The Rhetoric of Neo-Orientalism: The Perpetuation of Ideological Entanglements for Pakistan

Firasat Jabeen

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations

Recommended Citation
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/2386

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
THE RHETORIC OF NEO-ORIENTALISM: THE PERPETUATION OF IDEOLOGICAL ENTANGLEMENTS FOR PAKISTAN

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design

by
Firasat Jabeen
May 2019

Accepted by:
Dr. Cynthia Haynes, Committee Chair
Dr. Todd May
Dr. Cameron Fae Bushnell
Dr. Mashal Saif
ABSTRACT

This research is a re-imagination of Edward Said’s landmark scholarship *Orientalism* from a Pakistani perspective. The study focuses on the construction and creation of ideologies positioned in mass media (both US and Pakistani) messages. In doing so, I consider Edward Said’s *Orientalism* as a set of two distinctive theories: (i) the theory of representation, and (ii) the theory of power. For the former, I study the production and promotion of ideologies in the representation of events and case studies. These case studies include: (i) the Malala Yousafzai case (2012), (ii) the US Drone Strikes case (2010), (iii) the Daniel Pearl case (2002), and (iv) the Raymond Davis case (2011).

Employing the methodology of critical discourse analysis, I study the American newspapers’ stereotypical portrayals of Pakistan that depicts the country as a place that is backward, overtaken by benightedness, and civilizationally inferior. For the latter, I study the ideology of English language supremacy in Pakistan through the critical discourse analysis of newspaper advertisements. Here, I study this ideological dominance by examining repressive and ideological apparatuses in Pakistan. The core of my thesis is that the phenomena of imperialism and exploitation is also replicated within a nation wherein those within the circle of power and privileges tend to exploit/exclude marginalized groups, thus, rendering them as ‘others.’ Essentially, I study how language works in the frameworks of power. This research project entails consideration from multiple perspectives: rhetoric, media studies, cultural and critical studies, postcolonial theory, and rhetorical analysis and criticism, among others.
DEDICATION

To my mother, father, and husband who have significantly shaped me!
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to say my special thanks to Cynthia Haynes for detailed readings of earlier drafts of this dissertation; for her constant support and unending guidance; and her countless help on my presentation papers, publishable papers, and mentoring me throughout my research. My thanks to Todd May for his helpful suggestions and many generous readings. I owe special thanks to Cameron Bushnell for many beneficial discussions and constructive feedback, and to Mashal Saif for her deep and critical questions.

I want to express my gratitude for my friends Nathan Riggs, Eda Ozyesilpinar, and Eric Stephens, with whom I shared (besides sharing office suite) my sufferings, hardships, and research experiences. I have similar feelings for my friends Data Tolentino-Canlas, and Dina Septiani, who were (and still are) a great source of hope and comfort for me throughout my PhD journey and especially during my proposal and dissertation defense.

I have great respect for Victor Vitanza for always believing in me and making me a part of the wonderful RCID family. I want to express my thanks to Bryan Denham who helped me in sampling techniques for this study that made this research more systematic and structured. I want to say thanks to Camille Cooper in the Clemson library for her help and support. My special thanks for Clemson library’s interlibrary loan office, especially Renna, Erika, and Jamal who were always there to help me whenever I needed books/other material from outside the state, country, and even the continent. In addition, I am grateful to the Library of Congress (LoC) in Washington DC for providing me useful data, particularly microfilm reels that I have used in this study.

I cannot find words to express my love and gratitude for each and every person in the RCID family; they gave me utmost love and respect, and above all beautiful memories that I’ll carry and cherish for the rest of my life. I am immensely grateful to the Fulbright program for making my PhD dream real.
Lastly, I have immense respect and love for my parents, Ammi and Abu, who missed my absence the most in five PhD years and never forgot to pray for my success; my children, Ali and Izzah, for their patience during the tiring journey of PhD, and for bringing joy, love, care, and comfort in my life; my loving husband, Saleem Abbas, for his friendship, kindness, respect, love, thoughtfulness, and a never ending support in every endeavor of my life.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: INTERNAL ORIENTALISM: THE COLONIAL LEGACY LASTS UP TO THE PRESENT!</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN’S STRATIFIED EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE PREDICAMENT OF ENGLISH</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH—A DILEMMA, A SOURCE OF POLARIZATION</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSIVE APPARATUSES—CONSOLIDATING POWER THROUGH THE APPROPRIATION OF ENGLISH</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES—AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL ADVERTISEMENTS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A SHIFT IN THE STUDY OF LINGUISTIC DISENFRANCHISEMENT: GROWING CONCERNS ON EXTREMISM</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: THE REFLECTIONS OF ORIENTALISM FOR POST 9/11</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDIES ON MALALA YOUSAFZAI AND DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SELECTION OF NEWSPAPERS</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVERAGE OF THE <em>NEW YORK TIMES</em></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

CHAPTER 5: THE RHETORIC OF NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS AND COLUMNS

THE SELECTION OF NEWSPAPERS

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

OPINION ARTICLES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES

OPINION ARTICLES IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

OPINION ARTICLES IN DAWN

OPINION ARTICLES IN THE NATION

CONCLUSION

WORKS CITED
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Govt. Girls High School: English Medium ........................................... 45
Figure 2. Lahore Grammar School Advertisement ............................................... 47
Figure 3. Beaconhouse Advertisement ................................................................. 49
Figure 4. Karachi Grammar School Advertisement .............................................. 50
Figure 5. Froebels Advertisement ....................................................................... 52
Figure 6. Root School Advertisement .................................................................. 53
Figure 7. Army Burn Hall College Advertisement ............................................... 55
Figure 8. Army Burn Hall College Advertisement II .......................................... 57
Figure 9. PAF College Advertisement .................................................................. 58
LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 3:
Table 1. An overview of news articles on two case studies...............................82
Table 2. Coverage by the New York Times ......................................................83
Table 3. Coverage by The Nation .................................................................88
Table 4. Coverage by the Wall Street Journal .................................................95
Table 5. Coverage by Daily Times ...............................................................100

CHAPTER 4:
Table 1. An overview of news stories in four newspapers ...............................122
Table 2. Coverage by the New York Times .................................................123
Table 3. Coverage by the Wall Street Journal ...........................................129
Table 4. Coverage by Dawn .................................................................134
Table 5. Coverage by Jang .................................................................140

CHAPTER 5:
Table 1. Op-eds by the New York Times .......................................................158
Table 2. Op-eds by the Wall Street Journal .................................................166
Table 3. Op-eds by Dawn .................................................................172
Table 4. Op-eds by The Nation ...............................................................181
Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation, as its title suggests, is a consideration of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* from a Pakistani standpoint. Considering Said’s *Orientalism* as a set of two distinctive theories (i) the theory of power, and (ii) the theory of representation, this research entails the investigation of the phenomenon of ‘othering’ in the national and international contexts for Pakistan. I shall explain the ideas related to the study of power and representation in this study in a moment. For this research, my inclination for the study of orientalism from a Pakistani perspective mainly originated from academic and nonacademic experiences during my doctoral studies in the US. Noticing and posing questions about cultural differences is quite normal for someone who hails from a country in the East—Pakistan, and pursues his/her higher studies in the West—the US. Thus, most readings and debates in the classroom settings would make me ask pressing questions about the existence of current problems from which Pakistani society is also suffering. Often I would ask questions like: what solutions and cures can one offer—as a citizen of that country—to redress ongoing dilemmas? What outcomes can it lead to? That is where I started to envisage the exploration/manifestation of my thoughts about illustrating the circumstantial predicaments of Pakistan in the form of a research project.

Another state of affairs that particularly stimulated my interest in the study of orientalism was the majority of Americans’ ignorance about my country of origin, its culture, geography, and political circumstances. The predominant ideas about Pakistan that I found prevalent among most Americans in the informal settings mostly
included Islamic extremism, violence, the subjugation of women, and more importantly, Malala Yousafzai. Americans seem oblivious to Pakistan’s national heritage, cultural values, and historical background, and hence, cannot mention one single good thing related to the country. Identifying the apparent role of US media outlets for these mis/conceptions, the interest for this study has mainly sparked from the study of ‘representations.’ Since representations are generally enacted and embodied in ideological messages, another predominant theme in this study is ‘ideologies.’ In other words, the two recurrent themes throughout this dissertation are ‘representation,’ and ‘ideology.’

In order to study orientalism as a theory or model of power, I examine the dominance of English language in Pakistan that has enabled systematic and relentless cycles of exploitation that operate within the country and buttress the existing cycles of imperialism internationally as well. Here, it is important to mention that Said’s *Orientalism* has stimulated many contemporary scholars to extend this scholarship, particularly for studying orientalism as a model of power. For example, Cindi Katz and Neil Smith, in their interview with Edward Said, mention this fact and argue that “*Orientalism* resonated with geographers who in the 1970s and early 1980s were deeply immersed in questions of imperialism, racism, uneven development, and social reproduction, among others, and who were just beginning to link cultural critiques of capitalist expansionism to political economy” (635). Although Katz and Smith have discussed this propensity of scholars for borders and geography,¹ other scholars have been building on Said’s *Orientalism* to study issues related to racism, feminism and

¹ See Kraus, Little, and Nayak & Malone.
imperialism. Thus, in the study of English linguistic imperialism in Pakistan, I, too, use orientalism as a model of power, dominance, and hegemony.

Another reason for the consideration of orientalism as a model for the investigation of English linguistic imperialism in Pakistan is the model’s capability to scrutinize the uses and abuses of power. In other words, among other characteristics of Orientalism, one prominent feature is the provision of a framework to study power. There are several research studies wherein the scholars have used the model for studying issues related to hegemony. For the study of English linguistic imperialism, Robert Phillipson, whose work is seminal in the study of English imperialism, also conceptualizes—albeit briefly—this imperialism in the framework of orientalism. Phillipson argues that, “inspiration for the study of ELT profession … can be found in Said’s study of Orientalism (1978)” (75). Similarly, Shemeem Abbas studies the power of English specifically in Pakistan and analyzes this dominance using the hegemony models of Edward Said and Antonio Gramsci (147). Thus, through the analysis of English imperialism in this dissertation, I argue that the supremacy of English engenders cycles of imperialism within Pakistan—something that I describe as internal orientalism—and, hence, perpetuates the colonial legacies of exploitation.

In order to substantiate my argument regarding internal orientalism through English linguistic imperialism, I also invoke Johan Galtung’s theory of Structural Imperialism wherein Galtung argues that imperialism is a sophisticated type of dominance relation, “which cuts across nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the Center in the center nation establishes in the center of the Periphery nation” (81). The dominance of English—by being associated with developed (powerful) states—reinforces the concentration of power on an international scale. In this study, I explain
how the supremacy of English corroborates the same imperialistic function inside/within Pakistan. While Galtung emphasizes the relationship between the two centers (from the center and periphery states respectively) and argues for a structural and systematic hegemony cycle, among other types of imperialism, he highlights the role of communication, too, that facilitates the mechanism of exploitation (91). For this reason, the mention of Galtung’s theory of *Structural Imperialism* is a recurrent feature in the chapters of this dissertation.

One of Said’s tasks in *Orientalism* is essentially to expose the system of oppression. In order to critique this system, Said (as mentioned earlier) examines issues related to power as well as representation. There are several scholarly works regarding media representations as well that entail investigation into how media produce dominant ideological narratives through media portrayals. The subsequent chapters in this research discuss in detail the research works that have encompassed Pakistan, too, for the study of biased media portrayals. Eqbal Ahmad, Pakistani writer, academic, political scientist, and a close friend of Edward Said, raised some important concerns about the portrayal of the Islamic world by the US media (*The New York Times*). According to Ahmad, in the description of complexities of Islamic fundamentalism in Eastern countries, US media are unwilling to pay attention to the development of this phenomenon and the role of US imperialist policies in aggravating this problem (35). He further maintains that the four *New York Times* columnists for foreign affairs are “neither qualified nor would they want to be qualified” to comment on the realities of these issues (35). The findings and

---

2 See McChesney, Sharp, and Zengotita.
discussions in the chapters on representations for this study validate Ahmad’s arguments.

Similarly, in the contemporary context, Pakistani Woodrow Wilson scholar and media analyst, Huma Yusuf, has raised somewhat similar concerns about the biased reporting of western media on Pakistan. While responding to a question during the presentation of her research about Pakistani media at the Wilson Center’s Asia program, Yusuf argues that, “Media coverage of Pakistan (in foreign media) is dominated by the security issues” (01:21:19). Moreover, Yusuf shares her working experience with *The Christian Science Monitor*, a US based newspaper organization that publishes news articles in the electronic format. According to Yusuf, instead of welcoming Yusuf’s desire to write about the achievements of a women organization in Pakistan, the editor of *The Christian Science Monitor* wanted Yusuf to merely focus upon issues related to security, i.e., Taliban, terrorism, and violence for the presentation of Pakistan in their newspaper (01:21:51). Considering the US media’s predilection towards security related issues for the coverage of Pakistan, this dissertation specifically focuses on the US media portrayal of four Pakistani incidents that occurred in the post 9/11 period.

For studying representations, I have chosen four Pakistani case studies or events and examined the media portrayal with a comparative approach of worthy and unworthy victims—a propaganda model proposed by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Although Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model does not discuss the East-West binaries, this model entails the exploration of US imperialist policies, and how the working of US media is aligned with the elite US nationalist interests. In other words, in their empirical endeavor to unravel propaganda in the US media
through their book *Manufacturing Consent*, a term that they borrowed from Walter Lipmann, Herman and Chomsky explicate how the seemingly liberal and democratic US media tend to serve the political and imperial interests of the US. The examination of four case studies in this dissertation upholds the views of Herman and Chomsky. Here, the use of Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model to provide an empirical framework to study partial representation or misrepresentation of Pakistan alongside orientalism is practical and viable.

With that being said, I want to explain the word ‘neo-Orientalism’ in the title of this dissertation. In the study of representations under the lens of orientalism, many scholars have used different terminologies to illustrate scholarly works that engage the idea of revisiting orientalism from different places or times. For example, Hamid Dabashi extends a similar idea by using the terminology of ‘Post-orientalism’; M. Shahid Alam engages in a similar discussion by using the terminology of ‘New orientalism.’ For this study, I, too, use the term ‘neo’ along with the word orientalism to suggest the idea of revisiting or reimagining the concept of orientalism. Essentially, by adding the word ‘neo’ here, I am alluding to an addition that this study performs by entailing an empirical investigation component in the study of an Eastern periphery country, Pakistan. In addition, by incorporating local power structures through internal orientalism, I add to the traditional interlocutor—West versus East—whereby I intervene in an indigenous postcolonial binary—oriental versus fellow orientals—as well.

In his presentation of *Orientalism*, Said has extensively focused on eighteenth and nineteenth century French colonialism, and his analysis is limited to the Arab Middle East, hence ignoring/omitting India, Far East, and the Pacific (Clifford, 29).
Moreover, some intellectuals take issue with Said’s methodology of Foucauldian discourse analysis in the study of Orientalism. For example, in On Orientalism, James Clifford mentions Said’s predilection towards a Foucauldian approach and the latter’s ambivalence about Foucault and Nietzsche (23). Similarly, in Orientalism and After, Aijaz Ahmad, too, finds limitations and inadequacies in the use of the Foucauldian model in Said’s Orientalism (165). Especially Clifford mentions that Orientalism is ‘abstractly pitched’ and Said’s approach to study this phenomenon is neither historicist nor empirical but deductive or constructivist (22). At any rate, Orientalism remains one of the influential works to inspire authors with the examination of media representations, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. In this context, this dissertation contributes to the existing knowledge by providing an empirical analysis and a rhetorical criticism approach to the study of representations and ideologies, and situates this analysis within the field of cultural, critical, and media studies.

To study representations and ideologies, I have employed critical discourse analysis (CDA), a qualitative methodological approach. First, I used this methodology in the investigation of ideology related to the English language supremacy. Later, I have used the same methodology for studying orientalist stereotypes in the portrayal of four Pakistani incidents in US newspapers. In our contemporary times, CDA is extensively used in the field of communication, and rhetoric and composition. Thomas Huckin, Jennifer Andrus, and Jennifer Clary-Lemon explain the viability of CDA in both rhetoric and composition (Rhet/Comp), and communication, and argue that both encourage an interdisciplinary approach (110); both are concerned with the interplay of language and power (112); and both models intersect for the analysis of news coverage (115). Thus, CDA facilitates the scrutiny of ideologies in discursive
practices. The use of CDA in this study not only enriches a rhetorical approach but also provides an appropriate framework for detailed textual analysis, and the scrutiny of power dynamics through language.

Another reason for the consideration of CDA in this dissertation is the methodology’s focus on language, power, and ideology. For this purpose, I have specifically focused upon the CDA approaches developed by Norman Fairclough, a European linguist, and one of the founders of CDA. Fairclough’s CDA is essentially concerned with how power is exercised through language, and is mainly influenced by Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser. In the introduction of CDA, Fairclough writes that, “CDA combines critique of discourse and explanation of how it figures within and contributes to the existing social reality, …” (6, emphasis in original). The viability of this model—for providing a method to critique and find explanations—with its interdisciplinary outlook, and wider applicability in communication and rhetoric, thus, makes it suitable for this research.

In The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, Stuart Hall traces the history of western conquest and exploration and quotes John Roberts who argues that knowledge acquired by western explorers and conquerors opened up opportunities of dominance for western powers (qtd. in Hall 285). Hall, too, by taking Foucault into account, focuses on knowledge, discourse, and power and emphasizes the role of discourse in the circulation of power (291-296). For this dissertation, in the case of English dominance, I argue that the dissemination of discourse regarding English supremacy, and the confinement of English learning to a few, perpetuates power abuse nationally and internationally. Consequently, this phenomenon leads to the process of re-orientalization of the Orient by fellow orientals. Whereas in the case of
orientalist representation of Pakistan, my study contends that the US hegemony and leadership on the global infotainment industry serves imperialist purposes as well.

Daya Kishan Thussu, an expert on international communication, maintains that the West, led by the United States, dominates the news and entertainment industry, and hence is capable of spearheading agendas (163). Despite the rhetoric of free and liberal media, there are factors—mostly economic and capitalist—that tend to steer the trends and directions for the flow of information in the media industry. Many research studies explore the effects of economic activities on the process of news production. For example, while explaining political economy of communication, Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding argue that economic dynamics are central in the functioning of a communication process (63). Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model encompasses five important filters that tend to affect news gathering and making. While all five filters affect news dissemination in unique ways, two of them—ownership (most media houses are owned by transnational corporations), and advertising—are directly related to the economic strongholds of the capitalist class. The other three include the source of news, the flak (negative responses to media coverage), and ideological filter of anti-communism or anti-terrorism.

My purpose in this dissertation, however, is not to explicate business interest ramifications of transnational corporations on the working of US media. My focus here is to explore the agreement/alignment of US media’s reporting with their country’s elite’s nationalist interests (as Herman and Chomsky argue). The underpinning theme of orientalism is imperialism. In the post 9/11 world, one of the reasons for US intervention in Eastern Muslim countries have been the ‘humanitarian’
grounds with a focus on feminism. Bibi Aaisha from Afghanistan and Malala Yousafzai from Pakistan are two famous examples. The American *Time* magazine has published cover stories for both women. For the former, the front page of the magazine, along with Bibi Aaisha’s traumatic picture, runs the title that says, “What Happens if We Leave Afghanistan.” Similarly, the *Times* magazine included the latter in the list of the 100 most influential people in the world. In this context, since Herman and Chomsky’s model provides a framework of worthy and unworthy victims to examine the biased portrayals of US media, the use of this model alongside *Orientalism* has provided not only an empirical but also deductive approach to analyze US newspapers’ presentation with a lens of orientalism.

Here, it is important to mention that I am not arguing against the US media’s sympathetic portrayal for the victims (mostly women) of extremism in the name of religion. My assertion, here and later in the dissertation, is that the same US media do not appear to be equally sympathetic towards the coverage of atrocities committed by their own state or sometimes by their supposedly ally state(s). The sensational portrayal of selective incidents in periphery, by employing their powerful media with global reach, for the advancement of their imperialist agendas sustains American orientalism.

At this juncture, it is important to discuss some caveats for the presentation of orientalism in this study. For me, the study of orientalism does not necessarily mean the process of ascribing problems in the East to the West only. Orientalism inherently provides a diverse approach to study various issues predominantly related to the use of power. In *Conversations with Edward Said*, an interview of Said conducted by Tariq Ali, a Pakistani-British scholar, journalist, and public intellectual, Said argues
that *Orientalism* is neither a defense of Islam nor is it a blanket attack on the West (100). Said further describes that analysis in *Orientalism* is to show “diversity of opinion,” and “coalescence around a few ideas” (100). In my study of orientalism, I, too, have tried to envisage issues under study through a multiplicity of ideas. For this purpose, I not only study the dominance of US media in international communication and the issue of distorted Muslim/Pakistani representation but also examine issues of representation in ideologies that tend to replicate international power structure on a national scale.

It is common in Pakistan to talk about the Indian involvement rhetoric, or the US involvement rhetoric for aggravating the current national problems, most of which are related to security and stability. The majority of problems in Pakistan, however, are internal in nature. By internal I mean that many of the country’s problems are Pakistan’s own problems and have varying (depending on the time period) relevance with regard to the Western interference notion. Pakistan’s complex geopolitical situation, regional rivalries, the country’s entanglement in cold war politics, a troubled frontier with India (Pakistan’s supposed nemesis) on its eastern border and an equally difficult and porous border with Afghanistan on western side, and more importantly the strategic doctrine of matching with India in terms of military and arms race, are but a few to name. While there is no gainsaying the fact that the US’s neocolonial interventions have always exacerbated the problems rather than solving them, in order to be addressed and resolved, all aforementioned (and other) problems mainly need will and power on a domestic/internal level.

Earlier in this introduction, I alluded to the idea that this study is primarily situated in media studies, and the cultural and critical domain of communication.
Orientalism scholarship basically originated in the field of literary theory. However, it appears that postcolonial studies have a growing influence and expanding interest in media studies as well especially in terms of studying inequalities and the increasing digital divide in the global North and South, etc. In “When Postcolonial Studies meets Media Studies,” Raka Shome raises an important concern about the impact of postcolonial studies on media. Shome writes that, “In our age of mass publicity, far less people have access to literature …, or consume literature than they do tabloids, television, street images, advertising, the internet, mobile technologies, night club dance, music videos, consumer products, Facebook, Twitter, and so on” (258). As dominant discourse in media history and development is Western-oriented and Eurocentric, Shome also raises concerns about the absence of media history in the global South (246). In this context, the ever-growing field of media and communication certainly expands the concerns of studying this field’s impacts as well.

Sangeet Kumar and Radhika Parameswaran have also sought the relevance of postcolonial theory in the field of communication and media studies. According to Kumar and Parameswaran, postcolonial media and communication studies, which is a new and emerging field of inquiry (347), is more helpful than often employed theoretical approaches of development communication and cultural imperialism in investigating power operations (349). The incorporation of postcolonial studies in the field of media and communication enriches investigative approaches by offering flexible and subjective paradigms that challenge the ideas of universality and globalization especially in the age of digital communication. In this context, this dissertation, too, locates the communication issues of global power and inequity in the
postcolonial paradigm. Thus far, the majority of these issues have been largely positioned within the paradigms of the political economy of communication, and dependency theories, etc. However, a postcolonial/orientalism lens here provides an opportunity to assess not only global powers but local elites as well.

In the discussion of “Ideologies and Ideological Struggle,” Stuart Hall reminds us that ideologies are forms of representations that we tend to develop for the understanding of the world around us (136). Arguing that ideological knowledge is the result of specific practices, Hall maintains that ideologies are essentially discursive or semiotic in nature (136). For this study, although I have not delved into the semiotic explanation of media messages, I have explored discursive practices in detail; first, in the form of advertisements, and then, in contents of newspapers. Furthermore, in How Propaganda Works, Jason Stanley claims that ideological beliefs tend to stymie the reasonable questioning of practices—such as claims and policies—that conform ideologies (221). In this study, looking at actual examples in detail will help us to understand how this characteristically occurs. While chapter 1 (the current chapter) sets up the background and outlines the scope of this research, in what follows, I shall describe a brief chapter-by-chapter summary.

Chapter 2 in this dissertation identifies the issues of internal orientalism that are reproduced at a micro level within Pakistan because of English linguistic imperialism. The unequal education system engenders attitudes of English supremacy. Orientalism participates, or reveals, the global divisions between the East and West wherein the former is subservient to the latter. This division is reproduced domestically in Pakistan where English acquisition remains the preserve of a few who tend to exploit and ostracize (from privileges) others. To identify the corresponding
elements of imperialism, I study both repressive and ideological state apparatuses by examining government reports during military regimes for the former and the advertisements of elite schools for the latter. Both apparatuses play a significant role in promoting English supremacy ideology. With Louis Althusser, I examine this ideology focusing on two Ideological State Apparatuses, i.e., education—elite schools (both private and public), and media—school advertisements. The research in this chapter argues that English plays a significant role in the perpetuation of imperialism in postcolonial Pakistan.

Having a complex linguistic landscape, Pakistan has linguistic hierarchies wherein some ethnic and linguistic groups have also resented the state backing and promotion of the Urdu language. However, this research exclusively focuses on the dominance of English and politics associated with its promotion. The use of Althusser’s model here, along with orientalism, is consistent with the methodology of CDA. For Fairclough, hegemony is maintained by achieving consent, sometimes even in combination with coercion (32). Fairclough’s ideas on coercion and consent corroborate Althusser’s ideas of repressive and ideological state apparatuses. Thus, in the study of ideology in this chapter, I find Althusser’s model in consonant with the methodology that I have used. Towards the end of this chapter, I argue that linguistic apartheid aggravates already existing inequalities and can potentially jeopardize Pakistan’s security and stability by engendering the sense of disenfranchisement among those who do not have access to learning.

In the study of representations, Chapter 3 examines the media portrayal of Malala Yousafzai (2012) (campaigner for female education from Pakistan, shot by the Pakistani Taliban in 2012, and Pakistan’s Nobel laureate) and the victims of US drone
attacks (2010) in Pakistan. In this analysis, I compare the portrayal of these issues/events in US and Pakistani newspapers. Overall, this chapter not only provides a news analysis of the portrayal of Malala Yousafzai and the drone attack victims, it also observes that, once again, we are back to Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s ideas of ‘worthy and unworthy victims.’ This chapter argues that the US media’s selective representations lead to the perpetuation of orientalism.

Chapter 4 continues the study of representation, and analyses the orientalist issues by comparative rhetorical analysis of media portrayals of two incidents in Pakistan: (i) the Daniel Pearl Case (2002) (an American journalist kidnapped and killed by Pakistani terrorists in Karachi), and the Raymond Davis Case (2011) (a contractor with the American intelligence agency who shot two Pakistanis dead in Lahore). Here, again, I rhetorically analyze the news stories of these incidents in the US print media and compare this portrayal with the presentation of the same events in Pakistani newspapers. Throughout this study, I have remained consistent with the selection of US newspapers, i.e., the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*. However, the selection of Pakistani newspapers changes in each chapter depending upon the availability of their archives in databases and on microfilm reels. In this study, the addition of Pakistani newspapers is helpful in identifying issues of partial representation, mis/handling, and the overall framing of the incidents.

Lastly, Chapter 5 continues the same comparison of these same four incidents in the analysis of opinion pages of newspapers. In other words, chapter 5 expands the discussion of the same incidents in terms of the evaluation of op-ed articles, i.e., editorials, columns, and letters to the editor. Thus, by analyzing news stories in chapters 3 and 4, and later opinion articles in chapter 5, the last three chapters in this
dissertation present a comprehensive discussion of the media portrayal of the incidents. The research on Pakistani newspapers here shows that Pakistani media, too, have problems of sensationalism and fragmentary presentation. However, given the breadth of this topic and limited length of this research project, my discussion here needs to be selective. In doing so, I have not explored the issues of portrayal in Pakistani newspapers at length. In the current project, I have exclusively examined discourse in US newspapers to study orientalism.

This study reveals that the majority of media reports tend to portray Pakistan as a problematic country on the world map. While there is some truth in these assertions, the fact remains that generally there appears to be an indifferent approach to a thorough understanding (both nationally and internationally) of how Pakistan has got into the situation where it is today. In any case, Pakistan, in its course of seventy years now, has endured a difficult postcolonial transition, has survived difficult cold war entanglements soon after its birth, and having lost its eastern wing (in the form of Bangladesh), has shown remarkable resilience. This dissertation only explicates a few ideologies (that I have already explained in this introduction) in which Pakistan is entangled. On a domestic level, there are massive ideological entanglements (related to identity, rivalry with India, and relationship with the West) as well in which the majority of Pakistani people are mired. At any rate, these analyses of ideologies can yield meaningful outcomes for problems that appear to be simplistic or monocausal on face value. This dissertation, too, is an endeavor in that regard.
Chapter 2

Internal Orientalism: The Colonial Legacy Lasts up to the Present!

The purpose of this chapter, as it may sound, is neither to demonstrate how woefully unsatisfactory Pakistani education system is nor to bemoan the current status of intellectual sterility or the demise of indigenous languages in the country. The central focus here is to examine how language (English) works in the frameworks of power and how linguistic politics have reinforced the practices of exclusion for weaker groups. Furthermore, I will set this analysis in the context of unequal access of English learning in Pakistan in terms of the possible rise in terrorism. Braj B. Kachru (1986) explains at length that for many postcolonial countries, the role of English is deeply entrenched with the ideas of power and politics. Pakistan presents a good example of this relationship. Kachru’s argument that, “the strategies for acquiring linguistic power have several similarities with other power-acquiring strategies, for example, in politics,” (135) is highly pertinent to the prevalent status of English appropriation in Pakistan. There is a large body of literature on how English is appropriated for a particular class in Pakistan and how this appropriation is keeping a vast majority out of the circle of power and privileges.\(^3\)

Inspired by Edward Said, contemporary scholars\(^4\) add to the field of Orientalism and expand the idea of othering in several contexts. Some examples include domestic orientalism, gendered orientalism, bordered orientalism, and American orientalism against blacks, etc. Thus, in order to study the process of orientalism/othering (in terms of English acquisition) for people in Pakistan, I analyze

---


\(^4\) See Jansson, and Malfreddy
both repressive and ideological state apparatuses by examining government reports for the former and the advertisements of elite schools for the latter. I situate my findings in the theoretical frameworks of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses proposed by Louis Althusser. Before I delve into the details of English linguistic imperialism, it is important to consider how I operationalize this issue for my study. Robert Phillipson writes that, “English linguistic imperialism is that the dominance of English is maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages” (47, emphasis mine). Here, Phillipson refers to material properties (financial allocations, etc.) by the term structural; whereas the word “cultural” refers to immaterial properties (attitudes and pedagogical rules, etc.). The relationship between English and other indigenous languages in Pakistan is an unequal one; worse still, the forces of markets along with certain ideological practices help maintain this unequal relationship.

In other words, in this process of internalizing English, the hegemonic ideas—reinforced by the circulation of English supremacy ideology—tend to serve the purposes of dominated group(s). The study of this ideology, through the analysis of government reports and school advertisements in Pakistan, shows how English serves to uphold the domination of a small elite and of the foreign interests that are allied with them. This is how a replication of the process of orientalism is maintained at a domestic level. Orientalism is a phenomenon that is deeply implicated in the operations of power, i.e., imperialism (Hall, “The Spectacle of the Other,” 260). Imperialism supports global divisions between the East and West in which the former is subservient to the latter. However, these divisions are reproduced at a domestic
level in Pakistan where postcolonial indigenous elites take a leading role in reinforcing the power structure.

In this process of domination, the mechanism of exploitation and control is highly structured and can be illustrated by Johan Galtung’s *A Structural Theory of Imperialism*. The two key instruments in Galtung’s structural imperialism are center and periphery. This center and periphery do not only exist globally but they also lie within each state. Thus, the way Galtung conceives this imperialism is quite systematized in the sense that the center in center state has a ‘nexus’ with the center in the periphery state; correspondingly, the periphery in the center state largely remains indifferent towards the periphery in the periphery state. Galtung refers to this ‘nexus’ as the *harmony of interest* (82). So according to him, there is a harmony of interest between the centers of two nations—center and periphery; there is disharmony of interest between the peripheries of two nations—center and periphery; and there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery nation than a center state (83). From the third clause of his theory, he essentially means that inequalities in the periphery state are more rampant than those of the center state. Thus, this theoretical framework, which describes imperialism from side to side considerations of inequalities, is relevant to the issue of English linguistic imperialism and resulting inequalities.

In a broader context, what Galtung argues is based on the fact that imperialism is an intra-national as well as an inter-national process. This is consonant with the replication of internal orientalism—a concept that I argue is related with the exclusion of people from power and privileges on the basis of English language acquisition. The divide between us and them that reinforces the process of othering is not only global,
recognizing East-West or North-South divide. It also operates within the boundaries of a nation. The periphery nations, characterized by more inequalities, are more prone to experience internal othering. English, as several research studies reveal, has been an instrument for neo-colonialism in the postcolonial era. So for example, Robert Phillipson reveals in his research about the English teaching by American or British organizations in periphery countries that these organizations—through the teaching of English—serve neo-imperialist interests.

As for these neo-imperialist interests, the mechanism of English dominance in postcolonial countries, particularly Pakistan, is twofold. English is hegemonic internally thereby excluding those who are outside the skirts of its learning. Secondly, English, in the contemporary world, is a key instrument for linking to commerce, technology, sciences, and military alliances. Thus, being in the possession of center in Pakistan, it serves to facilitate the links of center in Pakistan with the centers of center states. Here lies the formation of a harmony of interest between two centers. This leads to the perpetuation of a vicious circle that not only maintains the hegemony of two centers but also sustains inequalities as a byproduct.

Another center-periphery relationship that Galtung refers to is the provision of raw material by periphery to center. In return, there is a flow of processed goods from center to periphery. This relationship of imperialism is not confined to past colonial empires; it rather continues in present “using international organizations as their mediums” (Galtung, 100). In order to understand the connection between English linguistic imperialism and inequality in the political and economic spheres, Phillipson examines the rhetoric and legitimation used by the ELT (English Language Teaching) programs in periphery countries by American and British international organizations
and argues that English linguistic imperialism, being a subtype of linguicism, reproduces an unequal division of power and resources between groups defined on the basis of language (47). The existence of ELT programs by center endure the continuation of raw material provision by periphery.

In a world where socio-economic mobility depends on the learning of English, peripheries contribute in the process of production by offering labor in this neo-imperialist phase. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Jean François Lyotard, discusses the idea of legitimacy for the production of knowledge. He points to the fact that relates to the “mercantilization of knowledge” (5); where scientific knowledge has to do with language, problems of communication, translation, computers, their languages, etc. (3). Although Lyotard is not specifically referring to the dominance of a particular language, he does talk about the idea of privilege that certain nation states enjoy because of their dominant position in production and distribution of learning. English performs a strong gatekeeping role for the production, dissemination, and distribution of knowledge, thus, increasing the level of dependence for peripheries both nationally and internationally. In order to understand the appropriation of English in Pakistan by the elite of power or wealth (as Rahman (2002) argues), it is essential to review a brief background and the current status of this predicament.

For a multilingual country like Pakistan, the issue of language(s) is highly complex and controversial. Tariq Rahman, Pakistan’s linguist, identifies more than 50 languages and dialects in Pakistan out of which there are eight most spoken languages—Punjabi (48.17), Pashto (13.14), Sindhi (11.77), Siraiki(9.83), Urdu (7.6), Balochi (3.02), Hindko (2.43), and Brahvi (1.21)—in the country (4556). In its history
of seventy years now, language has proved to be a source of conflict (1948, 1971, and 1972) many times. Urdu, being the mother tongue of a very small minority (7.6%) (Rahman, 2002), is a lingua franca between people belonging to different castes, sects, linguistic, and ethnic identities. Ethnic groups in Pakistan resent the superiority enjoyed by English and Urdu in the country. However, this chapter exclusively deals with the issue of the English language supremacy and how the idea of power related to English leads to the process of internal othering in Pakistan.

The supremacy of English in Pakistan is a perpetuation from the colonial times when British rulers appropriated English for their “intermediaries” who helped them consolidate their control in the subcontinent. Thus, this perpetuates the onset of a parallel education system in the subcontinent, which later continued in Pakistan, too. Shahid Siddiqui (2015) contends that “the strength that English gained does not have to do with the innate capabilities of this language; rather it was the association of power with its speakers that made this language powerful” (3). English became a language of power because of being associated with a powerful group. Similarly, while discussing the Anglicization of India, Robert McCrum reveals that in the pursuit of ‘adopting the ways of the white master,’ Indians began to play cricket (180). The adoption of English and its allocation to a higher status was one of endeavors to gain power and control in the subcontinent. Part of the reason why English enjoys a superior status in Pakistan today is because of its historical association with elites and proto-elites.

---

5 See Durrani, Mahboob, McCrum, Rahman, and Siddiqui.
After the inception of Pakistan, Urdu was declared as a national language; whereas English became its official language. Considering the multilingual and ethnically diverse nature of Pakistan, the decision to have one national language for the country fanned linguistic differences among various ethnic groups. The subsequent governments have not been able to address the issue of language(s) in a way that informs either locally communicated linguistic practices or the issues of educational apartheid that are a repercussion of unequal access to English learning opportunities. Although the article 251 of Pakistan’s constitution (1973) declares Urdu as the country’s national language, English could be used for the next fifteen years for official purposes with an aim of replacing it with Urdu. This has not happened so far. The ideological and repressive apparatuses have been able to maintain the status quo, which has resulted in a stratified education system.

**Pakistan’s Stratified Education System and the Predicament of English**

The education system of Pakistan is often blamed for the country’s inadequate progress on political, economic, and social fronts. Especially in the wake of the War on Terror, several experts and think tanks from national and international forums are focusing their attention on Pakistan’s educational system to identify the problems pertinent to the rise in extremism, radicalism, and violence. Language, as a medium of instruction, proves to be a hurdle for educational reforms. For example, consider here Zubeida Mustafa’s⁶ argument in *The English Language Tyrant in Pakistan’s Education System*, in which she writes that, “A calculated failure to tackle the

---

⁶ Zubeida Mustafa is a Pakistani journalist associated with daily *Dawn* since 1975. Being deeply concerned about the problems of English in Pakistan, Mustafa has written extensively on this issue. She published two books and a number of articles in national and international publications. Her article “Pakistan ruined by the Language Myth,” published in *The Guardian* (2012) got international attention for the issue.
English-language Hydra in education has led to it penetrating all walks of national life, be it industry, trade or the services sectors; English is made out to be indispensable for success” (189). Having affected almost all walks of life, English plays a significant role in Pakistan for engendering and increasing inequalities. Like most postcolonial countries, Pakistan, too, has been suffering from the controversy of the English language. The two-tiered education system (English medium for elite and vernacular medium for non-elites/millions) continued in Pakistan after independence.

There are elite English medium schools that are both public and private and cater to the needs of few segments of society—mostly elites; another category is Urdu/vernacular medium public schools that mostly cater to the majority of population. English is taught as a subject in public schools but they are neither well equipped nor are teachers proficient in English (Shamim, 294). As a result, English remains inaccessible to a large segment of society. In Insights on Insecurity in Pakistan, Manzar Zaidi argues that the education system in Pakistan is divided into three parallel systems: the madrassah sector, a public education system that is in a shambles, and a private sector which tends to be out of reach of the vast majority of the citizens (17). This shows that English is not only highly politicized (in terms of appropriation) in Pakistan but is also instrumental for marginalizing and ostracizing weaker groups of society.

Various studies reveal that the idea of classification, particularly for private schools, and a neat definition of elites in Pakistan is elusive. Hamid H. Kizilbash contends that Pakistani educational system defies clear and precise description; the range and types of schools that exist make the process of classification challenging (102). Similarly, in Language, Ideology and Power, Rahman argues that the existing
categories of English medium schools are not definable in a precise way (307). However, in broader terms, Rahman identifies three major types (categories) of English-medium schools in Pakistan: (a) state-influenced elitist public schools (b) private elitist schools, and (c) non-elitist schools (291). Here, he includes the federal government model schools and the armed forces schools in the first category (291). Kizilbash names a few for private elitist schools, like Karachi and Lahore Grammar, Beaconhouse, and Froebel’s (103). Moreover, there has been a mushrooming of average/poor quality non-elitist English medium schools in last few decades. The majority of these schools are nominal in terms of English education.

Another fact that adds to the complexity of this issue is that within some provinces, there are also mediums of instruction in regional languages. For example, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), there are public schools that offer an Urdu medium and Pushto medium education (Kizilbash, 103). Similarly, Sindhi is used as a medium of instruction in some schools of Sindh (Rahman, 4557). Children in public schools with minimal guidance and facilities for learning English are left with no opportunities except for rote learning to get through their examinations. This makes the situation of students’ performance in English exams quite grim; as Rahman (2002) writes, “The state of failure in the matriculation, intermediate and BA examinations is highest in English” (Language, Ideology, and Power 321). This situation of unequal English learning opportunities explains how English serves as a catalyst for increased polarization and social stratification in Pakistan.

In the category of state-influenced elitist public schools, Rahman includes Aitchison College, Lahore (one of five chief’s colleges established for the training of ruling elite during colonial period), numerous missionary schools, and schools run by
the Pakistani army. Some examples are Military College at Jhelum; Cadet Colleges at Petaro, Kohat, Ramzak, Hassanabad; Burn Hall College, Abbottabad; Pakistan Air Force Colleges at Sargodha and Lower Topa; and the Lawrence College at Ghora Gali; all are somewhat influenced by the armed forces (Language, Ideology and Power, 292). Here, considering the fact that the military has been an important broker in the domains of power in Pakistan, we can see how a powerful institution has specified English for itself. Thus, it confirms the assertion that English, in Pakistan, is a preserve for the elite of power.

In the same way, for private elitist schools, the fee structure is quite high. The fee varies depending on the age and grade. On average, these schools charge $250/300 for a child per month, which is significant even for the majority middle-class families. Rahman defines the concept of elites in terms of acquisition of English in Pakistan. Rahman explains that, “English medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of wealth or that of power. And this has not happened through market forces but has been brought about by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself” (Language, Ideology and Power 293). The purpose of describing these details here is to explicate the fact that the idea of classification is elusive for schools in Pakistan. However, the focus in this chapter, is to explain the politicizing process of English acquisition that not only ostracizes those on the margins but also impinges upon fundamental commitments to justice and equity that a state is supposed to endorse.

In addition to this, recent research by Coleman and Capstick reveals somewhat similar concerns about the classification and stratification of Pakistani schools. In 2010, the British Council in Pakistan hired the services of Hywel Coleman, an
internationally renowned British language expert. In the second report (2012), Coleman and Capstick identify five different categories of schools according to medium of instructions in Pakistan. According to them, they are classified as: (a) Elite private schools; (b) Schools by armed forces (English medium); (c) State schools, which serve the majority of population with no fee, which are largely Urdu medium with some schools offering Sindhi and Pushto in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa respectively; (d) Non-elite private English medium schools, which are private with a modest fee and largely cater to the needs of population that cannot afford elite schools; (e) Madrassa education which is heterogeneous (15). This classification of schools, in the contemporary context, makes the situation of English in the country clear, illustrating that the system is unjust in providing equal English learning access.

Having said that, in order to study English linguistic imperialism as a tool of othering, I incorporate Louis Althusser’s *Essays on Ideology*, choosing two ideological apparatuses: education (schools) and media (advertisements). For the selection of advertisements under study, I select advertisements (for admissions and jobs—faculty recruitment, etc.) of schools most of which offer education from ages five to sixteen. I chose schools of this age group because early age exposure to a foreign language plays a significant role in acquiring proficiency. The review of the above mentioned literature explains that the exposure to English during the initial phase of education is provided *only* in elite schools. This exposure is crucial in contributing to further proficiency and success in English. Thus, I only select advertisements of schools for my research.

**English—a dilemma, a source of polarization**
English in Pakistan contributes to an ineffective education system, lack of socio-economic mobility, and a sense of cohesion among various segments of society. What is more problematic is people’s attitude of superiority with regard to the English language. There is a vast body of literature on how English enjoys a superior status among languages in Pakistan. Fauzia Shamim argues that in the Pakistani context the term ‘English medium’ is heavily loaded with economic and socio-cultural connotations; she further maintains that familiarity with and the use of English in Pakistan is an indicator of social class, educational, and family background. Shamim calls this phenomenon ‘language apartheid’ in the country. This suggests that linguistic policies have made Pakistan’s educational system ineffective for the majority of its population.

The public education system state does not provide required facilities for the better learning of English, notwithstanding its increased demand in the market and social structures of Pakistan. In public schools, the majority of children are first generation school-goers. Since their parents have no formal education, they tend to have little or no exposure to the learning of English in environments other than schools. The majority of parents from underprivileged sections of society believe that acquiring English will open gateways of success for their children. This is one strong reason why most parents take extra measures, even borrowing and taking heavy loans, to send their children to English medium schools. Being associated with job prospects and upward mobility, English enjoys a superior status in Pakistan. Many low fee private schools highlight this feature in their advertisements.

---

7 See Abbas (1993), Bari, Coleman and Capstick, Durrani, Mahboob, Mansoor, Mustafa, Phillipson, Rahman, Shamim, and Siddiqui.
It appears that English schools are preserves of English teachers. In *Pakistan ruined by Language Myth*, Mustafa argues that competent English teachers are hired by exclusive private schools, which are beyond the affordability of the majority. So proficiency in English automatically becomes the preserve of the affluent. Comparatively, the situation of English learning in the majority public schools is grim. A report by the Society for Advancement of Education (SAHE)\(^8\) in 2013 shows grave concerns in the wake of the government’s recent policy to introduce English in public schools from grade 1. Categorizing schools in Punjab as elite private, low fee private, and government schools, the authors reveal that children from the latter two categories neither appear to be proficient in English nor to learn the subjects that are taught in English (I). This corroborates what Mustafa claims in *Pitfalls of English*, “Forget what you know to start again—in English. Rote learn if need be.” This report recommends ensuring the competency of teachers for teaching English as a foreign language (40). Considering the situation where English competency—through the hiring of English proficient teachers—is solely the domain of private schools, the analysis of school advertisements in the following section confirms this phenomenon.

Being a language of the army and bureaucracy, English bolsters the consolidation of political, social, and economic power. For example, in *The Tyranny of Language in Education*, Mustafa writes that in Pakistan linguistic policies have been used to consolidate the power of a small privileged elite (25). Moreover, she describes that the continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages has furthered the existing inequalities in our

\(^{8}\) Society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE) is a nongovernmental organization. Established in 1982 by a group of concerned citizens and academics, SAHE conducts research on the issues of equal access of quality education in Pakistan. [www.sahe.org.pk](http://www.sahe.org.pk)
society (21). Similarly, while arguing how education is bound to produce socio-economic classes, Rahman contends that the system of education is essentially a system of unequal distribution of sources and power (Denizens of Alien Worlds 147-148), whereby lower levels of education system produce clerks and semi-skilled workers and upper levels create westernized people who are conspicuous consumers of western products (149). English is crucial in playing divisive and alienating roles.

According to *The Pakistan Economic Survey (2014-15)*, currently there are 6.7 million out of school children in Pakistan (171). Furthermore, this survey quotes some facts from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER)\(^9\) 2014. For the quality of learning in English, ASER reported that 42% grade 5 students were able to read grade 2 level English sentences (186). An analysis of repressive and ideological apparatuses helps in understanding the command and confinement of English in Pakistan. Faisal Bari, in *An Unequal Education* asks how can we expect the children of our country to share a common future? Especially in circumstances where our children are a product of different educational systems, the chances of a stable society are gloomy. It appears that in the wake of Pakistan’s constant struggles for combating insurgency and ongoing militancy, many scholars and experts are recognizing the issue of linguistic differences, particularly the supremacy of English, as an obstacle to social cohesion.

**Repressive Apparatuses—Consolidating Power through the appropriation of English**

Louis Althusser’s description of Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs) is helpful in understanding the appropriation of English through repression in Pakistan.

---

\(^9\) The Annual Status of Education report (ASER) is the citizen-led, household based initiative. They work to provide reliable estimates on the schooling status of age 3 to 16 in Pakistan [www.aserpakistan.org](http://www.aserpakistan.org).
This appropriation results in the perpetuation (either intentionally or unintentionally) of a vicious cycle of production and reproduction in the society whereby a willingness to submission and compliance is reproduced. Essentially, Althusser proposes that in order to maintain and sustain power, the ruling class uses both ‘force’ and ‘ideology.’ In other words, power is maintained both by coercion and consent (as Fairclough argues). The term ‘state apparatuses’ refers to the body of institutions (Althusser, 22) that help maintain the power structure. Both RSAs and ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) perform the same function of maintaining the status quo. For Althusser, in order to ensure the reproduction of relations of production, RSAs work alongside ISAs. Thus, “ISA largely secure the reproduction behind a ‘shield’ provided by the RSA” (24). By focusing on two ISAs—media and education—I examine how, in the system of exploitation, submission is re-produced along with the skill to maintain the existing power structure. For studying RSAs, however, I integrate and analyze literature that reveals how the state has maintained a status quo for the perpetuation of hegemony in terms of English appropriation.

Speaking of the body of institutions, the military has enjoyed a dominant position in Pakistan’s political and economic landscape for both historical and geopolitical reasons (Jalal, 2014). The military, as an institution, has always been dominant even when not in the direct command of the country. Thus, for this study, I analyze the reports of educational proposals from Pakistan’s military regimes only. The armed forces have been a powerful institution even during democratic regimes. While describing General Ayub Khan’s\textsuperscript{10} approach towards maintaining an upper

\textsuperscript{10} General Ayub Khan served as the first martial law ruler of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. He assumed presidency following the exile of President Sikandar Mirza.
hand of the armed forces, Rahman (2004) writes that Ayub believed in the rule of an elite in the country and this elite could be created in the English medium schools (48). Considering the fact that the majority of Pakistan’s state-influenced elitist public schools are influenced by the armed forces in varying degrees, according to Rahman in *Language, Ideology, and Power*, “the state spends much more of the taxpayer’s money on the schooling of the elite through English than of the masses through the vernaculars” (297). Thus, it is a strong reason that Pakistan still lags behind in overall educational goals despite various governments’ proclamations of *Education for All*.

There is ambiguity about the medium of instruction issue in the governmental education policy. The issue has been recurring in Pakistan since its inception. This ambiguity appears to be intentional to safeguard the interests of ‘few’ under the umbrella of lack of resources. A proposal in the findings and recommendations of a study for the educational division of the government of Pakistan (1969) identifies the English language as a barrier; it deserves to be quoted here at length. While arguing about the problem of English, the report says:

One of the legacies of the British Raj has been the fact that the language of our administration is English while that of the masses is not. The result has been that the administrators are totally unaware of popular aspirations. This is a very dangerous situation. Educational policies have contributed to this by requiring the medium of instruction at the college and university levels, from which our leadership naturally emerges, to be English. This must not be allowed to continue. Not only does the use of English as the medium of instruction at higher levels perpetuate the gulf between he rulers and the ruled,

11 See Mansoor, Mustafà, and Siddiqui.
it also perpetuates the advantages of those children who come from the well-to-do families, and results in a colossal waste of human resources which could be developed to a far greater extent if instructions were to be given in national languages (MESR (Ministry of Education and Scientific Research) 3).

Despite recognition of the problem by various governments in Pakistan, the problem persists partly because of political reasons and lack of commitment and partly because of ill-conceived policies accompanied by the lack of research and planning to address the problem.

Similarly, in another report titled Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare (1966), there is a proposal for developing Urdu and Bengali as Pakistan’s official languages in the coming fifteen years with an aim of removing deficiencies with regard to making these two languages scientific and technical (MED (Ministry of Education)108). Besides this, recognizing the importance of English in the international arena, the report suggests the promotion of English along with national and respective regional languages for higher learning. However, an intriguing aspect of this report is to endorse the perpetuation of elite private schools in Pakistan; the report also recognizes the existence of elite public schools that are run by the state. But it appears that the existence of such schools is completely justified in the name of boosting the economy by encouraging private enterprise in the case of former. For the latter, however, by recommending equity assurance in the provision of

12 According to the First constitution of Pakistan (1956), Urdu and Bengali were both declared as national languages of the country. This essentially happened in response to political movements in former East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) for the recognition of Bengali as an official language of the country. Although the constitution was suspended after the 1958 coup d’état, the commission’s report mentioned here was written in the wake of that. Thus, considering the linguistic movements in East Pakistan, the report suggests the promotion of both Urdu and Bengali as the national languages of Pakistan.
educational opportunities, the report discourages the establishment of more of such state sponsored elite public schools.

A rhetorical analysis of wording in the report exposes the absence of a strong commitment on the part of state apparatuses. Here, the critical discourse analysis approach by Norman Fairclough is apt for examining the wording of report. For example, while justifying the existence of elite private schools, the report argues that, “A fully developed state may on doctrinal grounds dispense with the private sector in education, but in a developing society such as ours private enterprise cannot altogether be excluded for it helpfully augments the limited resources of the state” (MED (Ministry of Education) 16, emphasis mine). Considering this justification in the context of relational and expressive values of words, it appears that discourses not only create but also depend upon the relationships within society. The elite schools (both private and public) by catering to the educational needs of a certain segment of society also tend to appropriate a considerable share of the job market (next section on ISAs elaborates on this). In the above-mentioned wording, the author(s) appear to assume a positive outcome from the perpetuation of elite private schools without paying any heed to the issue of exacerbating polarization. In the phrase, “the developing society such as ours,” the word ours has a relative value in the sense that it depicts an element of comparison between center and periphery worlds. It does have a relational value, too, which implicitly displays the idea of a relationship of dependence. In other words, the word ours in the report creates a justifying gesture by creating an “us and them” situation. Furthermore, in the phrase,

---

13 I follow the relational and expressive values described by Norman Fairclough in *Language and Power*, they are explained in detail in the next section of this essay.
“private enterprise cannot be excluded,” the word cannot shows the expressive value of impossibility. Thus, by justifying the presence of elite private schools, the report seems to have an indifferent approach regarding the matter of educational apartheid in the country.

Additionally, in response to concerns that elite schools are expensive and transmit a type of education that is designed to create snobs (MED (Ministry of Education) 17), the report simply dismisses the concern with the argument, finding no evidence. So the report writes that, “We have no evidence that these schools have really produced any such snobs as suggested by the students, nor have we any evidence that their students usually secure better positions in public examinations” (MED (Ministry of Education)18). What are the ways employed to look for the evidence? The report provides no details on that. In this regard, the report appears to be generally naïve and superficial. The overall impression this report leaves about the existence and perpetuation of elite private schools in Pakistan is quite optimistic. It explicitly endorses them in the name of creating economic endeavors for a developing country such as ours. On the contrary, the possibility of repercussions in the form of inequity in education is mostly ignored.

The report does, however, consider this inequity while discussing elite public schools, but this consideration is somewhat ambiguous. While responding to the complaint that the government spends much more on elite public schools than on ordinary institutions, the report says that there is some justification for this complaint (MED (Ministry of Education) 18, emphasis mine). The use of word “some” in this sentence demonstrates a partial recognition of the problem, not a complete one.
Moreover, the report seems to justify the state’s preferred treatment for such schools by saying:

Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defense service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations (MED (Ministry of Education) 18).

As one can see, in order to create *better and suitable persons* for administration and bureaucracy, the state clearly has the intention of investing more in a few.

Recognizing the issue of inequity, the report, however, argues not to build such elite public schools anymore “until a proper evaluation has been made of the results achieved by those already set up as to whether the expenditure on them is commensurate with their performance” (MED (Ministry of Education)18). The evaluation of wording here proves the usage of euphemism. The wording here has expressive value, too, in the sense that it assigns a positive value to the establishment of elite public schools by offering a euphemism of the creation of *better and suitable persons* for the job market. The report does assign a negative value, too, by discussing the principles of equality, but towards the end such concerns are largely balanced by providing the euphemism of schools’ evaluation in order to see if the *expenditures are commensurate with their performance*. These euphemisms are incorporated as a way of avoiding negative values (Fairclough, 97). The overall analysis of discourse in the report demonstrates that it does recognize the problem but mostly dispels concerns with euphemistic approaches.
Even the repressive apparatuses of English for elites survived the proclamations of Islamization and Urduization of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). During his time, the elite schools continued to exist. General Zia had certain proclivity towards especially Urdu, and during this period English was not offered until grade 6 in public schools. According to Ahmar Mahboob, almost an entire decade of school going children were not exposed to English until grade 6, which led to a sharp decline in people’s competency in the English language (8). General Zia’s efforts to Islamize the country and the promotion of Urdu did not affect private English medium schools, which largely remained insulated. Despite the vibrant move of conservative-leaning ideologies in the Zia-ul-Haq regime, it was largely government schools that were influenced. On the contrary, the elite private schools were allowed to operate because of the political influence of the people that were sending their children to these schools (Abbas, 1993; Rahman, 2004). Rahman (2004) explains that an educationist, who used to run an elite English school, confessed in her interview to Rahman that the General allowed her to continue an English medium school regardless of the governmental policy of offering English from grade 6 (52).

In order to exhibit the Zia regime’s discriminatory policy towards non-elite public schools, I review the reflections of Pakistani newspaper editorials that were published soon after Zia administration’s Urduization policy. In an editorial titled “The Question of Medium” by daily Dawn, the author endorses the teaching of English as a secondary language in Pakistani schools. The editorial further mentions that in order to maintain international communication and to pursue knowledge in science and technology, it is inevitable for Pakistanis to get a functional knowledge of English. However, this article does raise the concern of a higher status that is enjoyed
by the English speaking class in Pakistan. Claiming the fact that the government recognizes the problem of a cultural divide that English dominance creates, the newspaper criticizes the government’s medium of instruction policy of retaining English in a few institutions for elites and those managed by the defense establishment. This article is very straightforward in arguing that the policy will widen the gaps between elites and masses in Pakistan (6). This critique of a national newspaper on the country’s language in medium of instruction policy manifests the repressive endeavors employed during General Zia ul Haq period for English appropriation.

Similarly, another editorial titled “Status of English” in daily The Nation voices somewhat similar concerns. Appreciating General Zia ul Haq’s decision to not to remove English in areas where it might lead to decline in quality, the editorial emphasizes opting for a policy that does not manifest discrimination. These news reports reveal that promoting Urdu under the rhetoric of religious and nationalistic consciousness by the Zia administration was one of many tactics that Zia’s government employed for the justification of an undemocratic regime. However, this did not affect the concentration of power in a few hands in terms of appropriation of English, and the linguistic apartheid continued. Another news story in the same time period recounts how the federal education minister in 1987, Sayyed Sajjad Haider, in a board of intermediate and secondary education ceremony claimed that replacing Urdu with English in schools is aligned with the ideology of Pakistan and according to the “spirit of Pakistanhood” (IV). These governmental proclamations appear to be undiscerning and unconcerned about the possible repercussions for Pakistan both in
terms of widening gaps and access to modern scientific knowledge from the outside world.

The subsequent elites in the country, especially through state apparatuses, have seized the acquisition of English only for themselves. General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime is unique in proclaiming the rhetoric of religious principles on one hand and sustaining the apparatuses of confinement, particularly for the acquisition of English, on the other hand. For example, Shemeem Abbas uncovers that during that period, a massive and substantial amount of monetary aid was received from both the US government and from the British Council and Overseas Development agency in order to promote the English language programs (151). Despite huge funds from foreign sources and the governments’ declarations of promoting education, the development is meager. The reports of SAHE and ASER (mentioned in the previous section) verify this fact. The problem lies in the maintenance of status quo by the powerful few who refuse to have their own interests and privileges at stake. This supports the idea of internal orientalism that my research advances in order to understand the structural exploitation and marginalization.

The transition of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime to General Musharraf’s regime has an interval of ten years, which is mostly marked by political instability in the country. Policies were made, plans were chalked out but the governments changed overnight without their implementations. General Musharraf’s period revealed a more advanced and enlightened approach towards English acquisition. In this context, I turn to the recent National Education Policy NEP (2009) by the Ministry of Education (Med), which was thought through in General Musharraf’s period and implemented in Post-Musharraf period. The policy highlights the educational demarcation whereby
the rich send their children to elite private schools, equipped with foreign curricula and examination systems; the public schools on the other hand cater to the poor majority that are unable to afford elite private schools (Med (Ministry of education) 16). The policy asserts that the English language works as one of the sources for stratification between elite and non-elites (Med (Ministry of education) 27). Among a list of policy actions, the policy says that after five years, the teaching of mathematics and science shall be in English only (Med (Ministry of education) 28, emphasis mine).

The ambiguity about language in education policy in NEP 2009 is well analyzed by Durrani; also, to what extent the policy has been successful is evident from the data collected in SAHE and ASER reports. According to Durrani, this policy assumes that after four to five years of English teaching, students will be able to acquire enough English proficiency to learn subjects in English. But how exactly this proficiency can be attained in such a short period of time in a country where English is spoken by a very small elite is a question which remains unanswered in the policy (42). Furthermore, in a situation where the majority of children have no English learning opportunity outside the classroom settings this presents a challenge that compounds the existing crisis. Durrani makes the point that in the US, immigrants and non-English speaking students take somewhere between four to seven years to acquire proficiency in English (42). It must be noted that for a country like the US, it happens in the settings where the majority in surroundings, for example, teachers, fellow students, and other staff is most likely to be fluent in English. On the other hand, the circumstances in Pakistan for English learning in public and low fee private schools is grim. The NEP (2009), unfortunately, fails to address these concerns.
The assurance of equity and quality seems to be some other concerns that are left unaddressed in NEP. SAHE’s report verifies this fact. The report argues that because of teachers’ incompetency and lack of planning, the teaching of other subjects in English is also undermining the subject knowledge. The report of schools in Sindh is no different. SAHE’s report *Teaching and Learning English in Sindh Schools* (2014), after NEP 2009’s recommendations of introducing English from grade 1, presents findings that are of serious concern. The report says that teaching and learning conditions in public schools and most private schools are not conducive to have English as a medium of instruction (Dar et al., 25). Furthermore, the report concludes that the government has to fulfill certain vital preconditions regarding the provision of adequate language learning resources (26). This aspect remains untouched in NEP 2009. Thus, this analysis makes it clear that the state’s vociferous claims—about recognizing and identifying the problem of unequal English learning access—are not accompanied by tangible rectifying policies and cogent clear-cut strategies to resolve the issue. The government reports and proposals for the improvement of education in Pakistan are replete with such examples where notwithstanding the recognition of problems, there is no convincing blueprint for solutions. The policies employed thus far have largely proved to be ill-conceived and flawed.

The evaluation of state apparatuses clearly reveals the appropriation of privileges—in this case, English acquisition—through repression. Consequently, it is mostly the individual belonging to the disadvantaged class who gets the blame for his failure; it is not the system that fails him with least possible opportunities and the lack of commitment. After encompassing the socio-political dimensions of control for
English and its critique through the lens of Althusser’s RSAs, the next section analyzes the discourse that reveals the encouragement of English supremacy ideology. In terms of RSAs, it is done either by holding the power (state apparatuses) or by forming alliances (as Althusser would say) with those holding the power. With ISAs, however, it permeates by fabricating and sustaining a certain ideology.

The Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)—an analysis of school advertisements

English continues to grow in strength for a small elite minority of Pakistan through RSAs, and this gain in strength is further escalated through ISAs. It appears that for Pakistan, a large number of researches on linguistic policies are either based on textual analysis of historical documents or are based on survey research. However, in order to understand the impact of English on Pakistan’s complex linguistic landscape, it is essential to consider ideological formations as well. Without a reflexive understanding of how we are positioned within these ideological entanglements, it becomes difficult to fathom contemporary linguistic problems and their possible repercussions. The analysis of ISAs reveals how ideologies are formed and enacted in routine life. By ‘ideology,’ I essentially mean the system of ideas and representations. At times, there are ideas that dominate our minds, and these ideas tend to take the shape of ideology(ies). Althusser claims that “ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions” (36). In order to study English supremacy ideology, I examine the discourse of school advertisements and determine its role in power related social structures.

Althusser’s theory of ideology essentially examines how the relations of production are reproduced, or broadly speaking, how the relationship between exploiters and the exploited is reproduced in a capitalist system; the educational
apparatus remains a helpful tool for maintaining and sustaining an ideology. Being best places for the cultivation of specific ideas, according to Althusser, no other ideological state apparatus has an obligatory audience who gets the exposure for almost eight hours a day for five to six days a week (30). He adds that “around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children is ejected for ‘production’” (29). Schools, especially, from age five to sixteen are important sites for inculcating certain ideas into young minds. Thus, I choose elite schools (both public and private) that offer education to this age group. Similarly, in terms of communication, Althusser argues that “the communication apparatus crams citizens with daily doses by means of the press, the radio, and television” (28). With the advent of modern technologies, the role of this apparatus seems to be more influential than the family apparatus. As for the publicity of English medium schools in Pakistan, advertisements serve as one of the important tools. By choosing advertisements of English medium schools in Pakistan as an object of study, I encompass two ideological state apparatuses—education and media. The majority of advertisements examined were published in newspapers (both English and Urdu) in the past five years (2013-2018) and can be located at job websites in Pakistan; these advertisements are related to faculty recruitment and student admissions in schools.

Here, it is worth mentioning that the idea of publicity for offering an English medium education is not merely restricted to elite private or public schools. Most low fee private schools and even ordinary public schools tend to highlight this aspect on their signboards, pamphlets, and other advertising materials. The picture of a government school’s signboard in Figure 1 is an example. Most educational

14 Figure 1, Source: Author’s personal archives
institutions tend to highlight or boast about the phrase “English medium” only to sell their services. This demonstrates that lip service toward “English-medium” interacts as a selling technique in Pakistan’s troubled educational atmosphere. A researcher and program manager from SAHE, Lahore, Muhammad Azhar, argued that in order to gain attention, “English medium school” is a catchphrase that most schools tend to emphasize in their advertisements. Azhar also mentioned that most private schools with high fees are likely to have an English inspired ambience in their premises, for example, the murals of Disney characters, etc. This type of atmosphere not only makes these schools significantly different from low fee private and public schools but also helps them capture the market for parents who are ready to go to any length to make their children learn English (personal communication).
Drawing on Fairclough, I examine the interaction of English supremacy ideology and power. In the practice of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), he describes a set of questions that need to be answered from the analysis of discourse. These answers exhibit the features associated with social practices and structures. Among a list of questions by Fairclough, I specifically choose three questions (with the caveat that not all three can be applied to a single advertisement text) that I find apt for examining the power of English in Pakistan’s social structure. These questions include: “(i) What relational values do words have? (ii) What expressive values do
words have? and (iii) What expressive values do grammatical features have?”
(Fairclough, 92-3).

The first advertisement (Figure 2)\(^{15}\) that I analyze is a job advertisement from Lahore Grammar School—an elite private school with various campuses throughout the city. The wording in this advertisement, titled *Faculty Required: Lahore Grammar School* (available at jobsalert.pk) says that the school is looking for suitable candidates for the vacancies of administrator and teachers. They require teachers for subjects like sciences, Urdu, geography, mathematics, and pre-school. There are no eligibility criteria for the job positions per se. However, the advertisement highlights that “the candidates must have excellent English language skills (written and spoken).” The analysis of the text reveals that the advertisement has a relational and expressive value. Being an expensive school, Lahore Grammar is affordable only for a certain wealthy class. The name of school itself depicts the social prestige that it enjoys in society.

Highlighting the idea of excellent English, both written and spoken, indicates a relationship between prestige and English in the country. Besides this, the usage of word *must* in the text is an expressive grammatical feature. This actually expresses an insistence, a firmness, towards an idea a prestigious school adheres to. The advertisement presents an example how the ideology of English supremacy is fostered by school advertisements. In *Pakistan ruined by Language Myth*, Mustafa writes that “a public demand has been created for English.” While elaborating on this demand, Mustafa contends that this demand has been created by jobs where proficiency in

---

English fetches more salary, by schools where they have made English a basic requirement, by CSS\textsuperscript{16} exams where it is the language of examination, by courts where proceedings are written in English, and by social attitudes where English tends to receive more respect (Personal Communication). It is evident from Mustafa’s talk that English connects with social practices and problems in Pakistan through ideological formations.

Similarly, the advertisement (Figure 3)\textsuperscript{17} of another elite school named Beaconhouse has somewhat similar features. The advertisement titled *Start Your Career with Beaconhouse*, invites applications for persons required to teach early age

\textit{Career with Beaconhouse}, invites applications for persons required to teach early age

\textsuperscript{16} Central Superior Services Examination for the selection of individuals responsible for running civil bureaucratic operations of the country. CSS has a low pass rate because of English problems.

\textsuperscript{17} Figure 3, Source: *Start your Career with Beaconhouse*, jobsworld.pk, published on 15 Jun. 2016, Accessed: 3 Aug. 2017.
classes including nursery, pre-nursery, and kindergarten. The text in this advertisement does have a list of eligibility criteria, which along with other things requires “Advanced English Language Proficiency.” The text also reveals that while claiming the world’s largest private schools network and operating in eight countries, the advertisement highlights that they offer a “competitive compensation package” and “intensive training for teachers prior to placement.” Now as it is clear from the analysis of RSAs and the reports of SAHE and ASER, most ordinary public schools and low fee private schools are deprived of both features. Thus, this reveals the fact that English learning remains a preserve of the elite through the allocation of funds and competent teachers to elite schools. The advertisement under study here has an expressive value in the sense that by highlighting the requirement of ‘advanced English proficiency,’ it assigns a positive value to this attribute for potential candidates.
The next advertisement (Figure 4)\textsuperscript{18} is about Karachi Grammar School—a counterpart of Lahore Grammar School in Karachi. The advertisement invites applications for teaching multiple subjects including sciences, mathematics, Islamiyat (the study of Islam), doctors, nursing, etc., for various sections ranging from kindergarten and junior to British O and A (ordinary and advanced) levels. This advertisement does not have any expressive grammatical value per se. But the text asks for applications from people with experience in English medium schools. Again, this phrase of ‘experience in English medium schools,’ depicts a positive value that the text assigns to persons looking for jobs in Karachi Grammar School. In addition to

this, the analysis of advertisement texts for Froebel’s and Roots School System is no different.

The advertisement (Figure 5) titled, *Froebel’s Career Opportunities* seeks to hire individuals for administrative—including principal and academic coordinators—and teaching positions. There are two notable features in this advertisement: (i) applicants must possess strong English skills, and (ii) they offer competitive salary.

---

19 Froebel’s, started in 1975, is a private school with eight campuses in five districts of Pakistan including Lahore, Wah, Faisalabad, and Rawalpindi. The school’s head office is in Islamabad.

packages including health insurance. In this case, again, both these features are absent in most ordinary public and private schools. The wording of *must* with the requirement of strong English again demonstrates a feature that is obligatory for the job position for this school. Similarly, the offer of competitive salary package along with insurance depicts a relational value about the relationship with this elite school. Since not every school offers a competitive package and health insurance, these attributes are related to Froebel’s. As for the Roots School System\textsuperscript{21} advertisement (Figure 6)\textsuperscript{22}, this text, too, highlights the school’s preference for fluency in English language. The advertisement also emphasizes that Roots school system is a model private sector educational institution that follows international standards for promoting modern education.

\textsuperscript{21}Roots International Schools are one of the leading private school systems in Pakistan. This education company has almost 85 campuses across the country.

\textsuperscript{22}Figure 6, Source: Roots School System, jobsalert.pk, Accessed: 3 Aug. 2017.
Froebel's International School is looking to hire individuals for the following positions at its new campuses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal/Headmistress</td>
<td>MA/M.Ed/B.Ed minimum 5 years relevant experience</td>
<td>Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Coordinators</td>
<td>MA/M.Ed/B.Ed minimum 5 years teaching experience</td>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Coordinators</td>
<td>MBA/BA minimum 5 years relevant experience</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Faculty</td>
<td>MA/M.Ed/B.Ed minimum 5 years teaching experience</td>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language Specialists</td>
<td>MA/M.Ed/BA/B.Ed Foreign qualification and</td>
<td>Wah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>experience preferred</td>
<td>Sialkot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applicants must possess strong English skills and relevant experience. Interested candidates must submit their CVs to careers@froebels.edu.pk by 2nd April, 2013. Only shortlisted candidates will be called for an interview.

We offer competitive salary packages including health insurance.
Welcome to Roots!

Now In
GUJRANWALA!!!

**BRANCH HEAD**

**S K I L L & Q U A L I F I C A T I O N**

- Minimum experience of 6 years in teaching
- 4 years experience in leadership role

**ADMINISTRATION**

- Montessori Directress
- Academic Coordinator
- School Manager

**S K I L L & Q U A L I F I C A T I O N**

- Minimum Bachelors or Master degree
- At least 1 to 2 years experience in academics centered environment.
- Computer literacy, Microsoft office shall be preferred.

**TEACHERS REQUIRED FOR MONTESSORI / PRIMARY / ELEMENTARY**

- Playgroup
- Jr. Montessori
- Adv. Montessori

**S K I L L & Q U A L I F I C A T I O N**

- Preferably AMI (Association Montessori International) or LMC (London Montessori Course) for Montessori Section.
- B.A, B.Sc, M.Sc, M.A qualified for primary & elementary School Section in relevant discipline.
- Fluency in English language and similar teaching experience shall be preferred.
- Fresh graduates are ENCOURAGED to apply as we provide on the job training.

Interested candidates are encouraged to send their Resumes with a cover letter, and a recent passport size photograph by January 4, 2009 to the following address.

Executive Manager HR  
Roots School System  
Department of Teacher Training and Human Resource Development (DTTHRD)  

Head Office, 74 Harley Street, Raewalpindli Cantt.  
Telephone: +92 51 111 123 074 & 0322 5088805 or  

Click on  
www.rootsschool.edu.pk  
e-mail at jobs@rootsschool.edu.pk

---

(Figure 6)
The next piece that I analyze here is the advertisement (Figure 7) of admission for Army Burn Hall College, Abbottabad. The advertisement, titled *Admission Session-2014: Army Burn Hall College for Boys, Abbottabad*, announces admission for O levels. Among other admission criteria mentioned in the advertisement is the written test for English, General Science, and mathematics. Given the poor conditions of English proficiency for ordinary private and public schools, one can probably presume that the target audience for this advertisement is certainly a particular class. Another significant aspect in this advertisement is the absence of Urdu in the criteria of written test. The medium of instruction for the majority of schools in Pakistan is Urdu with exceptions of Pushto and Sindhi in KPK and Sindh respectively. This vast majority tends to be excluded from the criteria prescribed by this state sponsored elite public school.

---

As for the job advertisements in most elite public schools, there is a requirement of experience at English medium schools. For an advertisement (Figure
of a job position at Army Burn Hall College, titled *Situation Vacant: Army Burn Hall College for Boys Abbottabad*, which mainly asks for applicants for the position of O and A level teacher, the text specifically asks for experience from a reputable English medium institution. Similarly, for another job advertisement (Figure 9) for Pakistan Airforce (PAF) Colleges at Sargodha and Lower Topa, the catchy phrase in the text is a slogan that says, “Be Part of an Elite Teaching Faculty.” Although subjects mentioned in the advertisement include chemistry, mathematics, Urdu and English, one of the attributes required for the job includes excellent English language skills both spoken and written.

---

## Applications are invited for the following Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Pay Package</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers for College/ School</td>
<td>Attractive Pay</td>
<td>23-45</td>
<td>English, Computer Science, Pak</td>
<td>MA/MSc as regular student from HEC recognized</td>
<td>Three years teaching experience of Board/O &amp; A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Male only)</td>
<td>Package</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Studies and Islamiat</td>
<td>University/ min 2nd Division</td>
<td>Level Classes at reputed English medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music Teacher</td>
<td>-d0-</td>
<td>22-40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>FA/FSc</td>
<td>Three years Music teaching experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Candidates will submit typed/hand-written application, CV along with photocopies of CNIC, educational/experience certificates & latest passport size photograph so as to reach the College office by 10 May 2016. Shortlisted candidates will be called for test/interview. Selected male teachers are also required to perform the duties of Assistant House Master. No TA/DA is admissible.

**Note:** The applicants who have already appeared in tests/interview need not to apply.

**PRINCIPAL**

Telephone: No. 0992-381823, 380722
Website: www.abhc.edu.pk

We Serve Pakistan
BE A PART OF AN ELITE TEACHING FACULTY
(AS LECTURER)

FOR PAF COLLEGES
SARGODHA & LOWER TOPA
(ADMINISTERED AS A RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR BOYS
FROM CLASS VIII TO XII)

If you have the potential and commitment to educate and groom the future pilots of the PAF,
join the elite group of the Teaching Faculty at PAF Colleges Sargodha / Lower Topa.
You must be able to fulfill the following criteria as a minimum requirement.

Applications are invited for the posts of lectures in Chemistry, Mathematics, English and Urdu.

ELIGIBILITY
(a) AGE On 18 Feb, 2018: 25 to 35 Years. Both male and female (Married or Unmarried) candidates can apply.
   (Based on Higher Qualification and Experience, age may be relaxed)
(b) NATIONALITY: Citizen of Pakistan. Not married to a foreign national.
(c) EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION REQUIRED
   PAF College Sargodha
   - Chemistry Lecturer: MSc Chemistry (1st Division / Grade 'B')
   - Mathematics Lecturer: MSc Mathematics (1st Division / Grade 'B')
   - English Language Lecturer: MA Linguistics (1st Division / Grade 'B')
   PAF College Lower Topa, Murree Hills
   - Urdu Lecturer: MA Urdu (1st Division / Grade 'B')
   (d) EXPERIENCE: At least 3 years of teaching experience in Cadet College / reputable English Medium Institution.
   (e) GENERAL ATTRIBUTES REQUIRED
      (i) Should be medically fit
      (ii) Proficiency in organizing sports and co-curricular activities.
      (iii) Excellent English language skills, both spoken and written.
      (iv) Personality traits suitable for residential Colleges.

BENEFITS
(a) Special Purposes Short Service Commission in PAF in the rank of Flying Officer. Higher rank up to Squadron Leader may be
granted subject to higher qualification and experience.
(b) Pay / allowances as per existing rules. Additional emoluments and allowances may be considered as per experience / qualification.
(c) FREE accommodation, medical facilities, servant allowance and 50% concessional fare by train and air. Membership in PAF
Officers Housing Scheme and Pension as per Government rules.

SELECTION PROCEDURE
(a) Intelligence, Psychological, Academic tests and Initial Medical examination followed by interview at PAF Information and Selection Centres.
(b) Interview by AHQ Special Selection Board I & II. (c) Final Medical examination by CMB.

REGISTRATION FROM 11 Sep to 08 Oct 2017

Applicants may visit PAF website www.joinpaf.gov.pk and fill in the Application Form online. Application may also be sent on
plain paper along with attested photocopies of necessary certificates and 03 latest passport size photographs to the Director HRI, Air
Headquarters, Peshawer by 01 October, 2017. Govt servants are to apply through proper channel.

PID (k) 831

(Figure 9)
The analysis of discourse in advertisements reveals that by highlighting and emphasizing the requirement of English either for admission or for getting a job in elite schools, they tend to propagate and inculcate an ideology towards the supremacy of the English language. Elite schools in Pakistan are not only gatekeepers of English learning by excluding others who are outside the domain of power or wealth, but they are also a preserve of power and privilege by offering the most lucrative job opportunities and attractive salary packages along with several other benefits. “The relationship between text and social structures is an indirect, mediated one” (Fairclough, 117). This is clear after the analysis of discourse in advertisements. The ambience that mass media develops is largely mediated and seeps into society through various channels of media; advertisement is one of them.

In order to determine how ideological messages tend to seep into society, it is essential to consider how the messages in a particular media genre—in this case advertisements—are decoded. Stuart Hall explains how the idea of denotation and connotation works in the circulation of an ideology. ‘Denotation’ has a fixed meaning and essentially means the literal meaning of a word. On the other hand, ‘connotation’ refers to something that is invoked by the literal meaning of something. Thus, connotative meanings are less fixed and according to Hall, connotation is the place where already coded signs intersect and hence take the shapes of ideological dimensions (123). Arguing that denotation and connotation are useful analytical tools, Hall explains that connotative meanings are ‘less fixed,’ ‘conventionalized,’ ‘changeable,’ and ‘associative meanings.’ (122). Since connotative meanings tend to have associative values, leading towards the alteration or exploitation of messages, in Hall’s view, here, one can see a more active intervention of ideology (122). This is
not to say that the messages in English medium schools’ advertisements only have associative meanings. My argument is based on the fact that these messages tend to perform both denotative and connotative functions in terms of producing meanings. Although their denotative meanings are strongly fixed, these meanings are embedded with conventionalized associative values. Thus, the text reveals a social relationship that is indirect and mediated, as Fairclough argues.

As a supplementary force, sometimes there can be repression with ISAs. Althusser argues that ISAs predominantly work through the circulation of an ideology, but at times, they may also function by repression; however, this repression often times is “attenuated, concealed, and even symbolic” (Althusser, 19); he gives the examples of punishment, expulsion, and selection, etc. at schools and churches (19). The use of repression along with ISAs is also applicable to the situation of English supremacy ideology in Pakistan. In an op-ed in Dawn, Mustafa recounts the experience of a mother whose school child was asked by her teacher to report on her classmates who speak a language other than English in school (“Why English?”). Moreover, Mustafa describes another incident at the Sahiwal campus of an elite school network where the headmaster sent a notification to parents to forbid students the use of foul language in school premises; the foul language included taunts, abuses, and Punjabi (“Why English?”). Such practices tend to reinforce the ideological perspectives towards the supremacy of English. Similarly, repression in ISAs is also maintained by rewards and sanctions. I take this point from my own observation as a teacher in a private institution of Lahore. For the semester wise student evaluation of instructors, among many other questions that students have to answer, they are also asked to evaluate the use of English by instructor for teaching courses. Student
evaluation, being a considerable tool for employees’ promotion and other institutional benefits, is a way to limit the use of other languages in Pakistan’s educational circles.

Internal Orientalism is a type of Orientalism wherein othering is “cultivated by the Orientals themselves” (Malreddy, 7). Malreddy further explains that internal orientalism does not negate external orientalism and is generally cultivated by Orientals that might entail western educated local elites, monarchs, and princely kings, etc. (7). This chapter, by examining the ideological labyrinths in Pakistan’s state apparatuses, argues that English plays an important role in engendering internal orientalism in the country whereby the downtrodden sections of people remain outside the circle of power and privilege. The education system of Pakistan, supporting structural inequalities, presents a perfect example of Galtung’s structural imperialism as well.

The analysis of governmental reports in the sections of RSAs shows that the state tends to focus on symptoms without considering root causes to eradicate the problem. Similarly, the section on ISAs reveals that there is an inverse relationship between the demand of English and its equal learning availability for all. Being a global language, there is no escape from English. However, the equality of its learning opportunities can enhance the equality of resources distribution, which is a promising feature of most stable and peaceful societies. In Pakistan, equal English acquisition is inevitable if we want to see Pakistan prosper and be peaceful.

**A shift in the study of Linguistic Disenfranchisement: Growing concerns on extremism**

Generally speaking, inequality is a broader term; there can be inequalities of many kinds and at many levels. The inequalities referred to in this chapter consider
both material and non-material forms. For the former, by following the Marxist line of argument, the power and prestige that English enjoys engenders economic inequalities; for the latter, in the multilingual context of Pakistan, people belonging to other linguistic groups tend to have feelings of disenfranchisement whereby their linguistic identity and rights are not recognized. Through an unequal education system, these inequalities seep into all walks of life. In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan appeared as a US ally against the War on Terror. In this context, there is an increased focus on figuring out the possible links between Pakistan’s polarized educational system and an increased rate of militancy. Along with this, the issue of English linguistic imperialism has also come to limelight.

There have been several research studies\textsuperscript{26} to determine the links and connections between Pakistan’s educational system and radicalization. However, it is important to note that considering unequal access of English as a possible threat for the country’s security is a comparatively recent phenomenon. For example, in *The Impact of European Languages in former colonial territories: The case of English in Pakistan*, Rahman (2005) raises the concern that in the post 9/11 world, Pakistan is a frontline state helping the US to fight the problem of terrorism. But at the same time, its educational system has the potential to create terrorists (3). Here, he mentions the relevancy of English to the problem. According to Rahman, those who are not exposed to English tend to have more intolerant and militant views (3). Analyzing these views of Rahman, Durrani considers this phenomenon as a post 9/11 ideological shift (38). In this shift, English is deemed as a language offering the means to observe and learn from other worlds. Thus, English serves as a window for an exposure to a

\textsuperscript{26}See Afzal (2017), and Rahman (2005)
variety of thoughts. Limited exposure of this language to the majority of people may affect their pluralistic approaches. Here, it must be noted that curricula in public schools is heavily burdened with nationalistic and state ideologies. Several scholars have identified this curricula to be responsible for fostering intolerant attitudes.

For the connection between inequalities and the rise in militancy, some scholars argue that the Eastern Islamic world struck by extreme inequalities is more prone to breed the menace of terrorism. In “Islam, Islamisms, and the West,” Aijaz Ahmad writes:

In the Arab world at least (and in Iran under the Shah), they have seen their rulers mortgaging their national resources to the West; squandering their rentier wealth on luxury for themselves and their ilk; and on building armies that may fight each other but never the invader and the occupier; and they have seen the armies of their secular nationalist leaders losing war after war against the US-Israeli juggernaut. They find no credible armies to join. They must make one of their own, stateless, in deep secrecy, loosely organized, not for pitched battles, for which their armies and numbers are much too inferior, but for spectacular action: propaganda of the deed (13-14).

In the contemporary context, violence seems to be rife in areas where inequalities are rampant. But this assumption is subject to further research in terms of gathering profiles of militants and some fieldwork.

On the face of it, the connection between the repercussions of inequality and the rise in terrorism in Pakistan is a question that requires empirical research. It

---

27 See Abbas (2007), Afzal (2015), and K.K Aziz
28 See Ahmed and Piketty
appears that there is a dearth of empirical data about the issue at hand. However, there are some scholars who discuss the possible correlation between rising inequalities and terrorism. At any rate, the links between inequalities and militancy is a highly contested and controversial issue. Although its proponents uphold the argument with cogent reasons, one cannot deny that inequality is a matter of discrimination that has the potential of leading to conflict.

Similarly, French economist, Thomas Piketty, focuses on wealth and economic inequality. He holds inequalities responsible for a rise in terrorism in the Middle Eastern areas. In his article titled “The all-safe will not be enough” (English translation), Piketty mentions that a minority of inhabitants of petro-monarchies appropriated a disproportionate share of this manna. Arguing that the Middle Eastern area is the most suffering place for inequalities on the planet, Piketty claims that terrorism is nourished by an undemocratic Middle East; Piketty largely holds western forces responsible for this absence of democracy.

For Pakistan the repercussions of linguistic inequalities in terms of terrorism largely remain unexplored (Tamim, 2014). However, in terms of empiricism, Khurram Iqbal in The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs decodes demographic, economic, and marital characteristics of Pakistani terrorists and claims that economic deprivation and illiteracy are one of many other factors fostering terrorism. Drawing an analysis from a sample of 160 militants, Iqbal documents educational and economic profiles of persons in the sample but here again the scarcity of data on perpetrators’ educational and economic backgrounds makes the accurate assessment a bit difficult. However, on the basis of data from 41.5 percent from sample, whose data

29 See Azam and Aftab, Iqbal, Malik, and Tankersley
Iqbal was able to accrue, he argues that 48% were enrolled in public and private schools (the category of private schools is unknown) (109). Similarly, for economic status, Iqbal argues that the majority of suicide bombers come from low-income families where most of their fathers were either manual laborers or farmers with small blocks of land (110). Another effort to find out the causation factors behind the making of terrorists was recently made by Sindh Police’s Counter Terrorism Department. The editorial in daily Dawn titled Militants’ profiles describes the details of almost five hundred militant profiles from the report whereby most imprisoned fighters belonged to the low-income group. Recognizing a dearth of data on this issue, the newspaper emphasizes the need for more research.

As I have discussed at length in previous sections, a stratified educational system is one of the main causes to extend this polarization, consider what Rahman argues about the unequal access of English learning in Pakistan in terms of the possible rise in terrorism:

The system is unjust in that it distributes the most lucrative and powerful jobs most advantageously to the elite, which is educated at English-medium institutions. Meanwhile, the madrassa-educated people and the failures from the Urdu medium schools join the increasing army of the unemployed who use the idiom of religion to express their defused sense of being cheated of their rights. Hence, the unjust system of schooling may increase Islamic militancy in Pakistan, which will be as much an expression of resentment against the present policies of the ruling elite as commitment to Islamising the society (“Education in Pakistan: A Survey” 43).
This concern that the country’s most famous linguist enunciates in his recent article cannot be downplayed. The situation is potentially dangerous for a country that is already abode to homegrown insurgency and violence.

In my interview with Zubeida Mustafa, she raises similar concerns for a polarized educational system where few enjoy the privileges of English. Speaking of inequality, Mustafa argues that, “Inequality is dangerous; this may not take the form of a direct confrontation between the authorities and the growing number of terrorists whose ranks the dissatisfied students will join. It would take the shape of a general unrest in society which the terrorists will exploit to promote their own vested interests.” She further says that the situation will be dangerous and we need peace and stability in the country if it is to prosper (Personal communication). In addition, Safdar Hussain, Joint Director and Research Analyst of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies30, shared somewhat similar concerns in an interview. Responding to a question related to links between inequality and terrorism in Pakistan, Hussain argues that “inequality is definitely linked with rise in conflicts in the country but not necessarily with terrorism which is largely religiously-inspired” (Personal communication).

The linguistic apartheid has the potential to aggravate already existing conflicts. As a matter of fact, Pakistan’s history is replete with examples where linguistic apartheid added insult to injury leading towards riots, skirmishes, exclusion, and even separation. In the separation of former East Pakistan, in response to the denial of a rightful share, linguistic rights took a central focus in the overall issues of

---

30 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent, nongovernmental, research and advocacy think tank based in Islamabad. They do field research on the issues of social, political, and religious conflicts related to national and international security.
deprivation and exploitation for the Bengali people. Similarly, the 1972 language violence in Sindh is another example of how in the list of “isms,” linguicism can herald issues of violence and terror. In this discussion of English linguistic imperialism, I do not argue that English cannot coexist with other languages; it definitely can as it has in other parts of the world. The real issue in Pakistan is on the purposeful ‘selective cultivation’ for few segments of society. This cultivation that leaves a big majority outside is a thriving force for a sense of deprivation, leading towards possible violent outcomes.

Towards the end of this chapter, I argue that inequality of any kind is considerably threatening for Pakistan’s current situation of stability. The country has examples where terrorist organizations and groups have manipulated religious and sectarian sentiments of people for their own political motives. So if religious and sectarian consciousness can be fanned for one’s own political agendas, then why not linguistic consciousness? Especially in a case where there is very little recognition for locally informed communicative practices and people’s linguistic identities.
Chapter 3
The Reflections of Orientalism for post 9/11 Pakistan

As mentioned in Chapter 1, drawing on the theory of *Structural Imperialism* by Johan Galtung, I emphasize that the ramifications of imperialism—embedded into the nuances of orientalism—are twofold: internal and external. In other words, the phenomenon of imperialism functions in a systematic way whereby both external and internal layers of power compound the situation. Thus, imperialism is a process that encompasses the layers of exploitation. In order to comprehend this systematic exploitation, Galtung lists five different types of imperialism: economic, political, military, communication, and cultural (91). In this chapter, I consider only the type of ‘communication’ to examine the media representation of two Pakistani case studies—the Drone Strikes case (2010), and the Malala Yousafzai case (2012. Both incidents happened after September 11. The comparison of these events’ coverage by US and Pakistani media provides a tangible opportunity to elucidate the perpetuation of orientalism, which is one of my main focuses for this dissertation.

Earlier, Ellick had an idea to film a documentary on Swat that showed the atrocities of the Taliban; however, according to Yousafzai in her memoir, Ellick noticed Malala Yousafzai’s passion for education and her sadness over the idea of not resuming school because of the Taliban, and so he decided to focus on Yousafzai for showing the Taliban’s wrongdoings in his documentary (159). This is also evident from Ellick’s own views published in the NYT a year after Yousafzai’s shooting incident. Ellick was awed by the news of the Taliban opposing schools for girls in the Swat Valley and thought that the coverage of this news by Pakistani media was not “aggressive” enough (Ellick, “Documenting a Pakistani Girl’s Transformation”). This suggests that Ellick undertook the making of his documentary to unveil the savagery of the Taliban in a “more aggressive” way. The overall depiction of this documentary further endorses this argument. The purpose of discussing Ellick’s documentary here in detail is to mention the fact that the New York Times played a significant role in making Malala Yousafzai popular. However, Yousafzai became an international icon after a near fatal attack on her by a Pakistani Taliban gunman in October, 2012.

While describing ‘communication’ as one of the five types of imperialism, Galtung maintains that in this type, “the Periphery ... produces events that the Center turns into news” (93). The portrayal of the Malala Yousafzai case (her shooting and its aftermath) by western media in general and the US media in particular confirms the assertion of Galtung. Moreover, in several of his works Edward Said vehemently argues for the role of media in the reinforcement of stereotypes through which the Orient is viewed. In the preface to the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of his Orientalism, Said contends that mass media tends to focus on the distant electronic

wars “ahistorically” and “sensationally” (xxvi). Considering Said’s views on mass media alongside Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model—wherein several filters allow the US government and dominant groups to relay their messages across the public, leading towards the portrayal of some victims as worthy whereas others are unworthy—this chapter considers two main themes: (i) the perpetuation of orientalism, and (ii) the presentation of worthy versus unworthy victims by the US media.

Needless to say, the world’s dominant news agencies are owned by the center countries32, thus, making the realm of communication a significant way for maintaining imperialism. A comparison of the coverage of two case studies confirms not only the case of the perpetuation of orientalism but also provides a concrete occasion to revisit the theoretical framework of worthy and unworthy victims. Herman and Chomsky argue that “a propaganda system will consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be unworthy” (37). Here, it is important to note that politically speaking, Pakistan cannot be taken as an enemy state of the US. As a matter of fact, in the ‘War on Terror,’ Pakistan became an important ally to the US. However, later developments of the War on Terror that encompass Pakistan, too (in the form of the drone strikes) seem to have the need of biased representation of Pakistan. The US drone attacks started in 2004 in Pakistan and have been highly unpopular since. Although the governments of the US and Pakistan claim to target militants, many civilian casualties have also been reported as a result of these attacks.

32 See Chomsky, Galtung, Murdoch and Golding, and Thussu
Here, I analyze the media coverage of both incidents in four newspapers (two US and two Pakistani). In order to make the comparison of the two case studies useful, I include Pakistani newspapers as well. This not only ascertains how Pakistan’s own media handled the case studies but also augments the argument of selectivity of issues by the US media. I’ll discuss the selection of newspapers and the methodology employed for research at length later in the chapter. The comparison of media coverage received by Malala Yousafzai and the victims of the drone attacks is a well-discussed and well-critiqued topic in Pakistan. Several Pakistani writers and analysts\textsuperscript{33} have evaluated this comparison and expressed concerns over the proclivity of the majority of Pakistanis for believing conspiracy theories.

Many Pakistanis, skeptical of Malala’s role as a “western agent,” lambast her; some raise concerns regarding her appropriation by western media. For most Pakistanis, Yousafzai received massive attention as compared to the US drone victims in Pakistani tribal\textsuperscript{34} areas that barely get reported. As for female oppression in Pakistan, the fact remains that females in the country have been facing discrimination, wrongdoing, and cruelty. That is why Yousafzai, who raised her voice against the Taliban’s oppression, symbolizes courage, bravery, and hope. However, in the comparison of media attention received by the two incidents, only a careful analysis of the rhetoric employed in the coverage of these incidents can yield meaningful results. Thus, this chapter is an attempt to unpack these unexamined assumptions.

\textbf{Studies on Malala Yousafzai and Drone Strikes in Pakistan}

\textsuperscript{33} See Ahmad, Ashraf, Babar, Hazir, and B. Shah.
\textsuperscript{34} Pakistani tribal areas are commonly known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that include seven tribal agencies. These agencies are: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan Agency, and South Waziristan Agency. Most drone strikes have targeted these agencies.
Before I analyze the rhetoric of the US and Pakistani newspapers regarding the two incidents, it is important to review literature on these case studies. For both incidents, there are authors who make a useful comparison of both events. In this context, in “Malala versus Extremism: Not Taliban, but Talibanization,” Syed Fazal-e-Haider contends that the US drone war is actually targeting the Taliban, not Talibanization, therefore, any military act against the Taliban is fruitless (73). Supporting the cause of Yousafzai, Fazal-e-Haider argues that Malala’s actual fight is against the barbaric thought of the Taliban. But the use of force in the case of drone attacks (which also results in civilian deaths) not only engenders public anger among Pakistanis but also generates sympathies for militants in public (73). ‘Talibanization’ is a mindset that needs to be tackled. On the contrary, drone attacks might yield a temporary solution against the Taliban but they are not effective for dealing with Talibanization.

In the same way, in an op-ed titled “Malala Vs drones debate,” Jalees Hazir censures the politics of maligning and appropriating Malala both inside and outside Pakistan respectively. Briefly, Hazir is of the view that it is actually the Pakistani government and establishment that needs to be answerable for jeopardizing the country’s territory, not a teenage child that became a victim of the Taliban’s atrocity. In addition, Hazir reprimands western powers, too, including Madonna, Angelina Jolie, and UN officers for paying homage to Malala but turning a blind eye to the sufferings of civilian drone victims at the same time. The opinions of several analysts in Pakistani newspapers (names already mentioned in footnote 4) reveal that the intelligentsia in Pakistan predominantly condemns sufferings of victims in both incidents.
It is useful to look at Yousafzai’s portrayal in comparison with another incident wherein victims relatively appear to be overlooked. While talking about “How to Keep Malala from being Appropriated,” Omid Safi explains that the critics of Malala actually do not critique her, rather they critique how she might be used by western powers to advance their colonial agendas. Safi urges Yousafzai to raise her voice against both the violence of the Taliban and the violence of American empire. Providing the facts and figures regarding the deaths of Pakistani civilians and children in the US drone attacks, Safi asserts that Yousafzai would not have been a celebrated figure if she were a drone victim, just like other drone victims who are barely reported or noticed.

There is a vast body of literature on Muslim representations by the Western media35. In our contemporary context, the Malala Yousafzai case is an important site to explore the issues of orientalism and othering. Brown women have been the objects of saving for the white savior complex since the onset of colonialism. While rhetorically asking the question of speaking for subalterns, Gayatri Spivak observes that, “White men are saving brown women from brown men” (92). Spivak explains how the saving of brown women serves to be a pretext for the civilizing mission of colonial powers. Raising somewhat similar concerns about western reactions to the Yousafzai’s shooting incident, Assed Baig in “Malala Yousafzai and the White Saviour Complex,” criticizes the heavy attention that this incident received by the Western media. Referring to relatively little western media attention received by

Shazia Ramzan and Kainat Riaz\textsuperscript{36}, and Abeer Qasim Hamza al-Janabi\textsuperscript{37}, Baig insists that the appropriation of Yousafzai by western media provides a justification to western powers for intervention in Pakistan.

Responding to the concerns of the ‘white savior complex,’ Bina Shah maintains that people should continue criticizing imperialist western policies but not at the cost of negating Malala’s noble cause. Arguing that if drones are somehow stopped in Pakistan, almost 13 million girls will still remain outside school, Shah urges not to blur the lines between the Yousafzai case and the drones case (“Malala and the West”). Nevertheless, the fact remains that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis think that atrocities in both incidents are unacceptable (Hazir, “Malala vs Drones Debate”).

The Malala Yousafzai case seems to herald a shift in the representation of Muslim women. In her doctoral dissertation titled “Celebration and Rescue: Mass Media Portrayals of Malala Yousafzai as Muslim Woman Activist,” Wajeeca Ameen Choudhary argues that Malala represents a significant shift in the representation of Muslim women in mass media (125). Keeping in view Yousafzai’s efforts to stand up for children, especially female education, and voicing her cause at various international forums, Choudhary argues that, “Malala has transitioned from being saved to saving others” (129); she further maintains that, “Malala has transitioned from rescuee to rescuer” (131). Thus, Malala’s mass media representation presents a female that is no more passive and dependent. Choudhary’s analysis of Yousafzai’s

\textsuperscript{36} Shazia Ramzan and Kainat Riaz are two Pakistani girls who were also injured along with Malala Yousafzai in the same incident. Both girls received relatively little attention.

\textsuperscript{37} Abeer Qasim Hamza al-Janabi was a 14-year-old Iraqi girl gang raped by five US soldiers. Abeer and her family were killed by the same soldiers in Iraq in 2006.
representation as a Muslim woman is factual but it does not address the questions of partial or biased representation. Wary of this fact, Choudhary herself describes that a representation will always lack a nuance, an element or an idea (125). Thus, in order to study the production and promotion of ideologies, it is significant to examine representations.

The Malala Yousafzai case has not only sparked debates on Muslims or representations of women, it also generated research interests in issues related to childhood and children’s rights. In “Facing Malala Yousafzai, Facing Ourselves,” Wendy S. Hesford discusses media portrayals of Yousafzai in comparison to drone victims and maintains that “… Yousafzai’s difference rests in her actions, not in media representations of her” (411). Although Hesford’s focus is to explore the rhetorics regulating childhood and children’s rights, she does incorporate the issues and problems of Yousafzai’s media portrayal. For example, while analyzing Declan Walsh’s coverage of Yousafzai in the NYT, Hesford writes that, “In becoming a symbol for Pakistani moderates, Malala has also become a symbol for the West—a symbol for the rationality of rights and irrationality of extremism” (410). This appropriation of Yousafzai is the result of a representation that needs to be explored at length.

In the same way, in “Malala and Sharbat Gula: Pashtun Icons of Hope,” Saleem Ali compares two Pashtun girls—Malala Yousafzai and Sharbat Gula— who have received international media attention. Ali argues that as compared to Sharbat Gula, Yousafzai is using her celebrity status to raise her voice against oppression,

---

38 Sharbat Gula is also known as The Afghan Girl. Gula became famous after her photographic portrait appeared on the cover page of National Geographic Magazine in 1985. Gula was photographed at the Nasir Bagh refugee camp in Lahore during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
unlike many others who were subservient to traditions. At any rate, Ali’s analysis is somewhat similar to Choudhary and Hesford’s examination of Yousafzai in envisaging a change in female representations. While there is no gainsaying that there seems to be a shift in Muslim women representation after the Yousafzai case (Choudhary, 125) and Yousafzai’s difference rests in her actions, rather than in her representation (Hesford, 411), there is a need to juxtapose the coverage of the Yousafzai case with the coverage of another incident that bears American involvement and civilian casualties. In order to elaborate the perpetuation of orientalism, such a juxtaposition is essential.

Expressing her concerns about the gravity of the drone strikes in Pakistan in her meeting with the Obamas, Yousafzai argued that the drone warfare is creating resentment among Pakistanis and its use is counterproductive (“Malala Yousafzai meets the Obamas at the White House”). Additionally, in her memoir I am Malala: The Girl Who Stood up for Education and was shot by the Taliban, Yousafzai alludes to the fact that the drone strikes are one of the causes for affecting/damaging America’s image for the majority Pakistanis (100, 256). Several authors and researchers also confirm this rise in anti-Americanism after the US drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The coverage of civilian deaths as a result of the US drone attacks is an ambiguous issue in Pakistan. There appears to be a sharp contrast between the claims of civilian deaths made by Washington and Islamabad and the ones made by investigative reporting forums such as The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. In “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the US Drone Program in Pakistan,”

---

39 See Afzal, Hazir, and Sawh
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann note that reporting in the tribal areas of Pakistan is a difficult and challenging task. However, they try to maintain a record of every US drone strike in Pakistan by developing an open source database, which is based on reliable accounts from the US and Pakistani media outlets (13). Claiming that only one out of seven drone attacks in Pakistan kills a militant leader (12), Bergen and Tiedemann urge for more openness and an overt cooperation from Pakistan in terms of the drone warfare (18). The demand for transparent and open news coverage for the drone strikes case in Pakistan confirms that the issue is either misrepresented or underrepresented. Probing into the media coverage of this issue, especially in comparison to another well-received and celebrated issue (such as the Malala Yousafzai case) by media is essential to investigating the continuity of orientalism for Pakistan.

The heavy attention that the Malala Yousafzai shooting incident received as compared to inattention received by the US drone victims in Pakistan did not escape the attention of Edward S. Herman—the co-author of Manufacturing Consent with Chomsky. Analyzing the portrayal of the shooting of Yousafzai compared to the news of drone warfare in Pakistan, in Dissident Voice Herman explains how the New York Times appeared to be selective in terms of publishing news stories that are consistent with elite interests. Quoting figures of child casualties from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Herman divulges the fact of the death of 176 Pakistani children as a result of drone attacks since 2004 and argues that the New York Times yet has to find it newsworthy to publish these stories as compared to the Yousafzai case, for which they published 14 articles in just 19 days after the incident. Three of these articles appeared on the editorial page. In a comparative analysis of these two
issues from Pakistan, Herman asserts that “We are back to the concepts of ‘worthy and unworthy victims’” (“Majority versus Elite Priorities”).

In the light of the above literature review, it appears that the contrasting coverage of these two case studies warrants our attention to study the ideological maneuvering that lies within media coverage and appears to be aligned with national interests. Some (Herman, and Safi) have raised these concerns on the basis of initial observation and prefatory research. However, a detailed analysis is required to determine the objectivity and impartiality of media in terms of selectivity. Thus, I analyze the media coverage of these two Pakistani case studies in order to reveal the ongoing nature of orientalism and imperialism.

The Selection of Newspapers

The two US newspapers that I chose for my study include the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Both of these newspapers are among the top broadsheet in the list of US national publications. Similarly, for Pakistani newspapers, I chose two English newspapers, i.e., The Nation and Daily Times. Here, it is important to note that media consumption in the Urdu language is higher in Pakistan as compared to English newspaper consumption. Considering the cultural divide of English and Urdu and the issues of inaccessibility for the learning of English (as discussed at length in the previous chapter), the majority of Pakistanis consume mass media in Urdu or indigenous languages. However, mass media in the English language retains popularity among the ruling elite.

A report titled “Between Radicalization and democratization in an unfolding conflict: Media in Pakistan,” presents an overview of the functioning of media in the multiethnic and multilingual landscape of Pakistan. According to the report, Urdu and
Sindhi are largest language groups among 11 languages used in print media (20). The report further describes that although English newspapers have a far smaller audience than their Urdu counterparts, English print media has “great leverage among opinion makers, politicians, the business community, and the upper strata of society” (14). Considering the importance of English media among the ruling elite, I select both Pakistani newspapers from English medium. Besides this, another consideration is their accessibility on databases. In order to examine the portrayal of worthy and unworthy victims in the coverage of two case studies, the comparison of news in Pakistani newspapers with the US newspapers is essential to determine the issues of selectivity, wording, and framing of news stories, etc. Moreover, this analysis not only reveals how both case studies were treated by Pakistan’s own media, it also provides the glimpses of internal orientalism, if any.

In addition, a comparative approach encompassing the coverage of the events by national media of Pakistan enriches the analysis and augments the argument of selectivity of issues by the US media. In the comparison of both incidents, it is important to note that both incidents are controversial. Malala Yousafzai is admired by many, but at the same time she is criticized for the amount of attention she received by western media. In the same way, there are some who support the drone warfare\textsuperscript{40} to defeat radicalism and militancy but there is an overwhelming majority who oppose drones. Generally, Pakistanis oppose drones for two reasons: (i) the US drone attacks affect civilians, including children, too, and (ii) the drone attacks violate the sovereignty of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{40} See Khetran, and Taj
For the selection of time period for the news analysis, I chose a time period of one year (twelve-months) for both case studies. Although the US drone strikes in Pakistan were started in 2004, they were stepped up in 2010—both in pace and intensity. After President Obama took office in January 2009, the frequency of drone attacks significantly went higher. Bergen and Tiedemann argue that just in two years after Obama took office, his “administration authorized nearly four times as many drone strikes as did the Bush administration throughout its entire time in office” (13). Furthermore, according to an American think tank New America, there were 617 total strikes in 13 years (from 2004 to 2017), out of which 122 attacks occurred in 2010 (“Drone Strikes: Pakistan”). Thus, I chose 2010 as a time period for my study to analyze the news articles published from 1st of January, 2010 to the 31st of December, 2010.

Although Malala Yousafzai was known in national and international media (because of Ellick’s documentary and Yousafzai’s blogging with BBC) before the shooting incident, she became an internationally reputed figure after she survived a murder attempt by a Taliban gunman who shot her in the head on the 9th of October, 2012, when she and other girls were returning from school. Yousafzai’s shooting incident received the attention of worldwide media. She gave a speech at the United Nations in July 2013, which was her first public appearance after the shooting incident and where she received a standing ovation for her bravery. Yousafzai is considered a strong Eastern voice since then. Keeping all these details in view, I consider a one-year time period for the Yousafzai incident as well (corresponding to one-year time period selected for the drone attacks case). Thus, I analyze news stories
published from the 9th of October, 2012 to the 9th of October, 2013 for the Malala Yousafzai case.

After a careful and detailed analysis from two databases\textsuperscript{41}, I obtained a total corpus of 855 news articles. Table 1 presents an overview of the number of news stories published by four newspapers regarding both case studies. Here, it is important to note that the number of news stories on databases may differ from the number of stories mentioned in the table. The news stories that are not directly pertinent to research questions are excluded from the corpus\textsuperscript{42}. For a twelve-month time period, I chose 12 news stories (one from each month) from each of the four newspapers, hence, 48 news articles in total for one case study. For both case studies, I analyzed 96 news articles in total. The selection of news articles is based on simple random sampling. Furthermore, in order to determine the media attention received by the two case studies, I also consider whether the newspaper editorialized the event, the number of columns/op-eds published, and letters to the editorial desk, etc. However, for the analysis of language, word choices, and overall framing of the issue, I only consider the news articles.

An overview of news articles on two case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai case</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{41} The databases used for this research include Nexis Uni (former Lexis Nexis) and ProQuest. The search terms used for the study are: (i) Malala Yousafzai, and Pakistan, and (ii) US Drone Strikes, and Pakistan Tribal areas, for the Yousafzai case and the Drone Strikes Case respectively.

\textsuperscript{42} The repetition of news stories also appears in databases. Thus, repeated news articles were also excluded from the corpus.
At times, if a newspaper has not published a news story in a specific month, notwithstanding the publication of op-eds or short news articles based on brief reporting in the same month, I balance it out by the selection of news stories from the months where they published the most news articles. I employ the methodology of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to study the ideological construction of orientalist messages embedded in the language of news stories. According to Fairclough, news goes through the messy process of gathering and interpretation (144). The ideologies embedded in the practice of this process can be examined by the discourse of language. Fairclough gives a list of questions that are significant for critical analysis. Providing a framework for the analysis of vocabulary, grammar, and the structure of a text, Fairclough’s list of questions helps to examine the experiential, relational, and expressive values within a particular text (129). The experiential, relational, and expressive elements give a clue to the text producer’s experiences, social relationships, and the producer’s evaluation of the bit of reality respectively (130). Here, Fairclough’s framework of questions is appropriate to understand the construction of messages in news stories.

**Summary of analysis and discussion**
The analysis of selected news stories revealed some important key characteristics about the selectivity of issues and language of news articles. Here, I provide a newspaper-wise summary and synthesis.

**Coverage of the New York Times for both Case Studies**

The coverage of the *New York Times* for the two case studies appears to be quite contrasting. Table 2 shows the details of quantitative aspects of the coverage.

**Coverage by The New York Times**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai case</th>
<th>The Drone strikes case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>10-9-2012 to 10-9-2013 = 1 year</td>
<td>01-01-2010 to 12-31-2010 = 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles Published</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>Columns/o p-ed</td>
<td>Editorial Letters to the Editorial desk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 2)

The coverage of the Yousafzai case not only dwarfs that of the coverage of the drone strikes victims, it seems to amount to propaganda. Let us review the portrayal of Malala Yousafzai first. The *NYT* published an editorial the next day after the Yousafzai shooting incident (Oct 10, 2012); the very first paragraph of this editorial presents the Taliban as a significant problem that Pakistan is facing. Popular *NYT* columnist Nicholas Kristof contributed op-eds about Yousafzai several times within the selected time period of the study. Other op-eds were contributed by Adam B. Ellick (the writer and director of the *NYT*’s documentary on Malala Yousafzai) and Gordon Brown (the former British Prime Minister).
The *NYT* reported an extensive coverage of Malala Yousafzai in two months—October, 2012 (the month when Yousafzai was shot in the head) and July, 2013 (the month when Yousafzai gave a speech at the United Nations Youth Assembly in New York); there are 14 and 9 news articles in both months respectively. Thus, I chose 3 articles from each of these months for CDA to compensate for the months where they only published op-eds or brief reports on Malala’s recovery. Moreover, the *NYT* also published quotes of Yousafzai a couple of times under the heading of ‘Quotation of the Day’ in the months of October and July. The majority of news articles on Yousafzai were published with pictures (some with at least three pictures in a single story) including pictures of Yousafzai, her family, the school van in which she was attacked, the map of Pakistan showing Swat, protesters in support of Yousafzai, and her doctors, etc. The intensity of this coverage assured that its readers would know who Malala Yousafzai is and what barbarism she had to face only because of her demand of education.

The majority of news stories on Yousafzai in the *NYT* are long (containing 700 to 1000 words) and describe the shooting incident with two dominant participants, i.e., Yousafzai and the Taliban. For example, consider the following excerpts of the *NYT* news story by Declan Walsh:

> At the age of 11, Malala Yousafzai took on the Taliban by giving voice to her dreams. As turbaned fighters swept through her town in northwestern Pakistan in 2009, the tiny school girl spoke out for her passion about education—she wanted to become a doctor, she said—and became a symbol of defiance against Taliban subjugation (Walsh, “Girl Shot by Taliban”).

(TEXT 1)
According to Fairclough’s CDA, this excerpt focuses on two main participants (whereby the Taliban are agents and Malala Yousafzai is a victim), Yousafzai and the Taliban; the paragraph also describes an action of Yousafzai’s resistance against the Taliban who appear as responsible agents for opposing female education. Fairclough writes that “such choices may be consistent, automatic, and commonsensical, and therefore ideological” (139). I am obviously not advocating the Taliban; my argument is that worthy victims are featured prominently and dramatically. Yousafzai is humanized and her victimization is presented in a way that not only generates interest among readers but also promotes sympathetic concerns.

Here is another excerpt that bears somewhat similar concerns:

The Pakistani Taliban see schools as symbols of both Western decadence and government authority, but their attacks are also intended to deny the Pakistani military the possibility of establishing temporary bases in the buildings (Siddiqui and Walsh, “Siege by Taliban” A4).

(Text 2)

Consider another sentence from the same news story:

Back in Pakistan … the Taliban war on girl’s education continues unabated (Siddiqui and Walsh, “Siege by Taliban” A4).

(Text 3)

Again, the examples in the Texts 2 and 3 reveal the Taliban as the responsible agents for opposing female education. The significant feature of most news stories is the absence of relational value. According to Fairclough, the relational value has to do with social relationships (130). In other words, the relational value of text helps to create social relationships. In the larger structure of the news stories from which I take the excerpts of Text 2 and 3 (and other stories), there is no consideration of the historical background and political rationale in the country that led to the existing
predicament of Talibanization. The absence of a holistic analysis channels readers toward disapproving of the Taliban but not considering the factors that lead to Talibanization. Additionally, there is an extensive focus on the suffering of Yousafzai. There are news stories that describe the details of her recovery and her skull’s reconstructive surgery along with the views of her doctors (Mackey, “Girl Shot by Taliban vows to Continue Activism”). The extent of this coverage undoubtedly raises questions about the dearth of attention received by the drone victims.

Let us now examine the portrayal of the drone attack’s victims. Drone strikes increased in 2010 possibly in the wake of a suicide bombing at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec 30, 2009 that killed seven Americans and a Jordanian intelligence operative. The majority of news stories in the NYT that report the deaths of militants by drones relate it to the death of seven Americans. The NYT did not editorialize the drone issue at all. There is only one column in the whole twelve-month period by Michael E. O’Hanlon and that, too, does not consider civilian deaths. As a matter of fact, O’Hanlon’s article is not directly pertinent to the issue of drones; he brings in the discussion of drones while talking about terrorism in Pakistan (“Pakistan’s War of Choice”).

The sufferings of drone victims did not receive any coverage by the NYT. There is no story that contains the pictures of victims. At times, if there are pictures along with the stories, these are the file-photos of militants who were either targeted or were suspected to be killed. The majority of articles relate the reporting of drones with the death of seven Americans in a suicide bombing, hence, again revealing a relational value in wording—whereby militants appear as agents and seven
Americans as victims. This description in the wording is ideologically burdened (as Fairclough would argue). Consider the wording of the following news story about stepping up drone strikes in Pakistan:

The drones were the deadliest reported since Dec. 30, when a double agent detonated a suicide vest packed with explosives and killed eight people at a Central Intelligence Agency base in southeastern Afghanistan. The C.I.A. base served as an important part of the American effort, which included drone strikes, to single out Al Qaeda’s top leadership in the region (Khan & Masood, “US Drone Strikes Against Militants Reported” A18).

(Text 4)

Similarly, consider the wording of another news story in which a drone strike mistakenly killed the younger brother of top militant commander in the North Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan:

The militant commander, Sirajuddin Haqqani, appeared to have been the target of the attack … The Americans blame the Haqqani network for helping plan the suicide bombing against the C.I.A. base in Afghanistan in December in which C.I.A. operatives and a Jordanian intelligence officer were killed (Shah, “Missile Strike Kills Brother of Militant” A6).

(Text 5)

The reporting of drones—with reference to the death of seven Americans—helps create a social relationship between participants (CIA operatives and militants). This suggests an implicit message: since the Taliban killed American officials, therefore drones are justified to tackle the Taliban’s brutality.

In Text 5, the killing of a militant’s younger brother is presented as though a part of the drone warfare. The news story highlights the Americans’ belief that the targeted militant (whom the drone wanted to hit) is closely affiliated with Al-Qaeda and his network is working against international forces (Shah, “Missile Strike Kills
Brother” A6). Consequently, the overall presentation of drone warfare by the NYT is almost euphemistic here. By euphemism I mean that word choices in the news story tend to avoid negative value. In Text 4, the news of deadliest drones is balanced out with the reporting of Americans’ deaths. Similarly, in Text 5, the reporting of a militant’s brother’s death is balanced out with the claim that the targeted militant (Sirajuddin Haqqani) is behind the Americans’ deaths. The reference of American deaths in both texts is to avoid negative value of innocent deaths in drones.

Overall, these news stories spotlight how drones are disrupting the Taliban’s sanctuaries and have been successful in tracing Al-Qaeda havens in Pakistan without paying any heed to civilian casualties. My conclusion of the NYT’s coverage of Malala Yousafzai in comparison to the drone victims is that the selectivity of the NYT appears to be aligned with the US’s national and political interests. The act in the Yousafzai shooting incident was cruel and deserved the attention it received; but the killing of innocent civilians and militants’ relatives as a result of the US drone attacks is also vicious but did not receive the same amount of attention. After reviewing the coverage of the two case studies by the NYT, now let us consider their coverage by a Pakistani newspaper, The Nation.

Coverage of The Nation for both Case Studies

The coverage of the two case studies in The Nation does not appear to be as contrasting as was the case in the NYT. This is clear from the quantitative aspects of the coverage in Table 3. The coverage of drone strikes by The Nation reveals some significant details that are totally absent in the NYT coverage.

Coverage by The Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai case</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

88
Table (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Articles published</th>
<th>10-9-2012 to 10-9-2013 = 1 year</th>
<th>01-01-2010 to 12-31-2010 = 1 year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns/op-eds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns/op-eds</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Nation’s coverage of Malala Yousafzai was intense with detailed news articles in the months of October (when the shooting incident happened) and July (when Malala addressed the UN Youth Assembly), with stories containing 1000 plus words. The Nation editorialized Malala Yousafzai 17 times in a twelve-month time period and many columnists contributed to the issue. Moreover, many people voiced their concerns about Yousafzai’s bravery, safety, and the state’s inability to protect the right of education for children through letters to the editor. The overall coverage of Malala Yousafzai by The Nation for the one-year time period appears to be fair and objective.

The stories right after the shooting incident mainly report the event and the response of political, intellectual, religious, and sports organizations on the incident. There is also a great focus on the coverage of news regarding how various celebrities (for example Hillary Clinton, Madonna, and Angelina Jolie) reacted to the shooting incident. Moreover, The Nation reported how international media portrayed the shooting incident and its aftermaths in Pakistan. For example, while reporting Declan Walsh’s news analysis for the NYT, The Nation highlighted the NYT’s concerns regarding conspiracy theories about the Yousafzai case in Pakistan (“Pakistan’s Malala Moment Has Passed: NYT”). Overall, The Nation tries to present an adequate picture of how the shooting incident depicts the problems of benightedness in Pakistan and how this affects Pakistan’s image in international community.
Another interesting feature in the coverage of *The Nation* is its focus on Yousafzai’s two friends who were also wounded with Yousafzai in the shooting incident. Unlike the *NYT* that exclusively encompasses the news coverage of Yousafzai, *The Nation* published several news stories including the conferment of *Tamgha-e-Shujat* (The Medal of Bravery) to Yousafzai’s fellows by the President of Pakistan in the month of March. Additionally, *The Nation* reports about the suffering of these girls, the feelings of insecurity their families had after the shooting incident, and the stories of Yousafzai’s friends receiving the UK visa and leaving Pakistan to pursue their education in Britain. By contrast, there is only one story published in October by the *NYT* about Yousafzai’s friends, which only explains the brutality of the Taliban, not the plight of affected girls. Consider this sentence from the *NYT*:

A 15-year-old girl who was wounded alongside Ms. Yousafzai described how easily the Taliban had been able to attack the school bus. “A young man in his early 20s approached the bus and asked for Malala,” the girl, Kainat Riaz, said in an interview at her family’s home in Swat (Walsh, “Taliban Reiterate” A5).

(Text 6)

Towards the end of this news article, there is just one sentence informing about another wounded girl, Shazia Ramzan, at a hospital in Peshawar. The disregard of two girls appears to suggest the issue of Yousafzai’s appropriation by the *NYT*.

Furthermore, *The Nation*’s coverage of Yousafzai’s address to the UN’s youth assembly in July brings forth the issue of selectivity employed by the *NYT* in the coverage of the same news story. While giving a detailed coverage of Yousafzai’s address, *The Nation* describes Yousafzai’s emphasis on Islam as a religion of peace and brotherhood. Similarly, she includes Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Martin
Luther King, Quaid-e-Azam\textsuperscript{43}, and Bacha Khan\textsuperscript{44} in the list of persons for her inspiration. Not only this, the newspaper also reported the woefully unsatisfactory situation of education in Pakistan whereby five million children are out of school, a number only surpassed by Nigeria. Describing Yousafzai’s views on the situation of education in terror-affected, conflict-ridden areas, the special correspondent of \textit{The Nation} writes that:

Pointing that the thousands had been killed and millions injured by the terrorists, Malala said that she was just one of them, and said that she spoke for the others who could not be heard. She asserted on the need to their right to be educated (“Malala Speaks for Pakistan at UN”).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{The Nation} focuses on the lack of educational opportunities in Pakistan as a problem whereas the \textit{NYT} focuses on the Taliban as a problem. Consider the difference of headlines between the two news stories: “Malala Speaks for Pakistan at UN” (\textit{The Nation}) and “Girl Shot by Taliban Makes Appeal at U.N.” (the \textit{NYT}). Clearly, \textit{The Nation}’s headline presents Yousafzai as someone representing Pakistan (and its problems) at the world forum; the \textit{NYT}’s headline, on the other hand, cues the Taliban as a problem.
\end{itemize}
Arguing that the functioning of the US media is to engineer opinions, Chomsky maintains that in order to divert people’s attention from the domestic problems of poverty, crime, health, and decline in education standards, etc., it is important to whip them up into a fear of enemies; since Russians enemies are losing their attractiveness, the new terrorist enemies have replaced them (Media Control 43-44). The reporting of Yousafzai in the NYT appears to be consistent with Chomsky’s arguments. The Nation’s reporting, however, encompasses a holistic approach to describing educational problems in Pakistan; it provides information on Pakistan’s ranking in international standing alongside the information that the Taliban intensified educational problems, particularly for females.

Moreover, considering the focus of the NYT’s reporting, one can suggest that the NYT purposely avoids Yousafzai’s reference to Pakistani Muslim figures and Islam as a peaceful religion. Comparatively, the NYT has detailed coverage of the Taliban who represent a non-traditional/non-standard face of the religion. Another example of the NYT’s selectivity is evident from the absence of Yousafzai’s coverage when she visited the United Nations a second time in September 2013 and pleaded for fighting terrorism through education. Her message at the UN was clear, strong, and appealing. Yousafzai asks that, “Instead of sending tanks, send pens; instead of sending soldiers, send teachers; instead of sending guns, send pens; fight terrorism through education” (“Send books not guns, Malala pleads at UN”). The Nation published this news story about Yousafzai’s visit to United Nations building in New York in September, 2013 and writes that:
With a maturity and poise that belied her tender years, Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani teen shot by the Taliban for championing girl’s education, stood by world leaders and called for books not guns (“Send books, not tanks, to Afghanistan, Malala pleads at UN”).

(Text 8)

By contrast, the NYT did not find newsworthiness in Yousafzai’s strong and emotional appeal of fighting terror through education, not a so-called ‘the War on Terror.’ The NYT’s disregard for this important yet conflicting (with the NYT’s interests) news event is an example of Yousafzai’s appropriation for a specific representation.

The comparison of The Nation’s coverage of the drone attacks brings forth more significant results. The newspaper heavily editorialized the drone warfare issue in Pakistan. A detailed analysis of news reveals that The Nation gave considerable attention to civilian and children casualties. However, it is significant to note that notwithstanding the description (mostly in numbers) of victims, The Nation does not provide the details (such as names, identities, and profiles, etc.) of affected people in the tribal areas. This may be because of challenges of reporting in Pakistani tribal areas. Nevertheless the fact remains that in the efforts to eliminate extremists, the drone warfare has caused the toll of civilians, which is evident from the reports of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. According to the Bureau, from 2004 to 2015, “these attacks have killed 2,499-4,001 people, including between 424 and 966 civilians” (Serle, “Infographic”).

Overall, The Nation gives considerable attention to report Pakistan’s political, religious, and judicial circles’ opposition and criticism against the Pakistani government’s complicity in the operation of drones in the Pakistani territories. The
Nation reports on the US demands to expand the drone operations to Baluchistan and Quetta. Besides this, there are reports on how the drone attacks create a sense of fear and harassment in the population of affected areas. Again, these news stories failed to meet the criteria of newsworthiness by the NYT. Although The Nation’s articles reveal the deaths of top militants in the drone strikes, often these stories contain the wording of “suspected militants.” This points to the fact that most targets are suspects. Drone strikes target them indiscriminately without letting them face any legal process or accountability.

The Nation published a news story in November 2010 revealing that a Pakistani journalist from North Waziristan Agency, Kareem Khan, served legal notices on the US secretary of defense, the director of CIA, and the chief of Islamabad station, Jonathan Banks, for killing his brother, son, and a friend in a drone strike in December 2009. The newspaper provided further details on Khan’s assertion regarding three persons’ innocence and the destruction of his house as a result of the drone attack. A significant feature about the reporting of this incident is that it received world media attention; The Guardian and Al-Jazeera covered this incident. The same incident, however, failed to grab the attention of the NYT. Several news stories in The Nation report civilian deaths. Some examples include reports by Human Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP) and Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC).

The majority of news stories published by The Nation give numbers regarding the number of casualties (both militants and civilians) since the onset of drone strikes in 2004. However, to repeat, the names and identities of most drone victims remain absent in most stories. For example, consider the following excerpt:
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several other got injured (“US Drone Strikes Kill 28 in NWA, SWA”).

(Text 9)

Text 9 is an excerpt from a news article that reports the killing of twenty more people in two different attacks in same area. Although the reporting in *The Nation*, potentially because of limited access, does not provide exact details of drone victims, the journalistic practice of this newspaper in comparison to the Malala Yousafzai case appears to be quite objective and fair. Here, the comparison of another US newspaper is essential to elucidate the problems of a biased or partial representation.

**Coverage of *The Wall Street Journal (WSJ)* for Both Case Studies**

Table 4 gives an overview of the quantitative aspects of the *Wall Street Journal’s* coverage of both case studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai case</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>10-9-2012 to 10-9-2013 = 1 year</td>
<td>01-01-2010 to 12-31-2010 = 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles Published</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns/ops-ed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The Table 4)

The *WSJ* and the *NYT* are akin in celebrating the heroism of Yousafzai and turning a blind eye to the victims of the drone attacks. The handling of both case studies by the *WSJ* reveals that there is a great focus on the Taliban’s wrongdoings. While the number of articles about the drone attacks in the *WSJ* is higher than the Yousafzai case, the analysis of language through CDA reveals that the *WSJ* does not consider the drone victims worthy of attention, hence, rendering them as unworthy victims.
Moreover, most articles about drone strikes appear to focus on the complicity of the Pakistani government and the US-Pakistan political tension, rather than the reporting of the drone victims.

Like the coverage of the NYT and The Nation, the WSJ also did extensive reporting of Malala Yousafzai in the months when she was shot (October 2012) and when she addressed the youth assembly at the UN (July 2013). However, the WSJ neither published any column/op-ed nor any editorial regarding Malala Yousafzai. Almost all news stories published in the month of October explained in detail that Yousafzai is known for championing the education rights for girls and raising her voice against atrocities committed by the Taliban. Following such news, there are news articles regarding her treatment in a British hospital, her successful surgery, signs of recovery, and the views of her doctors. The details of her surgery and doctor’s views, however, are not as detailed as they appear in the NYT.

Similarly, in the reporting of Yousafzai’s address at UN headquarters, the reporting of the WSJ appears to be selective. Describing how the Taliban failed to silence her, the article provides a brief background on how Yousafzai rose to prominence. Here, it is important to consider how the article concluded:

The Pakistani Taliban, which works closely with Al-Qaeda and is independent of the Afghan Taliban, is a menacing force in Pakistan, killing over 1,000 people in the country last year in hundreds of attacks. It is most potent in the northwest of the country, an area dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, who are also the largest ethnic group in neighboring Afghanistan (S. Shah, “Pakistani Schoolgirl brings message.”).

(Text 10)

The analysis of this news story reveals that the WSJ, too, does not consider Yousafzai’s references to Islamic and Pakistani figures that suggest her contentment
with her religious and cultural identity. Furthermore, the excerpt in Text 10 is from a news story that (unlike *The Nation*) goes without mentioning the fact that the Taliban are aggravating Pakistan’s already existing problems, and presents the Taliban as though an exclusive problem in equal access of education. According to Fairclough’s CDA approach, here, the mixing of news with interpretation induces a message that is ideologically driven. The excerpt in Text 10 is an example of mixing news with interpretation.

Another example of mixing news with interpretation is evident from a news story published in the *WSJ* when Adnan Rasheed, a Taliban militant, wrote a letter to Yousafzai after her address at the UN headquarters in July 2013. In his letter, Rasheed essentially castigates Yousafzai for pursuing western education and urges her to pursue Islamic education instead. Although the letter bears an acrimonious tone towards Western education, it does reflect aggrieved concerns of imperialism. The news story in the *WSJ* jumbles the reporting of this incident with ‘Islam versus West’ rhetoric. Here are a couple of excerpts from the *WSJ* news story:

> Malala Yousafzai, a teenage campaigner for girls’ education who was nearly killed by Pakistani militants, was feted at the United Nations last week. Here at home, however, she has been widely portrayed as part of a Western conspiracy against Islam and the developing world (S. Shah, “Pakistan Taliban Lambastes Schoolgirl”).

(Text 11)

After a paragraph, the same news story continues as follows:

> Even as the 16-year-old is celebrated abroad as a hero, such radical views are becoming mainstream in Pakistani society, where even commentators hostile to the Taliban widely portray Ms. Yousafzai as a pawn of the West or even a CIA agent (S. Shah, “Pakistan Taliban Lambastes Schoolgirl”).
(Text 12)

Considering the CDA approach for analyzing language, the logical connector *even* in the start of the Text 12 cues the ideological assumption that Yousafzai is acclaimed abroad but her standing within her home country is different. Besides this, both texts (11 and 12) reveal the expressive modality of the writer whereby we can see the writer’s authority with respect to the truth or probability of a representation of reality. The writer refers to the views of mainstream Pakistani society and commentators with no adequate evidence (an example of news mixed with interpretation). Both the *NYT* and the *WSJ* have detailed news articles on this incident. The *NYT* also published a copy of the original letter. Additionally, what remains missing in both the *NYT* and the *WSJ* regarding Yousafzai’s UN address coverage is their failure to consider Yousafzai’s second visit to the UN in September 2013, where she pleads to fight terrorism through education.

After analyzing the representation of Malala Yousafzai by the *WSJ*, now I consider the presentation of the drone attack victims by the same newspaper. The newspaper did not editorialize the issue; however, there are several op-eds, one of which criticizes the US arguing that the drone attacks actually radicalize Pakistani citizens (Zaidi, “Pakistan is Fighting Terror”). The overall coverage of the drone victims by the *WSJ* is, again, akin to that of the *NYT*. Unlike the coverage of *The Nation*, there are no news reports of civilian deaths except for the couple of stories. The majority of news articles report the deaths of targeted militants. There are many articles that comment on the merits of drone technology. For example, in a news story regarding stepping up drone attacks after the December 2009 suicide blast on the CIA
base in Khost, Afghanistan, the newspaper reports the killing of almost a dozen suspected militants. Toward the end of the same story, the writer explains that:

The drones have also been used to provide reconnaissance for an ongoing Pakistani offensive against the main faction of the Pakistan Taliban in South Waziristan. The offensive began in October, and the Pakistanis have reported major gains in the region (Hussein and Rosenberg, “U.S. Strike Targets”).

(Text 13)

Text 13 provides a justification to its readers, not only for perpetuating drone attacks, but also for stepping them up. Also, there is no explanation of how the newspaper collected reports of gains from drones in the region. The information on gains of drones, therefore, is an imprecise assumption.

The majority of news stories about the reporting of drone attacks follow the style of highlighting the merits of drones. According to most newspapers, the month of September in 2010 was the worst for having maximum (21 or 23) drone attacks. Providing reasons for increased drone strikes in September, the writer in a news article in the WSJ writes that:

In an effort to foil a suspected terrorist plot against European targets, the Central Intelligence Agency has ramped up missile strikes against militants in Pakistan’s tribal regions, current and former officials say. The strikes, launched from unmanned drone aircraft, represent a rare use of the CIA’s drone campaign to preempt a possible attack on the West (Gorman, “Drones Target Terror Plot”).

(Text 14)

The text in the news story explains that the increase of drones is to forestall any potential attack on ‘West.’ The text cues the ideological binary of ‘Islam versus West.’ The representation of drones in this text is coded in the lexical items of
preempt, possible, and West. These word choices provide a ground for the use of drones. On the contrary, there is no significant news article that provides information on civilian casualties. The WSJ, too, did not report on the incident of Kareem Khan who served legal notices on the US dignitaries. This incident ultimately led to the evacuation of Jonathan Banks, the CIA station chief in Islamabad. Let us now consider the coverage of two case studies by Daily Times, another Pakistani newspaper. This analysis brings new insights in the issues of representation.

**Coverage of Daily Times for Both Case Studies**

Consider the following table for a quick overview for the coverage of both case studies by Daily Times:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai case</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>10-9-2012 to 10-9-2013 = 1 year</td>
<td>01-01-2010 to 12-31-2010 = 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns/ops</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5)

Daily Times published multiple editorials about Yousafzai and several columnists contributed to the incident. Also, Daily Times published several news stories about Yousafzai; I specifically chose the ones that only report her (excluding the news stories that primarily report an incident other than Yousafzai but just mention her name because it somehow relates to the reporting incident). Daily Times also presented the views of activists, non-governmental organizations, and children rights organizations that vehemently raise their concerns about wrongdoings against women in Pakistan. The overall coverage of Daily Times for both case studies, however,
reveals the political economy of communication in Pakistan whereby the existing power structure tends to affect the dissemination of information.

Here, it is important to consider a brief background of this newspaper. *Daily Times* was launched in April 2002 by Salmaan Taseer, a Pakistani businessman, politician, and media mogul. Taseer was a member of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), a famous political party that constituted the government after the 2008 elections. During the time period selected for the research of both case studies, Taseer’s party was in ruling position. This research considers the year 2010 for examining the drone attack victims; the year when Taseer was the governor of Punjab. In the same way, the year selected for Yousafzai media representation is 2012. Although Taseer died in 2011 in an assassination, the PPP remained in ruling position until the next elections in 2013. The political affiliation of the newspaper and its owner suggests an impression of selectivity in the overall representation of case studies in *Daily Times*.

Considering this affiliation, it is clear that why *Daily Times* published several news stories reporting the comments and concerns of the PPP dignitaries about the shooting incident of Yousafzai. Most news stories in *Daily Times* about Yousafzai’s surgery, recovery, and other information are not as detailed as in *The Nation*. With that being said, the overall analysis of *Daily Times*’s coverage of Yousafzai reveals that like other newspapers, *Daily Times* presents her as a ‘worthy victim.’ *Daily Times*’s coverage of Yousafzai presents a holistic picture of Pakistan’s troubled education system. For example, while reporting on the initiation of the Malala Fund, *Daily Times* writes:
Pakistan also lags behind other South Asian countries in its education, at 2.8 percent of its gross national product (GNP), Pakistan’s expenditure on education is the second lowest in South Asia after Bangladesh at 2.4 percent (“Malala Fund”).

(Text 15)

The information in Text 15 reveals the expressive modality of the author, which according to Fairclough, is the modality of a speaker or writer’s evaluation of a fact (142). Speaking of the Malala Fund and its importance in improving female educational facilities in Pakistan, *Daily Times* appears to present a fair picture of the problem which is not mangled by the Taliban only but also by other factors that compound the problem.

The coverage of the US drone attacks by *Daily Times*, however, is noticeably biased. Here, it is important to mention that *The Nation*, the *NYT* and the *WSJ* mention the complicity of Pakistani government in the use of drones in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Several scholars have also written about the backing of Pakistan’s civil and military establishment for the use of drone technology in the tribal areas. Although *Daily Times* editorialized the drone strikes case and a number of columnists contributed to the issue, most of these articles focus on the information that drone attacks are precise and help Pakistan fight terrorism in an area where the country’s intelligence has troubles of access and communication. Several editorials and columns45 give references of civilian deaths as a result of the Taliban attack in various Pakistani cities and explicitly argue in the favor of drones.

The majority of drone attack news stories are based on the reporting of militants’ deaths. There is little mention of civilian deaths in the overall coverage of

---

45 See Taj, and Khetran.
Daily Times. Mostly, these casualties are balanced with the news of victims who lost their lives in terrorist attacks in different cities of Pakistan. The following excerpt, from a news story published in July 2010, is a good example:

According to a research carried out by the BBC Urdu Service, nearly 2,500 people have been killed as a result of US drones and Taliban attacks since January 2009 (“Mapping US Drone”).

(Text 16)

After a couple of paragraphs, the news further continues:

While attacks by the Taliban cannot be described as direct retaliation for drone strikes, they are firmly a part of the battle the US and Pakistani authorities are fighting against terrorist bases in Pakistan (“Mapping US Drone”).

(Text 17)

Text 16 reveals that while describing the number of casualties in the drone attacks, Daily Times tends to make a comparison of drone victims with the victims of terrorist attacks. This comparison suggests that Daily Times attempts to contrive a justification for the ongoing drone warfare. Moreover, the use of word While in the Text 17 is what Fairclough would argue a ‘logical connector’ (146). According to Fairclough, logical connectors cue ideological assumptions (146). Here, the Text 17 is a case in point. The use of word While suggests that terrorist attacks, albeit not in direct response to the drone strikes, are a continuation of the Taliban’s fight against the US and Pakistani forces—an implicit message here is that drones are justified. Towards the end of this news story, the author describes the details of areas hit by the US drones and the Taliban along with the number of deaths in both cases respectively.

For the reporting of Kareem Khan, Daily Times published a news report in mid-December on the issue. Although unlike the NYT and the WSJ, Daily Times did
not completely neglect the case of Khan, the presentation of this case, however, appears to be quite nominal. The Daily Times published only one news story on Khan in mid-December that contains 178 words. The presentation of this incident by Daily Times is quite brief and cursory. The overall coverage of the drones by Daily Times points to the fact that Pakistani media, too, is not insulated from the issues of propaganda manufactured by media conglomeration, ownership, and flak. In other words, the scrutiny of media messages under the framework of Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model—albeit proposed for the US media—can yield significant results for the analysis of Pakistani media’s functioning as well. However, this chapter is not the place to bring in the issues of representation and propaganda by Pakistani media. The central focus here remains the perpetuation of orientalism and the comparison of worthy and unworthy victims in the representation of Malala Yousafzai and the victims of the drone strikes.

**Conclusion:**

It is frequently asserted by media persons that mass media, serving the function of a watchdog in society, are independent, vigilant, and impartial. Such assertions are often proclaimed for Pakistani media, too. But the evidence that I just reviewed demonstrates that these assertions often do not hold true. Herman and Chomsky argue that despite the standard conceptions of media whereby journalistic practices are expected to be cantankerous, obstinate, and ubiquitous, in reality, media tend to serve the political interests of privileged elite (298). The review of the fate of worthy and unworthy victims in four newspapers demonstrates that media do appear to serve political interests. Especially in the review of the US newspapers, one can see
noticeable signs of biasness in word choices, framing of news stories, and the criteria for news selection.

The comparative analysis of four newspapers highlights the issues of selectivity practiced by the NYT and the WSJ. Kareem Khan’s case is an example. Another example is the absence of reporting on Yousafzai’s second UN visit and address where she calls for deploying books and pens instead of weapons to fight terrorism. In addition to that, the NYT and the WSJ’s attempts to jog readers’ memories about the death of seven Americans in a suicide bomb blast at Khost, Afghanistan, in connection to ongoing drone strikes cue partisanship and adherence to their country’s national and political interests. The overall presentation of the East (in this case, Pakistan), as a troublesome site that is in need of intervention, manifests orientalist perspectives that these US newspapers seek to establish. Here, I must clarify that these newspapers have fragmentary approaches in depicting the problems of Pakistan. The journalistic practice of selective and discriminatory approaches tends to taint the reality.

Another significant feature of the NYT and the WSJ’s reporting is the depiction of the Taliban as something ‘fearful’ and the iteration of this depiction. The maneuvering of fear has been a significant characteristic of the US media. For a long time, this fear has been associated with Russians (Chomsky, Media Control 44). In the revision of their propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky rightly argue that “the ‘war on terror’ has provided a useful substitute for the Soviet menace” (Mullen, “The Propaganda Model after twenty years”). Similarly, Elissa Marder, too, raises similar concerns by maintaining that in the aftermath of 9/11, fear has not only dominated the US political discourse but also dictated their domestic and foreign policies (91,
emphasize mine). According to Marder, the whipping up of this fear was an important driving force for invading Iraq and protecting the US against a future Al-Qaeda attack (91). In the same way, the US newspapers’ depiction of the Taliban as something fearful appears to be modus operandi for creating reasonable and defensive responses for military encroachments in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, the comparative analysis of the coverage of Yousafzai and the drone attack victims reveals that the former received more media attention—hence, valorized as a worthy victim—than the latter who appear to be unworthy victims. This assertion generally holds true for the US newspapers, thus, confirming the perpetuation of orientalism for post 9/11 Pakistan. Another feature of Yousafzai’s presentation is the fragmentary presentation of reasons behind her shooting incident. Several columnists and op-ed writers in Pakistani newspapers—albeit not included in the exclusive focus of news stories for this chapter—do encompass the historical reasons for Pakistan’s involvement in the 1980s Afghan Jihad and General Zia-ul-Haq’s conservative leaning government as a significant reason for the rise of the Taliban. Such historical considerations, however, are absent in the coverage of the US newspapers. This is consistent with what Lila Abu-Lughod argues in *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* While discussing the Western savior complex for Eastern Muslim women, Abu-Lughod asks a rhetorical question: why are the culture and particularly religious beliefs of the region given more consideration than exploring historical reasons and the US role in the development of repressive regimes in the study of treatment of women (31)? The analysis in the chapter demonstrates that holistic approaches for the handling of the Yousafzai case—albeit practiced by the Pakistani newspapers—are absent in the US newspapers.
The saving of Eastern/Muslim women has been central to the idea of orientalism and imperialism. According to Said, the Orient is a place that is characterized by ‘backwardness,’ ‘lack of democracy,’ and ‘the abrogation of women’s rights’ (*Orientalism* xix). In addition to this, Gayatri Spivak discusses the issue of saving women for the advancement of imperial designs in the subcontinent during the colonial period. In her famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak contends that “[i]mpperialism’s image as the establisher of the good society is marked by the espousal of the woman as *object* of protection from her own kind” (94). In the end, I argue that through her intrepid endeavors of advocating female education, Malala Yousafzai is challenging the discourse of ‘saving Muslim women.’ Yousafzai is a brave and courageous Muslim voice. Yousafzai’s contentment with her religious identity—revealed in the act of donning her headscarf and her speeches where she invokes various Muslim figures among others as her source of inspiration—demonstrates that she is a strong Muslim Eastern voice for females. She is precisely changing her image from ‘being saved’ to ‘saving others.’ There is, however, an urgency to recognize the voice(s) of several other women that are affected by western imperialistic endeavors. Moreover, the comparison of Yousafzai’s representation with the drone victims’ representation substantiates the framework of worthy versus unworthy victims.
Chapter 4

Orientalism Revisited: The Portrayals of the Daniel Pearl case and the Raymond Davis Case

The previous chapter analyzed the recurrence of orientalism in the comparison of the Malala Yousafzai case versus the Drone strikes case. Correspondingly, this chapter analyzes orientalism in the analysis of two case studies: (i) the Daniel Pearl case, and (ii) the Raymond Davis case. Once again, both case studies in this chapter are from post 9/11 period. The comparison of these events substantiates one of the central arguments of my research: the perpetuation of orientalism. Arguing about orientalism as a ‘political vision of reality,’ Edward Said contends that “[o]rientalism imposed limits upon thought about the Orient” (Orientalism 43). Said further argues that the scope of Orientalist reality—being both anti-human and persistent—lasts up to the present (Orientalism 44). Although Said’s analysis here is with reference to pre 9/11 period, my research expands on this idea of perpetuation of orientalism for post 9/11 Pakistan. The aforementioned case studies serve as the best examples to demonstrate the continuation of orientalism. Also, a number of scholars envisage the post 9/11 world as a revival of imperialism, colonialism, and orientalism. Thus, in that context, the reporting of these two incidents by US newspapers raises the questions of objectivity and impartiality.

Here again, I consider Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s theoretical framework of ‘worthy and unworthy victims’ alongside Edward Said’s Orientalism. Through the analysis of the two case studies, I show in this chapter that the US media’s portrayal of victim(s) is partial and political and manifests the expectations of

---

46 See Alatas, Gregory, Schmidt, and Schwartz.
Herman and Chomsky’s proposed model of worthy and unworthy victims. The propaganda model wherein “people abused in enemy states are taken as worthy victims, and those treated with equal severity by its own government or client will be unworthy” (Manufacturing Consent 37), is a workable premise to study the comparison of Pearl and Davis’s portrayals. As I mentioned in the last chapter, it would be erroneous to take Pakistan as a US enemy state. However, US political interests in Pakistan seem to engender the need for a partial/political portrayal of issues in Pakistan by the US media. Considering Pakistan’s geopolitical location (neighboring with China and Afghanistan), some of the political interests include the justification for the use of drone technology to curb militants in Pakistan, and the strategic presence in the region to sustain hegemony.

In terms of comparison, the incidents of Daniel Pearl and Raymond Davis have both similarities and differences. Pearl was an international journalist associated with a world-renowned newspaper, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Pearl was based in India as a South Asian correspondent. However, in January of 2002, Pearl was in Karachi, Pakistan, to work on an investigative report about Richard C. Reid. Pearl was abducted by Pakistani terrorists in late January; he was later brutally murdered by his captors. The whole incident is quite tragic as Pearl was literally carved up by extremists as is shown in the video of his murder released by his captors. Pearl’s wife, Mariane Pearl, was pregnant with their first child, and for many weeks, no one knew about Pearl’s fate. Pearl’s tragic death at the hands of Pakistani extremists received global attention for his brutal suffering, his wife and unborn child’s poignant condition, and his guilelessness.
Raymond Allen Davis is a former American army soldier. In 2011, Davis was associated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a contractor. In the month of January 2011, Davis shot and killed two Pakistani motorcyclists—Faizan Haider and Muhammed Faheem (also Faheem Shamshad)—on a road in Lahore. According to Davis, he killed them in self-defense (*The Contractor* 8-31). A US Consulate vehicle, coming to rescue Davis, killed a third man, Ibadur Rehman, in a hit-and-run while speeding on the wrong side of the road. As compared to Pearl, the three victims of the Raymond Davis case appear to have received little attention by the US media. On the face of it, the reason for little recognition received by the Davis case victims seems to be related to the fact that Pakistan is a periphery country that bears the marks of ongoing imperialism both national and international. Although unlike Pearl, the victims of the Davis case did not undergo being held hostage and the uncertainty of hovering between life and death, which was horrifying for Pearl’s family and friends, the Davis case’s victims did face brutal death without being accorded any legal and judicial process. Moreover, the suicide of a victim’s widow (Shumaila Faheem) is quite appalling and reveals the response of a sufferer in the face of the fundamental lack of justice and worthlessness of human life.

While there is significant literature by scholars and media analysts discussing the two incidents separately, there has, until recently, been comparatively little work in terms of studying the media representations of each. There are mainly two theories about the ghastly murder of Pearl. First, he was killed because of the denial of extremists’ ransom demands regarding the delivery of F-16 fighter airplanes to the Pakistani government. Second, Pearl was beheaded by fundamentalists because of his Jewish-American identity. However, Bernard-Henri Lèvy, a French intellectual and
author, takes issue with both conjectures. In an effort to present a comprehensive understanding of Pearl’s murder, Lèvy suggests that the actual reason behind Pearl’s death was his intrepid journalistic approach towards divulging Pakistan’s operations of nuclear proliferation (Who Killed Daniel Pearl? 446). While discussing the complicity of the Pakistani government and the involvement of right-wing nuclear scientists such as Bashiruddin Mahmoud in the transfer of nuclear weapons to Al-Qaeda, Lèvy hypothetically argues that Pearl, while investigating this nuclear proliferation, was on to something big (Who Killed Daniel Pearl? 446). The reason for Pearl’s gruesome murder, in Lèvy’s views, is Pearl’s journalistic scoop.

Lèvy’s argument, however, is contradicted by Charles Cogan in his review of Lèvy’s book. Considering Lèvy’s evidences for his argument to be insufficient, Cogan argues that Lèvy’s investigation is mixed up with affabulations (167). In addition to this, Cogan views Pakistan as a country wherein “elites speak English among themselves and ape English manners, while the masses are given over to a virulent anti-Americanism” (168). Here, Cogan refers to Lèvy’s indifference towards the colossal divide between the rulers and the majority in Pakistan that has made the country into a “jittery society” (168). The analysis of Lèvy lacks substantial evidence and Pakistan’s incidental circumstances—giving rise to anarchy and terrorism—are one of the many factors behind Pearl’s assassination.

At any rate, many scholars argue about the complicity of Pakistan’s military establishment, particularly ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), in the backing of Jihadi groups. For example, Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani analyst and author, vehemently argues about the links between Jihadi groups and ISI in Pakistan. Arguing that

---

47 See Fair, and Siddiqa.
terrorism in the country works in the form of a network of resources ("Jihadism in Pakistan: The Expanding Frontier" 67), Siddiqa claims that Omar Saeed Sheikh (the individual behind Pearl’s abduction) used the network of LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) to deliver Pearl to his assassins ("Jihadism in Pakistan: The Expanding Frontier" 67). Overall, the tragic death of the WSJ reporter raises many concerns and questions about the functioning and capability of Pakistan’s security apparatus.

Pearl’s family went through an unspeakable horror right after his abduction; the suffering of his parents—Judea Pearl and Ruth Pearl—and the agony of his pregnant wife—Mariane Pearl (also a journalist) are manifested in their writings. Judea Pearl, Daniel Pearl’s father and a professor of Computer Sciences at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), advocates mutual harmony and understanding between Muslims and Jews. Judea Pearl argues for progressive interpretations of Islam in the Muslim community ("Response to ‘Open Letter from Muslims to Jews’” 155); in his view, the acknowledgement of mutual respect and harmony will strengthen the understanding between the two religious groups rather than any theological account ("Response to ‘Open Letter from Muslims to Jews’” 156). Judea Pearl’s view calls our attention to the importance of mutual respect and coexistence.

The assassination of Pearl is the worst incident of a political expediency whereby an innocent is victimized for the religious-political agendas of fanatics. In The Homesick Phone Book, Cynthia Haynes explains how the scapegoat mechanism directs us at the intersection of war and peace but actually brings neither peace nor security (109). Referring to Pearl’s death as Glitch Rhetoric—a fluke that happened as a result of Pearl’s quest for his news story but put him in harm’s way—Haynes is
equally critical of both the US imperialism and Pearl’s assassins (109). The terrorists scapegoated Pearl for transmitting their political message and tried to use him as an instrument, a channel for their political bargaining. While criticizing mass media, particularly Al-Jazeera’s act of celebrating an anti-Israeli figure as hero, Judea Pearl is a bit downhearted at the seventh anniversary of Pearl’s death (“Daniel Pearl and the Normalization of Evil”). Media can play a crucial role to promote mutual respect, harmony, and coexistence. However, most media practices seem to be opposite of that. For this reason, it is important to analyze media portrayals, particularly in terms of the comparison of events.

Both Pakistani and the US media analysts wrote profoundly to condemn the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl. Husain Haqqani, a Pakistani analyst, journalist, and Pakistan’s former ambassador to Sri Lanka, and the US, wrote an op-ed in one of Pakistan’s leading newspapers Jang after the video of Pearl’s beheading came out and argued that the kidnapping of the American journalist from the country’s largest city indicates Pakistan’s impotent law and order situation that also raises concerns about the country’s stature as an American ally in the War on Terror (“Gher Mulki Sahafi ka Ighwa or Dahshat Gardi ke Khilaf Muhim (The Kidnapping of a Foreign Journalist and the Campaign against Terrorism)”). Several other Pakistani analysts48 raised similar concerns regarding Islamabad’s capacity and seriousness to fight the menace of terrorism.

In the wake of the Pearl incident, Mariane Pearl, however, appears to be quite optimist regarding Pakistan’s fight with terrorism. After Pearl’s death, in an op-ed in the New York Times, Mariane Pearl shares the experiences of her ordeal after her

48 See Cowasjee, and Husain
husband’s death. According to her article, several Pakistanis wrote to her to share their shame and sorrow over the sad demise of her husband. Mariane Pearl further says that such voices give her hope for a modern and stronger Pakistan wherein the people of Pakistan could help her see justice done (“Why Good Hearts Must Go Public”). It should be noted that Pearl’s kidnappers, who identified themselves (via an email) as the National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty, alleged that Pearl was a US spy associated with the CIA—a claim that was denied both by the CIA and the WSJ. Many Pakistanis feared that the brutal murder of the American journalist would add to their humiliation and difficulties (Mirza, “The War: Opportunity for Some”). It is true that the Pearl incident received world media attention and affected Pakistan’s international reputation in terms of peace and security. However, the comparison of this incident with the representation of another incident, one that involves Pakistani victims, reveals how US media tend to treat the issues related to Pakistan’s image.

Let us now review the literature regarding the Raymond Davis incident. The incident—also described as the ‘Qartaba Chowk killings’ by Pakistani newspapers because of the location of the incident—is distressing for causing the death of four Pakistanis: (i) Faizan Haider and Faheem Shamshad—shot at and killed by Davis, (ii) Ibadur Rehman—a motorcyclist crushed by a US consulate vehicle coming to rescue Davis, and (iii) Shumaila Faheem—the widow of Muhammad Faheem, who committed suicide a few days after her husband’s death. According to the newsfeed right after the incident, the identity and the visa status of Davis was not ascertained for a long time, which created a huge confusion among Pakistanis. Consequently, some Pakistani media outlets (newspapers and television channels) hastened to
describe the incident as a matter of ‘Qaumi Ghairat (nation’s honor),’ that required stringent response from the Pakistani government.

Referring to Pakistanis’ obsession with ‘honor,’ as the country’s Ghairat Brigade (a sarcastic expression whereby one tends to keep an eye on other’s moralities instead of considering his own), some analysts raised critical concerns about the functioning of Pakistani media. Kamran Shafi, a Pakistani freelance columnist and a retired army officer, is highly critical of the handling of the issue by the Pakistani media. Shafi refers to the reporting of a vociferous Pakistani TV channel wherein a witness of the incident claimed the Davis victims were muggers who were later shot dead by Davis (“Cutting off the Nose…”). Shafi further reveals that the video about the witness’s claim—broadcast twice—was taken off air after a period of thirty minutes (“Cutting off the Nose…”). Criticizing Pakistanis’ harsh demands for Davis, Shafi rhetorically asks if Pakistanis would like the same treatment for Malik Mumtaz Qadri.

In addition to this, Ardeshir Cowasjee, Pakistan’s renowned columnist and a social activist, raised somewhat similar concerns about the Pakistani media’s reporting of the Davis incident. Cowasjee suggests that a reasonable way to deal with this political tangle was to protest the actions of Davis and demand that the US government take action against him (“A Diplomatic Tangle” 7). Cowasjee further asserts that “Ratings and ravings by our media ghairatwallahs (honor-bearers) will neither enhance our international standing nor change facts” (“A Diplomatic Tangle” 7). While there is truth in the assertion that some Pakistani media outlets

---

49 Malik Mumtaz Qadri was a bodyguard and an assassin of Salmaan Taseer, the Governor of Punjab. Qadri assassinated Taseer on account of the latter’s criticism of Pakistan’s blasphemy law in support of Asia Bibi, convicted of blasphemy in the country.
hyperactively used the incident to incite anti-Americanism (as Shafi and Cowasjee argue), the Davis incident does raise concerns regarding the treatment of the incident by the US government and media. Moreover, the killing of Ibadur Rehman in a panic to save Davis and the treatment of that incident in the mass media calls for the consideration of worthlessness of a Pakistani life.

In the wake of Davis’s release and immediate escape thereafter from the country, the majority of Pakistani scholars and writers have remarked on the complicity of the Pakistani government. The whole tension-filled saga ended with a deal between Davis and the victims’ families whereby the families were paid blood money under Pakistan’s Islamic law. There were several speculations in the media about who paid the money. Pakistan’s eminent historian, Ayesha Jalal, indicates that the blood money wasn’t paid by the American government, instead it was paid by a Pakistani tycoon (364). At any rate, the Davis incident happened at a time when the Pak-US relations were already fraught with uncertainties and qualms and catapulted the political quagmire for Pakistan’s civilian and military establishment.

Besides the issue of increased political tension, Pakistan’s intelligentsia extensively wrote about the mishandling of the issue by the Pakistani government. Right after the shooting incident, Davis was found to have sophisticated weapons, cameras, and GPS devices in his possession. The incident also initiated debates about the presence of the US intelligence personnel on Pakistani soil and Americans conducting espionage in Lahore. All these questions and debates fanned anti-American sentiment in the public. Moreover, Syed Talat Hussain, a Pakistani journalist and foreign policy commentator, wrote that the suicide of a victim’s widow

---

50 See Almeida, S.T. Hussain, Iqbal, Nisar, M. Yusuf.
intensified public anger and grief ("Hearts and Minds Campaign"). The treatment of
the issue by both Pakistani and US governments raises issues related to orientalism
and a chasm between Pakistan’s political elite and the public (internal orientalism).

Speaking of Pakistani public’s right or influence about the decision in the
Raymond Davis case, Cyril Almeida, Pakistan’s eminent journalist, writes that “The
public has no choice in the matter. Whether we trust ISI and its masters, army
generals, or not, the one big black box in the country remains a big black box” (“A
Pyrrhic Victory” 7). Almeida is highly critical of the ambiguity and the provision of
little information on the deal between the US and Pakistani government for Davis’s
release and argues that the public does not know anything about whatever happens,
goes in, or comes out of the black box (“A Pyrrhic Victory”). The abrupt conclusion
of the Davis incident creates skepticism on the part of both the US and Pakistani
governments.

Furthermore, the acceptance of blood money by the victims’ heirs is another
issue that was criticized by most analysts. Some researchers51 argue that the problem
with the practice of diyar52 laws in Pakistan lies with rampant inequalities. Especially
in the Davis case, the use of the law was criticized by many people. Nazish Brohi, a
Pakistani researcher and analyst, contends that the diyat law tends to protect the rich
and powerful at the expense of justice ("The state and diyat"). Alluding to the
Raymond Davis case as one of the two high profile examples in the country for the
exercise of diyat law, Brohi argues about the misuse of this law in Pakistan. In fact,
the law appears to question the state’s authority. Also, the act of holding victims’

51 See Brohi, and Memon.
52 Diyat law allows the offender to provide compensation or blood money for the crime to the victim's family.
families incommunicado right after the acceptance of blood money suggests that the heirs were probably forced or pressured to accept the amount for the release of Davis.

In 2017, Raymond Davis published a memoir titled *The Contractor: How I Landed in a Pakistani Prison and Ignited a diplomatic Crisis*, where he discusses the details of the whole incident. Speaking of Pakistani media’s role in the reporting of the incident, Davis claims that the Pakistani government—bothered by the increasingly heavy American presence on their soil—used the incident to provoke anti-American sentiments among Pakistanis; for this reason, they used the media to spread stories they wished to spread (103). Moreover, criticizing Pakistani media’s allegations that Davis was a ‘CIA agent,’ Davis accuses Pakistani media of spreading lies and describes them as ‘egregious offenders’ (161). Davis is equally critical of the American media’s accounts of the incident (190; 206). According to Davis, “the American media often lifted erroneous details of the event form the Pakistani media and presented them as facts” (206).

Here, it is important to note that Davis’s book came out amid controversy that the book was censored by the CIA. A few weeks after the release of the book, daily *Dawn*, Pakistan’s leading English newspaper, wrote an editorial to point to the fact that since the book was censored, the claims made by the author are not verifiable (“Raymond Davis Mystery”). In his book, Davis explains at length how the Pakistani military plays a dominant role in the country’s affairs and how the withdrawal of US aid mainly affects the Pakistan army (123-8). Although Davis’s book explicitly suggests that his release from the Pakistani court was orchestrated by the ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence agency) (181), it does not answer the question regarding the
origin of the blood money. Generally, the book adds to the existing opaqueness for the understanding of the incident.

Here, it is important to note that although Pakistani columnists and analysts were writing extensively about the Davis case, their writings mostly criticized the role of the Pakistani government. Another ambiguous feature of this incident is the fact that although Davis’s two victims were paid the reparation, nothing is reported about the third victim, Ibadur Rehman. Moreover, most writers raised concerns about how blood money challenges the authority of both states (Pakistan and US) in the era of modern nation states. In “American ‘Blood Money’ and a Question of Reparations,” Susan Slyomovics quotes from the Washington Post about the seeming covert operations of Davis in Pakistan regarding the surveillance of militant groups (44) and highly criticizes both governments for the act of paying and accepting the blood money. Censuring the idea of blood money exchange, Slyomovics argues that issues like the Davis case and the death of Osama Bin Laden can momentarily halt coordination between the CIA and ISI, but actually the money flows between these intelligence agencies unabated after 9/11 (46). In a way, Slyomovics’s argument alludes to the complicity of both governments in the Davis case.

There appears to be a dearth of research regarding the treatment of both events in the news media. Also, there can be several approaches to examine the content in a newspaper. Some may include the analysis of news values, the process of gatekeeping, the framing of news, and the factors affecting the news gathering process. For example, in the study of the New York Times for the portrayal of Pakistan, Yelena Biberman in her paper titled “How We Know What We Know About Pakistan: New York Times News Production, 1954-71” examines factors
affecting foreign correspondents in Pakistan. Focusing on the years (1954-71) that were important for the formation of the relationship between Pakistan and the US, Biberman considers logistical and political constraints that are faced by foreign correspondents in the process of news gathering (1605). Especially in terms of political constraints Biberman explains that during the periods of dictatorship, correspondents in Pakistan were “caught in the middle of highly strategic and complex diplomatic maneuvers” (1625). One cannot stress enough that the consideration of factors affecting reporting are important to entail the issues of portrayal. However, the analysis of word choices, framing, and the preferences of journalists regarding how a story will be read are inescapable considerations in the study of media representation.

The above review of this literature reveals that while debates on the fates of Daniel Pearl and Raymond Davis and the subsequent involvement of intelligence agencies in both incidents have received great attention in the literature, few have talked about the role of the media—either Pakistani or American—to create perceptions regarding both incidents. This chapter unpacks the media presentations of both events especially in a comparative context. For this purpose, I chose two American and two Pakistani newspapers.

The time frame for both incidents is different. The Daniel Pearl case happened almost five months after 9/11, whereas the Raymond Davis case happened almost a decade after 9/11. However, the comparison of media representation for both incidents in the context of worthy and unworthy victims provides a concrete rhetorical occasion to exhibit the perpetuation of orientalism/imperialism in Pakistan. By employing the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA) by Norman
Fairclough, I analyze the language of news stories. In terms of time frame, I select the time period of four months for each incident respectively. The Davis case remained in the media for almost three and half months, thus, I chose a four-month time period (January 27 to May 27, 2011) for my study. Correspondingly, the Pearl case, too, remained in the media for almost four months. After the four months of the incident, there were occasional news stories related to Pearl’s kidnappers’ court trials and the finding and exhuming of Pearl’s remains in Karachi. However, most of these stories were brief and incidental. Thus, for the Pearl case, too, I chose a time period of four months (January 23 to May 23, 2002).

For this study, I chose the New York Times, which is one of the leading newspapers in the US and the Wall Street Journal, which is also one of the popular news circulations, and Pearl’s employer. As mentioned, in order to substantiate my argument about the perpetuation of orientalism, I include the comparison of two Pakistani newspapers as well. The selected Pakistani newspapers include Daily Dawn—the leading English newspaper of Pakistan, and Daily Jang—the leading Urdu newspaper of the country. A general overview of the number of news stories along with the size (in terms of words) published for these news stories provides a glimpse of the degree of attention these incidents received by the selected newspapers. Besides this, I rhetorically analyze the language used in news stories. This analysis helps in determining the quality of treatment and the promotion of an orientalist mindset through the news stories of selected newspapers.

Table 1 shows the total number of news articles for each case study by the four newspapers. For the US newspapers, the data was obtained after a careful and meticulous analysis from two databases, i.e., ProQuest and Nexis Uni. For the
Pakistani newspapers, however, as a result of the required data’s unavailability in the databases, I obtained the corpus from newspaper microfilm reels. Consequently, I procured a corpus of 883 news stories including op-ed articles, editorials and the letters to the editors. For the discourse analysis of the text, I use the same Fairclough’s methodological framework that I have explained at length in the previous chapter.

An overview of news stories in all four newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>477</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 883

By selecting three news stories from each month (from a four-month time period), I analyzed a sample of 12 news articles from each newspaper for each case study. Thus, by employing the technique of simple random sampling, I obtained a sample of 48 news articles for a case study from all four newspapers (American and Pakistani), ergo 96 news articles for the CDA from both case studies. I call this non-random because I determine the sample after examining the typical pattern that all 883 news stories follow. In Communication Research: Asking Questions, Finding Answers, Joann Keyton mentions that, “to help control the bias in purposive sampling, researchers should spend considerable time developing what is typical about the population” (emphasis mine, 117). Thus, going through all 883 articles, I obtained
that a sample of 12 news stories regarding an incident from a single newspaper is adequate to ascertain the depiction of victims as worthy or unworthy. This selected sample is helpful to explicate my point of biased representation of victims in the two incidents.

If a newspaper hasn’t published enough news stories in a given month or the news stories are too brief to be included in the sample for the CDA, I balanced that out by selecting stories from the months where newspapers have published maximum number of news articles. Although columns/op-eds, newspaper features, editorials and letters for the editor’s desk are not included for the discourse analysis in this chapter, I do mention them in the quantitative aspects of coverage to examine the degree of attention received by a case study. In other words, for this chapter, I only considered news articles for the analysis of language, word choices, and the framing of the overall issue.

**Summary of Analysis and Discussion**

Here, I provide a newspaper summary and synthesis of findings.

**Coverage of the New York Times for both Case Studies**

The coverage of the *New York Times* for both case studies appears to be quite contrasting. Table 2 reveals the quantitative aspects of the coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>01-23-2002 to 05-23-2002 = 4 months</td>
<td>01-27-2011 to 05-27-2011 = 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total articles published</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>Columns</td>
<td>Editorials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here, it is significant to note that out of 117 articles published in the New York Times on the Pearl case, 28 articles had only the name/hint of Pearl. The actual news story was about another issue; hence there was a need to exclude them from the corpus. Also, the stories that are not directly pertinent to the issue at hand are excluded from the corpus. The details in the reporting of the Pearl incident are long and contain complete descriptions regarding the views of his employer, friends, and family. The description in most news stories provides the details about the development of incident, starting from Pearl’s disappearance, emails revealing Pearl’s kidnappers’ demands, and the intense manhunt to find the main suspect—Ahmed Omar Sheikh—in Pearl’s abduction.

The overall representation of the Daniel Pearl incident in the New York Times appears to be quite fair. Providing detailed descriptions of the events happening in the progress of Pearl’s search earlier and the search for his killers after the release of the video, more than half of the news stories published on the Pearl case contain approximately 1000 plus words. The New York Times editorialized the Pearl case three times. The first time was right after his abduction, the second time after the video of his brutal killing came out, and the third and last editorial is highly critical about General Musharraf’s undemocratic regime and Pakistan’s failure to tackle the menace of terrorism. The editorial also discusses the Musharraf administration’s failure to protect Pearl. The newspaper published Mariane Pearl’s op-ed titled “Why Good Hearts Must Go Public,” where she voices her suffering and the plight she went through during the whole tragic incident. Similarly, in the description of Pearl, his wife, friends, and other family members (parents and sister), the New York Times
(NYT) is quite generous in giving the details of the incident and the demands of justice for Pearl and his family.

In addition to this, in its reporting about the Pearl case the NYT provided detailed accounts of Pakistan’s complex political landscape, which is dominated by the country’s military establishment. In several news stories, the NYT’s reporting also explicates how Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI plays an important role in issues related to the country’s governing matters especially related to foreign policy. The newspaper, however, appears to be highly critical of the American government’s change of policy regarding the support of General Pervez Musharraf’s dictatorship in the wake of the War on Terror (Sanger, “Bush Hails Mushrraf”). Here, it must be noted that Washington was highly unfavorable toward the act of General Musharraf’s overthrowing of a political government and usurping power in Pakistan. This unfavorable attitude, however, was overturned after Musharraf’s assurance of Pakistan’s aid of the US in fighting the War on Terror in Afghanistan. The Pearl case happened in the backdrop of this political scenario.

In several news stories, the NYT provides interpretation along with information. Consider the following example of a news report about the release of a videotape that confirms Pearl’s death:

His [Daniel Pearl] killing appears to have been intended as part of a campaign of retaliation by Pakistani militants against President Pervez Musharraf, who has turned his back on the Taliban and on other extremists who have long had ties with the Pakistani government. It also served as an affront to General Musharraf’s prestige, since his government had expressed optimism that the case would be solved and Mr. Pearl returned unharmed (Barringer and Jehl, “U.S. Says Video Shows Captors Killed Reporter”).

(Text 1)
In the reporting of the Pearl incident, the NYT describes the picture of Pakistan’s circumstances that are fraught with the country’s struggle in facing the menace of terrorism; this description appears to present a fair and just depiction of Pakistan’s intelligence agency’s involvement in nurturing extremists (Jehl, “Death of Reporter”). This presentation, however, lacks the description of historical factors encompassing the US partnership in Pakistan’s cultivation of extremism to defeat communism. The Pearl incident is tragic, and it deserved the comprehensive attention that it received by the NYT.

After reviewing the presentation of the Pearl case by the NYT, now I’ll discuss the same newspaper’s presentation of the Raymond Davis case. By contrast, the representation of the victims of the Davis case by the NYT appears to be indifferent. Although the US government kept claiming that Davis acted in self-defense and under the treaty of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), Davis—being a diplomat—had diplomatic immunity, yet the incident still caused four deaths. Unlike the coverage of the Pearl case, there are no gory details for the victims of the Davis case. The New York Times did not editorialize the issue; however, it did publish an op-ed (Arthur S. Brisbane) that actually criticizes the NYT for not being explicit about Davis’s affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The surprising feature is that none of the news stories published in the Davis case by the NYT had textual or pictorial coverage of the victims. Contrary to claims that Davis was on a diplomatic mission in Pakistan, there is no explanation of his job/duties in the country.

The NYT published several—albeit brief—news stories that report about the pressure exerted on Pakistani officials by the US government dignitaries for the release of Davis. The majority of news articles are replete with information about how
the Davis incident brought already tense Pak-US relations to a low and fanned anti-Americanism among Pakistanis. The news stories also highlight the predicament of the Pakistani government especially after Washington announced the decision of cutting Pakistan’s financial aid as a result of Islamabad’s noncompliance in Davis’s release. In the most news stories, at times there are details and pictures of Davis, handcuffed and surrounded by the Pakistani police; but there are, however, little or no details about the Davis case victims. While talking about the increase of agitation among Pakistanis on the Davis issue, the newspaper reported the suicide of Shumaila Faheem, a victim’s widow, only in a sentence, which is as follows:

The public furor increased Sunday when the 18-year-old wife of one of the men Mr. Davis shot committed suicide, after saying she believed that the American would be unfairly freed (Perlez, “Mystery Over Detained American’s Duties”).

(Text 2)

A thorough analysis of the news stories published in the NYT reveals that there is little description of the victims. Most descriptions are confined to a sentence only. Text 2 is a perfect case in point.

After the Davis incident, there was great confusion over the status of Raymond Davis. The US consulate in Lahore released a statement soon after the incident describing Davis as a staff member. The US embassy, however, declared a couple of days later that Davis had a diplomatic passport, ergo diplomatic immunity—a claim that was not accepted by Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, saying that official records of the foreign office do not warrant Davis’s diplomatic status (Perlez, “Kerry Says U.S. Will investigate”). The
comprehensive analysis of the *NYT* reveals that the newspaper spent more time describing the increase of tension between the two countries.

An interesting feature of the *NYT*’s reporting is the newspaper’s confession regarding hiding/not publishing information about Davis’s association and activities with the CIA. In late February 2011, almost a month after the incident, the newspaper published a story revealing that Davis was a CIA contractor working on covert operations in Pakistan. The *NYT* further writes that:

> The New York Times had agreed to temporarily withhold information about Mr. Davis’s ties to the agency at the request of the Obama administration, … On Monday, American officials lifted their request to withhold publication (Mazzetti, et al., “American Held in Pakistan Worked with C.I.A.”).

(Text 3)

The use of word ‘request’ in the text 3 is a euphemism (as Fairclough would argue). The act of withholding information is consistent with Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model wherein they present the filter of ‘sourcing’ (18-25) among other filters to curb information on media. In other words, the source of information on Davis’s status was the American officials/government that had the potential of exercising control over the release of information. In this case, the *NYT* had to face that filter.

Although the *NYT* doesn’t seem to show any great sympathy to the victims of the Davis case—as the depiction of victims is mostly confined to a sentence in a news article—the newspaper does present a fair description of Pakistan’s weak civilian government, the tense civil-military relationship, the complicity of Pakistan’s intelligence agency in the release of Davis, secret wars run by the CIA in eastern countries, and the confusion on the origin of blood money in the Davis case. While
reporting on the question of the payment of blood money to the families of the Davis victims, according to the NYT, the US Secretary of State (at that time), Hillary Clinton, explicitly denied the payment of money by Americans. Also, she deflected the question of whether the blood money was paid at the behest of the US government (Gall and Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Security Officer is Freed in Pakistan”). Finally, the NYT’s reporting does provide information on the American intrusion in Pakistan, but that reporting mostly seems to justify the intrusion by providing extensive details of Pakistan’s fragile political system and an unstable region on the planet.

**Coverage of the Wall Street Journal for both Case Studies**

It is important to consider the following table 3 for an overview of the overall representation of both events by the Wall Street Journal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>01-23-2002 to 05-23-2002 = 4 months</td>
<td>01-27-2011 to 05-27-2011 = 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total articles published</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 3)

Again, the number of articles appeared on the ProQuest is different from the numbers mentioned in table 3. The articles that were little or no pertinent to the research and repeated articles are excluded from the corpus.
The portrayal of the Pearl incident by the *Wall Street Journal* is no different from the *New York Times* in terms of repeated descriptions of the suffering of Pearl’s family and friends and the appeals of justice for the *Wall Street* journalist. The number of news stories published by the *Wall Street Journal* is less than the ones published by the *New York Times*, but the overall representation is replete with the suffering of the victim, his family, and friends, etc. In both newspapers, however, there are op-eds contributed by Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid, Shaheen Sehbai, and Hussain Haqqani that are highly critical of the Pakistani government’s political and diplomatic policies. These articles attempt to unpack the complex layers of power that entrenched in Pakistan.

As the employer of Daniel Pearl, the *WSJ*’s presentation of Pearl is quite extensive and sympathetic. The newspaper published several lengthy articles—of almost 2000 words—especially the first few days after Pearl’s abduction and right after the video of Pearl’s killing was circulated. The information in a news article explains that Pearl remained associated with the *WSJ* for a period of twelve years and worked in Atlanta, Washington, London, and Paris before he moved to Bombay to cover South Asia (“Fallen Journalist: Daniel Pearl is Dead”). The news story also expressed details of Daniel Pearl’s flair for writing, music, and cooking (“Fallen Journalist: Daniel Pearl is Dead”). Furthermore, the news story provides a detailed description of Pearl’s family, friends, and colleagues’ views about him and words of sorrow over his tragic demise.

Similarly, in the news story that was published in the few days after Pearl’s abduction, the newspaper describes Pearl as a veteran journalist who was experienced with being cautious when on investigative assignment in dangerous areas (“Pakistani
Group Says it seized Daniel Pearl”). The news stories also provided detailed accounts of Pearl’s captors’ demands, who claimed to be the members of The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty, an unknown and apparently fake organization. The information about Daniel Pearl and the incident of his kidnapping and killing in the majority of news stories is lengthy enough that its readers know who Daniel Pearl is/was and what happened to him. This asserts that the WSJ presented Pearl and his case as a worthy victim. The Pearl incident, indeed, was a tragic one and deserved the attention that it received.

Although the reporting of the WSJ vehemently condemns terrorists who abducted Pearl, it does not appear to whip up anti-Pakistan views or sentiments. However, in an editorial that the WSJ published right after the release of Pearl’s murder, the newspaper makes an analogy of Pearl with the victims of 9/11. According to the editorial, the perpetrators of 9/11 could not prevent Americans from protecting their values, similarly, the killers of Pearl would not be able to prevent American journalists from reporting on the world (“Daniel Pearl, RIP”). Moreover, the newspaper published a number of appeals from the WSJ, the newspaper’s managing editor, some of the world’s famous Islamic figures, and from Pearl’s wife, addressing Pearl’s kidnappers and imploring her husband’s release.

Let us now examine the coverage of the Raymond Davis case by the WSJ. The coverage of the Davis issue by the Wall Street Journal is akin to that of the New York Times. In all the news stories, there are no details of victims or their families or friends. There are only two news stories that describe the suicide of Shumaila Fahim—the widow of Muhammad Faheem (one of the victims of Davis’ shooting)—but here, too, that description is confined to one sentence. This depiction of
Shumaila’s suffering is quite a contrast to the depiction of Mariane Pearl—the widow of Daniel Pearl. Shumaila’s suicide is a response to the Pakistani government’s complicity and the absence of justice she envisaged in her husband’s killing.

One prominent feature of the Davis incident reporting in the *WSJ* is that it is replete with the reporting of Raymond Davis, his incarceration, the claims of the US government regarding his diplomatic status, and later his association with the CIA. The *WSJ* reported on the ambiguity of Davis’s status in Pakistan; the reporting also covers the issue of non-clarity about his activities in Pakistan. Like the *NYT*, there is more focus on how the Davis case strained the relationship between Pakistan and the US. By contrast, there is little mention of the victims of the incident. Along with the news articles, there are occasional pictures of Raymond Davis and people protesting in cities of Pakistan after the killing of the Davis victims and especially after his release as a result of compensation money.

The overall analysis, however, reveals that there appears to be an iteration in most news articles regarding the erosion of the US and Pakistan relationship in the wake of the Davis incident. For example, consider the following excerpt:

> The incident [the Davis incident] is likely to exacerbate strains in the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. Washington has pumped billions of dollars in civilian and military aid into Pakistan but remains deeply unpopular here for its campaign of unmanned Central Intelligence Agency drone strikes against Taliban fighters operating from Pakistani soil (Hussain and Wright, “U.S. calls for Release of Diplomat Held in Pakistan”).

*Text 4*

According to Fairclough’s CDA, text 4 cues both experiential and relational values. The majority of news stories discuss the increase of tension between the US and Pakistan because of the Davis incident. The reiteration of this fact suggests the *WSJ*’s
preoccupation with the idea of repercussions on the bilateral relations—an example of experiential value in the text. Moreover, text 4 also divulges the fact that despite the US military and civil aid in Pakistan, the former is highly disliked by the latter. The description of this information cues relational values. By relational value I mean that the text indicates the social relationships that are enacted via the text in discourse.

Here, it should be noted that the Pearl case occurred in the backdrop of the US invasion of Afghanistan wherein the seemingly unfavorable military government (by the US) in Pakistan won US favor by declaring itself as an ally in the US led war on terror. Whereas the Davis case occurred a few months before the killing of Osama Bin Laden in a Pakistani city by US forces—a time when the scourge of militancy in Pakistan was at its peak and there was an ongoing US mantra of ‘do more’ for combating terrorism in the country. As mentioned, the coverage of the Pearl case by the *WSJ* is quite sympathetic and arouses a feeling of compassion among readers. But this coverage does not necessarily appear to give an unfavorable picture of Pakistan. In the news projection of Raymond Davis, however, the *WSJ* sometimes tends to present Pakistan as a problematic country that does not comply with international law. The following excerpt from a news article is an example:

> Whatever anyone thinks of him [Davis] or his actions, the Vienna Convention obliges Pakistan to release Mr. Davis into U.S. custody. End of story—anywhere, except Pakistan (‘Pakistan’s Undiplomatic Bungle’).

*(Text 5)*

Considering the backdrop of both case studies, one can argue that the political aspirations of the US seemingly affect the framing and coverage of an incident by the *WSJ*. 

133
Lastly, the *WSJ*, too, withheld the information of Davis’s association with the CIA. The suppression of information regarding Davis’s CIA association by the newspaper at the behest of the US government indicates that the American media is not insulated from the political maneuvers of their own government. Text 6 is an example:

U.S. officials had asked several U.S. news organizations, including the Wall Street Journal, not to publish information about Mr. Davis’s work with the CIA because of fears over his safety in jail. U.S. officials agreed to release details about the case Monday after senior ISI officials were quoted over the weekend describing his ties to the CIA (Wright and Entous, “American Held in Pakistan Worked for CIA”).

(Text 6)

Again, like the *NYT*, the release of Davis’s association information by the *WSJ* is euphemistic. By euphemism I mean that the description of hiding this information is in a way that avoids negative value; text 6 is an example. After a thorough analysis of the US newspapers, let us now consider the evaluation of representation for both case studies by Pakistani newspapers.

**Coverage of Dawn for both Case Studies**

Let us take a look at the quantitative aspects of the coverage revealed in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>01-23-2002 to 05-23-2002 = 4 months</td>
<td>01-27-2011 to 05-27-2011 = 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to the Editor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 4)
A cursory glance at table 4 reveals that Dawn published more news articles for the Davis case as compared to the Pearl case. However, merely counting the number of news articles published regarding a certain incident does not reveal the issues of media representation. In order to investigate the portrayal of worthy versus unworthy victims in the presentation of both incidents, I analyze the text of news articles.

Let us first examine the presentation of the Pearl case by Dawn. The majority of news stories about the Pearl case were either published on the front page of the paper or the back page. Both pages contain the news of national and international importance. Although Dawn occasionally published the picture of Pearl, and later Omar Sheikh escorted by the Pakistani policemen for trials in a Pakistani court, the overall presentation of the incident by Dawn appears to be fair and neutral. The newspaper editorialized the event a couple of times—a few days after Pearl’s abduction and a day after the release of the video of his brutal killing. These editorials not only condemn the killing of the foreign journalist but also lambast the prevailing situation of lawlessness in the country that made the finding and release of Pearl difficult. Moreover, an editorial remarked how Pearl’s abduction and killing affects the country’s international reputation; the newspaper vehemently urges the Pakistani government and intelligence agencies to track down the perpetrators and bring them to justice (“Murder most foul”).

Dawn also published Mariane Pearl’s appeal that explained—in response to the kidnappers’ accusations—that Pearl had no association with the CIA or Mossad and was just a journalist. The newspaper also published the email of Paul Steiger, Daniel Pearl’s boss at the WSJ, explaining to kidnappers that Pearl or his organization had no ability to change the policies of the US or Pakistani governments (“Pearl’s
boss writes to kidnappers”). Moreover, several famous columnists including Irfan Husain and Ardeshir Cowasjee wrote on the Pearl issue for daily Dawn. Overall, the newspaper published several articles about Pearl that show compassion and concern about him. Thus, in the light of such reporting, one can say that Dawn reported Daniel Pearl as a ‘worthy victim.’

The reporting of the development in the Pearl’s case—the search of Pakistani forces for Pearl and the nabbing of the main suspect, Omar Sheikh, later the recovery of Pearl’s body, and Omar Sheikh’s trials in Pakistani court—is quite detailed. Dawn also reported the statement of Sheikh that he wasn’t arrested by the police on February 12, rather he surrendered himself to the police on February 5 as his family was being harassed by the Pakistani forces (Siddiqui, “Omar says he thinks Pearl is dead”). The overall analysis of Dawn reveals that in its reporting of the incident, it appears to be highly critical of the Pakistani military government. A few days after Sheikh’s statement of surrender, Dawn quoted from a news story published in the Washington Post and wrote that:

…the news of his [Sheikh] capture was delayed to coincide with General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Washington (Karachi Notebook, “Danny Pearl in Our Midst”).

(Text 7)

The excerpt in text 7 is from an article that appeared on the Karachi metropolitan page of the newspaper; the article, showing sympathy for Pearl’s wife, hopes for Daniel Pearl’s safe recovery. Furthermore, Dawn also reported Omar Sheikh to be a ‘hard nut to crack’ as he kept changing and retracting his statements during the investigation.

After analyzing the portrayal of the Pearl case by Dawn, I shall now analyze the presentation of the Raymond Davis case by the same newspaper. Dawn published
significantly more number of editorials and columns/op-eds for the Davis case than the Pearl case. However, in the presentation of the Davis case, *Dawn* discusses issues of bad governance, the intrusion of Pakistan’s intelligence agency in the issues of national and international importance, Pakistan’s obsession with the idea of *ghairat* (honor), and the state of the country’s governing elite’s dependency on the US aid.

Here, it is worth mentioning that both Pakistani newspapers in this study—*Dawn* and *Jang*—published a significant number of editorials and op-eds on the Davis case. There appears to be two reasons for this amount of attention for the Davis case on opinion pages: (i) the lack of transparency in the whole incident manifested by the Pakistani establishment (most op-ed writers censured Pakistani government for that), and (ii) a US drone attack a day after Davis’s release that killed almost 40 civilians. Both the Davis incident and the killing of 40 innocent civilians right after Davis’s release exhibit the callousness of the US government toward Pakistani lives. Thus, many scholars wrote about the apparent worthlessness of Pakistani human lives in the eyes of US forces.

A meticulous analysis of the language in news stories reveals that in the coverage of the Raymond Davis issue, daily *Dawn* is equally critical of the Pakistani and US governments. In its editorial right after the incident, *Dawn* urged both governments to be transparent in the handling of the case (“Lahore Shooting”). *Dawn* also reported on the noncooperation of the US consulate in Lahore for revealing the identity of the consulate employee(s) who drove the vehicle that crushed and killed Ibadur Rehman. Comparatively, *Dawn*’s coverage of both incidents is more detailed as compared to the *NYT* and the *WSJ*. After the Davis incident, Davis was revealed to be an employee at the US consulate in Lahore. However, a few days after the
incident, the US embassy announced him as a diplomat—an issue that remained controversial until the end of this saga. The excerpt of *Dawn’s* report on the change of Davis’s status is as follows:

In a clear about-turn on the status of the American charged with murder of two motorcyclists in Lahore, the United States on Saturday claimed that the accused was a diplomat and demanded his immediate release (Syed, “US seeks release of Suspect”).

(Text 8)

The reporting of Davis’s status in text 8 is somewhat sarcastic. The same news article also reveals that the US embassy and the Foreign Office were not on the same page regarding Davis’s status. Thus, this reporting reveals that *Dawn* attempted to divulge the complicity of both governments. Such an approach, however, seems to be missing in the US newspaper in the handling of the Davis case.

A thorough analysis of *Dawn’s* reporting reveals that it shows sympathetic concerns to the families of victims, particularly Ibadur Rehman. However, it spends more time in analyzing the Pakistan-US relationship and how the Davis episode aggravated the two countries’ already fraught relationship. A day before Davis’s release, *Dawn* reported that a breakthrough is likely in the Davis case. The text in this news report, which is a front-page story, presents an analysis of the Pakistan-US relationship. The following excerpt is an example:

The Davis episode was just the latest manifestation of the disquiet in the relations between the agencies that had been going on for some time and had found varying expressions, be it the frequent CIA allegations of Pakistanis patronizing jihadi groups and being insincere in fight against extremists or filing of a lawsuit in a New York by relatives of Mumbai carnage against ISI chief or blowing the cover of CIA’s Islamabad station head Jonathon Banks, leading to his recall (Syed, “Breakthrough likely in ISI-CIA talks”).
The analysis in text 9 reveals experiential values by explicating the role of agencies in the maintenance of relationship between the two countries. In other words, text 9 suggests that the bedrock of the relationship between the two countries is the two spy agencies.

Similarly, while reporting Davis’s escape from Pakistan, *Dawn* hints at the release of Davis as a result of a deal between the ISI and Washington. Here, it must be noted that Davis was convicted by a Pakistani court. However, he was released after the payment of *Diyat* (blood money); the origin of blood money remained highly controversial and *Dawn* had extensive coverage on that as well. To repeat, although *Dawn* presents the Davis case victims as ‘worthy,’ the newspaper’s reporting seems to pay more attention to explicating the lack of transparency and accountability in the case. This lack of transparency explains the complex political landscape of Pakistan whereby people have limited or no opportunity to exercise their will.

An example of *Dawn*’s presentation of worthy victims in the Davis case is evident from the example that the newspaper reports on the protests of Ibadur Rehman’s family against Davis’s release (“Ibad’s family takes to the Street”). Although the victims of Raymond Davis were alleged to be robbers, Ibadur Rehman had no charges against him. Moreover, *Dawn* also reported on the missing family members of Faizan Haider and Muhammad Faheem (“Court Seeks whereabouts of blood-money recipients”). The blood money recipients went missing after they received the amount. In addition to this, Raymond Davis also mentions the unhappiness of recipients over the blood money issue in his book (185). The coverage of these issues is absent in the selected US newspapers.
Coverage of Jang for both Case Studies

Let us now examine the coverage of both incidents by Pakistan’s leading Urdu newspaper Jang. Table 5 provides an overview of this coverage.

Coverage by Jang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>01-23-2002 to 05-23-2002 = 4 months</td>
<td>01-27-2011 to 05-27-2011 = 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columns</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to the Editor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5)

As for the Pearl case incident, Jang had an extensive and detailed coverage of Daniel Pearl. Jang published the majority of news stories in the Pearl case on the front page of the paper with some appearing on the back page. Both pages contain the news of national and international importance. Although Jang editorialized the event only once, the newspaper vehemently urged for the immediate release of the American journalist. Along with that Jang pointed to the fact that Pearl’s abduction is not only inimical to the country’s international reputation, but it also affects Pakistan’s economy since Karachi is Pakistan’s business and trade hub (“Daniel Pearl Ka Jald az Jald Pta Lagane Ki Zroorat (The Need of Recovering Daniel Pearl Immediately)

The overall coverage of Daniel Pearl by daily Jang reveals that the newspaper appears to be quite fair and just in the reporting of the incident. Many news articles accompanied the pictorial display of Daniel Pearl and sometimes the pictures of Mariane Pearl. Several columnists contributed on the issue. Jang also published
Pakistan’s famous poet Anwar Shuoor’s poetry after the news of Pearl’s murder in late February. Shuoor’s *Qata’aat* (a popular genre in Urdu poetry) are regularly featured in *Jang*; his piece on Pearl is quite touching and sentimental (Shuoor, “Daniel Pearl”). The presentation of Daniel Pearl by *Jang* portrays him as a worthy victim. Like other newspapers, *Jang* also published Mariane Pearl’s appeal for the release of her husband (“*Mera Shohar Sahafi hai, Jasoos nahi, Azaad ker den* (My husband is a Journalist, not a Spy, Set him Free)”). In addition to Pearl’s presentation as a worthy victim, *Jang*’s reporting of the incident also highlights the damage to Pakistan’s reputation, the negligence of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the views of several Islamic scholars condemning Pearl’s abduction, and the news of Pakistan’s reluctance over Omar Sheikh’s extradition.

The presentation of Daniel Pearl as a ‘worthy victim’ by *Jang* is evident from the fact that the newspaper had full front-page coverage the day after the release of Pearl’s killing video. For several days, *Jang* published more than twelve news articles a day on its front page about the Pearl issue. On February 23, *Jang* also published a chronology of events in the Pearl tragedy. This amount of attention demonstrates that the presentation of Daniel Pearl by *Jang* is extensive, detailed, and sympathetic—thus, rendering him as a worthy victim. It is difficult to ascertain the construction and circulation of ideological message(s) in the reporting of the incidents, however, mainly the selection and framing of news stories, word choices, and placement indicates if the victim is presented as worthy.

*Jang* published Mariane Pearl’s views multiple times in its reporting, most of them appearing on the front page with some exceptions on the back page as well.
Consider the following translation from the wording of a news story related to Mariane Pearl’s interview by the CNN (Cable News Network) published in *Jang*:

While giving an interview to the CNN, Mariane said that she wants justice for the killers of her husband…while answering questions, Mariane further said that she would tell her child (to be born) that “his father sacrificed himself for the search of truth,” … (“Daniel Pearl ko qatal ker ke Intiha-Pasando ne Maghrib ko mutnabih kia ha, Mariane Pearl (By Killing Daniel Pearl the extremists have sent a message to the West, Marine Pearl)”).

(Text 10)

The evaluation of the larger structure of the story from which text 10 is taken reveals that by publishing parts of Mariane Pearl’s interview at CNN, *Jang* reported about her suffering and pain at the loss of her husband—something that qualifies Mariane Pearl as a worthy victim.

After evaluating the depiction of the Pearl case by *Jang*, let us now examine how the same newspaper presented the Davis case. As I said earlier, in both Pakistani newspapers, the columnists contributed more opinions and op-eds on the Davis case as compared to the Pearl case for the two reasons already mentioned in the analysis of *Dawn*. Here, it is important to note that *Dawn*’s reporting of Raymond Davis seems to be moderate. Whereas *Jang* seems to be somewhat hyperactive in the opinion section of the newspaper for the analysis of the same incident. Pakistan’s famous names in the field of journalism extensively contributed on the issue. Some names include Saleem Safi, Nazeer Naji, Hamid Mir, Munnu Bhai, Najam Sethi, Irfan Siddiqui, Sana Bucha, Hassan Nisar, and Ansar Abbasi. All these names make up Pakistan’s journalistic intelligentsia. Although some of these writers appear to have pretty
critical views for the US government, the majority of these articles are critical of the Pakistani government as well.

The review of literature for the Davis case revealed that several writers\textsuperscript{53} held Pakistani media responsible for whipping up anti-American sentiments during the Raymond Davis saga. However, the fact remains that the Davis case—besides the US drone strikes in Pakistan—presents another example of the apparent worthlessness of Pakistani lives in the eyes of the American forces. After the agony of Drone attacks—that were stepped up in 2010—the Davis incident occurred in the backdrop of increased US drone attacks in Pakistan. Thus, the majority of columnists in \textit{Jang} wrote about the impertinence of the US government over the loss of Pakistani lives. Moreover, the drone attack exactly a day after the release of Davis that killed almost forty civilians also added insult to the injury—stirring up most of Pakistani journalists to pick up their pens.

For the reporting of Muhammad Faheem’s wife’s suicide, unlike the \textit{NYT} and the \textit{WSJ}—that published only a sentence in their news articles reporting the death of Muhammad Faheem’s wife—\textit{Jang} and \textit{Dawn} published a detailed news story about the suicide of Faheem’s wife wherein she reveals her aggrieved concerns over the death of her husband. The majority of news articles in \textit{Jang} illustrate the situation of back and forth in blaming between the provincial government of Punjab and the federal government for the mishandling of the Davis case. Moreover, most news stories report on the meetings of Carmela Cornoy, Consul General, and Cameron Munter, the US ambassador to Pakistan, with Pakistani government officials for the

\textsuperscript{53} See Almeida, Cowasjee, Davis and Storms, and Shafi.
release of Davis. This suggests that Jang reported in detail on the US pressure on Pakistani government in the Davis case.

Jang fairly reported the confusion of Raymond Davis’s actual status and his activities in Pakistan. Jang also quoted the news of the US media that revealed Davis’s identity as a contractor hired by the CIA. However, the overall analysis of the depiction of the Davis case by Jang reveals that the newspaper highly criticized the release of Davis by the Pakistani government. In the editorial that appeared after the release of Davis, Jang considered Davis an American spy, thus, a threat to Pakistan’s national security. Moreover, Jang emphasized that the Davis case was not a simple matter of murder, instead it was a matter of conducting espionage on Pakistani soil (“Raymond Davis ki Rehai or Awami Rad-e-amal (The Release of Raymond Davis and the Public Reaction)").

In addition to this, in a news article that appeared after the release of Davis, Jang is highly critical of the lack of self-reliance in the Pakistani government and highly reprimands the acceptance of blood money. Consider the following translation of an excerpt from a news story:

… while Musharraf, in his 9-year dictatorship, had been breaking all previous records of submissiveness towards the US, today our so-called democratic rulers have once again exhibited this [submissiveness]. We are sold once again. (Abbasi, “Qaum ki ghairat ka soda kis ne kia? (Who Bargained on Nation’s honor?)”).

(Text 11)

The news article from which text 11 is taken is highly critical of both governments. Another interesting feature of Jang’s reporting is that after the conviction and the subsequent release of Davis, Jang used the terminology ‘Amreeki Qatil’ (American Killer) to describe Davis. In short, although Jang’s reporting of the Davis case victims
is fair, it presents them as worthy victims, at times this reporting does seem to be hyperactive.

**Conclusion:**

While talking about media corporations’ role as economic actors, Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding argue that “the goods they [media corporations] manufacture—newspapers, advertisements, television programs, and feature films—play a pivotal role in organizing the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world” (60). Media messages, therefore, are important in the study of ideologies. Needless to say, the supremacy of the US media on the international spectrum of information and entertainment gives it an advantage of bringing its issues to the limelight. *A Mighty Heart*—a film on Mariane Pearl, played by Angeline Jolie—is an example. On the other hand, the situation for the victims from a periphery country (in this case, Pakistan) is quite opposite.

According to Edward Said, “the underlying theme of Orientalism is the affiliation of knowledge with power” (Covering Islam, ix). Mass media, in our contemporary context, tends to produce a significant deal of knowledge and information about the ways we perceive the world. Here, the monopoly of the US media over the global landscape of information and entertainment puts this western country in an advantaged position. The representation of Daniel Pearl and his wife by the US media is quite expansive as compared to the victims of the Davis case. Here, it is important for me to mention that my heart goes out to the family of Daniel Pearl, particularly the terrible experience Mariane Pearl went through. However, the treatment of the Davis case victims by the US newspapers is quite a contrast to the treatment of victims in the Pearl case.
The analysis of news stories by four newspapers in this chapter reveals that at times media, even in apparently democratic societies, is not insulated from government pressures and regulation. In *Manufacturing Consent* Herman and Chomsky argue that the propaganda system in the US media does not work in the manner of a totalitarian state. Instead they encourage debate, criticism, and dissent “as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus” (302). The government instructions to the US newspapers not to reveal Raymond Davis’s real status is a perfect example here. However, both US newspapers later present the case quite euphemistically.

Although the two persons shot and killed by Davis were allegedly robbers, the person crushed and killed by the US consulate vehicle was completely innocent. His meager presentation in the US media suggests the comparative worthlessness of a Pakistani life. At the time of my research and writing for this chapter, in two separate incidents a motorcyclist and his passenger were rammed by a US diplomat and another killed and his fellow passenger seriously injured by a US military attaché in Islamabad, the federal capital of Pakistan (Qarar, “Islamabad police take US diplomat into custody”). These cases—albeit reported by the Pakistani media—do not seem to have had any reporting in the US media. Finally, in the light of representations in both comparisons, one can argue that the phenomenon of orientalism persists and media plays a significant role in perpetuating it.
Chapter 5

The Rhetoric of Newspaper Editorials and Columns

In the study of representations, my previous focus has been on the news stories/articles from various Pakistani and US newspapers. For this chapter, however, I focus on opinion pages of newspapers. Although the US newspapers, in their presentation of the selected events, appear to be aligned with their country’s national interests, Pakistani newspapers, too, do not appear to be disengaged from the indoctrination of state ideologies. This research, however, exclusively focuses on the manipulation of information by the US media. For this purpose, this chapter expands the study of representations for the same case studies (discussed and analyzed at length in chapters 3 and 4) and explicates the study of opinion pieces—editorials, columns/op-ed articles, and letters to the editor’s desk—in US and Pakistani newspapers. Although previous chapters provide quantitative information (in tables) on the number of editorials, and columns appeared in selected newspapers, these chapters do not incorporate these opinion pieces for the study of language and ideologies. This chapter, thus, entails and exclusively focuses on opinion articles to study the promotion of ideologies that tend to reinforce orientalist practices.

For this last chapter of my research, I combine all four case studies/events and examine them together to ascertain the perpetuation of orientalism, and the presentation of worthy and unworthy victims. In this regard, the chapter is different (in its presentation) from previous chapters wherein I examine two case studies for each chapter. With that being said, it is worth-mentioning that while I study all four events together, this chapter juxtaposes the same case studies for comparison. For example, here, I analyze the opinion articles related to the portrayal of the Malala
Yousafzai case in comparison to the Drone Strikes case; similarly, to endorse my argument of worthy and unworthy victims, I examine and compare the opinion articles related to the Daniel Pearl case with the opinion articles related to the Raymond Davis case. Thus, this chapter—albeit focusing on the same case studies—is different in encompassing ‘opinion articles’ for its focus. Here, again, I employ the same critical discourse analysis (CDA) methodology by Norman Fairclough and the theoretical framework of Orientalism by Edward Said alongside Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model.

Dialectical and persuasive pieces in newspapers, such as opinion pages, are rhetorically significant because they reflect the voices of newspaper organizations and the intelligentsia of the country of their location. For this reason, many research studies in media and communication focus on editorials and columns to ascertain the framing of issues, the ability of setting agendas for the public, and directing discussions on issues of importance. Especially in the wake of the War on Terror and the resurgence of ‘Islam versus West’ after 9/11, it appears that a number of columnists set their pens to paper and present their pro/anti-war analysis of the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, a number of scholars have research studies wherein they have examined the rhetorical appeal and impact of these opinion pages.

In this context, in “Metaphor as rhetoric: newspaper/Op/Ed debate of the prelude to the 2003 Iraq war,” Ahmed Sahlane examines the mainstream US and British newspaper editorials and op-eds, and investigates the use of metaphor in opinion articles, which, he argues, is a ‘strategic maneuvering’ to avoid a ‘reasoned discussion’ (154). Essentially, through critical discourse analysis of opinion articles, Sahlane demonstrates how pro/anti-Iraq war writers used metaphor in their writings to
build their arguments. Sahlane contends that both pro and anti-war opinion writers presented their arguments with metaphors in such a way that it created a polarization situation whereby readers have to opt for solidarity with one group while distancing themselves from the other group (167). In addition, an intriguing feature in Sahlane’s study is that even anti-war arguers also used dehumanizing portrayals of the other party and thus, ‘failed to conduct a reasoned dialogue’ (167).

An influential study of media attitudes regarding the representation of Muslims was recently conducted in the UK. In their study titled *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press*, Baker, et al. conclude that British newspapers essentially avoid open criticism or generalizing stereotypes regarding Muslims or Islam; instead, there appears to be an ambivalent attitude in the press and a perpetuation of implicit messages that endorse the negative stereotypes (255). The research by Baker et al. is an extensive study that uses a detailed analysis of 140 million words and is based on the mixed methodology of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis. In a somewhat similar study that examines the representation of Pakistan in the US newspapers, Susan D. Moeller, studies thirteen US agenda-setting (Moeller, 5) newspapers in two time periods: right after the 9/11 incident, and five years after 9/11, i.e., in 2006. Specifically, the first slot of time includes the period from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2002; whereas the second time slot includes the period from January 1, 2006 to January 15, 2007, respectively.

The study of Baker et al., and the study of Moeller, have both similarities and differences. Baker et al.’s research is more holistic and detailed in terms of encompassing issues related to the coverage of Muslims in the British newspapers.
Whereas Moeller’s research—albeit including thirteen US newspapers—lacks a systematic approach to investigate the problem, and does not present a comprehensive overview of the coverage of US newspapers regarding Pakistan. But nevertheless, a common feature of both studies is that they highlight the centrality of ‘eastern women’ in the media portrayal of women in Islam, and Pakistan respectively. For example, Baker et al. argue that generally in the British press, Muslim women are represented as victims, and Muslim men are viewed as potential aggressors (257). Similarly, Moeller argues that the presentation of Pakistan in the US newspapers suggests that women are victims, and are good Muslims (6, 17). This presentation further suggests that women are saviors as though they can be used by the West to spread peace at the family, ethnic, tribal, and national level in Pakistan (6, 10). Both studies are important and significantly contribute to the investigations related to representations. However, the aforementioned studies do not make any distinction between news and opinion.

Since articles included in opinion pages of newspapers reflect writers’/newspaper organizations’ opinions, they primarily aim at steering thoughts and discussions. Thus, the analysis of the language used in opinion articles elucidates what rhetorical strategies are employed and how the figuration of speech delivers a message. In “The Rhetoric of Newspaper Editorials,” Farahman Farrokhi and Sanaz Nazemi compare the rhetorical devices employed by an American—the New York Times—and an Australian—The Australian newspaper. Farrokhi and Nazemi explore the use of rhetorical devices such as metaphor, hyperbole, and metonymy in the editorials of aforementioned newspapers. Cognizant of the fact that the two countries—US and Australia—are geographically miles apart from each other, and
thus, would be culturally different, Farrokhi and Nazemi found the two newspapers to be identical in their usage of rhetorical devices in editorials to persuade their audience (160). This explains that opinion pages in newspapers are sites of rhetorical appeals and, hence, are important for the analysis of representation.

In another study of editorials, titled “Patterns of Schematic Structure and Strategic Features in Newspaper editorials: A Comparative Study of American and Malaysian editorials,” Sahar Zarza and Helen Tan examine the schematic structures of editorials for an American—The New York Times (NYT), and a Malaysian—New Straits Times (NST) newspaper, and come to the conclusion that moves and steps in the writing of editorials are largely influenced by cultural practices (nuances) prevalent in a society (655). In this cross-cultural study of contrastive rhetoric, Zarza and Tan observe that the NYT is more authoritative and evaluative as compared to the NST in its style of editorial writing; Zarza and Tan associate this feature of the NYT with the rhetoric of freedom and independence of journalism circulated in the US (654). Similarly, in another study of rhetorical properties of schematic structures in editorials, Alireza Bonyadi compares an American—the New York Times (NYT), and a Persian Tehran Times (TT) newspaper, and finds somewhat similar results for the analysis of the NYT.

Although the analysis of Bonyadi is specific to the examination of editorials of criticism—a type of editorial that mainly presents criticism, he essentially differentiates three distinctive parts in editorial writing: The Introduction, the body, and the ending. Analyzing a sample of 40 editorials (twenty from each newspaper), Bonyadi finds many similarities and differences between the editorial writing style of the two newspapers, and in the case of the NYT, tends to attribute the characteristics
of this writing with the US culture (337)—something that is similar to the analysis of Zarza and Tan. Furthermore, Bonyadi concludes that editorial writers in the TT are more assertive than editorial writers in the NYT (339), and in the ending section, the NYT editorials are more argumentative than those in the TT (340). The research studies of Zarza and Tan, and Bonyadi compare editorials—an important component on the opinion page—of newspapers in different cultural contexts, and provide a contrastive analysis to comprehend different rhetorical usages in the languages of these opinion pieces. Both studies suggest that cultural practices seem to affect the journalistic practices that are reflected in the choice of rhetorical strategies.

In the study of ideologies, critical discourse analysis (CDA) appears to be an effective qualitative tool for examining the relationship between power and ideology. In this context, in “Evolution of Frames During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Critical Discourse Analysis of Fox News’s and CNN’s Framing of Protesters, Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood,” Andrea L. Guzman examines the 2011 Egyptian Revolution coverage by Fox News and CNN News in the binary opposition frames of ‘US friend versus enemy,’ and ‘rational versus irrational’ (86). Guzman contends that while applying these frames to the coverage of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Fox News and CNN news repeatedly bring these attributes to their audience’s minds (86). As mentioned in the title of her article, Guzman focuses on the two frames for the analysis of (i) protesters in Egypt, (ii) Hosni Mubarak, and (iii) the Muslim Brotherhood, to investigate the content broadcast by the Fox and CNN on their respective websites. Guzman’s analysis reveals that both new sites keep referring to the portrayal of protesters as friend/rational (88, 90); Hosni Mubarak’s portrayal—albeit a former US friend—as neither friend nor enemy/irrational (87, 89),
and Muslim Brotherhood as enemy/irrational (88, 91) in their coverage. According to Guzman’s analysis, both CNN and Fox have varying degrees of the use of the two frames. Considering the overall framing of this anti-government protest in Egypt as a departure from an orientalist stereotype, Guzman also argues that this framing is in harmony with the US media portrayal of US allies (93).

Similarly, in another research related to the study of ideologies, titled “Ideology through Sentiment Analysis: A changing Perspective on Russia and Islam in NYT,” Anastasia Smirnova, et al., while investigating the representation of the ‘other,’ also find out that a quantitative linguistic software Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) enriches the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Referring to the representation of the ‘Other’ as a classic topic within CDA (297), Smirnova, et al. conduct two independent studies to examine the portrayal of Russia and Islam in the NYT, before and after Russia’s annexation of Crimea for the former, and before and after 9/11 for the latter. In this diachronic investigation of the two case studies, the authors find out that the representation of Islam in the NYT appears in predominantly negative context even before the event of 9/11 (308). This research further divulges that this negativity is increased after 9/11 (308). The findings of this study essentially endorse the case of orientalist framing of Islam in the Western media.

Although all four case studies, included in this study, received significant media attention with some varying degrees, it appears that the media representations of Malala Yousafzai, in particular, intrigued scholars and researchers to investigate how media frame the issues related to Muslim women. In this context, in “Malala: the story of a Muslim girl and a Muslim nation,” Ayesha Khurshid and Brittany Pitts
examine Yousafzai’s representation in two US newspapers—the *New York Times* (NYT), and the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ). Analyzing both news and opinion articles, Khurshid and Pitts contend that the Western media positions Yousafzai as a Muslim girl, and thus this Muslim girl becomes a site to reinforce, rather than challenge, the negative stereotypes against the Muslim world (9). Similarly, Elsa Ashish Thomas and Rashid Narain Shukul investigate the framing of Malala Yousafzai in a Pakistani (*Dawn*), and a US (the *NYT*) newspaper, and maintain that the texts in Western media demonstrate that Yousafzai appeared to be a ‘news peg’ for highlighting and elaborating the Taliban and the Talibanized sections of Pakistani society (236). Precisely, both studies, by Khurshid and Brittany, and Thomas and Shukul assert that in the representation of Yousafzai, the Western media seems to pit Islam against West, or progressive America against primitive Pakistan.

An intriguing feature of the aforementioned two research studies—that emerged at the time of this writing—is that the authors mention the Western media’s neglect of Yousafzai’s references to Islam and Muslim figures for her inspiration (Khurshid & Pitts, 8; Thomas & Shukul, 234)—an issue that I already discussed at length in Chapter 3 during the critical discourse analysis of western media for the presentation of Malala Yousafzai. The studies of Khurshid & Pitts, and Thomas & Shukul, however, are mainly centered on content analysis and do not make a distinction between news articles and opinion pieces. In order to have a systematic analysis, however, this distinction may yield significant results, and thus, this chapter (having already analyzed news reports) only focuses on opinion pieces. Furthermore, the use of CDA enriches and endorses already existing knowledge by providing a comprehensive analysis on ideologies.
In “Identity Constructions through Media Discourses: Malala Yousafzai in Pakistani English Newspapers,” another study that appeared during the time of this writing, Habib Qazi and Saeeda Shah examine two Pakistani English newspapers, *Dawn* and *The Nation* to study the construction of identity through the news coverage of Malala Yousafzai. In addition to analyzing the news stories and editorials in the two newspapers, Qazi and Shah also analyze the online comments to these newspaper articles, and argue that there is a complex relationship between Yousafzai, Pakistani media, and the English newspaper readership (1607). Noticing the silence of *The Nation*’s readers over the newspaper’s liberal presentation of Yousafzai, Qazi and Shah suggest that probably audience who are trained in conservative ideologies find it hard to adjust to liberal views (1608). Similarly, Qazi and Shah observe that *Dawn*’s readers—through their online comments—appear to be sympathetic to Yousafzai and opposed to the Taliban (1608). This characteristic of *Dawn*’s readers is aligned with the newspaper’s liberal and secular policy. Here, it is important to note that *The Nation* is deemed as a conservative newspaper in Pakistan, whereas *Dawn* is famous for having a liberal and secular bent.

In terms of journalistic practices, however, Qazi and Shah’s study finds both newspapers to be vociferous critics of the Taliban and sympathizer/supporters of Malala Yousafzai. Methodologically, Qazi and Shah’s study is consonant with this chapter’s research in the sense that Qazi and Shah examine the same Pakistani newspapers—*Dawn* and *The Nation*—that I examine in this chapter. In addition, Qazi and Shah employ the same methodological framework of CDA to study the representation of Yousafzai in news reports and editorials. However, Qazi and Shah’s main focus remains the identity construction of Yousafzai, and this analysis is devoid
of a comparative approach with any foreign media. In this sense, the research in this chapter adds to the existing scholarship by presenting an analogy of Pakistani and US newspapers.

It appears that the presentation of Daniel Pearl, too, has intrigued some researchers to explore the maneuvering of ideologies through the presentation of Pearl’s corpus in the newspaper narratives of US and Pakistan. In “The Corpus of Daniel Pearl,” Davin Allen Grindstaff and Kevin Michael DeLuca engage in the rhetorical analysis of Pearl’s execution tape and news reports in both countries. Essentially, Grindstaff and DeLuca explore how Pearl’s body is used to appropriate discourses of terrorism and nationalism in Pakistan and the US. Through an analysis of news narratives, most of which includes opinion articles and letters to the editors from Pakistani and US newspapers, Grindstaff and DeLuca argue that the binary of ‘us versus them,’ is not always adequate to describe nationalist discourses; instead, in the contemporary world, such discourses are guided by the forces of ethnicity and religion (315). Grindstaff and DeLuca’s analysis—albeit significant—lacks a systematic approach for the selection of newspapers and a precise methodology for the investigation of the issue of ideologies.

Given the importance of opinion articles in newspapers, the studies discussed hitherto reveal that opinion pages are important sites of investigation for researchers. While some studies examine how rhetorical schemes are employed in opinion pieces to persuade audiences, some studies also investigate how these rhetorical usages uphold the promotion of ideologies. The previous chapters have already reviewed the literature related to the four case studies in detail. The literature review here, however, has mostly focused on the review of material related to the study of opinions in
newspapers. On the face of it, there is not any significant study about the investigation of opinion pieces regarding the four case studies, with some exception in the Malala Yousafzai case. Thus, this chapter encompasses the study of ideology for orientalist representation of four case studies in the presentation of opinion pieces in newspapers.

The Selection of Newspapers

Here again, I chose two US and two Pakistani newspapers. The two US newspapers include the *New York Times* (NYT), and the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ). Both newspapers are widely popular across the US and around the globe. Similarly, for Pakistani newspapers, I chose *Dawn*, and *The Nation*—both are English newspapers. The selection of Pakistani newspapers, for this chapter, reflects the views of a left and a right wing newspaper respectively. *The Nation* is one of several publications by the Nawa-i-Waqat group in Pakistan, which is famous for its flagship Urdu newspaper named *Nawa-i-Waqat*. According to Qazi and Shah, the newspaper is considered an “Ultra-right wing” in the country (1601). Whereas *Dawn* is one of the several publications by the Pakistan Herald Publications/Dawn Media Group, and is Pakistan’s leading and most-widely read English newspaper. *Dawn* was founded by Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the newspaper proudly writes this fact on its masthead.

I procured the data for Pakistani newspapers through microfilms at the Library of Congress, and the database Nexis Uni. For American newspapers, I obtained data from multiple databases such as ProQuest, and Nexis Uni. The search terms used during the research have been consistent for all chapters in this dissertation. The search terms used are ‘Malala Yousafzai’ for the Yousafzai case; ‘US Drone Strikes
in Pakistan’ for the drone attacks case; ‘Daniel Pearl-Pakistan’ for the Pearl case, and; ‘Raymond Davis-Pakistan’ for the Davis case respectively. To repeat, I excluded repetitive and irrelevant articles from the corpus. More often than not, for the sake of accuracy and preciseness, I double-checked data, especially related to American newspapers, on multiple databases. For the selection of the time period for the case studies, this chapter entails the same time period as determined in previous chapters.

For the sampling of articles in this chapter, unlike previous chapters, I have not followed a systematic procedure. Since the number of articles in Pakistani newspapers is far greater than American newspapers, I have analyzed all articles included in this study.

**Summary of analysis and discussion**

In what follows, I present an overview of findings and analyze it in the light of Said’s *Orientalism*, and Herman and Chomsky’s worthy and unworthy victims.

**Opinion Articles in the *New York Times* (NYT)**

The following table presents an overview of opinion articles published by the *NYT* for four case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Op-eds by the <em>New York Times</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Malala Yousafzai Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Column LTT E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us begin with the comparative analysis of the Yousafzai versus the drone strikes case. As table 1 reveals, there is no significant representation of the drone attack
victims in the opinion pages of the *NYT*. The newspaper did not publish any editorial to address the issue of victims. The *NYT*, did however, publish two editorials that allude to the drone operations in Pakistan, again without paying any heed to the drone attack victims. For this reason, these editorials are not included in the corpus of this study. Here, it is worth mentioning that most databases tend to pick articles on the basis of the existence of search terms in the content. Thus, after a meticulous analysis, I chose only those articles that addressed the research questions at hand.

The above-mentioned two editorials mainly address the issue of the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and US; along with that, there is also a brief mention of the US Drone Strikes in Pakistan. Both editorials were published in the month of October, a month after the month of maximum drone strikes (September)—as mentioned earlier in the Chapter 3. In an editorial titled “Lethal Force Under Law,” the newspaper presents the drone attacks in a euphemistic way. Here is an excerpt from the first paragraph:

> The drone program has been effective, killing more than 400 Al Qaeda militants this year alone, according to American officials, but fewer than 10 noncombatants … The government needs to do a better job of showing the world that it is acting in strict compliance with international law (WK.7).

(Text 1)

The paragraph from which I’ve taken Text 1 actually also confesses the deaths of innocents by saying that the drones have been effective by killing 400 Al Qaeda militants but fewer than 10 noncombatants. But this confession, according to Fairclough’s CDA framework, is presented in a euphemistic way whereby the effectiveness of drones offsets the killing of noncombatants.
Here, another interesting feature of this analysis is that the statistics provided in the editorial are in sharp contrast with the reporting of other investigative forums such as The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, and The Intercept. As one can see in Text 1, the NYT here is relying on American official sources for the information, this is something incongruous with the proclamations of investigative journalism of the NYT. At any rate, the NYT in this editorial—albeit not primarily focusing on Pakistan for the drone issue—vehemently urges the US government for openness and transparency in the handling of the drone attacks; the newspaper also urges the government to use drones as a last resort.

In another editorial, the NYT primarily discusses the importance of the US-Pakistan alliance for combating terrorism and insurgence in the area. However, there is a small paragraph that alludes to the fact of an increase in drone attacks in Pakistan in the coming weeks after the month of September, then the editorial describes the American oversight of drones as inadequate, and the rest of the information goes as follows:

…but Pakistan’s leadership needs to understand that if they won’t go after insurgents targeting American troops, then the United States military will (The Latest Crisis, A. 30).

(Text 2)

Again, in the editorial piece from which Text 2 is taken, there is no mention of civilian casualties and sufferings. The whole article emphasizes the Pakistani government to support the stringent policy of the US to combat terrorism. As a matter of fact, also evident from Text 2, the NYT encourages a stern stance in case of Pakistani leadership’s noncooperation.
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann contributed a brief op-ed, but that piece primarily reprimands the issue of secretive operations from both countries’ respective governments (“No Secrets in the Sky” A. 23). Similarly, on the face of it, the op-ed piece of Michael E. O’Hanlon (also mentioned in Chapter 3) seems to be relevant for the research question in the study. But the article is mainly directed towards internal problems in Pakistan that are prevalent in the backdrop of the US drone attacks. This meager representation of the drone victims in the opinion pages of the NYT calls for comparison of the same coverage with another incident/event wherein the US media, particularly, seems to be hyperactive.

The representation of Malala Yousafzai in the NYT is quite a contrast to the representation of the drone victims. This difference is evident not only in the number of editorial and op-ed articles published, but can also be observed in the extent of sympathetic concerns and overall humane approach in the Yousafzai’s presentation. The NYT published an editorial in praise of Yousafzai right after the shooting incident and expresses accolades for this Pakistani girl (“Malala Yousafzai’s Courage” A. 30).

Consider the beginning of this editorial:

If Pakistan has a future, it is embodied in Malala Yousafzai. Yet the Taliban so feared this 14-year-old girl that they tried to assassinate her. Her supposed offence? Her want of an education and her public advocation for it (“Malala Yousafzai’s Courage” A. 30).

(Text 3)

Clearly, this piece, that reflects the NYT’s own opinion on the matter, has an emotional and favorable appeal in presenting the victim. The NYT also describes that according to the Taliban, Yousafzai had become a symbol of Western culture in the area; and if she survives, the Taliban would retry to kill her (“Malala Yousafzai’s
Courage” A. 30). The NYT presents a case for its audience wherein they could possibly envisage the Taliban’s apparent friction towards the West.

As compared to the presentation of the drone victims, the NYT published quite a few op-ed columns on the shooting incident of Malala Yousafzai. Nicholas D. Kristof, famous NYT columnist, wrote a couple of times about Yousafzai in his op-eds during the selected time period of this study. Kristof’s article “Her ‘Crime’ was loving Schools” was published just a day after the shooting incident. Although like the NYT’s editorial, Kristof’s opinion article, too, highly commends Yousafzai for her bravery and advocacy of female education, this opinion piece also lambasts the situation of female mistreatment in the US through sex trafficking. Additionally, Kristof urges the US government to increase educational aid for Pakistan instead of the military aid. While discussing the Taliban’s atrocities in Pakistan, Kristof argues that “The greatest risk for violent extremists in Pakistan isn’t American drones. It’s educated girls” (“Her ‘Crime’ was loving Schools” A. 31). Kristof’s analysis—though somewhat moderate—exalts Yousafzai and, hence, induces sympathetic favor for her. Other op-ed writers on the Yousafzai case in the NYT include Adam B. Ellick, Gordon Brown, and Syed Fazl-e-Haider.

After comparing the NYT’s portrayal of the drone victims with the presentation of Yousafzai, I will henceforth compare and analyze the presentation of the Pearl case with the Davis case victims. Let us begin with the presentation of the Daniel Pearl case in the NYT. The newspaper published three editorials, and several columns that commented on the incident of Daniel Pearl. The NYT published the first editorial soon after Pearl’s abduction; they published the second editorial after the release of video about Pearl’s decapitation; and the third editorial mainly urges
General Musharraf to purge the ties between Pakistan’s intelligence agency and militants.

The first editorial, besides recounting the harrowing details of Pearl’s abduction, strongly appeals for his immediate release (“A Journalist’s Abduction” A. 24). The NYT’s censure of Pearl’s kidnapping and the details of his family, particularly Pearl’s pregnant wife’s plight, explains that in its editorials, the NYT presents Pearl with a sympathetic approach, and thus, as a worthy victim. Similarly, the second editorial, too, highly condemns Pearl’s murder, and urges the Pakistani government to bring Pearl’s killers to justice (“The Murder of Daniel Pearl” A. 24). All three editorials, reflecting compassion and concern about Pearl and his family, spotlight Pearl as a deserving and worthwhile victim.

For the op-ed section, the most appealing piece is Mariane Pearl’s article “Why Good Hearts Must Go Public” wherein Mrs. Pearl, along with appreciating Pakistani citizens’ condolence letters to her, urges the Pakistani government to build a memorial in Karachi (the city where Pearl was abducted and later murdered) for Daniel Pearl. Another important article in the NYT is by Ann Cooper, the executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Cooper, by referring to the statistics vis-à-vis journalists facing threats, intimidation, and the loss of life, outlines the possibilities of injury or harm that journalists (especially after 9/11) had to face (“Daniel Pearl’s Essential Work” A. 15). Essentially, Cooper’s article is a tribute to Pearl’s intrepid journalistic endeavor that put him in trouble, and eventually led to his death.

The review of all opinion articles related to the Daniel Pearl case in the opinion section of the NYT reveals that, besides discussing Pearl’s macabre fate, the
majority of writers also addressed the security issues of journalists in conflict zones and the issues of failure or mishandling of technology for the surveillance or investigation of criminal activities. For many analysts, it was the nature of Pearl’s beat that put him in harm’s way. For example, consider the following excerpt from Nicholas Kristof’s article, which was published right after the release of the video of Pearl’s killing:

Each time a colleague like Danny Pearl is killed, the death sends a shock through the spine of anyone who has ever been a foreign correspondent. To be a reporter abroad is to make constant judgements about risk … (“A Life of Balances” A. 25).

(Text 4)

Although most write-ups in the NYT on the Daniel Pearl case criticize work pressures on journalists for scoops, and the nature of the job for reporters who work in war zones, nevertheless, in overall, these opinion pieces tend to present Pearl in a way that readers feel sorrow and distress for the victim.

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US and Sri Lanka, contributed an important op-ed to the NYT. Condemning the act of Pearl’s abduction (the article was published before the video of Pearl’s murder came out), Haqqani outlines the facts about links between Pakistan’s intelligence agency and Islamic militants (“Trying to Create a New Pakistan” A. 31). Noting the fact that one of Pearl’s abductors—Ahmed Omar Sheikh—is famous for being mollycoddled by Pakistan’s security apparatus, Haqqani considers Pakistan’s strategic struggle with India—whereby the state apparatus in Pakistan has nurtured the shadowy Islamic militants—to be an important reason behind the state of insecurity and instability in

---

54 See Anderson, Kristof, and Stellin.
Pakistan (“Trying to Create a New Pakistan” A. 31). This is the only article in the op-ed section of the NYT that considers Pakistan’s political entanglements to be one of the important reasons for the country’s unsteadiness. The rest of the articles, however, present religiously inspired militancy and terrorism as a problem.

The presentation of the Raymond Davis case victims is quite contrary to the Pearl case on the opinion pages of the NYT. Although the victims of the Davis case did not have Pearl’s equivalent socioeconomic stature, the Davis incident led to the strained relationship between the two former allies to an extent wherein the US President (Obama) had to intercede for the release of Davis. For this reason, the Davis incident received significant attention in Pakistani media. However, the US media’s relative indifference to this incident suggests the assent of national and political agendas of US media with nationalist ideologies.

There is no significant editorial or op-ed in the NYT vis-à-vis the Davis case. In Chapter 4, I’ve explained the NYT’s act of concealing Davis’s true identity at the behest of the US government. The only op-ed article pertinent to the Davis case in the NYT essentially criticizes the newspaper for withholding the information about Davis working in Pakistan as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent (Brisbane “An American in Pakistan” WK. 8). The author, Arthur S. Brisbane, who is the NYT’s public editor, and whose primary job is to respond to public comments and complaints, and monitor the NYT’s journalistic practices, considers the government instructions as a ‘hard call,’ and argues that it has damaged the NYT’s standing. There is, nevertheless, no mention of victims in this solo op-ed article as well. At any rate, the example in this particular incident shows that even in liberal and democratic societies, sometimes media cannot be free from government pressures.
Opinion Articles in the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ)

The following table 2 presents a summary of opinion pieces published by the *WSJ* on the four case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Op-eds by the <em>Wall Street Journal</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Malala Yousafzai Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 2)

Before I delve into the comparative analysis of the Yousafzai and the drone attacks case, it is important to mention that the presentation of both cases is not sufficient in the opinion pages of the *WSJ* that it can help to make an opinion. For the Malala Yousafzai case, although the *WSJ* (through news stories) portrayed the victim in a way that drew readers’ sympathies toward Yousafzai, it appears that there is no significant representation of Yousafzai in the op-ed sections of the *WSJ*. Sadanand Dhume, an Indian journalist who is based in Washington DC, and is famous for his writings on Asian affairs, contributed a couple of write-ups in the *WSJ*. Although these articles appear to be commentary on the Yousafzai case, the databases do not categorize them as opinion; instead, they are digitized as news articles. For this reason, they are excluded from the corpus of this chapter’s research. But nevertheless, Dhume’s analysis is somewhat critical of Pakistan, and describes the war against the Taliban as not America’s war, but Pakistan’s war (Dhume “A Child Soldier”). Overall, the presentation of Dhume’s article renders Yousafzai as a worthy victim.
By contrast, in the discussion of the US drone attacks in the op-ed section of the *WSJ*, there is no mention of civilian casualties in the discussion of these incidents. Although there are three op-ed articles in the *WSJ* related to the issue, one of them reads like a news story rather than an opinion piece. For this reason, the total number of opinion articles ranges between 2 to 3. Essentially, these articles describe the situation of insurgency and uncertainty in Pakistani tribal areas, and hence, further explain the viability of the usage of drone attacks. For example, consider the following excerpt from an op-ed article:

... The insurgents who kill American troops in Afghanistan—principally the Taliban, whose leadership is in Baluchistan, and the militants loyal to the legendary fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani in the tribal regions—operate all too freely from Pakistan. President Obama should note that, too, today (Matthew “Obama and the Pakistan Dilemma” A. 23).

(Text 5)

Similarly, consider the following excerpt from another article:

Advances in unmanned aerial vehicle technology allow the United States to reach around the globe and target terrorists in areas where our troops cannot go for tactical or diplomatic reasons. Drone attacks have increased significantly in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the past six months while civilian casualties have decreased (Rittgers “Both Left and Right” A. 11).

(Text 6)

The articles from which text 5 and 6 are taken mainly talk about the effectiveness of the drone technology for combating terrorism, and shed light on the issue of how the use of drone technology is proving to be a workable option where other combat strategies had failed. To repeat, neither of these articles mentions civilian victims; instead, they argue about the decrease in civilian deaths (as is the case in the article...
from where text 6 is taken). This information, however, is in contrast with the reporting of other investigative forums that I have already mentioned.

There is, however, another article by Mosharraf Zaidi, a Pakistani columnist, who wrote a piece for the *WSJ* in the wake of the arrest of Faisal Shahzad, an American-Pakistani citizen, who was convicted in 2010 for the Time Square car bombing in New York City. Shahzad reportedly cited the civilian deaths in drone attacks as the prime motivator for his acts. Zaidi contextualizes the problem of terrorism in Pakistan and presents the rise in terrorism as an outcome of the US backed anti-communism war in Afghanistan. Considering the case of Faisal Shahzad as an example, Zaidi contends that the US drone attacks continue to radicalize Pakistani citizens, and hence are counterproductive (“Pakistan is Fighting Terror”). This is the only piece in the *WSJ* that describes the backlash effect on Pakistani people as a result of civilian deaths in the drone attacks. The overall analysis of the *WSJ* reveals that there is scant presentation of either the Yousafzai case or the drone attacks’ victims in the opinion section of this newspaper. This presentation in the *WSJ* is quite meager as compared to the *NYT*. The information here is not sufficient to develop an opinion on the comparative analysis of the Yousafzai versus the drone strikes case.

Let us now analyze the presentation of the Pearl case versus the Davis case. There is a detailed presentation of Daniel Pearl in the op-ed section of the *WSJ*. As shown in table 2, the newspaper published several editorials, letters to the editor, and numerous columns after the abduction and later the murder of Daniel Pearl. As the *WSJ* was also Pearl’s employer organization, they also published several editorial appeals for Pearl’s release soon after the news of his abduction came out. In one of
the editorials that was published right after the release of the video showing Pearl’s murder, the *WSJ*, while mourning the sad demise of Pearl, presented an analogy between Pearl, and the victims of 9/11. For example, see the following excerpt from the editorial:

> At the Journal, we should add, we have felt this terrorist assault in an especially personal way. The World Trade Center attacks knocked us out of our headquarters and killed many of our neighbors. Now it has murdered one of our colleagues. In this of course we only feel more acutely the deep sense of violation felt by millions of other Americans since September 11 ("Daniel Pearl, RIP" A. 14).

(Text 7)

In this editorial, the newspaper keeps referring to the 9/11 incident, and positions the death of Pearl within the binary of ‘America versus terrorism.’ Analyzing this editorial according to Fairclough’s CDA framework, one can find the presentation of relational value enacted via the text in the discourse. The relational value refers to social relationships that a certain text endorses (Fairclough, 130). In the analysis of Pearl’s death, the repeated allusion to the 9/11 tragedy as a clash between America and terrorism tends to reinforce the same binary and suggests that terrorism is only America’s problem. By all means, this presentation of Pearl renders him as a worthy victim for the readers and audience of the *WSJ*.

All editorials and the letters to the editors in the *WSJ* vehemently appeal for Pearl’s release, and highly condemn his murder. Additionally, in several of its editorials, the *WSJ* presents itself as a victim, and a sufferer of terrorism. The first sentence of the editorial published soon after Pearl’s abduction reads like this, “The risks of reporting on the war on terrorism have come to *The Wall Street Journal* in a very personal way with the seizure in Karachi, Pakistan, of our reporter Danny Pearl”
(“Free Danny Pearl” A. 14). In this editorial (and others, too, especially from where text 7 is taken), the newspaper repeatedly uses the pronoun ‘we.’ According to Fairclough, pronouns in English have relational values of different sorts (143). More often than not, newspaper editorials tend to use this pronoun that refers to the writer(s), readers, and indeed all American citizens. In doing so, the newspaper tends to make an implicit authority claim whereby it has the authority to speak for others. One aspect of this presentation is that it tends to accord ideological differences between the west and the rest of the world.

There are a variety of concerns in the columns published during the Pearl case in the WSJ, some of which also include the safety of journalists in risky environments especially after 9/11. An article by Frank J. Gaffney Jr., a senior defense department official during the Reagan administration, has a particularly harsh tone for combating terrorism in eastern countries, and tends to frame Pearl as a worthy victim. The end of this essay reads like this:

We will use every available source to liquidate the perpetrators and to hold accountable those who have enabled their aggression against our people. The place to start will be with the murderers of Danny Pearl (“How America Must Respond to Barbarism” A. 20).

(Text 8)

The article from which text 8 is taken incites nationalist sentiments and urges the American government and people to track terrorists down and deal with them strictly. With that said, however, the WSJ also published a couple of articles by Pakistani analysts and journalists like Ahmed Rashid, and Shaheen Sehbai. Seemingly, these articles, with little and indirect mention of Pearl, are not directly pertinent to the Pearl case. These articles, instead contextualize the historical and political turmoil in
Pakistan that led to the Pearl incident. Especially Shaheen Sehbai, Pakistan’s famous journalist and the former editor of The News International (Pakistan’s famous English daily), highlights America’s role in backing military regimes in Pakistan that further led to the audacity of Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI), an organization that Sehbai accuses of nurturing Ahmed Omar Sheik—the main suspect in the Pearl case (“Don’t be Fooled” A. 22). This is the only article in the WSJ that emphasizes the understanding of factors that underpin the existence of extremist groups in Pakistan.

For the presentation of the Raymond Davis case, it appears that the WSJ’s op-ed section paid relatively more attention to the Davis case than the NYT. Although the newspaper published almost three editorials on the Davis issue, none of these articles mention anything about the victims of the Davis case. All editorials strongly criticize the Pakistani government for mishandling of the issue and for disregarding Davis’s diplomatic immunity claimed by the US government. In addition, all these editorials underscore the importance of removing tension between two allies for fighting the war on terror, and tend to show Pakistan as a dangerous and problematic place. For example, see the following excerpt from an editorial published in the middle of the crisis.

The presence of armed Americans on Pakistani soil is a sore point. Pakistan is the world’s leading terrorist sanctuary, home to Al Qaeda’s leadership as well as the Afghan Taliban (“Pakistan’s Undiplomatic Bungle” A. 14).

(Text 9)

The example in text 9 shows that the editorial depicts Pakistan as a place that harbors terrorists and is mired in security problems. While there is some truth in this assertion, an inadequate and ahistorical presentation of the problem only tends to taint the
reality, and does not lead to the solution. The ordeal of victims’ families, dispute over Davis’s true identity, and the nature of Davis’s job in Pakistan are some issues that are utterly unaddressed in the *WSJ*’s editorials.

Moreover, there are only two op-ed articles in the *WSJ* that somehow discuss the Davis case. In this context, Pakistani journalist, Imtiaz Gul’s article provides a logical argument that in the wake of increased drone attacks in Pakistan, most Pakistanis were vexed about the presence of an armed American in their midst (“Perfidious America”). In overall, there is no significant presentation of Davis case victims in the *WSJ*. As the analysis of the *NYT* and the *WSJ* reveals, both American newspapers published (in varying degrees) on the four incidents. At times, there is not significant representation of some case studies in the op-ed pages of these newspapers that can possibly help to develop an opinion regarding the portrayal of worthy and unworthy victims. However, time and again, as we see in texts 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9, there is presentation of ideas whereby audience/readers can conceive Pakistan to be a place rife with terrorism, anarchy, and the subjugation of women. After analyzing the American newspapers for this study, I will now analyze Pakistani newspapers for the same incidents.

**Opinion Articles in Dawn**

The following table 3 reveals the quantitative aspects of opinion articles in famous Pakistani newspaper *Dawn* regarding the four case studies.

**Op-eds by *Dawn***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai Case</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes Case</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>Columns</td>
<td>LTT</td>
<td>Editorials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LTT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Let us start with the analysis of opinion discussions on the Malala Yousafzai case in *Dawn*. Soon after the Yousafzai shooting incident, *Dawn* has an extensive representation of Yousafzai on its opinion pages. Especially there is a flood of messages in *Dawn* in the form of letters to the editors through which people voiced their concerns regarding Yousafzai’s safety and raised their voice against the Taliban’s atrocity. Quantitatively, in the month of October 2012 (the month of Yousafzai’s shooting) *Dawn* published four editorials, twelve op-ed articles, and twenty-three letters (varying in length) to the editorial desk. Among the columnists are Pakistan’s top-notch journalists and analysts, some of which include Zubeida Mustafa, Rafia Zakaria, Moeed Yusuf, Abbas Nasir, Syed Irfan Ashraf, and F.S. Aijazuddin. This presentation of Yousafzai, however, dwindled in *Dawn* until the month of July when Yousafzai addressed a youth assembly in the United Nations.

While reviewing editorials in *Dawn*, one can see a sharp difference in focus between the presentation of *Dawn* and the American newspapers included in this study. For example, in the editorial that *Dawn* published right after the shooting incident, the newspaper, besides discussing the ordeal of Yousafzai and her family, mainly appears to focus on the prevailing hidebound ideology in the Swat valley that became more evident after the 2009 military operation in Swat ("Symbol of Resistance" 7). Although *Dawn* published editorials on the Yousafzai shooting incident for three consecutive days, i.e., Oct 11, 12, and 13, these editorials mainly tend to highlight the growing problems of intolerance and violent extremism in Pakistani society.
My point here is that instead of merely glorifying Yousafzai, as is the case in the NYT (text 3 is an example), editorials in Dawn essentially attempt to outline the reasons that engendered the shooting incident of Yousafzai. Keeping in view that the shooting incident occurred in the aftermath of the 2009 Pakistani military operation in Swat, Dawn argues that the military establishment needs to consider the reasons for the operation’s futility (“Moment of Truth” 7). Here, again, one can see that the focus of the newspaper, along with sympathizing with Yousafzai, is to figure out the reason for the incident and its potential outcomes. It is also important to mention that apparently Dawn published many editorials that mainly criticized the Pakistani government or the military for the situation of insecurity and instability in Swat, but the main focus of the majority of these editorials, however, was not to comment on Malala Yousafzai.

In an important editorial that was published almost a week after the shooting incident of Yousafzai, Dawn reprimands the act of comparing Yousafzai with the drone strikes victims. Considering the attack on Yousafzai, a deliberate response by the Taliban to Yousafzai’s activism for female education (she was a teenage child at that time), Dawn writes about the drone issue as follows:

Drone strikes maybe unacceptable in their current form and end up killing innocent children,
but doing so is not their intent (“Skewed narrative” 7).

(Text 10)
Clearly, Dawn criticizes the public outcry in Pakistan wherein some people in the country, troubled by the significant amount of attention received by Yousafzai, began comparing the latter with the victims of the Drone attacks in Pakistan. However, research (as discussed at length in Chapter 3) in this study only compares the media
representation of the two incidents, not the incidents themselves. *Dawn* published a number of op-ed articles during the Yousafzai incident. Almost all articles express concerns over the impending risks of insecurity to female education in the country. Moreover, the majority of articles appear to criticize the religious right wing sections in Pakistani society for whipping up conspiracy theories behind the shooting incident of Yousafzai. Generally, these articles express concerns over the act of benightedness in the shooting incident and urge the Pakistani administration to ensure that such incidents are not repeated in the future.

As for the op-ed contribution about the US drone attacks in Pakistan, it appears that *Dawn* published quite a few editorials on the topics of the sensitive relationship between the US and Pakistan: strategic dialogues between the two countries, the December 2009 Khost bombing that resulted in seven CIA officials’ deaths, increased drone attacks on Pakistani tribal territories, Faisal Shahzad’s car bombing attempt in the New York City, the increased anti-Americanism in Pakistan, the complicity of Pakistani government for allowing the use of drone technology on its territory, and the impending perils of jihadi infrastructure in the country. The majority of these editorials discuss the US drone strikes issue in their write-ups. However, there is no particular editorial in *Dawn* that specifically addresses the issue of civilian deaths as a result of the drone attacks. The majority of these editorials are more critical of the Pakistani government (especially the Pakistani army) than the US government.

In the wake of the Faisal Shahzad event, there were US dignitaries’ visits (including the CIA chief, Leon Panetta) to Islamabad, and media speculations about the US unilateral attack on Pakistani territory. Responding to this situation, *Dawn*
published an editorial that implicitly considers the US drone attacks in Pakistan a bilateral undertaking. Consider the following excerpt of this editorial:

It would be absurd for America to try and position itself as a friend and well-wisher of Pakistan if it were at the same time launching unilateral strikes inside this country (whatever the official line, the drone strikes are not considered ‘unilateral’ by either side) (“Friend or foe?” 7).

(Text 11)

The editorial from where text 11 is taken hints at the involvement of the Pakistani government for the ongoing drone attacks in Pakistan. However, again, there is no mention of innocent or civilian deaths as a result of US drone attacks in Pakistan. At any rate, Dawn is highly vocal in criticizing the US imperialist policies, particularly the ones that impinged on Pakistan, and their fallouts especially since the Zia-ul-Haq era.

As I discussed in Chapter 3, September 2010 was the month with the maximum drone attacks on the Pakistani tribal areas. Dawn published an editorial in the aftermath of increased strikes and urged both governments to be transparent on the matter rather than being secretive; along with that, in order to address the concerns of Pakistani sovereignty, Dawn also highlighted the possibility of handing the drone technology over to the Pakistani government (“Drone Strikes” 7). Although Dawn’s editorials do not provide any significant details about the drones’ victims, many times these articles provide details on the issues of increased insurgency and militancy in the FATA and parts of Baluchistan, and the prevalent problem of terrorism in Pakistan. For example, Dawn repeatedly underscores the ‘War on Terror’ as Pakistan’s own war (“Why from America” 7; “Victims of Terror” 7), and urges the
Pakistan government (especially the military) to be open and transparent on the handling of terrorism.

*Dawn* also published several columns and letters to the editor on the drone attacks issue. The names of some columnists include Huma Yusuf, Rafia Zakaria, Irfan Husain, and Pervez Hoodbhoy. The majority of these articles seem to question the legality and effectiveness of these attacks. In this context, Hoodbhoy’s article is important in explaining the apparent reasons for anti-Americanism among young Pakistanis. Hoodbhoy, in the article that he wrote in the wake of the Faisal Shahzad event, does not buy the reason of innocent deaths in the US drone attacks as a prime motivator for Shahzad’s (as described by Shahzad himself) attempt to set off a car bomb at Times Square in New York City. Among many reasons for rising anti-Americanism in Pakistan, Hoodbhoy considers the state indoctrination of exclusive conservative ideologies in young Pakistani minds during the Zia-ul-Haq period to be an important one (“Faisal Shahzad’s anti-Americanism” 7). About the drone attacks, Hoodbhoy writes that:

*Drone Strikes are a common but false explanation … Drone Strikes have killed some innocents but they have devastated militant operations in Waziristan while causing far less collateral damage than Pakistan Army operations (“Faisal Shahzad’s anti-Americanism” 7).*

(Text 12)

A detailed and precise examination of articles in the opinion section of *Dawn* reveals that the newspaper tends to provide an incisive analysis of the Yousafzai and the drone strikes cases. Although there is no aggrandized portrayal of victims in both case studies (especially in the case of the drone attacks), *Dawn* appears to present a
thorough analysis of historical factors and formative circumstances that have brought Pakistan to this stage; here, the article from where text 12 is taken is a case in point.

For the Daniel Pearl case, *Dawn* published several editorials, letters to the editors, and columns. In the month of February, *Dawn* published two editorials: first, to condemn the abduction of the American reporter, and the misuse of mobile phone technology in Pakistan that made the identification of his perpetrators difficult for investigative agencies (“Misuse of mobiles” 7); second, to denounce the killing of the American journalist (“Murder most Foul” 7). In the latter piece, *Dawn*’s expression of grief and shock over the death of Pearl, and the criticism of Pakistan’s intelligence services that, according to *Dawn*, failed to recover Pearl from his abductors, reveals that *Dawn* presented Pearl as a worthy victim. Here, in addition to condemning Pearl’s death, *Dawn* also describes how until the mid-nineties, Pakistan was a safe place for foreigners; and how the situation deteriorated gradually after the Afghan war. The American newspapers, as the analysis in the earlier pages of this chapter reveals, are inattentive to such details in the presentation of the problem. This ahistorical presentation of the problem tends to depict a picture of the country whereby one can assume that Pakistan has always been a hotbed of extremism.

Pakistan’s famous columnist, Ardeshir Cowasjee, wrote a highly sympathetic article after the news of Pearl’s murder. The first paragraph of this column needs to be quoted here in detail:

Call them brutes, fanatics, bigots, murderers, terrorists, religious militants—call them what you will. The killing of Daniel Pearl was an act perpetrated by deranged, unreasonable, mindless men (“Brutal Fanatics” 7).

(Text 13)
Clearly, the utterance of these attributes for Pearl’s perpetrators by Cowasjee renders Pearl as a worthy victim. The concerns of Pakistanis for Pearl, his wife, and other family members are also evident from the fact that several contributed letters to the editor and voiced their sympathies for the victim and his bereaved family.

Let us now consider the portrayal of the Davis case and its victims by the same newspaper. On the face of it, Dawn published more articles on the Davis case than the Pearl case. But most of the articles in Dawn related to the Davis case focus more on the criticism of both governments for the lack of openness and secretive deals for the release of Raymond Davis. There are especially more articles published in the month of March (when Davis was released) criticizing the Pakistani government on above-mentioned issues and the US government for the drone attack incident that happened right after Davis’s release and resulted in the death of forty civilians. Overall, the majority of articles in Dawn appear to reprimand the imperialist power of the US for the apparent disregard of Pakistani citizens’ lives.

In the editorial that Dawn published after the Davis shooting incident, Dawn condemns the killing of two Pakistanis by the American shooter whose identity had raised many questions about American incursion or espionage on Pakistani soil. The same editorial also criticized the ensuing panic after the Davis shooting incident that resulted in the death of another Pakistani by a vehicle coming to rescue Davis (“Lahore Shooting” 7). From the language used in most of the editorials in Dawn, however, it is difficult to discern if the editorials appear to arouse sympathies for the victims in this case. Although most editorials appear to condemn the killing, especially of the third motorcyclist who was killed by the US consulate van, mainly
these editorials present details on the confusion of Davis’s true identity and the diplomatic trust deficit between the two countries.

The columns that were published in *Dawn* during the Davis incident appear to be more critical of the Pakistani government (and particularly the Pakistani media) than the US government. In other words, *Dawn* is more censorious of the Pakistani government and media and considers the Davis incident as an occasion that manifested the rise of anti-American feelings among Pakistanis. For example, consider the following excerpt from a column written by famous Pakistani journalist, Syed Talat Hussain:

… the general eye in Pakistan perceives Washington’s demand for immunity for Davis’s actions as akin to audacious American actions against Muslim countries, where international law is stretched and distorted to defend invasions and destruction of Muslim homelands in the name of countering terrorism (“Hearts and minds Campaign?” 7).

(Text 14)

Text 14 is from an article that presents the context of the US Afghan and Iraq invasions after 9/11 that stirred up qualms in Muslims about US foreign policies. Consequently, the oft-quoted ‘West versus Islam’ binary that the war on terror triggered seems to incite stereotypical feelings in eastern peoples as well. Among the columnists in *Dawn* are Huma Yusuf, Aredeshir Cowasjee, Irfan Husain, Syed Talat Hussain, Cyril Almeida, Rafia Zakaria, Kamran Shafi, and S. Akbar Zaidi. The majority of these columns criticize the Pakistani government for the mishandling of the issue and the hyperactivity of Pakistani media (especially the electronic media) over the presentation of this incident. Most of these articles appear to be fair in the analysis of the incident.

**Opinion Articles in *The Nation***
After analyzing the portrayal of the four case studies in the opinion pages of *Dawn*, I shall now examine the presentation of same events in the opinion section of another Pakistani English daily newspaper *The Nation*. Table 4 reveals the total number of articles and their subsequent details in *The Nation*.

**Op-eds by *The Nation***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>The Malala Yousafzai</th>
<th>The Drone Strikes Case</th>
<th>The Daniel Pearl Case</th>
<th>The Raymond Davis Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorials/LTTE</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-eds/LTT</td>
<td>17/25</td>
<td>51/51</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>40/36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 4)

Before I delve into my analysis of *The Nation*’s opinion section, it is important to mention that I procured the data for this newspaper from two sources: (i) databases, and (ii) microfilm reels. For example, the data about the Pearl case, and some parts of the Yousafzai case was obtained through the microfilm reels. The rest of the data, however, came from the database Nexis Uni. As discussed earlier, databases tend to generate results on the basis of the appearance of search terms, it is often likely that the article is not pertinent to the issue under study; it only mentions the issue while discussing something else. Thus, there can be variation in the number of articles from the ones mentioned in table 4. In other words, for the analysis of *The Nation*, the number of articles that are directly related to the four case studies can be less than the articles mentioned in table 4.

Like all newspapers, *The Nation*, too, portrayed Yousafzai as a worthy victim. There are many editorials in the newspaper that disapprove of her shooting by the Taliban, and appreciate her advocacy for female education. Similarly, for the
columns, M.A. Niazi, Samson Simon Sharaf, Tallat Azim, and Mohammad Jamil are among the contributors. At times, *The Nation* also published columns by foreign writers such as Ban Ki Moon and Atle Hetland. All op-ed articles in *The Nation* criticize the Taliban’s ideology, problems with the Pakistani education system, and the Pakistani government’s inattention to the promotion of female education in the country. All these things suggest that *The Nation* presented Yousafzai as a victim worthy of sympathies and concerns.

About the drone attacks, again, there are many editorials and columns in *The Nation* that discussed the drone issue in Pakistan. The majority of these articles focus on the issue of the killing of innocents, the clandestine deal of the Pakistani government on the Drones, Pakistan’s lack of self-reliance, and the legitimacy of drone operations. Like other newspapers—*Dawn* and the *WSJ*—*The Nation*, too, published the most number of articles after the Faisal Shahzad event in May 2010. At times, *The Nation* appears to be fixated on the issues of Pakistan’s sovereignty, the legality of US drone operations in Pakistani territory, and the sycophant approach of Pakistani rulers for fulfilling US imperial demands.

For example, see the following excerpt from an editorial that was published after the US forces stepped up the drone attacks in the wake of the Khost bombing:

… it bears pointing out that a meaningful dialogue can only be possible if the US is warned in no uncertain terms to stop its drone attacks, which have caused a severe backlash among the tribal population. After all, this is a war of winning over hearts and minds; and bombs and guns are no cure; they can only exacerbate the malady. It is a pity that, egged on by the US masters, the government has been using brute force to quell the opposition that could have been tamed easily by peaceful means (“A Positive Step”).

(Text 15)
Similarly, see another excerpt from an editorial that was published in mid-July:

> The US, as the unadvised drone attacks on our tribal areas have shown, seems not to bother about Pakistanis’ sensitivities on the question of territorial sovereignty, at least as far as the tribal areas are concerned (“Time to Get out of War”).

(Text 16)

The example in text 15 shows that *The Nation* advocates the policy of engaging militant forces in talks and listening to their concerns; along with that, the newspaper criticizes the Pakistani government for blindly following US policies. Similarly, there are many editorials like the one from where I took text 16 in *The Nation* that repeatedly criticize the US drone attacks for violating Pakistan’s sovereignty.

In its editorials, *The Nation* also provides facts and figures related to civilian deaths in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Another issue that *The Nation* appears to highlight is the problem of internally displaced people (IDPs). These IDPs—who had to vacate their area either because of a military operation or the drone attacks—were also occasionally discussed in the opinion pages of *Dawn*. Overall, *The Nation* is stronger and more assertive in opposing the US drone attacks in Pakistan as compared to *Dawn*. The columns in *The Nation* address more or less the same concerns. Among the columnists in *The Nation* are retired Pakistan Army officers like Samson Simon Sharaf, and General Mirza Aslam Beg; academics like Dr. Haider Mehdi, and Dr. A. H. Khayal; and politicians like Shireen Mazari (also federal minister for human rights at the time of writing of this study). All columnists mentioned here are famous analytical voices in Pakistan, and their opinions are significantly important for galvanizing public opinion against the drone attacks. This level of attention by *The
Nation’s opinion section towards the drone attacks shows that its victims can probably be taken as worthy victims.

Let us now examine the presentation of the Daniel Pearl case in the opinion pages of The Nation. A thorough investigation of this newspaper reveals that the Pearl case was a front page story in The Nation. The newspaper published multiple editorials in the month of February 2002. While expressing concerns over the kidnapping of Pearl, The Nation, in its editorial, writes that “it is a pity that journalists pursuing the legitimate interest of their profession become the target of hostile forces … (“Innocent Victim” 6).” Just three days after this editorial, The Nation wrote another editorial wherein it strongly appealed to Pearl’s captors to release him immediately. In this editorial, The Nation, through examples, shows how Pearl had been a strong critic of US policies, and thus had no spying agenda (Pearl’s abductors alleged him to be a spy) (“Let Daniel Pearl Be Free” 6). Similarly, the publication of two more editorials after Pearl’s death manifests that The Nation framed the Pearl case in a sympathetic way.

The Nation published several columns, too, related to the Pearl case. Some of the columnists are important national and political figures such as Husain Haqqani, and Mushahid Hussain. Here, the interesting aspect of this presentation is that it describes the developmental process for the onset of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. For example, instead of considering only the religion-based militancy (as is the case in the American newspapers), the columns in The Nation consider the India-Pakistan rivalry as one of the causes of unleashed brutal forces in the country. See the following excerpt from a column by Mushahid Hussain, who is a Pakistani politician, journalist, and currently the senator in Pakistan:
The Pearl killing has provided Pakistan’s detractors an opportunity to draw a linkage between India, Intelligence, and Islam, trying to attribute the worst to the Pakistani state and Muslims generally (“Pearl’s Murder and Pakistan” 6).

(Text 17)

Hussain discusses this at length because the main suspect in the Pearl case, Omar Sheikh, is famous for being nurtured by the Pakistani intelligence agency. Sheikh, with some other Pakistanis, was incarcerated in India for the kidnapping of western tourists in Kashmir until he was freed by the Indian government in exchange for passengers on the hijacked Indian plane (also known as Kandahar hijacking). In his article, Hussain writes that after the Kandahar hijacking incident Sheikh was living freely in Pakistan until nabbed again for the Pearl case. Clearly, Hussain encourages the consideration of Pakistan’s political maneuvering and geopolitical entanglements with India to fathom the country’s existing circumstances. Many columnists in The Nation discuss the details of condoning militia organizations by the Pakistani governments (particularly the Pakistan Army). Such considerations, however, usually are absent in the American press.

For the Davis case, although it seems that The Nation published several editorials, most editorials only allude to the Davis case; these articles essentially criticize the Pakistani or US government for the handling of the issue. A detailed analysis of the Davis case in the opinion articles of The Nation reveals that the newspaper gave more attention to the issues like confusion over the immunity for Davis, the US threats of blocking Pakistani aid, the compromise of the Pakistani government on US demands, and the secrecy of Davis’s release as a result of reparation. An interesting feature of this presentation is that like the Urdu newspaper
Jang in the 4th Chapter, The Nation, too, used the word ‘murderer’ for Pearl in its editorial that was published right after Davis’s release (“It Left Everyone Petrified”). Given the iteration of The Nation’s criticism of Davis’s release, one can potentially assume that this iteration renders the Davis case victims as the worthy victims. There is, however, no significant presentation of victims in editorials or columns, though The Nation keeps referring to the fact of the killing of Pakistanis in the incident.

Often media professionals and practitioners appear to cherish the idea of media working as a ‘watchdog’ in a democratic and pluralist society. The watchdog function of media (also referred as the fourth estate) basically entails providing people fair and accurate information, which is devoid of any political or economic interest. Essentially, mass media are supposed to keep a check on other state apparatuses (legislature, executive, and judiciary) for their respective functions. However, the analysis of media representations in the three chapters of this dissertation explains that more often than not, media appear to perform an instrumental role in the extension of nationalist or political agendas of a country. I have discussed in previous chapters (mostly in the literature reviews) that there is a copious amount of research on how western media present radical Islam as a global enemy. The study of representations in this research substantiates this argument. Both the appropriation of Yousafzai to highlight the Taliban and the ahistorical presentation of the extremism problem in Pakistan in the wake of the Pearl case show that the US media reinforces the idea of Islam being at odds with the West—an idea that is central to Said’s Orientalism.
Many studies\textsuperscript{55} show that the practice of propaganda intensifies during times of war and conflict. All the four case studies, here, are from the post 9/11 war-on-terror period. Thus, in terms of timeframe, these case studies provide an occasion to study propaganda or issues of representation during the heightened time of conflict between the Islamic world and the West. Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman contend that “Mainstream media reproduce the frameworks of political and military leaders and in doing so provide propaganda rather than ‘disinterested’ journalism” (6). Moreover, the US media dominates the international media landscape because of the transnational reach of the powerful US media conglomerates, and the fame of the American film industry, Hollywood. Thus, the US media industry—both information and entertainment—has the potential for seeking attention, setting agendas, and bringing issues/events/persons to public fame. For example, American actor and humanitarian Angelina Jolie’s news story about writing an essay with her children about the shooting incident of Yousafzai (“Felt Compelled to tell story of Malala”), and her performance as Mariane Pearl in the movie, \textit{A Mighty Heart}, which describes the ordeal of Daniel Pearl’s wife, contributed towards highlighting the Yousafzai case and the Pearl case.

The US media’s zealous presentation of the Yousafzai case is evident from the fact that many famous political and international figures—such as Gordon Brown, Ban Ki-Moon, and Laura Bush—contributed op-ed articles to emphasize the brutality of the Taliban. As a matter of fact, Laura Bush, America’s first lady during the presidency of her husband, President George W. Bush, wrote one of the most appealing and poignant articles on Yousafzai. While comparing Yousafzai with the

\textsuperscript{55} See Chomsky (2006); Herman & Chomsky (2002); Thussu (2003).
German diarist, Anne Frank, Laura Bush describes the hidebound and harsh ideology of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that brought the ‘abject subjugation’ of women. Laura Bush’s article essentially prepares the ground for the justification of the war on terror in the wake of 9/11. In her article, Bush contends that “Eleven years ago, America awoke to the barbaric mind-set of the Taliban” (“Why Malala Inspires Us” A. 19), and urges audience/readers to support a stringent policy against the Taliban.

Given the overriding portrayal of Yousafzai in the US newspapers, Thomas and Shukul rightly argue that “Malala is as much a creation of the Pakistan Taliban as she is of the West” (235).

For the presentation of the Drone attacks, the US media’s inattention is evident from the analysis in this research. But Pakistani media, too, do not appear to present detailed and demographic accounts of innocent victims in these attacks. Here, it is important to mention that the Pakistani media, having constraints on press freedom especially in the areas of FATA and parts of Baluchistan, face political and logistical problems in the coverage and presentation of these attacks. That is why the issues of openness and transparency are central to the debates of Drone attacks. The lack of transparency gives rise to uncertainties and subsequently conspiracy theories. This can be one of the reasons for the repeated criticism and seemingly exaggerated response of Pakistani media (particularly The Nation) for the use of drone technology in Pakistan. However, this is a question that requires a thorough empirical research study and is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

In the end, I want to emphasize that I am not arguing that the presentation of worthy victims in the US newspapers is uncalled-for or that the victims in the Yousafzai case or the Pearl case did not deserve this attention. I also do not want to
have any opinion on the case studies themselves. My sole purpose in this research has been to study representations to further explore the issues related to media hegemony, international communication, and the political economy of communication; and I perform this analysis by studying ideologies.

**Conclusion:**

Throughout this dissertation, I have discussed two predominant themes: (i) power, and (ii) ideology. In order to study the relationship of power and ideology, I have studied and analyzed the texts using the methodology of critical discourse analysis. In other words, to examine how power is enacted through ideological discourse, I have studied language (in advertisements, and newspaper articles) to comprehend complex power structures. Earlier (in Chapter 2) in this dissertation, I examined the use and abuse of power through the study of English linguistic imperialism in Pakistan, and argued that the dominance of English over other indigenous languages have helped maintain more or less a similar abuse of power that was prevalent in colonial times. The core of my argument here is that English imperialism exacerbates the existing chasm between elites (by wealth or by power) and the disenfranchised, and allows an inside (operating within a nation) system of exploitation and imperialism that is evocative of the imperialism of colonial masters—a phenomenon that I have described as internal orientalism. In order to substantiate my argument, I also engaged Johan Galtung’s theory of Structural Imperialism, which endorses that imperialism is a structured process and is accomplished by the combination of two centers wherein the center of a center state has a gainful relationship with the center of a periphery state.
Another predominant theme in this dissertation is the idea of perpetuation. In the study of Orientalism as a theory of power, I have claimed that the hegemony of English language perpetuates the cycle of imperialism—also by one’s own people within a nation. Similarly, in the study of Orientalism as a theory of representation, I have shown that in the presentation of Pakistan by American newspapers, the conventional binary of the West (us) versus East (them) is recurrent whereby the former is humane, rational, progressive, and more advanced, and the latter is quite the opposite. Here, again, I invoke Galtung’s *Structural Imperialism* to explain the role of communication to reinforce stereotypical portrayals and a systematic process of imperialism. I have discussed the substantial amount of literature that examines the archetypal (sometimes demonizing) portrayal of the Islamic world by western media after 9/11. However, departing from these works, I have specifically focused on issues of representation related to Pakistan only. Besides studying representations under the lens of Orientalism, I have also shown the manipulation of fear by American media by including the propaganda theory of worthy and unworthy victims. A comparative analysis of events along with comparisons of different newspapers in this dissertation has enriched the overall discussion of representation.

For the study of representations, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the analogy of the victims of the Malala case and the Drone strikes case is a well-discussed comparison in Pakistan. For the other—the Pearl case versus the Davis case—analogy, admittedly, this is no perfect comparison. The timeline of the events, the socioeconomic stature of victims in the two incidents, and the incidental political circumstances of Pakistan during both events, are different. However, the study of media coverage for both case studies that entailed the two (Pakistan/US) countries,
their respective governments, and an apparent nationalist maneuvering in journalistic practices warrants investigation into the newspaper coverage of the two events. Although the factors shaping media (either Pakistani or US) practices cannot be fully discerned by the investigation of the coverage of four case studies, what can be concluded is that the re/presentation of issues by the US media is not devoid of orientalist political ideologies.

The representation of four post 9/11 Pakistani events in the US newspapers reveals that the US print media continues to depict issues in Pakistan in a way that engenders the binary of “progressive west (US)” versus “primitive Pakistan.” In addition, the presentation in US newspapers appears to offer a religious prism to see/analyze Pakistani problems, the majority of which are political or economic in nature. Another argument that I have repeatedly discussed in this dissertation is about ahistorical and fragmentary presentation of problems in Pakistan. Baran and Davis discuss the problems of fragmentary presentation in Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment, and Future. While talking about problems in the process of news presentation, Baran and Davis argue that, “Events are treated in isolation … Connection requires putting them in a broader context, and this would require making speculative, sometimes controversial linkages” (304). The research in this dissertation shows that media presentation that lacks a thorough background information, and the consideration of other political factors, only tends to distort the facts. Not only does it hamper the accurate understanding of circumstances, it also tends to impinge upon the possibilities of peaceful and mutual coexistence between nations.

Having said that, towards the end of this research, I also want to emphasize that Pakistani media, too, has the problems of representation. Just like the orientalist
approach of western media, Pakistani media also tend to present events and issues in
the framework of Occidentalism. Huma Yusuf, Pakistani journalist and the Woodrow
Wilson Center’s Pakistan scholar, mentions in her presentation that Pakistani media
face press freedom issues whereby media persons are unable to criticize the military
and sometimes even the judiciary; thus, journalists in Pakistan vent their criticism
(and anger) on politicians or external forces such as India and the US (“Who Watches
the Watch dog” 10:58). Sometimes, I have also come across anti-US or anti-India
rhetoric in Pakistani newspapers during the study of the four case studies.

During my research, having the limitations of funds, time, and travel, I could
not incorporate a detailed comparative analysis of Pakistani newspapers in terms of
studying Occidentalism. However, I intend to take on this issue and expand this
project in the form of a publishable book. Another issue I plan to explore at length
includes how the problems of censorship and curtailed media freedom in Pakistan
affects the coverage of issues by foreign media. For example, the study of Yelena
Biberman—about the restrictions faced by the NYT correspondents in Pakistan, and
the account of Declan Walsh—the NYT journalist and reporter in Pakistan who was
expelled from the country in 2013 on the charges of being involved in ‘undesirable
activities’—show that undemocratic practices in Pakistan also influence the working
of foreign journalists in the country, and hence engender problems related to factual
presentation.

According to an article in The Guardian, Walsh was expelled from Pakistan
because of his report regarding several drone strikes in Pakistan that the report
suggested were operated by the Pakistan Army (not US forces) (Holpuch and Boone
“New York Times Pakistan bureau chief expelled”). This kind of manipulation by the
Pakistani establishment calls for an investigation of Pakistani media as well. At any rate, in this research, through the study of ideological entanglements in Pakistan, I have shown the implications of power abuse, and hence I have argued that the ubiquity of Orientalism still persists.
WORKS CITED


“Court Seeks whereabouts of blood-money recipients.” *Dawn*, 22 Mar. 2011, p. 3.


“Daniel Pearl ko qatal ker ke Intiha-Pasando ne Maghrib ko mutnabih kia ha, Mariane Pearl (By Killing Daniel Pearl the extremists have sent a message to the West, Marine Pearl).” *Jang*, 21 Mar. 2002, p. 12.


“Ibad’s family takes to the street.” *Dawn*, 21 Mar. 2011, p. 3.


@mohammedhanif. “Thanks. NYT in Pakistan left a blank space where this essay was suppose to appear. I don’t know why we write for a paper which is complicit in some very crude censorship. I wonder if my American colleagues can stand up to it.” Twitter, 3 Nov 2018, 3:10 a.m.,

https://twitter.com/mohammedhanif/status/1058662779035500544


“98.5 p.c. Pakistanis want Urdu as medium of instruction—Haider.” *The Pakistan Times*, 6 October, 1987, p. IV.


Yousafzai, Malala, & Lamb, Christina. *I am Malala: The Girl Who Stood up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2013.

Yusuf, Huma. “Who Watches the Watchdog? The Pakistani Media’s Impact on Politics and Society.” *Youtube*, uploaded by Woodrow Wilson Center, 30 July 2013, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQsiWMvLDkQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQsiWMvLDkQ)


