

8-2016

Erasing Race? An Exploratory Study of Correlates of Color-Blind Racism

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ERASING RACE? AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CORRELATES
OF COLOR-BLIND RACISM

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Applied Sociology

by
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August 2016

Accepted by:
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ABSTRACT

Color-blindness is a sociological term that refers to a state in which race is neither “seen” nor relevant. That is, there is the assumption that all are equal, and race does not matter. Adherents of the color-blind ideology contend that in order to improve race relations, racial and ethnic differences should be ignored and, further, should not even be discussed. This study investigated the following research questions: Does adherence to the color-blind ideology differ by race? What is the relationship between racial self-awareness and opposition to the color-blind ideology? Do geographic region, attitudes toward segregation, and political ideology mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology? Using data from both waves of the Portraits of American Life Study this study observed the changing attitudes to the color-blind ideology from Wave I in 2006 to Wave II in 2012, while only including respondents who participated in both waves.

The current study found that racial identity mediated the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology. Geographic region, political ideology and attitudes toward legal segregation strengthened the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology. There was a clear racial difference in response to the color-blind ideology. Blacks and Hispanics were much more likely than whites to oppose the idea that one of the most effective ways of dealing with race relations is to stop talking about race. This suggests that contemporary American society is in no way “post-racial,” and that political and social movements occurring between 2006 and 2012 have in no way erased the relevance of race.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Brenda Vander Mey, for her constant support throughout the completion of this thesis, and for her guidance throughout my graduate career and professional development. I am fortunate that she has been able to share her knowledge with me over the past two years. Her instruction was critical in the completion of this thesis, and I sincerely thank her for her continued patience and encouragement.

I am grateful for the support of my committee member, Dr. Ye Luo. I want to thank Dr. Luo for her patience and guidance, not only for this thesis but throughout my coursework as well. I am thankful to have had the opportunity to learn more from her about research methods and the complexities of SPSS. I would also like to thank my other committee member, Dr. Catherine Mobley, who has assisted me throughout this endeavor and has prepared me for entering the workforce as an applied sociologist.

My sincere thanks also go to my graduate coordinator, Dr. William Haller, who has consistently been a source of insight regarding sociological research. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Stephanie Southworth and Dr. Andrew Whitehead, who were always willing to lend a helping hand.

I would like to recognize my family and my fiancé, Bethany, for their continued support during my time at Clemson. Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and fellow graduate students, Tamara Dobson, Rachel Hanson, Amy Liu, Alicia Scalia, and Alison Sheets for keeping me sane in the shared excursion that is graduate school.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The color-blind ideology assumes that race no longer matters. Racism has been eliminated or else minimized to the point that it no longer is an important or salient factor in social structure, social life, and social relations today (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000). That is, there is the assumption that all are equal, and race does not matter. Further, it is asserted that in order to improve race relations, racial and ethnic differences should be ignored (Bonilla-Silva 2001). It is assumed that removing the idea of race altogether will help create a more inclusive society, one in which a race-based stratification no longer exists. Fundamentally, adherents of the color-blind ideology contend that talking about race is actually the problem; racism is not the problem. It is argued that ignoring and obliterating the idea of race altogether will make it possible to create a more inclusive, fair and just society, and for some, a more civil and inclusive world in which achievement trumps ascription. From this perspective, the world now is “post-racial.” Previous findings have shown that the color-blind ideology exists and is part of contemporary systemic racism, or what is characterized as the “new racism” (Feagin and Vera 1995; Bonilla-Silva 2001).

The color-blind ideology supports the idea of a “level playing field” for all ethnic groups. Others argue that the color-blind ideology also could be classified as racism evasiveness (Beeman 2015), or an attempt to hide concealed racist beliefs (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Hastie and Rimmington 2014). This is another feature of the “new” or liberal racism that is more difficult to detect. The color-blind ideology, as a feature of this

“new” form of racism, makes an assumption that structural racism does not exist, and that white supremacy is really a function of cultural inferiority (or the deficiency) of blacks (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Bonilla-Silva 2001).

The general premise of the color-blind ideology is that racism is perpetuated by discussions of race, and that by not discussing race it will no longer be real (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000). Furthermore, this idea has been associated with equality despite its potential for ignoring discrimination and structural inequality. This also can lead to arguments regarding the racial inequality gap, or whether policy interventions such as affirmative action are necessary. Those who believe that policy interventions based on race are not necessary hold that racially based discrimination is not the cause of the original inequalities; rather, the inequalities can be attributed to naturally occurring phenomena (Bonilla-Silva 2012). This further complicates the racial discourse in the United States due to different perceptions on the presence of systemic racism.

Racism in the United States continues to be a structural social problem. There are some United States citizens who nonetheless hold that racism at the structural level no longer is a social problem. To understand race relations in the United States, it is important to understand the differences between blatant or traditional types of racism in comparison to a newer subtler form of racism. Although traditional racism (e.g., refusing to rent an apartment to someone on the basis of their race, Jim Crow Laws of the 1950’s) may be more recognizable and overt, both of these forms of racism are real in their consequences. Racial attitudes are still influential in predicting stances on public policy, including the welfare state (Brown 2013). Analyzing white attitudes toward color-

blindness and white privilege can also have public policy implications (Bunyasi 2015; Hastie and Rimmington 2014). Whites who embrace white privilege and its implications have generally been found to be more supportive of race-based policies aimed to help ethnic minorities (Hastie and Rimmington 2014). Awareness of white privilege and the structural dimensions of color-blind racism are therefore important in determining the need for social policies intended to benefit ethnic minorities. New education programs can be implemented to address the color-blind ideology within sociology, and its greater impact on political processes.

The meaning and social significance of race in the United States has increased within the past few decades, with a peak of interest after World War II (Winant 2000). It also has increased globally. The Civil Rights movement, the Cold War, the anti-apartheid in South Africa, the civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri sparked by the shooting of Michael Brown and Black Lives Matter (García and Sharif 2015) are a few examples of social movements that have greatly influenced discussions about the social meaning of race categories. Coinciding with these events are a number of migration patterns that have shaped a new demographic in the United States (Rugh and Massey 2013). Race is still a relevant topic for discussion in the twenty-first century, especially within the discipline of sociology.

Sociologist Howard Winant (2001) posited that race is no longer characterized as a natural, biological phenomenon, but instead is a social one. Race as a social construct developed historically through propositions that differences in achievement among races were due to biological differences (Saperstein, Penner and Light 2013). Race, although a

social construction, has greatly affected the history and culture of the United States, and continues to do so. We argue that, said another way, race is a social construction that has taken on a life of its own and is inherent within social structures and personal and social realities. That is, race is not merely a construct, it is a structure. Sociologists have expanded greatly on the different dimensions of race as a social phenomenon through racialization and the concept of a racialized culture. Using theories such as racial formation theory and critical race theory, race is a fluid concept that is continually modified by political and social forces (Winant 2000). Although race is a fluid concept, it continues to remain a relevant one socially. From understanding racism and structural inequality to more liberal forms of racism such as the color-blind ideology, it continues to remain a relevant subject in the post-Civil Rights era. In terms of the future of the racial landscape in the United States, Winant (2001) predicted that while there will be a greater understanding of the relevance of racial identities; structural racism will continue to grow alongside it. Winant (2015) later classified race and racism in the twenty-first century as “dark-matter.” Race and racism were characterized this way to emphasize that the relevance of race has largely been forgotten or ignored in institutional contexts.

There is a limited empirical analysis regarding correlates and mediators of adherence to the color-blind ideology. While research has established that being white is associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Levin et al. 2012), it is also the case that not all whites embrace this ideology. Whether blacks embrace this ideology is not known at this time. Previous research has mainly relied on examining color-blindness through qualitative and cross-sectional studies that

rely on convenience samples, but these studies have failed to observe the changes in attitudes toward color-blindness in a panel design. More information is needed regarding the correlates and mediators of adherence to this ideology.

This thesis aimed to answer the following research questions: Does adherence to the color-blind ideology differ by race? Does self-awareness of one's race mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology? Can geographic region, attitudes toward legal segregation and political ideology also mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology?

This study focused on addressing agreement with color-blindness between the years 2006 and 2012, which has not been analyzed in depth through several studies (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2000; Zamudio and Rios 2006; Vargas 2014). It is important to study and understand the color-blind ideology and its racist undertones to combat the idea that the United States is a post-racial society. The idea of a post-racial society has many negative and serious implications in the United States. President Barack Obama's election in 2008, along with the supposed "rise" of the black middle class, has helped justify the notion that the United States is now post-racial. President Obama's election in 2008 helped develop the "new" politics of race (Logan 2014), and contrary to what is widely believed, further validated the color-blind ideology for many whites in the United States (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011; Bonilla-Silva 2012:260). The 2008 election stirred conversations over racial progress, along with the meaning and importance of racial diversity in contemporary society. There is still an assumption that having an African American president is a strong indicator of racial progress, however this cannot

be the only indicator of progress when structural racism pervades into justice and public health systems (García and Sharif 2015; Wingfield 2015). There is also evidence of a large racial divide on median household income and educational attainment (Pew Research 2016). The idea of this post-racial society ignores the reality of the racialized society we inhabit, the relevance of race in everyday life, and the means by which race remains relevant in political processes.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The sociology of race and ethnicity is an understudied field compared to other topics within sociology (Brunnsma, Embrick, and Nanney 2015). It is important, therefore, to conduct research on the color-blind ideology, not only to add to a lacking research field but to address how racism is a salient part of an organized social structure. The study of race within sociology is linked to global political processes (Winant 2000). It is also critical to understanding growing social and economic inequalities (Brunnsma et al. 2015). The following literature review will address the rationalizations for maintaining structural inequality, types and forms of racism, the theoretical background for the current study, and previous empirical findings on color-blind racism.

Types and Forms of Racism

In addition to structural racism, racism can take on other different forms. There are traditional forms of racism, which are considered more overt, and then there are “new” or liberal forms of racism which are more subtle and difficult to detect (Bonilla-Silva 2001:89). The varying forms of racism include individual racism that is based on prejudiced beliefs, institutionalized racism that is imbedded within social institutions, structural racism, where inequality is based on exclusion in social institutions, and systemic racism which is derived from policies and practices within social institutions (Blum 2004). Systemic racism is, according to Elias and Feagin (2016:258), “a concrete material and social reality, and thus is well embedded in all major institutions of society.” Systemic racism is evident in attitudes toward the welfare state, in that color-blind

stances are taken to ignore continued social and economic inequalities on the basis of race (Bonilla-Silva 2012). This tendency to disregard race saturates into other political processes (Brown 2013). Color-blindness is even evident in Supreme Court cases such as *Grutter v. Bollinger* in 2003 (Walsh 2004) and more recently with *Fisher v. the University of Texas* in 2016 (Liptak 2016; Thomason 2016). These Supreme Court cases rested on the premise that race-conscious policies are beneficial in promoting a diverse student body in university settings. It was posited that in order to accomplish this goal color-blindness (to ignore potential inequality on the basis of race) must be removed from the justice system. It also has been posited that the justice system is just as capable of promoting post-racial stances and white domination (Moore 2014), despite any notions of “equal protection” under the law. Although the traditional and overt forms of racism have been denounced by many in the post-Civil Rights era (see, e.g., Zamudio and Rios 2006), structural inequality persists for marginalized groups. Inequality affects opportunities and quality of life. The persistence of inequality is perplexing and discordant with notions of equality and progress, two traditional “American” values. However, as explained by Elias and Feagin (2016:258), theorists often overlook or ignore the ways in which whites societally reproduced “unbalanced racial power and privilege” through “an array of intergenerational social inheritance mechanisms supported by most societal institutions.”

Contemporary (or “modern,” or symbolic) forms of racism posit that racial minorities, typically blacks, are culturally or morally deficient (Winant 2001; Bonilla-Silva 2001; Picca and Feagin 2007). Arguing that blacks are culturally deficient implies that they lack a worth ethic. This purportedly contemporary racism holds that blacks

demand too much desegregation, and that they fail to take advantage of provided resources that assist in upward mobility. Those who hold this view of a lack of individual accountability fail to account for structural inequality that has been maintained even after the Civil Rights era (Shams 2015). However, there is nothing new about the assumption that blacks and other minorities are culturally and morally deficient. Racist assertions that blacks lack a work ethic also are not new (see, e.g., DuBois 1898; Gilman 1908). Rather, just as in the past these racist notions effectively skirt the fact that race-based discrimination is operating. Consequences include lower pay and higher unemployment among devalued minorities, as well as blocked access to the resources that would avail them of the cultural capital typically associated with the majority group(s) in society.

Forms of exclusionary domination promote an ethnic stratification that promotes unequal opportunities for members of a community solely based on ethnic background (Esman 2004). It has been stated that the color-blind ideology is more prevalent among the majority group due to a parallel belief in a meritocratic society (Tran and Peterson 2015), where, it is contended, that work ethic is the only determinant of sustained success. In other words, it is contended that achievement, rather than ascription or other social forces and factors, determine status. According to this assertion, race should be ignored when observing individual differences. Instead, persons should be judged solely by their individual work ethic.

In reality, upward mobility is constrained by factors such as racial discrimination and types and degrees of status ascription. These factors mitigate any earned rewards emanating solely from individuals' work (Tumin 1985). Similar arguments are used to

ignore the power of class ascription in contributing to the constraints on achievement that are beyond the control of individuals. The dampening effect on the presumed power of work ethic is further compounded by sex-based ascription. Sociologists posit that the color-blind ideology is not recognized to be racist, or as an ideology furthering white supremacy among its adherents (Feagin and Vera 1995; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Feagin 2001).

There are several views on the current racism discourse that help advance adherence to the color-blind ideology in the United States. One view holds that traditional racism (pre-Civil Rights era) is outdated - a “thing of the past,” - and that the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s has eradicated policies that previously limited ethnic minorities (Zamudio and Rios 2006). Another view holds that government agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have been put in place to ensure that traditional racism is not as prevalent, and that upward mobility for ethnic minorities is therefore attainable. This is closely related to a belief that an emerging black middle class can thrive (Shams 2015). This perspective does not account for the persistence of a black under-class, which has been around since Emancipation.

Maintaining Structural Inequality: White Privilege and Color-Blind Racism

According to Bonilla-Silva (2012:3-4), the racial order in the United States is maintained by some (but not all) whites, who help sustain the racial hierarchy by continuing participation in forms of laissez-faire discrimination (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997). Bonilla-Silva (2012) also posited that whites ignore the structural disadvantages that ethnic minorities face, and that white privilege is responsible for the

maintenance of a white hegemony (Feagin 2001). Thus, subordinate races are caught in a struggle to become a part of the status quo. For example, some whites oppose affirmative action because it is seen as facilitating preferential treatment. This opposition to race conscious policies then helps to justify the structural advantage of whites.

Hughey, Embrick, and Donne (2015) overviewed the processes that rationalize structural inequality, mainly based on acts of racial discrimination. Drawing on earlier structural interpretations of racism, they identified six determinants of what they defined to be a racialized social system in the United States. The dimensions are as follows:

- racism as a result and a characteristic of a racialized society
- racism as variable, enough so that it is very difficult to determine any improvement in the racial landscape over time
- racism as a system that rationalizes existing systems of stratification
- racism as more than an ideology
- racism as blatant just as it can be subtle

This confirms previous research showing that systemic racism is sustained by white privilege and a white racial frame (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006). Color-blind racism is subtle and rationalizes existing systems of stratification. Bonilla-Silva (2012) described the rationalization of this ideology from four different perspectives. Bonilla-Silva explained that the ideology manifests itself through 1) an inaccurate assumption of equal opportunity, or “abstract liberalism” 2) justification by “naturalization,” 3) through a cultural frame that justifies the system of stratification, and 4) the belief that sufficient progress has been made in terms of racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2012:12).

The last perspective of minimization states that the United States has made significant progress in terms of racial inequality. While there still may be some evidence of discrimination there are also many more opportunities that previously were not available to ethnic minorities. The justification through naturalization holds that racial inequality is a natural occurrence, and therefore “just the way things are.” These perspectives, along with the color-blind ideology, provide further justification for ignoring and further rationalizing racial discrimination (Hughey et al. 2015). The naturalization of racial inequality also helps validate color-blind behavior while maintaining an inequitable stratified system.

It is important to note that racism is mainly a structural phenomenon (Bonilla-Silva 1997), and trying to interpret racism through a social psychological lens at the individual level presents a limited perspective of the issue. With this in mind, the evidence for a racialized society cannot be determined by individual behavior alone. Rather, a structural approach can provide reasons for examining racism that exists at the institutional level (Bonilla-Silva 1997). An individual level approach can easily ignore this interpretation by only focusing on the racist beliefs of individuals alone. However, some social psychological research has been conducted on color-blind racism (Awad et al. 2005; Apfelbaum 2008; Levin et al. 2013). The study of prejudice is itself highly popular in psychological studies, but these studies fail to account for the “material” aspect of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2015). This material aspect is linked to group domination and systemic, policy-based racism.

Theoretical Background

Omi and Winant's (1986) racial formation theory provided a way of examining racism through a sociological perspective, one in which race is considered a socially constructed identity. Racial formation theory is used to understand race as a social construction, and then explains racism and how it operates. Racial formation theory emphasizes a general classification of the "other" group, which is then used to justify various structures of inequality and differential treatment (Omi and Winant 1986:105). Over time, different perspectives on racial formation theory have developed through different modes of analysis. Racial formation theory is applied to macro-, micro-, and meso-level sociological research (Saperstein et al. 2013). Macro-level studies generally focus on distinct racial categories, while micro-level studies analyze the individuals who are assigned to these categories. Outside of this, meso-level studies analyze the intertwining of institutional contexts (Saperstein et al. 2013).

In the past, social inequalities were attributed to genetic or biological differences. Omi and Winant's (1986) idea of a social construction of race challenged this notion. Winant (2000) later posited that political processes, such as decolonization and the Civil Rights movement, helped shape the sociological construction of race over time. Although racial formation theory offers a reference for understanding race through a sociological lens, Winant (2000) proposed a new, more elaborate race theory that accounts for the historical sociology of race. Winant argued that racial formation theory, although not perfect in its approach, provides a sociological understanding of race while accounting for large-scale political processes. Race as a social construct is endemic in racialized

societies (Omi and Winant 1986; Winant 2000). Omi and Winant have posited that a social structure based on racial hierarchies always has been in place (1986:137), and that race has been salient in North America since the earliest European conquests.

Racial formation theory also is evident in Feagin's (2006) theory of systemic racism. Feagin (2006) argued that the persistence of systemic racism is due to the presence of a white racial frame. The white racial frame is "an organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate" (Feagin 2006: 24). According to Feagin (2006), white racial framing helps justify and rationalize a social system in which systemic racism is imbedded. The white racial frame long has been imbedded in American society, even starting with some of the first presidents of the United States. The rationalization of the white racial frame has persisted through time, and has repeatedly justified white superiority and privilege (Picca and Feagin 2007:28). This perspective, along with racial formation theory, contradicts the commonly held post-racial view of contemporary American society.

Color-Blindness in the context of Social Policy and the Welfare State

Williams' (2003) analysis of social policy and race based on critical race theory and a policy legal approach uncovered the relevance of race in determining social policies throughout the history of the United States. Williams first explained the shaping of social policy by race through liberal individualism (2003:6). Liberal individualism parallels the assumptions of a meritocratic society in which work ethic and reasonable decision-making are necessary to succeed. Liberal individualism emphasizes individual responsibility, hard work, and abundant economic opportunity.

Williams (2003) posited that the welfare state in the United States was delayed mostly in part to a belief in liberal individualism. Williams (2003) provided a historical analysis that demonstrated that throughout the history of the United States, African Americans have been denied the opportunities that individual liberalism promotes, although both whites and blacks have been shown to embrace aspects of abstract liberalism (Manning, Hartmann, and Gerteis 2015). African Americans also have been denied opportunities due to biological arguments supposedly rooted in genetics, suggesting that race is genetically inherited (Law 2010; Byrd and Hughey 2015; Byrd and Ray 2015; Gillborn 2016). These biological arguments have been taken as fact regarding predetermined abilities, and race science became an emerging field through efforts such as the Human Genome Project and the International HapMap project (Law 2010; Phelan, Link and Feldman 2013; Byrd and Hughey 2015; Byrd and Ray 2015). These studies are problematic due to their persistence in presenting race differences as scientific fact, and they have the capacity to affect current conceptions of race (Phelan et al. 2013), along with public policy initiatives (Gillborn 2016). Discussions of biological determinism and genetic influences on race are still relevant in the social sciences today (Morning 2014).

Williams' (2003) historical analysis revealed how social policies were constructed in response (or as a non-response) to the inequity in opportunity. Williams (2003:19) asserted that a historical analysis of the development of social policies over time could be beneficial in observing progress as well as struggle. Critical race theorists contend that the white hegemony is not maintained by blatant individual racism; rather, it is mostly

maintained by institutional factors (Williams 2003:12). This idea contradicts the notion that social policies have mainly benefited ethnic minorities instead of whites. Staples' (1995) analysis of responses to public policies such as affirmative action confirmed a false perception (held by whites) of a strong black middle class. This false perception affected the opinions toward the need for policies such as affirmative action; whites believed that the programs were unnecessary due to another assumption based on a post-racial society. John F. Kennedy introduced affirmative action policies into the United States to see increases in the numbers of jobs in the public sector for African Americans and other ethnic minorities (Staples 1995). Although it is generally held that African Americans are the only beneficiaries of the policy, the policy was intended to benefit women, Asians, Hispanics, military veterans and the disabled.

The most frequently posited arguments against policies such as affirmative action are that the progress from the 1960's has been enough to level the playing field for all minorities. This argument fails to take account for the racial composition of the United States. Although white males composed around 35 percent of United States citizens in 1999, they generally held 75 percent of the highest earnings in the country (Staples 1995). As of 2015, there are still noticeable race income gaps in the United States, even when controlling for educational attainment. In regards to median hourly earnings, blacks earned 75% as much as whites (Patten 2016). White males averaged \$21 hourly compared to blacks (\$15 hourly) and Hispanics (\$14 hourly). Hourly earnings were also higher for white (\$18 hourly) and Asian women (\$17 hourly) compared to black (\$13

hourly) and Hispanic (\$12 hourly) women. White males also made up 33% of the workforce in 2015, composing the largest demographic group (Patten 2016).

Assuming a strong black middle class, granting ethnic minorities a few amount of rights can even strengthen majority group domination (Esman 2004). Esman's (2004:173-177) analysis of ethnic dominance used Northern Ireland as an example of a political democracy that maintained a government dominated by a Protestant majority. Roman Catholics, the minority group, were controlled and suppressed by the Protestant majority even in a system supposedly based on freedom and democracy. Esman (2004) argued that ethnic minorities still could be controlled by the granting of a small amount of rights, which then confine the minorities into their status as those with less power. In extreme cases, minorities may not be granted any rights, and could later be labeled as the main opposition to the majority (Esman 2004:176). If anything, this suggests that even in a political system allegedly based on freedom of speech and choice, minority groups can still be severely disadvantaged.

Contact Theory, Religious Affiliation, and Segregation among Communities

Different theories have been constructed to understand the dynamics and effects of interracial contact at the individual level. Of particular importance has been how interracial contact affects social ties among different races. Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey (2002) analyzed contact theory as an explanation for interracial social interactions at the individual level. Contact theory states that by increasing contact between different racial groups, positive interracial relations will also increase, and prejudice among groups will also decrease (Allport 1954). The means by which this

process occurs generally results from four different changes: 1) shared goals, 2) intergroup cooperation, 3) authoritative support and 4) a balanced social status (Emerson et al. 2002).

Emerson et al. (2002) analyzed interracial social ties, and the advantages for those involved. The authors asserted that these social ties are particularly beneficial for reducing segregation among individuals, and that if these ties are developed early, they are likely to be sustained into adulthood. The authors used retrospective data from the Lilly Survey of Attitudes and Social Networks, which included a nationally representative sample of 2,561 American citizens. In their test of the contact hypothesis, Emerson et al. (2002) hypothesized that previous racial contact would lead to noticeable changes in the racial diversity of social circles. It was found that participants who, as children, had interracial contact experiences at the neighborhood and school level were more likely to have racially diverse social groups as adults (Emerson et al. 2002:745).

The authors first measured the racial makeup of an individual's social circle (i.e. people with whom they regularly had contact), along with the respondent's social ties (i.e. all of the people with whom they frequently contact) (Emerson et al. 2002). Ranges for these values were measured on a scale from 1-5 with (1=all of the same race) and (5=none of the same race). The third measure of general social ties analyzed the respondents who regularly attended a religious congregation (two or more times a month). The last measure asked about interracial marriages.

The study revealed that previous residence in racially mixed neighborhoods and racially mixed schools influenced the racial makeup of a respondent's current circle of

friends. It was found that on average, whites had less diverse friend groups compared to blacks. The respondent's age, being an immigrant and being married, and living in a central city all reduced the diversity of one's social circle. However, living in a central city had the opposite effect for whites (Emerson et al. 2002). Overall, the study contributed to the literature on contact theory by analyzing previous interracial behavior as a predictor for current diversity, or lack thereof, within one's social circle.

Although contact with other races is generally seen as a factor that reduces prejudice (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ 2011), it does not always reduce prejudice. There are still a number of limitations related to contact theory, such that it is not always seen as a nonracist strategy. Although contact with other races is usually associated with a greater understanding of "other" ethnic groups to diminish stereotypes (Pettigrew et al. 2011), these stereotypes can just as easily be re-learned (Erasmus 2010). Other limitations of contact theory are its assumptions that race is stable, and therefore contact theory can be a more "reformist" strategy instead of a transformative strategy (Erasmus 2010).

Religious affiliation also has been shown to be an important variable when assessing diversity among closed communities (Porter and Emerson 2013). Most religious communities have been characterized as tight-knit, with strong social ties. These groups have been shown to have very rigid ideologies, with an aversion to outside influence (Porter and Emerson 2013). Closed communities such as these also vary depending on geographic space. That is, the Midwest may have a higher percentage of Protestants compared to the Northeast, which may have a higher percentage of Roman

Catholics. There are also variations of these beliefs with religious ideologies differing between conservative and liberal views. The South itself is very distinct from other parts of the country due to low levels of educational attainment, a higher percentage of African-American residents (Porter and Emerson 2013), and generally more conservative views. As a whole, more rural regions of the country tend to be more religious, and are thus more clustered or segregated into distinct communities (Porter and Emerson 2013).

The homogeneity of environments, from the neighborhood level to the school level, often goes unnoticed through the lens of color-blind racism. If areas are segregated, it is simply by choice, and not due to any other social forces. Along with racism as a whole, this ideology assumes that legal segregation in school environments has been done away with by the Supreme Court case *Brown vs. The Board of Education of Topeka* in 1954. The segregation seen today is generally expected to be from natural social forces, while race is left as an explanation that would have only been expected during the pre-Civil Rights era.

Geographic Region, Legal Segregation, and Integration

In terms of the geographic racial landscape, some perspectives hold that whites are separated from ethnic minorities, both intentionally and unintentionally, and this prevents them from understanding how race matters for ethnic minorities in everyday life. This can apply to neighborhoods, schools (Cabrera 2014; Modica 2015), workplaces and churches, all of which maintain some degree of racial segregation (Lewis 2001; Pew Research Center 2008b). Therefore, if whites generally remain in homogeneous environments with other whites (Rugh and Massey 2013), the odds of adhering to the

color-blind ideology, which ignores racial differences, are higher. In terms of geographic space, the color-blind ideology would assume that neighborhoods and schools, if segregated, are segregated by choice and not by other structural factors. This again reinforces the naturalization assumption.

In general, ethnic minorities typically oppose the color-blind ideology in favor of multiculturalism, while whites typically favor acculturation, or cultural change that occurs when differing cultures meet, and ideas or notions similar to the color-blind ideology (Ryan et al. 2007; Neville et al. 2013). Acculturation has been classified as a form of inclusionary discrimination (Esman 2004). Acculturation can be forced, in that in order to advance within a society, the minority members must learn majority practices (e.g. language, customs). In the context of the color-blind ideology, acculturation can force majority group practices on minority groups so that all of the practices within a broader community are almost identical (color-blind). Therefore, individuals are seen just as individuals, regardless of clear race differences. For multiculturalism, cultural differences are acknowledged and then promoted under one area of authority. In this way, multiculturalism differs from the color-blind ideology which ignores race entirely.

Although some ethnic minorities may try to balance both their own practices and those of the majority, it is more likely that the minority group's distinctive and defining cultural markers will diminish because of the pressure of adapting to majority group practices in everyday life.

Acculturation is widely believed to be a hierarchy enhancing behavior, due to its reliance on blending minority ethnic group characteristics with majority ethnic group

practices and characteristics (Taylor and Moghaddam 1987). Within the United States, this has involved the abandonment of ethnic-minority group practices in place of majority ethnic group practices. This is an assimilation process that helps reinforce an “American identity” for some members of minority ethnic groups’ name (1987). Forced assimilation also has been very prevalent throughout the history of the United States. Multiculturalism is considered a hierarchy-attenuating behavior due to its reliance on accepting and or incorporating ethnic minority group practices (Levin et al. 2012). In this way, multiculturalism is the opposite of assimilation, which mainly relies on minority groups adopting majority group practices. The color-blind ideology is considered by some to be a hierarchy attenuating behavior (due to the assumption of a “level” playing field).

The support for multiculturalism among blacks can be contributed to a number of factors. One of the main contributors is being reared in homes where people regularly recognize their own ethnic diversity (Brewer 1993; Phinney 1992). Reminders of their ethnic identity throughout childhood serve to highlight the ethnic differences amongst other ethnic groups within the United States as well. This distinction could potentially contribute to a stance on the color-blind ideology, which ignores racial differences altogether. Racial self-awareness also has been linked to the salience of one’s racial identity and sense of self (Winkler 2012:2). Some African American parents, along with parents of other ethnic minorities, rear their children to develop a sense of pride in their race and ethnic background. In this environment, a young member of an ethnic minority would likely be more self-aware of their own race.

Portés and Zhou (1993) argued that acculturation is very uneven and segmented, with several possible outcomes for second-generation immigrants. The outcomes of acculturation are mainly due to the availability of resources and vulnerability. Immigrants face other obstacles that limit upward mobility in employment and education, and this may serve as a further impediment to acculturation. Race specifically can strengthen these boundaries, especially for immigrant children that are growing into acculturation (Portés and Zhou 1993). Immigrant children are also a rapidly increasing population; these boundaries present problems for their future (Haller, Portés, and Lynch 2011). Without a smooth transition into the majority group, second-generation immigrant children may reject this notion altogether and engage in deviant behaviors.

Ethnic minorities are often reminded of their ethnicity when they are confronted by acts of ethnic discrimination (Phinney 1992). This discrimination could manifest itself through acts of traditional racism, or acts of more discrete racism (Zamudio and Rios 2006). Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is a reminder of one's membership in a particular ethnicity (Apfelbaum et al. 2008). Although one's ethnicity can contribute to support or opposition to the color-blind ideology, self-awareness is also a relevant factor. Sellers et al. (1998) proposed four ideologies that African Americans hold in relation to their racial self-awareness. The four ideologies are a nationalist identity (a general sense of pride), an oppressed minority ideology, an assimilationist ideology (the perceived need to blend in with the ethnic majority), and a humanist ideology. Combined, these ideologies influence individual behavior and individual perceptions on race-based issues (Sellers et al. 1998)

Empirical Findings

Segregation patterns have persisted in the United States, despite any inclination that American citizens prefer diverse communities (Pew Research Center 2008b). This does not hold true for all corners of the United States; however, patterns of segregation are still re-emerging. Rugh and Massey (2013) used data from the Decennial Census of Housing and Population by the decade starting from 1970 and ending in 2010. This allowed for a comparison of how communities have or have not been isolated over the past 40 years. Using a panel of 287 metropolitan statistical areas, the study controlled for socioeconomic status, industrial organization, urbanism and geographic region.

The Rugh and Massey (2013) study was conducted on the heels of a sharp increase in the growth of the Hispanic population (from 8-45 million) across the span of 40 years in the observed metropolitan areas. The black population also showed a gradual increase over time (17.4-34.2 million), along with the Asian populations (1.5-16 million). Using an index for analyzing trends in dissimilarity among neighborhoods, the authors also found that the segregation between white and black communities has slowly declined since the 1970s. However, it would take sixty-seven years in order to reach a point of low dissimilarity. In contrast, the dissimilarity index increased for both Hispanic and Asian populations, indicating that these communities have become less segregated. Overall, the authors found that although racial segregation may be increasing in some metropolitan areas, it might be on the decline in other non-metropolitan areas. The areas that are integrating are areas with generally high levels of education and low levels of anti-Black

or anti-Latino sentiments. The long-term findings on whether these communities will become more or less segregated remain to be seen (Rugh and Massey 2013).

Lewis (2001) conducted an ethnographic study to examine segregation within schools. Contrary to most studies on segregation within school environments that focus on ethnic minorities, the study was conducted on an elementary school populated primarily of white students. The analysis focused on the racial messages given from the parents to the students, and how these messages reflected a hidden curriculum about race. By examining this curriculum of learned and taught racial lessons, the explanation for racial boundaries in the community would become evident. This “hidden” curriculum also was important to understand how the participants arrived at the conclusion that race no longer matters (Lewis 2001).

The Lewis (2001) study found that a multicultural education was not deemed necessary by the school administration due to a largely white student population. The study also revealed that students were taught to embrace color-blindness, and that discussing race or acknowledging the presence of race was considered divisive. Again, the adoption of color-blindness in these instances is strategic in that it emphasizes that “we are all just people,” while ignoring the persisting salience of race and racism in school and broader community settings. Color-blind stances are dangerous in classroom settings because they avoid any real discussion of race or racial inequality. A call for educational programs aimed toward discussing race openly in the classroom have therefore been deemed necessary and important in the developing modern classroom (Modica 2015).

Similar trends in educational settings have been found, even in mixed-race classrooms. The Modica (2015) field research study revealed that discussing race in the classroom was generally avoided by teachers and students. This is mainly due to the fear of being labeled a racist. This same pattern was found among white high school students, who expressed anxiety and concern over being labeled a racist. Similar to previous studies on white students (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000), the students from this suburban high school also exhibited anxiety over using racially descriptive terms. The perpetuation of the color-blind ideology in educational settings is not limited to K-12 systems. It is also present in post-secondary institutions as well. Cabrera (2014) conducted interviews with 12 white college students at a Western University in the United States. It was found that the 12 white students found little evidence of racism on the campus. In fact, the white students embraced the notion that they were the victims of “reverse racism” on campus (Cabrera 2014). The white students blamed minority students for promoting racial antagonism. This is one instance of how white individuals can remain color-blind, or ignore the continuing significance of race in contemporary society. The university environment is important for networking and serves as an opportunity for increased earning potential after degrees are completed. If minorities are underrepresented in these environments, the potential for job opportunities and future success could be impeded. By ignoring this, white college students can further rationalize the segregation found in university environments.

Although color-blind racism assumes that overt racism is a thing of the past, Picca and Feagin (2007) analyzed various dimensions of racial events through journals kept by

white college students across the United States. More specifically, they observed observed racialized actions, the performers and observers of these actions, the racial framing of these actions (through ideas, stereotypes, etc.), and the societal context of these actions. While white college students are not a representative sample of all United States citizens, Picca and Feagin (2007) chose to analyze the opinions of college students based on the premise that these students could be potential authority figures of the future. Another justification for a college student sample was that college students are typically viewed as more tolerant in comparison to working class whites who are perceived as more extreme in their racist views (2007:31).

Picca and Feagin's (2007) analysis used Erving Goffman's dramaturgy to analyze front stage and back stage social interactions with whites and persons of other races. University students recorded these social interactions into their journals. The journals were later analyzed to examine the difference between front and back stage behavior. The front stage was described as when the students were in public, while the back stage was primarily when they were alone or among close friends. Picca and Feagin (2007) found that in front stage interactions, the students were likely to avoid discussions of race, other people of race, and repressed certain comments that might be deemed racist by others. The front stage and back stage analysis is important in the context of color-blind racism because it reinforces the idea that racism *is* still relevant. White students that claimed not to notice race (to be color-blind) in the front stage were depicted as overtly racist in the backstage. This is where there are race differences in the assessment of the color-blind ideology, and whether it is an effective way to address race-relations.

Whether overt or covert, it is difficult to thoroughly analyze the back stage behavior to see how this plays out realistically in the front stage. The back stage interactions, typically occurring among whites, gave insight into what comments are made in an area that is perceived as free from judgment for whites.

Zamudio and Rios (2006) further elaborated on the analysis from these journals by analyzing the journals of 60 white students enrolled in Social Problems courses at the University of Wyoming. They further categorized examples from entries by different forms of racism, including traditional (overt), segregationist, revisionist racist narratives (redefining racist actions to appear non-racist), and equal opportunity racism. Although similar to Picca and Feagin's analysis (2007), Zamudio and Rios (2006) distinguished further the specific types of racism that were seen along with how they align with color-blind or traditional racism.

Other scholars also have measured the color-blind ideology with a sample of college students. Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) analyzed qualitative and quantitative data on white prejudiced attitudes among white college students in the United States. The study relied on data from the 1997 Social Attitudes of College Students Survey that included a sample of undergraduate students from four universities. A total of 732 students completed the survey. However, the analysis focused solely on the 451 white students who had participated in the survey. These students were later asked to provide their contact information. The 41 students who did provide contact information were asked to return for in-depth interviews with other white graduate students.

Bonilla-Silva and Forman's 2000 study found a contradiction between responses indicated on a survey and responses given during in-depth interviews. During the in-depth interviews, "semantic moves" were used to avoid appearing prejudiced, although their responses generally did reveal some support to affirmative action and assistance toward ethnic minorities. This differed from the survey responses that were generally not supportive of such assistance. This same pattern was found for questions on inter-racial marriage and the significance of discrimination on blacks' life chances. Overall, the analysis indicated that survey questions are not necessarily more effective for measuring prejudiced attitudes compared to in-depth interviews. In many cases, the responses suggested a maintenance of the status quo, but this was not true for the students labeled as progressives that were aware of white privilege.

Jackson, Sweeney and Welcher (2014) conducted an analysis using a sample of 72 undergraduate college students to analyze color-blindness and cross-racial interaction. The study implemented 14 focus groups that were divided homogeneously by race. The moderators of the focus groups were all female. However, it was not possible to match the moderators by the same race of each focus group. The responses during the focus group sessions involved three central themes that helped rationalize segregation among the student body. The first theme was that although the students recognized the segregation among the student population, this was described to be a natural phenomenon. The students were also more likely to blame the underrepresented groups for this segregation, stating that the creation of sub-groups based on race or ethnicity is divisive (Jackson et al. 2014). This specific theme was consistent in all of the focus

groups regardless of race or ethnic group. Another theme was a concern with a sense of belonging to groups of other ethnicities. It was concluded that this may be due to an original lack of cross-ethnic interaction, or the students may not intermix among groups of other ethnicities due to peer pressure.

Awad, Cokley, and Ravitch (2005) also examined color-blind attitudes and attitudes toward affirmative action through a sample of college students. The sample of 375 was a convenience sample from a Midwestern university in introductory and advanced level psychology courses. The study examined why Whites generally oppose affirmative action, even if whites acknowledge that affirmative action exists to increase equality. It was argued that sex and race would contribute to a large amount of variation on attitudes toward affirmative action; however, color-blind related attitudes were hypothesized to contribute an even larger variation. Race was found to be a significant predictor of attitudes toward affirmative action, while sex was not. It also was found that color-blind and modern racist attitudes were significantly associated with attitudes toward affirmative action. The third hypothesis, which stated that color-blind attitudes would be a stronger predictor of attitudes toward affirmative action compared to modern racist attitudes, also was supported (see also: Ravitch 2002).

Hastie and Rimmington (2014) found, consistent with the color-blind ideology, recurring comments that denied the existence of structural inequality based on race, as well as comments suggesting that the mention of race is itself racist. The mention of white privilege was not frequent among the comments, however, those who did

acknowledge white privilege used it as a mechanism to explain the persistence of structural inequality.

The findings from Bunyasi's (2015) study supported previous research on white privilege and color-blindness, in that a self-recognition of white privilege and its advantages can be important in understanding the persistence of structural inequality. Therefore, those who are color-blind are likely not aware of white privilege (Bunyasi 2015), although the authors could not determine the race of the commentators on the articles. The persistence of white privilege was referenced using the phrase '200 years of white affirmative action,' (Hastie and Rimmington 2014), suggesting that cultural restitution is in order to account for the advantages whites have had and continue to have.

Hastie and Rimmington (2014) observed the connection between recognition of racial privilege and support toward social policies aimed to reduce inequality. The authors analyzed awareness of one's privilege as a means for supporting these social policies. Relying on data from 357 discussion board comments (331 being original comments, 26 comments being re-posts from the same user) regarding six New York Times articles that were made in response to Supreme Court rulings of discrimination against European American firefighters, along with one Hispanic firefighter. The authors used the articles relating to this case due to the potential for comments exhibiting white privilege. The majority of these comments focused on either the Supreme Court cases themselves, or else on broader subjects such as affirmative action (Hastie and Rimmington 2014).

Bunyasi (2015) tested hypotheses relating to white racial identities, white privilege and attitudes toward race-specific policies. The analysis used data from five global telephone interviews conducted from 2000 and 2009. The interviews asked questions about a variety of current political issues, with a focus on racial issues. The survey items were related to an acceptance or denial of white privilege, both for the individual and within society as a whole. For the main dependent variables, the first policy-based survey item asked about support or opposition to programs that make efforts to help minorities advance to make up for past discrimination. Other survey items asked about the necessity of diverse workspaces and the presences of laws that protect minorities from discrimination in the hiring process (Bunyasi 2015).

In the Bunyasi (2015) study, the independent variables were attitudes toward white privilege in the workplace and a general measure assessing whether upward mobility is easier for whites. It was found that an acceptance of white privilege was associated with support for race-based policy initiatives, but it also was found that both privilege affirming whites and color-blind whites were more supportive of affirmative action as a means of reconciling for past discrimination. Disadvantaged whites, however, were much less likely to report support for affirmative action programs. Color-blind whites were found to be less likely to support diversity in the workplace. When assessing the entire sample, the majority of the white respondents did not acknowledge white privilege. Disadvantaged whites were found to be significantly different from color-blind and privilege acknowledging whites in all cases. This is one of the few studies that used disadvantaged whites as a category, instead of focusing on the dichotomy between color-

blind and non-colorblind whites. It also was suggested that the expressed color-blind views might have been adopted in an attempt to express socially acceptable views (Bunyasi 2015). These findings coincide with previous research suggesting that survey results might contradict responses given during in-depth interviews (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000).

Wilkins and Wenger (2014) conducted an analysis using data from the General Social Survey to uncover the relationship between a belief in a just world and attitudes toward affirmative action for women and African Americans. As hypothesized, the authors found that those who believe in a just world, where equal opportunity is abundant for all citizens, oppose government intervention in the form of social programs (2014). When controlling for political ideology, it was found that conservatives were much more likely to oppose affirmative action compared to those who identified as extremely liberal (Wilkins and Wenger 2014). The evaluation of the deserving and the un-deserving is relevant to the color-blind ideology in a number of ways. First, the color-blind ideology assumes a meritocratic society in which a strong work ethic is all that is necessary to achieve upward mobility. The meritocratic assumption, along with other “liberal” principles are also apparent in other countries (Augoustinos, Tuffin and Every 2005), and are used as a justification for opposing policies such as affirmative action. Through the lens of color-blindness, programs such as affirmative action are rendered unnecessary due to a belief that there should be “equal opportunity” for all. It is also important to examine political ideology in these cases because it can help shape individual attitudes and beliefs regarding how society functions.

McDermott (2015) analyzed American Community Survey data on the salience of white racial identities in the contemporary color-blind era. McDermott (2015) posited that color-blind ideology adherence for whites generally stems from the idea of self-reliance and a strong sense of national identity, the latter suggesting that national identity goes beyond racial and ethnic distinctions. Therefore, the construction of a white identity varies. McDermott (2015) asserted that whites who acknowledge the relevance of racism are more likely to have a stronger white identity, but whites who believe that race is irrelevant are much less likely to have any awareness of their racial identity. Whites are often distinguished as the default category when examining race, and “white” is the commonly used default category to which all other races are compared. There are a number of empirical studies that have covered color-blind racism, segregation, attitudes toward affirmative action, and white privilege. All of these topics relate to contemporary racism in that although there is evidence that race continues to be a salient factor in social life and life opportunities, race continues to be ignored.

The majority of studies on color-blind racism, however, have focused on convenience samples of white college students. These results are not generalizable and lack the benefits of a nationally representative survey. This study aimed to address these limitations with a panel study that did include a nationally representative sample. This study also aimed to analyze the potential mediating factors of geographic region, political ideology, racial identity and attitudes toward legal segregation, something that has not been analyzed in previous work. McDermott’s (2015) study mainly aimed to address the mediators of adherence to the color-blind ideology through race among other control

variables. For a more detailed comparison of previous empirical work on color-blind racism, reference Table 1.

Refer to Table 1, page 83

Summary of Literature Review

This literature review examined the different forms of racial discrimination, the social and structural rationalizations for adherence to the color-blind ideology, and the importance of racial awareness in relation to the color-blind ideology. This review focused on the false perception of a post-racial society and why contemporary color-blindness ignores structural inequality that continues to persist in a racialized society. Although it is a social construct, race continues to be a relevant factor in public policy, political processes and social life. The color-blind ideology, as part of contemporary racism, persists due to an insistence that race is no longer relevant and that discussing race itself is racist. This limits discussions on programs that aim to benefit ethnic minorities who are disadvantaged in a racialized society that has continued to maintain the status quo of a white hegemony.

CHAPTER THREE

HYPOTHESES

This study aimed to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Black respondents and respondents of other races will be more likely than White respondents to disagree with the color-blind ideology.

Whites generally have been shown to agree with the color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Levin 2001; Levin et al. 2012; McDermott 2015), due to its potential for sustaining systemic racism. Black respondents and respondents of other races were therefore predicted to disagree with this ideology more so than white respondents.

Blacks, Hispanics, and respondents of other races were also predicted to disagree with the color-blind ideology due to the racial divide on attitudes toward policies such as affirmative action. There is continued evidence of a racial divide on race-based issues in the United States (Bobo 2011; Pew Research Center 2016), particularly among whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Whites stand to benefit from being color-blind, in that a general disregard of racial differences is associated with a disregard for the persistence of social and economic discrimination faced by blacks and Hispanics. This also enables whites to continue to benefit from a privileged status as the dominant group.

Hypothesis 2: Geographic region will mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.

Through the contact hypothesis, whites tend to be segregated geographically when compared to other races (Emerson et al. 2002). It is also true that the relevance of race can be ignored depending on one's environment and upbringing (Brewer 1993).

Geographic region was predicted to mediate the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology, and it also was intended to be a proxy for neighborhood level communities. Individuals who live in highly segregated areas might not “see” the relevance of race in everyday life, nor will they see the need for race-conscious social policies.

Hypothesis 3: Political ideology will mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.

Attitudes toward social policies that benefit racial minorities are closely correlated with political ideology, and thus indirectly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology. Basic ideas and principles based on racial progress can be closely related to political ideology. More progressive ideologies might lean towards more social change, while more conservative ideologies might lean towards preserving the status quo (Bonilla-Silva 2012; Pew Research Center 2016). Conservatives are generally more likely to oppose affirmative action and other social policies intended to benefit ethnic minorities compared to those who identify as liberal (Wilkins and Wenger 2014).

Hypothesis 4: Self-awareness of one’s race will mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.

The self-awareness of one’s race was predicted to provide a rationale for disagreeing with the color-blind ideology, which ignores the relevance of race in everyday life.

Respondents who are more aware of their racial identity were predicted to be more opposed to the color-blind ideology compared to those who are not frequently aware of their racial identity, due to a higher potential for discriminatory encounters, which serve

as reminders of one's racial identity (Sellers 1998; Sellers and Shelton 2003; Apfelbaum 2008).

Hypothesis 5: Attitudes toward legal segregation will mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.

Along with geographic region, attitudes toward legal segregation are related to the divide among different communities on the basis of race. Although legal segregation, along with racism, is considered a phenomenon that has been done away with by the Civil Rights era (Bonilla-Silva 2001), areas are continually segregated geographically by race (Rugh and Massey 2013). In regards to geographic space, the color-blind ideology would assume that neighborhoods and schools, if segregated, are segregated by choice and not by other structural factors.

Figure 1 displayed in Appendix A is a graphic depiction of the anticipated mediators of the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology. These variables were selected as mediators of the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology for a number of different reasons. Respondent's race could influence where they are located geographically, as communities generally tend to be segregated by race (Rugh and Massey 2013). Attitudes toward legal segregation are also related to race, in that a denial or acceptance of racial segregation within one's community could vary greatly depending on the perceived reasons for such segregation. The principles behind respondent's political ideology could also influence their attitudes toward color-blindness, in that political ideology can indicate how people believe society should work, racial minorities have also been shown to be more liberal compared to whites (Pew

Research Center 2016). Racial identity is related to the awareness of one's race (Sellers et al. 1998). This variable was chosen in the model to see if racial identity could influence opinions on color-blindness, which presumes that race and racism have been erased.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODS

Data

The Portraits of American Life Study (formerly known as the Panel Study on American Religion and Ethnicity) is a nationally representative multi-level panel study. It included six hundred variables in the first wave in 2006 and eight hundred and sixty-one variables in 2012, covering topics on religion, family relations, and deviance with an emphasis on ethnic and racial diversity (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). The target population for the study was non-institutionalized United States citizens who were eighteen years or older by the time of the first wave. RTI international Inc. statisticians used a four-stage sampling approach by first establishing a nationally representative sampling frame from Primary Sampling Units (three-digit zip code tabulation areas). RTI statisticians then selected sixty primary sampling units that had probabilities corresponding to a composite size measure, weighting sixty primary sampling units with a higher concentration of ethnic minorities (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). Over 120 five-digit zip codes were selected from the sixty primary sampling units. An average of 100 addresses were selected from each zip code. Two hundred and forty-eight postal carrier routes were also selected from the selected five-digit zip codes. With forty-one addresses selected per carrier route, the total number of addresses was 10,320. RTI statisticians used the HOI (Half-open Interval) frame linking procedure to include housing units that are not normally selected on mailing lists, one individual was then selected per each housing unit. The goal amount of in-person interviews was 2,600 for

the first wave of the study and a total of 2,610 interviews were conducted (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). After the data collection process, weights were assigned to respondents in Wave I to determine the probability of being selected at each stage.

Respondents were compensated \$50 to complete the survey. Respondents were also required to complete a screening interview prior to participating. The screening interview was a paper and pencil interview while the official survey was administered using a laptop computer. The response rate for the first wave was 58%. This was calculated from an original amount of respondents who agreed to the interview (82%). There was an 83% contact rate and an 86% screening rate. The data collection for the second wave relied primarily on conducting online interviews with as many of the original respondents from Wave I as possible.

The Portraits of American Life Study was divided into two separate waves. The first wave, conducted in 2006, had a total of 2,610 respondents. The second wave, conducted in 2012, included 1,417 respondents with 1,314 cases that were original respondents from Wave I, while 103 cases were new respondents. The new respondents were children of the parents in Wave I that were unable to participate in Wave II. This analysis only included the 1,314 respondents who participated in both Wave I and II. However, after excluding cases with missing values for select variables, the sample size was reduced to 1,252 respondents.

The data collection relied on face-to-face interviews for the first wave, but respondents also used computer-assisted self-interviewing (i.e. ACASI). ACASI was used to help respondents answer more sensitive questions relating to deviance (Vargas

2014). Abt SRBI conducted the second wave of the study. The response rate for the second wave was 50.3 percent, which is a percentage based on all of the respondents originally in the first wave. The adjusted response rate was 53%, when accounting for the four percent of respondents who died or were mentally unable to take the survey. In the second wave of the study, respondents were given the choice of a web or telephone survey and a face-to-face interview. Respondents were compensated \$30 if they participated in the phone interview, but were otherwise compensated \$50 for either the web survey or the face-to-face interview (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012).

Measures

The main independent variable, race, was recoded into dummy variables so that it included a Black, Hispanic, and an “other race” variable. White was used as the reference category in the analysis. This “other race” category included Pacific Islander, Native American, Asian and Mixed race. These categories collectively made up a small percentage of the racial distribution of the sample (6.5% weighted), as seen in Table 2 (next chapter).

The dependent variable, adherence to the color-blind ideology, measured the extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the following statement at Wave II: *One of the most effective ways of dealing with race relations in the US is to stop talking about race* (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Somewhat disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Somewhat agree, 5=Strongly agree). Previous studies have examined views toward the current racial landscape in the United States (Jackson et al 2014; Neville et al. 2013), as well as why United States citizens utilize the color-blind ideology in inter-race relations

at the individual level (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Hastie and Rimmington 2014; Vargas 2014). This survey item was used to address the degree to which respondents agree or disagree with this ideology. This statement closely relates to the concept of minimization, or the notion of a post-racial society. The same color-blind measure at Wave I was used as a control variable, and the measure at Wave II was the main dependent variable. The color-blind variable was recoded to include three categories in both waves i.e. Agree, Neutral, and Disagree. The numerals are values; the titles are categories. The categories were coded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The “Agree” measure in Wave I was used as the reference category.

Subsequent ordinal logistic regression models added each mediating variable individually, while excluding other mediating variables. One final model included all of the mediating and control variables. The first mediating variable, geographic region, was measured by asking respondents to identify their current geographic region through the following response categories: (1=Northeast, 2=Midwest, 3=South, 4=West). The “South” category was used as the reference category. The second mediating variable, political ideology, was measured through the following question: *when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as:* (1=Very liberal, 2=Somewhat liberal, 3=Middle of the road, 4=Somewhat conservative, 5=Very conservative, 6=Haven’t thought much about it). Political ideology was recoded into four categories, liberal, conservative, middle of the road, and a category for respondents who do not give much thought to political matters. Conservative was used as the reference category. Racial identity was measured through the following question: *How often, if at all, do you think*

about or are you aware of your race? The responses ranged from (1=About every day, 2=About once a week, 3=About once a month, 4=Less than monthly, 5=Never). These categories were recoded into three main categories: 1=Daily/weekly (about every day/about once a week), 2= Infrequently (about once a month/less than monthly), and 3=Never. The “daily/weekly” category was used as a reference category within the regression models. Attitudes toward legal segregation were measured through responses to the following statement: *“It’s OK to have a country where the races are basically separate from one another, as long as they have equal opportunity.”* Responses then followed a Likert scale format: (1=Strongly disagree, 2= Somewhat disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Somewhat agree, 5=Strongly Agree). The responses were recoded to combine strongly disagree and somewhat disagree (3=Disagree), strongly agree and somewhat agree (1=Agree), while maintaining a neutral category (2=Neutral). The “Agree” category was used as a reference category in the regression models.

Other control variables included religious affiliation, age, education and gender. Religious categories were recoded to include Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, those with no religious affiliation, and an “other Protestant” category. The “No-Affiliation” category was used as the reference category within the models. It is important to control for religious affiliation due to the tendency of certain congregations to be segregated by race (Emerson and Woo 2006), along with the tendency of congregations to have strict and unwavering ideologies (Porter and Emerson 2013). Color-blind practices such as ignoring the relevance of race and focusing on racism as an individual issue have been observed mainly among white evangelicals

(Hearn 2009). Education categories were recoded to include Less than high school, High School/GED, Vocational/Associates, Bachelors, Post-Graduate, and an “other education” category. The “Less than high school” category was used as a reference category in the regression models. This analysis also controlled for survey mode, by creating a dummy variable to dichotomize the two different types of survey mode (1=Web, 0=In person/telephone interview).

Statistical Procedure

In order to account for non-response bias, the study weighted the sample data in both waves. The study included longitudinal weights to account for the non-responders in Wave II. The weighting parameters for demographic characteristics were taken from an analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, which was conducted in 2005 and 2011. The study created the variable LOWEIGHT which was intended to represent the original sample, the weight PLOWEIGHT was constructed as a population weight (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). These weights were adjusted using a raking technique that helped match population proportions. The longitudinal weight variables also controlled for sample selection bias. This accounted for whether the respondents who dropped out between Wave I and Wave II were noticeably different compared to the respondents who stayed. For this thesis, comparisons were made between Wave I and II to observe the changing attitudes toward the color-blind ideology among the respondents who participated in both waves. SPSS statistics 23 (IBM) was used to analyze descriptive statistics and produce ordinal logistic regression models. Several ordinal logistic regression models were estimated for the merged dataset.

Cases were weighted in the merged dataset using the LOWEIGHT variable. This data set only contained respondents who participated in both Wave I and II. There are many different approaches to using a panel data (Selig, Preacher, and Little 2012). In the past, researchers have used path analysis, fixed effect models, random effect models and multilevel modeling when working with panel data (Frees 2004). These options are unique in that they can map individual change through different regression or path models. Panel data analysis also allows for the use of the time between the waves as a control variable. These approaches were ideal for this study due to the use of an ordinal-level measure for the dependent variable. Panel studies in general, however, can be beneficial due to the ability to observe different population parameters at different points in time, to measure net change, and to aggregate data for a group of individuals (Duncan and Kalton 1987).

This study used the color-blind measure at Wave I and II as two separate variables, which both measure the same concept. Among other control variables in the first ordinal logistic regression model, the color-blind measure at Wave I was included as a control variable. This was used to describe the association between race and change in adherence to the color-blind ideology, which changes as a function of the time between the waves. This is what is referred to as a lagged-dependent variable regression (Selig et al. 2012). The panel design was deemed to be appropriate after finding that there was enough variation between the Wave I and II responses to the color-blind survey question. A cross-tabulation of the responses to the measures can be found in Table 3 (next chapter).

The first ordinal logistic regression model included sex, age, race, education, religion, respondent type, and the color-blind measure at Wave I. The main dependent variable, the Wave II color-blind measure, was coded (1=Agree, 2=Neutral, 3=Disagree). Models two, three, four and five included a new mediating variable in order to observe the effects each variable had on attitudes toward the color-blind ideology. The final model, model six, included all of the mediating and control variables. All of the ordinal logistic regression models can be found in Table 4 (next chapter).

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

Weighted and un-weighted descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2 (below). As can be seen, more than half of the respondents were white (54.3%), while 19.5% were black, 14.5% were Hispanic, and 11.7% identified as another race. The majority of the respondents were female (62.1%). After the data were weighted, the percentage of female respondents was reduced to 51.5%. The mean value for age was 42.53 (SD= 15.5). Slightly over one-fourth (26.8%) of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 22.6% identified as Evangelical Protestant, 16.3% identified as Unaffiliated, 10.5% identified as Mainline Protestant, 8.9% identified as Black Protestant, 8.3% identified as “other faith,” and 6.6% identified as “Protestant – Other.” In terms of educational attainment, 34.7% of the respondents had a high school diploma or GED (General Education Diploma), 22.2% had a Bachelor’s degree, 21.1% had a vocational or Associates degree, and 12.1% said that they had a postgraduate degree. Very few respondents (7.6%) had less than a high school education, while 2.4% said that they had an “other” form of education.

In regards to geographic region, 33.5% of the respondents lived in the South, 31.1% lived in the West, 19.2% lived in the Midwest and 16.2% lived in the Northeast. For Political Ideology, 26.7% were Conservative, 25.9% did not give much thought to political matters, 24.3% were Liberal and 23.2% identified as “Middle of the Road.” In relation to racial identity, 34.7% of respondents reported that they were daily or weekly aware of their own race, while 38% of respondents were infrequently aware of their race and 27.2% were never aware of their race. For attitudes toward legal segregation, the

majority of respondents disagreed (60.9%), while 22.8% were neutral and 16.3% agreed. For the color-blind measure at Wave I 40.4% of the respondents agreed with the color-blind ideology, while 37.5% disagreed and 22.0% were neutral. In Wave II, 49.4% of the respondents agreed with the color-blind ideology, 32.9% disagreed, and 17.7% were neutral. Compared to Wave I, respondents were more inclined to agree with the color-ideology and less likely to disagree at Wave II, therefore respondents were generally more color-blind in 2012 compared to 2006.

Refer to Table 2, page 77

Table 3 displays a cross-tabulation of the color-blind measure at Wave II by the color-blind measure at Wave I. As can be seen in table 3, when comparing respondents who agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I, 64.6% also agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave II. In regards to respondents who disagreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I, 36.2% of those respondents agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave II. Additionally, 48.1% of respondents who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I also disagreed in Wave II. Therefore, respondents who originally agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were less inclined to change their response.

Refer to Table 3, page 91

The ordinal logistic regression models can be found in Table 4. In terms of general race observations in Model 1 ($\chi^2 = 194.68$, $df = 19$), blacks were 186% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, this relationship was statistically significant (OR= 2.86, $p = .000 < .05$). Hispanics were 56% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology (OR= 1.56, $p = .024 < .05$). Age (OR= .00, $p = .973 > .05$) and gender (OR= .98, $p = .918 > .05$) were not significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology in any of the models. Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (OR= .59, $p = .007 < .05$), and the odds ratio of .59 indicated that Evangelical Protestants were 41% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor's degree were 81% (OR= 1.81, $p = .018 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 195% (OR= 2.95, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. When observing the color-blind measure at Wave I as a control variable, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 243% (OR= 3.43, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 162% (OR= 2.62, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 1 approximately 14.5-16.8% of the

variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

When geographic region was added in Model 2 ($\chi = 202.384$, $df = 22$), blacks were 193% (OR=2.93, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than whites to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 50% (OR= 1.50, $p = .042 < .05$) more likely than whites to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. Evangelical Protestants were 36% (OR= .64, $p = .18 < .05$) less likely than unaffiliated respondents to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Identically to Model 1, those possessing a bachelor's degree were 81% (OR= 1.81, $p = .018 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. However, those possessing a post-graduate degree were now 204% (OR= 3.04, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 227% (OR= 3.27, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than those who agree with the color-blind ideology to disagree with the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 154% (OR= 2.54, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than respondents who agreed with the color-blind ideology to show stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology in Wave II. None of the geographic regions were significantly associated with the color-blind ideology ($p = > .05$), however Northeastern residents were 26% (OR= 1.26, $p = .179 > .05$) more likely than Southern residents to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents residing in the West were 30% (OR= 1.30, $p = .098 > .05$) more likely than Southern residents to have a

stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 2 approximately 15-17.5% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

When political ideology was added in Model 3 ($\chi^2 = 200.23$, $df = 22$), blacks were 191% (OR= 2.91, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 55% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology (OR= 1.55, $p = .027 < .05$). Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (OR= .62, $p = .015 < .05$), and Evangelical Protestants were 38% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. In regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor's degree were 66% more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer statistically significant in Model 3 (OR= 1.66, $p = .051 > .05$). Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 160% (OR= 2.60, $p = .001 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. When observing the Color-Blind measure in Wave I as a control variable, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 234% (OR= 3.34, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 167% (OR= 2.67, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. Although liberals were 32% more likely than

conservatives to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, this relationship was not statistically significant (OR= 1.32, $p = .10 > .05$). In model 3 approximately 14.9-17.3% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

When racial identity was added into model 4 ($\chi^2 = 198.57$, $df = 21$), blacks were 161% (OR= 2.61, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 35% more likely than whites to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer statistically significant as it was in the previous models (OR= 1.35, $p = .146 > .05$). Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (OR= .59, $p = .006 < .05$), and Evangelical Protestants were 41% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. Additionally, Roman Catholics were 33% (OR= 1.33, $p = .048 < .05$) less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. In regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor's degree were 80% (OR= 1.80, $p = .019 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 191% (OR= 2.91, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. For the Color-Blind measure in Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 243% (OR= 3.43, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in

Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 159% (OR= 2.59, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents indicating that they were not frequently aware of their race were 26% (OR= .74, $p = .048 < .05$) less likely than respondents who were aware of their race daily to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents who were never aware of their race were 21% less likely than respondents who were aware of their race daily to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was not statistically significant (OR= .79, $p = .143 > .05$). In model 4 approximately 14.8-17.2% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

In Model 5 ($\chi^2 = 201.37$, $df = 21$), which included attitudes toward legal segregation as a mediating variable, blacks were 198% (OR= 2.98, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than whites to have stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 59% more likely than whites to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology (OR= 1.59, $p = .146 > .05$). Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (OR= .60, $p = .006 < .05$), and Evangelical Protestants were 40% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a bachelor's degree were 71% (OR= 1.71, $p = .035 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 181% (OR= 2.81, $p = .000 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology.

For the Color-Blind measure in Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 233% (OR= 3.33, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 155% (OR= 2.55, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a stronger to the color-blind ideology. Respondents who disagreed with legal segregation were 51% (OR= 1.51, $p = .018 < .05$) more likely than respondents who agreed with legal segregation to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Interestingly, respondents who were neutral toward legal segregation were 59% (OR= 1.59, $p = .015 < .05$). more likely than respondents who agreed with legal segregation to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 5 approximately 15-17.4% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

The final ordinal logistic regression model, Model 6 ($\chi = 217.66$, $df = 29$), included all of the control variables along with geographic region, political ideology, racial identity and attitudes toward legal segregation. Similar to the first model, blacks were 186% ($p = .000 < .05$) more likely than whites to have stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 36% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, however, just as in model 4, this relationship was no longer statistically significant as it was in the other models (OR= 1.36, $p = .148 > .05$). In regards to religious affiliation, Evangelical Protestants were 33% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. In

regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor's degree were 58% more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer statistically significant (OR= 1.58, $p = .078 > .05$). Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 155% (OR= 2.55, $p = .001 < .05$) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. For the Color-Blind measure in Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 210% (OR= 3.10, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 149% (OR= 2.49, $p = .000 < .01$) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 6 approximately 16.1-18.7% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.

Just as in Model 1, geographic region was not significant in predicting attitudes toward the color-blind ideology in the final model. None of the categories for political ideology or racial identity were statistically significant. However, respondents indicating that they disagreed with legal segregation were 48% (OR= 1.48, $p = .025 < .05$) more likely than respondents who agreed with legal segregation to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents who were neutral to legal segregation were 62% more likely than respondents who agree with legal segregation to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was not statistically significant (OR= 1.62, $p = .012 < .05$).

Refer to Table 4, page 92

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION

This study examined the relationship between race and adherence to the color-blind ideology. Using data from both waves of the Portraits of American Life Study, this study examined attitudes toward the color-blind ideology from the respondents who participated in both waves of the study. This study contributed a longitudinal perspective to the color-blind ideology, and added new information regarding the mediators of this relationship. Previous studies have focused on the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Lewis 2001; Awad et al. 2005; Zamudio and Rios 2006; Hughey et al. 2015), but the mediators of this relationship previously were unknown.

The current study highlighted the racial divide in regards to attitudes toward dealing with race related issues in the United States. This study validated other research stating that black individuals are much more likely to suggest that racism is still a major problem in the United States, this has been confirmed among millennials, who are growing into the “new” politics of race (Cohen 2011; Bobo 2011; Pew Research 2016). This difference is still evident today, even with President Barack Obama’s election in 2008, which was the presumed landmark of post-racialism. The current study on color-blindness provided new insights on the multidimensional concept of the color-blind ideology, showing that there are still race differences in regards to addressing racial tensions within the United States.

This study can contribute to public policy decisions on social programs that are available to ethnic minorities. Race relations cannot improve simply by not discussing race, not talking about race is not going to erase race as a concept or racism as a reality. Education programs can enforce the fact that upward mobility for ethnic minorities is not due to cultural inferiority, and that race is a social fact in contemporary society. These ideas are at odds with the assumptions of the color-blind ideology, because it posits that race no longer matters, and that it has been erased entirely. Under the lens of color-blindness, it is seen as unnecessary to develop social programs that benefit racial minorities if race is no longer relevant or “unseen.” However, racism persists.

Although some Americans have argued that the election of the first African American president is the landmark for a post-racial society, many Americans also have argued that Barack Obama’s presidency has worsened race relations (Pew Research Center 2016). Barack Obama’s presidential election in 2008 was deemed as the “weapon of choice” used by whites to justify color-blind stances (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011), and to further the notion of a post-racial society. There is not only a racial divide in regards to this issue, but other variables such as political affiliation also show noticeable differences in responses to race-based issues in the United States. According to a recent Pew Research Center study (2016), 63% of white Republicans indicated that President Obama worsened race relations in the United States compared to just 5% of white Democrats. Additionally, 78% of white Democrats agreed that more changes are necessary in order to strive for racial equality in the United States compared to only 36% of white Republicans (Pew Research Center 2016). Additionally, it was found that 49%

of white Democrats indicated that their race has served as an advantage to “get ahead” in life (Pew Research Center 2016). This leaves more to be desired in the pursuit of racial equality in the United States. One of the most important findings from this study indicated that four out of ten blacks indicated that they were doubtful that the United States would ever reach a standard of racial equality (Pew Research Center 2016). These findings indicated that there are large race-based differences on how to deal with racial tensions in the United States, and there is still more to be done.

Discussion of the Results

There was a clear racial difference in attitudes toward color-blindness, even when controlling for prior attitudes. Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than were whites to disagree with the color-blind ideology. This was found in all of the ordinal logistic regression models. In Model 1, blacks were 186% more likely than were whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This confirmed the first hypothesis that predicted that blacks and other races would be more likely to oppose the color-blind ideology compared to whites. The sizeable gap between whites and other races suggests that there is a clear divide on how to address racial tensions within the United States. This validated previous findings, which emphasized the racial divide on addressing race-related issues in the United States (Bobo 2011; Bunyasi 2015; Pew Research 2016). This indicated that whites are much more likely to be color-blind than blacks and Hispanics, and whites are generally more inclined to ignore the continuing relevance of race in contemporary society by not discussing race.

Geographic region did not mediate the relationship between race and attitudes toward the color-blind ideology. Therefore, the second hypothesis was not supported. However, geographic region did strengthen the odds of blacks and Hispanics having a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology compared to whites. When geographic region was added in model 2 blacks were 193% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, however in model 1 blacks were only 186% more likely than whites to oppose the color-blind ideology. This suggests that geographic region does strengthen the stance toward the color-blind ideology. Geographic region was not significant in the model potentially due to the variable being used as a proxy, but also due to the limited number of four geographic regions used in the study.

Political ideology did not mediate the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology, therefore the third hypothesis was not supported. Similar to geographic region, adding political ideology into the model strengthened the odds for blacks and Hispanics of opposing the color-blind ideology. Liberals were 32% more likely than were conservatives to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology in Model 3. This validated previous literature focusing on progressive political ideologies that tend to acknowledge racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2012; Wilkins and Wegner 2014). However, no political ideology variables were statistically significant in Model 3 or in the final model. There have been distinctions found between political affiliation and the color-blind ideology (Pew Research 2016), and similar differences were found in this analysis. Political ideology did increase the odds ratios for blacks, but the same was not true for

Hispanics. Those showing pessimism about the current state of racial affairs in the United States are more likely Liberal than conservative (Pew Research 2008), but this relationship is more relevant for blacks than it is for Hispanics.

Racial identity mediated the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology, therefore the fourth hypothesis was supported. In model 4 blacks were 161% more likely than were whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. However, in model 1 blacks were 186% more likely than were whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This suggests that blacks do have strong racial identities as previously confirmed by the Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (Sellers et al. 1998). However, Hispanics were only 32% more likely than were whites to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Once racial identity was added to the model, the relationship between Hispanics and the color-blind ideology was no longer significant ($p = .146 > .05$). This indicates that Hispanics might not have strong racial identities compared to blacks.

When legal segregation was added in Model 5, it did not mediate the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis was not supported. Blacks were 198% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This was the highest level of opposition observed in any of the models. Hispanics were 59% more likely than whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology; this was a 3% increase from Model 1. Disagreement ($p = .018 < .05$) and neutral attitudes ($p = .015 < .05$) toward legal segregation were both significantly associated with opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those indicating

neutral attitudes toward legal segregation were 59% more likely than those indicating agreement with legal segregation to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This differed from those who disagreed with legal segregation, who were 56% more likely than those indicating agreement with legal segregation to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Attitudes toward segregated communities are closely related to the color-blind ideology (Rugh and Massey 2013) and the assumption of naturalization (Bonilla-Silva 2012) in that segregation of communities based on race is dismissed as a natural phenomenon. Therefore, it is not surprising that those who disagree with or are neutral to legal segregation are also likely to disagree with the color-blind ideology.

In the final model, blacks were 186% more likely than whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This was the same figure for Model 1, which did not include any of the mediating variables. Hispanics were 36% more likely than whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology ($p = .148 > .05$). This was a 1% increase from Model 4 and a 20% decrease from Model 1. When observing the effects of the mediating variables, the legal segregation variables were the only variables that were significantly associated with the color-blind ideology. This could be related to the correlation between the color-blind ideology and failing to recognize the relevance of race in the segregation of communities (Rugh and Massey 2013).

In regards to other demographic findings, higher levels of education (more specifically a post-graduate or bachelor's degree) were associated with a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This was especially evident in model 2, when

geographic region was added as a mediator. Those having a post-graduate degree were 204% more likely than were those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This validated previous research stating that higher education levels are associated with an acknowledgment of the relevance of race in everyday life (Pew Research Center 2016). Color-blind responses from Wave I were highly predictive of color-blind responses at Wave II. This was mostly evident in Models 1 and 4, where those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I were 243% more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology at Wave II.

Limitations

The current study has several limitations. The first limitation, as should be expected, is that there was attrition between the two waves of the Portraits of American Life Study (47%). The attrition limits a complete comparison of how attitudes to the color-blind ideology changed among this group of respondents. However, there are longitudinal variable weights for the second wave, which accommodated for the attrition between Wave I and II. This allowed for a nationally representative sample to be maintained.

The next limitation is related to the measure for the dependent variable. Ideally, more questions could be asked that also measured attitudes or adherence to the color-blind ideology. Other studies have employed scales that measure different aspects of this concept (confer Neville et al. 2013). The second wave of the survey also included many more variables, and included a variety of race-related questions that were not asked in

Wave I. Ideally more mediating variables could be included in the model, but a number of questions on racial or ethnic diversity were only asked in Wave II when the sample size was greatly reduced.

It can be argued that it is problematic to measure prejudiced attitudes using a survey that is conducted face to face (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Zamudio and Rios 2006). Respondents could be more inclined to indicate a more socially acceptable response rather than their actual thoughts (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Zamudio and Rios 2006). This might be especially relevant during in-person interviews when the interviewee is of another race. However, race of the interviewee was not reported in this study. Racist attitudes can be further expanded upon through qualitative methods. Additionally, it is likely that people might be more forthcoming when filling out an anonymous survey than when being interviewed in person.

Suggestions for Future Research

Future studies could add to this growing body of research in the sociology of race and ethnicity. Further studies should be conducted on the color-blind ideology, not only through survey questions, but also from a combination of qualitative and ethnographic studies. Other studies could examine other mediating and or moderating factors that could not be analyzed with these data. Additionally, further research can be conducted on color-blindness and attitudes towards the presumed absence of racism in contemporary society.

It is important to account for the “new” politics of race (Logan 2014) and how this “new” political landscape could further shape views toward social policy (Cohen

2011; Bunyasi 2015). It has been stated that racial division is critical in the understanding of the welfare state (Williams 2003), as well as what this means for the future of race-policy relationships (Brown 2013). In addition to furthering the understanding of race-policy relationships, it is also important to examine further the importance of racial identities, segregation by race, and political ideology. The characteristics of the “new” politics of race are related to an avoidance of race-based discussions that are considered divisive, an acceptance of racial progress in the United States, and a disassociation from race-based policies, which are considered unfair. This “new” politics of race also suggests that lower-class black citizens are lower-class citizens due to their own cultural deficiencies (Logan 2014). The “new” politics of race coincide with the “new” racism in that there is a desire to avoid addressing race-based issues and to preserve the status quo.

Aside from these variables, more studies could elaborate on the racial divide without dichotomizing into black and white individuals. Further, racial identities among Hispanics and members of other races should be further examined to better understand more fully how awareness of one’s racial identity influences their stance on color-blindness and other race-based issues. It is critical to understand how these variables shape opinions toward race-based policies and life chances to better address race-relations in the United States. Moving forward, it is necessary to address the rationalizations for the color-blind ideology and continued structural inequality (Hughey et al. 2015). If proponents of the color-blind ideology assume that race has been erased, more scholarship may be necessary to explain further the racialized social system that we inhabit. The relevance of race in everyday life is evident in education and admissions

policies (Augoustinos et al. 2005; Thomason 2016; Liptak 2016) to broader political practices (Logan 2014), and the biological sciences (Morning 2014; Byrd and Hughey 2015; Gillborn 2016).

While race has not been erased from contemporary society, the relevance and importance of race has been erased from the realities of many living in the “post-racial” America of today. The racial divide will continue to exist until racial matters are taken more seriously. To initiate this, racial matters in the United States must first be discussed. The aversion to discussing race and racial inequality among mixed-race communities only contributes to persisting racial inequality by not addressing or acknowledging its importance in contemporary society. The importance of race has not been “erased” as much as it has been brushed under the rug, ignored until it has been brought to the surface again. It was brought to the surface in 2008 during the presidential election, but has since been brushed back. The relevance of race must be made clear in public policies to promote further a fair and just society, one in which the color-blind ideology promotes but does not fully endorse.

In conclusion, this study shed light on a longitudinal perspective on the color-blind ideology. It was found that racial identity mediated the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology. This confirmed the fourth hypothesis. There were large racial differences in regards to attitudes toward the color-blind ideology, with blacks and Hispanics being much more likely to disagree with this ideology compared to whites, this confirmed the first hypothesis. Although geographic region, political

ideology and attitudes toward legal segregation did not mediate this relationship, these variables further strengthened this racial divide.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Figures

Figure 1: Anticipated Mediators of the Relationship between Race and Adherence to the Color-Blind Ideology



Appendix B: Tables

Table 1: Previous Empirical Work on Color-Blind Racism

Author/Year	Methods/Data Source	Sample	Objective	Findings	Implications
Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000)	1997 Social Attitudes of College Students Survey including in-depth interviews	451 white college students	To examine the extent to which surveys underestimate prejudiced attitudes compared to in-depth (in person) interviews	Responses varied between data collection modes in that there were contradictions between responses given in the survey compared to responses given during the interviews.	Defending white supremacy is no longer based on Jim Crow racism but is rooted in the subtle nature of color-blind racism. Survey questions alone may not be adequate for assessing all components of color-blindness.
Lewis (2001)	Ethnographic study during 1997-98 school year. Formal and informal interviews were conducted with students, staff and parents of students in an elementary school.	489 elementary school students (90% white), unidentified number of parents and administrators	Understanding how race operates in a school environment that is predominantly white.	Many students and faculty espoused color-blind viewpoints about the community and the school, even though the community was largely segregated by race.	Understanding how race operates is important even within environments populated mostly by whites. Multicultural education is not only for students of color.
Awad, Cokley and Ravitch (2005)	Convenience sample from a large Midwestern university	375 college students in the Midwest, 58.7% white	To assess attitudes toward affirmative action programs	Attitudes toward affirmative action differed by race. Color-blind and modern racist attitudes were associated with affirmative action attitudes.	Attitudes toward affirmative action are not proxies of racial attitudes. Color-blindness and individual prejudice may differ.

Zamudio and Rios (2006)	Data taken from Picca and Feagin's (2007) analysis	Journals from 60 (951 entries) of the original 626 white college students from the Picca and Feagin data set which was collected from 2002-2003	Analyze different characteristics of color-blind racism in comparison to traditional racism in the journals	Entries coinciding with traditional racism and themes of white supremacy were more frequent than entries relating to color-blind racism.	Racism is played out in a number of different ways. There are a number of different rationalizations for color-blind or traditional racism.
Picca and Feagin (2007)	Journal entries collected from college students' journals among 28 colleges.	626 white college students from 28 colleges in the United States, collected 2002-2003.	Observe racialized actions, performers, observers of these actions and the racial framing of these actions.	Significant differences were found between how whites behave in public and how they express their views in the backstage.	Racial prejudices can be concealed and may not manifest themselves in the "front stage" as much as they do in the "back stage."
Cabrera (2011)	Semi-structured interviews conducted in	12 white college students from a university in the Western region of the United States	Observe the minimization of racism in higher education by white college students	The white students blamed minority students for perpetuating "reverse racism" and expressed hostility toward multiculturalis-m	Affirmative action and multiculturalism are met with hostility by some white college student, who claimed that they were the supposed victims of these policies
Rugh and Massey (2013)	Decennial Census of Housing and Population (1970-2010)	White, Black, Hispanic residents of the United States (Residents from 287 metropolitan statistical areas)	Observe the segregation patterns by the decade from 1970 to 2010	Whites still remain segregated from other ethnic groups. The Hispanic population has grown substantially, and Black segregation is still high in some regions	Areas exhibiting high education levels and low anti-Black and anti-Latino sentiment are areas that are integrating at higher rates. Segregation may be increasing in some

				but has decreased overall from 1970-2010.	metropolitan areas while decreasing in others.
Hastie and Rimmington (2014)	Discussion board comments on six news articles from the New York Times that focused on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on racial discrimination	357 discussion board comments posted to the New York Times article “Detecting Race Bias in Workplaces” in 2009	To address examples of white privilege and the denial of structural inequality within the comments regarding affirmative action	Those who did discuss and acknowledge white privilege were more likely to acknowledge structural inequality, with those who are color-blind not acknowledging white privilege.	The analysis provided predictive characteristics of attitudes toward affirmative action through acknowledgment of white privilege, and what this means for attitudes on public policy.
Jackson, Sweeney and Welcher (2014)	14 group interviews, divided homogeneously by race	14 groups, a total of 72 students	To address racial segregation on college campuses, as well as if cross-group interaction is desired, and the reasoning for lack of contact.	The white segregation was characterized as a natural occurrence, and both minority and white students blamed the “other” for the lack of integration.	Provided another perspective to the justification for continued segregation: that underrepresented groups “create and perpetuate separation.” This validated research suggesting that segregation is a natural phenomenon.
Bunyasi (2015)	Five global telephone interviews from 2000-2009	Sample sizes ranged from 684-1,040 across the polls	Address white privilege along with white identity to ask questions relating to upward mobility in the workplace, affirmative action, and other political issues.	Privilege reporting and color-blind whites were both likely than disadvantages whites to support affirmative action. Privilege reporting whites were more likely to support diversity-based	Privilege reporting whites were more likely to support diversity-based affirmative action. Disadvantaged whites also were more likely to oppose affirmative action. This may lend more information to attitudes toward public policy

				affirmative action compared to other groups.	based on white racial identity.
McDermott (2015)	The American Community Survey (2011)	16,632 non-Hispanic whites	Assess how different white identities (white, American, ethnic, none) are related to color-blind and color-visible ideologies	Whites arrived at conclusions consistent with the color-blind ideology through different pathways depending on their ancestry or self-proclaimed "white" identity.	Un-hyphenated white ethnic identities can help lend information on voting behavior, with non-hyphenated whites being more likely to identify as Republican compared to hyphenated white identities.
Modica (2015)	Convenience sample of white high school students from Excellence Academy (EA) located in Woodlark.	Conducted 26 total interviews: 20 with students, 6 with teachers or administrators	To understand responses to multi-cultural literature in a suburban public school setting	There was an overall aversion to discussing race in the classroom, for fear of being labeled racist. Most students used a reverse racism discourse to explain race-based issues.	Productive classroom discussions were avoided due to a color-blind and reverse racism discourse exhibited by the students. Mentioning the "R" word (Race), was generally associated with being labeled a racist.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
(n=1,252)

Variable	n	Un-weighted % Mean(SD)	Weighted % Mean(SD)
Color-Blind Ideology Wave I			
Strongly Disagree	296	23.6	19.4
Somewhat disagree	174	13.9	13.8
Neither agree nor disagree	276	22.0	24.0
Somewhat agree	270	21.6	22.9
Strongly agree	236	18.8	20.0
Color-Blind Ideology Wave I (Recoded)			
Disagree	470	37.5	33.2
Neutral	276	22.0	24.0
Agree	506	40.4	42.8
Color-Blind Ideology Wave II			
Strongly disagree	247	19.7	15.4
Somewhat disagree	165	13.2	11.7
Neither disagree nor agree	221	17.7	17.6
Somewhat agree	275	22.0	24.3
Strongly agree	344	27.5	31.1
Color-Blind Ideology Wave II (Recoded)			
Disagree	412	32.9	27.0
Neutral	221	17.7	17.6
Agree	619	49.4	55.4
Attitudes Toward Legal Segregation			
Strongly disagree	582	46.5	41.5
Somewhat disagree	180	14.4	15.5
Neither agree nor disagree	286	22.8	26.0
Somewhat agree	115	9.20	9.20
Strongly agree	89	7.10	7.90
Attitudes Toward Legal Segregation (Recoded)			
Disagree	762	60.9	56.9
Neutral	286	22.8	26.0
Agree	204	16.3	17.1
Racial Identity			

Variable	n	Un-weighted % Mean(SD)	Weighted % Mean(SD)
Every day	324	25.9	20.2
Nearly every day	110	8.80	8.70
Weekly	123	9.80	8.90
Monthly	86	6.90	6.70
Less than monthly	268	21.4	22.8
Never	341	27.2	32.6
Racial Identity (Recoded)			
Daily aware of own race	434	34.7	29.0
Not frequently aware of own race	477	38.0	37.8
Never aware of own race	341	27.2	33.2
Geographic Region			
Northeast	203	16.2	17.2
Midwest	241	19.2	24.9
South	419	33.5	32.7
West	389	31.1	25.2
Political Ideology			
Very liberal	94	7.50	5.80
Somewhat liberal	210	16.8	16.1
Middle of the road	290	23.2	24.7
Somewhat conservative	249	19.9	20.6
Very conservative	85	6.80	7.90
Haven't thought much about it	324	25.9	25.0
Political Ideology (Recoded)			
Liberal	304	24.3	21.8
Middle of the road	290	23.2	24.7
Conservative	334	26.7	28.5
Do not give much thought to political matters	324	25.9	25.0
Race			
White	680	54.3	69.5
Black	244	19.5	11.2
Hispanic	181	14.5	12.5
Asian	90	7.20	4.70
Native American	5	0.40	0.10
Pacific Islander	4	0.30	0.20
Mixed Race	32	2.60	0.90

Variable	n	Un-weighted % Mean(SD)	Weighted % Mean(SD)
Other	16	1.30	0.90
Race (Recoded)			
White	680	54.3	69.4
Black	244	19.5	11.2
Hispanic	181	14.5	12.5
Other Race	147	11.7	6.9
Age		42.53(15.51)	44.99(16.22)
Sex			
Male	474	37.9	48.5
Female	778	62.1	51.5
Education			
Less than high school	95	7.60	9.40
GED	61	4.90	6.80
High School	373	29.8	34.9
Vocational-technical	117	9.30	8.30
Associate	147	11.7	10.0
Bachelor's	278	22.2	17.0
Master's/Master's of divinity	111	8.80	7.50
Doctorate	15	1.20	0.90
Professional degree	25	2.0	2.40
Other	30	2.40	2.80
Education (Recoded)			
Less than high school	95	7.60	9.40
High School/GED	434	34.7	35.7
Vocational/Associates	264	21.1	18.5
Bachelor's	278	22.2	21.4
Post Graduate Degree	151	12.1	9.20
Other	30	2.40	5.80
Religion			
Christian	629	50.2	57.5
Muslim	4	0.30	0.50
Jewish	24	1.90	1.50
Roman Catholic	335	26.8	21.0
Mormon	6	0.50	0.40
Buddhist	24	1.90	0.60
Hindu	14	1.10	1.60

Variable	n	Un-weighted % Mean(SD)	Weighted % Mean(SD)
Agnostic	41	3.30	2.60
Atheist	16	1.30	1.30
Spiritual	116	9.30	8.40
Don't give religious things much thought	31	2.50	1.90
Other	12	0.90	2.70
Religion (Recoded)			
Black Protestant	111	8.90	5.0
Evangelical Protestant	283	22.6	27.2
Mainline Protestant	131	10.5	11.1
Catholic	336	26.8	26.5
Other faith	104	8.30	7.50
Un-affiliated	204	16.3	14.1
Protestant –Other	83	6.60	8.70
Respondent Type			
Web	1033	82.5	80.8
In person/other	219	17.5	19.2

Table 3. Cross-Tabulation of Color-Blind at Wave II by Color-Blind at Wave I

Color-Blind Wave II	Color-Blind Wave I			Total
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
Agree	64.60%	44.00%	36.20%	49.40%
Neutral	12.80%	29.80%	15.70%	17.70%
Disagree	22.50%	26.20%	48.10%	32.90%
Total	n=506 (100%)	n=276 (100%)	n=470 (100%)	n=1,252

$\chi=144.36$, Sig.:000, df=4

Table 4: Odds Ratios of Ordinal Logistic Regression of Color-Blind Racism on Race, Religion, Education, Geographic Region and Political Ideology

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Race (ref. =White)						
Black	2.86***(.24)	2.93***(.24)	2.91***(.24)	2.61***(.24)	2.98***(.24)	2.86***(.25)
Hispanic	1.56*(.20)	1.50*(.20)	1.55*(.20)	1.35(.21)	1.59*(.20)	1.36(.21)
Other Race	1.06(.24)	1.09(.24)	1.19(.24)	1.08(.25)	1.19(.24)	1.07(.25)
Gender (ref.=female)						
Male	0.98 (.12)	0.97(.12)	0.99(.12)	0.97(.12)	1(.12)	0.97(.12)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Religion (ref.=Unaffiliated)						
Black Protestant	0.84(.36)	0.87(.36)	0.87(.36)	0.80(.36)	0.85(.36)	0.88(.37)
Evangelical Protestant	0.59**(.19)	0.64*(.19)	0.62*(.20)	0.59**(.19)	0.60**(.19)	0.67*(.20)
Mainline Protestant	0.97(.23)	1(.23)	1.02(.23)	0.96(.23)	0.99(.23)	1.05(.24)
Roman Catholic	0.69(.20)	0.71(.20)	0.71(.20)	0.67*(.20)	0.69(.20)	0.72(.20)
Other Faith	0.78(.26)	0.74(.26)	0.8(.26)	0.76(.26)	0.77(.26)	0.73(.26)
Other Protestant	1.01(.25)	1.01(.25)	1.01(.25)	1.03(.25)	1.01(.25)	1.04(.25)
Education (ref.=Less than High School)						
High School/GRE	1.06(.22)	1.1(.22)	1.01(.22)	1.05(.22)	1.02(.22)	0.99(.23)
Associates/Vocational	1.24(.24)	1.27(.25)	1.17(.25)	1.23(.24)	1.19(.25)	1.14(.25)
Bachelors	1.81*(.25)	1.81*(.25)	1.66(.26)	1.80*(.25)	1.71*(.25)	1.58(.26)
Post Graduate	2.95***(.28)	3.04***(.28)	2.60**(.28)	2.91***(.28)	2.81***(.28)	2.55**(.29)
Other Education	1.77(.39)	1.84(.39)	1.68(.40)	1.78(.39)	1.69(.39)	1.68(.40)
Color-Blind W1(ref.=Agree)						
Color-Blind W1 - Disagree	3.43***(.14)	3.27***(.14)	3.34***(.14)	3.43***(.14)	3.33***(.14)	3.10***(.14)
Color-Blind W1 - Neutral	2.62***(.15)	2.54***(.15)	2.67***(.15)	2.59***(.15)	2.55***(.15)	2.49***(.15)
Geographic Region (ref.=South)						
Northeast		1.26(.18)				1.25(.18)
Midwest		0.86(.16)				0.86(.16)
West		1.3(.16)				1.27(.16)
Political Ideology (ref.=Conservative)						
Liberal			1.32(.17)			1.34(.17)
Middle of the Road			0.95(.17)			0.96(.17)
No thought to politics			0.90(.17)			0.92(.17)

Racial Identity (ref.=Daily aware)						
Racial Awareness - Infrequent)					0.74*(.16)	0.77(.16)
Racial Awareness - Never)					0.79(.16)	0.80(.16)
Legal Segregation (ref.=Agree)						
Legal Segregation - Neutral					1.59*(.19)	1.62*(.20)
Legal Segregation – Disagree					1.51*(.17)	1.48*(.18)
Nagelkerke R-Square	0.168	0.175	0.173	0.172	0.174	0.187
Cox and Snell R-Square	0.145	0.150	0.149	0.148	0.150	0.161
Chi-Square	194.68	202.384	200.23	198.57	201.37	217.66
df	19	22	22	21	21	29