledge, 2002), 65-83.

104. Marcel Mauss, *A General Theory of Magic* (London: Routledge, 2005), 174-175.

interested in either of these works, they do shed light on his continued interest in social mechanics. For Mauss, both gift exchange and magic are social developments that could not begin with rationality. The people did not “make it up” or “believe in it.” Conversely, even in a Marxian or Durkheimian form, such social groups were not grown in a Petri dish of symbols or strict means of production. In other words, the people did not inherit notions through signage or through organized labor. The only way to account for fantastical or generous societies like this is to look at the practices of daily life. There, not only do the body and technique of doing converge, but multiple people and things coordinate in shared procedures that are the building blocks of social order.¹⁰⁵

To establish his claim, Mauss homes in on motion—bodily motion.¹⁰⁶ He reads it fundamentally as a social phenomenon. Whereas contemporaries like Henri Bergson had taken motion to be an ontological substrate of creativity, Mauss was interested in the mobilization of practices.¹⁰⁷ Mobilization is both spatial and temporal and thus accounts for the shared norms of social life. Techniques, for Mauss, are ways of moving through life. Techniques can be distributed to others nearby and down the historical lineage. This fact helps resituate what others celebrate in his more famous work. His claims in *The Gift* can be seen as a technical exploration rather than an economic one. In *the Gift*, he articulates the movement of

105. Marcel Mauss, "Techniques of the Body," in *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, ed. Nathan Schlanger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 79.

106. Mauss, 77.

107. Marcel Mauss, "Technology," in *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, ed. Nathan Schlanger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 100.

goods throughout society in a way that is not based on debt but based on surplus. Gifts *technically* spread the wealth of life.¹⁰⁸ Now, in *Techniques of the Body*, he extends that implication by asserting that daily actions, the literal movements of the body like walking and talking, are *shareable*. They are shareable because they operate like Ingold's perceptive positionality. That is, my bodily gestures occur within groups of other people and those people are the surfaces of material intrageneration. Those surfaces evaluate, confirm, and reconfigure my movements every bit as much as I do theirs.

This interplay and feedback of various techniques return us to the complexity of living in a meshwork. Mauss' emphasis on social bonding and sharing helps us navigate the confusion, however. When surfaces come together and share movements, or affirm some techniques above others, they join in crafting a habitus.¹⁰⁹ To lay out the process more directly, social norms are constructed in techniques of the body. The collective movement of bodies, in their cooperative sharing, forms the rhythms of a society. This rhythm is inscribed in habits.¹¹⁰ But, to ward off misunderstandings, habit should not necessitate automation. We will consider the nature of habit below. The critical point here is the appearance of inscription in this sequence. It is not convenient or incidental. It is central to movements as they shift from local to shared and from shared to repeated. For Mauss, these technical practices are a form of inscribing—in others—the movements of a body or bodies. We mark on one another sometimes as fashion,

108. Mauss, *Gift*, 44.

109. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 214.

110. Mauss, *Techniques*, 78.

body art, or even in physiological transformations. Incriptions are shared techniques because they join us and pass between us. Mauss' arrangement adds two significant aspects to what we have collected thus far. First, in all of this, technique and sharing can be done consciously. Unlike his contemporaries, who preferred irrational motion or elevated idealism to account for human decisions, techniques reproduce social organization according to **agency**. The second aspect is that Mauss says the quiet part out loud. In the foregoing scholars, there was a latent assumption that technicity, inscription, and making were inherently shared events. The implication is that the lowest common denominator of making, perceiving, technicity, or even inscriptions is two. These two notions—*purposive agency and twoness*—will keep recurring as we progress until we are forced to address them directly.

Mauss' emphasis on perception, technique, and social organization raises the question about what kinds of bonds they will create? If we follow this logic, will we simply be a productive society making and manufacturing at every turn? Given his emphasis on gift and loyalty, Mauss' technicity trajectory points towards something more like kinship—a major field of study in anthropology. Kinship studies dominated the anthropological landscape for decades until David Schneider dropped bombshell critiques that called it all into question.¹¹¹ The damage was not all for naught, though. Schneider may have dismantled the inherited notion of biological kinship but he also opened the door to new forms of kin-making. In fact, this was his direct claim: that kinship did not exist in any system insofar as kinship

111. David M. Schneider, *American Kinship: A Cultural Account* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 5.

is understood through blood ties but kin can be found when it is formed symbolically.¹¹²

Marshall Sahlins, a modern anthropologist, took up Schneider's argument in his essay: *What Kinship is (and is not)*.¹¹³ He also questions the notion that kinship can be understood as patrilineal or matrilineal. He confirmed what had already been stated by Schneider: kinship is not a genealogical or biological property. What actually separated Sahlins' position from Schneider's is that he more directly asserted that technique, or cultural action, actually informed and shaped biological ties. That is, rather than only saying that kin can be crafted through social bonds, he goes a step further and says that blood bonds are themselves derivative of technical ones. He uses the example of birth, the sine qua non of heritage and kinship. The assumption is that one has children and those children become kin. The story continues: the kin forms a locus around which social networks and behaviors begin to form. In due fashion, the child will go on to build a world or participate in activities and rituals that are derived from that blood-based kinship. But Sahlins shows that there is no necessary priority in this sequence.¹¹⁴ He turns it on its head. He argues that the already connected world of people makes that birth important. To piggyback on Mauss, births find meaning in culture because we keep reproducing a social order by way of body, movement, and technique. That biological reproduction is seen as an instance of this shared world—as a movement or technique rather than a novelty. It's the fact that the parent does X, Y, and Z and

112. Schneider, *American Kinship*, 116.

113. Marshall Sahlins, *What Kinship Is-And Is Not* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 65.

114. Sahlins, 64.

then has a baby that will also do X, Y, and Z that makes its birth significant and grants it social significance. The baby arrives in a technical matrix. It is the fact that the brothers and sisters participate in these acts, rituals, constructions, and so forth, that makes a blood birth a manifestation of those procedures.¹¹⁵ This may offend some of our sensibilities and biological impulses, but that does not refute that those very sensibilities and impulses are not derived or at least interwoven with our lived techniques. In simplest terms, kin is made. Kinship is built.

The issue of kin now gives our thesis a more robust vision of what a theory of making requires and what a theory of making can engender. That is, intragenerative perception, making, technicity—or whatever we may call it—is, as we have noted, social. It is shared. Making is a twofold moment. Sahlins' insights not only confirm this fact but colors it kind, friendly, and familial.¹¹⁶ Though this is promising, kinship also has a peculiar position with respect to the problematics we outlined in the first chapter. Recall that both climate crises and class conflict dampen the human propensity towards making. By virtue of that dampening, they also threaten any sense of kinship that reaches beyond trade, exchange, or acquiescence to power structures. I call the issue of kin *peculiar* because it is both suppressed in this way but also surreptitiously affords resistance. On the one hand, it is directly dismissed as an artifact of class conflict. Capitalocenic folks may resist kinship as means of maintaining hierarchies and power relations between aristocratic families and the *hoi polloi*. But this fear is driven by the general

115. Sahlins, 68.

116. Sahlins, 19.

assumption that kinship is biological. If Sahlins and Schneider are correct, then kin might also foment resistance to class conflict. We may be able to build a collective of active making that is more than a hegemonic enabler.

The acclaimed feminist theorist, Donna Haraway, believes just that. Though not typically associated with anthropology, Haraway has been directly involved in debates regarding the names of these two problematics.¹¹⁷ She accepts the term Anthropocene and Capitalocene but introduces her own nomenclature in order to reimagine our impending doom and sketch exit routes. She describes our age as the Cthulucene.¹¹⁸ Despite temptations, this is not a reference to H.P. Lovecraft's horror monster. It is a reference to the ground—*chthonic*¹¹⁹. Haraway argues that if we are going to survive the Anthropocenic and Capitalocenic age, then we need to return to the perceptive posture outlined by Ingold above. That is, we need to be aware of the surfaces that comprise our intragenerative environment. And the chief surface of our dwelling—the ground—is our primary shared surface. It helps us to see that we belong together. In this way, Haraway synthesizes Sahlins, Ingold, and even Mauss: we can make kin with one another through shared perception when we also have kinship at the perceptive surface of the ground. More simply, our kinship with one another is our kinship with our world. Haraway positions this hope directly against the traumas of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene in her work, *Staying with Trouble*.¹²⁰ Kinship kills two birds with one stone. By focusing on

117. Elmar Altvater et al., *Anthropocene Or Capitalocene?: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism* (2016), 34.

118. Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Cthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 2.

119. "chthonic, adj.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/32645>.

120. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 114.

the ground, we can make kin with the earth and maybe mollify ecological damage. This is the plight of the Anthropocene. In addition, by focusing on the earth, we can find lines of connection with each other. We can make “ties” of connection that are of a different sort of bloodline.¹²¹ They are of a line drawn in blood, sweat, and tears—in shared technique and practice.

To summarize these findings, Sahlins’ and Haraway’s arguments stand in line with the anthropologists we have consulted thus far. For Ingold, man is making his way in the world with lines and movement. For Leroi-Gourhan, that way and evolving position in the world is formed by tools and technicity. For Mauss, technicity is the congealing force of social organization and social continuity. For Sahlins, a la Schneider, our cultural techniques give rise to the core of that social organization in kinship. And, all along the way, drawing has been either iterated as fundamental to (Ingold, Leroi-Gourhan) or implicated in techniques for (Mauss, Sahlins) human life and making. When all of these thoughts come together, new channels of understanding making open up. We have glossed over them above. Now, we turn to commentators who can help us coordinate these new channels and state them openly so that we can pursue them directly in the next chapter.

2.6 Scratching the Surface

Our foray into anthropology demands careful explication. It is not always immediately evident as to how these primal human conditions will factor into a theory of making that in turn pivots around drawing. For that, we must return to

121. Haraway, 13.

the fourfold set of concepts that we distilled in the first chapter. We need to comment on how they have behaved under the magnifying lens of anthropology. Furthermore, we need to observe the forces and conditions that are maneuvering these four within these anthropological accounts. Those conditions and forces will help us more clearly link the structural elements with the specific thesis of drawing. Only then, can we speculate about how they will serve an overarching theory of making. The figure of drawing is beginning to emerge against the ground of all these methodological rehearsals (as anticipated in the introduction). But we are not there yet. Our concepts will undergo explication here and then are made available to another layer of magnification that will zoom in even further.

To go back to the beginning, Tim Ingold directly introduced the importance of **surfaces** and **materials**. In many respects, in his model, these are one and the same. For Ingold, recall that the surface is a site of interaction and what defines materials is their morphogenetic capacity to adjust and grow along with whatever other material is at that surface. Ingold insisted that this interaction was always evolving and could not be scripted in advance. It must be followed as a correspondence. These concepts of surface and material were corroborated in the work of Leroi-Gourhan wherein every material gesture had a double-movement. It shaped the body and the world simultaneously. Furthermore, each time it is enacted that event of technicity or making is both novel and habitual. Leroi-Gourhan and Ingold both isolate a third term, **marking**, as critical to this surface interaction. In a single sentence, then, we could say that anthropology confirms that the surfaces, and by implication materials, are themselves sites of creative

markings and that this act of marking is making life. And this demands a hearing: what exactly are these surfaces? Yes, they are interactions, but this does not help see what they are in real-time and amongst real people. So, what are they?

In an anthropological vein, we are inclined to think of these surfaces only as extended organisms or constructions. That is, we imagine plants or walls or perhaps skin as these intragenerative sites. But phenomenologist Ed Casey expands our narrow assumptions and sheds light on the scope and material nature of surfaces and materials. What is more, He does this from within the empirical world and common experience. He just looks more closely. In his book, *The World on Edge*, Casey does not use the term surface as his largest category.¹²² He actually reduces surfaces as being one instance of his larger genus: the edge. We do not need to debate Casey here about which category is higher up the ladder of genera. We can treat surface and edge as interchangeable because our surface is much more akin to Casey's edge than his own diminutive definition of surface. We think we know edges and surfaces but Casey challenges our instinct about their operation. He pushes past the obvious truism that edges are the terminal outside of an object. He sees edges as more than stopping points. They are also starting points. As one thing terminates at the edge another is beginning. For him, an edge is a site of interaction but it is more importantly a double event of coming and going.¹²³ It is an arrival and a departure. This capacity allows the edge to gesture past itself toward other things. Or it that limit or line may gesture back towards the

122. Edward S. Casey, *The World on Edge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 39-56.

123. Casey, 21.

thing whence it came. It has, as he says, material intentionality.¹²⁴ That intentionality is this two-sided trend. Casey's book surveys a full range of objects that have edges and explores the different functions and manifestations of this double-sided line. His survey confirms what our instincts are telling us right now: edges must be everywhere.

Casey's *tour de force* opens us up to the underlying conditions and forces which guide the arrangements of our four structural concepts (the surface being one). For example, Casey's definition of the edge as having this material intentionality suggests that every edge, and by virtue of that edge every material, is always "on the way." It is always in process. Our empirical instinct is to think of surfaces as static when we confine our observations to our eyes. But if we look closer at things or look at other elements like our hopes or cares, we will immediately resonate with the pliable indeterminacy of the surface. If the surface is endemic to any theory of making, and a theory of making is to be useful for a common person, then the way we conceive of a surface as process is critical. Immediately it shows promise. It means that the surface is not only a site of interaction but is itself an interaction. It means that a surface is constantly amenable to any other material surface (including ourselves). Considering "process" will help overturn the restraining assumption that we cannot make something because we do not have the materials or that we will be met with stiff opposition—physical surface or abstract surface. Upon filtering the surface through Casey's account of the edge, we can have hope that all making is possible. Coming and going—material intentionality—is

124. Casey, 327.

perpetually possible. But this deep current or condition—process—comes with pitfalls and questions that Casey does NOT address.

Casey's account does not give us any ontological insight into this process of surface-making. We do not know whether the materials we touch are touchable if they are always on the way. We do not know whether the marks we make endure if the surface is always "becoming." Or to put it differently, we do not know whether we have agency. And without agency, we have a deeply impoverished account of making. Without penetrating philosophical consideration of the full nature of markings and agency, making would be left to those who already have powerful agency and a capacity to mark. To be fair, ontological exploration was not his intent. Thus far, none of our interlocutors has probed the surface metaphysically. But this absence actually confirms the importance of understanding surfaces at an ontological and phenomenological level. For starters, if Ingold is right and surfaces are marked by lines, and if those lines are also surfaces, then is there any actual making to line-marking after all? Is there any newness? If it's all a bunch of lines on lines then are we adding anything to this? To rephrase Derrida's question: can the line be drawn? But this returns us right back to the complicated questions about surfaces. If surfaces are being made; If surfaces are themselves interactions; if surfaces are intentional and gestural; if they reach forward into the new, then what catalyzes this transformation? Is the thing that catalyzes transcendent to the immanent event of change? If it is immanent, then is the catalyst for change no different than the thing being changed? Is this a monist account of time and space where all fluctuations leave us in a place of passivity? In the simplest terms, can we

ever make something on purpose? Am I thwarted in advance by the very philosophical nature of “stuff”? These two, surface and agency, seem to share many of the same ontological questions when we peer into the deep currents and conditions that they swim in (process, becoming, etc.). The ontological makeup of one will have an effect on the other. Therefore, as we unfold agency in this and the next chapter, the act of marking on surfaces will become more ontologically discernible, pragmatically repeatable, and manifestly related to drawing.

2.7 Homo Superficialis

Agency has developed a bad reputation in philosophical reflection. The general fear is that any advocacy for agency smuggles in preconceived and erroneous metaphysical assumptions that ultimately end in ethical violence. From the divine right of kings to the well-informed western scholar, agency has often been a cover for “do it my way.” The very notion of intent and purpose has been stripped down to the bones to the point of vanishing. But, even the most critical voices do not dispense with agency altogether. One response has been to distribute agency as a means of recovering it. It aligns violent agency with singular and centered wills. Therefore the hope is that a more diverse and dispersed body of agents may quell the forces of that violence.¹²⁵ In this model, there is no willing center or desiring subject but rather a melange of forces and ambitions coordinating in a moment of change or illumination. This approach runs parallel to post-human appeals. It may

125. N J Enfield, "Distribution of Agency," in *Distributed Agency*, ed. N J Enfield and Paul Kockelman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 10-12.

not be enough to have multiple humans expressing a coordinated agency. To avoid violence we may need to distribute agency across the full network of actors.¹²⁶ Another strategy is to keep the agency located in this or that person but weaken it.¹²⁷ Agency would be more indirect as a participatory affect or involvement in some type of event. For example, this event of ecological growth attests to “my” witnessing agency. Each of these strategies has its own merits and applications. They only become problematic when they substitute for materially efficacious agency. As I will exposit in the next section, denying humans materially efficacious agency is to preserve it for a select few. This was the underlying problem of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene.

But why humans? Why must agency be connected to humans at all? Didn't you read the above paragraph? Haven't they (we) done enough damage? Perhaps. But the tacit point of this entire anthropological appraisal is that it is not the warp and weft of humanity to destroy. Rather, the violent trends and imperialist impulses are decidedly *not* human. The perceptive and intragenerative descriptions above beget a world of interdependence. This is Haraway's point. The anthropologists are all telling us that human agency's core competency is constructive beneficence. Abdicating that function is not “natural.” This fact, amongst others, drives my advocacy for human agency. But to be persuasive, we must chart a way back to this human essence and bring surface, material, and marks along with it. A human

126. Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 219.

127. Gianni Vattimo, "Dialectics, difference, Weak Thought," in *Weak Thought*, ed. Gianni Vattimo, translated by Pier A. Rovatti (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 49-52.

essence that accommodates the pliability of the surface and the intragenerational energy of materials avoids violent imposition. This brings us to a unique possibility: what if the core of human agency is precisely its lack of essence?

Over the course of philosophical history, there have been countless efforts to locate the human essence and discriminate it from other organisms and materials. At each turn, and depending on the intellectual affinities of the investigating party, the human incidentally becomes more animal or more angelic. Not uniquely human. But in the last 15 years, a new trend has emerged alongside neuroscience. Namely, that the slippery nature of the human is telling us what it is. The human is plastic.¹²⁸ Catherine Malabou minted the idea that the human's distinction is its indistinction and variability. It can, in other words, fold around anything. There is both promise and peril in this model—especially in light of my opening desires. A plastic person can become a surface for any object, material, animal, and so forth. This is the promising part. But what will be left of this person once they do so? If the other surface writes on them, then what remains of their own shape if their plasticity makes them utterly deformable? Does the person have any determinate quality?¹²⁹ This is perilous for the everyday person already crushed to a pliable and fungible pulp under the weight of the Capitalocene. So is plasticity enough? Is this the surface? Is this agency?

128. Catherine Malabou, *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 11.

129. Catherine Malabou, *What Should We Do with Our Brain?* (New York City: Fordham University Press, 2009), 30.

Michel Serres offers a way forward. In Serres' concept, the greatest distinction of humans is not language or the like. It is its any-distinction.¹³⁰ At first glance, this sounds like an echo of Malabou. But unlike Malabou, Serres' human has determinate life. It has colors. The human is so full of white light that it can be pushed through any prismatic determination. He calls this "incandescence."¹³¹ Those colors are refractions of the determinate worlds in which they dwell and move. The human has no strict vocation. But it also does not have to revoke one calling to take up another.¹³² Rather it is the surface par excellence. It is material par excellence. It does not just fold around things. It does not just enter into situations as a vessel. It can become those things, those surfaces, those materials. And they can become it. It can pass into them and participate in them in a dispositional way. They can pass into the human and shape its determinate form. The way Serres describes it: man "has no niche but the world."¹³³

These last expositions provide a few preliminary conclusions that we should catalog. 1) If we can conceive of the human surface this way, we can also consider agency under the same ontological principle. To be an agent of making would simply amount to being available to mark and to be marked. This resonates with the account of surfaces and material we have developed up to this point. Agency could be participatory, perceptive, material, and surfacial. It would be open to all. It

130. Michel Serres, *Hominescence* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 181.

131. Michel Serres, *The Incandescent* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 81.

132. Giorgio Agamben, *The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2005), 23.

133. Michel Serres, "The science of relations an interview," *Angelaki* 8, no. 2 (2003): 231.

would be technically determinate at those sites of intrageneration. This has substantial promise though questions remain. But would it be constructive? Would it actually make things or is that a line we cannot cross? 2) If we draw some of anthropology's earlier premises forward, we can see that this agency and surface align with the requisite twoness in making. Making something must always be occurring in cooperation with another surface offering itself. 3) An open agency and surface, a sharing technicity, is also that process of repetition gleaned from Casey. The act of intragenerational crossing will continue and never stop lest it achieves an end. Ends like this are usually only measurable according to a concept that has been violently imposed from a conceptual beginning. Surface, material, agency—as making—must always be *in situ* and always *in actu*.¹³⁴ 4) These developments open a need to understand twoness, repetition, habit, and duration.

2.8 Anthropological Findings

As a way of summarizing, let me condense our progress thus far. I set out to address the needs of common people. I wanted to know how common people, including myself, could make their world better and more livable. I wanted to subject this desire to academic scrutiny and precision. I stated, right away, that any advocacy for—or model of—making would need to be usable for those common folks whilst remaining intellectually legitimate. Therefore I enlisted systematic combining as a method of inquiry. Systematic combining took us to the ground at the end of the dissertation to witness a call to making in real-time. We took the

134. "in actu, adv.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74260481>.

questions of our friends as a representative empirical sample. We pressed those questions for patterns and discovered four pillars of making. They were **surfaces**, **agency**, and **marking**.

For the purposes of strict study, these four have been treated as dependent variables. They occur in most accounts of making but their interrelationship and nature are dependent on other factors. To observe the changes and chart them, we established a constant for them to pivot around. We proposed the *inscription*. The inscription is a Janus-faced entity that has both mentalist and materialist sides. The inscription serves as a basis for measuring and witnessing the variable elements of making. At this juncture, we had collected raw data (the questions of doing, mattering, making, and living), structural concepts (agency, material, marking, surface), and were ready to see how they responded to an independent variable. Which, in our case, is the theory category of systematic combining. But before consulting the theory or paradigm we placed our empirical observations under the microscope.

We looked through the lens of anthropology to see if these four structural concepts had validity and value. Tim Ingold reinforced the importance of **surface** and materials. He suggested that they are central to humanity across time and critical for life. Andre Leroi-Gourhan affirmed **agency** and **marking** by focusing on the feedback loop of technicity. Mauss extended technicity to social organization. Sahlins and Haraway recast that socialization as kin-making. We turned to the work of Ed Casey to extrapolate the underlying conditions of surfaces and materiality and

then consulted Michel Serres' work to plot a forthcoming investigation into agency and marking.

At present, we can reassess the dissertation's original claim and improve upon its nested subtleties and fill in some conceptual gaps. Formerly, I asserted that drawing is a superior model of making and it invigorates that making specifically through its material, habitual, and tectonic nature. Now, I can, with confidence say that drawing is a superior model of making because it connects the surface and materials of construction with the pliable agency of the human. Because of this connection and pliability, drawing enriches the lives of humanity and the earth at a perceptibly material level.

3. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DRAWING

3.1 Digging In

Let us keep our findings in front of us. But let us also be brief so that we can get on to the crux of this study. Anthropology has shown us that materials—and by implication, the very concept of “the” material—are critical to making a life. More specifically, materials are defined by mutual generation and transformation—to both agent and surface. Anthropology confirms that the human, its world, its kin, and its products are material. It illustrates the way that—as materials—they are surface, they are interactions, they affect change, and they do all of this in that double movement noted above. Anthropology also provides the basis for including drawing in this schema. Anthropology points our attention to the way that change is operationalized in marking the surface of materials through graphism. Therefore, the first proposition in a drawn theory of making is that drawing is material.

As anticipated in the previous chapter, the anthropological proposition introduces difficult philosophical questions. We might know *that* we interact as material but not *what* that material *is*. We do not yet know what interaction *is*. What *are* agents? Where does the event of drawing start/stop or begin/end? There are

multiple ways to approach these curiosities. They can induce substantive exploration, mechanical responses, or outright dismissal. We must avoid the latter two options lest we leave the daily practices of making unchanged. Mechanical explanations would also leave hierarchies and current structures in place. Therefore, we will follow the substantive route. More specifically, we turn to Phenomenology at Anthropology's behest. Anthropologists have already situated making and materials on the horizon of perception. By virtue of that positioning, it should be supplemented by a science of perception. That is to say, phenomenology. At this stage of the study, the phenomenological lens of magnification will bring three "ontological motifs" to light. As we will learn, those motifs are critical in configuring the structural concepts of making (surface, et al.) that we identified in previous sections.

Using phenomenology is not without scholarly risk. Several critics (some of whom we will mention below) have abandoned phenomenology in the last few decades out of a concern for what they perceive to be a self-involved or narrowly subjective view of reality.¹³⁵ Critics fear that phenomenology is too egocentric to even address the problems of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene.¹³⁶ In some instances, they may even blame phenomenology. While this may be true in certain applications, it isn't the case for its roots, derivatives, and core questions. Instead—as the voices here will confirm—phenomenology tries to understand experiential

135. Silvia Stoller, "Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 17, no. 5 (2009): 712.

136. Travis Holloway, *How to Live at the End of the World: Theory, Art, and Politics for the Anthropocene* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2022), 12-14.

sites where intersecting forces and influences converge but without privileging a subject. When it does acknowledge a subjective angle, however, it does not do so in a preferential or violently solipsistic way. It does so by bearing witness to that subject's own matrix of perception.¹³⁷

Beyond its risks, phenomenology has two distinct advantages for this study. The first comes from its explicit focus. Phenomenology is highly attuned to everyday life and everyday experience. Despite its various trajectories and legacies, phenomenological investigation is always asking one question: *what is appearance?*¹³⁸ Or in everyday terms: what is the stuff of life? In light of the meshwork of “appearing,” laid out by Ingold above, we might describe phenomenology as a description of the emergence or application of that meshwork in any given world. Thus, phenomenology is inherently allied to my interests. The second advantage for this study lies in phenomenology's accompanying disciplines and perspectives. Because phenomenology is always looking at local experience and trying to extrapolate insights, it regularly interacts with other fields. One field is of particular interest. Given the metaphysical and abstract questions related to experience, phenomenology routinely engages ontology. Ontology investigates the nature of a “thing”—be it conceptual, extended, or otherwise. Phenomenology and ontology are correlatives though they remain conceptually distinct. Together, they

137. Gail Weiss, Gayle Salamon, and Ann V. Murphy, 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019), 11-16. See also Michael Marder, *Phenomena-Critique-Logos: The Project of Critical Phenomenology* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014); Elisa Magri and Paddy McQueen, *Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2022).

138. Weiss et al., 4.

explicate events at their lowest—albeit abstract—level. In sum, phenomenology and ontology allow us to peer into the interstices and energies of making, living, and drawing.

Schematically, this third chapter has four main movements broken up over two large sections. A1) It sets forth from the anthropological proposition and enters into phenomenology, A2) proceeds through ontology, B1) undergoes theoretical experimentation, and then B2) arrives at a pragmatic recommendation for the future of making. Those movements are then tied together in a final aesthetic proposition. In the first movement (A1), I explore three main threads of historical phenomenology and engage their chief proponents. In the next movement (A2), I engage three corresponding reactions to those threads in order to distill key “ontological motifs.” Though I expand on this further down, for provisional understanding, “ontological motif” is my term for those energies or currents that coordinate structural concepts and manifest overarching theories of making. Therefore, in the third movement (B1), these resultant motifs are coordinated and synthesized so as to present two main—inscriptive—rubrics for making. I then abductively experiment with these emergent theories. This theoretical exploration is the key turning point for the entire study. It highlights a critical assumption that has a ripple effect on the ontological motifs. In the final movement (B2), I press on from phenomenology/ontology towards pragmatics. I shift from describing making to prescribing drawing as a means of rehabilitating making as such. In the end, this rehabilitation will push towards the following chapter and its lens of Architecture.

3.2 Phenomenology

Anthropology confirms that human living—past and present at least—is bound up with making. It also demonstrates that making is deeply rooted in perception.¹³⁹ This brings making, in its anthropological hue, to the doorstep of phenomenology. It is hard to describe phenomenology constructively though. Phenomenology seems only loosely interested in making since it has historically been interested in reception.¹⁴⁰ In the worst cases, it has been reduced to a narrative about human consciousness. Therefore, if making does play a role it is usually circumscribed by psychological interests. But at its core, phenomenology is curious about the appearance of what appears. This is consistent across a variety of disparate thinkers. What is more, phenomenological investigation is guided by a curiosity about what *constitutes* that appearing. This is why we see whole phenomenological texts or oeuvres dedicated to art. In other words, making is not incidental to phenomenology. It figures in here as a mode of appearing. In this way, making is the very bedrock of phenomenology. While no two thinkers have the exact same questions or treat appearing the same way, we can identify three historical strands of phenomenology that share an interest in making. Respectively, we will consider Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and G.W.F. Hegel.

3.2.1 Edmund Husserl

139. Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Psychology Press, 2000), 166-168.

140. Weiss et al., *50 Concepts*, 12.

The most recognizable name in phenomenology, especially to those outside the philosophical world, is Edmund Husserl, a turn-of-the-century German philosopher. His diverse interests in psychology, mathematics, and logic have contributed to his broad renown. Upon closer review, those seemingly varied interests orbit around a basic and unified concern. Namely, he was intrigued by the human's perceptive ability to discriminate objects. His dissertation on number represents an early stage of that interest.¹⁴¹ Number, specifically geometry, continued to inform his later work.¹⁴² He is most well known for his take on the concept of intentionality. That is, the perceptive moment wherein a subject's consciousness is directed towards—or intends—an object. What we look for in Husserl are the ways in which his account of the perceptive moment supports or threatens making. More specifically, will probe whether perceptive agency has the capacity to affect the objects it encounters. And if so, what is the nature of that efficacy?

Husserl's teacher, Franz Brentano, had already claimed that consciousness had corresponding objects.¹⁴³ In simpler terms, consciousness was never empty. Intentionality was not new in Husserl. But, Husserl wanted to focus on the connection itself rather than the object or the consciousness. If he could explain the nexus, the very event of perception would not depend on the properties of either

141. Edmund Husserl, *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2011), 1-6. See also Edmund Husserl, "On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analysis," *Philosophia Mathematica* s1-10, no. 1 (1973), 273; Mirja Hartimo, "Mathematical roots of phenomenology: Husserl and the concept of number," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 27, no. 4 (2006): 326-331.

142. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 24-27.

143. Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (London: Routledge, 2012), 68.

mind or matter. It would have wide explanatory value for both experience and understanding. It would be repeatable, universal, and shareable. Therefore, for Husserl, intentionality should be understood on its own terms.¹⁴⁴ Not on the consciousness that intends or the object that is intended but the intending *qua* intending. In anthropological terms, Husserl is aiming for a science of interaction without a focus on the human or the world.

We do not have the space to delineate all of the features of his entire system, but we should note a few important aspects of intentionality. First, intentionality does not mean that the world is not real. It means that we bring something to the world to differentiate it. The blobby experience of phenomena is discriminated through a conceptual structure he calls the noema.¹⁴⁵ This process is ongoing and is critical in constituting objects as we know them. Second, this noetic act is unified. We are not piecing things together; the structuring is in real-time. Third, sensation is critical to consciousness insofar as the objects we perceive can alter which structure we apply to them. Thus, intentionality is more like the consciousness providing an expectation for an object but it does not always get it right. Once again, in intentionality, there is no doubt about the world's existence. There is only a desire to understand how we interact with it.

But what happens to intentionality when there are no corresponding objects? At least when there is no tree, thread, or lake? Husserl offers the notions of intuition and reduction.¹⁴⁶ The former is a familiar term and describes perceptive access to

144. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 2012), 119-122.

145. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (London: Routledge, 2014), 213.

146. Husserl, 131.

essences like those of his aforementioned mathematical objects. Reduction, on the other hand, is where his pure science of interaction begins to take fuller form. When we reduce, we reverse the conscious movement. That is, instead of attending to the object through the application of structures or expectations, we turn back and attend to our process of perception. We reflect on the structures like the noema.¹⁴⁷ Famously, he calls this a bracketing or an epoche.¹⁴⁸ We turn away from the “standard” way of looking at the world, set it aside, and reflect. When our reduction homes in on a conscious feature in our perception that is a prerequisite for it, this reduction is demonstrating a “transcendental.”¹⁴⁹ This is a key shift in the science of perception. It opens up ontological speculation about the nature of these transcendental structures and how we participate in them. In the spirit of anthropology, we should be wondering whether this retreat into the recesses of reflection can be called interaction. These categories may refine, but they may not bring perception closer to the material surface.

Before we move on from Husserl, there is one more key aspect of his science of interaction that deserves attention. His systems of perception do not preclude other consciousnesses doing their own perceiving. The temptation for interpreters of Husserl is to see the subject as isolated and objects as delimited to that subject’s world alone. But Husserl claimed that the structures of perception actually exposed that consciousness to the interplay of other consciousnesses.¹⁵⁰ This is because the

147. Husserl, 134.

148. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 6-9.

149. Husserl, *Ideas*, 114.

150. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 207-222.

actions and movements of the body, as part of the structure of perception, raised conscious awareness of other bodies and their capacity towards interacting. Husserl's famous example of this is the touch.¹⁵¹ When my hand touches a keyboard or table, the noetic structures can zero in on the hyle of the object. But the perceptive apparatus can also reflect back on the sense that my body is doing the touching and therefore is an object amongst objects in this lifeworld. This realization is heightened even further when one of my hands touches the other. Since I become aware of myself in the self-touch, I also become intimately attuned to others', activity and our joint capacity to act.

Again, though we certainly have not explored the fullness of Husserl's scheme, these few notes have a direct relation to our study of making. First, his scheme attests to the structural categories we have been working with all along. His meticulous taxonomy of the perceptive act begins and ends at the site of interaction we have been calling the **surface**. His descriptions of intentionality and even sensation do not retreat to either side of the intentional moment.¹⁵² The consciousness bends, revises, and reflects in lockstep with the intention. Likewise, the objects of experience are on a horizon of indeterminacy without the act of intention. Intention is a double movement. It is a double effect. As a result, it is extremely hard to posit either consciousness or object without it. In other words, this intention is primordial and bi-directional. This resonates with anthropology's vision of the material surface and the action of making. Recall that the material

151. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 1989), 60-90.

152. Husserl, chap.2.

moment is the ground or surface of intragenerational perception—or technicity. In the same way that the biped changes and is changed in the encounter with the world, at the surface of perceptive intention, both agent and object are active and pliable. But, while Husserl sheds more light on the nature of the surface—as a fountain of dual effect—his lasting weakness has been his appeal to a transcendental subject. We do not have the space or time to expound on this danger but suffice it to say, Husserl posited a subject that dwelt amongst the noetic transcendentals.¹⁵³ According to critics, this sort of subject would have full agency by solipsistically containing the world. Or, it would lend itself to a neutered agency that receded too far behind the intention. Neither model of agency is sufficient to account for a life of making. Husserl’s successor, Martin Heidegger, would take up this issue of the subject and build his own phenomenological scheme around it.

3.2.2 Martin Heidegger

Heidegger is not commonly spoken about as a phenomenologist. His impact has extended into a variety of disciplines and that is for mostly ontological and existential reasons. Still, his ongoing fixation with appearing combined with his tutelage under Husserl places him in a phenomenological lineage.¹⁵⁴ He inherited much of his predecessor’s questions and conditions but ontologically overhauled them. Specifically, Heidegger thought that we could not begin to understand life, the world, and our actions from the vantage point of things or the perception

153. Husserl, *Crisis*, 151.

154. Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 169.

thereof. For Heidegger, Husserl's former aim to explicate the perceptive middle might have been a noble path but he would need to go further than perception. He needed to ask about the appearing of appearing. Heidegger would radicalize, or purify, phenomenology's focus on appearance and center his attention on being. Though this may seem only distantly related to making, this issue of first appearing inflects the process of making at its originary moment. If Heidegger can show that appearing is only passive or that it is elusive, then agency and marking may vanish at the surface of Being's revelation.

To put it directly, Heidegger wants to reach behind any discussion of the structures of perception. Starting with the *perceived* would limit our understanding of appearance only to the ontic. According to Heidegger, things—extended, palpable, present—are “ontic” and ontic things only appear.¹⁵⁵ There is something more primordial and properly basic that grants such an appearance. Ontic things may include us, the act of intention, and the objects intended but they do not give us insights into the source of those things. Therefore, our interests should be in the very event of that appearing.¹⁵⁶ Such an appearing is not reducible to perception. It is ontological and, for Heidegger, ontology is the disclosure of being. If we want to know life and live it well, we need to explicate the very disclosure of the being of life, its materials, and its ideas. So, whereas Husserl structured perception via noetic categories, Heidegger look for events that gave rise to perception. Put differently, Heidegger and Husserl can be distinguished by the differences between

155. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 12.

156. Heidegger, 42.

a preposition and a noun. For Husserl, the “of” in consciousness-*of*-x was the site of investigation. For Heidegger, the “is” in the-table-*is*-hard was the true curiosity of life.

In short, Heidegger’s chief conception is that being is always in a process of revealing and simultaneously in the process of hiding. Whenever we say something “is” this way or that, we encounter the reality of a moment but are also faced with the immediate vanishing of that moment. This prompts us to wonder about how and why this event recurs. Heidegger realized that if any human took this issue seriously—if they asked what is *is*—it would throw the human into anxiety.¹⁵⁷ When we peer into being and its disclosure we also find it receding behind our investigations. We cannot tame it or name it. We cannot secure the ground beneath us. This pres-abs-ence, as Heidegger would think of it, hints at our own nature as vulnerable to disappearance.¹⁵⁸ Just as things are disclosed and retreat, we too stand at the precipice of our own arriving and concealment. To avoid confusion, this loss is not something that awaits us at the end of a long life. Our absence is concomitant with our presence. Because we *are*, this presabscent reality (and its accompanying anxiety) has been with us since our appearing. To be clear, that appearing is happening—and continues to happen—now.

Heidegger does not back away from the anxiety this induces. Rather, he sees anxiety as the proper response to our place in time and a radical awareness of where we stand with respect to being’s disclosure. Death is a part of life.¹⁵⁹

157. Heidegger, 228.

158. Heidegger, 340.

159. Heidegger, 293.

Therefore, an authentic life for the human would be being-towards-death. At the risk of redundancy, once again, this death is not something that is postponed to a chronological moment. The reality that we might not appear or will not appear later is a precondition for appearing at all. Ontological investigation begets a radical awareness of this fragility in the light of being's revelation. Heidegger calls this fully human self-awareness: *Dasein*.¹⁶⁰ Humanity is unique as *Dasein* because it is the site where being reflects on itself. In a similar way that Husserl's consciousness exercises a reduction, *Dasein* is where being reflects on being. These cosmic responsibilities should not dismay the human but invigorate it. According to Heidegger, human life has been shackled to the ontic and forgotten its ontological posture. This being-towards death is a kind of radical freedom. It gives humans a life unanchored to things and fallen imaginations.¹⁶¹ In the terms of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, this awareness of being-towards-death is a kind of standing up. Beyond standing, this ontological posture could move the human forward into material exploration and authentic expression. This realization led Heidegger to consider art and productivity as a means of executing an authentic life.¹⁶²

There is simply too much in Heidegger to give his scheme a proper hearing. Unfortunately, our space is limited to those insights that address our interest in making. First, we note that in Heidegger, surface and marking appear alongside agency—even in diminished form. I have enough **agency** to make **markings** that testify to being. I appear at the **surface** of disclosure. But our three concepts all

160. Heidegger, 36.

161. Heidegger, 219.

162. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 85.

remain under limit conditions. As the human peers or reaches towards its absenting end, it never quite gets there. The same applies to artistic works. Though they disclose disclosure itself, they do so by admitting their inability to touch the edge of a thing or arrive at the ground of a surface. In other words, the surface of agency is constantly retreating, and therefore marking is a kind of perpetual futurity. Our agency is groping. Our markings are hovering over an abyss rather than at a surface.

In Heidegger's system, this is not necessarily bad news. It is the font of authenticity—even if authentic life is somehow configured by real death. Heidegger finds this authenticity dwellable, buildable, and liveable¹⁶³. It just needs to keep happening. To be authentic, and to face the possibility of death, is to keep peering into this disclosure time and again. Still, despite his novelty and advocacy, such an exotic account of liberated living may not square with daily life as we know it. Heidegger had considered this possibility but dismissed it as the result of inauthentic humans forgetting their calling. Even if this holds, it still distances his work from applicability. His elevation of *Dasein* also puts human action in a somewhat passive light. Art reveals and tools may disclose but he never prescribes an active mechanics. Humans are simply reacting to the conditions of being-towards-death and every tool at their disposal vanishes in the translucent light of being's disclosure. This fall short of an account of making that is purposeful and actionable. Shortly, we will consider Jacques Derrida's phenomenological critique as a step towards an actionable and material account of agency, marking, and

163. Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 145.

surface. Even with this weakness, Heidegger's keen sensitivity to language and the mundane, combined with his penetrating abstract analysis, reminds us that an account of making may include speculative but fecund elements.

3.2.3 G.W.F. Hegel

Whereas Heidegger shifted attention to the grounds behind the perception, G.W.F. Hegel's phenomenological approach more or less reversed it. Both Husserl and Heidegger were interested in the experience of the phenomenological subject as they beheld objects or being. Hegel was interested in the nature and process of the objects and being themselves.¹⁶⁴ Labeled as an idealist by history, Hegel is not usually associated with other traditional phenomenologists. But we include him here because his approach to appearing is not only holistic and novel but it anticipates some of the analyses we will apply shortly. As noted, Hegel was curious about the being of things just as Heidegger was. But being, for Hegel, was less disclosive and more inclusive, developmental, and historical. Being was a comprehensive term that did not just appear on the horizon of human reflection but was operative in all things.¹⁶⁵ We do not need to start with human perception to find the nature of phenomenal appearing. We can see consciousness at work in things. This makes him less concerned about the phenomenon of appearing and more interested in the appearing of all phenomena.

164. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45.

165. Hegel., 126.

His most famous work, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, tracks the development of being as a general consciousness that works itself out in things. In Heidegger's terms, the ontological is alive in the ontic. This work demonstrates the way that all of history is a perceptive horizon and mechanism for "Spirit's" authentic awareness of itself. Spirit, or being, comes to itself in the material order of the world and its elements. For Hegel, the phenomenon of life is not the purview of *Dasein* or the structure of perception. It is the movement of the living world itself. It is not immediately self-evident that such a movement has any bearing on a concept of making. But as we shall see, his ontology of holistic consciousness elevates making as a critical process in the world's development while also undermining it in its practical aspects. Once again, how we conceive of appearing and origination has a direct impact on a philosophy of making.

Though preceding both Heidegger and Husserl, like them, Hegel also targets the ground of appearing. Recall that in Husserl, phenomenology could provide a science of perception. It culled out structures of intentionality. Consider also, in Heidegger, phenomenology would point consciousness towards the very givenness of being. In his system, phenomenology could differentiate and organize the elements of being's disclosure. Hegel shared their ambition to describe the mechanism of appearance in rigorous terms. One major distinction, for Hegel, is that phenomenology is a description of the process, rather than the structure, of consciousness. The second major distinction is that, in his system, the isolated consciousness is not a given but arises within a world as it unfolds unto itself.¹⁶⁶

166. Georg W. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1977), 104.

The developing world of things is itself the process of consciousness. But whose? Which subject is doing the perceiving? Hegel's answer: all of them.¹⁶⁷ Instead of privileging the subject of consciousness—as Husserl had done implicitly and Heidegger had explicitly—Hegel looks from the side of the objects. The world and its objects take part in a universal and determinate consciousness. Objects are in an ongoing discovery of their shared structure. The internal life of each object is a slice of a consciousness that comprises all objects, moments in time, and relations between things. Ultimately, these varied elements will converge into one self-awareness. Critically, for Hegel, this is because they began in one.

Contra Husserl, this broad consciousness is not a simple matter of a subject sensing or perceiving an object. Moreover, Hegel's is not a bare reversal of it either wherein the object is thinking about the human. Contra Heidegger, conscious self-awareness is also not a recognition of one's place in the matrix of being. For Hegel, self-consciousness is an ontological condition and reality. It belongs to all things. It is the engine of matter, space, and time.¹⁶⁸ In order for being to be, in order for it to have extension and duration, it must be moving. That moving is the discovery of universal self-awareness. The animal, the bottle, and the screen all evolve within the movement of this engine. The fuel of this engine, the currency of self-consciousness, is its internal logic of negation. Any positive discriminate thing is always accompanied by its negation or opposite.¹⁶⁹ The interaction of these

167. Hegel, *Logic*, 466.

168. Hegel., 420.

169. Hegel., 33.

opposites propels awareness forward. This logic works in both immaterial concepts and extended matter.

For example, at the physical level, when a group of coins is gathered together (at minimum, two), their relation becomes a grouping—a number. Each coin is the “same” as the others in one sense and “not like” each other in another. Eventually, this interplay of opposites will lend itself to a higher conceptual unity of coinage-as-such (i.e. as “money” or “metal circles). That unity can gather with another element to produce another unity. This may be hard to see in matter or in daily life but both Darwin and Marx were keenly aware of it. For Hegel, the important thing is that each stage of unity brings reality closer to its self-understanding.¹⁷⁰ It brings Spirit closer to self-consciousness. This engine operates at the lowest abstract levels of reality. “Being” is always accompanied by non-being. They are not separate but pass into each other in sublation.¹⁷¹ That passing is its own “thing” which will in turn have its own negation. This goes on *ad infinitum* producing quantity, quality, extension, measure, shape, and all the way to institutions and disciplines like religion, philosophy, and art. The process of self-awareness is being coming into its own by negating everything it entails. At least until the process concludes in a circle of return and awareness. This is phenomenology for Hegel: phenomena manifest a process of discovery and return that can be called ideal and universal self-consciousness.

170. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 364.

171. Hegel, *Logic*, 51.

This model has a direct impact on his theories of making and creativity. Recall that the material world does not just demonstrate a movement of negation but *is* itself negation and self-consciousness in process. This places material institutions in a key role. They are steps towards that final horizon when the physical and the mental mutually participate in one another. When this happens, when the opposites continue to sublimate into one another, self-consciousness is set free. Spirit is free when history, matter, and sensation are folded into one another.¹⁷² Making is critical to this freedom. For example, tools and construction betoken a freedom-cum-unity. They coordinate mind and machine to express the self-consciousness and coincidence of opposites. Works of art are even a finer testament to Spirit's development.¹⁷³ They are not expressions of a private mind. They are not referential works. Rather they demonstrate the freedom that arises in the harmony of material and immaterial in a joint movement.

Hegel falls further behind both Husserl and Heidegger with respect to prescribing a mechanism of making. Husserl and Heidegger circled issues of surface and agency but their positions on signs or art still left us wanting for a practical prescription for markings. Hegel's model enervates most of the structural concepts we have been working with thus far. The surface is weakened and overcome. Agency is displaced to the whole. And artistic markings are only valuable insofar as they evince a process. This is not the advocacy of Hegel but the result of his overarching system. Hegel's great skill is to see everything in reality

172. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 479.

173. Hegel., 424.

together under one rubric. That skill also compromises the discrete value of any single thing, act, or element. For example, while he appears to celebrate the material, things are not really interacting with other things. Rather, they are being incorporated into ever-increasing unities that will position them according to that synthesis. In other words, any distinction they may have is proximate. The same consequences befall the agent, surface, and markings. The only surface that seems to be of significance is the final shell which encases the grand synthesis of self-consciousness. The agent finds itself to be interchangeable with any “other” given in the process of becoming that other. Lastly, the surface seems too permeable to offer any resistance at the site of passing and sublation between opposites. In the end, Hegel’s system may not only fail to reach the common person, it may actually pose a danger by encouraging their acquiescence to a hegemonic status quo.

Despite any drawbacks, these forbears of phenomenology introduce new complexity and clarity to the discoveries of anthropology. Anthropology had already positioned making at the core of human life—especially in its punctuated evolutionary moments. These phenomenological voices further confirmed the structural elements of surface, agent, and marking that we saw in descriptions of perceptive making, technicity, and kinship. In the mold of phenomenology, these structural concepts take on greater significance. Husserl suggests that the surface is a blooming site that begets an interaction, not the other way around. The material surface is not waiting on the properties of the agent or object. Instead, the surface is fecund each time it appears. Heidegger helped us see that the agent does not “bear down” on that surface but “bears with” it. We could say that the agent

exists to bear being itself. Heidegger's agent of revelation and interaction marked that surface but not as violence. Rather as hospitality and welcoming the world and earth. Hegel confirmed that making, process, and growth are integral to the whole world. Negatively (ironically), his system showed that surface, marking, and agent are threatened by totalities that do not account for "making a difference." Still, important issues remain unresolved. Each of these phenomenological threads evokes critical and clarifying responses to which we now turn.

3.3 Ontology

Let us be clear, as we move through more phenomenological systems we will continue to conceptually diverge and lose direct historical continuity. As a reminder, historical linkage is not our purpose or methodological practice. From the beginning, I stated that I wanted to explore the deepest recesses of making so that I might find the resources for a novel theory. Our aim has been abductive from the start. We have been just off to the side distilling and reassembling elements of making to construct a systematic account that will be tenable for the everyday person. This method of locating, cross-applying, sampling, and conjoining is not incidental or arbitrary. It is systematic combining's core practice of MATCHING. To build a theory from the ground up, we flow back and forth inductively and deductively to sketch out a blueprint. What is more, given the scope of this study, that blueprint may only *found* the theory but not finish it. In this way, what we are doing here in selecting and sampling thinkers, provides a "vigorous" theory that can be developed further by future humans. It can, and should, grow.

What we are seeing up to this point is the increasing intricacy of making. Anthropology started with a clear celebration of human activity in the environment and then pressed further into the evolutionary effects of technicity. That technicity opened the question about the nature of perceptive interaction. Phenomenology probed deeper into the mechanisms of this perception as noetic, disclosive, or dialectical consciousness. Along the way, as making ripened, the structural concepts intensified. This process highlights the fact that making and its structures are ultimately rooted in ontology. Our phenomenologists did make that more explicit than our anthropologists but still stopped short of providing a theory of making. This omission is precisely because their ontologies had little room for humans on the ground making things. Instead, they elevated abstractions like revelation, transcendence, and totality. In short, making still hangs in the ontological balance. We can see, by their own abstractions, that there is more to a theory of making than just its ingredients.

Ontologies of making also reveal motifs that organize and arrange these ingredients. Ontological motifs render theoretical products and prompt empirical behavior. Though we are well on our way, we have not fully grasped these motifs. We know that making should include **surface**, **agent**, and **markings** but we do not how those pieces are combined or blended. Here below, we make another pass at phenomenology but this time through the work of these forbears heirs, and critics. In order, we consider the embodied phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the written ontology of Jacques Derrida, and the creative philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. As respondents, their writings already do a lot of the work that we would otherwise

take on as MATCHING. When we cross-apply these critic's systems, we will expand our matching process, develop the mold of these budding ontological motifs, assert them clearly, and then include them in our foundation for a theory of making. We will proceed in the order of appearance above.

3.3.1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty

As it concerns aim and basic terms, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology feels a lot like Husserl's. He too is interested in the nature of perception at ground zero. He wants to bracket typical perspectives and start afresh at the surface of interaction and consciousness. But unlike Husserl, he does not begin structurally. He is not interested in finding repeatable universals but its opposite. He wants to discover the *sine qua non* condition of perceiving. He is looking for that thing that is unique to perception and life. In a word, this is the body.¹⁷⁴ Merleau-Ponty considers the body to be Husserl's—and other's—grand omission. Even if Husserl had discussed kinetics, Hegel had elevated matter, or Heidegger had positioned the human as the site of being, none had spotlighted the body as the fundamental organ of perception. Given that the body is paramount, Merleau-Ponty begins his examination of perception from the angle of behavioral psychology.

Behavioral psychology was a mixed bag for Merleau-Ponty. On the one hand, it was mired in the mind-on-matter paradigm. Some unreflective psychologists simply perpetuated the assumption that humans are a mind who receives or conceives of intents and then conveys those intents on matter. These sorts of models often died

174. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Psychology Press, 2002), 100.

out in a debate between idealism and empiricism.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, Gestalt theory was a branch of behavioral psychology that was rife with perceptive affordances. In Gestalt theory, humans perceive objects as forms—as wholes.¹⁷⁶ This pressed against Husserl's tendency to break down perception into various interlocking structures of reception. Gestalt theory would argue that the figures of perception were irreducible to component parts. For Merleau-Ponty, Gestalt models described everyday life and experience because daily action is whole. Daily action is bodily. Therefore, in Merleau-Ponty's system, the lowest common denominator of perception was the unified form.¹⁷⁷ And, life is comprised of unified forms confronting each other. This confrontation, once again, foregrounds the importance of the body.

The body is not just something the mind operates on. It is not something the consciousness possesses. It is also not merely an object amongst objects. It is, in our terms, the surface of perception. The body provides a canvas for the appearance of any object. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "it is that by which there are objects."¹⁷⁸ The body is a zone of possibility. And, as a result, it is ambiguous.¹⁷⁹ It is as much defined by the event of perception as the object perceived might be. The body is growable, adjustable, and changeable. These descriptions of the pliable and

175. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Relations of the Soul and the Body and the Problem of Perceptual Consciousness," in *The Merleau-Ponty Reader* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 101.

176. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1983), 129.

177. Merleau-Ponty, *Structure*, 168.

178. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology*, 105.

179. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Man and Adversity," in *The Merleau-Ponty Reader* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 141.

receptive subject hint at similar thoughts in Heidegger with the critical exception of the body. In Heidegger's model, *Dasein* was the site of being's disclosure insofar as *Dasein* cared or considered this disclosure (perhaps in a theoretical way). For Merleau-Ponty, the body was the site of perception precisely in its sensations, reflections, speech, and creativity. To change, it did not refer out to some vanishing horizon. The body bestows meaning right where it is.

The elevation of the body posed a transcendental risk. Namely, would the body and its bestowal of meaning and significance count as a transcendental subject in the spirit of Husserl? Instead of positing a receding entity guiding perception—as Husserl had—Merleau-Ponty thrusts perception back to the surface. Perception happens where the body interacts. If perception is transcendental it is not because it is removed from events of perception but because it is pervasive. Transcendence here indicates “across” more than “above.”¹⁸⁰ The body stretches out across all perceptive acts. Therefore, it grounds even our ability to talk about it. It foments speech rather than fields it.¹⁸¹ To call it transcendent would not mean that it is above or beyond but that it is woven in so deeply that we have to use it to try and reflect on it. We cannot gain distance in order to describe the thing that founds our descriptions. Our body, perceiving at this surface of interaction, presents a gap in the manifold of describable things.¹⁸² He fleshes this idea out in his later ontological writings.

180. "transcendence, n.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204607>.

181. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology*, 179.

182. Merleau-Ponty., 387.

At the time of his death, Merleau-Ponty was working out his ontology of perception in a series of essays that would later be collected as *The Visible and the Invisible*.¹⁸³ He wanted to give more depth and shape to the immanence of perception and resolve those lingering questions about the nature of this transcendental gap. In this collection, he introduces the notion that the world, itself, is flesh.¹⁸⁴ This flesh is like a plane of possibility and sensation that folds back on itself and produces perception at the point of contact. He described the flesh of the world as both touching and being touched.¹⁸⁵ The flesh of the world manifests in a body that is both object and subject.¹⁸⁶ In other words, that body gap noted above is the result of the world's flesh opening a site of interaction. That opening is not an absence as it had been in Heidegger, it is a point of contact, touch, and connection. To clarify this point, he returns to Husserl and takes up his example of the hand.¹⁸⁷ Recall that Husserl had illustrated the notion of reflection and reduction when a subject becomes keenly aware of their own touch. In the first instance, touching a cat helps me feel the cat feeling me. But, when a subject's hand touches their other hand, their self-awareness is amplified. For Merleau-Ponty, this second instance is momentous. It suggests that I can perceive on both sides of the perceptive connection. Self-touch demonstrates a kinship at work in perception. The cat, the

183. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

184. Merleau-Ponty, 133.

185. Merleau-Ponty, 134.

186. Merleau-Ponty, 137.

187. Merleau-Ponty, 141-148.

tree, and the wind are all sensing me. Self-touch implies a reversibility of sensation and is therefore exemplary for Merleau-Ponty.¹⁸⁸

In the same essay, he calls this reversibility a chiasm.¹⁸⁹ A chiasm is both a literary tool wherein action reverses after a nexus and a visual cue in the form of an X. In the chiasm, Merleau-Ponty is illustrating connection and departure in the same movement. This is his basic ontological principle. When perception occurs, the flesh of the world begets bodies that join and separate. At that juncture, one body senses another body sensing it. This enables a reversibility and expands perception and life. I can see what you see, if only proximately. I can feel what you feel, if only proximately. But the chiasm is not reducible to simple sensation. Chiasms describe all interactions. Two ideas converging and sharing or SYSTEMATIC COMBINING'S MATCHING could both be called chiastic. What is more, the chiasm can describe interactions without imposing a totalizing and absorptive principle. By nature, the chiasm resists any kind of finality, incorporation, or substantive closure. It is, in that way, an act of making. This brings Merleau-Ponty into proximity with anthropologists like Tim Ingold and even Andre-Leroi Gourhan who had described this double-movement of interaction and growth.

Though this idea would only emerge near the end of his life, the chiasm forms the basis of his final work on art and making. In his essay on the *Eye and Mind*, Merleau-Ponty brings the body to the surface and argues that the painter offers his

188. Merleau-Ponty, 144.

189. Merleau-Ponty, 130.

body and the world offers itself back¹⁹⁰. The artist arises in this chiasmic moment and his perception reverses positions with the world he paints. The painting itself is the expression of this reversibility.¹⁹¹ Heidegger had argued elsewhere that art was a revealing of deeper ontological conditions.¹⁹² Thus, like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty's craft of making has something to do with disclosure. But unlike Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty's art was tied to the event of the intertwining rather than the result of an interruptive outside. He went so far as to call these makings: icons.¹⁹³ The lines, forms, and methods of the maker did not subtract the material ground of perception and life. Painters were not trying to represent an object through distance but to encounter the world. In our terms, to make a living.

3.3.2 Jacques Derrida

Merleau-Ponty would not be the final, or even the most consequential, word on Husserl's phenomenology. That title belongs to Jacques Derrida, the French theorist. Derrida is not strictly a phenomenologist but his work inevitably orbits it. His oeuvre, from his master's thesis to *Speech and Phenomena*, are often responses to Husserl's phenomenological system.¹⁹⁴ In fact, his earliest published work, in

190. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in *The Merleau-Ponty Reader* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 358.

191. Merleau-Ponty, 373.

192. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, xx.

193. Merleau-Ponty, *Eye and Mind*, 359.

194. Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 53; Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 27.

1962, was his introduction to Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*.¹⁹⁵ Husserl had commented on Geometry in his *The Crisis of European Sciences*. This introduction still serves as a reference point for Derrida's grammatological ontology. In it, Derrida addresses the structures of perception specifically as they relate to immaterial concepts like geometric conclusions.

Husserl had introduced the notion of eidetic essences. The eidos refers to the underlying "shape" of an object of perception beyond the particular moments of perception. Husserl even applied them to phenomena that had no direct material reference. In light of Husserl's background in mathematics, geometry served as a prime example of an immaterial eidos. The geometer engages reality with the same noetic structures that the child in the field might use. He would use the same reductions and the same intuition to access the shape of the thing under observation. But, unlike that child's grasp of flower, the geometer's object must be inscribed.¹⁹⁶ That is, the geometric object would not be a phenomenon unless it appeared. As a result, this object appears on the surface of the page.¹⁹⁷ These inscribed objects—or as Husserl called them: buried intentions—are get reanimated in the event of other perceptions. This happens time and again when others "read" this object on the page. This is how things like geometric forms escape simple rationalist enclosure. They do not just exist in the mind but rather

195. Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 51.

196. Derrida., 104.

197. Derrida., 87.

appear on the surface and for perception. Husserl takes these objects to be available for universal and immediate reflection.

Derrida's concern is that there are ontological assumptions in the aforementioned example that are not only dubious but obscure the process that the geometric object must undergo. Namely, that this object must pass through the inscription in order to be present. Derrida objects to the notion that the geometer is present to things in inscriptions. He rejects the claim that such inscriptions can semiotically produce absolute presence for its later "readers." Their reanimating reading will also pass through a process before they become presently aware of its *eidos*.¹⁹⁸ He discovers and critiques these assumptions according to Husserl's own categories of expression and indication. These are two modalities of putting signs down on paper.¹⁹⁹ For Husserl, expressions are inherently meaningful. They may not indicate another object. Rather they are their object, so to speak. Like art, they convey their shape openly. Indications, on the other hand, refer away to an object not present to the sign. For Husserl, the perception of geometric objects is expressive. Unlike the writing that may convey it later, the geometric object is immediate in its perceived moment.

But Derrida questions that expressive assumption. How does an expressive sign unfold inside perception? For him, it assumes that the subject is present to the intuited object in an uninterrupted, immediate, and direct way. This, Derrida claims, depends on the subject also being a pure immediate presence unto itself.²⁰⁰

198. Derrida., 47-48.

199. Derrida., 89-99.

200. Derrida., 137-141.

The most glaring difficulty is that such an ideal relation could hardly be shared. It would be like a silent encounter—never referring. Pure expression would be somewhat inexpressible. With that in mind, Husserl had held that an expression had the potency for indication in the intersubjective actions of readers. It is writable, in other words. This allowed the pure expression to be “on its way” to reference and sharing. Such potency did not depend on indication—geometric objects had perpetuity—but it did enable it. For Derrida, this is suspect because the subject’s intuition of the expression only becomes visible in the potency of inscription. In Derrida’s mind, Husserl has it backwards. The potential of geometric forms—to be “read,” to be repeated across time and space, and to be vulnerable to misinterpretation—implies that they are always already indicative because these are attributes of indication.²⁰¹ Therefore, Derrida concludes, that all perceptive acts and intuitions are always already indicative and arise alongside the mediation of inscription.

Derrida expands on the implications of this primordial mediation in phenomenology. If all perceptive acts arise in indicative inscription, then all acts have some potential for being shared but also for being misinterpreted. One implication is that reality, as we know it, is always underscored by a fundamental alterity. Everything, not only perceivable events, is situated in alterity, differing, or othering. That differing is both a generosity and a slippage of control over meaning. But it is not a moral condition. It is an ontological one. Alterity is ready-to-hand insofar as it is the very nature of inscription or writing. The inscribed opens room

201. Derrida., 73.

for more perception and more differing. The other implication is that this alterity presumes repeatability. If something can always be something else, then it is never statically presented. It can reappear in another form. If a phenomenon was self-present, it would go silent and cease to signify. The bond between sign and signified would be absolute. To even utter the statement “this thing is like that thing,” presumes the space of uncertainty that even makes that claim meaningful. Therefore, inscriptions, as alterable, are inherently repetitious. Derrida synthesized these implications in a single term: iterability.²⁰² Inscriptions are iterable insofar as they alter and repeat. This taxonomy suggests that at its basic level, perception is a fundamental mediation that is also constructive insofar as it is iterable. Perceiving means we are altering and repeating and therefore producing something new. In his critique, Derrida had turned phenomenology upside down and, in so doing, open the door to mechanical explanations of this constructive differing alive within perception.

Any Derridean mechanics of construction must pivot around the fact that mediation is necessarily inscriptive. As we have seen, the writing of geometry opens perception by opening iterability. This is where Derrida’s connection between writing and acting, perceiving, and living takes root. He coins the term *différance* to describe the internal differing of perception that we have been calling iterability.²⁰³ *différance* is a deferral of time and difference of place. When something is written, given that it is never fully self-present, it is always elsewhere

202. Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977), 7.

203. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 82.

and else-when. So, what is posed directly in the text can be even read as its inverse. Writing is the inscription of here that always leans on an absenting there. Writing is that inscription whose now is also then. This, for Derrida, is the structure of perceptive indication as laid out by Husserl. The indices of perception are coextensive with a primordial “writing” that founds events.²⁰⁴ What is critical here is that Derrida is shifting phenomenological speculation away from biological or philosophical accounts of lived phenomena and positioning them within the exceedingly familiar practice and event of writing. Therefore, he can ontologically assert that writing makes perception possible by instituting *différance*. Derrida did not back into writing by happenstance but derived it from Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s claims about the hand, the mouth, and technicity. Leroi-Gourhan had shown that man’s technical development of speech and tools exteriorized his life and desire. In other words, writing was instrumental for human’s ongoing perception and life. Derrida reads this as confirmation of writing’s role in establishing and exteriorizing all perceptive encounters in *différance*.

Significantly, writing is not left bare as an abstract force of differing and repeating. This represents a substantial advancement towards a theory of making. Namely, Derrida operationalizes his unique take on perception. This way of living could be shared, taught, or practiced on purpose. Writing is not simply a concept or a medium. It is both. What is more, now with *différance* and iterability in hand, writing and its mediating structuration can be dissected. Since writing is iterability *par excellence*. The lowest form of alterity and repetition can be found amongst

204. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2016), 18.

phonemes or graphemes. We can engage these elements and observe their differing and iteration. What Derrida finds there, amongst the differing, is the fact that writing's iterability depends on basic binaries.²⁰⁵ We have already noted how saying one thing implies another. But this implication can open a chain of reference that can stretch all the way to the opposite end of meaning. In other words, a term seems to imply its opposite. For example, each time we say light, dark is always lurking. A binary is shorthand for that chain or reference. Deconstruction was Derrida's method of exposing these embedded binaries.²⁰⁶ But becoming aware of binaries was only the first step. The reader can invert the binary to explore and play with the consequences. If we wrote about dark instead of light, for example, we could see ripple effects in textual meaning and force. Deconstructing the binary is a process that reveals the way a writer, institution, or culture has privileged one aspect of a differing world and heralded that aspect as metaphysically given. We can ask why light over dark? Why now as opposed to then? What we cannot do is rid ourselves of these binaries. They are basic to writing and writing is basic to perceiving, living, and moving. What we have here in deconstruction, iteration, and *différance* is an inscriptive model for making a life. We will discuss the merits of this model in detail below. For now, it is only important to see the subtle coordination of phenomenological concepts with mechanical practices.

Thus far, written mediation has only affected our certainty and clarity regarding the objects of understanding. But writing's exteriority, iterability, and

205. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 230.

206. Derrida, *Grammatology*, 67-70.

deconstruction also alter our orientation towards an assumed subject—towards ourselves. In indication—in inscriptive perception—self-presence assumes non-presence. This means that our concepts of our own life are themselves never self-identical. According to Derrida, then, our “life” implies not-life. To put it anthropologically, as alive and perceiving, our perceptions are configured by death.²⁰⁷ This fact resonates with, but also nuances, Heidegger’s advocacy for *Dasein* to acknowledge its own death.

Back in the geometric example, Derrida had shown that if expression were possible then both the geometric object and the self would need to be fully present. Objecting to that demand, he demonstrated that the object is always already mediated despite Husserl’s contortions. The same applies to the subjective perceiver. In the same way that geometric expressions are always already indicative, the self is always already indicative. As such, both subject and objects arrive through references, signs, and language. In simplest terms, since language always accompanies perception, I am a function of the written. This conclusion has direct impact on the lived present. If the subject of perception is never immediate, then every now of perception is tied to a past and future. Every here of perception is tied to a there. There is no moment where our experience of something is utterly direct and utterly present without indication. But there is also no clear moment wherein we set our pencil page, hammer to anvil, or eyes to screen. So, in one

207. Jacques Derrida et al., *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 2006), 67.

sense we are instructed to write but in another sense, we may never be able to.²⁰⁸ Despite Derrida's developments, this raises problems for making that we will examine below.

In his later work, Derrida would explore the full ontological implications of this iterable life *cum* death phenomenology. He takes cues from Heidegger's resistance to metaphysics. Heidegger had objected to the notion that we could begin our understanding in the perceivable things of the world. That approach would assume a kind of stability that never went behind the curtain to consider the appearance of appearing. Derrida accepts that critique and calls it the privileging of presence or logocentrism.²⁰⁹ This would influence Derrida's more formal ontological articulation. Derrida used Heidegger's concepts of disclosure and concealment alongside difference to claim that life was imbued with a hauntology.²¹⁰ Beyond the moment of perception and the process of writing, the nature and being of things, like *différance*, is the lurking and nearness of what is not "present." Life is not logocentric and to make it that way messes things up. Hauntology presents and delays just like writing but with a critical nuance. Writing, in the binary, foregrounds one thing while downplaying another. Therefore, hauntology is not just the double movement of revelation. Revealing and concealing are not concurrent and equally active. We are highly involved in what is put forward and what is hidden. And our decisions are haunted. There are always the specters of

208. Nicholas Royle and Jacques Derrida, "Et Cetera," in *Deconstructions: A User's Guide* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 300.

209. Derrida, *Grammatology*, 3-13.

210. Derrida, Marx, 10.

another thing meandering around every element of our active experience. The undecidable is nested in our decisions. This led Derrida to further explore the role of death in all of reality. Much like Heidegger, everywhere there is life, there is also death.²¹¹ Life is not only self-present, it is also deadly absent. And, the two are never resolvable but always remain undeniable and possible. In the end, even while writing is proposed as a way of differing and creating the new, even as it is expounded as a way of life, it is also perpetually dying.²¹²

As we have already said, Derrida's work advances our understanding of making exponentially. He not only reinforces our structural concepts but gives further shape to the ontological motifs that order and develop those concepts. Three contributions are of note. First, iterability is intimately bound up in altering binaries. Binaries implicate reversibility, dialectical strategies, double-movements, and other phenomenological categories outlined above. But most importantly, they give our theory a way to conceive of the surface of interaction: as double-sided. In other words, the binaries may not be so bad. They may actually be a key staple in the process of making given that they implicate a surface—a key structural element of making. Second, iterability is repetitious. We had already seen, in anthropology, that the process of living and making was ongoing. Technicity and kinship never cease. While this moving repetition is suggested in Hegel or is tacit in Merleau-

211. It is also worth noting that Hegel's totalising phenomenology also runs in the background of hauntology. Derrida had studied Hegel with his teacher, Jean Hyppolite. His hauntology pushes back against the vitality and closure of spirit's self-consciousness

212. See Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire"* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 95.

Ponty's flesh, in Derrida it is explicit. Thus, making can take up repetition as a critical aspect of its ontology. Making may not be so violent or impositional if it is a perpetual process. Third, and finally, Derrida brings the buried and abstract reflection of phenomenology back to the surface of daily action. All of the prior explorations lent themselves to wayward speculations about making. They struggled to apply their concepts (flesh, noema, dialectics, being-towards-death) to instruments which could underwrite a livable theory of making. Ultimately, the value of Derrida's work is in the fact that it states and operationalizes a specific—inscribed—theory of making. Namely, writing. The question of whether this is the most suitable theory remains open.

3.3.3 Gilles Deleuze

Most of the foregoing phenomenologies, and their derivatives, pivot around humanity. Their conclusions may wander from the human but they are guided by that latent interest. Of course, with the exception of Hegel. There is no doubt that Hegel has a critical role for the human but it is also evident that he expands the notion of phenomenology beyond it. All things are Spirit's movement of self-consciousness. Therefore, things, in their own way, perceive, make, and live. The ongoing criticisms of Hegel often return to this issue of humanity.²¹³ On the one hand, Hegel makes humanity too small. Human decisions are virtually ineffectual in the grand synthesis of Spirit. This is Kierkegaard's critique (which we will return to

213. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy Of Right'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Soren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life* (London: Penguin UK, 2004).

in the second part). On the other hand, the self-conscious Spirit appears to be a human writ large. The critique is that Hegel's system privileges the human so much that consciousness becomes the pure form of all reality. In both senses, Hegel represents an enormous achievement in phenomenological speculation insofar as he relocates it in the wide array of "things." He also represents an enormous problem in that the way he conceives of things is covertly rational and anthropocentric. His work opens the question: can there even be a phenomenology of "stuff"? Is there a phenomenology of things in their own right?

Such a question prompts and drives the work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze would never count himself amongst the phenomenologists, but in some respect, his rethinking of all of life could be read as a new phenomenological beginning.²¹⁴ Deleuze shares the aim as those who have gone before—to understand and experience life—but he abandons all of their starting points in order to be a radical empiricist in the vein of David Hume.²¹⁵ His aggressive reconsideration of all things even applies to his own catalog of inspirational theorists (including Hume). He reads his sources against and apart from their inherited interpretations. Regarding Hume, most interpreters take his work as a description of the shortcomings of rationalism. Hume's writings, at least in this paradigm, are a declaration about the passive habits of the mind as they correspond to unpredictable reality. But Deleuze reads Hume differently. Hume is not a diagnostician. He is not shrinking the

214. Dorothea E. Olkowski, *Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021), 10.

215. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 105.

human capacity by way of restrained empiricism. Instead, Deleuze sees Hume as an advocate for the powers of creative synthesis.²¹⁶ Instead of seeing Hume as simply indicting ideas like causality, Deleuze sees him highlighting the promise and creativity of association that manifests itself in human mental habits. Through Hume, Deleuze suggests that what the world shows us—including the human part of the world—is that we assemble things.²¹⁷ If we want to frame this in terms of perception or anthropology, life is an intragenerative joining. This joining is not reducible to the human though *we* have started here. Deleuze takes Hume’s insight and distributes it beyond the human scope. All things join and those joinings are every bit as viable as the things joined.

Thus, for Deleuze, there is no need to retreat behind the observable phenomena of the world. We only need to observe life on its own terms. And its terms are constantly being assembled into new things. This “ideal” event of perception occurs all over, all around, and all of the time. It does not require any kind of concept that could come from anywhere else. We can observe—with some creativity—that everything is associative. Our bodies themselves, our families, our memories, the plants around us, the weather, and so on are all networks of associated nodes. Brain activity is a coordination of electrical impulses.²¹⁸ Baskets are woven threads. Screens are interacting light particles. This coordinating is a fundamental idea for Deleuze and for those who would enlist his work in their own.

216. Deleuze, 92.

217. Deleuze, 124.

218. Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 23.

For our purposes, assembly and association raise some new ontological questions. To our advantage, though, Deleuze addresses them openly.

First, we may be inclined to see the vestiges of Hegel in this associative principle. If association is the underlying principle of reality then do things all converge into one? For Deleuze, it is the opposite. Things emerge from a “one” and diverge into an ever-expanding plurality. Deleuze will call this “one” a plane of immanence or the virtual.²¹⁹ This plane is pure possibility that needs no outside to dictate its permutations and iterations. As is well-documented, he draws this idea from Baruch Spinoza.²²⁰ Spinoza is the first philosopher, for Deleuze, to offer an account of pure immanence. In Hegel, there is a transcendent process that brings different things into a unity under that principle. In Spinoza, there is a reversal and a rejection of that idea. There is no transcendental. Whatever life is, it does not come from above. By implication, there is no “two.” There is not “this life” and some organizing other. There is only life here below and its internal animating creativity. Hence, “one.” Therefore, consciousness—the gold standard of phenomenology—is not transcendentally substantive. Morality and theism are not transcendentally substantive. In Spinoza, there is only the world. There are only finite modes enacting the life of the world. Consciousness and morality are immanent modalities of this world. What is more, living this one life is associative but not synthetic. Therefore, the act of living is monistic but differentiating and pluralizing. It is not closure and sameness. For Deleuze, this immanent life is the

219. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: A&C Black, 2004), 190.

220. Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (City Lights Books, 1988), 44.

world making new things through permutations, associations, and combinatorics. This raises a second ontological issue. Namely, how does action in a monistic world beget difference? What animates this action?

To explicate this associative and differentiating action, Deleuze employs a notion of force and repetition that he derives from Friedrich Nietzsche. He reads Nietzsche as a supplement to Spinoza's account of singular substance.²²¹ Nietzsche's concepts of affirmation and return help filter Spinoza's emphasis on ethical postures within the monistic life. Spinoza had held that in a monism of plural possibilities, we have no need for sad passions. Sadness or disappointment would violate the central concept of having everything at our disposal. They would imply a loss or unmet goal. But if life were one and its models were plural, then nothing can ultimately fall short. This is made explicit in Nietzsche, who rejects any sense of the transcendental in favor of the immanent power of affirmation.²²² We do not need to measure our action against a beyond. A life well-lived is one that affirms. In that affirmation, one participates in the creativity of the world. According to Deleuze, that affirmation is differentiating association. We are saying "yes" to possible connections, as it were. This posture can exist in perpetuity precisely because it spawns newness. Deleuze leverages one of Nietzsche's most famous concepts to augment this perpetuity: eternal recurrence.²²³ Eternal recurrence is never a recurrence of the same things that had gone before. It is a renewing force of

221. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 27.

222. Friedrich W. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Vintage, 1974), 101.

223. Nietzsche, 15.

change. It is a recurrence of an affirmation—an affirmation that life is differentiating and possible. For Deleuze, both the monism of Spinoza and the force of recurrent affirmation in Nietzsche pivoted around the issue of repetition. As has been the case above, we are faced with a new ontological question. How would one world, and its recurring movement, beget change, newness, and difference if it is repeating?

Deleuze's most systematic work, *Difference and Repetition* lays this ontological question out in detail.²²⁴ It is clear by now that, for Deleuze, newness is sedimented in the ontological bedrock of life. The world is constantly crafting new species, new relations, and new possibilities. But we have failed to think newness because we have always tried to conceive of it from the vantage point of the “the same.” Our typical reasoning goes: this thing is new because it is “not” like that thing. Thinking from sameness gives rise to philosophy's most notorious problems. It is hard to think movement and growth through the repetition of the same. If we start with what is the same, then what remains as we progress in time? Am I still me when my cells change? What is the me that endures when I experience trauma? What remains, we wonder, as change occurs. Our questions only exist because they are grounded in sameness. Deleuze inverts the priority.²²⁵ He argues that if we are going to engage life and its fecundity, we must embrace the repetition of its creativity. After all, we are alive and are therefore repetitiously becoming something new. It behooves us, then, to rethink the repetition that is life from the

224. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 39.

225. Deleuze, 16.

starting point of difference itself. For Deleuze, difference is somewhat self-evident. For most of philosophical history, it has been hard to access.

Hegel operates as a prime example of our failure to theorize difference. His dialectical account of life ostensibly celebrates it. As noted above, for Hegel, in any circumstance when this thing (a) is not that thing (b), we observe the difference. This difference opens a passage of the a into b—or b into a—by way of sublation. This sublation overcomes or undermines their difference by begetting another moment. For Deleuze, it is not this second moment of sublation that ignores difference.²²⁶ Difference is subordinated already in the first moment wherein the second thing (b) is defined as different from the original (a). That primary moment is already a departure from the sameness of the (a). Its sameness unto itself. What is worse, Hegel's ostensible differences are only a caricature. In the end, each variation is folded back into a cyclical whole.²²⁷

According to Deleuze, this trend has been around since Plato.²²⁸ In Plato's hierarchy, there are three constitutive moments in being as well. There is an *original* form that subsists in perpetuity. This is the domain of the "same." This form is unchanging and persists in itself *as* itself. There are *copies* of that form that circulate amongst the world. They vary. They have accidental properties and undergo decay, growth, and movement. Beyond them, there are copies of those copies that he calls *simulacra*. This third level, the simulated one, has no direct link

226. Deleuze, 19.

227. Deleuze, 42-45.

228. Gilles Deleuze and Rosalind Krauss, "Plato and the Simulacrum," *October* 27 (1983): 46-47.

to the original.²²⁹ They are unmoored from representation. They are not really even trying to refer to the other two layers above them. Deleuze sees the potential to think difference in this lowest tier. For Plato and most of western philosophy, the same was idealized and therefore this simulation has constantly been discarded as an unwanted distraction. But Deleuze sees the promise of the simulation in its freedom. It does not have to correspond to the original. When it comes into being, it is growing, moving, and developing without respect to the seed of the same. Simulacra have their own internal ontology. Their nature and existence do not depend on anything else and therefore it is fundamentally new.²³⁰ Therefore, to think difference first—as something irrespective of sameness—would be to start with this third layer.

Deleuze recognizes that his account of difference, here, must reconcile with the concomitant issue of repetition. If the world is continuing this process of making and it makes according to simulated difference, then are any of these things made more than once? In a word, no. He had already invoked Nietzsche's eternal recurrence to explain how the world (including us) acted out its creativity in the force of affirmation. Now, here, in *Difference and Repetition*, he returns to this force to explain repetition in time.²³¹ Deleuze tries to show that the simulacra of difference do not arrive in the eternal recurrence of time but rather coincide with it.²³² Simulacra are the manifestation of perpetually affirming change and growth.

229. Deleuze, 53.

230. Deleuze, 53.

231. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 70.

232. Deleuze, Plato and the Simulacrum, 54.

This seems counter-intuitive only because our concepts of time start from notions of the same just as our ideas of difference do. To be clear from the outset, having this “sameness” paradigm for time does not necessarily mean that we think every successive moment is the same as the one that preceded it. It usually means the opposite: this moment is different than that one because it is not the same moment. Nevertheless, this understanding starts from sameness.

Deleuze demonstrates this point by configuring our standard views of time as lines. The first one, circular time, is a succession of the same moments. Each moment may not be exactly like the one before. That would be better represented by a point or dot. Circular time, rather, holds that moments move forward but do so in an arc of repetition. Moments will eventually revolve back on themselves. In daily practice, this kind of time is religious or habitual.²³³ We repeat in hopes of reproducing the same thing that had come before. Perhaps, such a circle could be understood as a large dot of immobility when we scale back in perspective. Either way, the critical insight is that this circle is defined by sameness. Another form of time is the vectored line. This line goes on without any reproduction of its first moments. It celebrates novelty and difference. This moment on the line is not the one that we started with. But while it appears to avoid the same, vectored time just relocates that sameness. According to Deleuze, this version of time is rooted in the self, the consciousness, that lays out the world in front of itself and synthesizes its perceptions as a chronological path ahead. He associates memory with this

233. Deleuze, 73-82.

model.²³⁴ The unity of time is held together in the self—in the consciousness of one's own temporal continuity. True time, time that honors the differentiating affirmation of life, is one that recurs precisely in newness. It is neither habit nor memory. This kind of repetition is more like a selective growth pattern with no geometric destiny like the circle or the vector.²³⁵

Deleuze applies this ontological insight to making more directly in his discussion of art, literature, and cinema.²³⁶ This is critical for our investigation. According to his model of difference, an artist is never representing an idea or experience. This would be vectored time organized in the synthesis of the artistic genius. Rather, the artist is participating and affirming that repetition which is recurrence and variation. Their work is an affirmation of those forces. Every art piece is distinct because every artwork combines, associates, and participates in the forces it tries to signify. These forces fold, network, amplify, intensify, mitigate, and ameliorate. The artists employ all of these to connect nodes, dots, surfaces, and so on as a testament to the associative movement of life. That life billows out of this single substance of differentiating repetition. The artist leaves behind a semiology of forces.²³⁷ New signs and indications emerge in each artistic production. Art begets local reflection rather than constructing suppressed syntheses or totalizing universals. Therefore, the artist is judged according to their ability to affirm the forces of association and change. This is the way Spinoza had suggested that ethics

234. Deleuze, 81-94.

235. Deleuze, 110-115.

236. Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art* (London: A&C Black, 2013), 149.

237. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon* (London: A&C Black, 2005), 56.

are measured.²³⁸ We cannot judge an immanent ontology from a transcendental height. Ontologies are measured by ethics and immanent practices. In the same way, art is not measured with a respect to a transcendental—object *or* subject. The only way we can discriminate one mode of finite action—or making—from another is whether it affirms the ethics of difference and repetition. The ethics of difference and repetition are joining, growing, breathing, and begetting the full freedom of life. They enable a freedom that allows them to fully realize a relational ontology that will circle back and make more.

At this point, Deleuze’s radical rethinking of life, experience, and phenomena strengthens the issue of making even further. Ostensibly, it would seem that we have all of the elements and forces necessary to mold a theory of making. But problems and questions persist. The first question is about exteriority. Up to this point, several thinkers’ phenomenological speculations have pointed toward the “outside” whether in alterity, technicity, other bodies, or transcendental selfhood. Deleuze, despite his immanence and monism, maintains a critical role for exteriority. The plane of immanence that begets all of these changes and variations never coincides with the objects it produces.²³⁹ It is virtual. It is possibility *par excellence*. But where is it? How is this plane not an elsewhere that verges on the transcendent? The second difficulty in Deleuze is more practical. It is the problem of common craft. Deleuze’s descriptions are penetrating but remain unfamiliar to everyday people. Making has become force. Life has become differentiating. Art is

238. Deleuze, *Spinoza*, 110.

239. Peter Hallward, *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (Brooklyn: Verso, 2006), 79. See also Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: the Clamor of Being* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 67.

a semiosis of affirmation. Time is a recurrence. The world is monistically singular. The difficulty in applying these formulations to our neighbors and friends lies in their ability to actuate them. Unlike Derrida's writing, Deleuze does not offer a mechanism of making that is ubiquitous and familiar. Even while he spends time expounding the affirming ontologies of cinema, very few readers take up these works as field manuals. In terms of the structures of making listed above, there is an absence of agency in his system.

Deleuze would never concede that this vital life is inactive. There is agency, his acolytes would claim. The difference is that Deleuzean agency is distributed and lies along the network. Multiple agents beget multiple differences. But his critics wonder whether such a monistically networked ontology can ever describe purposive and active difference without enervating it. In other words, if the world is the unfolding of a plane of immanence, and action is distributed to a network, then are the changes I make just an illusion? Are they merely an instance of intensifying virtuality? will any of my discrete actions matter? This was the original question that prompted the entire study. Not only is it difficult to answer this question in a vitally monistic universe, but it is equally as hard to encourage his kind of creativity with any kind of purpose. We should not dismiss Deleuze's profound revolution but we must also position them against the Capitocene and Anthropocene. We are inclined to wonder that without a discrete formulation of agency, does this model of making institute a kind of quietism. Is it as if to say: yes, you make when you work, when eating, when you pay because you are still associating and differentiating? This would prove disastrous for everyday people and the world as they both suffer

under the weight of climate crises and class conflict. In Deleuze's terms, is the monistic and virtual plane of creativity liberating the ethical orientation of the earth and its inhabitants? If not, we need to explore why and find an immanent response that maximizes life and making.

3.4 Three Motifs

Our exploration of phenomenology and its ontological derivatives can feel bewildering. Therefore, before we draw any conclusions about them, it is appropriate once again to step back and gather our investigative bearings. The first chapter established our intent and methodology. I wanted to understand making and living in a way that could invigorate common people. We saw that current models of making are beset by the problems of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Therefore, I set out to build a theory from the ground up. My constructive plan was laid out in SYSTEMATIC COMBINING and ABDUCTION. to find a new theory would test an EMPIRICAL sample of a current one, observe its FRAMEWORK, analyze its controlling THEORIES, and then test it in a CASE STUDY. Each of those processes would expose **elements** of a paradigm of making that were being underserved in the current models but that could also be reimagined for a novel theory. In addition, at each stage of the study, we could begin to sketch out our new theory making by stating conclusive propositions.

Thus far, we have collected three structural elements that comprise theories of making. We have stated one anthropological proposition and We are on the cusp of a second. Now, with this phenomenological review at our disposal, we can

introduce a set of ontological motifs that are operative in theories of making. Ontological motifs, as I noted in the introduction, are not reducible to structural concepts. Instead of being ingredients, these motifs are more like movements that arrange and organize those ingredients. Above, we saw each of the **structural elements** at work in the different phenomenological systems. But those structural elements served different purposes, were emphasized differently or retooled to look like something else. This means that structural elements may appear in all models of making but they may not be familiar or operate the same between models. The question is, what accounts for that variation? In a word, those differences are based on the way each system handles three ontological motifs. Ontological motifs operate as a coordinating field. They position the structural elements but themselves can morph in size, density, texture, and so forth.

The first ontological motif is touch. Each thinker's model of phenomenal experience raises the issue of whether things touch in perception or in making. For Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, this was foregrounded. Touch was not only conceived as tactile but as a description of other senses like vision. In Derrida's work, we are invited to ask whether binaries merely warp around each other like these magnetic poles or whether they actually touch. Deleuze's monistic universe leaves us wondering if touch is possible if it is a folding of a singular substance with no other reality to grant it space. Or conversely, if there actually is an "other" in that virtual plane that grants space then does it ever touch the actual? Elsewhere, Heidegger's concept of unconcealment hints at the intangible. In all, touch is a way of organizing contact, interaction, and connectedness within making.

The second motif is repetition. Derrida and Deleuze explicitly see repetition as critical to organizing making and living. But the others' work also hinges on how they handle repetition. As Derrida pointed out, Husserl's assumed that the concepts of intuition, reduction, and eidos could be shared universally. And, sharing is repeating. Hegel's dialectical process was a repetition of the same—as pointed out by Deleuze. Heidegger subjugates repetition to the novelty of disclosure but retains some concept of recurring poetics in his later advocacy of dwelling. Merleau-Ponty's account of the chiasm resonated with Deleuze's repetition insofar as each perceptive meeting, no matter how many times it happens, always has the shape of differing and joining. Altogether, if perceiving lies at the basis of making, and perceiving assumes confidence and reliability in its apparatus, then any formulation of making must oblige repetition.

The last motif is number. In Derrida, there was a clear reference to twoness in his discussion of binaries. More importantly, he made it clear that this twoness contributed to undecidability. Likewise, in Merleau-Ponty, the self-touching hand and the flesh of the world affirms a basic twoness in perception. This twofold is visualized in the chiasm. Hegel's system operated on a cyclical triad of negation. Heidegger allowed for the plurality of beings, but his concept of being and its disclosure is ineluctably singular. Deleuze's universe is avowedly and unapologetically monistic in terms of the plane of immanence. Husserl began with an explicit interest in the discriminating power of number but his late turn towards the transcendental associates him with a remote one (or zero?). In all, number has an unexpected but significant function in theories of making. As our construction

moves forward, we will need to be clear about how touch, repetition, and number organize **surface, agent, and marking**.

4. THE LIFE OF DRAWING

4.1 All the Pieces

In this chapter, I take my cue from Karl Marx who once famously noted that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the c it.”²⁴⁰ Thus far, I have “interpreted” the creative deficiencies in everyday life. We have “interpreted” generation and perception in anthropological life. We have “interpreted” the role of construction in phenomenologies of life. The “point,” now, is to *make* something that enables life. I am happy to oblige.

We should not need another paragraph to rehearse our findings. We have what we need. Everything heretofore has been to provide the basic tools to build a theory. So, let us gather these provisions, enumerate them, and use them.

- 1) We have a fundamental premise: making is manifestly common.
- 2) We have a fundamental task: build a common theory of making.
- 3) We have a strategic method: systematic combining and abduction.

240. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to The Critique of Political Economy* (Amherst: Prometheus, 1998), 571.

- 4) We discovered two threats to making: Anthropocene and Capitalocene.
- 5) We isolated three structural pillars within making: surface, agent, and marking.
- 6) We narrowed our testable focus: inscriptions.
- 7) We discovered three ontological motifs at work in unified theories of making: touch, repetition, and number.

In all, there will be ten steps to our discovery and construction. Here below, we will establish both the eighth and ninth steps. Number ten, which states three conclusive propositions about drawing, will materialize at the end of the next chapter. Now, let us take up step 8: identify the key theoretical assumptions that currently arrange the pieces in 5-7. More specifically, we will observe how critical premises in current approaches to making inflect ontological motifs which, in turn, shape making's structural elements. Afterward, we will move to Step 9: abductively prescribe an alternative theory.

In the previous section, despite phenomenological nuances or outright rejections of the phenomenal question, each philosophy shared a fundamental premise that was foreshadowed in Andre Leroi-Gourhan. Namely, *exteriority*. Leroi-Gourhan claimed that technicity allowed the human to exteriorize what was formerly interior and even unknown.²⁴¹ When we crawled on the ground we did not imagine, see, or execute our desires the same we do in the aforementioned phenomenological accounts. We were fully involved, so to speak. Our mouth was

241. André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 242-253.

down on the ground near our hands, our sense of space was structured by locomotion, and bodily senses were attuned to food or threat. When we stood up, coincidentally both hand and mouth could project these behaviors. A fork could bring me food. A phoneme could establish inclusive packs. Our standing enabled our technical abilities. The key, though, is that this technicity is indissolubly linked with posture. Technicity is a function of spatiotemporal and geositional perception. Standing introduces front-and-back and before-and-after. In other words, our bodily posture produced a perceptive posture.²⁴² I am here and the world is there. The future is in front and the past is behind. In a word, Leroi-Gourhan called this shift: *exteriorizing*. It has left an indelible mark on the entire disciplines of phenomenology *and* ontology.

Many of the categories of phenomenology—thingness, subjectivity, objects, etc —are inflected by exteriorizing assumptions. The fundamental daily experiences of humans are almost universally exterior. There is a banana. I am not her. We are friends. That is a memory. These are manifestations of our exteriorizing technicity which affixes our sense of place in the world. Exteriority, largely associated with objects or “thingness,” provoked phenomenological reflection for our aforementioned philosophers. If a thing is not me, per se, or if the world and I are different, then how do I understand my interaction with it? What is my perception thereof? Critically, the assumptions of exteriority that guide the questions also guide the solutions. Exteriority remains embedded in these inquiries—no matter

242. Leroi-Gourhan, 116.

how formal and novel the formulations. But is this so problematic? How does exteriority bear on life? Specifically, the everyday life I celebrate so much?

The problem is remarkably simple: if exteriority is the ground of action, how do I do something if I am disconnected from that something? If I do not have access? If I do not have the power? Or, the right? Or, in our terms, how do I make something that I cannot touch? We do not normally ask questions with this level of abstraction. But, if these same questions are recast as issues of material power or financial access, then we do ask them—constantly. For example, how do I make a living? The exteriority of wealth or material goods and services circles us back to philosophical renderings. These daily concerns and their philosophical counterparts both pivot around the issue of exteriority. Together, they corroborate a philosophical conundrum that has puzzled all of western philosophy. When there is distance between one thing and another, when they are mutually exterior, then do they ever touch? Can one “move” towards another? This is no place to revisit the whole of philosophical history and its disputations about motion and change. I only cite this problem to show that phenomenologies that rely on some notion of exteriority inherit this problem. A synthetic review of the philosophical systems above will show that this is true even when those phenomenologies labor in vain against such an indictment.

4.2 Exteriority as Phenomenologically Basic

Recall that Husserl wanted to get close to the moment of perception—to get inside it. He wanted to establish a universally particular account that needed no direct

help from either object or agent. But to get inside, he had to erect an outside. He ended up with a receding transcendental subject of phenomenology that was, paradoxically, non-phenomenological and un-experienceable. By trying to contain phenomenological structures within themselves, Husserl concluded that something was outside that event containing it.²⁴³ This prompts important questions about the thing doing the containing. Is it also phenomenological? Is it subject to the same perceptive structures that it uses? How does it influence its containing? That second thing—what I will call that “exterior” thing—becomes subject to its own exterior containment and subsequent questions. To stop the regress, there is some backstop that lies behind or of the contiguity. In other words, there is something outside or exterior. Something no exterior of its own. But that transcendent thing, or no-thing, is hardly actionable, livable, or present. Exterior begets exterior whilst diminishing experience, knowledge, and action.

Heidegger and Hegel shared Husserl’s instincts to exteriorize. Heidegger’s Being, in its disclosure and concealment, simply never arrives but is always arriving. The site of its reception, *Dasein*, is fraught with anxiety about this arrival. *Dasein* might be shrouded in light, but at that moment of unveiling, the actual life of the human becomes peculiar to itself.²⁴⁴ The light that exposes *Dasein*’s fragility is never beheld and never passes into it. In other words, the life lived finds its shape from the outside. Being remains exterior lest it ever be conflated with the ontic. In Heidegger’s exterior model, Art, architecture, and technology are only known in

243. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 151.

244. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 235.

their proximity to Being but never as a process of making something in its own right. Being remained exterior, even to making. These conclusions could also be applied to Hegel. Despite including every material element in ideal reality—and in lieu of his internal dialectical engine of being and becoming—Being was never present to any of these things. Being began in its own exteriority insofar as it distanced itself by a necessary relationship to Non-Being.²⁴⁵ By virtue of that ontologic, the perceived stuff of the world is also exterior to Being and even exterior within. The stuff of the world departed from itself and headed towards the outside of Being. Upon arrival, they would be folded up in Being's sphere—whose true nature appears as statically dense. Everything would finally be in its harmonious place. The parts of Being that brought it to that historical zenith would no longer be mobile in that ultimate enclosure. Like Heidegger, Hegel took art, architecture, and craft as a passing moment that would hasten Being's final exterior synthesis. The point, in both thinkers, is that a strictly ontological approach—whose aim was to see into the depths of actual experience—brought us no closer to actionable life. Rather, both systems constructed vast exterior explanations for the prosaic.

Merleau-Ponty took up the mantle and tried to elude these same pitfalls. He mitigated the issue of the outside by repositioning it as a touchpoint. In many ways, he succeeded. At least, in his model, the outside would be between—or centered

245. Georg W. Hegel, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59.

within—every moment of experience.²⁴⁶ As a point of commendation, there is a philosophical purchase in connecting the here and there, the inside and outside, in the chiasm. That is until Merleau-Ponty was faced with the potential dangers of the Husserlian subject. After all, what was this subject, this body, that came to the encounter of the chiasm? Did it exceed or precede the chiasm? Merleau-Ponty did not want the body to be just another undefinable precondition of the encounter—like the transcendental subject. So, he posited the flesh of the world as an ontological basis for reversibility and touch. But this opened the system back towards the outside as “flesh.” The flesh is the supra and infra condition whence this body and others arrive. The self, that appeared in the gap of this flesh’s turning, only appears as an “outside.” After all, in this description, the body is a gap that is outside both here and there. The between of the flesh and the chiasm introduced new ideas but left too much exteriority in play to be immanently effective.

Derrida and Deleuze, rather than retreat from, hide, or smuggle in exteriority, embrace it as the only corrective to all phenomenological futility. For Derrida, there may be nothing outside the text but that nothing is precisely what motivates it. The text manifests and perpetuates the binaries of life as we know it. The generative force of those binaries is a trace that arises as they multiply towards an undeconstructable horizon. The outsideness of *différance* is always manifestly near and enables writing to continue. It is the ground of perception. The outside is a *Khora* that begets. We cannot touch the limit, befriend the beyond, or even fully

246. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 133.

join it in death. Deleuze also centers his system on exteriority despite his immanent aspirations. In fact, Deleuze is more explicit in claiming that the outside is the inside. Much like Merleau-Ponty's flesh, objects in space and time are invaginated. They are folds upon folds of a pure outside.²⁴⁷ In Deleuze, the virtual, the pure memory, or the molecular are constant forces that are available for any actuality. But, much like Hegel, they never coincide with actuality. They sit in potential towards all manifestation. But, once again, as an outside potential are active within things without ever being there inside. Deleuze wants to avoid a substantive base for anything. The only solution, for him, is to turn actual things inside-out. The molar thing, the actual thing, is larval and composite but it is without an inside. It is a machine or body without organs.²⁴⁸ It is an intensity of creases. It folds in the one "outside" that animates it. It is a Möbius strip all crumpled up. As we have noted, even aggressive and elegant exteriorities like these struggle to create, make, or unite. Despite Deleuzian advocacies of assembly, the ontology of exteriority always calls assemblage into question. Making a living still seems out of reach—outside.

4.3 Exteriority, Elements, and Motifs

Each of these thinkers has incorporated making into their schematics. What we are seeing is the way these systems and their governing ontologies give making a certain form. Namely, as exteriority. Altogether, these exteriorizing models evince a budding theory of making. With this in view, it is incumbent upon us to do two

247. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 94.

248. Gilles Deleuze, *Logic of Sense* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004), 280.

things. 1) We should name this theory—at least for heuristic purposes. 2) We must show how this exteriority leverages our ontological motifs and organizes the structural elements of making. This second step is an extended exposition of the first. Therefore, I can state the first one briefly.

1) **WRITING VS WRIGHTING.** I call this exteriorizing model of making: “writing.” This is not a pejorative. I do not intend to debase what I am actually doing. Instead, I use the banner of writing in the same way that Leroi-Gourhan does in his original distinction between graphism and writing. Writing exteriorizes. It converts the radial perception of standing technicity into repeatable action at a distance. The affordance of Derrida is to see writing as a way of moving and perceiving. It is not reducible to a technique. Therefore, I will describe Deleuze or Hegel, for example, under the rubric of writing without them having a large literary sample dedicated to it. Certainly, those thinkers that do not write about writing instead focus on some other specific media (e.g. Deleuze and cinema). Still, hereafter I will be treating “writing” as the primary classification for said media. I do this because—as I will argue—moving images, industrial labor, or. even code are heirs to what begins in writing. Namely, exteriority.

To be fair, we cannot emphasize the theoretical shape of writing at the expense of its implementation. Admittedly, there is a symmetry between writing-as-exterior-theory and writing-as-practice. But, we can hold that link loosely. Their connection can be weakened or broken. When they are broken, writing is renovated and restored. Writing-as-practice does not have to begin or terminate in exteriority. Writing can be recovered in a reversal of that exterior trajectory. We will attempt

this below. For now, a new lexicon is necessary. In contradistinction to “writing,” I introduce the term “wrighting” to describe the craft that re-emerges in that reversal. This offers us a conceptual and visual distinction between two trajectories. As I proceed, when I mention writing I am referring to that exteriorizing trend that synthesizes the phenomenologies above. When I mention wrighting, I am still referring to a manual practice of mark-making but with a theoretical paradigm that is local, efficacious, and interior. This alternate term is critical. By the end of this study, I will have offered sharp assessments of writing as exteriority and made claims about its potential damage to our ability to make a living. But, I would not want anyone to conclude that therefore writing is anathema. Rather, I simply want to expunge writing’s exterior trajectory from wrighting’s locality and efficacy. Wrighting bears witness to making because this latter term means “working.”²⁴⁹ The term connotes someone who works with wood as a joiner, fastener, or in carpentry in general. It still circulates in contemporary discourse (e.g. playwright) but its sense of using marks (letters) as means of joining and making is largely obscured. By rethinking contemporary writing under the auspices of joining, suggests that it does not have to rely on exteriority as the basis of its craft.

2) **MATCHING AND MIXING.** My critiques may be pointed, but there is no doubt that some form of making happens in exteriority. Our question is what kind of making? There are other implied questions: how long do made things endure? Can everyone do it? Does writing deserve credit for accomplishing making? Is there a better way? To answer, we have to shed light on how exteriority leverages

249. "wright, n.1," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230697>.

our ontological motifs and organizes the structural elements of making. First, we should be clear about exteriority as a fundamental presupposition. In the above systems, exteriority is a broad ontological category that secures local actions. The “outside,” in whatever form, maintains the space for things to come into being. It is the ground of becoming. The typical assumption about exteriority—and a common critique—is that exterior systems constitute transcendence. Our writers were all well aware of this and hoped to avoid it. Insofar as any of them pursued exteriority, it was to home in on the differences between specific objects, events, or moments. That is, theirs was not an exteriority of divine transcendence but an exteriority of alterity and otherness. This does not necessarily mean that they succeeded in eluding the grasp of holistic transcendence. But for the purposes of evaluating them, we need to start from where they started—the mutual exteriority of things like the body and world.

Nevertheless, we should resist the temptation to reduce their exterior ambitions to simple dualism. They were, after all, trying to posit outsides or exteriors that could negotiate the relation between things rather than hold them in unwieldy independence. So, while the critiques of grand exteriority have been useful or may become consequential here below, our critical appraisal should focus on the local relation. Only then can we extrapolate exteriority as basic ontology. At this point in the study, we are working backward with respect to SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. We moved from EMPIRICAL SAMPLING to FRAMEWORK and then repeated that process with two disciplinary magnifications. That process revealed exteriority to be a fundamental presupposition for a theory of making we

call writing. Now, we take that presupposition, walk it back, and apply it to the ontological motifs and structural concepts of making. This should produce an EMPIRICAL picture of the writing theory of making. In the spirit of reversal, we will survey writing as a theory by starting with the motifs, then considering the elements, and ultimately arriving at writing inscriptions.

TOUCH. For writing, nothing is in a state of being. Everything is always becoming. It is always in a state of change. From fleshly fluctuations to rhizomatic entities, things are unfurling from an outside to an outside. No inside essence is permissible. But, if exteriority is the font of becoming, then touch is severely compromised. Consider this from two angles. If an object is blooming outward and its edges are multiplying, it is unfolding towards a plane (whatever the direction) without touching that plane. Likewise, the object is blooming from a plane. Neither plane has any substance. It is only virtual conditions. Likewise, if a word or text billows out in the same manner, it is secured from the outside—before or after. That outside, again, is only a condition of possibility and therefore remains unavowable, nameless, and untouchable.²⁵⁰ And if that exteriority is pure and (ab)grounding, then is it real? Primary? First? Last? And does this condition apply “between” objects? If either of those objects given above move towards another of like kind, and their growth is given by exterior virtuality, then they perpetually approach but do not touch. After all, what would they touch if the destination has no

250. This is actually Nancy’s explicit claim in Jean-Luc Nancy, *Noli Me Tangere: On the Raising of the Body* (New York City: Fordham University Press, 2009), 20. For a discussion of namelessness see Jacques Derrida, *On the Name* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1995), 68. For a discussion of proclamations see Maurice Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community* (Barrytown/ Station Hill Press, 2006), 5.

bottom nor base? In all, without touch, how would we make? Even if we imagine machines, electrical currents, and light pulses as the apparatus of making, with exteriority, we have to ask: is nothing touching?

NUMBER. Just as exteriority compromises touch, it also undermines number. If things do not touch, then how many things are we talking about when we discuss making, moving, or perceiving? A world of exteriority can be both multiple or singular. In a monistic system, where things are the result of a singular substance folding in on itself, we have to wonder about the space and nature of that fold. Is there a second, non-thing, allowing for the movement of the singularity? If we suspended our physical imagination and posited that the folds are like crystalline internal movements, then we would wonder whether any of those folds were things at all. Especially if they are strictly modes. But, as we noted, there might be a pure multiple—not a monad. That is, there may be innumerable things in this non-touching world. But does the number grow? Is it infinitely static? Does making “add” to infinity? If we cannot touch things how do we count them? Does our sight touch them? Exteriority problematizes number and touch and therefore largely dispenses with them.

REPETITION. The consequences for repetition are not immediately self-evident. Especially if things have no number or if they do not touch. A world of multiplicity or singularity could repeat endlessly or not at all. This world could be on a perpetual collision course of forces (whilst never touching). It could be an illusory motion of only futile changes; merely apparent motion ultimately remaining the same. But a pure exteriority could not repeat in the manner that Deleuze’s

fecund differentiation does. This is because pure exteriority would threaten to flatten every difference. Each simulation would just vanish into simulation-as-such. Or, they would become indistinguishable in the plane of virtuality.²⁵¹ Just as things emerged in granular variation they would dissipate into the ether. How would one repeat what was not? From the Deleuzian angle, how would one repeat what could never be?

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS. We can speculate about the consequences of exteriority as applied to the ontological motifs, but they are more acutely felt at the level of the structural elements. The surface is compromised first. When a person grabs a tool, strikes a keyboard, or gazes at a screen they interact at a surface. The surface is the primordial site of all interacting, perceiving, and making. But if the surface only expresses the ever-receding outside that grounds reality then all of my interactions there will have little to no duration. If I grant them any substantive value, I commit violence. This corrodes agency at the same time. If the surface is a translucent mirage then so is any sense of the subject as a surfaced body. Will must be multiplied into the innumerable agencies that I cannot touch. And given that we cannot actually touch, I will never mark anything. I will only gesture towards a mark but just as all of my agency and all surfaces remain outside, the pencil does not reach the paper.

EMPIRICAL PICTURE: ~~LIFE~~ DEATH. Exteriority shapes making and its elements, no doubt. But it also frames its corollary, life. Each of these phenomenological models above aimed at understanding life. In some cases, they

251. Peter Hallward, *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (Brooklyn: Verso, 2006), 79.

wanted to embellish and intensify life. Ironically, though, these models problematize the life they celebrate. Because, as they see it, life has suffered from a kind of violence of imposition. They are all reacting, at some level, to the brutish confidence of religion, rationalism, and scientific quantification. Exteriority, alterity, and otherness provide a way out of enforced metaphysics. Therefore, exteriority has continually relied on the concept of death to situate life. Death is a liberating finality that no metaphysics can account for. This is made explicit in Heidegger's model. Death is the outer edge of living. It was *Dasein's* own sense of self-awareness. The surface of the painter, the tool of the handyman, and the markings of any agent would only be authentic insofar as they disclosed this fragility. It would not be a stretch to see death in Hegel's sublation and final synthesis or Husserl's transcendentals. In fact, this is why Derrida also made death central to his system. He saw it at work in the prior phenomenologists. *Différance* was death ensconced in the text. It had always been there in experience but now we saw it coming through our fingers. Still, while these formulations may tidy up abstract problems, they make actual life hard to live. They make us great at *destruktion* but not so good at construction.²⁵² Thus, on this side of exteriority's tour through the elements, we are seeing that a writing theory of making renders life as a kind of death. Touching might not heal. The two of friendship is proximate but may not be real. And, repetition could become vain.

But on balance, we do not find these kinds of extrapolations completely consistent with lived experience. Our college classes in writing did not "kill" us—at

252. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 43-44.

least in the sense I mean here. But this dissonance is exactly the purpose of our thought experiment. This is what systematic combining does. Tension is not a flaw in the system it is its virtue. We wanted to match a theoretical arrangement (in this instance, writing) with the motifs and **structural elements** to see how they line with EMPIRICAL experience. This is why we set up the constant of inscriptions. They give our test finer precision. Inscriptions allow us to see these theories at work in all of the structural elements and motifs as they cycle through cultural materials. Inscriptions give us a way to heed Spinoza's admonition. Namely, that we should measure an ontological theory by juxtaposing its ethical consequences against its claims. This brings us back to the Anthropocene and Capitalocene.

INSCRIPTIONS. We cannot provide an exhaustive list of writing's inscriptions but we can circle back to a few ideas we visited before for help. Latour, Ferraris, and Nancy help flesh out the haunting shape of exteriority and writing. Latour points us towards inscriptions because they coordinate cultural thinking and cultural mechanics. In his example, inscriptions like scientific illustrations, lab records, and mathematics formulae all demonstrated the development of optics as a rational assumption about clarity as well as a prescription for how a reputable institution should codify its insights. Ferraris pointed out the social matrices that found and congeal around these inscriptions. In his terms, when the social circle affirms inscriptions those inscriptions become documents that have duration. Nancy went one step further and saw this documenting, inscribing, and social forming as a way of world-making. But in his terms, inscription becomes exscription wherein writing or mark-making etches the edges of things and the

world as a kind of touching. But even Nancy's touch is plagued by exteriority. That which is touchable is untouched²⁵³. And the teachability of that untouched is a kind of remote death raised to life.²⁵⁴

In these three, we can see how well they resonate with what we have discovered in our study. In Latour, we can see that the Capitalocene and Anthropocene are secured by inscriptions. Bureaucracy, red tape, and law codes entrench systems of making (or unmaking). A recent example is too suitable to overlook. In the summer of 2022, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency does not have broad authority to regulate the carbon emissions of fossil fuel companies. Their ruling derived from a narrow fidelity to a text. The documentality around this inscription, then, permitted those companies to continue anthropogenic damages in the name of their capitalocentric interests. Ferraris' insights on documentality show that a certain group—or in anthropological terms, a certain kinship—forms around that document and holds it up to clarify boundaries between friend and foe. Nancy would not celebrate the ruling as an example of description but instead, as a kind of subjective over-touching that lays claim to a world it does not know it is making. In other words, to exscribe—to raise life—you need to not touch it or get your hands off of it.²⁵⁵

What intrigues us about this example, is not that it fosters fear or raises concern. What is curious is whether these dangers are the consequences of a certain kind of inscription. What is more, can those same inscriptions reverse these

253. Jacques Derrida, *On Touching*, Jean-Luc Nancy (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2005), 216.

254. Nancy, *Noli Me Tangere*, 11.

255. Nancy, 31.

dangers? Can writings inscriptions, guided by exteriority, rescue us from the death of the Anthropocene or Capitalocene? If our current written inscriptions gather certain kin around documents, and those documents seal industry's control over the earth or reinforce information agencies' control over digital storytelling, then is exteriority working? Has death done its job of deconstructing? Are we not still privileging certain kin over others? Exteriority and death feel far from liberation. We are very familiar with death in our submission and our sense of helplessness. As it concerns the Capitalocene, is exteriority performing any better? Do we intensify life in the inscribed money we "make"? Is its vast exterior life-giving? Does the outside give the poor inside accessibility? We are all too familiar with exteriority in networks of digital information where agency belongs to all and none. Where autoethnographies remain estranged and fly past one another like arrows. Is the exteriority of a digital surface ensuring life for personal narrative? In sum, it feels like we know death and exteriority as a means of dismantling or unmaking. But, building anything back up seems to require more ontological elbow grease.

These are not trite questions or over-simplified applications. They are not unwarranted leaps. They are the very kinds of questions corroborated by some of exteriority's contemporary proponents. The late Bernard Stiegler updated the ideas of Andre-Leroi Gourhan, Heidegger, and Derrida in order to grapple with these very comparisons. For Stiegler, more of Andre Leroi-Gourhan's technicity and perhaps greater exteriority can usher in change and hope. Stiegler saw technicity at the center of the human's experience of individuation and collectivity as well as

their sense of time.²⁵⁶ His work affirms that without asking these very direct lived questions, our efforts at theory remain mere chatter.²⁵⁷ Though Stiegler engages cybernetic thinkers, he is heavily influenced by Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger. As a student of Derrida, Stiegler saw a general principle of life in *différance* wherein the human supplemented its textual—ever-changing form—with technical prostheses. In our terms, he inherits exteriority, still believes it has promise, and applies it as a function of digital technicity. But Stiegler, unlike some of his predecessors, realizes that the future cannot be salvaged by exteriority alone. Exterior inscriptions would only ensure our demise.

Following Leroi-Gourhan, he held that humans were constantly reforming according to a noetic cycle of exteriorization *and* interiorization. In one of his last works, Stiegler juxtaposed this technical exchange to the issue of entropy in the Anthropocene.²⁵⁸ In the Anthropocene, entropy simplifies life and reduces complexity to sameness. Stiegler reads technics, or the noetic interplay of human prosthetic growth, as a way to reverse entropy and reintroduce complexity. Once again, he inserts Derrida's textual idea of *différance* as a way to generate this reversal. But the exteriorizing force of *différance* must be interiorized later lest humans abdicate their complexifying gift permanently. In other words, as the human surrenders their thought to the outside—in texts and tools, that outside

256. Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time: The fault of Epimetheus* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998), 212. An entire dissertation is waiting for me here. Stiegler's work is simply too large to tackle alongside Henry. Any follow-up work to my claims here must attend to Stiegler, Bertrand Gilles, and Gilbert Simondon.

257. Bernard Stiegler, *Acting Out* (Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 2009), 9.

258. Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2020), 240-248.

must return a new form to the human as interior. Losing this feedback ushers us further into the simplicity and homogeneity of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. In our terms, the inscriptions that will save us must be a double-movement. The inscriptions that will change us will have a surface that marks agent and material. Those inscriptions must be twofold. Thus, what is most notable about proposals like Stiegler is that despite never fully theorizing the inside, he obliquely recognizes the importance of twoness and interiority. His shift on the ontological motif of number gestures toward a turn in theories of making. And ultimately, he realizes that this is what it will take to change the actual political and cultural life of the human: a rehabilitated ontology.

This was already prefigured in our section on anthropology. Anthropologists were telling us that from the beginning humans have been intragenerative. Moreover, they explicitly stated that those primeval intragenerative acts are thoroughly material, thoroughly connected, and thoroughly graphic. Anthropology anticipates Stiegler's signaling for a refreshed ontology and his recognition of collectivity and individuation. Ingold and Haraway assert that any restoration of the earth in the Anthropocene requires a perception of the ground. Specifically, it requires the human to recognize its kinship with the soil around, the animals nearby, and the sky that directs its movements. For Mauss and Sahlins, to develop a social support system amidst the Capitalocene's inequalities, we must literally "make" kin. We must enact social techniques that align us as friends. Anthropology also fears that a purely exteriorized writing-making may only entrench the Capitalocene and Anthropocene. If we cannot touch the earth we should caress

then we command it with a fist. If we cannot befriend the enemy or hospitably welcome their gift then we will make ownership claims the status quo. In this world, we would proliferate difference but struggle to maintain unity. We might share space in a social text as magnetic poles or binaries, but we cannot cross into each other and empathize. We can file a copyright claim and differentiate unities in non-fungible tokens but we struggle to joint-author a public building. We know how to multiply money, set down property boundaries, or split an atom, but joining eludes us. But even stating these problems feels dissonant. We know very well that we do all of these things. We do have friends, share life, and empathize. We have already stated that there is tension between the consequences of this writing theory of making and our actual life. Therefore, my point, once again is that we do not make our lives according to the written theory of making or an exteriorized ontology. We do these things out of a drawn theory of making and through a vital and interiorizing ontology.

4.4 The Abductive Turn

These foregoing reflections lay out the abductive path very clearly. If the ruling theory is exteriority *cum* writing, and the case for testing that is inscriptions, but it is not yielding the results we want, then we need a new rule. Our new rule will take an abductive turn. That is, we will consider interiority *cum* drawing as a rule that can generate better results for empirically lived life. This is our Kierkegaardian moment. I certainly do not mean to inflate the importance of our study or claim to be the reincarnated form of the great Danish anti-philosopher. But my brash

comparison serves a heuristic purpose. In effect, our turn positions a new theory of making in response to exteriority as a totality. I am positioning drawing against writing as a monism. To repeat, what I mean to do is look upon the exteriorizing ontology of writing in the same way that Kierkegaard saw Hegel's totalizing systematicity. To be clear, since Hegel figures into my own work above, I am not turning the whole dissertation towards him or his detractors. I am not delimiting myself to Kierkegaard's lexicon, system, or writings. I am using Kierkegaard strictly as an exemplar of the kind of shift I want to propose here. In short, the time for turning ontology outside-in has come.

Kierkegaard's main concern with Hegel and his like-minded contemporaries was their tendency to subjugate all particularity in life.²⁵⁹ The grand synthesis of the dialectic made each concrete instance or decision not only undecidable but irrelevant. Kierkegaard wanted to remind Hegel that he too was human—all too human. To be perched atop the world seeing the world from Being's godlike heights did not befit his place in time, space, and with others. The world is not a testing ground to be swallowed up in logic. The world is lived. Furthermore, it is lived at the threshold of *this/that, here/ there, either/or, and you/me*.²⁶⁰ For Kierkegaard (and me), the most important part of those pairs is the backslash. These binaries cannot be washed away in a principle of fungibility. They require us to “make” decisions. Decisions are cuts. Or, in Ingold's terms, decisions are lines.

259. Soren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life* (London: Penguin UK, 2004), 246.

260. Kierkegaard., 7.

Exteriorizing ontology and its correlative inscription—writing—verge on a similar totality and transcendence. But this is not a final indictment. Writing only trends towards this totality as a point of emphasis. Make no mistake, there are deep verities in all of the ontologies above. Exteriority is not germane to writing as such. Writing, as an inscribed theory of making, has only emphasized exteriority to its own detriment. Writing, as Leroi-Gourhan and Derrida both confirm, was always already graphism and drawing.²⁶¹ Writing is graphism gone linear which terminates in the exteriority of code. Wrighting is that discipline that can make. And, as such, writing can make through touch, repetition, and twoness without vanishing or without violently substantiating presence. It can twist and bend the line of text to radiate poetically, move backward, welcome novelty, and beget friendship. When writing recalls its deep relation with drawing, then it reverts to wrighting. Wrighting is work. Wrighting is joining. Whereas writing is deadly, wrighting is an exertion of life. As we shall see below, the immanence of this exertion has vital affective consequences.

To summarize, the problem facing making *cum* writing is exteriority—but only exteriority *in vacuo*. A new theory of making will need to be keenly aware of the inside, discern how to cross between the inside and outside, as well as how to operationalize both of these concepts for everyday people. Therefore, my critical conjecture is that drawing can achieve all three. What is more, drawing can salvage writing/wrighting in its erection of the exterior. The rest of this section explicates this claim. Importantly, as you can tell already, my claim pivots around

261. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2016), 123-124.

paradigmatic shifts that lie deep in the concepts of making. Excavating them may not signal the consequences of a drawn ontology right away. They require excavation, clarification, and interpretation. I utilize the insights of Michel Henry, Felix Ravaisson, Charles Sanders Peirce, and several supplemental voices to draw out the abstract distinctions that inform making at its lowest levels. As a result, we will not necessarily mention drawing at every turn as we probe the distinctions between interiority and exteriority. Drawing will appear later as a synthetic figure emerging against this ontologically shifting ground.

4.5 Life on the Inside

Michel Henry has been emerging from the phenomenological margin over the last few decades as more of his work is translated into English and as more scholars publish reflections on his insights. He remains suspect to many—as Derrida and Heidegger might have in their first few decades—because he overturns the central pieces of phenomenology in such a radical way that his concepts are confoundingly simple. Henry’s philosophical system starts with a very plain question: why is everything about the outside? Henry focuses this broad question by claiming that all philosophical conundrums can find their way back to this central problem.²⁶² Because all philosophy, at some level, concerns itself with “stuff” and the appearance of that “stuff.” Therefore, philosophy has phenomenological roots. In those roots, is a central assumption that must be addressed: knowledge/stuff/experience is external.

262. Michel Henry, *The Essence of Manifestation* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), 47.

Henry sees this as the fundamental reason that phenomenology cannot account for appearing as such. It has been proficient at describing the way something appears or disappears (as we saw in the case of Heidegger or Derrida). Still, he says, there must be a condition for appearance's appearing.²⁶³ Without it, "stuff" crumbles. Husserl sensed the same problem. This opened a deeper philosophical trap. Namely, that to establish appearances' appearing invokes an infinite regress that always raises a prior thing that begets those conditions of appearing. In more direct terms, to solve the question of base appearing, Husserl applied that external assumption above. Whatever was granting appearing was before, beyond, or outside of appearing. In Henry's view, Derrida, Heidegger, Deleuze, Hegel, and even Merleau-Ponty do the same. The undeconstructable, Being, Virtual, Spirit, and even flesh are all backstops outside of the thing they grant. Henry sees this persistent externality as the result of an ontological monism whose basic assumption is that everything lies outside of everything else (down to an infinitesimal scale). Ontological monism inevitably produces ek-static philosophical schemes that in turn create their own problems and aporias.²⁶⁴ For us, one of those problems is making insofar as it relies on ekstatic accounts.

Henry's response is a bold but basic reversal. Henry counters ekstasis and monism by simply claiming that appearing comes from the inside. The inside of what? This is an instinctive response. But it is the wrong question. It evinces external biases. It starts from the outside. It defines the inside in relation-to

263. Michel Henry, *Material Phenomenology* (Perspectives in Continental Ph, 2008), 49.

264. Henry, *Essence of Manifestation*, 74.

something other—something transcendent. Henry’s reversal echos the Deleuzean attempt to overhaul difference and sameness. We can no more think difference from same than think inside from outside. Pure interiority is not inside-of at all. It is simply unto-itself. The appearing of appearing, the foundational moment of all experience, is internal. It is self-appearing.²⁶⁵ The act of seeing itself is not seen. Therefore, phenomenology’s basis is not intentional. It is life itself in its purity. This basis is a pure subjectivity that takes its own self as its “object.”²⁶⁶

Once again, as noted above, these terms can be misleading if filtered through our own ekstatic tendencies. For example, this interiority may come across as a simple Cartesian relativism. We are tempted to read Henry as an advocate for some sort of reductive existentialism. But this would be to repeat the same mistake Henry is trying to undo. The “interior” is not the inside of a shell. It is pure immanence.²⁶⁷ It is self-appearing with no distance between giving and receiving. It is not the Cartesian ego inside a body. That kind of “interior” would only refer to an encasing of the mind within some sort of chaotic, albeit critically necessary, outside. Seeing this inside in a Cartesian would require standing on the outside. The interior Henry refers to is not seen, known, or even described. To say it even has an object is inapplicable. There is no gap or between in this self-manifesting interiority. So, how is it experienced? It can only be felt.²⁶⁸ The interiority of experience is affective. Affect is immediate. Affectivity is a reality without exterior

265. Henry, 457.

266. Henry, 719.

267. Henry, *Material Phenomenology*, 70.

268. Henry, 2.

remove. This is the interiority that begets all phenomena. Thus, as Henry himself notes, had Descartes said “I feel therefore I am,” he would have been much closer to the reality of things.²⁶⁹

The interior is hard to grasp as an ontological or phenomenological condition of lived experience because we are mired in generations of exteriority. Still, this deceptively simple thesis is observable in our local experience of suffering or joy. When we hurt, we often designate some exterior object as a cause. But when we suffer, we often continue in this condition without objects.²⁷⁰ Suffering can intensify and mollify without external change. For those who know suffering, the experience continues and even deepens irrespective of any outside circumstances. Phobias are similar. In fact, psychoanalytical responses roam the exterior of the unconscious to find some cause. But the phobia is felt, and often evolves, without any external cause satiating it. The point is that affects like suffering and joy have no distance, delay, or deferral within them. They need no outside explanation. But, we must be reminded that though these affects are felt in immediacy, they are not “mine.” This would be to revert to the “outside.” I would be thinking of affects as external things to be had, observed, or endured. This would require me to think of myself outside myself as the subject who has them. I would miss the fact that they are themselves my immediate access to any “thing.” They foment any awareness I have of a “me.” Self-affectivity, then, is not a private or possessed feature but a shared ontological one. Affects like suffering and joy open a relation without transcendence,

269. Michel Henry, *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998), 12-30.

270. Henry, *Material Phenomenology*, 41.

difference, or any outside. They confirm a self-relating or self-affectivity. Affects proceed in me and things without exceeding or preceding either. It is the basis of appearing because it attests to a primordial ground of all experience. Namely, life. Life is this *immanent* self-appearing in its immanent self-affectivity.²⁷¹

Immanence is a difficult road to travel. Henry is not the first to take it. Deleuze, and perhaps to some extent Heidegger and Derrida, walked a similar path. What immanentists want to do is expunge any reference to the transcendent. They want to account for reality from within reality. And, according to our aims—to construct a theory of making accessible on the ground—immanentism is a laudable goal. But Heidegger and Derrida fell short in establishing Being’s transcendent concealment or language’s haunting erasure. Deleuze compromises his own immanent system by keeping a pure memory, pure potency, or pure virtual alongside every actuality.²⁷² Henry reverses these trends with simple and radical immanent consistency. The life we experience we feel. The things we feel are actual. They are not given from elsewhere. They are not going elsewhere. They are not hovering liminally above a khora, virtual, or disclosive horizon. They are life’s very own manifestation given to life itself. Life is both cause and effect. It does not pop out of its immanent self-appearing. There is no “out.” What it does is always actual—not potential.²⁷³ We feel *this* thing. Life never wants to “become” anything other than what it is. Life simply lives and that life is an actuality that is rooted in affectivity.

271. Henry, 14.

272. Hallward, *Deleuze*, 5.

273. Henry, *Essence of Manifestation*, 708.

With this in view, we start to see a path towards making and inscribing that is shared, present, and accessible to all. Henry's interiority approaches our categories by raising the question of discrete and particular lives under the motif of number. In this interiority of life can there be lives? His answer in short: there must be. Immanent life is, by definition, superfluity and multiplicity. Immanent affectivity cannot stop lest it be guided or curtailed by an exterior telos, encasing, or death.²⁷⁴ Every instance of self-feeling in this life is an incarnating actuality. To localize this difficult concept: when I feel myself suffering that feeling is a moment/space/thing/state, and is grounded in self-affectivity that arises as a me here and now. This man, this woman, or this element is an instance of affects upon affects.²⁷⁵ Actualities are not congealed pasts but rather present and unique things afforded by affective interplay and self-revelation in Life. Lived lives "are" because of the self-affectivity of life. The gift of a general Life is that *this* life, the one I live, is actual. This life is not enfolded back into being, undermine by potentiality, or death.

To fully appreciate Henry's contribution, we have to think of affective self-relating as a concrete moment and a concrete thing. Life is not folding on itself. There is no distance or transcendent nothing for it to fold in. It is an act of joining without outsides. It is not describable in the terms of things because our knowledge of things is biased towards externality. It is pure affect. Life begets life and affects beget affects. Both are always *actual* because whatever moments may feel like they are what they are in their self-relation. These concepts directly apply to material

274. This is the reason Blanchot had to extend death as dying in Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire"* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 95.

275. Henry, *Material Phenomenology*, 133.

objects. The inherited hylomorphic model assumes that matter comes to an external subject as an externality itself. Beginning with this exteriority demands an exterior condition like *Khora* or the virtual to account for interaction and morphology. But for Henry, the *hyle* of the world is an affective impression all its own.²⁷⁶ It is already a *morphe*. When matter touches another thing, that touch is itself a self-relating of life. It is a new actual. We could read this as a full, comprehensive, and ontological application of the feedback idea Andre Leroi-Gourhan sketched as technicity. The self-affectivity of materiality does not subdue that touch or evacuate it into general “life.” As a moment of self-affectivity, the connection is self-appearing and that self-appearing is actual. Another actuality—concrete and material thing—will arise as another affective revelation later. The meaning of life (even when that term is considered mathematically) is to live at the junctures of affective actuality.

To reiterate, this life is not passive. It is pure action rather than a pure possibility. If life feels itself and that feeling is not a potency towards anything other than what it is, then life always accomplishes what it does. Its being is its act of manifestation. We even “feel” this actuality in our effort. Maine de Biran had addressed this issue when responding to Hume’s critique of cause.²⁷⁷ He notes that when we lift a stick and we subsequently articulate our body as a cause, we are not “intentionally” projecting a concept. We are actually responding to the pressure and force of our own endeavors. This is not external in the first instance. We know our

²⁷⁶ Henry, 25.

²⁷⁷ Maine D. Biran, *Maine de Biran's 'Of Immediate Apperception'*, trans. Mark Sinclair (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 104-103.

effort effectively. Our muscles tighten internally. That force and the corresponding resistance introduce a new layer of our self-experience and are translated as understanding. Resistance to internal affect is a material actualization of sorts. Henry forwards this same notion in his account of affectivity, interiority, and life. Any actual effort and movement of lives are generated by Life's self-affectation. That effort endows another actuality at the surface of any resistance. The broad subjective self-affectivity of Life is conveyed to narrow subjective lives. Movement and resistance bestow a sense of localized selfhood. With all of the energy of Life at large, then, the concrete subject experiences their life as an "I can" rather than an I know or I think.²⁷⁸ The "can" arises from the fact of pure actuality. I can because I do.

The subject "can," and perhaps must interact. Henry's world is a myriad of actualities. It is a plurality of concrete events that are birthing new ones. Still, Henry's descriptions of intersubjectivity remain too vague to be systematized in a local pedagogy. In other words, he cannot quite prescribe how to affectively interact with each other. He can, however, be supplemented by two other critical voices. First, Luce Irigaray helps us articulate intersubjective birthing.²⁷⁹ Luce's interests are commensurate with Henry's focus on life. She is interested in conscious connectivity and its expressions in culture and thought. What is more, her own perspective is driven by one of our ontological motifs above: number. Irigaray

278. Michel Henry, *I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2003), 136-137.

279. Luce Irigaray, *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2017), xx. Luce Irigaray, *To Be Two* (London: Routledge, 2017), xx.

began her career critiquing the notion of singularity with respect to cultural consciousness and sexual identity.²⁸⁰ The world was not only one and therefore not only man. As her work progressed, she expanded her notion of otherness explicitly in the number two. To be anyone at all is to be two at minimum. Two precedes anything that resembles identity. You give me my me. There are touches replete through personhood such that, ontologically speaking, life is touch and twoness all the way down. In addition to Irigaray, one of Husserl's students, Edith Stein, had a more explicitly phenomenological claim about connection. For our purposes, her claims were explicitly affective. Stein held that we can cross over into others through empathy.²⁸¹ We can feel what they feel. We can enter and pass their edge. In consonance with Henry, affective actualities are the ground of life. But beyond Henry, affective actualities can be exteriorized as entities and those actualities can interact through the self-same affectivity that bore them. While we cannot plumb all of their insights, Stein and Irigaray show us is Henry's affective life should be a shared affectivity. The world may be immanently one, but its tonality is twofold.

That twofold nature is not reducible to the connection of people but applies to the touchpoint of any actuality. This is expressed in Henry's reading of material craft. In his work on Kandinsky, he focuses on the way that Wassily Kandinsky probed the world and felt its revealing in color.²⁸² Color, unlike other graphic elements, is self-referential. It is akin to life's own energy. Color gives us immediate

280. This word means more than selfhood. It is numerical in nature. The words do not go together. Identity is one and sex is two. Luce Irigaray, *This Sex which is Not One* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 23.

281. Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2013), 6-7.

282. Michel Henry, *Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2009), 70.

affective access to the actual world as opposed to the kinds of markings that exteriorize it. In the terms of Leroi-Gourhan, color is like graphism. It places us in the world, with the world, and of the world. Writing aligns with perspectival art or even fanciful self-indulgent sculptures. In a similar vein to Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, Kandinsky's work testifies to life. But unlike them, that life is not elsewhere. It is the actuality of that color, that *hyle*, and that affect. What is important here is that deep into ontological interiority, this life can be inscribed. It can be made. Therefore, as we continue through Henrian implications, we must keep track of the way these insights inflect a theory of making on the ground.

For Henry, mark-making does not begin or end with art. Henry was also a critical Marxist who had a novel way of understanding Marx's system. Rather than read him as an economist, Henry treats Marx as a social phenomenologist.²⁸³ For Henry, Marx express in labor what Henry sees in Kandinsky's color. That is, the "I can" actuates life in labor. Work is living labor. When that labor, however, becomes ekstatic or exteriorized in price, it dies. It is occultized and the energy of life is traded for the sarcophagi of reification. Contra Deleuze, work and labor are not about originality. They are not beset by copies. Life has no copy. Therefore, the subsequent solution to the problem of repetition cannot be simulation. Labor is actuality begetting actuality. Difference is simply a function of being alive, active, and working. Labor and its actual produce are only "original" when they are taken from life and viewed from the outside. Whereas simulation is pure outsideness, labor is deep interiority. When that interior work is lost, culture has reached a state

283. Michel Henry, *Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 265.

of barbarism.²⁸⁴ Barbarism, according to Henry, is not primitivism. It is the very opposite. It is hyper technicity wherein exteriority reigns. It produces a world of outsides that become the only measure of a life lived.

4.5.1 Out into Life

Henry's insight profoundly resynthesizes everything we have seen up to this point. What is striking, is that we require less space to affirm his synthesis because it is self-evident in the life we live. Above, we pointed out the way exteriority compromised life when placed under theoretical scrutiny. We admitted, however, that those hazards are not always felt on the ground. They make sense theoretically but we may not see them in daily life. Exteriority and writing do not kill me, for example. We have to account for the dissonance between described dangers and lived experience. With respect to exteriority, the dangers are not felt because they recede in the centers of calculation and their written inscriptions are codified into daily practice. Therefore, it requires extra effort to unravel those assumptions because of the resistance of these networks of inscription. Once we do this, though, advocating for interiority runs smoothly because it aligns with life as we know it. Thus, the categorical consequences of Henry seem to flow naturally.

We know we do "stuff." We feel our actions. We make things. Henry's model is in keeping with this immanent sensation. The interior life of all things is fraught with **agency**. In fact, this is a cornerstone of his entire system. The subjective energy of life is "I can." I can because all is actual. As an agent, I can **mark**

284. Michel Henry, *Barbarism* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 75.

anything. Every interaction is itself an actuality that is novel and concrete. I can act because the energy of motion is interior to life. I can also touch. I can touch wherever that effort meets resistance. If we augment Henry with Stein, I can interact within the depths of another's life as affectivity carries me into their concrete place in the myriad of moments we share. We repeat this over and over because life is a process with no outside. Our repetition sidesteps a sameness because life is an intricate history of actual affects. Despite this seamless application, when it comes to **surface** and twoness, though, Henry's account is wanting. Stein and Irigaray affirmed intersubjectivity in Henry's model but we still do not have an inscriptive prescription. We need a method that honors the interior life but also enacts the multiplicity it promises. We need to know *how* we encounter others? And how does this refract an ontology of interiority? Are others me? Is there a line between us where these actualities touch? If there is no distance in life, then is there ever an outside at all that I can call someone or something "else"? Can we be two? A la Irigaray, can I be two? Is there a moment in my past that is outside of me now? Is there a future? I submit that upon further examination, making directly addresses these potential problems in Henry.

For Henry, where life self-reveals, it opens concrete actualities and their interaction forms another affective entity or moment. But this universe is dangerously static despite Henry's claim that life is in process. Without any outside, *here* and *there* become indiscernible as just life's self-revelation. Henry avoids all outsides because he fears smuggling in transcendence. We are heading back to square one. Without *any* exteriority then our experience of things would feel

illusory—even if actualities exist ontologically. It seems that we *need* exteriority in some sense. We need that backslash of Kierkegaard above. If there is going to be any exteriority in Henry’s life, that exteriority would need to cycle and repeat. It would need to rise and fall constantly. But it could not disclose and conceal. That exteriority could not be a precondition of pure outsidedness. It could not be a potentiality in that way. Exteriority would need to be actual. *So, what if the outside were made? That is, what if the process of life was about making outsides in the interiority of affect?* If making happened over and over, then each marked moment, each surface, would beget a new moment or actual instance in life. In simple terms, what if life was about “making” outsides—notably, *from* the inside and toward the inside. Surface would be that event of exterior formation *within* life. This life of making would beget more of itself internally but do so through actuality agency rather than against it. Surfaces would manifest a life comprised of exscription and inscription. Repetition would be key to this surface. Repetition prevents it from becoming a shell for essence. Repetition allows making to make an exterior time and again. In other words, repetition would be resurfacing. Life never dies because in making it is pure resurrection. Resurrection precedes both incarnation and termination—both life and death.

Where do agency and marking fit into this making? How are they necessary to making rather than incidental and dispensable? Before Henry, phenomenological agency was intentionality. That intentionality is transcendent and so Henry dispenses with it. But he also dispensed with all outsidedness. Just above, we argued that we could recover outsidedness if we could keep making it. Therefore,

we can couple Henry's "I can" with inscribed exteriority in the repetition of making. In other words, agency's "I can" gives rise and room to others by inscribing them. It is, ironically, indifferent to otherness or Other. Otherness or the "Other" is a transcendent that remains exterior and dead. Agency, by inscribing exteriors, makes otherS. Others are concrete and actual and therefore plural. They are someones or somethings. Agency would be instrumental in keeping outsideness from becoming a stagnant and onerous transcendent presence. Namely, by exteriorizing from *within*. It would be instrumental in keeping life doing what life does: actuate. We would always have the opportunity to keep making outsideness—even our own.

In this arrangement, agency becomes purposive rather than intentional. But purposive cannot mean a simple imposition. We can call it purposive in the sense that the term means to "put there."²⁸⁵ In that sense, the term is best treated as purpose. It is not reducible to forcing a preconceived agenda. Pur-*pose* would be a kind of touch or marking that seeks the multiplicity of actual outsides. In other words, as it makes it "puts there." What is central to the pur-*posive* making is that it is always two at bottom. Two is the smallest molecule of reality in this sense. When making happens, at minimum, *this* thing *puts that* thing *there*. This kind of making enables a shared Life. If nothing else, this site of twoness in making is a small social arrangement we call friendship. Marking begets the outside and that outside then multiplies as others are made. The way that pur-*posive* making does this is critical. As an offering of others, then pro-*posive* making is also a kind of contraction. It is a

285. "purpose, v.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/154973>.

pulling back so that this exterior and its distance are born. This hospitable posture is repeatable. Repetition, on its face, is to re-ask.²⁸⁶ It is to invite. Repetitious purposive making is consonant with a life of opening and *disponibilité*.²⁸⁷ And when there is no one then this asking is a summons. It is a question that invites exterior to interior. It is ontology's fundamental friendship. It cannot die.

Finally, this reconfigured ontology calls for an operation. We cannot simply leave these insights to abstract confirmation and betray our original interests in the common world. Fortunately, Andre Leroi-Grouhan's work affords a technicity and inscription that can operationalize this ontology. As anticipated, this is drawing. Drawing can be an inscription that reaches the ontological and phenomenological ground below writing. Not only can it go to those dimensions, but it can also stay at the surface as a method or practice. Jean-Luc Nancy, mentioned earlier in conjunction with writing, anticipates and epitomizes our use of drawing in his work *The Pleasure in Drawing*.²⁸⁸ Nancy says that drawing the line allows us to see into the connective construction of the world. Nancy, in his own right, is very interested in exteriors touching. But in this case, what is important is that Nancy describes that when we pull a line across a page what was once zero immediately becomes two. *Here* is touching *there*. That side is contiguous with this side. Like Pyramus and Thisbe's wall, this line is both meeting and departure.²⁸⁹ Without it, "we—nor just me or you either—would not be. Therefore, drawing has the capacity to

286. "re-petition, v.," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/275284>.

287. Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism* (Citadel Press, 2002), 39-40.

288. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing* (New York City: Fordham University Press, 2013), 10.

289. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 76ff.

exteriorize, affectively self-relate, maximize contractive agency, enable twoness, touch, repeat, mark a surface, and do it all on purpose. Below, I will lay out some of drawing's instrumental mechanics with respect to Henry's ontology.

4.5.2 *Felix Ravaissou: The Flexuous Line*

To operationalize Henry's interiority, we revisit the Maine De Brian philosophy tree in the work of one of his pupils: Felix Ravaissou. Felix Ravaissou studied under Maine De Biran and taught Henri Bergson. He is heralded as a titan of the French Spiritualist tradition but has been relatively underserved in much of the continental conversation. His landmark works concern Aristotle and habit.²⁹⁰ Given his position and his scholarly focus, his work is highly instructive for a theory of making. We will address habit momentarily, but for now, it is his lesser-known writings about drawing that are of interest.²⁹¹

According to assorted writings, Ravaissou takes drawing to be a modality of interaction.²⁹² He thinks of it as a way of beholding or perceiving reality. It is not a referential practice. It is not even a pictorial practice. It is not, as Derrida would purport, a blind exploration.²⁹³ It was a means of accessing the substantive world around. It is a way of touching them. In Merleau-Ponty's words, it touches them from a distance. In our words, drawing makes this distance—purposively. These

290. Felix Ravaissou, "Of Habit," in *Félix Ravaissou: Selected Essays*, ed. Mark Sinclair (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 31.

291. Felix Ravaissou, "On the Teaching of Drawing," in *Félix Ravaissou: Selected Essays*, ed. Mark Sinclair (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 159.

292. Ravaissou, *On the Teaching of Drawing*, 161.

293. Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: the Self-portrait and Other Ruins* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 24.

convictions are coordinated in Ravaisson's description of the "flexuous line."²⁹⁴ This is the backbone of drawing. Flexuous drawing enacts a certain kind of line that is neither geometric nor simply curved. As flexuous, this line inscribes movement. As a student of Aristotle, movement and continuity are principal features of life. As a student of Maine de Biran, force and effort are critical elements of life as well. The flexuous line combines them. It is a serpentine line that evokes the movement and force of the world around. Even when the flexuous line evinces a known body or seemingly refers to an object, that line is touching that body and moving with that object.

This line unites many of our aforementioned thinkers in an operative instrument for making a living. In the terms of Ingold, the flexuous line is intragenerative interweaving. In the terms of Henry, it participates in a shared subjectivity of affective life. In the terms of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, this flexuous line is graphic, not linear. In the terms of Stein, this flexuous line, just as it finds another, enters in and dwells with that other. For Ravaisson, the flexuous line is the *oikonomia* of the life it touches. It inscribes that life in its repetitious ("perpetual asking") turns and transgressions. The turns of the line are not folds but the very making of quadrants, sections, and entities. The turns of the flexuous line are akin to what Rabbi Ben Bag Bag said of sacred writings: turn it turn it for everything is in it.²⁹⁵

294. Ravaisson, *On the Teaching of Drawing*, 183-187.

295. Ben Bag Bag, *Pirkei Avot: Chapters of the Fathers* (Berlin: The Floating Press, 2014), ch. 5.

This serpentine line is not necessarily visible.²⁹⁶ Like life, which does not give itself to knowledge or sight, the flexuous line is drawn by and with but never depicted. It is that interior that is always exteriorized. Bergson called Ravaisson's flexuous line a "figurative metaphysics."²⁹⁷ Its bends and straightaways testify to the polarity and intensity of a thing's way of being. Or as we said above, the flexuous line tells us what it is like to be this thing—without referring or transcending. Drawing's flexuous line maintains instants, cuts, and dots. It breaks and rejoins. It crosses over itself. It draws on its own marked pathways and thickens the entities as they are revealed in this flexuous figuration.

As invisible, the flexuous line is the rhythm of life.²⁹⁸ Or better, for Ravaisson, is eurythmic. It is beautiful or good precisely in its capacity to foment actual newness and difference. It is rhythmic in the sense that it is ongoing and undulating. As it turns corners, rises and falls, or thickens and fades it is making. It is the touchstone for the inner and outer—interiority and exteriority. Just as our concept of making above inscribes exteriority on the inside, the flexuous line can be the means of that inscribing. It does both things because, as line, it is ineluctably two-sided. And the two that it gives continue as the line is pulled. In other words, as drawn. It also is rhythmic in the sense that it is a testament to instants. It is not an unceasing flow nor an uninterrupted monism. There are no rhythms where there is pure potency or virtuality without starts and stops. The flexuous line makes different actual things surface as instants come into view. Eurythm testifies to the fits and starts of

296. Catherine Malabou, "Addiction and Grace," in *On Habit* ed. Claire Carlisle (London: Routledge, 2014), xix.

297. Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* (North Chelmsford: Courier Corporation, 2012), 262.

298. Ravaisson, *On the Teaching of Drawing*, 183-187.

a life feeling itself. It is never a pure symmetry, a pure void, or a virtual. Lastly, it is rhythmic in the sense that it is purposive. It puts. As the flexuous line repeats, it puts this there and that here by calling them forward and touching them.

Ravaisson, as we noted, was not only an advocate for drawing but published a major work on habit.²⁹⁹ The flexuous line and habit are co-constitutive. This is critical for our theory of making. In his book, Ravaisson dispels the notion that habits are routines or rote mechanical movements. Rather, habits negotiate the polarity of will and nature. Habits are also twofold. He points out that when something is repeated in habit, it crosses between exterior nature and interior will.³⁰⁰ In the terms of drawing, this is like a twofold interacting and intersecting like a flexuous line crisscrossing and pulling. But just as drawing helps us see habit, a habit can help us see what is happening in the flexuous line. Habit is transformative and constructive. A repetitious conscious act of the interior will become more inscribed in nature. It will float “outside” of the self in that sense, as second nature. It will occur more spontaneously as a result of natural prompting.³⁰¹ It is the will exscribed. In our terms, habit is the very process of the interior being inscribed into another. The inverse also happens. As natural, it will become more precise. As the act is performed on the outside, the inside will become less resistant to its enactment. Habit is purposive in this way. Nature and will (purposively) put each other into view and then cross into each other without synthesis or dialectic.

299. Felix Ravaisson, *Of Habit* ed. Claire Carlisle (London: Routledge, 2014), 25.

300. Ravaisson, *Of Habit*, 55.

301. Ravaisson, *Of Habit*, 37.

They befriend one another. Ultimately, according to our theory of making, a habit is the kind of repetition that engenders living. It makes, crosses, and dwells.³⁰²

If we were to scale back from our study, we would see that we are continuing to work backward. We moved further into abstraction from an EMPIRICAL sample, into a FRAMEWORK of elements and motifs, and have now considered theoretical distinctions. My proposal, to take up drawing as an interior theory of making, redeploys motifs and reconfigures **elements**. The flexuous line, at least as I have theorized here, is not yet fully EMPIRICAL. It is still rather vague to the common person, who is the target audience. Therefore, we need one more step. We need to address whether this flexuous line, described as invisible, can actually be drawn. We need to establish the *kind* of drawing that comes closest to the constructive rhythms of the flexuous line. For that, we turn to the American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce to solidify our drawn theory of making.

4.5.3 Charles Sanders Peirce: Diagrammatics

Peirce lies well outside of our stream of thinkers above but he is no stranger to phenomenology. He was a rigorous scientist that spent a lifetime trying to categorize and systematize his field's methods and practices. As a result, his writings are fraught with hierarchies, information architecture, and novel titles. For example, he substituted the term phaneroscopy for phenomenology.³⁰³ But what is important about Peirce is not his peculiarity but his sense of connectedness and

302. Thomas A. Tweed, *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 123.

303. Charles S. Peirce, "On Phenomenology," in *The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 145.

interplay. What is more, we need to see how his affinity for connection informed his phenomenology, shaped his idea about drawing, and endorsed communities of interpretation.

One of Peirce's lasting insights in phenomenology is that every experience is contoured by the ontological motif of number. He claimed that every observation and actual entity has firstness, secondness, and thirdness.³⁰⁴ Firstness is a kind of feeling or sensation in any encounter. Though he most likely meant something external and substantive, this correlates to Henry's immediate affectivity. Secondness is discerned in resistance or otherness. Once again, Peirce is more directly empirical than we have been but secondness, here, corresponds to the drawn line. Peirce's thirdness, finally, is a reflection on the relation between firstness and secondness. That relation is akin to a law or even a habit. Critically, thirdness is not subsequent. In some cases it is primary. His own simple example can help us clarify. When a dot is placed on a page, it is always first, second, and third all at once. The paper is firstness, the dot is twoness, and their interaction is thirdness. We can see that none of these trumps the other. Though, thirdness—our "habit" of the flexuous line—holds their mutual reality together. Furthermore, that thirdness is not static but is actively present as it is the ground of continued reaction or interaction. Namely, someone can draw lines of dots extending from the dot and paper. This model is in lockstep with our foregoing arrangement. In effect, he is confirming that a proper phenomenology of life must account for interiority,

304. Charles S. Peirce, "Categories Defended," in *The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 60.

exteriority, and their mutual enactment. Peirce goes on to coordinate this numerical ontology in his own form of graphism.

We can see his ontology at work in drawing but it will be helpful to take an intermediate step before getting there. For Peirce, markings on a page are signs. Therefore, to fully comprehend his model of drawing, we should understand how the numerical ontology above informs signs. Peirce is well known for his semiotics. His most accessible triad of signs is his hierarchy of indexes, icons, and symbols.³⁰⁵ Indexes have a strong relation to the object they signify. For example, smoke is to fire. Icons “resemble” the things they signify. For example, a photo or digital graphic. Symbols are remotely related to the things they signify. For example, a flag as a symbol of freedom. In lieu of this hierarchy, Frederic Stjernfelt has pointed out that indexes and symbols are actually limit cases of the icon.³⁰⁶ Icons have that “resemblance” that makes them the central element of signification. The semblance of the icon is latent in the index and symbol without which they would no longer signify. A straight index would be the same as the object it signifies. The symbol would be utterly unrelated to its so as to be irrelevant and unreadable. This latter insight has unexpected fruit. Above, we saw that pure exteriority requires assemblage of the unlinked simulacra. This is akin to the pure symbol of Peirce. Pure interiority needs disassembly for its undistanced actualities. This is akin to the pure index of Peirce. The icon coincides with habit and the flexuous line as re-

305. Charles S. Peirce, “Of Reasoning in General,” in *The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 12.

306. Frederik Stjernfelt, *Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 49.

semblance. The icon, and by implication drawing, is once again the thirdness that repeats a relation. Fortunately, in Peirce, this thirdness can be signified in certain kin of graphic icon.

Peirce's graphical icon of choice is the diagram.³⁰⁷ The diagram has a unique position in this signifying chain since it has a semblance but is also internally revisable. For Peirce, a diagram relates to its reference by graphically illustrating the internal relations within that thing.³⁰⁸ Those parts, mereologically splayed in the diagram are akin to the touching we affirmed in the flexuous inscriptions. The diagram is an actualization of what is felt in another actuality, so to speak. But this diagram, and all of its lines, can be reassembled and rearranged. This is so that we might draw closer to the actuality it diagrams. That redrawing, according to Henry, affects that actuality too. Therefore, diagrams are the kind of flexuous drawing that lies at the surface. As the means of a drawn making, diagrams do more than just actuate the flexuous line, though. They also craft the kind of community that Peirce expected to gather around signs.³⁰⁹

While diagrams resonate with the technicity and line-making interweaving of anthropology, they also serve kin-making. When we refract Peircean diagrams through Henry and shine them onto human life through anthropology, then diagrams become a technicity that summons others into life. Peirce was adamant

307. Jakub Zdebik, *Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 109.

308. Peirce, "Of Reasoning in General," 13.

309. Charles S. Peirce, "On Science and Natural Classes," in *The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 116.

that a larger network of human lives was critical to affirming scientific concepts. Truth belonged to all because truth is not a property but a kind of alignment.³¹⁰ Thus, when life is shared, kin is made. Diagrams materialize these generalities by being 1) a drawn actuality that inaugurates exteriority (or two) 2) flexuously purposeful and 3) a reconfiguration that multiplies otherness and makes kin by feeling the lives of those around it. Given this formulation, diagrams cannot be those technical drawings tucked away in plans and encyclopedias only to be deciphered by experts. That would be exteriority and occulted life. The diagrams we have in mind are those sketches that two people share at a dinner table when they want someone to observe what they see in a project, a relationship, or a game. These diagrams are the sketches that doodle out a love note or that a child draws to illustrate a school procedure. Diagrams can certainly rise to the level of full-blown construction but at their ontological core, they sprout life at the smallest levels.

4.6 Diagramming Conclusions

We can summarize our entire exposition in a simple motto: drawing invigorates making. This sort of affirmation might seem too succinct to feel viable. But brevity is indicative of our sustained effort heretofore. What we have done is finally make our way to the tip of an iceberg. We have dug into the ground of life enough to come back to the top and make simple claims. Now, rather than rehash all of the elements of the chapter, in the spirit of its findings, I want to circle back to the

310. Charles S. Peirce, "The Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy," in *The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 360.

diagrammatic enumeration at the beginning and redraw it. This time, I want to eliminate the meta-discursive research elements and focus on the relationship between the two theories of making. I want to weave drawing and writing together under the rubrics of making we have developed. Then I will make a final propositional statement. The table is organized according to the structures of making we have developed, how writing addresses and coordinates each, and how drawing offers a different arrangement.

findings

RESEARCH ELEMENTS	STRUCTURE	WRITING	DRAWING
<i>Identify Obstacles</i>	Anthropocene and Capitalocene	Alterity saves through death	We make life together
<i>Identify Variables</i>	Surface, Agent, Marking	Exterior potentiality	Interior actuality
<i>Establish Constant</i>	Inscriptions	What is literature?	Flexuous diagrams
<i>Observe Variations</i>	touch/repetition/number	non-touch/simulation/one	crossing-into/asking/two

At this point of the study, every piece of the theory is in full view. We have migrated around the SYSTEMATIC COMBINING categories and solidified a drawn theory of making that carefully considers both anthropological and phenomenological subtleties. What is more, we have an operational instrument to actualize that theory. But, since our goal is to transmit this theory on the ground, that instrument should be accompanied by our findings. Regrettably, our findings are too cumbersome for everyday use. To take them along with us, we can pare down the

insights of these two lenses—anthropology and phenomenology—into two formal propositions. 1) Anthropology taught us that **Drawing is Material**. 2) Now, phenomenology has shown that **Drawing is Habitual**. In the final section, we turn to Architecture where we will see all of these aforementioned elements at work in one discipline. Architecture will verify the importance of a drawn theory of making as well as provide our third and final proposition. 3) Namely, **Drawing is tectonic**.

5. THE ARCHITECTURE OF DRAWING

5.1 Case Study

First, let us be clear, it would be impossible to cover the entirety of architectural history in an effort to observe drawing as a phenomenological condition of making. architecture is a vast and sweeping discipline that has covered far too many corners of the human experience. To be succinct, but direct, that is not what we are trying to do. It is not just a matter of whether we can do it. We do not want to do it. In SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, CASE STUDIES are not used for surveying or refining area expertise. They are not simply additional empirical samples either. The CASE STUDY serves as a threshold of understanding for any phenomenon—or theory—and its context.³¹¹ The case study integrates. As noted in the introduction and first chapter, I launched this study under the guidance of a *mytheme*. Here in these latter parts, the investigation has evolved into a general and abstract theoretical construct. This transformation can complicate and obfuscate understanding. The mytheme is often too small for general comprehension and the

311. Anna Dubois and Lars-Erik Gadde, "Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research," *Journal of Business Research* 55, no. 7 (2002): 554,

theory is too large for specific insight. The CASE STUDY helps us negotiate these two extremes.

The CASE STUDY, then, serves as both a tool and a product of all that has gone before. As a tool, it concretely coordinates all of the elements, motifs, and theoretical reflections we have developed along the way. At the same time, it is a product of those same pieces. In other words, architecture is not just the means of showing the pieces. It is also—in its very disciplinary form—the natural end of these pieces. What we want, is to see how these pieces configure both ends and means. In the terms of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, we want to see how the pieces match, clash, or exclude one another. For example, to see how surface begets drawing. Or, to see how drawing materializes in building. Therefore, we do not necessarily need a genealogy of architectural influences or methods. Our purpose is not chronological (though it is always historical in a material sense). Neither do we require an archaeology that highlights specific architectural components. We only need a series of specimens that can capture and convey architecture's prevailing logic and mythos. These will allow us to observe the ways our elements contribute to its historical self-expression and self-understanding.

Most importantly, a case study gives us an interlocutor. It gives us someone to whom we can pose our questions. What is more, we can ask with specific reference to the elements we have developed heretofore. For example, "How does architecture deal with the anthropological issues of perception? How does architecture handle its ontological development? What is its relationship to writing? Did the architect die alongside the author? Is architecture distinctive because of

drawing? Will drawing survive the digital turn? Is architecture a harbinger of a life to come? For everyone? These questions circulate in the background of our case study and will help us confirm our suspicion that drawing, and its constituent parts, is integral to architecture. But beyond that, the case study documents the indispensable role that architecture and drawing will play for any possible life beyond the Anthropocene and Capitalocene.³¹²

5.2 First Joining

In that spirit of questioning, architecture's various threads can be largely distinguished by which sorts of questions they ask. Before those questions diverged, there was rough unity. In the beginning, architecture was interested in dwelling. Despite any later disputes about the nature of that dwelling, it is incontrovertible that the earliest stages of constructed environments concerned liveable spaces. Whether for gods, people, or animals, humans built for habitation.³¹³ This reality is confirmed by anthropology. In many respects, anthropology and architecture are so intertwined that in their primeval form, they are difficult to distinguish. Humans culled out caves or erected huts right alongside their physiological metamorphosis.³¹⁴ The shape of the body and the shape of the building go hand in hand.

312. The following architects were chosen in accordance with the principles discovered up to this point. These by no means are the exemplary figures of architectural drawing. Their emphases correspond to concepts heretofore established.

313. Ray Lucas, *Anthropology for Architects: Social Relations and the Built Environment* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 45.

314. André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 4.

5.2.1 Vitruvius

One of the standard backdrops that reinforce this general unity is the work of the Roman architectural theorist, Vitruvius.³¹⁵ Vitruvius offered an anthropological rationale for the emergence of architecture. When humans foraged in the woods, a storm bestowed fire upon them by putting trees, wind, and other elements on a collision course. Their convergence produced a conflagration that intimidated the wood dwellers. The blaze subdued and the accessible fire provided a central meeting hub for the onlookers. They sustained the fire and, by repetition (or “habit”), they formed assemblies and shared language. Since the assembly pivoted on the fire, they needed to maintain it. This prompted the building process. Namely, they constructed a roof and walls to shelter the fire. Eventually, what they learned in this shared technicity would endow them with the skill to return to their own sleeping quarters and erect similar protections. The story provided an ecological and anthropological context for Vitruvius’ eventual architectural principles. He delineated three essential features for any construction—*firmitas*, *utilitas*, *venustas*.³¹⁶ These features—integrity, utility, and beauty—were derived from the natural properties that gave rise to architecture in the first place. In other words, as it is in nature so should it be in the building process.

Most, if not all, serious architectural minds dismiss this story as fanciful. Nevertheless, those same minds often revisit it as instructive. It remains so for us

315. Vitruvius, *Ten Books on Architecture*, ed. Thomas N. Howe and Ingrid Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 38-41.

316. Vitruvius, 17.

now. Vitruvius' account is a mytheme that lies deep in the bosom of architecture regardless of how it is received. Importantly, that mytheme aligns humans and the world in a way that resonates with Andre Leroi-Gourhan's technicity, Marcel Mauss's social technics, and Tim Ingold's account of intragenerative perception.³¹⁷ In addition, the story's account of subsequent construction outlines a responsive agency that cannot be reduced to vaulted modern agendas. Humans were not imposing concepts on surfaces but were letting surfaces shape their own action. In Serres' terms, there was a pliability or openness to their agency. Admittedly, my affirmations must be held loosely. It is certainly possible that the behaviors that lie within the text may not be consistent with the actions of those using that text. But that is not what is important here. What is critical is that in the mind of early thinkers, materiality and agency work in consonance—however concocted. And, as the Vitruvian epic continued, human technicity would advance to the degree that they could “correspond” to the interior life of the materials through mimicry— (the triad). What is more, the ontological motif of repetition is directly operative in all of these elements. The agency, surfaces, and markings manifested the Vitruvian humans' shared habit of coming together.

Thus, in its earliest manifestos, a nascent theory of architecture was underway. Fortuitously, that theory was a constellation comprised of all of the elements we have distilled in the foregoing chapters. This affords us a constructive reversal. Whereas we are looking at architecture with an eye toward making, architecture is

317. Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Psychology Press, 2000), 220-222.

pointing us back. Vitruvius' story directly integrates joining and making. To build coincides with commonality. This feedback provides a way to retain a simple definition of architecture as it undergoes multiple historical revisions and theoretical mutations. I submit, that even here at the beginning and unto the last, we should understand architecture as "first joining." This is not a cheap exit from hard theoretical conflict and conversation. I am not trying to sidestep the experts and their necessary wrangling. First of all, I pose this definition as a prolepsis of the kind of tectonism that will return below after a few cursory detours. Second, it is a testament to the prima facie nature of the term. Third, I should note that this definition is only provisional. It cannot possibly account for all historical nuance. Despite being confident in its long-term stability, I only offer it experimentally feature of our theory-building until is bolstered.

Vitruvius' treatise would remain intact for several centuries or at least as long as classical thought reigned throughout the world. It would even be reinforced by Leon Battista Alberti's own manifesto in the 15th century.³¹⁸ It was not until the Enlightenment and its subsequent corollary, the industrial revolution, that Vitruvius' ideas would fade to the background. Even still, the centerpiece of his scheme—human and material relations—persisted. In fact, it grounded 19th-century debates about the origins of culture.³¹⁹ What makes art art? Disciplines were open to new theories about the origins of craft given the Greek and Roman heritage had been thrown into relief by rationalist and empirical transformations. In

318. Leon B. Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 2.

319. Harry F. Mallgrave, *Modern Architectural Theory: A Historical Survey, 1673–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 141.

architecture, the debate was unique. Unlike some other disciplines which relied wholly on abstract argumentation, architecture had archaeological evidence of built structures that either verified or refuted a claim about origins. This is the seedbed of our next archaeological specimen: the work of Gottfried Semper.

5.2.2 Gottfried Semper

In the 19th century, there was an ongoing debate about the whiteness of Greek monuments and buildings. The prevailing—classical—assumption was that these structures were singularly white. This seemingly insignificant issue was central because it spoke to the purity and supremacy of the Greek ideal in comparison to Roman admixtures. If the structures were white, then their philosophies of form and political life also had an advantage over Rome. But if they were not white, then what could that mean? What was at stake? In a word, the underlying concern was: what are the basic building blocks of culture?³²⁰ Is it Rome? Is it Greece? Gottfried Semper, a German architect, would address the core questions which subtended these controversies. He first entered into these debates in favor of polychromy—the view that Greek whiteness was actually an agglomeration of layered colors.³²¹ Semper saw this as a virtue and not a vice. Polychromy meant that the Greeks were sensitive to their ecosystem's light conditions and correspond to their surrounding environment. Above all though, this multi-colored approach evinced an ancient interest in ornament, dressing, and aesthetic construction. In Semper's estimation,

320. Mallgrave, *Modern Architectural Theory*, 91.

321. Mallgrave, 74.

Greek influence on culture should not derive from their distinctive purity but rather from their ability to combine, transform, build, and flourish (in every sense of the term).

Semper's affirmation of integration led to propositions about the basic purposes of architecture as well as to certain assumptions about its fundamental elements. To begin with, Semper would emphasize a return to the materials of the world which surrounded any construction. The materials of the world had, in their own actuality, propensities or motives. Semper does not offer a specific ontology of matter but he does offer an account of human interactions with matter that is strikingly intragenerative. In sum, life is defined by a transformation of material elements.³²² In many cases, those material elements were already transformations. They were often constructs of other things. They were tectonic or woven things. Therefore, building—architecture—inherits and forwards this combining and transforming practice. It is an interaction at this material surface. This awareness required a delicate and faithful understanding of the basic elements that comprised each constructive interaction. That is, to be a proper “first joiner” we should know materials at the earliest state of combinatoric—or tectonic—development. Much like Vitruvius, Semper had a sequential model. He held that there were four key “elements” in architecture. Namely, architectural junctures stemmed from hearth, mound, roof, and wall.³²³

322. Gottfried Semper, *The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74.

323. Semper, *The Four Elements*, 42.

These elements were more like organizing motifs that had corresponding tectonic skills. The term tectonic will become central for us as we proceed and we will define it in more detail later. For now, and for Semper, tectonic skill describes the ability to grasp the elemental motive (hearth, etc.) of materials and to employ the technical capacity to bring that material to a cultural expression.³²⁴ This makes more sense if we consider them in turn. The hearth describes a movement of assemblage around a fire. For a society, the hearth becomes an altar. The hearth coincides with the skill of ceramics. Presumably, the elements of sharing in the assembly—dinnerware or religious artifacts—were constructed by joining the earthen elements with that fire. When that fire is lifted up off the ground, then this is the movement of mounding. Mounding begets masonry and terracing. The roof comes next insofar as it is placed over the flame to shelter it. Carpentry, as another tectonic skill, joins together raw elements to thatch a covering. Finally, and most importantly for Semper, a wall is constructed by weaving. Semper spends a good deal of time discussing weaving given that it is the moment of the architectural enclosure.³²⁵ When the wall is added—which would have been a tapestry at first—suddenly a new cultural moment occurs. Here, at the emergence of the wall, Semper’s former debates about polychromy resonate. Polychrome monuments and walls were the heirs of early woven tapestries and therefore naturally would bear multiple layers of coloring.

324. Gottfried Semper, *Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts, Or, Practical Aesthetics* (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2004), 109.

325. Semper, 254-257.

The wall was more than a convenient conclusion, though. It was, for Semper, the essence of architecture. The wall was the site of cultural dressing. Dressing was not a banal ornamentation but the very feedback of tectonic advancement.³²⁶ We see life in it. For Semper, as humans tectonically interacted with materials, they changed them. Those transformations advanced and multiplied. They built on themselves much like Leroi-Gourhan's technicity. For Semper, even if industrialization's methods were derivative of this process, it is not necessarily counterproductive. It can provide new tectonic opportunities for architecture. This tectonism also had an exteriorizing effect. Whereas former woven walls had color and cultural expression embedded in them, later they would be spiritualized in paint. Once, again, this is not necessarily evaluative. It is descriptive. Semper goes further by cross-applying the built transformations of tapestry and painted walls to the decorative "scene" of Greek drama.³²⁷ That is, the tapestry became wall and the wall wore a mask in the same way that actors and settings would. In all, Semper's tectonism had an evolutionary impulse without determinate or positivist conclusions.

Semper's thesis narrows our focus to the issue of tectonics. His original definition, given above, can be expanded to shed light on the role of our elements and motifs of making within architecture. Tectonic skill is a grasp of material inclination and the capacity to bring, or transform, that material into a new manifestation. But, even our cursory review suggests that tectonics is even more

326. Semper, *Four Elements*, 104-109.

327. Harry F. Mallgrave, *Gottfried Semper: Architect of the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 8.

simple—more elemental—than that. For Semper, the basic process of all making is the act of joining. This corroborates the ostensible meaning of the term tectonics itself. *Tekton*, taken literally, is a “joining by weaving.” Recall that he emphasized the weaving of textiles and their critical role in architectural development. He also, implicitly or explicitly, distributes this process of weaving across all of the tectonic arts. As we noted above, ceramics bring earth and fire together. Mounding layers dirt upon dirt. The roof is a matrix of touching pieces. The tapestry that creates the inside and outside is the full embodiment and expressive pinnacle of an ongoing joining process. This wall is not only a cultural marvel but it is a reflexive testimony. It articulates the interactions that have brought the building to life. It is important to note that this kind of joining is not mereological. We are not simply joining given parts. Rather, this joining is itself the begetting and birthing of parts. They are not brought together subsequent to their existence. The joining is their origination.

This model substantiates our simple definition of architecture as first joining. It also deepens this claim by putting touch and surface at the center of building and making. The connection of materials is an originary moment but it is not a violent, impositional, or external moment. Semper’s joining is germane and internal to the material process itself. Of which, agents are a part. The surface is where the growth, transformation, and parturition are actual and occurrent. The agent’s unique offering lies in their receptivity. Or, in our terms, it lies in their ability to become whatever they need to make room for the forthcoming otherness of the object. This process is lived. It is actual. The agent does not survey the ground as a site probing pure potentiality. Rather, they touch the surface and tectonic life moves

along. And, what is more, this touching is not unilateral. It is shared. Agents are touching the surface but in so doing they are coming together with one another. In the terms of Sahlins, Mauss, and Haraway, tectonics is always already kin-making.³²⁸ It is a kinship with the earth and its inhabitants simultaneously. Given Semper's indeterminate sense of fecund making, some scholars have filtered his through a Deleuze, digitality, or externality. They read his openness to transformation as a prefiguration of code and algorithmic variation.³²⁹ But as we see here, Semper is thoroughly affective and interior with respect to material motifs. We feel life in materiality. We learn "what it is like to be" this thing or that thing by touching it. We also learn what is like to be us in this twofold moment.

The 19th-century questions of origins that prompted Semper's system circulated in other parts of Europe as well. Other responses also focused on materials as the ground and origin of cultural formation. Some of which, are favorable to our theory of making. The English art critic John Ruskin, for example, elevated material craft and situated the tectonic practices of architecture alongside drawing.³³⁰ For Ruskin, bringing things together, joining them, was epitomized in the flexuous line. Despite these 19th-century material advocates, tectonic issues would give way to new questions at the turn of the century and in the face of modernization. The industrial arts continued to throw questions of making into

328. Marshall Sahlins, *What Kinship Is-And Is Not* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Marcel Mauss, "Techniques of the Body," in *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, ed. Nathan Schlanger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).

329. Bernard Cache, "Digital Semper," in *Rethinking Architectural Technology*, ed. William W. Braham and Jonathan A. Hale (London: Routledge, 2013), 378; Lars Spuybroek, *Textile Tectonics* (Nai Uitgevers Pub, 2011), 20.

330. John Ruskin, *The Work of John Ruskin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), app. xxxii.

disarray. The issue of culture would continue to expand and the assumption that humans could articulate and guide it—whether in its origins or toward its end—grew increasingly suspicious. After the world wars of the first half of the 20th century, architects began to wonder about their purpose.³³¹ The material and anthropological ideas bequeathed to them by Vitruvius, Semper, Ruskin, and others seemed insufficient in the face of machines, concrete, and steel.

5.3 Uninhabitable

Up into the 20th century, there was a prevailing assumption that since architecture was coincident with human development and human civilization that it should continue to participate in their evolutionary advancement. The belief was that architecture could enhance historical maturity on two levels.³³² One, it could seek and sketch out built systems that would promote human flourishing. Two, it employed novel technologies to execute those systematic visions. The first level gave rise to planned communities and architectural aspirations for broad and universal structuration. As noted, this ambition was reconfigured in the wake of the wars. Universal systems were suddenly volatile, dangerous, and inhumane. The second level, that of technological progress, rose to prominence in this post-war period and in lieu of its conditions. In some sense, the idea of planning would slowly be subsumed by technological novelty. This would not mean that architects

331. Harry F. Mallgrave and David J. Goodman, *An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 37.

332. Mallgrave and Goodman, 6.

would wholly abandon social interests but rather they would approach those aims from the standpoint of technology.

Harry Mallgrave, the esteemed architectural historian, cites Buckminster Fuller as an inflection point in the disciplinary transformation of architecture.³³³ Fuller, an American architect, began to turn his attention toward the ecological role of architecture during this time. That is, instead of starting from its social role. His interests in energy distribution, consumption, and their consequences prompted his development of a “world game.” In his 1967 networked game, computers and users from all over the world would help calculate and discern the proper distribution of energy and resources through their cross-comparison and information sharing.³³⁴ This seemingly altruistic agenda was not only putting architecture on the technological track, it was introducing computation and code into the design process. The information gleaned from the world game would inform construction sites and formal design decisions.

Mallgrave highlights one other architectural impulse of the post-war area that would redefine the questions of the discipline. The world was reorganizing after geopolitical strife. There were new methods, new cultural affinities, and new ecological demands. Whereas Fuller would make a coded game of the situation, architects like Christopher Alexander put themselves to the task of discerning patterns in all of this variation.³³⁵ This paralleled the structuralist approaches that were appearing in anthropology and linguistics. He also leveraged computation in

333. Mallgrave and Goodman, 5.

334. Timothy Stott, *Buckminster Fuller's World Game and Its Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2021), 76.

335. Christopher Alexander, *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 73.

an attempt to locate and apply these architectural patterns. Even so, as Alexander's work progressed, the old anthropological interests in human well-being and lived life returned.³³⁶ But they would have little purchase across the architectural landscape. There were other currents emerging in the 60s and 70s that would continue the computational and exploratory trends that were guiding architecture's identity crisis. The important point here is that architecture was groping for some sort of defining principle in the wake of anthropological fallout. architecture could no longer be defined by what it had immediately "done." Its buildings, materials, and plans had run aground. The architectural condition was primed for some external, outside, pure ideality that could give it enclosure and meaning. The code and semiotic patterns that would inform later architectural philosophies were in their embryonic form.

There were two other threads that would shape the fabric of architectural self-understanding in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. Both touched on architecture's growing guilt and sense of communicative failure. Starting from the latter, the emerging question was whether architectural projects had gone awry—like large planned communities now empty—due to poor description, expression, and delivery rather than any inherent weakness in the discipline. This opened architecture to the growing academic field of semiotics. architecture looked to the study of signs and symbols as a way to recast building and making.³³⁷ This move to

336. Christopher Alexander, *A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10.

337. Mallgrave and Goodman, *Introduction to Theory*, 39.

semiosis and words also brought architecture into proximity with structuralism.³³⁸ As mentioned above, structuralism culled out universal patterns within phenomena that accounted for local and concrete manifestations and organization of elements. Structural language could have value for a communicatively deficient discipline. For heuristic purposes, we might call this architecture's own linguistic turn. Ongoing interactions between architectural minds and structuralists during this era paved the way for a pivotal post-structuralist moment.

In addition to its communicative problems, another discipline would address and validate architecture's latent sense of guilt. As descendants of Marx, at some level, German-based critical theory was calling all systems of planning and organization into question around the themes of violence, expropriation, or hegemonic imposition.³³⁹ In combination with the linguistic turn, the general critical concern with overbearing and totalizing systems aggravated architecture's identity crisis and search for definition and purpose. Therefore, architecture was searching for some code, sign-system, and linguistic structure that could give meaning without any positivist claim. It seemed serendipitous, then, that one discipline could address the demands of the other. Namely, a sign-based philosophy or a post-structural linguistic theory could provide meaning to architecture without sliding into the hegemony identified by critical theory. Like Fuller and Alexander's altruistic impulses above, this would have significant and even deleterious consequences. It would lead some architectural theorists away

338. Mallgrave and Goodman, 123-126.

339. David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 29.

from lived experience and the building process altogether in search of more plastic and universally bland structures.

5.3.1 Peter Eisenman

One such theorist is Peter Eisenman. A titanic figure in modern architecture, Eisenman plays a significant role in this linguistic turn. Under the influence of Colin Rowe's notions of transparency in architecture, Eisenman's dissertation was an early search for a pure architectural form that preceded and exceeded all functionality.³⁴⁰ A basic and denuded form would avoid the problems of positivism. Though not yet exposed to the work of post-structuralists like Jacques Derrida, Eisenman was, in effect, looking for that geometric solid that sat on the event horizon of the *khora*. He was in search of the seeds of shape that could take root as any structural manifestation. His ensuing work would continue to explore this theme and would employ linguistic notions like syntax and grammar as ways to describe the growth of a form.³⁴¹ It would not be a stretch to say that he was trying to understand architecture as a kind of pure formality—a fecund and open-ended formality, though. The analytical properties of a form turned it into a stem cell which outstripped and eluded any kind of symbolism or functionality.

The inchoate identity crisis of architecture in the post-war era was coming to maturity in Eisenman. Even amidst the objections, we will levy here below, his courage and bravado put that crisis on display and gave it responsive traction. His

340. Peter Eisenman, *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture* (Lars Müller Publishers, 2006), 25.

341. Peter Eisenman, *Inside Out: Selected Writings, 1963-1988* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 226.

approach, however, was like the *pharmakon* of Derrida: both medicinal solution and poison.³⁴² His theories were determined by his ongoing and inherited aversion to positivism. As noted above, the historical shift from humanism to modernism demanded a rejection of any positivist position. To reiterate, it also introduced new cultural findings and novel technological methods. In Eisenman's mind, this invited architects to apply the new technologies and thoughts of other disciplines to their work. Architects had not yet taken up that invitation and still circled the drain of a dying anthropocentrism. Therefore, Eisenman considered himself a vanguard. Eisenman's experimental thought openly manifested a shift from architecture's former terrestrial, tectonic, and interior self-understanding to an ethereal, remote, and exterior validation. By stripping architecture of all actuality in function, Eisenman was reaching beyond any "thisness" of a building in favor of a pure potentiality that would define it.³⁴³ This has consequences for the elements and motifs of making we have developed thus far. The surface that was once instrumental for Semper and anthropology was no longer of interest. In fact, surfacial elements distracted from geometric emergence. The tectonic agent receded from prominence given that the form itself would define its future. Though it had not happened quite yet, the mark-making process itself would fall into disrepute in favor of computation.

Eisenman's ideas would come to full fruition in conjunction with the work of Jacques Derrida, who we have mentioned above. For Eisenman, Derrida addressed

342. Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination* (London: A&C Black, 2004), 67.

343. Peter Eisenman, *Written Into the Void: Selected Writings, 1990-2004* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 42.

the anti-capitalist concerns of critical theory through an account of signs that could both strip architecture of its symbolic pretense and give it an engine for new formal growth. He did not just adopt Derrida as proof of his own position. Derrida's account of writing and difference revised and updated Eisenman's work. Whereas Eisenman had used Chomskian notions of grammar and syntax in his earlier accounts of form, now he would turn to the traces, undecidability, and binaries of *différance*.³⁴⁴ That geometric form he was so fond of before would now be read as a series of fragments that could be recombined and arranged in any number of non-meaningful compositions.³⁴⁵ The idea of pure, and deconstructed, fictions of writing was now the exemplar of architecture.

The implications are nearly self-evident. In the same way that Derrida's making-*cum*-writing questioned touch, ensconced repetition and variation, and preferenced multiplicity, Eisenman would envision a architecture-*cum*-writing that heralded a self-making surface that could evolve without the hand of a mark-making agent.³⁴⁶ From one angle, this turn towards writing was a turn inward. It has the appearance of what I have celebrated as interiority. It was a move that would place building within the text. But that text, that difference, is undeconstructable. You cannot get inside of it. In a strict ontological sense, it is always defined by some receding outside, as we outlined above. Architecture was not inside wiring but rather accompanied writing to the very unapproachable edge of reality. The *khora* and

344. Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, *Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997), 7.

345. Derrida and Eisenman, *Chora L Works*, 46.

346. Eisenman, *Void*, 87.

death that provision making dwell so low in the order of things that they are ultimately an exteriority. We cannot live in them. Thus, in typical fashion, in an effort to resolve the problems of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene, Eisenman turned architecture and making inside out. To avoid the presumptions and dangers of architecture's past, he went deep into the building to find the outside that perfected it and protected it from positivistic hegemony. This exteriorizing potentiality may have satisfied theoretical conditions but it had negative affective consequences for actual life. People have trouble living in Eisenman's buildings. People do not gather there except to marvel at it from the outside (even when inside). There is no tectonism that can grant a phenomenological positionality. there is no intragenerative making. Thus, his attempt to free architecture from positivism actually sealed it in an unreachable and transcendent purity.

5.3.2 Greg Lynn

Even with Derrida's meteoric rise and widespread significance, his ideas would fall out of favor with architects in the late 90s. This does not mean they were insignificant. They fell out of favor because they struggled to construct. Despite any proposal to the contrary, construction remained the ineluctable core of architecture. Derrida and writing were excellent at opening up possibilities and avenues of resistance but they also left the architectural imagination in a state of fragmentation.³⁴⁷ This era saw the work of Rem Koolhaas and others construct

³⁴⁷ Harry F. Mallgrave and David J. Goodman, *An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 161.

buildings that testified to the accidental relationships of city fragments. Derrida's fragmentary effect would give way to another titan of architectural theory, Gilles Deleuze—who we also mentioned earlier. Deleuze's ideas of potentiality, force, and repetition are still active in contemporary architectural theory.³⁴⁸ However, his influence has still not overcome the presence and basic dominance of writing and exteriority as the paradigm of making. Deleuzian models of architecture have digitized them.

Greg Lynn was a student of Peter Eisenman and would emerge as a chief proponent of Deleuze's ideas. One specific text had a unique influence on Lynn—Deleuze's *The Fold*.³⁴⁹ In this piece, Deleuze examines the baroque period and the work of Gottfried Leibniz. Instead of decrying the ostentation and superfluity of the Baroque, Deleuze sees it as a premier example of simulacra, difference, and repetition. Leibniz's monadology operationalized the multiplicity that Deleuze celebrated. The more monads, the more ornament. The more ornamentation, the more life, so to speak. Given Deleuze's monism, these ornamental and dressed monads were folds in the singular substance of the world. Each instance of change was an invaginated crease. The technical and complex beauties of life were folds upon folds without any direction or prescribed form. Therefore, the Baroque gestured towards a making and evolution that could proceed without determination or *telos*.

348. Helene Frichot, *Deleuze and Architecture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 4.

349. Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold* (London: A&C Black, 2006), 27.

Lynn took this materialist explanation to heart and cross-applied it to the technological affordances of architecture mentioned above. Since architecture could not plan or oversee civilized development, it could provide a way to grow life in an indirect and technologically advanced way. Lynn would use computing algorithms to build according to the principles of the fold. The computer would generate designs that unfolded according to certain given parameters.³⁵⁰ Lynn's approach can be read as an advancement of Eisenman. Whereas Eisenman's writing had yielded purely potential buildings, Lynn's were actual and appeared biomechanical.³⁵¹ This process of clicking a button and letting the computer fold freely was akin to planting a seed and letting the form guide itself autonomously. This autonomy was a consummation of Eisenman's pure outside. It put that pure outside inside the computationally generated folds. It had all of the markings of settling architecture's ongoing desire for an autonomous self-understanding. This Deleuzian model could be thoroughly real, unapologetically indeterminate, ecologically aware, and indifferent to any systematic hegemony.

Because Lynn's buildings inherited Eisenman's ambitions and assumptions, he also inherited the same problems that would beset triumphal proclamations. Namely, these buildings unfolded as blobs or extended horizontal creases. They were not livable. They still stood as beacons of a virtual outside however deeply inside of the code that generated them. Lynn had also not exactly left writing behind. His use of Deleuze converted deconstructed fragments of writing into the

350. Greg Lynn, *Folds, Bodies & Blobs: Collected Essays* (La lettre volée, 1998), 223.

351. Mallgrave, *Introduction to Theory*, 163.

modalities of a monistic form of writing—code. Writing’s exteriority and iterability became the black box of the algorithm. Code was the inevitable heir of writing. Drawing faded to the edges as the alphabetic algorithm accomplished all of the mark-making. Ecological surfaces were silently nested into the basic computational parameters. But the consequences of code were not only theoretical. The materials needed for these buildings strained the earth. The human labor that brought such buildings to life was routinely ignored. Thus, while presenting itself as the corrective to anthropocenic, capitalocenic, and historical architectural problems, Lynn’s model was on the verge of encoding them and locking them in.

One other development is worth noting. During this Deleuzean epoch, just as drawing would subside, the notion of the diagram would come into vogue. But the Deleuzean diagram is different than the Peircean one in critical respects. Peirce’s diagrams are flexuous and inscribed. They evolve and change according to redrawing, situatedness, and actuality. Deleuze’s diagrams are more akin to potencies or assemblages-in-waiting. They do not necessarily take place but provision the taking-place. This Deleuzean model of the diagram is predisposed to the work of Eisenman and Lynn. It is a potential empowerment rather than actual energy.³⁵² Recall that Peirce, on the other hand, took the diagram as iconic.³⁵³ It has some semblance of form. In this way, it is tectonic in the vein of Semper. The diagram is not simply the potency to assemble discrete parts or folds. It is the

352. Jakub Zdebik, *Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 165-170.

353. Frederik Stjernfelt, *Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 49.

capacity to grasp any material in its actual life, and in that grasping touch, inscribe new—and actual—material lives.

5.4 Tectonics of Light

Not every architectural trajectory followed this exteriorizing tendency, however. As we noted above, the different threads of architectural identity are largely defined by the kinds of questions they ask. If we look back to that same era of emerging anxiety about architectural identity we can revisit the work and questions of Louis Kahn. Kahn, the Estonian-born architect, is famous for mystical sayings and esoteric quips. His most well-known question is posed to a brick wherein he asks what that brick wants to be.³⁵⁴ This seemingly odd pan-psychic inquiry sets him apart from the exteriorizing inclinations of his contemporaries and their descendants. That is because it evinces his central posture: listening. This posture helped him withstand the modernist transvaluation. His willingness to listen to materials and their desires confirms that Kahn was thoroughly tectonic and thoroughly interior. Though he never explicitly advocated for tectonism or anthropological architecture, his distinctively humane and materialist approach places him within their legacy.

Louis Kahn designed and executed buildings from the 1930s up through the 1960s and stands as a foil to the linguistic turn of Eisenman and Lynn. Kahn's work not only predates their own but stands outside most architectural and categorical groupings. This is not to say Kahn was wholly different but that his pathway to

354. Louis I. Kahn, *Louis Kahn: Essential Texts* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 271.

architectural prominence did not follow the standard path of his contemporaries.³⁵⁵ His first decade of building was collaborative and never evinced his complete style or perspective. Afterward, he became an instructor and drifted from commissioned work. In his 50s, the door to construction reopened to him. He was commissioned to build a medical research facility that would inaugurate his own distinctive philosophical vision. As a result of this late-blooming, his concepts of structure, form, and order had matured and eluded fanciful influences. Again, this is not to suggest that he was anomalous and independent. Rather, it is to say he knew how to wield and synthesize influences with his own developed vision of architecture.

Kahn's ideas are distinctively tectonic in their material emphasis and evocation of kinship. His work is historically positioned against the background of the Beaux-Arts tradition and Brutalism. These two comprise his first tectonic synthesis. On the one hand, he drew on the classical works of Greece and Rome, and on the other hand, he pulled from modern building techniques and materials (including concrete). Kahn's famous works like the Kimball Art Museum, the Salk Institute, the Phillips Exeter Library, and others might appear as quintessentially modern to the untrained eye. They are geometric. They are simple in ornamentation. But they are nevertheless set apart by their subtle consideration of materials, material propensities, and material tectonic connections. Kahn was highly interested in the desires and feelings of materials in themselves.³⁵⁶ He wanted to give room for the bricks or concrete to express their own intentions. This spiritual deference was

355. Wendy Lesser, *You Say to Brick: The Life of Louis Kahn* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017), 313.

356. Louis I. Kahn, Dung Ngo, and Peter C. Papademetriou, *Louis Kahn: Conversations with Students* (Princeton: Architectural Press, 1998), 86-88.

maintained in his buildings. Though apparently plain, he constructed the buildings such that the materials who gave themselves to it, could have a hand in forming its expression. He wanted continuity between the making of the building and its making of space and room.³⁵⁷ This is his critical tectonic juncture. A simple way to illustrate this would be the way he integrated mechanical and electrical elements into the design features of a ceiling. Or, in the case of the Kimball Museum, its vaulted corridors have gaps in their construction that let light peer through. In both instances, the visitor can witness the former construction of the building. They can encounter its memory and be a part of its future. Much like Semper, Kahn's approach to design and even dwelling was one of interaction with materials. Furthermore, he wanted to honor their interactions with each other.

Kahn's tectonism exceeds his predecessors in one crucial respect: light.³⁵⁸ In the former models of Semper et al, the elements of architecture are joined around a human activity and fire. For Kahn, this fire had evolved. But this was not out of step with his predecessors. Recall that Semper had described the spiritual mutation of woven tapestries into the "white" painting of Greek walls or monuments. He went on to describe further transformation in the exteriorization of that weaving in the scene of Greek drama. Kahn's own focus on light can be read as an elaboration on that primordial architectural fire. Importantly, this light afforded what both fire and weaving did. Namely, connection and kinship. His heavy and geometric buildings were built to accentuate the movement of light.³⁵⁹ As the walls protruded,

357. Kahn, *Essential Texts*, 252-254.

358. Kahn, 236.

359. Kahn, 275.

overlapped, or even receded, they would shift light and its shadows. In an almost phenomenological way, He considered light to be presencing in itself. It bestowed action and engagement upon anyone who would move through his building. Light allowed people to gather, for someone to converse with a book, or for a student to touch and connect with a laboratory sample. Light belonged to the inhabitant but it also tectonically joined them to the life of the building. The light revealed the past of the building in its mechanical syntheses. The light created domains for congregating, pathways for progression, and shadows for listening.

Kahn's buildings were actualities upon actualities rather than folds upon folds. This is confirmed by the fact that some of his buildings had nearly 900 sketches in their past.³⁶⁰ Each drawing was itself an actual instance or moment in the life of the building. Drawing illustrated the rhythm of its growth. Kahn was a consummate drawer. For him, drawing was access to light and presencing. No drawing was a strict parallel to the final building. Instead, drawings were flexuous perceptions that allowed him to touch and feel the desires of the building materials. Kahn's famous quip— "you say to brick"— returns here in drawing. It could be read as a gesture toward Deleuzean diagrammatics wherein the brick can be topologically converted into anything. But if conceived alongside his drawings and buildings, as a "drawing near," it is a gesture toward the actuality of the material. It is as if to say, in the spirit of Henry, what is it like to be you? In some manner, all drawing is that

360. Michael Merrill, *Louis Kahn: The Importance of Drawing* (Zurich: Lars Muller Publishers, 2020); Michael Merrill, *Louis Kahn: Drawing to Find Out : the Dominican Motherhouse and the Patient Search for Architecture* (Zurich: Lars Muller Publishers, 2010).

question. And, for Kahn, whatever answer the material would give should reverberate in the building throughout its lifetime.

5.5 Regional Tectonics

Kahn stands out as an example of how to work within modern conditions without embracing modern assumptions. But, in large part, his resistance is the result of his age and position in time. Our final architectural specimen is able to resist the exteriorizing trends of modernity and post-structuralism directly within the belly of the beast. Kenneth Frampton, an English architect who has spent most of his career in the United States, began his own work in the company of Peter Eisenman, Manfredo Tafuri, and Rem Koolhaas. He began in the very circles that would produce writing and exteriority as a measure of architectural autonomy. Nevertheless, he would not end up there. In the 80s, in a journal he co-founded, *Oppositions*, Frampton wrote an essay about the causes of architecture's fragile self-understanding. His position in this essay would set his architectural thinking on a phenomenological path.

In the essay, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an architecture of Resistance," Frampton argues that architecture's recurring identity crises have been proportionate to its inability to fully respond to industrialization. Each attempt—whether critical theory, structuralism, deconstruction, or future isms—did not reconcile with the fact that industrialization had shifted architecture's attention

away from its ineluctable core: building.³⁶¹ Highly influenced by Heidegger's famous work, Frampton was convinced that building had been submerged in the labor of construction and its technologies.³⁶² In some sense, Frampton's proposal in this essay was to extract architecture from its constant redefining; to liberate it from a perpetual crisis of identity. He would reposition it in its proper role in the phenomenological building of life. The existence of architecture, he thought, was ethically necessary as a common experiential foundation for the individual development of fully human lives.³⁶³ Building enables the kind of lives capable of experiencing a shared social reality. The trouble for architecture as a discipline was that in the age of industrialization and globalization, it had become impossible to elevate building above mere labor. What this required, then was a critical regionalism that returned the craft of making to places where topography, climate, and culture conditioned building.³⁶⁴ Only this could avoid the allure of universal absences and theories of exteriority that continued to seduce architecture.

Frampton's posture in this essay was guided by his budding association with a theoretical counter-movement within the late stages of 20th-century architectural thought. That counter-position was phenomenology. The fragmentary remainders of Derrida and the programmatic resolutions of Deleuze left many architects wondering what had happened to the life and bodies of architecture's inhabitants.

361. Kenneth Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," in *The Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend: New Press, 2002), 17.

362. Frampton, 26.

363. Frampton, 21.

364. Frampton, 27.

This prompted a return to the sensorial and bodily in an embrace of phenomenology.³⁶⁵ Given our extensive discussion above, this does not need much elaboration. It is noteworthy, however, that the phenomenology within architectural discourse has been largely guided by the Merleau-Pontian variety.

Phenomenological voices like Juhani Pullasmaa, Steven Holl, Peter Zumthor, and others have focused on the flesh, chiasmic integration, and perceptive embodiment. This trend is not problematic in its own right. I simply add it here to show that, as of yet, very few architectural theorists have engaged the kind of phenomenological interiority I posited in the previous chapter. We will return to this point after a brief examination of Frampton's materialist phenomenological advocacy. Frampton's "Critical Regionalism" essay was diagnostic. As his work progressed, and as his phenomenological affiliations deepened, his prescriptive recommendations came under the aegis of tectonics. No other modern architectural voice has positioned the issue so directly as has Frampton. He would go on to publish a monumental work called *Studies in Tectonic Culture* wherein he would excavate the history of the idea.³⁶⁶ His book accentuates the importance of tectonics role in realigning architecture with the material world and revivifying its sense of purpose.

In the book, Frampton starts by redirecting the architectural imagination away from the issues of space and scenes. He points attention back to the constructive framework. Therein we find architecture's spine: tectonics. He offers an updated

365. Mallgrave, *Introduction to Theory*, 97.

366. Kenneth Frampton, *Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), ch. 1.

and simplified definition of tectonics as simply “the art of joining.”³⁶⁷ In a word, Frampton encourages architecture to find its poetic sensibility. architecture need not distract itself with stylistic contests and futile searches for exterior validation. It only needs to concern itself with earthwork and framework.³⁶⁸ In other words, land and making. The latter of which is ultimately a tectonic art. Throughout the book, earthwork and framework operate reciprocally to define the architectural practice. They suggest that building is always somewhere (earthwork) and something (framework). Frampton sees this as an updating of Semper’s fourfold into a basic twofold. This two is irreducible in the tectonic practice. Despite adjusting Semper, Frampton shares his conclusion that tectonic interaction with earthwork is always a kind of listening and sensing of the earth’s propensities towards a particular structuration. Like Kahn before him, Frampton advocates a tectonic culture that is familiar with the distinctions and usefulness of materials without reducing their construction to some preconceived imposition. In Ingold’s terms, tectonics is intragenerative.

As I noted, no architectural thinker has fully engaged the ontological interiority as outlined by Michel Henry. Objectors may claim that some phenomenological allusions to neuroscience accomplish this. But, as we laid out in the previous chapter, mental internalization is not the radical interiority of Henry. It is instead another exteriority. It is not entirely necessary that architecture take up Henry’s mantle. However, if it did, architecture could complete a return to the

367. Frampton, 4.

368. Frampton, 5.

anthropological and expand its influence in vernacular making and living. That is, by rethinking the life that is always tectonic, architecture (as first joining) becomes the purview of all that actually live, feel, and move. Furthermore, a fully interior life opens diagrammatics. Drawing, sketching, and modeling become mechanisms for kinship, shared life, and continued making. finally, by rethinking tectonics under Henry's frame of interior life and affectivity, architecture roots in habitation would dilate further. Habit, read as repetition and flexuous variation, is itself a dwelling place for life. It always underwrites habitus and habitat. Therefore, basic everyday life would be perpetually and inescapably architectural. The summative point is that architecture might not only reduce itself from identity dysfunction but could also expand its scope of influence. This could help humans address the problems of the Anthropocene with pervasive and accessible tools—theoretical and pragmatic. An architectural affectivity that avoided the pitfalls of exteriority, I submit, would radically impact the Capitalocene and Anthropocene by returning us to life on the surface.

5.6 Tectonics Contra Technique

This case study represents the culminating moment of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING jigsaw matching methodology. Throughout the preceding chapters, we established three structural elements within making. We discovered three ontological motifs that directed those elements. We observed the theoretical differences between writing and drawing with respect to those motifs and elements. We highlighted the critical ontological predilection towards exteriority in writing.

We then proposed a return to interiority as a basis for recovering a viable exteriority. All of these steps were on full display here in the case study. architecture is not only comprised of surface, agency, and markings, its shape and history are guided by its attitude toward number, touch, and repetition. We have seen that this shape is vulnerable to the same exteriorizing trends that have affected a phenomenology of making.

Altogether, what architecture gives our study, is a single word to comprise the **elements**, the motifs, and the theories of making. Namely, tectonics. It helps us see that in anthropological, phenomenological, and common perspectives, architecture is, above all, always a first joining. What began technicity now has its fullest expression in *tehton*. The basis of making lies in connecting rather than in tooling, skill, or training. Tectonics helps us describe our social behaviors in the terms of geological behaviors. In the same way that tectonic plates shift, we collide, construct, and connect. Regardless of how we shift, tectonics confirms that kinship is always about touching. Finally, tectonics helps us see that drawing is never merely an operation or concept but is always a joining (and separating).

Therefore, we have a testable and fundamental novel theory of making. Making is comprised of surface, agents, and markings. Making is moved along by touch, repetition, and number. Making has an ontology of interior life and self-affectation. We can affirm the conclusion that drawing is the best means of operationalizing making and its constituent parts because it is material, habitual, and tectonic.

AFTERWORD

The Next Questions

Here at the end, we arrive at the same questions we started with. We have been circling them throughout the study. What is doing? What is mattering? What is making a living? But, as T.S. Eliot said, we come to them as if for the first time with new eyes. In many ways, we come to them with answers. We do, we make, and we matter because this has been the bedrock of human living since our beginning. We stand, we perceive, and we move according to making. These claims all address the question of *why* we make. But they also gesture towards the issue of *who* makes. In short, the answer is all of us. Whether academic, corporate head, or daily line worker, everyone bears this task. And, as we have seen, when the responsibility or opportunity to make is lopsided, living is threatened. We all make to live and we must all live with what we have made. We know more than just what making is and who does it. We have also outlined *what* making is. It is living. Living is interiority, affectivity, and actuality. We have sketched making's figurative proportions in surfaces, agents, and markings. We have shaded in its dimensions with ontological motifs. Beyond knowing *what* living is, we have also drafted a blueprint for *how* to

do it. We need something material, something habitual, and something tectonic. This is drawing. Now, we are faced with *when* and *where* to draw. These are the next questions and we can diagram them briefly.

First, where will we make? This is not just a geospatial question. It is not strictly a topographical question either. This issue of where draws our attention to those intragenerative surfaces we sketched out above. To restate the question with that in mind: where are the surfaces of our making? Formerly, they were grass, field, and fabric. In our more recent past, the surfaces of making were stone, iron, or refined metals. But as architecture has shown, our surfaces now are glass, plasma, copper wiring, and—ultimately—light. The materials we work with now are coordinated in computational, intelligent, or digital machines. It is incumbent upon us all, then, to discern how our elements (surfaces, et al.) and motifs (touch, et al.) operate at these surfaces. We should also remember that any adjustment to surfaces is simultaneously an adjustment to the entire constellation or network of pieces that comprise making. For example, if we shift from the surfaces of rebar and concrete to glass and flickering light then agency and marks change too. We would then need to reconsider the motifs and whether these new materials preference writing or drawing.

The most natural lens for this sort of examination would be new media studies. New Media would come with some obstacles. The first thing we need to address is the centrality of writing within the field. Even with its emphasis on imaging, there may be an exteriorizing ontology that runs in the background. This is evident in foundational texts like Barthes' *Camera Lucida*. We would need to discover or

craft a new ontology of drawing specifically directed at new media. For example, we could position our work in relation to Vilem Flusser insofar as he rethinks media from the starting point of lines and surfaces. We could locate a non-writing apparatus for making in the work of scholars like Deborah Levitt. We could revisit Architecture and its post-digital drawing resurgence. But given my advocacy for the anthropological shape of making, we may want to base our engagement with new media precisely in the ground. Namely, in media ecology. Jussi Parriika and others have spent their careers showing readers the material backside of new media. There is a series of unseen wires, mounds of electronic waste, and costly energy resourcing behind every digital ethnographic proposal. Thus, it behooves a drawn theory of making to understand how drawing on light and glass relates to the ground—either benevolently or malevolently. Lastly, other scholars could help provide ontological depth to digital or computational making. Beyond the obvious use of Gilbert Simondon, scholars like Sean Cubitt focus our ontological interests on light. A concentrated ontology of light would place drawing in a fecund relation to the ground (as electricity), to humanity (as vision), and to making (as creative software).

This is only one itinerary for answering the question of where we make. The ontological issue must engage the ever-developing field of speculative realism. Most know this field by its subsection of Object-Oriented Ontology. No other philosophical movement addresses the issue of thingness—or in our terms material, surface, etc—more openly. What is more, OOO and SR both see themselves as a corrective to the very phenomenologies we leveraged above. OOO

and SR also explicitly critique the term correspondence and consider objects to be fundamentally exterior and incommensurate. thinkers like Timothy Morton extrapolate this exterior in way that complies with our discussion above. His hyperobjects are edgeless containers that bear the aura of Deleuzian immanence. They also invite cross-comparison with Peirce's hypoicons—which is the genus of the diagram. These brief indicators suggest that the field is primed for and Henry-driven advocacy and engagement.

Going forward, we are also faced with when will we make? Or better, when we should. Whilst where pointed us towards the digital and geological, the issue of when points our theories back to the political and ethical. If we are going to resist the political mechanisms that restrain drawing, they must be configured as an act of making. We would want to look back to voices like Vaclav Havel who align poetics with politics. Adopting any modern political theorist based on visibility alone could undermine our progress if their work were not filtered through the ontological scrutiny we applied to exteriority and interiority. For example, engaging Bratton's *The Stack* would help position our theory of making with the political authority of a planetary computational mechanism. Yet, in so doing, we would need to constantly recalibrate the interiority of the stack with the interiority of life. This would be critical to knowing whether agents actually make or whether they are absorbed.

In all, the question of where and when is another way of situating making cum drawing within the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene. Together, where and when—and their climate and class backdrops—pivot around a heretofore unnamed issue. It is an issue that any future theory of making must wrestle with. Namely,

power. Whether the word refers to access or to electricity, making needs some kind of force, movement, or enlivenment. This was intimated in Henry's account of barbarism. But as it appears in space in time, it is configured as power. Access to making could mean the redistribution of wealth to the disenfranchised. Access to power could mean the extension of an electrical or telecommunication grid to remote villages. Empowerment could refer to any number of scenarios but one condition seems inevitable: power depends on fuel and maintenance. What if the climate crises, itself caused by the need for power, converges on the electrical grid and heat corrupts the wiring infrastructure? How will we make our videos? And of course, power is not physical but is social. What happens to access and power if the electrical banking network suffers a hack or a dysfunction? Are we making money for someone else? How will we redistribute power and wealth then? In addition, power is not only economic but it is a resistance force. How will we grant ethnographic voice to those who are illiterate or are estranged from the internet? What does making look like when pollution floods our streets and backyards? These potential hazards are summarized as a simple problem: what do we do—how do we make—if the power goes out? Any power—social, economic, or electrical. We have done it before. We need to think about how to do it again.

So, let's get back to the drawing board.

REFERENCES

- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- . "Vocation and Voice." *Critical Inquiry* 40, no. 2 (2014), 492-501.
- doi:10.1086/674125.
- Alberti, Leon B. *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
- Alexander, Christopher. *A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- . *Notes on the Synthesis of Form*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Altwater, Elmar, Eileen C. Crist, Donna J. Haraway, Andreas Malm, Daniel Hartley, and Christian Parenti. *Anthropocene Or Capitalocene?: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism*. Oakland: PM Press, 2016.
- Aristotle. *Poetics*. London: Penguin, 1997.
- Badiou, Alain. *Deleuze: the Clamor of Being*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Baer, Hans A. "Anthropology and Climate Change: From Encounters to Actions." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 20, no. 3 (2009), 396-398.
doi:10.1111/j.1757-6547.2009.00055.x.
- Bergson, Henri. *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*. North Chelmsford: Courier Corporation, 2012.
- Biran, Maine D. *Maine de Biran's 'Of Immediate Apperception'*. Translated by Mark Sinclair. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.
- . *The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking*. Santa Monica: Praeger, 1970.
- Blanchot, Maurice. *The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire"*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.

- . *The Unavowable Community*. Barrytown/ Station Hill Press, 2006.
- . *The Writing of the Disaster*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Brentano, Franz. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Cache, Bernard. "Digital Semper." In *Rethinking Architectural Technology*, edited by William W. Braham and Jonathan A. Hale. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Carlisle, Clare. *Of Habit*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Carlisle, Clare, and Catherine Malabou. "Addiction and Grace." In *Of Habit*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Carmo, Mario. *The Alphabet and the Algorithm*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011.
- . *The Digital Turn in Architecture 1992 - 2012*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
- . *The Second Digital Turn: Design Beyond Intelligence*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017.
- . *The Working Drawing: The Architect's Tool*. Zürich: Park Book, 2013.
- Casey, Edward S. *The World on Edge*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017.
- Crate, Susan A., and Mark Nuttall. "Introduction: Anthropology and Climate Change." In *Anthropology and Climate Change: From Encounters to Actions*, edited by Susan A. Crate and Mark Nuttall. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Crowell, Steven. *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Crutzen, Paul J. "Geology of mankind." *Nature* 415, no. 6867 (2002), 23-23. doi:10.1038/415023a.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

———. *Foucault*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.

———. *Francis Bacon*. London: A&C Black, 2005.

———. *Logic of Sense*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004.

———. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

———. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. City Lights Books, 1988.

———. *The Fold*. London: A&C Black, 2006.

———. *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton. London: A&C Black, 2004.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Rosalind Krauss. "Plato and the Simulacrum." *October* 27 (1983), 45. doi:10.2307/778495.

Derrida, Jacques. *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.

———. *Limited Inc.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977.

———. *Memoirs of the Blind: the Self-portrait and Other Ruins*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

———. *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore: JHU Press, 2016.

———. *On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2005.

———. *On the Name*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1995.

- . *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- . *The Animal that Therefore I Am*. Perspectives in Continental Ph, 2008.
- . *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- . *Writing and Difference*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021.
- . "Plato's Pharmacy." *In Dissemination*. London: A&C Black, 2004.
- Derrida, Jacques, and Peter Eisenman. *Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman*. New York: Monacelli Press, 1997.
- Derrida, Jacques, Bernd Magnus, and Stephen Cullenberg. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Dubois, Anna, and Lars-Erik Gadde. "Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research." *Journal of Business Research* 55, no. 7 (2002), 553-560. doi:10.1016/s0148-2963(00)00195-8.
- Eisenman, Peter. *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture*. Lars Müller Publishers, 2006.
- . *Written Into the Void: Selected Writings, 1990-2004*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
- . *Inside Out: Selected Writings, 1963-1988*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Enfield, N J. "Distribution of Agency." In *Distributed Agency*, edited by N J Enfield and Paul Kockelman, 9-14. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Ferraris, Maurizio. *Documentality: Why it is Necessary to Leave Traces*. Commonalities, 2013.
- Pirkei Avot: Chapters of the Fathers*. Berlin: The Floating Press, 2014.

- Frampton, Kenneth. *Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
- . "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance." In *The Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, edited by Hal Foster. Port Townsend: New Press, 2002.
- Frichot, Helene. *Deleuze and Architecture*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
- Gane, Mike J. *Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Gibson, James J. *The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception*. London: Psychology Press, 2013.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. "Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the Flesh." *Thesis Eleven* 36, no. 1 (1993), 37-59. doi:10.1177/072551369303600103.
- Hallam, Elizabeth, and Tim Ingold. *Making and Growing: Anthropological Studies of Organisms and Artefacts*. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Hallward, Peter. *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*. Brooklyn: Verso, 2006.
- Haraway, Donna, Noboru Ishikawa, Scott F. Gilbert, Kenneth Olwig, Anna L. Tsing, and Nils Bubandt. "Anthropologists Are Talking – About the Anthropocene." *Ethnos* 81, no. 3 (2015), 535-564. doi:10.1080/00141844.2015.1105838.
- Haraway, Donna J. *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Harman, Graham. *Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything*. London: Penguin UK, 2018.
- . *Speculative Realism: An Introduction*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2018.
- Hartimo, Mirja. "Mathematical roots of phenomenology: Husserl and the concept of number." *History and Philosophy of Logic* 27, no. 4 (2006), 319-337. doi:10.1080/01445340600619663.
- Hegel, Georg W. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- . *Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1977.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2010.
- . *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- . "Building, Dwelling, Thinking." In *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 141-160. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.
- . "The Origin of the Work of Art." In *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 15-86. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.
- Held, David. *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
- Henry, Michel. *Barbarism*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.
- . *I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- . *Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality* (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.
- . *Material Phenomenology*. Perspectives in Continental Ph, 2008.
- . *Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2009.
- . *The Essence of Manifestation*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
- . *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Holloway, Travis. *How to Live at the End of the World: Theory, Art, and Politics for the Anthropocene*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2022.
- Husserl, Edmund. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

- . *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2011.
- . *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 1989.
- . *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- . *Logical Investigations* Volume 1. London: Routledge, 2012.
- . *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- . "On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analysis." *Philosophia Mathematica* s1-10, no. 1 (1973), 37-87. doi:10.1093/phimat/s1-10.1.37.
- Ingold, Tim. *Anthropology and/as Education*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- . *Correspondences*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2020.
- . *Lines: A Brief History*. London: Routledge, 2016.
- . *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- . *The Life of Lines*. London: Routledge, 2015.
- . *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*. London: Psychology Press, 2000.
- . "Walking the Plank: Meditations on a Process of Skill." In *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description*, 51-62. Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2011.

- . "Anthropology is Not Ethnography." *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Volume 154, 2007 Lectures, 2008. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197264355.003.0003.
- . "Materials against materiality." *Archaeological Dialogues* 14, no. 1 (2007), 1-16. doi:10.1017/s1380203807002127.
- . "Walking the Plank: Meditations on a Process of Skill." *Defining Technological Literacy*, 2006, 65-80. doi:10.1057/9781403983053_6.
- Irigaray, Luce. *This Sex which is Not One*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.
- . *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2017.
- . *To Be Two*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- Jasper, Adam. *Architecture and Anthropology*. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Jobst, Marko, and Hélène Frichot. *Architectural Affects after Deleuze and Guattari*. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Kahn, Louis I. *Louis Kahn: Essential Texts*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.
- Kahn, Louis I., Dung Ngo, and Peter C. Papademetriou. *Louis Kahn: Conversations with Students*. Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.
- Kierkegaard, Soren. *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*. London: Penguin UK, 2004.
- Latour, Bruno. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- . "Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together." In *The Map Reader: Theories of Mapping Practice and Cartographic Representation*, edited by Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins, 65-72. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
- . "Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene: A Personal View of What Is to Be Studied." *The Anthropology of Sustainability*, 2017, 35-49. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56636-2_2.

- , and Steve Woolgar. *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Lawlor, Leonard. *Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
- Leroi-Gourhan, André. *Gesture and Speech*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
- Lesser, Wendy. *You Say to Brick: The Life of Louis Kahn*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude. "The Structural Study of Myth." *The Journal of American Folklore* 68, no. 270 (1955), 428. doi:10.2307/536768.
- Lucas, Ray. *Anthropology for Architects: Social Relations and the Built Environment*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.
- Lynn, Greg. *Animate Form*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business, 1999.
- Lynn, Greg. *Folds, Bodies & Blobs: Collected Essays*. La lettre volée, 1998.
- Magri, Elisa, and Paddy McQueen. *Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity, 2022.
- Malabou, Catherine. *Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- . *What Should We Do with Our Brain?*. New York City: Fordham University Press, 2009.
- Mallgrave, Harry F. *Gottfried Semper: Architect of the Nineteenth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
- . *Modern Architectural Theory: A Historical Survey, 1673–1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Mallgrave, Harry F., and David J. Goodman. *An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
- Mallgrave, Harry F., Alina Payne, Caroline V. Eck, Sigrid D. Jong, Martin Bressani, Christina Contandriopoulos, David Leatherbarrow, and Alexander

- Eisenschmidt. *Companions to the History of Architecture*, 4 Volume Set. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.
- Marcel, Gabriel. *The Philosophy of Existentialism*. Citadel Press, 2002.
- Marder, Michael. *Phenomena-Critique-Logos: The Project of Critical Phenomenology*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014.
- Marx, Karl. *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy Of Right'*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. "Theses on Feuerbach." In *The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to The Critique of Political Economy*. Amherst: Prometheus, 1998.
- Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Mauss, Marcel. *A General Theory of Magic*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- . *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- . "Techniques of the Body." In *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, edited by Nathan Schlanger, 77-96. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006.
- Mauss, Marcel, and Emile Durkheim. "Notes on the concept of Civilization." In *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, edited by Nathan Schlanger, 35-40. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006.
- Mcauliffe. "How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation?" *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 51, no. 3 (2015), 300. doi:10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.51.3.300.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Psychology Press, 2002.
- . *The Structure of Behavior*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1983.
- . *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

- . "Eye and Mind." In *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, 351-378. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
- . "Man and Adversity." In *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, 189-240. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
- . "The Relations of the Soul and the Body and the Problem of Perceptual Consciousness." In *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, 5-40. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
- Merrill, Michael. *Louis Kahn: Drawing to Find Out: the Dominican Motherhouse and the Patient Search for Architecture*. Zurich: Lars Muller Publishers, 2010.
- . *Louis Kahn: The Importance of Drawing*. Zurich: Lars Muller Publishers, 2020.
- Moore, Jason W. "The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 44, no. 3 (2017), 594-630. doi:10.1080/03066150.2016.1235036.
- Moore, Jerry D. "Alfred Kroeber: Configurations of Culture." In *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*. Lanham: Rowman Altamira, 2012.
- . "Phillippe Descola: Nature and Culture." In *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*, 326-339. Lanham: Rowman Altamira, 2004.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Being Singular Plural*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- . *Noli Me Tangere: On the Raising of the Body*. New York City: Fordham University Press, 2009.
- . *The Birth to Presence*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- . *The Pleasure in Drawing*. New York City: Fordham University Press, 2013.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc, and Katherine Lydon. "Exscription." *Yale French Studies*, no. 78 (1990), 47. doi:10.2307/2930115.

- Nietzsche, Friedrich W. *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*. Translated by Walter Kauffman. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- Olkowski, Dorothea E. *Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021.
- Ovid. *Metamorphoses*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Peirce, Charles S. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931.
- . *The Essential Peirce, Volume 1: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867–1893)*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- . "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction (Lecture VII of the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism)." In *Essential Peirce v. 2*, 226–241. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998.
- Philipsen, Kristian. "Theory Building: Using Abductive Search Strategies." In *Collaborative Research Design*, edited by P. Freytag and L. Young, 45–71. Singapore: Singer, 2017.
- Ravaisson, Felix. "Of Habit." In *Félix Ravaisson: Selected Essays*, edited by Mark Sinclair. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.
- . "On the Teaching of Drawing." In *Félix Ravaisson: Selected Essays*, edited by Mark Sinclair. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.
- Royle, Nicholas, and Jacques Derrida. "Et Cetera." In *Deconstructions: A User's Guide*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.
- Ruskin, John. *The Works of John Ruskin*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Sahlins, Marshall. *What Kinship Is-And Is Not*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
- Sauvagnargues, Anne. *Deleuze and Art*. London: A&C Black, 2013.

- Sayre, Nathan F. "The Politics of the Anthropogenic." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41, no. 1 (2012), 57-70. doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-092611-145846.
- Scheer, David R. *The Death of Drawing: Architecture in the Age of Simulation*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Schneider, David M. *American Kinship: A Cultural Account*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.
- Schrift, Alan D., and Claire Colbrook. "The linguistic turn in continental philosophy." In *The History of Continental Philosophy*, 2125-2156. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
- Semper, Gottfried. *Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts, Or, Practical Aesthetics*. Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2004.
- . *The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Serres, Michel. *Hominescence*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.
- . *The Incandescent*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018.
- . "The science of relations an interview." *Angelaki* 8, no. 2 (2003), 227-238. doi:10.1080/0969725032000162675.
- Spuybroek, Lars. *Textile Tectonics*. Rotterdam: Nai Publishers, 2011.
- Stein, Edith. *On the Problem of Empathy*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2013.
- Stiegler, Bernard. *Acting Out*. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 2009.
- . *Technics and Time, 1: The fault of Epimetheus*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2010.

- . *The Neganthropocene*. Translated by Daniel Ross. London: Open Humanities Press, 2020.
- Stjernfelt, Frederik. *Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007.
- Stoller, Silvia. "Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 17, no. 5 (2009), 707-737. doi:10.1080/09672550903301762.
- Stott, Timothy. *Buckminster Fuller's World Game and Its Legacy*. London: Routledge, 2021.
- Tweed, Thomas A. *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Vattimo, Gianni. "Dialectics, difference, Weak Thought." In *Weak Thought*, edited by Gianni Vattimo, translated by Pier A. Rovatti, 39-52. Albany: SUNY Press, 2012.
- Vico, Giambattista. *New Science*. London: Penguin UK, 1999.
- Vitruvius. *Ten Books on Architecture*. Edited by Thomas N. Howe and Ingrid Rowland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Wambacq, Judith. *Thinking between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018.
- Weiss, Gail, Gayle Salamon, and Ann V. Murphy. *50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019.
- Zalasiewicz, Jan, Colin N. Waters, Erle C. Ellis, Martin J. Head, Davor Vidas, Will Steffen, Julia A. Thomas, et al. "The Anthropocene: Comparing Its Meaning in Geology (Chronostratigraphy) with Conceptual Approaches Arising in Other Disciplines." *Earth's Future* 9, no. 3 (2021). doi:10.1029/2020ef001896.
- Zdebik, Jakub. *Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.