Dis/Orienting 'Middle East': A Cart-Rhetorical Rhizomatic Mapping

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DIS/ORIENTING ‘MIDDLE EAST’: A CART-RHETORICAL RHIZOMATIC MAPPING

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design

by
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May 2018

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the association between the geopolitical region Middle East and the unjust profiling of Islamic terrorism. I examine this connection from the lens of border-politics and deconstruct Western cartographic discourses that constructed the current misrepresentative and extensively totalizing identity of Middle East as the land of Muslim terrorists. My conjecture is framed around Karen Culcasi’s argument on how Middle East was re-invented in the discourse of Orientalism during the early twentieth century. To challenge the region’s current misrepresentative and unjust socio-spatial identity, I map how the region’s inherently othered identity under the European gaze of Orientalism has arrived to its current state as a result of changing discourses of power and geopolitical relations throughout the twentieth century. In this light, I investigate three central questions in this dissertation:

1) How the discourse of global war on terrorism has emerged from the haunting image of the Oriental discourse and continues to respond and counter-respond to the great Middle Eastern question: continuous reproductions of the region in the totalizing image of the Western tree-system.

2) How this continual process of reproducing Middle East in the same problematic rhetoric has mirrored itself into re-constructing the cartographic reality of the region both in its Western perceptions and Middle/Eastern receptions: internalization of the Western tree-image and finally arriving to the Islamic tree-system of a violent and fundamental ideology of terrorism.

3) How these cartographic reproductions have been suppressing the diverse identities in the region while these socio-spatial formations have always already been disrupting various systems of subordinations: how the internalized tree-system of the West and its tap-roots have been cutting the lines and paths of the rhizomatic identities of the region.
As I unpack these three questions, I approach the Western modern scientific knowledge production and information design (dominant mode of production) as a form of alienating rhetorical re-invention. I best understand the working structure of the Western rhetoric of alienation through Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘mechanical reproduction.’ I draw from cartographic hermeneutics and cartographic deconstruction to unpack how the Western ground logic of this machinic system has been re-inventing the socio-spatial consciousness of Middle East. I argue that the unjust image of Middle East as the land of Muslim terrorists has been another process for Western society to re-define its non-Western other.

I define the mapping of this project as a dis/orienting rhizomatic mapping which draws from Deleuze and Guattari’s models of rhizome and tree-system. As I analyze the shifting discourses to map the shifting borders, changing names, and transforming otherness of Middle East, I approach the Western process of re-inventing and homogenizing Middle East as a tree-system while I read the region’s organic heterogeneity and complex relations of meaning-making as rhizomatic. In this light, I conduct a carto-rhetorical deconstruction on the cartographic discourses (maps of dominant gaze) representing Middle East with a focus on the rhetorical and narrative qualities of maps as technical documents. The central agenda is to dis/other the geography of Middle East by mapping with its rhizomatic socio-spatial identities and to write an anti-memory challenging the Islamic stereotypes and prejudices that have been produced in the dominant vision and discourses of alienation, enemization, and victimization of the region.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to all the amazing women who shaped me as the writer that I am today.

I share the degree with my mother who always supported me, with my sister who always believed in me, and with my father who set an example for me.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cynthia, thank you for believing in me; thank you for your kindness and support; thank you for listening me with patience every time I lost hope in myself, in my writing. Thank you for being one of the amazing women who always bring me to writing. Thank you for inspiring me and always showing me the light.

Victor, thank you for your wisdom and constant support; thank you for seeing value in my research and writing. Thank you for understanding and respecting my thinking and my voice. Thank you for always encouraging me to do what I believe in and thank you for letting me be brave and take risks in my work and writing.

James, thank you for expanding my vision, challenging my thinking, and supporting me to improve my research. Thank you for our conversations and thank you for sharing your wisdom and experience with me.

Amit, thank you for the invaluable insights you provided me in my research. Thank you for respecting my vision and helping me to improve myself as a scholar and critical thinker. Thank you for sharing your wisdom with me.

Susan, thank you for always believing in me and supporting me. Thank you for your wisdom and friendship. Thank you for encouraging me to do the things that I would never think that I was capable of. You are one of the reasons I am where I am today.

Data, Dina, and Firasat, thank you for being amazing friends and great role models for me. Thank you for our great conversations. You make me believe that I can do anything. You give me strength and hope. You are amazing women who bring me to writing.

Whitney, Charlotte, and Diane, thank for you being amazing friends. Thank you for being there for me and listening me going on and on as I talked about my research. You are great friends and amazing women who bring me to writing.
Alison and Angela, thank you for your friendship, your smiling faces, and constant support. You are amazing women who bring me to writing.

My cohort, Nathan Riggs, Joshua Wood, Samuel Fuller, Daniel Frank, and Firasat Jabeen, thank you for always being there for me. Thank you for becoming and being my friends. I could not imagine finishing this degree without all of you. I am honored to call you my friends and my colleagues.

My two amazing research assistants, Zemin and Providence; thank you for time, hard work, and more importantly your creative vision. Thank you for making sure to support me and my vision in producing the story maps for my project.

My mother, Berna, and my sister, Ayca; thank you for believing in me, listening me, and supporting me. Thank you for seeing strength in me and reminding me that I have what it takes. Thank you for being amazing women who bring me to writing.

My aunt, Rana, and my cousin, Gulsah; thank you for your laughter and your love. Thank you for being amazing women who bring me to writing.

My grandmother, Nevin; thank you for your prayers and your love. Thank you for being one of the amazing women who brings me to writing.

My father, Ercument; thank you for teaching me the value of hard work and showing me that having an education is more than receiving a degree; it is about becoming and being a better person. Thank you for raising me to be a strong woman.
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INTRODUCTION: HOME/SICK BORDERLANDS

“If we are truly concerned with the social consequences of what happens when we make a map, then we might also decide that cartography is too important to be left entirely to cartographers.” Brian Harley, “Can There Be a Cartographic Ethics?”, 203

This is a mapping project about lost spaces and geographies of homesick identities. The very act/ion of mapping is concerned with what a map is:

The usual answer to this question—that a map is a flat image of the earth or of one of its regions—simply raises new questions. What is an image, and on what grounds can an image represent the earth? The object eludes definition because the definition situates the

Fig. 1. Colton's illustrated and embellished steel plate map of the world on Mercator's projection.
map in a generic category. The nature of the map can be specified only by referring in an immediate way to what it represents—that is, to what it is not. (Christian Jacob 11)

Understanding the map object through the relation between what its cartographic visualization does (what it is) and does not represent (what it is not) entails attending to the dis/orienting spatial reality of the map image. The cartographic image of a map object “creates a non-local representation of a particular space so that I can be somewhere and have a representation that is independent of this location” (Patrice Maniglier 48). This independent representation of space is detached from lived human experiences, cultures, hi/stories, and identities. This separation functions as a form of re-inventing the space, which defines the experience of dis/orientation. The map object (Fig. 1) produced by Colton is how this project understands dis/orientation and the problematic case of identification. Colton’s map is the product of a specific gaze and understanding of the world and its space. The mapmaker’s subjective position reveals itself in the margins, through the decorative and pictorial representation of people and cities. These visual images illustrate the cultural and social identities of the world regions. A rhetorical reading of the marginal narrative that accompanies the world map at the center is a reading and mapping from what is seen to what is not seen. A spatial reading that moves in-between the West-East binary.

Deconstructing the ground logic of Colton’s visual-spatialization is a mapping of the old West-East narrative line. The center of this binary informs the spatial reality of this map object by reproducing the civilized West and uncivilized East dichotomy in the global context. What we see in this map are the stereotypical and totalizing representations of non-Western identities. Marginal representation introduces non-Western men and women as exotic and mystical. In particular, the fragile and submissive depiction of non-Western women in a primitive geography implements a strong sense of difference from the Western image. Rather than focusing on people,
the West’s spatial identity is represented with a focus on its modern cities. The presence of Western civilization is established through what the Western man produced: progress, development, and growth. This ideal image is embodied in the material construction of Western cities. In this marginal pictorial narrative, the non-Western men and women are seen as undeveloped societies in comparison to the great cities of the civilized West. Reading what is visibly accessible in Colton’s map calls for revealing what is not visually present.

As I map the geographies of the world with Colton, I see and hear absences and silences of diverse cultural and social relations that define heterogeneous and indigenous identities of non-Western societies. Mapping these absences and silences is a rhetorical move to unpack how the map creates an uncanny experience of dis/orientation, which “is to become caught in a problematic fantasy of identification with that which has been pushed off the map” (Karen Piper 257). What this project aims to unfold is how this uncanny experience forms lost spaces of absences/alienations and marginalizations/silences with a particular focus on the geopolitical island Middle East.

**Home/Sick Identities**

Helene Cixous highlights the significance of one’s first encounter with his/her spatial belonging: naming where you are from immediately reveals multi-layered connections to specific histories and cultures that represent the identity of a space, which transfers itself to defining one’s own ‘self’ (Elisa Marder 218). Naming where I am from is a disposition, which as a result I find myself at a threshold; an in-between lost space no one quite knows how to respond to. I am from Turkey; a country that is between an always already existing civilized West and an always already existing uncivilized East; an East in the Middle; a Middle East of chaos. In-between these vague and extensively totalizing constructs of the global map, naming where I am from is a dis/orienting experience of getting lost and losing who I am. When people in the United States
first meet me, they ask me a series of questions about Turkey: where is it? Do we have beaches in Turkey? Do we ride camels in Turkey? (because we probably should be living in the middle of a desert). Do we have malls in Turkey? When did I stop covering my hair? When did I start drinking? When did I start dressing up like a ‘modern’ female? Do my parents know that I am drinking? Do they force me to get married? These are just a couple of questions out of many. But the nature of these questions tells me something very important about the pre-conceptions the people I have encountered have about Turkey. For them, Turkey, as an Eastern country that is non-Western, is a reflection of the stereotypical representation of a Muslim country: a deserted geography of un-civilization oppressing women. People ask me these questions either due to their implicit/unconscious or explicit/conscious biases. In each context, what I have come to realize is that the existing pre-assumptions about non-Western geographies shape the dominant image: a distorted image of being the non-Western other.

These monolithic structures of Western and non-Western geographies are the products of understanding space as a closed and immobile empty construct. The notion of closed space works as a rhetorical form of justification that situates the cartographer and his/her subjective gaze into a state of power that desires to re-invent the lifeless reality of closed space. This rhetorical re-invention produces closed space with meaning that represents the reality and ideology of the dominant gaze that orders the West and East binary. To deconstruct how the closed spaces of West and East inflict violent alienations into cartographic visualizations, I map with Edward Soja’s conceptualization of socio-spatial dialectic “that social and spatial relations are dialectically inter-reactive, interdependent; that social relations of production are both space-forming and space-contingent” (*Postmodern Geographies* 81). I use socio-spatial dialectic as a counter-mapping, which understands space through Doreen Massey’s approach: space as an open becoming of social and cultural relations and lived human experiences, which is the chance of
space. As a counter-movement to the ground logic of the closed space, open space flies over the hardened borders that totalize monolithic images of West and East. Through this fluid movement, space as an open becoming offers us an unexpected alternative that our Western maps fail to recognize: alternatives—absences and silences—that are pushed off the global map.

On the closed space of a map-object, my fluid relation to open space, my individual social and cultural connection with where I am from and who I am, is an absent alternative. My unique understanding of who I am in conjunction with where I am from does not have a location on the global map, because the space that I define myself with is a closed spatial representation of the monolithic Eastern otherness. The absence of diverse socio-cultural spaces of Eastern identities on the global map is the reason for this project to have a desire in its own writing and language to map lost geographies of threshold spaces/places “in which the movement from one place to another is effected. A threshold is the concrete interplace of an important transition…[that serves] as the support for a rite of passage” (Edward Casey, “How to Get from Space to Place” 39-40). According to Van Gennep, this rite of passage, door, functions as “the boundary between the foreign and domestic worlds in the case of an ordinary dwelling, between the profane and sacred world in the case of a temple. Therefore, to cross the threshold is to unite oneself with a new world. It is thus an important act in marriage, adoption, ordination, and funeral ceremonies.” (qtd. in Casey 40). I have come to terms with the fact that I belong to threshold spaces, the borderlands the global map refuses to map. Instead, the global map covers, conceals, and almost hides these threshold spaces of lost geographies. It creates absences and silences we do not see by replacing open spaces of thresholds with constructed spaces of hardened borders.

Inflicting silences and absences in maps is a two-fold process of mapping: 1) emptying and 2) re-inventing the meaning of empty space by displacing people, groups, communities, and nations. Western cartography has not only mastered this dual process, but it also has been using it
as a rhetorical device to implement the West-East binary into the geographical construction of the
global world image. This great divide is a fixation on defining non-Western others as merely
different. I understand the violent implications of this monolithic duality in producing the
geographies of West and East as a cognitive product of the Western rhetorical tradition and
thinking: the model that always alienates me from you or you from me. Piper indicates that
“Western identity is formulated by pushing something off the map, then safely embracing the
map as the self” (17). I understand the history of Western cartography as the history of an
alienating rhetoric rooted in forming differentiating lines and borders between Western Self and
Eastern Other(s).

In this context, I map with a question of what happens when the system of this great
division fails. What happens when the reproduced categorical differences that define West
(civilized) and East (primitive) forget and silence voices that do not fit into these categories. I ask
these questions because not belonging to the categories of the Western maps is the dis/orienting
experience of homelessness that I have been suffering from. To be a Muslim female in the West, I
am expected to cover my hair, not to consume alcohol and pork products. To be a Muslim and a
proper Turkish female in Turkey, I am expected to find a husband, get married, and be, first, a
domestic housewife and, second, have a low-key career if I really want to. I am neither of these
things. For the Western man, I am not a good enough Muslim female because I do not need to be
liberated and rescued; for the Eastern man I am not a good enough Muslim female because I am
too educated and talk too much. I am always at a threshold in between. Each side of this threshold
tells me something different about who I am and who I should be to be understood, recognized,
and responded to. Each side of this threshold is a different world; yet for one world to have a
meaningful reality, the other space needs to exist.
The root of my homelessness stems from my unrecognized mobility that takes place in the borderlands. I cross these borders because I do not belong to any center that holds the ground of these binary definitions that form the global world order. On the spatial surface of our global map, I remain as the uncategorized other like many ‘other’ men, women, and children who are not uncivilized terrorists and deviants that need to be kept out while the only thing they do is surviving due to the catastrophic consequences of war and chaos they neither caused nor asked for. I respond to these monolithic binary constructions of the global map and the home/sick condition of borderlands in-between through the model of rhizome because a rhizome “has no beginning or end, interbeing, intermezzo…proceeding from the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 25). The rhizomatic consciousness of this mapping project aims to unpack how a map shows what it does not show by leaving things out, by altering meaning, and by producing distorted spatial knowledge. I define this mapping as a rhizomatic mapping of the ‘white lies’ that maps tell us.¹ These white lies tell us that we live in a world of the civilized West fighting against the chaos, disorder, and terrorism of the non-Western East(s): the discourse of war on terror.

Instead of trying to find a way to escape from this dis/orienting vision, rhizomatic mapping of this project embraces the very experience of dis/orientation and moves with “a desire to evade the effects of ‘over-civilization’ and so to jump off the official map and into the margins or blank spaces” (Piper 257). Jumping off the official map is how I understand rhizomatic mapping because where I fall into is in the margins, the cracks in-between the borders and lines on the official maps. In this sense, the rhizomatic mapping of this project is concerned with how modern cartographic visualization processes and techniques of our global world produce spatial stereotypes that construct misrepresentative identities of the global West and global East.

Mapping rhizomatically intends to unpack the metaphysical ground of the dichotomized global map and the dominant discourse that constructs this map: the Western gaze. The purpose of unpacking the map of this monolithic binary vision is to understand the logic of this dominant language of power and how this language has been using alienation (logos), marginalization (ethos), and differentiation (pathos) as its primary rhetorical persuasive tools. The rhetorical movement of this rhizomatic mapping is, then, to understand the rhetorical context and to learn the problematic language of the Western gaze as a path to explore alternative rhetorical strategies and meanings in reading and engaging with the West-East dichotomy.

**Call of the Home/Sick Middle East**

Reading the West and East relation from a global trajectory through a rhizomatic consciousness is my desire. This desire has been the result of a strong discomfort I have been having with the collective social and cultural experiences of dis/orientation in the non-Western geographies of the global East. As I have been moving from my personal dis/orientation to the collective homelessness of global East, I found myself responding to a call from a particular geopolitical entity: Middle East. In the ground logic of the global map that is centered in the alienating rhetoricity of the Western gaze, the call of Middle East and its lost geography is a call of “biophony, where the facts of life fall into a twilight zone between knowing and not knowing, between rather crude ground of empiricist and mode diaphanous heights of speculation.” (Avital Ronell, *The Telephone Book* 9). This is a call of absences and silences that are left out, suppressed in-between the borders that fill the empty spaces in the legitimized papers\(^2\) of the official map-

\(^2\) In *Paper Machine*, Jacques Derrida addresses the notion of legitimacy in the body of paper: “Credit or discredit, legitimation or delegitimation, have long been signified by the body of the paper. A guarantee is worth what a signed piece of paper is worth” (44). Later in the book he addresses the impact of a password, or an identification card on our identities, and brings the notion of the legitimacy of a signed paper, a paper made it official, in relation to the notion of crossing, shibboleth and its experience which is “a passage: crossing, voyage, breaking through, route, *via rupta*. The shibboleth confers the right to cross a frontier, it’s
object: forgotten identities and their stories. Spatial reality represented in our official maps rooted in the logic of Western thought has been pushing these different identities off the map by producing their consciousness as different and alienated others.

To me, the call of the Home/Sick Middle East has been a call coming from a placeless unity of modern globalization in “where there has been little or no relation…A state casts a net of connectedness around itself from which the deadly flower of unity can grow under the sun of constant surveillance” (Ronell 8). Under the sun of this deadly surveillance of our global age’s satellite data, this call that is reaching out from a placeless unity is a call from three years old Aylan Kurdi whose body was found on the shores of Bodrum/Turkey last year. A call of a memory I have of seeing the navy officers in my hometown getting dozens of refugees out of their boats on the shores of my hometown. A call of a no-memory we have a tendency to forget in-between the statistics of how many refugees have entered Europe so far. A forgetfulness that taught me to “hang up and dial again” and “offered a certain untried access code to a terrorism that, in the first place, is technologically constellated” (Ronell 8). A call of a terrorizing violent rhetoric of the homelessness the lost geography of Middle East has been suffering from.

This homelessness, more importantly being home/sick, as Cynthia Haynes explains, “is not about missing home, it is about the sickness called Homeland Security and our rhetorical task of addressing it in an age of perpetual conflict… [an allegory of the Other that] speaks, but it does not, nor never will, tell us why…We will never know the why when it comes to conflict and unspeakable violence… [even though it] seduces us into believing there is an answer on the other side of why” (2; 10-11). The call of the home/sick Middle East, then, is the call of Aylan, the call the equivalent of a visa or passport. But it also has the differential, sometimes discriminatory, value of a shared secret. It is the mark and sign of recognition of a “between oneself” (community, nation, family, language, etc.)” (156). I approach the official papers of maps as legitimized spaces of the hegemonic, dominant vision of a culture and society since while maps offer pathways and routes to cross, they also draw borders in where our passports and visas differentiate and immobilize us.
of every face, voice, story, and name that has been silenced, suppressed, and disposed into the 
 margins of the maps of our global age: forgotten and forgetful memories. This is a call of “a dead 
gaze…the ghost of external vision” (Ronell 22). The call of this dead vision has been haunting 
the rhizomatic inhabitants of this region since its invention in the modern imagination of the 
enlightened Western man: the eternal image of the Orient.

Re/Inventions of Middle East: Global Other in the image of Islamic Terrorism

As a geopolitical monolithic entity, Middle East currently represents the spatial narrative 
of violent Islam violence and terrorist Muslims as this narrative constructs itself in the popular 
global representation. This particular dis/place ment and representation of the region on the global 
map immediately im/places the region to the margins wherein the non-Western Global East gives 
itsel f into the Western stereotypes that are constructed in binary relations: civilized vs. 
uncivilized, modern vs. primitive, democracy/peace vs. oppression/terror. These particular 
stereotypes that visualize the monolithic reality of both West and Middle East on the global map 
are rhetorical inventions of the discourse of the global war on terror, a narrative created by the 
Bush administration’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The alienating rhetoric that forms the 
ground logic of this discourse re-invented the global West-East binary around the notions of ‘us’ 
vs. ‘them.’ According to Heather Ashley Hayes, the rhetoric of the Bush doctrine that invented 
the discourse of war on terror left “little room for interpretation of the enemy as anything but evil 
and the USA as anything but heroic and good,” which rooted the context of war in religious 
foundations while depicting the conflict between U.S. and Middle East “as an ongoing and 
permanent problem that is not limited to the acts of al Qaeda and Afghanistan” (41-43). 

As a result, as Mahmood Mamdani explains, the war on terrorism discourse called “for a 
war to the finish…in the name of justice but understand justice as revenge… [and it] has 
processed by dishing out collective punishment, with callous disregard for either ‘collateral
damage’ or legitimate grievances” (3244). Currently, the way the Trump administration has been responding to Middle East is also a response narrated in the rhetorical context of the war on terror discourse and aims at, Mamdani indicates, “nurturing the spirit of revenge” (3244). I suggest that the Bush administration’s strict nationalist ideology found itself another voice in the Trump administration’s populist nationalism. The ethical argument of maintaining global order, peace, and ending terrorism in the ground logic of this populist nationalism has been functioning in the dominant discourse as a form of geopolitical gatekeeping responding to the Middle East and Muslim world as a problem to be fixed.

This problematic monolithic representation of Middle East did not occur overnight. The Bush administration and the Trump administration’s aggressive political rhetoric can be considered as two main points in the history of defining the Middle East. These rhetorical re-inventions produced a distorted image of Middle East as a geography of violence and terror. However, the historical roots of the region’s dis/orienting cartographic image is an indication of how the Middle East has always been re-defined in the context of alienation and marginalization. Mapping the ground logic of the modern Middle East in order to challenge its contemporary discomforting reality necessitates this rhizomatic mapping to respond to Middle East “as an emerging notion, the culmination of, rather than the starting point in, a process of conceptual coalescence” (Daniel Foliard 63). I approach the current cartographic construction of Middle East as a product of Western rhetorical re-inventions that culminated over time. Through these carto-rhetorical re-productions, the Middle East arrived to its contemporary actualized reality. In this sense, mapping Middle East rhizomatically means unpacking how the Western rhetorical re-productions of the region have been working within the Western tree-system. Mapping the ground logic of these mechanical reproductions is a pathway towards understanding why and how the region always already suffers from dis/orientation and, as a result, home/sickness.
From Oriental Other to the Middle Eastern Other

Reading the monolithic reality of Middle East on the global map creates the necessity of mapping the Western spatial reproductions of the region on the same global level. This rhetorical reading understands the working structure of Western re-inventions of Middle East in relation to the nature of the tree-image Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize. Engaging with the Western rhetorical system of invention as a tree-system on a global level is a way to both understand and unpack how the extensively totalizing image of Middle East has been re-narrated. I trace the roots of the Western tree-image of the modern Middle East to the discourse of Orientalism and argue that the European construction of the Oriental image has been haunting the geopolitical reality of Middle East. The ghost of the Oriental picture has been functioning as the underlying groundwork causing the modern Middle East to suffer from the dis/orienting symptoms of homelessness.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire during the early twentieth century, which defined the modern Middle East as we know it today, the geospatial location and reality of this region had been re-defined in the Western context. Middle East had been re-constructed as a space of non-Western other to maintain the binary structure of the global world order. However, what we do not see in this global map is the nomadic culture of Middle East; a nomadic culture we need to write a nomadic history for. In the context of our global age, I have come to understand this nomadic culture as the culture of forced migrations and movements, the culture of the unspeakable places of refugee camps and unbearable experiences of running away from terrorism and death. This culture requires us to “consider the departure from within, the dispossesion that demands immobility” (Judith Butler in *Who Signs the Nation State?* 18). The experience of nomadic culture, then, became an experience of constantly arriving into a state of statelessness,
which is “the idea of passing from one bounded territory to another [that] requires a narrative line in which arrival follows departure and where the dominant themes are assimilation and estrangement” (17). This narrative line is the narrative line of violence and terrorism concealed by the Homeland Security; the narrative line of enemization the Western modern globalization has been using to keep the dangerous terrorists out at the expense of human rights, equality, and justice. Yet, the rhetoric of this narrative line has already persuaded us into believing that there is actually a response to why: the very discourse of global war on terrorism. With this ethical justification, the narrative line we do not see or hear is the narrative line of a violently invented nomadic culture created by unjust enemization and alienation, which is the silenced crisis of our global age.

The existing scholarship has been responding to the problematic identity of Middle East by tracing the historical transformations of the region via the application of socio-critical and spatial theories and approaches. These works have been interrogating the emergence of the term ‘Middle East’ by highlighting the ambiguity of this artificial Western construction in addition to how this Western construction has been internalized in the region. Furthermore, the growing scholarship have been contributing to the growth of the interdisciplinary works in Middle Eastern Studies by incorporating geographical, environmental, and critical socio-cultural and political

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perspectives and applications into studying Middle East and its histories, cultures, and traditions. On one hand, this growing interdisciplinary activity in Middle East studies can be considered as a response to Michael Bonine’s call of bringing geographical and environmental studies into studying Middle East in “Where is The Geography of the Middle East?” One the other hand, it can also be perceived as acknowledging the necessity of adopting a trans-regional approach such as Rashid Khalidi addresses in “‘Middle East’ as a Framework of Analysis: Re-Mapping a Region in the Era of Globalization.” On a broader level, the growth in producing interdisciplinary work in Middle Eastern studies entails the need to address complex geographical and spatial challenges and struggles of this transcending region. This urgent need that has been being responded to can be considered as a reaction to the continuing domination of the nineteenth century Western modernization’s scientific objectivity and abstraction of space in producing the cartographic reality of Middle East.

It cannot be denied that the modern Middle East as we know it today is a Western product due to how the cartographic visualizations of the region have been transformed according to changing interests of Western colonization and imperial capitalism (Faik Bulut “The New Map

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of the Middle East”). However, staying in the same narrative line⁵ the West has re-composed to serve its own interests only results in reproducing that narrative and arriving into the same stateless space of home/sickness. Today, especially in discourse of popular media, while the region’s enemy and alienated image continues be the dominant representation, I see growing efforts in picturing an image of victimization for the region. The rhetorical move behind these efforts is an attempt in producing a counter-narrative, which intends to turn the West-East binary upside down by picturing the West as the enemy. However, any attempt to reverse the binary system will only result in re-placing the Middle East as the object of subjugation. Creating an image of victimization for Middle East as a counter-narrative is still re-producing the West-East binary that Western rhetorical thinking had formed. Especially the current efforts in producing a counter-victim image of Middle East fall into the danger and mistake of following the Western narrative line due to simply defining this victim image in opposition to the enemy image the West created for Middle East. This counter-production, unfortunately, fails to escape the already existing monolithic representation of Middle East; instead it re-invents yet another totalizing reality that paints all the inhabitants of the region as weak, primitive, incapable, and uncivilized. Narrating a counter-image that is a mere opposition of the existing reality prevents us from considering alternative ways of thinking of Middle East that do not fall into the twilight zones of either the enemy or victim images (Jonathan Crush “Post-colonialism, De-colonization, and Geography”). This not moving beyond the state of objectified victim has resulted in not presenting a possible illustration of how a de-Westernized/de-Orientalized and dis-othered geography of Middle East would look.

⁵ In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Spivak indicates that following the same narrative line results in the dramatization and romanticizing of the victim images, which I suggest also results in the extremization and acceleration of enemy images.
In this context, my aim is not to escape modern globalization or try to propose ways to break the various dichotomized power centers forming the hierarchical ordering of the world regions because this machinic system is what operates the dominant networks of our global age. In this machine of global capitalism and the imperialism of our post-information technology, we as the consumer society actualized and internalized this consciousness of otherness and its enemy and victim images. The purpose of this rhizomatic mapping project, then, is to understand the discourse of the problematic Middle Eastern question and how this rhetorical context has produced the monolithic spatial reality of the region on a global level. The need for developing a rhetorical understanding of the Western discourses that invented Middle East is the primary contribution this project is making to the field of Middle Eastern studies. Developing a rhetorical approach to the Middle Eastern problem through a rhizomatic consciousness does not mean to provide ‘answers’ to a highly problematic question since, I suggest, this attempt would only result in forming highly problematic answers. Conducting a rhetorical spatial analysis on the Middle Eastern question is, then, a rhizomatic path that aims to, first, deconstruct how the discourse of Orientalism invented modern Middle East and second, how this re-invention had formed the alienating ground logic of the dichotomized global map of West and Middle/East. Through this rhetorical reading, my purpose is to find a way to ask a different question for Middle East that would result in producing responses/solutions that hold the potential of dis-othering the cartographic consciousness of Middle East.

Asking a question is actually a more difficult task than it sounds. This mapping project, in the end, which is not an ending due to its rhizomatic consciousness, may not be able to reach to what this question is. Yet, the possibility of asking a question that might challenge how the given system of Western thinking produced the Middle East is the very reason for this map-maker to take this difficult task and map with it. As Michel Foucault indicates, “no matter how terrifying a
given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings” (“Space, Knowledge, Power” 354). Within the ground logic of the global map, there are already happening rhizomatic movements and these movements as forms of resistances point at alternative forms of realities in engaging with Middle East. These alternative realities that are always already being and becoming within the threshold spaces of the lost geographies of Middle East are the possible paths to asking a better question.

The strong desire to open these concealed threshold spaces of rhizomatic movements became a rhetorical move in writing an anti-memory for and of the Middle East. Ross King explains that “the purpose of writing the anti-memory is to reveal to us what the past is doing now…and what the myth of human progress is doing to us now, so that the present with its oppressions and divisions (the moment of danger) can be accepted and confronted for what it is and so that out of the present we can create some place (a new geography)” (162). As a result, this mapping, by looking at the past, is forming connections to what is happening right now, which is an attempt at writing an anti-memory of the Middle East. Mapping with the past and present realities of this geopolitical island means mapping with a constantly changing Middle East. Currently, Qatar is left alone and Turkey, my country, is expected to be the mediator to resolve the conflict. Palestine is still suffering from the violent vision of Israel; just this morning I saw on the news that a group of Palestinians were forced to break their fast at one of the Israeli watch points. The voice of Kurds and their struggle is still a problem for Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in addition to the fact that these countries, like many others in the Middle East, are all fighting against terrorist groups with many names and faces united and separated under the

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different ideologies of the fundamental Islam. As the dominant discourse of the global map continues to maintain the eternal otherness and alienation of the Middle East as a monolithic entity, the borderlands within the region, the in-between spaces the global map is incapable of controlling, are always already providing a different, an alternative rhetorical reality for the Middle East. The voices and images of the very people of this region is resisting and finally saying that they do not want terrorism, they do not want corrupt governments (both external and internal) to determine their faith. They are already writing an anti-memory; they are already (re)dis/orienting their fixed positions; they refuse to be neither terrorist enemies nor victims to be saved.7

**Rhizomatic Participatory Mapping: Using the Power Networks of the Global Map**

The initial vision and goal that I set for this mapping, the desire to map with the rhizomatic movements of thresholds spaces in the Middle East, was focused on providing opportune spaces of representations to these already happening rhizomatic movements within the region. Mapping with a rhizomatic consciousness is a mapping I conduct as a participatory act. The idea of developing a method for a participatory mapping of rhizomatic movements of the Middle East was initially intended to use the existing global information networks due to their rhizomatic nature of this system. According to John Pickles,

> Geo-references databases give complete strangers more information about me in two minutes than my friends and families will learn in thirty years. Map after map, layer after layer, identity after identity, combining and recombining, crashing and compounding, erasing and reconfiguring…sedimentations, striations, inscriptions, projections, gorings,

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7 Syrian artist, Abdalla Al Omari, who was granted asylum in Belgium in 2012 after fleeing Syria, paints the world leader as refugees in his latest exhibit. As an individual who experiences the violent consequences of displacement, Abdalla presents his personal story within an alternative narrative, and anti-memory, that disarms the oppressive power and the bodies this power is embodied in. See his story at [Painting World Leaders as Refugees. Al Jazeera English Facebook. Al Jazeera English, 16 June 2017. Web.](https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/10155650091368690/).
scalings…markings on the multi-subject that is walking through the garden to check the mail. Codings and recodings producing subject and world along axes of difference, as dwelling, access, flow, consumer, owner, borrower, neighbour; identities and codings that multiply subjectivities in interesting and always unexpected overdetermined ways. We are, in this sense, over-coded as multiple coded shifting, decentered identities. (180)

Considering we are always already rhizomatic within the tree-system of the global map, my notion of participatory rhizomatic mapping aims to find a method to effectively use the existing networks of the global map to open and create threshold spaces and voices of Middle East in order to have a position and a location on the global map.

This inevitable desire to map rhizomatically for and with the rhizomatic socio-spatial identity of the Middle East, first, attempted to create a digital space that is an open platform providing open access for people who do not have neither a voice nor representation in the dominant Western discourse of the global map. The idea was to create a wiki page as a mapping space for individuals to post and share the dis/orienting experience of the threshold spaces of Middle East as a way to write and map an anti-memory that resists and challenges the monolithic reality imposed on the region. I described the central reasoning for using a rhizomatic wikipage as follows:

The purpose is of this rhizomatic wiki page is to provide a hyper platform for a participatory and collaborative mapping of spatio-temporal Middle East by welcoming map and map-like spacings of the region. By opening this mapping project and its spatio-temporal data set to external mappings, movements, and crossings, this project forms multiple lines of connections unpacking more diverse and silenced experiences of assimilations and estrangements the excluded others of the region have been arriving into

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in the past and present re-formations of Middle East. Using the hyper-space of a wikipage opens the connecting layers of global networks and lines of communications to form an in-between state of transitions/transformations: a subversive space of rhizomatic embodiment. Forming a rhizomatic wiki-page aims to let different and changing temporal experiences of placelessness of stateless nations, ethnic groups, and tribal communities to take passages of singular lines to fill the flat multiplicity of this hyper platform. I provide an open access to this spatio-temporal rhizomatic platform to connect with the experiences of Middle East taking place both within and beyond the borders of the region to link the unique conditions of assimilations, marginalization, feelings of non-belonging, fear, and anxiety.

By keeping the spatio-temporal space of this wikipage as a form of digital collection open to public access and use/edition, this mapping intends to form a sense of community in working with the various unique experiences and reflections/actions of excluded others of Middle East: a form of taking action. I introduce rhizomatic wiki-page as an anachronistic de-re-territorialization holding the potential of crossing the borders of the great Middle/Eastern question and the Western image of Orientalism. Providing access to the voices that need to be heard and seen forms the consciousness of this rhizomatic space: being the cartographer and narrator of your own mappings and experiences. In this consciousness, the voices of these rhizomes are going to be the voices who have not been aware of being identified with these labels created from the privileged gaze of a dominant culture: excluded identities mapping their own rhizomes. They will also be the voices that have been working with the experiences of these oppressed identities who are aware of the stereotypes yet consciously chose to challenge and not to operate in the problematic language of these discourses: institutions, organizations, and
media groups raising awareness to the unspoken challenges without using the persuasive rhetoric of victimization. Finally, forming a rhizomatic wiki-page will open up possible pathways towards providing an image and idea of a dis/othered cartographic socio-spatial consciousness of Middle East by dis-associating the region from the image of Islamic terrorism the global war on terror discourse has been intensifying.

Overall, the idea of the rhizomatic wikipage was a way to disrupt the ground logic of the global map. However, the idea of finding a digital space to use the networks of global map against it by providing open access resulted in an unexpected hacking of this space. The thousand pages attached to the rhizomatic wikipage of Middle East were all ads for an acne medicine, a medicine providing hope for people to be comfortable in their own skins and be confident in who they are; yet only thing I was able to think of was Aylan’s skin. I hoped that he felt comfort.

Learning the importance of being comfortable in one’s own skin from the attempt of mapping with an open access wikipage resulted in this mapping entering the spaces of social media, Facebook and Instagram⁹, wherein people felt the most comfortable in their own skins. I hoped the hashtags supporting diversity and empowerment would respond to the threshold spaces of Middle East. People of social media liked the rhizomatic movements of Middle East. Through their emojis, they liked, they cried, they got angry, sometimes they even laughed. They wrote responses in languages the social media translated in awkward forms, which created a barrier that was difficult to overcome. But, they continued to like, to cry, to get angry, and to laugh. Yet, people of social media were resistant to finding ways to open opportune paths for rhizomes of Middle East to be shared, to navigate through the networks of global communication. I was told that they knew the problem, yet they did not feel comfortable in their own skins to respond to this problem in order to move away from it.

Coming to a realization that the Middle Eastern problem was apparent to many; however, it was also almost impossible for the audience I was trying to reach to respond to the Middle East not as a problem. The very process of attempting to make an opening for threshold spaces of rhizomatic identities of Middle East was always already a failure due to our lack of knowledge, proficiency, and competency over the rhetoricity of global maps’ ground logic. The scholarship on Middle East provides extensive knowledge of how this discourse was produced and this region constructed, and why the very socio-spatial and cartographic representations of the region are problematic. Yet, among these studies, I have been observing a lack of rhetorical understanding of the persuasive and manipulating impacts of the dominant discourses of power and how the networks of these discourses inform the constructed spaces of West and East on the global map. My attempts in forming a digital networked space were not effective because of the lack of rhetorical understanding of the hardened West-East binary. These failed attempts became rhetorical moves in this mapping project, which resulted in doing a rhetorical reading of the Western constructions of Middle East. This rhetorical reading draws from the realms of border-politics and identity representation as they are framed within the legitimized scienticity of cartographic discourse. I argue that to engage with the unique and diverse patterns that form diverse rhetorical meanings and identities of Middle East across the borders of global West and East, learning the language of the Western ground logic is an effective rhetorical strategy. This rhetorical move offers an access to not only understand how the global networks of the Western gaze work, but it also offers an insight into how we can use these same networks to re-invent the rhetorical meaning and function of Middle East and its spatial being in the global world.

Each chapter this mapping project unfolds is a form of rhizomatic mapping. The overall process of this dis/orienting rhizomatic mapping is a three-fold framework based on Aristotle’s
fundamental triad of knowing, doing, and making. Chapters one and two function as the ‘knowing’ of this triad. Chapter one contextualizes the transcending theoretical framing that the cartographer of this project calls carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading by unfolding the rhizomatic lines of flight in the socio-spatiality of identity formation and in the context of the ethics of otherness. Chapter two picks up from chapter one’s discussion of how the modern cartographic techniques and visualizations methods are obsessed with not getting lost as a pathway to map the roots of this obsession: the obsession of nineteenth century’s modernity with time over space. As a first step of deconstruction, this chapter unpacks the internal working system of modern scientific knowledge production and how this process was internalized in spatial knowledge production as yet another pathway to illustrate the unseen and usually concealed complexity of this dichotomized system. This unpacking leads the chapter to explain how the modern vision of the West succeeded over non-Western forms of producing knowledge by reading this relation through the metaphors of tree-image (West) and rhizome (East).

Chapters three, four, and five are the doing within the Aristotelian triad. Chapter three maps with the West and East relation and provides a rhetorical understanding of how the psychoanalytic roots of this relation—Self and Other—resulted in one of the most totalizing discourses of otherness: Orientalism. Chapter four continues its mapping with the image of Orient to explore how the modern Middle East was a form of re-invention in the haunting image of the Orient through the construction of the great Middle/Eastern question and its geospatial imagination. By analyzing the cartographic visualizations of Middle East from the early twentieth century to the post-WWII period, Chapter four presents understanding of how the borders and identities of modern Middle East were narrated in the European imagination around the images of

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10 Aristotelian triad of knowing, doing, and making as a framework is contextualized primarily in *Nichomachean Ethics VI* and *Metaphysics VI*. 
the colonizer and the colonized. Chapter five realigns the trajectory of this rhizomatic mapping with a focus on the Cold War period and deconstructs how the shift from the multipolar vision of the European colonialization to the bipolar power tension between the United States and Soviet Russia had started yet another cartographic reconstruction process of the region. The rest of the chapter presents a case study that is considered the result of the bipolar vision of the Cold War period: the Israel-Palestine conflict. This case study aims to conduct a carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading of the selected maps to unpack how the bipolar gaze of the Cold War tree-image was internalized within the region. This unpacking depicts how the external power tension between the two new great powers of the post-WWII period was a mirror effect in the internalized enemization of Palestinians in Israel’s socio-spatial narrative line of being the victim and illustrates how the images of the colonizer and the colonized were re-invented in the ground logic of the Cold War period.

The making of this rhizomatic mapping project takes place as the knowing and doing work together in unpacking the ground logic of the global map with a focus on visualizing how the subjective rhetoricity of the maps being analyzed re-invented Middle East. This visualization aims to unfold the root-system of the overall global map that dis/orients Middle East as the alienated other. As a method of working with the root-system of the Western global map, I use information networks of Geographic Information System (GIS), which in itself uses the already rhizomatic over-codings of the global map. In particular, the making aspect of this project is a visualization of the rhetorical ground logic of the global map. For this visualization, I use ArcGIS pro and a GIS application called Story Maps. While ArcGIS pro functions as a digital tool to visualize the changing borders and the geographical names of the region as a spatial timeline, Story Maps operates as a GIS application to visualize the spatial narrative of the re-makings and re-constructions of Middle East throughout the twentieth century.
At this arbitrary beginning, this project already suffers from a “sense of disorientation, a sort of cartographic anxiety or spatial perplexity that appears to be part of our fundamental being-in-the-world” (Robert T. Tally 1). This is because beginning to write/map is always already dis/orienting in itself considering it is an attempt to construct a space within borders. To cross these borders I set for myself un/consciously, each chapter as a beginning is an entering to a conversation in the middle. With this important awareness, this mapping project begins its mapping/writing in the middle! And you choose where you want to enter.

Chapter 1   Chapter 4   Chapter 2   Chapter 5   Chapter 3
CHAPTER 1: HOW TO DIS/OTHER THE HOME/SICK MIDDLE EAST?

“There is something truly terrifying, or at least rather frustrating, in being lost. Not to know where one is, or perhaps, not to know where one is relative to where one would like to be, is a thoroughly unpleasant feeling. In such a situation a sign, any sign, would help, but most useful would be a map.” Robert T. Tally, Spatiality, 2

Rhizome 1-Mapping of Getting Lost: A Story of Dis/orientation#rhizomap

“I made a map to talk of “a space of moments and discontinuities” (Walter Benjamin, “A Berlin Chronicle” 316). I reproduced my experience(s) with space and my mapping became a form of way-finding that dis/oriented my consciousness of ‘Here I am!’ I mapped as I walked and now I hear the wind on my face from the open window of the car and the wind on my face as I fly above the land that my eyes see and my mind imagines. My mother is driving the car through the mountains, through the roads, and a bus passes by. As my mother is driving, the sound of the air balloon, its fire, its heat, its floating movement become stronger. I think we are floating over one of the underground cities we drove to yesterday; yet I cannot quite identify which one I am seeing or hearing. I am walking through a tunnel right now; a pathway opening and leading me to my mother, father, sister, and my brother in-law. I see the blue fairy-chimneys between the orange sky and the green-brown trees and the ground. I am turning and my gaze through the lens of my camera is upon the sky beyond the walls I am walking by. I hear the sound of us floating yet seeing faces I do not remember. I am flying over Cappadocia and mapping my footsteps through the underground cities, cities “entirely without roots” that are rhizomatic with their stem-canals (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 15). I follow my mother as we walk through one of these stem-canals, passing through another pathway connecting us to the sky we float over and the land we drive through. The bus passes by again and I see the blue fairy-chimneys between the orange sky

11 A Video-Mapping project that I visualized through the practice of rhizomatic mapping. This description presented is the first 1:20 minutes. https://youtu.be/9u88GVqLzWA
"and the green-brown trees and the ground once again. A mapping back to the beginning, the very space of middle, before I unfold more pathways to be walked."

I find a great value in the notion of being lost, unlike the great obsession of the cyborg maps of our global age; the great obsession with ‘never losing the sight of where you are!’ These cyborg maps, GPS/GIS, MapQuest, Google Maps, are being fed with the reliable and scientifically processed undistorted satellite data that invent space as a closed construct. The modern visualization techniques and technologies focus on producing ‘accurate’ spatial knowledge of our geographies that are transparent representations of our physical world. This emphasis on accuracy supports the notion of providing easy and reliable communication and navigation that do not fail. They are designed and produced for us to always know our exact locations, positions, and our being-in-the-world. Having the exact knowledge of our whereabouts is a legitimized necessity so we have more time “to create, to think, to feel” without worrying about being lost (Karen Piper 79). However, what shadows and limits our creativity, thinking, and engagement with open spaces of movements is never worrying or actually thinking about how we move in the world.

Getting lost is an important part of experiencing space and mentally processing the knowledge of geographies of socio-cultural relations. Losing one’s way in a city, in a village, in-between streets, alleys, gives an opportunity to walk with memories, stories, cultures, traditions, and people of a space. The memory of this experience of moving within and through space is a mapping practice that depicts a spatial image one will be remembering. However, since getting

12 Karen Piper uses the term ‘cyborg’ to refer to the map-products of cartographic visualization techniques and methods of our global age in Cartographic Fictions.

13 And I forgot. I was looking at myself from the balcony of my little purple house on the top of a mountain and started to listen to myself. I needed to talk to me in the middle of the dirty big street of the big city. I smiled and I stopped walking. I cried, then I hear someone calling me. I cried a little more with laughter; and I finally turned around; I looked around. That was the first time I stood on a crossroad. The very first time I started crossing many gateways. I always get lost but then I remember to stop on a crossroad. The
lost is becoming a practice that we are forgetting, we are also becoming over dependent on the
global data and the communicated information of our cyborg maps. This overreliance makes us
spatially/geographically ignorant\(^\text{14}\) because we consume the received spatial knowledge without
being critical. This lack of critical encounters with digital spatial images of cyborg maps is due to
the ethical credibility of these systems, which is justified by scientific objectivity. Yet, this not
having the need to worry or think about how to get from point A to point B by having the exact
knowledge of ‘You Are Here!’ pin has rare occasions of failing.

Please take a detour and go back to the beginning with me; go back to the narrative form
of mapping I chose to enter into a conversation with you; to a space in where I (re)began in the
middle: \textit{Mapping of Getting Lost: A Story of Dis/Orientation}. This narrative is a rhizomatic
mapping practice I have been performing for a while now: a mapping of my experiences of
getting lost in-between the roads, lines, and signs, and linguistic representations of iconographic
emblems and symbols. As you see and hear us driving, walking, and flying, there is a little story
in-between that I would like to tell you. Two summers ago on our way to Cappadocia to enjoy
our family trip, we spent two extra hours driving in circles to get to our hotel because our GPS
had a very difficult time in finding a road that was neither under construction nor closed for us. I
remember the frustration my sister had since she was driving right next to my father who was
getting really mad at “the stupid GPS in my stupid phone that he could not believe I paid that
\begin{quote}
center of a crossroad always moves, whirling around and I connect with many paths/roads that I have
forgotten a while ago, or I have never realized before. I always spend a little time at the center of a
crossroad and watch myself from the balcony of my little purple house on the top of a mountain. I
experience my ‘self’ in many forms and positions, then I enter into a door and then it is a journey every
time. Each crossroad is different, each doorway is different, each journey is different, and each ‘me’ is
different. But all of ‘me’ always waits for the next stop at a new crossroad at the balcony of my little purple
house on the top of a mountain.
\end{quote}

\(^\text{14}\) Harvey, David. “Cartographic Identities: Geographical Knowledges Under Globalization.” \textit{Spaces of
much money more for!” My smartphone and its smart GPS failed us miserably in our account of
getting to our hotel without getting lost; and yes we were lost! What we did was still mapping to
find our way; a mapping that took place outside of the scientifically justified accurate space of
our GPS system because, as Piper explains, the cyborg map of our global age did push us off the
map; as a result, we were unable to find ourselves in the geographical space of our GPS (254-
257). We mapped our own way and our own location by using an alternative form of knowing, an
alternative, a primitive, a pre-cartographic form of wayfinding\textsuperscript{15}: we stopped at the local studio of
pottery we had passed by at least ten times and asked the owner of the studio how to get to our
hotel because flying over the represented space of our GPS, a land rooted in an empty ground,
was not able to show us the fluid human relations that formed the spatial meaning and reality of
this space.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} In \textit{Spatiality}, Robert Tally explains cognitive forms of wayfinding, a form of pre-cartographic, an
alternative form of producing spatial knowledge that lay outside of the scientific technicality of
cartography; an itinerary of images made sense through cognitive imageability (1248-1252).

\textsuperscript{16} “The power of a country road is different when one is walking along it from when one is flying over it by
airplane.” (Benjamin, “One Way Street” 50) Different meanings opening up through the tunnels; tunnels
as crossroads change with people; spaces have different meanings, functions, directions; now I walk the
same tunnels and enter the same rooms; I see neither a kitchen nor a dining room. I see abandoned empty
spaces; why live underground, hide, no sun; I hear the echoes from the tunnels “They are coming hide.”
The sounds from the walls of the empty rooms, underground, but so loud. Then I am flying over; what a
beautiful scenery, the country roads right below me; I am at a distance from the underground cities. I
cannot even see them, but I can hear them walking the tunnels. Now I can hear the kitchen working. Oh
now it is a cellar. Wait but now they keep animals here. I hear them all. Underground and I am flying over
them; they are all hidden. I am up above and down below at the same time. I have this feeling in my
stomach. I forgot something. I hear my sister, her fiancé, and my mom; they are saying things, but I am not
listening. I have this feeling in my stomach. I know I forgot something. Now everything moving too fast at
the crossroads; the center keeps whirling around and I cannot see the paths around me; I keep looking and
looking, but I feel dizzy, nauseous. Why is it too fast? Why am I in a hurry? I am nervous; I am scared. I am
taking pictures of my sister and his fiancé; I am taking pictures of my mom; I am still at the center; What
did I forget? I feel...I feel...I feel... Close your eyes; now I am at the balcony of my purple house on the top
of a mountain. I see myself. I look happy with my family on a balloon trip; the sun is rising, and the scenery
is amazing. I know what I forgot but it is okay now. I know everything will be fine. Just listen, read
yourself, read a different story for yourself. A story you dream about but also remember it is okay to have
nightmares too. You will be fine.
I know this is not the exciting and shocking story you probably expected me to tell you. Something fundamental that changed my, and maybe you hoped that would change your, entire understanding and perception of space and mapping. I am sorry if I disappointed you with my simple mapping story, but as Denis Cosgrove indicates, “mapping is [actually] a deceptively simple activity. To map is one way or another to make measure of a world, and more than merely take it, to figure the measure so taken in such a way that it may be communicated between people, places or times” (“Introduction: Mapping Meaning” 2). In this deceptively simple practice of trying to find our way, what we suffered from was the identity and representation crisis we experienced because what we saw in our GPS was not the ‘exact’ space we were experiencing at the moment. The socio-cultural identity of the space that was produced in the lived experiences of the people of this land was distorted, alerted, and changed in our GPS. This uncanny experience of being disoriented is the representation crisis of our global age, which is the disconnection between the received knowledge of our constructed spaces and the socially and culturally changing knowledges of our open spaces. In this dis/orienting symbiotic relationship

Not only is GIS being linked to improving human performance, but also mapping programs are being sold for their ability to process vast amounts of global information (or data), making it useful to the individual. Advertisements, therefore, commonly depict mapping data as literally being ingested into the body; satellite photos of the globe are often being carried, thrown, or even eaten. (Piper 88)

The way that the mass satellite data and cyborg maps’ connection to our bodies are being promoted with a focus on the betterment of our performances unveils an uncanny resemblance to the consciousness of the enlightened modern Western man for me. I hear his “extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would promote not only the control of natural forces but
also understanding of the world and of the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the happiness of human beings” (Jürgen Habermas 9). This humanism in the modern vision is evident in what the global modern cartographic methods and techniques are trying to promote through the symbiotic relationship between our bodies and the mass data: “a body wed to the map, improved and nourished by the consumption of data” (Piper 88; 95). Yet, as asking “whose body is being linked to the map and who is given the power to consume and process data” becomes an alarming question to respond to due to the salient oppressive relationship hidden in this symbiotic alchemy that is justified with the ethical argument of humanism (Piper 97).

The Oppressive Vision of Modern Globalization and Our Cyborg Maps

The oppressive vision of modern globalization controls the global networks of cyborg maps. As Piper explains, the first principle of GIS technologies is using the locations, geographies, territories, and countries with less and worse data (100). This principle, at first, did not register to me, especially considering the fundamental function of a map-object: using undistorted data to provide accurate visualization that is transparent to reality for the most effective experience of finding our way and exact location. However, this principle of production of data from poorer countries unveils a meta-narrative: imperial subjugation and the capitalist oppression of the ‘other’ by owning its space and knowledge. Brian Harley understands “maps as an impersonal type of knowledge [that] tend to ‘desocialize’ the territory they represent. They foster a notion of socially empty space” (“Maps, Knowledge, and Power” 80). Through re-inventing the meaning of this empty space, maps inflict varying practices of power in political, economic, social and cultural contexts. These configurations of power in maps produce realities

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17 This technical and empirical definition of the functionality of cartographic visualization techniques and methods is a definition I deduced from varying definition of maps problematizing this positivist approach dominant in the field of cartography. A couple of important names to mention here are Brian Harley, David Harvey, Christian Jacob, Denis Wood, Matthew Edney, Denis Cosgrove, Mark Monmonier, and Jeremy Crampton.
and truths about people, nations, and countries that replace socially and culturally formed open spaces. This notion of how constructed map knowledge replaces dialectical existence of space as an open becoming of social and cultural human relations and how this replacement functions as a system of subjugation becomes clearer when it is explained with the consciousness of global vision: a vision that exercises subjugating power that produces West as the First-World and the rest of the world pretty much as the Third-World. The incapability of third-world countries to produce their own reliable data, and as a result not being able to produce the knowledge of their spaces, provides the legitimate justification to the first-world countries in producing the information and representation of these spaces as primitive margins in the global world order.
Piper considers this relationship as a highly oppressive one due to how “those who have the information see themselves as empirically better able to make decisions than those who are merely the ‘other’” (104).

I consider this oppressive relation as a form of rhetorical invention rooted in the relation between power and knowledge that produces a discourse of alienating otherness. This alienating rhetoric has been causing us to “live in less proximity to the other human beings, in their presence and discourse, and more under the silent gaze of deceptive and obedient objects which continuously repeat the same discourse, that our stupefied (medusée) power, of our potential affluence and of our absence from one another” (Jean Baudrillard, “Consumer Society” 29). Rhetorical alienation defines the history of Western cartography as “a history of coding the enemy, making a ‘them’ and ‘us’ that can be defended with a clear border. It has been, above all, a history of pushing “them” out of territory that is considered ours—denying their existence, deleting their maps, drawing lines the in the sand” (Piper 39-40). Today, many countries are suffering from the consequences of this history fixated on defining ‘others’ to keep them under close surveillance and control so that they will not disrupt the stabilized hierarchy that has been
privileging the West over East. Mapping the other off from the cartographic vision of the unified globe has always taken place in a discourse of otherness by imagining a land with an identity narrated in the imagination of the Western Self. Today, in the context of the global refugee crisis, terrorism, and war, the region named as Middle East is residing in this actualized geography of otherness under the totalizing narrative of Islam as inherently violent. As this narrative writes itself through the dominant networks of war on terror discourse, it produces the region’s problematic identity, an identity that is the product of the mechanical reproduction system of the imperial State and its modern Constitution.¹⁸

**How to Dis/Other the Geopolitical Identity of Middle East: A Dis/Orienting Process of Rhizomatic Mapping**

The path to dis/othering the cartographic consciousness of Middle East starts with uprooting the grounded and fixed binary relation between West and Middle/East on the dialectical lines of connection between the tree and rhizome metaphors by Deleuze and Guattari. The notion of ‘rhizome’ is the underlying un/ground that I up/root my proposed mixed theoretical/methodological application. The reasoning in up/rooting a transcendant framework with a rhizomatic consciousness is because of the non-centered, non-structured, and non-hierarchical life of ‘rhizome’: an embodiment of linear lines of multiplicities (bodies without organs) mapping connections through a process of de-re-territorialization. The consciousness of rhizome as connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, asignifying rupture, cartography, and decalcomania, presents this mapping metaphor, unlike the tree-system, as “not the object of reproduction: neither external reproduction as image-tree nor internal reproduction as tree-structure…[rhizome] is an antigenealogy…a short-term memory or anti-memory.” (21) Having a

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rhizomatic consciousness is a rhetorical performativity of moving with rhizomatic anti-memories of Middle East: a performative and a participatory mapping project.

Rhizomatic mapping as a form of rhetorical performativity has a participatory nature in itself. Through this participatory nature, I take different lines of thoughts and social and critical pathways in disrupting both the old and newly invented socio-spatial realities of Middle East. In this sense, mapping of this project consciously aims to disrupt the tree-image of Middle East. The transcending framework of this mapping project conducts a rhetorical reading of the selected maps of the region by unpacking their persuasive meanings and transformative and strategic functions. This framework applies a carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading of the selected maps of the region. Mapping with this performative practice also implements a heuristic methodological approach in forming a spatio-temporal data set of cartographic artifacts of Middle East. In addition to its heuristic approach, this mixed methodology uses cartographic hermeneutics as a form of rhetorical invention in interpreting digital map collections with a critical awareness of how the cartographic discourses of maps impact and shape the spatial organization and information design of digital map-data. The non-structure of rhizome and its fluid movement is the acentered force that pushes this mapping project not only to unpack closed borders but also to cross fixed lines of categorizations in the presentation of knowledge both in the closed spaces of maps and in the digital spaces in which they are presented and (re)produced.

*Critical and Socio-Cultural Approach to Maps: Rhetoricity of Maps and Mapping as Cartographic Texts*

The carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading this mapping project applies understands maps as texts that produce meaning by using a cartographic language in the socio-cultural context
of its cartographic discourse. This understanding unveils the diversity of map-meaning and its functionality, which I find significant for three main reasons that I am currently critically aware of: 1) understanding the strong connection between the notions of space and identity (a dialectical relationship); 2) how different perceptions and subjective positions redefine this space-identity connection; and 3) how these shifting positions impact how the knowledge and identity of the spaces we are connected to being produced. In this context, maps as texts are extremely powerful tools because, as Denis Wood indicates, “knowledge of the map is knowledge of the world from which it emerges—as a casting from its mold, as a shoe from its last—isomorphic counter-image to everything in society that conspires to produce it” (18). This strong power of and in maps stems from the strong communicative functions of these cartographic images. Maps have been one of the primary mediators “between an inner mental world and our physical world...[they] are fundamental tools in helping the human mind making sense of its universe at various scales” by being “one of the oldest forms of human communication” due to the always existing “mapping impulse in human consciousness” (Harley, “The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography” 1). Considering maps/mapping is one of the key forms of representing the relationship between the mind and the world, it does not/nor shouldn’t come as a surprise that maps are also being used as metaphors for alternative forms of knowing. We use maps and mapping as metaphors to understand and represent how our thinking and thoughts reflect upon

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19 Brian Harley, who is considered to be one of the leading names in critical cartography, introduces the notions of cartographic discourses and cartographic language in his various discussions of deconstructing the silent and un/intentional exercises of powers in maps as cultural texts. See his collection of essays The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography, edited by Paul Laxton, The John Hopkins University Press, 2001.

20 In the “Introduction” to Maps: Finding Our Way in the World, and edited collection by James Akerman and Robert Karrow, Karrow indicates that “maps conjures up so many powerful images in the popular mind that the world has long had figurative connotations far beyond those we consider...Administrators and politicians ‘map strategy,’ teacher uses an ‘English curriculum map,’ and diplomats follow a ‘road map’ toward peace...If we can begin to see how some initially unfamiliar constructions can function in maplike ways, perhaps we can also begin to see how culturally and historically conditioned our notions of ‘mapness’ are” (2).
the world we are for (intentional relationship/being for) and the world we are with (coexistence relationship/being with); how the world shapes our perspectives that form a model and image of our thoughts about the world; a dialectical relationship of defining and being defined by the very knowledge of the world (Patrice Maniglier 37-43).

The wide-range use of metaphorical meanings and connotations of maps in representing and communicating different forms of knowing is primarily because of how “spatial aspects of all existence are fundamental. Before an awareness of time, there is an awareness of relations in space, and space seems to be that aspect of existence to which most other things can be analogized or with which they can be equated” (Arthur H. Robinson and Barbara Bartz Petchenik qtd. in John Noble Wilford 14). This strong communicative function of maps that crosses the borders of physical space and expands into the spatial realms of different ways of engaging with the world is also the fundamental reason why cartography is considered as an interdisciplinary field, or should be an interdisciplinary field, at the intersection of natural and social sciences and humanities. As a result, the very act of mapping expects us to be explorers with an intention to produce meaning/knowledge and effectively communicate this meaning. We map and “contemplate a world; and as that world would not otherwise exist, we create it even as we discover it” and “determine the best way to present it” (Peter Turchi 117; 147.) In the process of mapping, then, we as writers/cartographers make many rhetorical decisions because mapping as writing, as Harley indicates, is a highly rhetorical act of meaning-making. Every map, different type and genre, has a subject, an author (cartographer/mapmaker), and a theme addressing a specific audience (Wood 22). Mapping reveals itself as a form of writing, which Alan MacEachren’s hermeneutic approach to cartographic visualization unveils as the discursive nature of this writing: every map and mapping process visualize knowledge, which involves

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21 See Brian Harley’s “Text and Contexts” (36-37) and “Deconstructing the Map” (163) in The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography.
communicating this knowledge, and every map and mapping process communicate knowledge, which involves applying a method and technique of visualization as a form of writing/composing (qtd. in Elaine J. Hallisey 353).

However, each cartographer/mapmaker in the process of cartographic visualization and communication apply a process of generalization, which can be a different mix of different generalization techniques in the changing rhetorical contexts and subjective positions of the mapmakers. According to Wilford, mapmakers in their process of generalization must choose what to show and how to show it, and what not to show. They deconstruct the world or a part of it, then reassemble selected components…The most conscientious mapmaker perforce falls short of telling the whole truth, because of limited knowledge, restrictions imposed by the particular map format, and a strict devotion to the intended purpose of the work. Some things are left out. (14-15)

Leaving things out as a result of cartographic generalization is justified through the claim that maps are transparent realities to the world as it is (the scientific positivist approach). This is the dominant vision my mapping project is challenging by adopting a multi-folded understanding of maps and mapping that highlights the strong rhetoricity of maps.

Harley indicates that on one hand, this generalization process can result in conscious and deliberate distortions, silences, and alterations in maps due to the mapmakers’ ideological intentions serving the dominant vision’s political purposes; on the other hand, these very same distortions and silences can also be unintentional because of “the hidden rules of cartographic
discourse” that are determined in the context of its cultural production: the concealed impact of the dominant culture’s control in the established practices and laws of knowledge production.  

*Carto-Rhetorical Deconstructive Reading*

The things that are left out in the specific vision and socio-cultural context of cartographic discourses is what drives this mapping project to unpack rhizomatic anti-memories of Middle East that are already providing us possible dis/othered images of the region. To unpack what’s left out, I conduct a carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading to investigate the cartographic re-constructions of Middle East by considering the impacts of accelerating modernization and globalization on the geopolitical relations and socio-spatial imaginations. This is a pathway I take to disrupt the dominant Western tree-system and its image in addition to its contemporary subjugating sub-unit, which is the Islamic root-system. I frame the setting of this rhetorical examination as a mixed and transcending application in a borderland zone crossing lines with socio-critical and rhetorical cartography, cartographic hermeneutics/semiosis, and visual-material rhetorics. I apply this mixed framework to effectively respond to the three central issues that this project is currently concerned with: 1) the almost impossible task of ‘knowing’ where Middle East starts and ends and how this ambiguity came to dominate the cartographic reality of the region; 2) how this cartographic ambiguity, rooted in changing geopolitical relations and interests, has been creating internal tensions among the nation-states due to trying to define the region under one ethnic and religious identity, the Arab Muslims; and 3) the social and spatial injustice in identifying the heterogeneous socio-spatial identities of Middle East under the enemy and victim images of the Islamic terrorism in the mainstream global networks of communication and information design.

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22 See Brian Harley “Maps, Knowledge, and Power” (79) and “Deconstructing the Map” (154) *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*. 
Harley introduces cartographic deconstruction in examining the concealed meanings/messages embedded into the spaces of maps. I incorporate cartographic deconstruction to interrogate the functions of maps in the exercises of power: 1) External power-political and economic contexts and how political power is exerted on cartography: global empire building, imperialism/colonialism and capitalist interests, nation-state preservations, juridical power and territory; and 2) Internal power-map content in the transaction of power and how the external power affects what cartographers do when they make a map: map distortions and silences (unintentional/unconscious and intentional/conscious).\(^{23}\) Harley draws from Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and his approach to the historicity of all texts and Michel Foucault’s analysis of discourse as a system of exercising power through knowledge (“Deconstructing the Map” 152-153). As Harley explains,\(^{24}\) cartography as a discourse system mixes different elements of generalizations due to the interconnected exercises of external and internal powers: selection, omission, simplification, classification, creation of hierarchies, and symbolization. These different elements of generalization as steps of map-making and producing spatial meaning are all inherently rhetorical. The exercises of power in changing social and cultural contexts under the subjugating control of a dominant vision impact these rhetorical elements of cartographic knowledge production. In this context, I apply Harley’s cartographic deconstruction to unpack the cartographic discourses and language of the maps of Middle East in relation to their rhetorical contexts (socio-political relations and power dynamics) and the rhetorical exigency and agency (the events, actors, and players determining the communicative visualization of map meaning and information to be produced).

\(^{23}\) See Brian Harley “Deconstructing the Map” for external and internal power exercises (164-168) in addition to “Silences and Secrecy” (84-107) and “Map, Knowledge, and Power” (62-69) for unintentional and deliberate silences/distortions/alterations in maps in relation to the exercises of power in The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography.

This critical cartographic discourse analysis through the application of cartographic deconstruction will be examining deliberate and unconscious distortions in addition to intentional and unintentional silences in the shifting contexts of the maps of the region. How did the exercises of internal and external power produce cartographic language(s) inventing socio-spatial realities? How did the cartographic language(s) actualize distortions and silences to form a spatial hierarchy through the use of cartographic ethics grounded in scientific legitimacy? To respond to these questions, I also incorporate cartographic hermeneutics/semiosis to deconstruct the cartographic language(s) used in the maps of Middle East. In “Cartographic Semiosis: Reality as Representation,” Emanuela Casti explains that Harley’s critical cartographic approach has opened a new arena for many socio-critical theorists and cartographers/geographers to work with. According to Casti, Christian Jacob and Franco Farinelli are two significant names in critical and cultural cartography who made essential contributions to the field in addition to Harley.

In The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History, Jacob’s focus is on the complex dialectical relations shaping the socially bounded knowledge and meaning of the geographies of spaces represented in maps. Jacob considers the map as “not an object but a function.” I understand this function through Edward Soja’s\(^\text{25}\) conceptualization of socio-spatial dialectic: producing knowledge of space is not merely producing knowledge of geographical territory or region, but rather it is a socially and culturally bounded process that generates knowledge in its diverse connections to complex socio-cultural human relations. In this context, maps as functions are strategic tools and instruments of discursive power and knowledge.

\(^{25}\) In Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, Edward Soja, by drawing from David Harvey and Henri Lefebvre on the organized space and its mode of production, indicates that “the structure of organized space is not a separate structure with its own autonomous laws of construction and transformation, nor is it simply an expression of the class structure emerging from social (and thus aspatial) relations of production. It represents, instead, a dialectically defined component of the general relations of production, relations which are simultaneously social and spatial” (78).
relations. As Casti explains, Jacob’s approach maintains that “the persuasive power of maps lies not only in socio-political factors but also in the fact that maps satisfy a fundamental need of individuals for tools to build a ‘poetics of space’ which show how the world might be” (142). While Jacob introduces the diverse “individual and social uses, of symbolic and empirical meanings” of maps, Farinelli returns to the ideology of maps by examining “how maps affect geographical epistemology” and how the communicative function of maps is an indication that the representations in maps are ideological products that require a critical, not merely a technical, awareness (Casti 142-43). Casti expands on Harley, Jacob, and Farinelli to introduce cartographic semiosis as a newly emerging sub-field. According to Casti, cartographic semiosis “effectively shifts the emphasis from maps as a mediation of territory to maps as agents, whereupon the actions to be carried out in territory are determined” (135).

Casti presents two concepts as part of cartographic semiosis: self-reference and iconosiation. The self-referential nature of maps indicates that maps as systems of signs have a life of their own and they communicate knowledge independently by impacting the perceptions and interpretations of their observers. Iconisation comes into play to justify the self-referential meaning-making of maps by presenting this meaning as a transparent truth to reality (Casti 151-61). There is a dialectical relation between self-reference and iconisation in the cartographic semiotic approach because Casti explains that “maps not only can convey complex information, but that this information is always the product of iconisation; that it is connected with reality but cannot simply be superimposed upon it…maps replace rather than represent territory” (162). In

26 In Sovereign Map, Jacob expands on maps as functions by indicating that map “is a technical prosthesis that extends and redefines the field of sensorial perceptions, or rather, a place where ocular vision and the ‘mind’s eye’ coincide. As a mediation, an interface, it remains hidden” (11). I approach this functional process as a process of producing spatial illusions imagining a world and as a result, through the technical and scientific methods of map production, actualizing exercises of social, cultural, political, and ideological power and knowledge relations by replacing territorial and regional representations in maps.

27 The reflection on Farinelli depends merely on Casti’s interpretation because the majority of Farinelli’s works have not been translated into English as far I am aware of.
this process of semiotic replacement, naming plays a significant role. Jacob explains that the very act of naming a title of a map has a fundamental impact on the meaning of the map because the name of the title “progressively fashions the meaning of the organization of the forms, colors, and lines that make the map” (195). Toponymy, the very act of naming in maps as part of the cartographic language, is the act of “spatialization of knowledge” (Jacob 201). The carto-linguistic sign system of maps present information and produce meaning through the use of symbols, icons/facts, colors, decorations, paintings, marginal texts, in addition to the very act of naming. The cartographic language of maps, then, through naming in various forms, plays a significant role in how the semiotic consciousness of maps replace territories, because “the entire language of maps…are key in [maps’] self-generating mechanism” (Casti 157). This is why a cartographic hermeneutic approach will be essential in unpacking the rhetorical decisions made in the system of cartographic discourse. This unpacking aims to explore how repetition of symbolic realism has canonized spatial metaphors and transformed them into rooted and fixed stereotypes defining Middle East with a highly problematic identity.

To form a more dynamic application, I combine the method of cartographic deconstruction and cartographic hermeneutics/semiotics with Heather Ashley Hayes’s framing of rhetorical cartography in Violent Subjects and Rhetorical Cartography in the Age of the Terror Wars. Hayes frames rhetorical cartography as a method of inquiry that draws from rhetorical studies and critical cartography and geography. She uses rhetorical cartography in locating spatio-memories of violent experiences through the application of rhetoricoviolence as a new form of rhetorical circulation: violence and rhetoric act together in imposing power. Through rhetorical circulation, Hayes moves beyond the fixed context of a rhetorical situation and adopts a dynamic approach to understanding the relations between speakers, audiences, and messages in their dialectical multiplicities. The notion of movement and fluidity of rhetorical circulation “resituated
the rhetorical situation on a trajectory of becoming rather than being” (Barbara A. Biesecker qtd. in Hayes 33). Catherine Chaput takes this shift one step further by considering Foucault’s notions of bio-power and governmentality as the foundation which “takes us from the rhetorical situation as a temporally and spatially fixed site of exigency, constraints, and discourse to rhetorical circulation as a fluidity of everyday practices, effects, and uncertainties” (qtd. in Hayes 33). By adopting the fluidity of rhetorical circulation, Hayes presents her notion of rhetoricoviolence to unpack the relation between rhetoric and violence in the practices of power.

When it comes to understanding the very notion of power, Hayes refers to “Foucauldian forms of power as productive” (34). According to Foucault, power “needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body” because power “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also transverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (“Truth and Power” 120). This productive nature of power has an impact on us as subjects because “while human subject is placed in relation of production and of signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very complex” (“Subject and Power” 327). The notion of rhetorical circulation and the productive nature of power allows Hayes to frame rhetoricoviolence by forming a fluid relation between rhetoric and violence because “rhetoric and violence participate in the act of inflicting power” (34). Her focus is not to interrogate whether or not rhetoric is violent because she approaches violence as already a rhetorical form and frames rhetoricoviolence “as a new category [which] works to define the complex strategic situations in particular societies when the binding of rhetoric and violence allows for the emergence, or destruction, of new subjectivities and rhetorical situations” (34-35).

With a focus on the rhetorical context of terror wars, Hayes uses rhetoricoviolence as part of her rhetorical cartographic framework to unpack how rhetoric and violence works together in the exercises of power.
Hayes’s focus on the context of war examining the impacts of varying degrees of power stems from the fact that the nation-state structure and its juridical exercise of power is “no longer the most useful concept in understanding power and violence” (41). This is why the notions of rhetorical circulation and rhetoricoviolence form Hayes’s framing of rhetorical cartography of terror wars. Hayes considers rhetorical cartography as a primary mode in her study to understand rhetorical circulation “because of cartography’s unique access to understanding issues of transnational circulation, as well as the possibilities this approach offers for making rhetoric a clear lens through which to understand the conjecture of terror wars” (5). For an effective application of rhetorical cartography in mapping the power-violence relations, Hayes addresses the need in considering three elements of rhetorical circulation: bodies, spaces/places, and technologies. These three notions of rhetorical circulation provide a strong theoretical grounding in unpacking the suppressed and detached relations of social and spatial processes of human knowledge production. Overall, Hayes’s rhetorical cartography is essential in examining “the apparatus of power and the technologies of governance at work in the social, political, and legal processes of mapping, whether the maps consist of spatial locations or of discursive bodies” (55-56). Hayes’s framework of the rhetorical cartography of terror wars provides my mapping project another pathway to examine: the discourse of war in producing silences and distortions in maps by constructing images of enemies and victims.

The transcending framework of the carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading allows this mapping project to deconstruct the exercises of power by unpacking the machinic systems producing cartographic discourses: tree-systems of nation-states, supranational structures, international communities, and political and economic ideologies of war and terrorism. As
Gayatri Spivak explains,\(^28\) we are in a state of globalization in which the various forms of nation-state systems are collapsing all around us in the context of terror wars. This is why I understand the impact of war in relation to power and violence while also considering how this circulating relation is tied to the central automaton of the machinic system of the state apparatus. These complex rhetorical relations among these varying systems of power result in this mapping project taking yet another pathway. This pathway draws upon Amy Propen’s visual-material rhetorical framework, which connects the lines of Foucault’s notion of heterotopia and Carole Blair’s material rhetoric to one another and presents visual-material rhetorical theory to uncover various ways material experiences connect spaces and places in socio-cultural contexts. Propen’s framework will complement the proposed carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading by analyzing the symbolic and iconographic language of the maps of Middle East in opening the closed links between bodies, spaces/places, and cultures/technologies.

**Rhizomatic Socio-Spatiality of Identity Formations: Ethics of Otherness in Cartographic Visualizations**

The transcending framework of carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading leads this rhizomatic mapping project to also perform with the notion of ethics of otherness in relation to the rhizomatic socio-spatiality of identity formations. This performance complements the carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading by opening critical pathways to unfold how the ethical justifications and arguments have been also functioning to create cartographic silences and alterations and how these ethically legitimized rhetorical deceptions have been dis/placing the

\(^28\) In *Who Signs the Nation-State?*, Spivak considers this as a result of the project of globalization in addition to considering the nation-state system already faulty from the beginning. The consequences of this collapse in Middle East, as a reaction to the extensive totalizations of these systems in the broader framework of modern globalization, is a central focus in chapters three and four. As I conduct carto-rhetorical deconstructions of the selected maps of the region, I will be unpacking how these systems planted the seeds of long-term and short-term conflicts that had and have been terrorizing and tearing the region apart from within.
heterogeneous socio-spatial identities of Middle East into the placeless state of home/sickness. In this light, I initiate an understanding of the ‘ethics of otherness’ by conducting a Levinasian reading of the relation between West/Self and Middle East/Other. Through this reading, I intend to unfold a re-appearing pattern of ethical justification that the globalizing West has been using in its intensified processes of ‘otherings.’: West as a path to salvation and civilization and West as the protector of peace and democracy. As part of this pathway I re/up/root the relation between the Western tree and the Eastern rhizome, in terms of the relation between the ‘Self/I’ and ‘Other,’ by examining the psychoanalytic roots of this engagement. I use Foucault’s notion of ‘mirror in-between’ to understand how this complex relationship between the Self and Other has been reproducing the cartographic reality and identity of Middle East. In this light, I pair Foucault’s notion of utopia with Self’s unreal imagination of its spatial identity in relation to the spatial identity of its Other and heterotopia with the actualizations of these imagined spatial identities that exist across cultures.

The reasoning behind this pairing stems from the fact that the global world hierarchy is in itself the product of this actualization: the notions of centers and peripheries, the frontiers separating West from East not only in global but also local and regional scales exist across cultures today. Middle East, as being one of the most critical Others hovering on the margins, functions as a heterotopia: the spatial reality of the excluded Other/the heterotopia of spatial Otherness. This spatial leveling, as a result of this mirror effect, has been functioning almost like


a portal for the tree-system to expand its roots and it is always justified with the ethical responsibility of the Self to its Other.

The ethics of otherness also raises the question Harley asks in his article “Can There Be a Cartographic Ethics?” The ethical responsibility of a cartographer/mapmaker, as Harley indicates, is grounded in the modern scientific positivity: “the so-called ‘ ethic’ of being ‘precise, accurate, and exact’” (199). The already existing undistorted data available to cartographers justifies the ethicality of the cartographer in producing transparent realities to physical geography.\(^3^1\) This notion of undistorted data and its ethical credibility forms the scientific and unbiased identity of a cartographer, which is rooted in “the constitution of cartographic knowledge as an a priori, that is, as beyond the reach of human conceptualization” (Jeremy Crampton 6). Yet, Mark Monmonier argues that maps always tell us white lies because each cartographer makes subjective decisions in the process of generalizing spatial knowledge. This undermined manipulative authority of the ethical argument on the already existing undistorted data is what conceals and silences socio-cultural and socio-spatial injustices the cartographic visualizations cause. For an ethically informed cartography to exist, these socio-cultural and political consequences should be acknowledged in terms of how they impact not only the map-object (its visualization) but also its communicative meaning. As Harley indicates, “ethics cannot be divorced from questions of social justice”; which is why for an ethical cartography to exist, even the white lies the maps tell us are important to take into consideration with a social and critical awareness (“Can There Be a Cartographic Ethics?” 205-07).

To unpack the impacts of ethics of otherness in the cartographic visualizations of Middle East, this mapping project also performs with post-colonial geographies\textsuperscript{32} to unfold how the very post-colonial condition has been dis/im/placed into the stateless reality of home/sickness. In this context, this mapping project also examines the consciousness of the post-colonial subject\textsuperscript{33} as always already being and becoming a hybrid in-between the dichotomized global vision: a hybrid always being reproduced in temporal narrative lines of homesickness. Today, Middle East as a post-colonial subject is always in a temporal state of being in-transition yet never quite arriving to a state of belonging. In this temporal state of being homeless, the experience and anxiety of being home-sick became the temporal yet fixed spatial reality of the region. However, in this state of not-belonging and in the fixed space of being and becoming home/sick, the rhizomatic consciousness of the inhabitants of Middle East narrate their own temporal and performative acts. These rhizomatic performances have been already disrupting the fixed spatial exigency of their disposed post-colonial conditions; a performative act always already happening in the dialectical relation of socio-spatiality: rhizomatic socio-spatiality of identity formations. Connecting the lines of ethics of otherness and rhizomatic socio-spatiality of identity formation is a path towards perceiving West and East not as the two ends (civilized and primitive) of the fixed binary set in the discourse of power. This unpacking aims to explore how both West and East can respond to one another in a space of embodiment rather than in a spaceless detachment.

\textit{Map Selection Methodology: Rhetorical Invention of a Spatio-Temporal Cartographic Data Set}

\textsuperscript{32} Sharp, Joanne P. \textit{Geographies of Postcolonialism: Spaces of Power and Representation}. Los Angeles, SAGE, 2009.

\textsuperscript{33} In understanding the consciousness and condition of the post-colonial subject, I primarily draw from the works of Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Judith Butler, Arif Dirlik, and of course in relation to Orientalism and Middle East, I primarily use Edward Said and Rashid Khalidi.
I respond to the geography of Middle East as a rhizomatic spatio-temporal geospatial consciousness. I define spatio-temporality in the context of space-time circulation, which Doreen Massey contextualizes as “the mutual necessity of space and time. It is on both of them, necessarily together, that rests the liveliness of the world” (56). Massey explains this notion through the concept of spacing, which emphasizes horizontality of deconstruction, which Derrida explains through the idea of spacing as textualization: instead of approaching textual representation as spatialization, the spacing itself is textual representation. Massey indicates that the notion of spacing as textualization is a reversed movement that stems from the proposition ‘the world is like a text.’ This proposition, as Massey continues, is “quite distinct from ‘texts are just like the rest of the world’” (50). While the first proposition is the act of spacing, the latter is representation as spatialisation. According to Massey, this change in the route to spatial thinking through horizontality of deconstruction is “a turn towards spatiality and a spatiality, what’s more, which is open and differentiated” (50-51). With horizontality of deconstruction, spacing brings the momentary passing of horizontal openness and multiplicity of space together and unpacks the movement of spacing as both spatial and temporal (51). As an alternative route to space, the importance of spacing is “the integration within this of both space and time. The wrestling over how the process of difference/heterogeneity is to be conceptualized” (53). And the very reality of spacing leads us to conceive space not as a static slice through time…as a closed system…[because] if time is to be open to a future of the new then space cannot be equated with the closures and horizontalities of representation. More generally, if time is to be open then space must be open too. Conceptualising space as open, multiple and relational, unfinished and always becoming, is a prerequisite for history to be open and thus a prerequisite, too, for the possibility of politics. (59)
With this conceptualization of space by taking the route of spacing, I perceive the geography of Middle East as spatio-temporal. This perception is yet another uprooting of the proposition ‘the world is like a text’. And through this proposition, I approach rhizomatic socio-spatiality of identity formations and the fluid movements/mobility of the region as an act of spacing: Middle East textualizing/mapping its own temporal and open narrative lines. To be able to perform with the spatio-temporal mobility of Middle East, as an act of spacing, then, this mapping project frames a spatio-temporal data set with fluid borders. In this spacing, I apply a mixed methodology (see Appendix) using cartographic hermeneutics as a form of rhetorical (re)invention with a rhizomatic consciousness. Cartographic hermeneutics opens a path to take into consideration how the cartographic language of maps impacts their spatial categorizations and presentations in digital collections. This is why to form a spatio-temporal data set, it is crucial to be aware of how these spatial categorizations could be limiting: how the cartographic namings of maps determine their regional category and how this category leaves out certain spacings from the spatio-temporal vision of a researcher in digital environments. In this light, it becomes essential to make strategic crossings within the categorized borders of digital map collections to integrate the spatial and temporal movements of the act of spacing into the data set being retrieved from the digital collections.

This heuristic approach to framing a spatio-temporal data set has four main elements assessing digital map collections: 1) Digital map artefacts in digital archives providing free access and re-use; 2) Diversity in the digital archives in terms of providing map artefacts from different perceptions and rhetorical situations in addition to providing different types and genre of maps; 3) Easy navigation and simple search tools provided by the digital archives; and 4) Digital archives providing enough amount content and context information for map artefacts, especially information needed for maps composed in languages other than English. The primary purpose
was to locate a diverse sample that would enable this project to work with the spatio-temporal geography of the region in a most time efficient and financially most reasonable manner.

As a result of this heuristic assessment process, this mapping project is currently performing with two digital map archives as primary modes of rhetorical inventions of a spatio-temporal data set: Library of Congress’s map collection (a public institution) and David Rumsey Map Collection digitally made available by the Stanford University (a private map collection). Currently this spatio-temporal data set consists of 200 maps of Middle East from 1900 to early 2000s. Deciding to use these two map collections as the two primary sources of map data was a process of, first, determining the nature of the data set I envisioned for this project’s primary conjecture, and second, reviewing different databases and map collections that hold maps of Middle East that I came to be aware of after engaging with professionals who work with and/or are responsible for organizing and categorizing maps of the region. Since my methodological framing is a heuristic one, these two digital map collections were two cartographic archives that met the four main elements I have described above.

The expected crossings in terms of making this spatio-temporal data set more diverse, open, and heterogeneous, happens through internal crossings made by me the cartographer. These crossings happen through the incorporation of examples and artefacts that are outside of the borders of this data set. As Victor Vitanza once suggested, these crossings are extremely important in terms of unpacking the rhizomatic consciousness of geographies of diverse cultures and identities disposed into the placeless spaces of borderlands. The very act of crossing in itself is a performance of deconstruction because crossing as a disruptive movement outside of the control of the fixed borders, and grounded territories provides experiencing space as a socio-spatial dialectical engagement. As our in-transit crossings produce the rhizomatic socio-spatiality of borderlands, the rhizomatic consciousness of the borderlands produces our spatial identities
and, as a result, our spatial productions. This is why this mapping project crosses the borders of its own cartographic data set as a form of deconstruction and de-re-territorialization of spatio-temporality.

And again, I start in the middle; on a boat offshore; flying over the cruel empiricism of the ground logic; with invisible memories, faces, and images of the boat people!
CHAPTER 2: THE INVISIBLE SPACES OF THE BOAT PEOPLE

“On the road map you won’t drive off the edge of your known world. In space as I want to imagine it, you just might...the element of surprise, the unexpected, the other, is crucial to what space gives us.” Doreen Massey, For Space, 111-112

“The Memory Machine consists of the backstage only—the spectacle takes place wholly outside of it...As a ghost of humanism’s cosmic hubris, the Memory Machine seeks to disengage sites from the Earth in order to return them to their original, destine locus: Joyce’s Dublin and Tatlin’s Moscow.” Daniel Libeskind, The Space of Encounter, 181

Rhizome 2-Mapping of (Anti)Memory: A Story of Dis/Orientation

“My mom says “it’s like a labyrinth.” A labyrinth? Everything I see, hear, and feel; what I remember is like a labyrinth to me right now. Once again, I see the blue fairy-chimneys between the orange sky and the green-brown trees and the ground. And once again, I am dis/oriented through my own mapping because of space and memory and how they always already whisper a different story that I forget to tell. As I visualize my movement in-between the mountains, the sky, and the ground, I map because space is unfinished; it is a short-term memory that “includes forgetting as a process” (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 16). Space is a becoming; it is an antimemory always already mapping new connections: a rhizome “and now remembrances from small to smallest details, from the smallest to the infinitesimal, while that which it encounters in these microcosms grows ever mightier” (Walter Benjamin, “A Berlin Chronicle” 296). Every remembrance is a formation of a rhizome that opens and leads to a new route, a new pathway that I walk through, fly above, and drive off. And this time, this acentered Memory Machine took me to an unexpected destine locus; an unexpected surprise when I let the space to be open and fluid. We waited for the sunrise and fell off the edge of the map. We fell into ‘here’ in the past

34 A Video-Mapping project that I visualized through the practice of rhizomatic mapping. This description presented is a reflection on the mapping from 1:20-3:00 minutes. https://youtu.be/9u88GVqLzWA
which was then probably different than the ‘here’ I am at right now. A space between the mountains, the sky, and ground again as far as I can remember; so familiar yet also different, which will become a space I do not know in the future; yet, in the present ‘here,’ in the temporal condition of me writing, I fell into a space in where I remember seeing men pushing the invisible bodies in boats to the edges of the world; they were drowning without being able to say goodbye.”

I watched the news about a little boy’s body washed up to the shores of Bodrum/Turkey. Thinking that I was actually back home not too long ago, maybe a month or top month and a half, made my stomach hurt. I talked about Aylan; remembering his body on the news, on every social media page, over and over again it still hurts me, because his body, his tiny body on the shores of Bodrum, wherein the mountains meet the sea through the ground in-between, resonated with me through a recollection of other bodies that nobody saw, heard, or talked about. The invisible bodies in the empty flammable boats; the bodies of the boat people who “end up frightened, cold, and wet, huddled on a sinking boat…, while government argued over who would rescue them, who would allow them entry, who would ‘process’ them—these people sans papier, living without paper” (Cynthia Haynes 87). Have you ever seen one of those boats, empty and washed up to a shore you walk on every day? Have you ever driven through a road and seen ‘illegal’ refugees caught by navy officers? You know Aylan was on one of those boats before they found him on the ground that we, the modern human civilization of our global age, cannot get enough of. Keeping our ground in the ground we strongly desire to territorialize and own was apparently more important than Aylan. It was/is more important to protect the sovereignty of the ground and keep Aylan out.

Brian Harley reminds us that “maps are preeminently a language of power, not of protest” (“Maps, Knowledge, and Power” 79). The spaces this language of power represents,
then, are a field of power relations wherein social, cultural, ethnic, and racial differences are produced. In this field of power relations, maps represent a reality that is a world of separations and differences. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson explain that in this world, the issue and question of immigration is an “area where the politics of space and politics of otherness link up very directly…[because] if we accept a world of originally separate and culturally distinct places, then the question of immigration policy is just a question of how hard we should try to maintain this original order” (17). Seeing how the navy officers forcefully grabbed the refugees from that empty boat on the shore of my hometown, the shore that I touched, felt, and walked since I was a little girl, changed the meaning of that space for me. Now, the shores of my childhood come with a memory-image of desperation and degradation of human life and its value… the materialization of suppressive power in its most disturbing form.

The language of power in maps depicts an image that hides this degradation. An image that silences and erases the boat people from the flat surfaces of the official maps. A picture that does not give away the faces, the stories, the lives of the displaced people. A story that is a cold-fact of reality that eliminates the truth/knowledge of these non-places that are “marked by the ‘fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral’…un-rooted places marked by [in/voluntary] mobility” (Tim Creswell 46). All the visual-memories of this placeless space are always in-transition without an address that we can locate on a map. What we have is a placeless non-address that I am trying to map in this project because this non-address is “the address that connects life to death by dwelling” (Haynes 19). It is a ‘third’ address, “a multiplicity of real-and-imagined places,” that nobody wants to put it on their GPS due to the fear of driving off the official map.

Every morning, I spend an hour in my patio. Having my coffee, smoking, and trying to wake up as I go through series of thoughts about ‘how can I write this so that it makes sense? ’ This is a trouble for me. I know writing is not an easy task and it is messy; but there is an extra level of challenge for me, because as a writer from a rhetorical and literacy background that is significantly ‘non-Western,’ my whole process of writing is literally translating and transforming the writing that happens organically for me. It is a constant
(Edward Soja, *Thirdspace* 6). Mapping the non/address of the boat people, the placeless address of the home/sick Middle East, means that I need to be able to speak this language of power. I need to understand how the encrypted code of this language conceals and alters the ‘memory’ of displaced Middle East. I need to break the code.

The code of this language has been causing us to internalize and to a certain extent normalize the addressless, silent, and absent condition of these non-places. As Michel Foucault explains in “Language of Space,” this is a language of making returns to the original order of power and knowledge relation and how this relation designates the notion of self and identity in-the-world. Writing with this language and its space in the West, Foucault continues, is a game of multiple layers of retrospections that “is never neutral; it gives the impression of leaving things there where they are; in fact, it ‘removes’ them, virtually detaching them from their depths and layers, in order to enter them into the composition of a film [a narrative in a map] that is yet to exist” (165; 166). Language of power occupies open space, removes its multiple and complex socio-cultural and human relations to only re-invent this space with a new image, reality, and story. The impact of this violent erasure and silencing of open space “becomes visible as one of the main means through which the disempowered are kept away” (Gupta and Ferguson 17). I need to break the code.

I pick up the call of homesick Middle East and I arrive to an address that pins the region as the home of unwanted refugees, deviant terrorists, and oppressed/uncivilized people who
threaten the Home/Land of the Western Man. I pick up the call and use my compass to find the placeless address of forgotten, lost Middle East/s.

Boat people, Haynes calls them, are forcefully displaced and unfortunately cannot move from this placeless state to a state of belonging, security, and inclusion. They are always in an in-transit state, a non-place, wherein they “become effectively stateless [yet remain] still under the control of state power. In this way, they are without a legal protection but in no way relegated to a “bare life”: this is a life steeped in power” (Judith Butler in *Who Signs the Nation State?* 8-9). Boat people, refugees, immigrants…displaced people who are either fleeing their homes or becoming home/less without actually leaving what’s left of ‘home;’ people who become part of another state as a result of constantly changing borders; these forced movements under the terrorizing gaze of Western perception of political Islam is the in/visible image informing the ground logic of the official map. The code of the language of power conceals how this image of war, chaos, and terror works as the underlying mechanism that continuously pushes the Middle East out, into the margins of the map. I need to break the code.

To break this code, I intend to learn “how to speak the language of boat people and refugees (a language not ruled by the sovereignty of ground logic) and how to unbuild the logic of containment, the camp” (Haynes 103). The logic of borders and what they keep in-between and off the official map have become the unbearable place-memory36 of the ‘camp:’ the material camp that once terrorized millions of people transformed and became the open air-camp that replaced the geography of Middle East by designating this region as the container of eternal enemies, the evil-doers, the deviants. This open air-camp is a closed prison guarded by the borders, the frontiers that are programmed to keep everything in. The mechanical surveillance of this prison is the network system the language of power works through to contain Middle East.

36 Edward Casey defines place-memory as “the ability of place to make the past come to life in the present and thus contribute to the production and reproduction of social memory” (Tim Creswell 87).
Learning the language of power, then, is a move in finding ways to work within this tree-system. I write/map to learn this language. My writing/mapping flows rhizomatically.\textsuperscript{37} I understand my task as a writer/mapper through how Haynes describes “what an architecture of trajectories would look like: \textit{a boat in an intensive zone}” (87). As a cartographer of trajectories, I write/map on a boat (my vessel) in and through intensive zones of unseen and concealed borderlands.

I understand the language of the home/sick Middle East as a language of the intensive zone of the borderlands, the consciousness of Gloria Anzaldúa’s \textit{mestiza} that offers a third address and language as a “product of the transfer of the cultural and spiritual values of one group to another. Being [becoming] tricultural, monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual, speaking a patois, and in a state of perpetual transition, the \textit{mestiza} faces the dilemma of the mixed breed” (78). To speak the language of the \textit{mestiza}, the language of the boat people, the language of the home/sick Middle East, I take up Haynes’s task of “unbuilding the ‘ground’ as reason” because “the dissolution of ground metaphysics…effectively throws us all into the sea, or on the move, in one fell swoop. \textit{We are all boat people}” (88). To become boat people and learn the language of otherness, I continue my writing/mapping by deconstructing the metaphysical ground of Western

\textsuperscript{37}Every morning, as I dwell in the homelessness of my writing and thinking, I attempt to take a step out from my placeless state of writing wherein I feel my writing is lost, wherein I feel like my writing is out of language, words. As I try to escape and fixate my position, the sound of the birds and the movement of the river behind the big old trees right in front of my patio become stronger. And as I try harder to mute these voices, to fixate these movements, I become more incapable of mapping my lines of thoughts. I feel that my writing fails me because I cannot follow a clear path, a road that directs me to an address with specific coordinates that are easy to locate. For me, getting more attuned to the ambient surrounding of my spaces is inevitable as I move in-between the gaze of West and East. The reason for this inevitability, which is also the cause of my dis/orientation, is because as much as I am of the geographies of East, I also become of the geographies of the West. What happens when one becomes of a geography of culture and thinking is the infinite layering of culture on top of another culture? As I try harder to divorce these diverse geographies of cultures, I get lost in-between the borders. As if the only place my writing can take me is a dis/orienting no-place: borderlands and contact zones. And in these transitioning fluid places, I write rhizomatically, which I finally understand as a form of mapping. Now, I map to write, and embrace the lost geography of my writing as a bridge, a cross-road in-between the gaze of the West and East. Spaces of my writing are neither the first/West nor the second/East; it is a thirdspace of alternative acts of writings through “different spatial scales: the body, the street, the city.” (Nedra Reynolds 3)
logos: the organized and constructed space of Western logical thinking. And, I start again, in the middle, with the chance of space.

**Dialectics/Trialetics of Spatial Productions and Impacts of Cartographic Interpretations**

I cannot help but not to return to my experience of getting lost which became almost how I find my way and understand my relation to space; the very notion of being lost, becoming a lost pin on the map pushes me away, off the map. As my mother said, it felt like we were in a labyrinth. My father was the one who cracked the code of this labyrinth after driving in circles for hours. What I found the most interesting was how my father’s place-memory, his strong attachment to the city that he walked through its streets everyday more than twenty years ago, helped him to unveil this city’s present spatiality. This unveiling, a form of unbuilding the ground logic of our GPS, re/produced his place-memory. His interactions with the locals of Cappadocia helped him to form a bridge between what he remembered and how the city had changed in time. He was able to transfer this short-term place-memory he was constructing into our GPS by deconstructing its stable ground image. In this sense, my father’s mapping was rhizomatic because he responded to the chance of open space and mapped Cappadocia “within time-space…[through] arrangement-in-relation-to-each-other that is the result of there being a multiplicity of trajectories” (Doreen Massey 111). Mapping rhizomatically, he was able to see the unexpected differences, disruption, and erasures; he was able to unpack the imperfections of the ground logic.

Seeing and experiencing the imperfections of the ground logic makes me question the feasibility of the great obsession of our global age: the obsession with not getting lost and always knowing where we are, where we belong to, and where are going and how we are getting there. I would like to argue that the imperfections of ground logic are the possible paths that will take us
to a different spatiality in which “different temporalities and different voices must work out means of accommodation” (Massey 111). A form of wayfinding that responds to the chance of space by challenging and questioning the hidden mistakes/errors the official maps offer us as ‘universal truth.’ I understand mapping with this other form of spatiality, which is a cognitive process of mapping. Frederick Jameson defines this form of wayfinding as the narrower sense of cognitive mapping that “involves practical reconquest of a sense of place and the construction and reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the moments of mobile, alternative trajectories” (51). This working definition stems from Kevin Lynch’s analysis in *The Image of the City*. However, for Jameson this definition of cognitive mapping is too individualized and relies too much on the subject’s relation with imageability and wayfinding (Robert T. Tally 72-74). It does not give the connection to a broader, social global context that Jameson wants to contextualize cognitive mapping in.

Jameson formulates a broader sense of cognitive mapping by synthesizing Lynch’s analysis with an Althusserian definition of ideology and a Lacanian Symbolic: “an aesthetic of cognitive mapping [that is] a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system…a global cognitive mapping, on a social as well as spatial scale” (54). This conceptualization of cognitive mapping moves from this personal relation with space to a collective experience of space (national and global). Through this movement, cognitive mapping aims to overcome de-historicization and detachment of space, place, and mapping from politics of social, cultural, and economic relations of human production. This conceptualization and definition of cognitive mapping is Jameson’s response to the postmodern representation crisis that came with the organized logic of late capitalism, which resulted in a new depthlessness in and of space. Jean Baudrillard’s notion of
simulacrum explains this new depthlessness as an outcome of the fast production of empty models and codes—maps—that replace reality for us: a gigantic world of simulacra that neutralizes and normalizes the desire to consume and internalize the received knowledge the map feeds to us and our bodies. What we have is a world of self-referentiality that is both a technique and medium of mechanical re/production that “has no meaning: its social finality gets lost in seriality. Simulacra surpass history” (“Symbolic Exchange and Death” 138). In this surpassing of history/time abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the [re]generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory. (Baudrillard, Simulations 1-2)

What map/space as a closed system of simulation does in postmodern ideology, then, is taming history/time. This is Jameson’s main criticism of postmodernity’s hyperspaces and how these depthless spaces cause the cartographic anxiety of our global age. Jameson writes that the post-modern hyperspace and its “alarming disjunction point between the body and its built environment…the incapacity of our minds…to map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (44). Jameson connects this representation crisis to George Lukacs’s “transcendental homelessness” due to “the unresolvable…dilemma of the transfer of curved space to flat charts” (52). In this cartographic anxiety, human beings try to overcome the emotional impacts of displacement, the strong sense of homelessness, and not-belonging by trying to feel at home everywhere.

I share this desire to be at home, to re/turn home, which is why I respond to the chance of space as Massey suggests. This response leads me to turn to Jameson’s call for a global cognitive
mapping that finds its vocality not only in space but also in social life that is not a cut from history/time; a possible way to home; a possibility for a mapping that forms connections among individual, collective, and socio-cultural historical relations on the spatial theatre of the global. As I respond to the chance of space and map cognitively among multiple trajectories, I find myself in-between various dualities of spatial relations and connections. This duality of the spatial is not an oppositional conceptualization of a closed binary system like modernity vs. postmodernity. It is rather a duality that I understand with Soja’s conceptualization of a socio-spatial dialectic and historico-geographical materialism that moves towards a third interpretative geography, “one which recognized spatiality as simultaneously…a social product (or outcome) and a shaping force (or medium) in social life” (Postmodern Geographies 7).

Yet again, I return to my experience of getting lost with our GPS because every returning to this moment opens another level of map-meaning and how this meaning impacts our spaces, relations, and connections to open space. I started this chapter with this returning as a rhizomatic mapping. I cannot escape from returning to the memory-image of Turkish navy officers on the shores of the Aegean Sea, getting refugees from illegal boats that they were in. The boats that became lifeless and sad images of lost hopes is the memory-image that haunts me. This unexpected movement from my personal cognitive mapping of getting lost to yet another mental mapping of a broader, a collective crisis of being lost, being forcefully displaced, is how I understand my practice of rhizomatic mapping. It is a writing of how different experiences of space, varying levels of spatial meanings and place-memories, shape “a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exists and its own lines of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari 20-21).

Christian Jacob offers me a significant level of understanding of how “the map varies in its identity and in its functions. It is not perceived nor does it circulate in society in the same way.
[When it comes to the map], a wide range of individual and social uses, of symbolic and empirical meanings” are possible (51). The technological improvements in cartographic methods of information design inform a variety of meanings, functions, and circulations of map-objects. As new technologies enter into the field of cartography, the forms of interpreting the meaning of space gain new perspectives. The scientific and technological developments are linked to the changing conditions of politics, economics, and international relations. Changes in the global world relations on these different fronts have an impact on social and cultural relations of human needs and expectations. As we are told we need our smartphones and cyborg maps to always know where we are and where we need to go, we are also marked, traced, and kept under close surveillance. In this sense, I find it important to consider how the changes “in the political organization of the state” impact the technological developments in the field of cartography (Emanuela Casti 143; Denis Cosgrove, “Introduction: Map Meaning” 4). Unpacking the connection between political state and cartographic information design also requires us to consider the shifting social, cultural, and economic contexts of human relations. Examining this complex chain of relations is yet another important step in deconstructing hidden subjective positions and interpretations shaping the map-image.

In addition to these broader socio-political and economic and cultural factors, it is equally important to remember how we as human beings are highly spatial animals with a strong desire to map our spaces to imagine a world that might be. This more personal/individual level of envisioning a map-image is also informed by our social, cultural, and political contexts and lived experiences. In this complexity of cartographic visualization and spatial production, the notion of interpretation, as Jacob explains,

is a movement…between the agency of authority (the normative power of the map) and unique and individual itineraries—imaginary excursions, visual wandering, and
intellectual poaching—which cause each individual, in his or her own way, to appropriate the geographical map, to become implicated in it and to circulate within it, to project his or her memories and desires into it. It is a movement, finally, between the graphic paths and the construction of a meaningful image. (271)

Approaching cartographic interpretation as a movement among varying degrees and levels of experiencing and engaging with space and spatiality introduces us to the idea that map-making is a way for people “to tell other people about the places or space they experienced” (Harley, “The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography” 2). This desire to map for me is a desperate need to help make sense out of experiencing space and understanding what containing, controlling, and policing space does. This is why I have been writing about the place of the boat people. Reading about them, seeing them on TV, hearing statistics, and how much money is needed for them to be taken care of did not warn me about the silence, pain, and fear of the boat people. That day, seeing that boat under the burning sun was beyond anything that I have ever known about them. The spatially contained life of boat people is incomprehensible.

In Thiridspace, Soja’s notion of the third interpretative geography helps me to understand the complex factors involved in interpreting and producing meanings of space. The complex process of producing spatial knowledge tells me something very important about my journey in finding the addressless Middle East: there might be more than one addresses to look for. To be honest, I have never expected anything less than a challenge. Finding these addresses is breaking the code of the language of power. This is why I am navigating through different cartographic and spatial interpretation modes to unpack multiple paths to respond to Middle East.

This complexity in different cartographic/spatial interpretations, I suggest, is a reflection of the complexity in the connection between the mind and the world. I read this relation as a dialectical production of discursive exchanges; a circular movement between the individual and
collective production, between subjective and objective perspectives of the world, and between socio-cultural and political relations. In this dialectical relation, Henri Lefebvre offers a conceptual triad unpacking the ways we experience and also practice space: spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces (33). Each corner of this triad is connected to three modes of being and perceiving space: perceived, conceived, and lived (Tally 118).

This diagram (Fig. 2) is a simplified mapping representing the relationship between the three modes of spatial productions and three modes of being and comprehending social space that Lefebvre presents. However, the relationship is more complex than what my simple diagram is capable of presenting. Lefebvre explains that spatial practice is a “practice of a society’s secrets that society’s space…in a dialectical interaction; it produced it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it…the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space”: perceived space (38). Perceived space, then, is the space of everyday social life blending with the common and popular perception and representation of a society’s space. Representations of space, Lefebvre continues, is “conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdivides and social engineers…all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived…This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production)” (38-39). The space of scientists, transparent objectivity and universal truth, is the
closed space that dominates the ‘third’/open space in the triad. I perceive Lefebvre’s conceptualization of representational spaces as another understanding of open/third space. For Lefebvre, representational spaces are “directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’…This is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space…representational spaces…tend towards more or less coherent system of non-verbal symbols and signs” (39). Third space, even though it is given a fixed position in the triad, is fluid; it flows between the conceived and perceived space.

In Thirdspace, Soja explains this conceptual triad of Lefebvre as triple dialectics, trialectics, which gives me the ability to illustrate Massey’s notion of the chance of space more clearly and why responding to this chance is important in this project to respond to the home/sick Middle East. Thirdspace is what the chance of space offers: the element of surprise, openness, and alternative spatiality; it disrupts conceptual dialectics of oppositional binaries such as West vs. Middle/East; in this sense, as Soja indicates, thirdspace as a product of a “thirding” of the spatial imagination, the creation of another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the material and mental spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope, substance, and meaning. Simultaneously real and imagined and more (both and also…), the exploration of Thirdspace can be described and inscribed in journey to “real-and-imaged” (or perhaps “realandimagined”?) places. (Thirdspace 11)

The possibility, capability, and ability of thirding, thirdspace, is an alternative mode of production that floats among the personal, collective, and global visions of space. Thirdspace is a critical part of “the fundamental premise of the socio-spatial dialectics…[which is] that social and spatial relations are dialectically inter-reactive, interdependent; that social relations of production
are both space-forming and space-contingent” (Soja, *Postmodern Geographies* 81). Thirding is a mode of production with a strong chance of disrupting, challenging, and countering the closed space of the homogenic global word order. However, the question remains: if spatial production is a diverse and complex process of rhetorical meaning-making and engaging with the world, how come we are dominated by one path to understanding our geographies of cultures and geographies of space? How come, when we talk of a global space, we are fixed within the borders of Western gaze and how has this gaze has been constructing this global space? Responding to these questions is yet another pathway I take to understand and deconstruct the sovereign ground logic that has been pushing the boat people off the official map.

**Globalization and the Dead Gaze of Western Modernity**

Let’s start again, in the middle, with the great obsession of our global age and its unifying networks: time-space compression for easier and faster communication, mobility, and transportation without ever worrying about getting lost or getting disconnected. David Harvey indicates that what we have been going through recently is this strong phase of space-time compression in which “the world suddenly feels much smaller, and the time-horizons over which we can think about social action become much shorter” (123). This phase defines the current state of globalization in which we suffer from a mass identity crisis due to how the space-time compression supporting the capitalist mode of production of space “has shaken up our sense of who and what we are” (Harvey 124). This representation crisis has emerged because of how the “capitalist mode of production promotes the production of cheap and rapid forms of communication and transportation in order that ‘the direct product can be realized in distant markets in mass quantities’ at the same time as new ‘spheres of realization of labour driven by capital’ can be opened up” (Harvey 244). This obsession with a faster production of commodified spaces and environments for us to consume claims that the betterment of human beings, and the
nourishment of their bodies and minds is a priority. This argument reaches out to us as a call from the past: the call of European modernity, the enlightened Western man and the “great obsession of the nineteenth century…[which] was, as we know, history/time: with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycles, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the word” (Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”). In the vision of modernity, space as an empty voice became a mode of producing historical narrative and identities. How space is produced through multiple relations of social, cultural, and individual relations lost its value because it did not serve the agenda of the imperial and capitalist systems of production: dominating power forms/‘State’ (Foucault, “Questions on Geography” 177 and Soja, Postmodern Geographies 14). Space needed to be emptied to be used as a white canvas in re-inventing the new modern world order.

The industrial West and its rising capitalism has been mechanically reproducing the knowledge of our spaces in a shorter amount of time to improve capital growth and to serve the imperial power embodied in the top-down hierarchy of its modern State. This emphasis on mass production changed the meaning and function of space, which resulted in how the knowledge of space is produced, constructed, and organized. The visual-material object, the map, became the container that holds the universal truth for the meaning of space, for the meaning of geographies of cultures, social, economic, and politic relations. The map-object became one of the vessels of the machinic system of capital production of the sovereign ground logic. Harvey informs us that the production of space for capital growth stemmed from the desire for territorializing and owning/having ownership over space:

In the imperialist era, the cartographic basis was laid for the imposition of capitalist forms of territorial rights in areas of the world (Africa, the America, Australasia, and much of Asia) that had previously lacked them. Cartographic definition of sovereignty
(state formation), aided state formation and the exercise of state powers. Cartography laid the legal basis for class-based privileges of land-ownership and the right to the appropriation of the fruits of both nature and labor within well-defined spaces. It also opened up the possibility for the ‘rational’ organization of space for capital accumulation, the partition of space for purposes of efficient administration or for the pursuit of improvements in the health and welfare of populations (the Enlightenment dream incorporated into rational planning for human welfare). (220)

I read the rhetorical situation of Western cartography with its heavy reliance on Cartesian logic, its strong desire to de-re-territorialize geographies of spaces for capital growth, state power, and ownership; it was, is, and will be a rhetoric of subjugation, alienation, and oppression. As Piper indicates, as much as cartography has been producing the knowledge of the earth as the object to be studied and understood, it also has been producing us. In this closed binary relation in which the both space and men are produced in the discourse of power relations, I understand cartography as “part of a colonial discourse [more broadly part of a discourse of subjugating power relations and networks] invested in establishing ‘whiteness,’ or transparency, as a kind of identity formation” (217-220).

Today, as Foucault predicted, we are in the epoch of space, “epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment…when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein” (“Of Other Spaces”). Epoch as a metaphor for space is an intelligent rhetorical move to critique how space became a commodity that is at the service of time. The discourse of capitalist and imperialist state power values time “richness, fecundity, life, and dialectic” by devaluing space
(Foucault, “Questions on Geography” 177). This annihilation of space by time has been necessary for capital production, consumption, and the mass circulation of spatial products (Harvey 81-83).

The capital mode of production has resulted in the construction of center-periphery relations that emerged from the binary structures of power networks. This spatial binary—center-periphery—resulted in the mass geopolitical production of otherness. Production of otherness in the geopolitical arena resulted in implementing borders that re-reproduced the notions of center-periphery around First and Third world countries on a global level. Invention of these spatial binaries leaves little room for an alternative that remains in-between, which is the second world countries that “are frequently both first- and third-world at the same time” and these countries represent “a zone of great potential, both actual and unrealized…with their future uncertain” due to having a limited role and voice on the global market place and geopolitical relations (Parag Khanna xxv).

In the global communication networks, the use of the term Second World is vague in its meaning and function. Second world is commonly used to represent ‘developing countries’ in the geopolitical theatre of global relations. In this sense, the meaning and function of Second World is an in-between spatiality of becoming. The movement and openness in the reality and future of Second World as a spatial entity could be considered as a ‘thirdspace.’ It has the potential for disrupting the bipolar global world order of the First and Third Worlds. However, the system of mass reproduction works to maintain this dichotomized hierarchy. As a result, Second World only remains as a term that refers to the possibility of development that might happen in countries that are closer to the Third World. However, these countries that are in the process of becoming developed countries almost never reach this destination. Take Turkey as an example. As a second world country, Turkey has been a great example for the Western First World countries to make a strong case against the Middle Eastern Third World countries on how a developing country
should be. This has been Turkey’s spatial meaning and function in-between the West and Middle East: always a developing country, always an example for underdeveloped Middle Eastern countries, yet never accepted and considered as a developed country.

This fixed image and meaning of Second World illustrates that this in-between category is in use to always stabilize the distinction and separation between the First and the Third World. The meaning of Second World is determined by the reproduced binary of the First and Third worlds; it represents the process of development yet never actually means that. Additionally, the idea of second world, its address and geographical location are in reality closer to the Third World. The use of the term functions as a barrier, as an undefined border that keeps the unwanted others, whether second world or third world, out in the margins. The realities of these world regions are determined by the dichotomized ground logic of the map-object. In other words, map-object as the medium of representation becomes the meaning that we define our roles and identities with in the global village we are connected to: today the medium/the map is the message/meaning (Marshall McLuhan 26; 41; 157).

Massey indicates that “our notion of the root meaning of ‘map’, [the map medium as the message of spatial truth] the term map in its most common current Western usage, has to do with geography and space…Maps are about space; they are forms of representation, indeed iconic forms…But a map of a geography is no more that geography—or that space—than a painting of a pipe is a pipe” (106). Yet, this cognitive image of a representation of geographic and spatial knowledge has become the universal truth that defines the dichotomized global world order we have been living in: centers and peripheries, higher and lower spaces, First-World and Third-World geographies—socio-spatial dialectical tensions between the dominant discourse of scientific production of space and the social production of space.
The dominant vision of the Western cartography represents the hegemonic gaze of globalization and its discourse of power-knowledge relation. As Foucault explains in “Two Lectures,” “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth…In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power” (93–94). In this discourse of power, which operates as the underlying mechanism of globalization, “we ‘map things out’ to get a feeling for their structure, call for ‘cognitive maps’…Maps as a representation of an essential structure. The ordering representation” (Massey 106). This ordering is the product of the Western cognitive mapping that represents the Western modern thinking system and its global image. As much as this image represents the Western modernity’s violent colonial history and imperial domination, it is important to be aware that this discourse has never accomplished a finalized domination over the “alternative forms of territoriality, which continue to haunt the map.

Similarly, the progress of the map, itself, could be read as a kind of cognitive failure—a form of mistaken identity” (Piper 220). How this cognitive failure, this mistaken identity, has succeeded to establish its vision as the dominant mode of knowledge production is what I am interested in investigating. Unpacking the dominant vision of this cognitive failure is a path to unbuilding the ground logic’s mistaken identity.

I am at a crossroads wherein I am following the invisible footsteps of the boat people; because the dis/orienting image of the boat people is at the heart of the representation crisis of our global age. A representation crisis John Pickles explains as the Cartographic-Cartesian Anxiety that stems from the dis/orienting tension between the modern/objective and post-modern/subjective visions and “how implicit assumptions about objectivism and subjectivism frame the understanding of error and distortion in cartography” (28). I consider this as anxiety’s
source as the dominant vision of contemporary globalization, which is “Western in its origins and integrated into the process of modernization through which the very idea of ‘the West’ has been differentiated on a single global surface” (Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye x). The narrative line of this vision is the narrative of the borderless and unified global world of social life and relations that are beyond the separating borders of the nations; the narrative of a one-world picture in which the divided territories are opened yet kept in a safe distance from one another. John Short explains that “at the heart of globalization [and its vision] is an ambiguity…globalization is making places both different and the same. It is bringing people closer apart and places further together” (9).

I suggest that the ambiguity in the meaning and function of globalization is due to the subjectivity involved in determining including and excluding geographies of cultures according to the power hierarchy that orders the image of the global map. David Sibley indicates that the notion of exclusion, social and spatial, “is necessarily concerned with inclusion, with the ‘normal’ as much as the ‘deviant’, the ‘same’ as well as the ‘other’, and with credentials required to gain entry to the dominant groups in society” (xv). In this light, determining what and where to include and also how to include in the unifying image of globalization starts with a discussion on what and where to exclude in addition to how to exclude. The subjective decisions being made in this process of exclusion and inclusion creates the cartographic anxiety Pickles addresses: an anxiety emerging from ambiguity, the arbitrary image of the map. I suggest that this complex connection between inclusion and exclusion is at the core of the ambiguous meaning and function of globalization. This desire to exclude what is considered and defined as different is strong, a will embodied in the dead gaze of Western modernity and the ideology of Western modernization.

Short indicates that the consciousness of globalization was simply a replacement of the consciousness of modernity. However, this replacement was not necessarily meant as an entire change in the methods and theories of modernity in the discourse of globalization; it has never
been a paradigm shift in the sense of a reconstruction of the old view and methods of modernity; rather this replacement has been “a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old paradigm” (Thomas S. Kuhn 85). Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the project of modernity as an incomplete one is a similar approach to what Shaw adopts, which understands the project of globalization and the global state as also incomplete. Both projects are incomplete, because the project of modernity continues its task in the larger scale of the project of globalization. Habermas indicates that today the modern consciousness is dead, yet still dominant because the consciousness of modernity is embedded into the vision of globalization (7). The vision of Western modernization has been operating to prevent the unwanted change that comes with the notion of globalization: “the foreign other, an incomprehensible force that is beyond national, let alone individual, control” (Short 8). The unifying image of globalization has been concealing the differentiating and alienating forces of the Western modern gaze and justifying the problematic spatial ordering in the map-object. This is one of the most prominent ways the map of globalization has been lying to us: presenting its visual meaning as it is not impacted or shaped by the dominant world view of Western modernity.

The strong emphasis on objectivity to transparent truth and reality in Western modern sciences, including cartography and geography, has a tendency to overlook the critical relation between knowledge production and social and cultural contexts of different belief systems. According to Short,

‘World-views’ are the material products of cultural projects such as nation-building, colonial expansion or cultural hegemony. In each, maps (and other forms of representation) have played their role. Systems of meaning are inscribed in maps through the lines, boundaries and symbols that give meaning and reality to the world. These are
not mere representations of reality but come to represent objects whose existence is in part conditioned and produced by their representations. (31-32)

I consider the world-view of globalization as the material product of the cultural project of Western modernization. To clarify how the modern gaze continues to shape the spatial representation of globalization, it is important to understand in which ways the global gaze is different from the modern vision. According to Massey, globalization “calls up a vision of total unfettered mobility…It is a mantra which evokes a powerful vision of an immense, unstructured, free unbounded space and of a glorious, complex mixity…an imagination of the world’s geography…which contrasts radically with the modernist one. In place of an imagination of a world of bounded places we are now presented with a world of flows” (81). While globalization seems to be already embracing the chance of open space, it actually annihilates the chance of space with its borderless vision, which eliminates the need for movements and crossings.

There is a great value in being able to freely cross borders, which always challenges the borders and the notion of exclusion through the very movement of crossing. In this sense, while the spatial vision of globalization seems to be in contrast with the gaze of modernity, “the structuring characteristics of the conceptualization of space” in both discourses focus on controlling “spatial differences” either by keeping them out or by erasing them under the temporality of extensive totalization (Massey 83). In both discourses of modernity and globalization, “the real is not only what can be reproduced, that which is already produced” and this is the paradox of representation that Pickles addresses it (31). This paradox of representation is what Baudrillard means when he indicates that “the territory no longer preceded the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory-PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA-it is the map that engenders the territory” (Simulations 1-2). The already produced representation of the map-object becomes the reality defining space. Massey describes this
paradox as the “aspatial view of globalization… [in which] the essential multiplicities of spatial
are denied” (82). This denial, resistance to the chance of space, produces a dis/orienting spatial
unity that strategically divides the world map under the hierarchical vision of Western modernity.

There is one enormous geographical reality the aspatial vision mechanically re-produces: a
unified world with a hierarchical bipolar division. The “effects of this reality are political” and
these political effects makes the rules that decide which geographies are included in the civilized
and modern First World and which geographies are excluded. The ground logic of this exclusion
frames the idea of the West and the rest/non-Western dichotomy, which is the dead yet still
dominant gaze of Western modernity. Massey describes this particular form of globalization that
currently dominates our geographies as the capitalist globalization, which is “a discursive
manoeuvre which at a stroke obscures the possibility of seeing alternative forms” and the political
discourse of this vision which is beyond the reach of economic and technological considerations
“is an important component in the continuing legitimization of the view that there is one
particular model of ‘development,’ one path to one form of ‘modernisation’” (83; 84). This one
path to modernity, unfortunately, is a dangerous path for the boat people due to how this path is
already doomed to be a path of being denied and rejected. It is a path that represents the unwanted
change of globalization; a path wherein democracy, justice, and equality lost their way to
humanity: chance of space has gone missing.

Western Modernity and Ground Logic of Global Space

The spatial image the cartographic reality of capitalist aspatial globalization is a
terror/izing vision for me. A black hole from a sci-fi movie or an artificial intelligence taking over
the world; that’s what I think when I try to understand the global space that we are all connected
to. The model of the tree-system and its image, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, is the visual
metaphor that works for me to explain the unbearable political effects of this vision: the tree-
system’s hierarchy of reproduction translates “the map into an image…rhizome into roots and radicles” (11). The map of capitalist globalization’s image is a Western cartographic construction, which is “relatively fixed, rooted in space or holding to stable patterns distribution and identity…used to actually accomplish spatial stability” (Cosgrove, “Introduction: Map Meaning” 5). This cartographic image is a reflection of the Western tree-system, which is rooted in the dead gaze and consciousness of Western modern thinking.

**The Consciousness of Modern Thought**

The consciousness of modern thought is a binary system of thinking that separates itself from a past that is considered as not-modern. According to Bruno Latour,

Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The adjective ‘modern’ designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. When the word ‘modern’, ‘modernization’, or ‘modernity’ appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight, in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns. (10)

Western modernity and its tree-system considers its reality “as the result of a transition from the old to the new” which is a process “freeing itself from all specific historical ties” (Habermas 3). I understand the consciousness of modernity as a form of rhetorical re-invention that operates as a system that re-produces the modern vision of Western identity in the changing contexts of social, cultural, economic, political, and technological shifts. While this process of change seems as a progress moving with the irreversible arrow of time, a transition from old to the new, it is also never a complete departure nor separation from the past, from the old realities, structures, and forms of engaging with the world. It is a cumulative mechanical process of
reproduction that maintains the promise for a new world, for a better world in the identity of the modern Western man.

Once again, the grand-narrative of Western modernity is the story line I am mapping in: an excessive form of alienation and marginalization of differences that is justified by the grand promise of the betterment of humanity in a unified world. What I am curiously trying to understand better is how this marginalizing system and its totalizing alienating gaze has managed to dominate alternative/non-Western modes of thinking and producing knowledge.

**Western and non-Western Modes of Thinking**

I have always been aware of how different it is for me to write in the Western rhetorical context. The simplest act of presenting a thesis, the main argument, the conjecture at the beginning of my writing is probably one of the most difficult things that I have to accomplish. Because the way I learned to compose a meaningful argument requires a different relationship to my audience; a relationship that seeks to work simultaneously with my reader. As you read, you unpack the argument with me and we reach a central idea, a thesis, together. It is a mutual process of writing/reading, which I understand as a circular one. Trying to transform this discursive and collaborative process of meaning-making to effectively engage with my Western audience has been a challenging task. Richard Nisbett explains that Asians think by paying “attention to wide a range of things…[they] search for relationships between things” due to believing “you cannot understand the part without understand the whole” (91). I find myself constantly nodding my head and agreeing with these lines as I read them silently. Eastern, Asian, Tribal, Nomadic…non-Western and non-mainstream forms of thinkings have a different relationship to the world. In these cultures and traditions, thinking of the world is a thinking that forms an image of relationships, connections, overlays, and crossings that seek knowledge and meaning in open spaces. More importantly, these modes of thinking wait for space to let knowledge emerge to
produce a meaningful interpretation. This is the reason for many non-Westerners it is difficult to adjust to the Westerners’ “deterministic world” due to how “they focus on salient objects or people instead of the larger picture” (Nisbett 93). In Western thinking, waiting for space to tell you its secrets means not having control, and Westerners “think they can control events because they know the rules that govern the behavior of objects” (Nisbett 91). This logical reasoning, which is the ground logic of the Western thinking, is what eliminates the chance of space, and it is the reason for its succession over non-Western forms of knowing the world.

As Nisbett unpacks the main differences between Western and Asian thoughts, he also cannot avoid making the kind of generalization I am making here. For example, he indicates Westerners have a strong interest in categorization, which helps them to know what rules to apply to the objects in question, and formal logic plays a role in problem solving. East Asians, in contrast, attend to objects in their broad context. The world seems more complex…understanding events always requires consideration of a host of factors that operate in relation to one another in no simple, deterministic way. Formal logic plays little role in problem solving. In fact, the person who is too concerned with logic may be considered immature. (129)

This last sentence is where I find an essential connection to my own culture, which I can simply call ‘the Turkish culture.’ But I am also aware that the long history that crosses many borders and constitutes the thinking of my culture is more than one geography and one cultural tradition. It is a mosaic of the great works of Persian literature and Arabic logos connected to the multiple canals of Turkic cultures and myths that feed the heart and soul of the cultural and social tradition I identify myself with. I am not talking about one indigenous culture and dominant social system; I am trying to describe a connection of heterogeneous formations that form alliances among different paths of thoughts to form yet another one. I describe this diverse
connectivity through the model of rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari describe one of the main traits of rhizome through the principles of connections and heterogeneity: “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be…A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (7). The rhizomatic consciousness is also evident in the language uses of non-Western cultures. As Nisbett unfolds the cognitive differences between Westerners and Easterners/Asians, he indicates that the differences among the language uses between these different geographies of cultures tell us a lot about the different cognitive processes of these thinking models. According to Nisbett,

The Western concern with categories is reflected in language. “Generic” noun phrases are more common for English speakers than for Chinese speakers, perhaps because Western languages mark in a more explicit way whether a generic interpretation of an utterance is the correct one. In fact, in Chinese there is no way to tell the difference between the sentence “squirrels eat nuts” and “this squirrel is eating the nut.” Only context can provide this information. English speakers know from linguistic markers whether it is a category or an individual that is being talked about. (156)

This will to categorize in Western thinking is rooted in the Platonic form of abstraction of objects and their properties. Westerners, as Nisbett argues, “encourage making properties of objects into real objects in their own right” and this level of abstraction actually has “a greater reality than the properties of objects in the physical world” (156). At this point, unfortunately, it makes a little more sense to me how the Western way to responding to the boat people can actually deal with this crisis of displacement more logically; a logical approach that assesses the situation with a focus on numbers and statistics (properties of human objects) and what these numbers tell become the reality: numbers are too great for Europe/West to let all the refugees in,
numbers reveal a critical risk of a significant amount of possible terrorists to also come into Europe/West, the numbers tell that we need to keep them out because that is the reality of Western logos, a reality of the great divide between the West and East.

Yet, as Nisbett indicates, this kind of high level of abstraction and production of truth/knowledge has never been a characteristic of Chinese language, which I extend to many of the non-Western languages and their cultures and thinkings. I understand the geographies of many non-Western languages as rhizomatic becomings that are “highly contextual. Words (or phonemes) typically have multiple meanings, so to be understood [and to understand the world] they require the context of sentences” within the social-cultural context of their meaning-making (Nisbett 157). I find the model of rhizome highly effective in understanding the diverse rhetorical meaning-makings in non-Western cultures across geographies. The rhizome metaphor allows me to move from the Western rhetorical situation to a cross-cultural rhetorical circulation of diverse modes of non-Western thinking. In this context, privileging one mode of rhetorical thinking, which has been the Western rhetorical situation, fails us in our globalizing world today because we cannot talk about one “ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogenous linguistic community…There is no mother tongue [nor one form of thinking that works for everyone], only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity” (Deleuze and Guattari 7). This power takeover is what terrorizes and paralyzes the boat people.

The linguistic tree of Western modernity has become the primary dominant language with its multiple political systems of power arbitrarily during the beginning of the twentieth century. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, this linguistic tree “plots a point, fixes an order” and as in Chomsky’s model “begins at a point S [sign] and proceeds by dichotomy [signifier and signified]” (7). The linguistic tree of Western modern thinking has been producing linguistic universals to distinctly define and categorize similarities and differences among the cultures of
the West and East. These universal linguistic categories have determined the fate and reality of
the boat people for us. They belong to a symbolic reality of chaos, terror, disorder, homelessness,
and the inevitable fate of death. They suffer from epistemic violence of codification and they
cannot speak.38

**Knowledge Production in the World Views of West and East**

Through its binary logic and the epistemic violence of codification, the modern Western
thought system and its language take over the political power that creates silences and absences in
our spaces. The boat people are always offshore because they cannot speak.

I trace the roots of this epistemic violence of codification back to Plato and Aristotle. The
early thinking of ancient Greek rhetorics gave birth to the skeleton of the scientific knowledge
production that played an essential role in shaping the image of Western modernity. Plato
established the central division between nature and social/object and subject in his ‘Theory of
Forms’ by using the methods of division and subdivision through the continuous use of the ‘what
is?’ question.39 As George Kennedy explains, every “what is?” question in Plato’s dialogues aims
to create categories, divisions and subdivisions with a focus on the differences/counterparts of
‘arts’: true arts (based on knowledge/Platonic philosophy) in relation to arts of ‘flattery’ (based on
persuasion/pleasure/Sophistic rhetoric) (62-63). By continuously asking the ‘what is?’ question,
Plato has formed a system that creates fixed divisions and subdivisions to define nature and social
in a dual-oppositional binary structure: ‘what is?’ vs. ‘what is not?’ and/or ‘being’ vs. ‘not-being.’

As a student of Plato, Aristotle draws many ideas from his teacher; yet he differs from
Plato in terms of his pragmatic approach in creating a system of rhetoric. As George Kennedy
explains: “In many areas of study Aristotle may have begun with questions as Plato viewed them,
but he lacked Plato’s mystical side and was far more pragmatic than his master” (74-75).

38 Gayatri, Spivak. “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
39 Primarily in his dialogues *Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Sophists.*
Aristotle’s pragmatic approach reveals itself within the method he used to create a system for “rhetoric” as an art in his treatise *On Rhetoric*: system of definition determined by species—genus—differentiae. Similar to Plato in *Gorgias*, Aristotle divides, categorizes, and groups parts considering many possibilities and common spaces to reach the universal truth and to create an ideal system that functions for all. Even though Plato and Aristotle had different approaches to Nature, which was mirrored in their system of thinking, they both worked on developing “an all-embracing system of thought...around certain novel theoretical conceptions, which could provide a ‘logical skeleton’ for scientific explanation” (Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield 74). The emphasis on fixed and distinct divisions to define Nature and Social and all matters/forms in Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms,’ and the pragmatic extension of Plato’s philosophy at the hands of Aristotle with an emphasis on unity and reaching to universal truth gave birth to fixed binary structures.

In comparison to the logical scienticity of Western thought, its high level of abstraction, individualization, and objectification to grasp the knowledge of the world in a manner that is applicable and true for everyone, Eastern thought in its diversity, in its heterogeneous fluidity, has always understood and engaged with the world in its complexity and in its relations to parts and pieces. Nisbett explains this essential difference between Western and Eastern thought systems by examining Chinese thinking and its orientation toward the world. As Nisbett indicates, the Chinese non-linear and non-deterministic orientation towards world reveals a great insight into the Eastern orientation towards life: “The world is constantly changing and is full of contradictions. To understand and appreciate one state of affairs requires the existence of its opposite; what seems to be true now may be the opposite of what it seems to be” (12-13). The notions of constant change and fluidity in Eastern world views in contrast to the stability and grounded fixity in Western world views is at the heart of the current cartographic representation.
crises we suffer from in our global space. While the dominant gaze of the Western global vision constructs this global space “as being composed of discreet objects or separate atoms” of differences, the alienated and outlasted alternative non-Western world views—Eastern—see “the world as consisting of continuous substances” (Nisbett 80).

This middle way runs through the Eastern modes of knowledge production, which is nonstable, always changing, and leads to multiple positions and forms of understanding and engaging with the world. Instead of a binary logic preferring simplicity in organizing the knowledge of the world—Western thinking—in Eastern cognitive processes there is “a part-whole dichotomy” being used to make sense of the world (Nisbett 138). The rhizome model as a meta-metaphor unfolds the complex orientation of the world in the Eastern vision: “the East presents a different figure [in comparison to the West]: a relation to the steppe and garden (or in some cases, the desert and the oasis), rather than forest and field; cultivation of tubers by fragmentation of the individual” which is a rhizomatic openness, fluidity, and heterogeneity (Deleuze and Guattari 18). As its binary logic and linear orientation to the world illustrate, “the tree has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought…the root-foundation, Grund, racine, fondement…a special relation to the forest, and deforestation; the fields carved from the forest are populated with seed plant produced by cultivation based on species lineages of the arborescent type” which is a simplistic system of categorization that limits knowledge (Deleuze and Guattari 18). The tree-model in understanding the binary logic of the Western modern thought is an image depicting how the “one-many, individual-class organization of knowledge [in Western thinking] encourages induction from the single case” which makes it easier to eliminate error and make generalizations in ordering knowledge (Nisbett 139).

This simplicity in Western binary logical reasoning made it easier to make the argument against the complex thinking of the East in defining Western modern thought as the dominant
world view over primitive non-Western forms. As Nisbett also explains, “simple models are the most useful ones—at least in science—because they’re easier to disprove and consequently to improve upon” (134). The simplistic vision of Western modern thought impacted how knowledge is organized and as a result became the foundation of the dominant mode of scientific knowledge production of our global age and consequently how a unified geography of space is constructed and ordered around simplified categories of social, cultural, economic, politic, and technological differences: West/developed and East/Rest/underdeveloped/developing.

**Mechanical Knowledge Production and Cartography**

I use the tree metaphor in unpacking the dichotomized ground logic of Western thought and its methodological application of knowledge production. But, I understand the working mechanism of Western thinking with Walter Benjamin’s ‘mechanical reproduction’ in relation to the work of art. The line of connection I am mapping between the system of the tree-image and mechanical reproduction in unfolding the logic of modern scientific knowledge production is the very notion of ‘reproduction’ itself. Benjamin notes that “a work of art has always been reproducible. Man-made artifacts could always be imitated by men. Replicas were made by pupils in practice of their craft, by masters for diffusing their works, and, finally by third parties in the pursuit of gain” (218). The reproduction of a work of art, then, echoes the Western modes of producing knowledge, which informs the cartographic process of visualization as a scientific method of spatial knowledge production.

Marie-Anger Brayer explains that before the succession of scientific objectivity in nineteenth century “the geographic map was understood as a parable of painting…Maps and works of art allowed for the displacement of one’s point-of-view and multiple points-of-view, even offering ‘several points-of-view’ simultaneously by favoring none, from whence comes an iconic mobility” (57). The reproduction Benjamin refers to is a different kind of reproduction; a
reproduction that requires direct human engagement with the process without eliminating the
discovery of new representations and understandings of existing knowledge/art. However, with
the Renaissance and Enlightenment, which resulted in fundamental changes in Western society
and its thinking, a monocular perspective in representing space became the dominant vision
“assigning a fixed point-of-view on the world,” and during the nineteenth-century, “the century of
positivism and rationalization . . . an irremediable schism between painting and maps occurred,”
which resulted in map/mapping becoming a specific sub-discipline of the category of scientific
knowledge: cartography (Brayer 58). A switch occurred between the lines of engaging with the
world; a mechanical shift that altered re/production.

Benjamin explains mechanical reproduction as something different from reproduction
that “represents something new… the technique of [mechanical] reproduction detaches the
reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a
plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder
or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced” (218-221). Today,
the map object as a product of mechanical reproduction functions the same way for us. We carry
the plural copies of our world in our smart phones; we walk the streets we are told to; we drive
through roads we are directed to; we do not see or hear the silences and distortions these replicas
hide from us; we are blind to the consequences. As Jon Berger eloquently observes: “prophesy
now involves geographical rather than historical projection; it is space, not time, that hides
consequences from us” (qtd. in Soja, Postmodern Geographies 93).

The space that has been hiding the boat people, hiding Aylan, is the aspatial global space
that the binary logic of the gaze of Western modernity has been mechanically reproducing; a tree-
space with “a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered
or segmented higher unity…[that] never get[s] beyond the One-Two, and fake multiplicities”
(Deleuze and Guattari 16). This sad image is the dominant discourse that narrates the hi/story of the boat people, the reality of the non-Western other; the fate of home/sick Middle East. To me this sad image embodies itself in those empty boats; the fear, the terror, the violence…and I am trying to use words to understand…yet I fall into the language of power that has been keeping the boat people off-shore. I am calling them the unwanted other, the feared so-called terrorists being kept out, the deviants and threats to Western modern society. Their inherent otherness is something I have also internalized within myself, because I am also the other that does not belong. The ground logic of the aspatial global map keeps us at a distance, away, in an absent space of silence. In this space of silence, I write with boat people…with Middle/East—wherever middle of East is—because the language of people is an articulation and a performative act that negates the language of sovereign ground logic.

It is a language that uses codes that the ground logic does not know how to speak. It changes lines, uses a different sign/al. To make the switch, to change the code, I return to the call of the home/sick Middle East. And again, I start in the middle, with the dead gaze of modernity and its eternal Other…the Orient…the Middle East!
CHAPTER 3: THE MAKING OF THE ‘ORIENTAL OTHER’

“To see a camel train laden with the spices of Arabia and the rare fabrics of Persia come marching through the narrow alleys of the bazaar among porters with their burdens, money changers, lamp-merchants, Al-naschars in the glass-ware business, portly cross-legged Turks smoking the famous narghili, and the crowds drifting to and fro in the fanciful costumes of the East, is a genuine revelation of the Orient. The picture lacks nothing. It casts you back at once into your forgotten boyhood, and again you dream over the wonder of the Arabian Nights; again your companions are princes, your lord is the Caliph Haroun Al Rachid, and your servants are terrific giants and genii come with smoke and lighting and thunder, and go as a storm goes when they depart.” Mark Twain, Innocents Abroad or The New Pilgrims Progress, 411

“The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.” Edward Said, Orientalism, 1

Rhizome 3-Mapping of Zero Degree: A Story of Dis/Orientation⁴⁰ #rhizomap

“I am walking, again, through the stem-canals of the underground cities. I see what my eyes saw once and I look through that cave’s window to say hi to my sister and her husband. He tells me he just met a family from Texas and said ‘hi’ to them with his Texan accent. As we are looking for my dad in-between the corridors and the rooms that belonged to ‘other’ people from an alien past, I am trying to remember what I thought. Who was I when I was there? Who were all these people? Travelers! Yes, I hear the sound of another camera flash going. Travelers recording everything. Travelers mapping the land through the lenses of their cameras. In a sense, they are map-makers imagining what the people of this space once were and trying to capture the essence of the cities that once belonged to these people. What’s left of them is all we have to re-invent these people. And again, I see the blue fairy-chimneys between the orange sky and the

⁴⁰ A Video-Mapping project that I visualized through the practice of rhizomatic mapping. This description presented is a reflection on the mapping from 3:00-6:20 minutes. https://youtu.be/9u88GVqLzWA
green-brown trees and the ground through the window of the car my mom was driving, from the edge of the flying hot air balloon I am in, and through the lens of my camera. My gaze is always at a distance and I am there depicting a picture of the land with amazement by what’s left behind. I am looking up to see the paintings on the church wall and I am immediately disoriented from the shift in my gaze. Now I see the land below; all of it like a sheet covering what’s underneath: zero level. As If I am looking at a postcard waiting to be polished. I hear Walter Benjamin: “If one arrives from far away the town is suddenly as noiseless as if one had stepped through a door into landscape. It does not give the impression that one could ever manage to come any closer. But should one succeed, then one falls into its lap and cannot find oneself again for all the humming of grills and children’s cries” (Walter Benjamin’s Archive 175). Seeing the land from a gaze above is looking at an empty flat space expanding without borders and I have a strong desire to move with what’s flowing underneath. I fall from the edge of the balloon into the land and map the cities, houses, rooms, and the paintings made by an ‘other’ I have never met before. Now, the blue sky is burning with the red flames of the sun. Now the ground below is deeper than the sea, the ocean. I, once again, fell off the map and now I need to start again!”

I am afraid of the very word ‘other.’ The source of this fear for me is the experience of anxiety that I keep coming back to; the anxiety stemming from not knowing where one belongs and as a result not quite understanding one’s being-in-the-world. John Dixon and Kevin Durrheim indicate that for “geographers and psychologists, questions of ‘who we are’ are often intimately related questions of ‘where we are’” (27). My response to where I am causes me to first think of

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41 Roland Barthes defines zero degree of writing “not [as] a total absence… [but as] a significant absence” (Writing Degree Zero 77). I use this concept here to illustrate not only mapping as a form of writing in its nature but also to show how mapping, like writing, testifies to the strong desire and need to re-invent meaning of space through a system of signs. Approaching space and geography of a land, territory, region as zero degree is a rhizomatic mapping practice that tries to break the code of any given sign system by mapping with absence and exploring alternative signs to allow chance of space to unpack diverse meanings and practices of space and spatiality.
where I am from, because where I am defines me according to where I am from: Turkey, a
country in-between the West and Middle East and always closer to the Middle in the East.
Emmanuel Levinas explains that “knowledge [la connaissance], the manifestation of what is, of
beings, to a conscious being, means as much representation of the data (individual or universal,
intuition and understanding) as it does a going beyond the data in the adventure and method of
research. In giving itself, a being offers certain traits and excludes others” (Alterity and
Transcendence 57). The knowledge of a map, the data the official maps visualize and present, is a
transcendent reality and undistorted truth, which is an embodiment of Western being. The identity
of Western geography excludes any non-Western traits from its spatial being in the official map.
The ground logic of the Western map defines my being as an extension of a lifeless Oriental
image. I am the exotic Muslim female liberated by the consciousness of Western modernity and
saved from Islamic oppression by Western man. This is the address of where I am in the Western
map because the address of where I am from is the address of an oppressed Muslim female. If I
do not look like the perceived image of an oppressed Muslim, then I must have been saved. The
two addresses of where I am and where I am from are the narratives the dominant discourse of
war on terror has been representing as reality. Yet, I am from neither of these addresses, nor do I
belong to either of them. I reside in an in-between land that is absent in the ground logic of the
Western map.

The ‘other’ has a hard time responding to the map-object in this sense. Looking at the
land represented in the flat surface of the map through that distanced gaze, through that vision
from above that already produced the meaning of that land is dis/orienting for the ‘other,’ because
the otherness of the ‘other’ is invented in the discourse of this gaze in which the dominant ‘self’
positions its spatially bounded identity in opposition to the alien identity of the ‘other.’ For the
Western Man, the ‘other’ of the exotic land is the ultimate stranger “evoking the forgotten aura of
what Hölderlin has called the “sacred alien." (Avital Ronell, “The Disappearance and the Returns of the Idiot” 200). The sacred alien all at once represents the nomadic culture, the primitive natives, the exotic and the fragile women, the Arab on the camel, the Turk with narghili, the Persian selling rugs, the pyramids of the Egyptians, the lights in the desert…the immortal foreign Orient. The ‘other’ with its eternal image of being the Orient without a place is the ultimate stereotype we are unable to escape. The addressless ‘other’ of the Oriental land is the source of our fears because there is a chance of possibilities in the ‘other’ we can neither predict nor control. We are doomed by our own fear of the ‘other.’

This illogical yet somehow always justified ‘fear’ in the Western discourse threw me off the map on October 9th, 2017. It was a regular Monday morning for many of you. As you are mapping with me, in your current space-time condition, you might not even remember this specific Monday morning. But I, unfortunately, will always remember. I will remember because of, again, fear and anxiety. The night before this Monday was a regular Sunday night when I felt a strong force run through my body after one of my colleagues messaged me about the news that appeared on Al Jazeera: “US suspends all non-immigrant visa services in Turkey.” Reading the article, I slowly became paralyzed. I was worried, anxious, furious, and mad. My stomach kept resisting as my brain was trying to function logically and come up with an alternative game plan. A game plan for my parents, a game plan for my sister and her American husband, a game plan for myself since I have been applying for jobs here in the States for a while now. When the rules of the game always change, trying to remain in the game and continue to play is almost impossible. I was doomed by the fear of the ‘other.’

That night I felt like I was out of the game and my core kept yelling ‘What Am I going to DO?’ The options that I had before reading that article were taken away from me. My freedom to decide to stay in the U.S. was gone. Having a free will in choosing to go back to Turkey was
gone. There was no choice; only a forced decision imposed on me; I had to go back, even though I neither do not want to nor am scared to do so. The main point was that I did not have the freedom to decide for myself. Somebody made someone else upset and that someone else made a decision that I did not have a say in it; a decision that has a significant impact on my life, on my being, on my freedom.

That Monday morning, I woke up still feeling paralyzed. Mondays are already difficult, wherever you are in the world. But that Monday morning I was dis/oriented. My living room, my kitchen, my room…nothing made me feel like I belonged. One of my roommates’ attempt to have a morning conversation with me was yet another trigger that caused me to feel even more alienated: “Look at the eggs that I made,” he said, “I am the egg master.” In my lack of response and silence, my stomach was whispering “Does anybody actually care? Will anybody ever do or actually say more than just using a sad emoji face on Facebook when something like this happens?” I am not blaming my roommate for his early morning pride about the eggs he cooked. I know that it was his way of trying to communicate with me without responding to the ‘other’ issue that made me feel almost broken. He responded to me, the non-American other who was yet in another familiar state of being pushed off the official map and its ground logic. He related, with eggs, yet he did not directly respond to me, the other, due to another kind of fear. The fear of guilt on his part. The guilt of ‘I am sorry this is happening to you, but I do not know what else to do except share the eggs I cooked with you.’ He just did not know or understand that I was describing what this was as a night terror that I used to experience frequently when I was a little girl. I was that little girl being crushed under the giant and shapeless form of darkness without even being able to scream. That Monday morning, I was placeless and lost in a night terror. I was dis/im/placed into a stateless condition of uncontrolled movements and happenings. I was in the
pitch black open and in this open space I was in my most fragile being. I did not know that this blinding openness was going to be a response to the chance of space.

It was 9:00 am, and I was in my seat ready for my dear mentor Cynthia Haynes to give her talk, titled “Unalterable Rites: The Architecture of Mass Rhetoric.” Her deep sensibility and sensitivity to ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ of one’s self always evokes a force, a desire in me to move, to always become without letting myself be chained or grounded by the fixating ties and rules of the game. She always already helps me to escape, to fall off the official map. And the moment she asked “What does it mean to be in the open? Where are we in the open?” She made me remember that when I had those night terrors as a little girl, there was always a moment that I started feeling lighter. The heavy weight of that darkness always lifted off slowly. I always started to see the light in the room as my parents were holding me. That morning, Cynthia got rid of that darkness that was consuming the light from the open space I was in. I responded to the chance of this space; I embraced the unknown, the anxiety, and the fear. The moment I responded to chance of this open rather than resisting it, I was able to see multiple possibilities for myself. I slowly started to feel that my stomach and my brain were becoming synchronized again. I felt that the immobilizing force of this machinic architecture, the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, and its paralyzing power over my being and my freedom of mobility was losing its control. As Cynthia said, in this fragile openness, in this open space, what was inevitable is the twisting of the center, the Heideggerian primal conflict between the world (open space) and earth (the ground logic).42 What the game plan the US embassy in Turkey and the Turkish State did not take into consideration was the instability of the center. Center as a movement, as a happening is never an organized,

structured, or fixed source of power. As Jacques Derrida indicates, the center is always elsewhere\(^43\), and I think, the center is also nowhere; it is acenter; it is open space; it is rhizome.

I was, and still am, in a placeless open space wherein what is ordinary (freedom of mobility) is not ordinary anymore; it is uncanny. And this uncanny happening in open space, for me, welcomes the chance of space; it welcomes placelessness and dis/orientation as an opening for a path that ungrounds the grounding force of bounded space. It is an invitation to deconstruct and produce anti-memory as an antidote to the paralyzing control of the machinic ground the architecture of power actualizes through its linguistic structure and its alienating rhetoric. I respond to this invitation of open space, and I once again jump off the official map. I play the game of the sovereign ground logic by using rhetorical theory and deconstruction to unpack how the geopolitical region we know as Middle East today is a product of a cumulative process of reinvention. While the fall of the Ottoman Empire as a result of WWI marked the invention of the modern Middle East as a geopolitical region, the roots of this cartographic reality with its home/sick address is traced back to the Oriental image and land. As Daniel Foliard indicates, “the long-term cultural processes that presided over the invention of the “Middle East” as a representational category have a chaotic history” (209). I argue that this chaotic history is a history of the Western Self always re-inventing its non-Western Other in the mythicized image of the exotic and deviant Orient. In this sense, I adopt Foliard’s approach to reading and understanding the formation of the Middle East as a process of cumulative re-conceptualizations in the rhetorical contexts of shifting discourses of power. Mapping this process is a way to learn the language of power and how this language has been functioning in the contemporary war on terror discourse that narrates Islam as inherently violent and Middle East as the land of Muslim

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terrorists. I draw from Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse to unpack the logic of this language in framing the rhetorical context of the war on terror discourse.

Instead of approaching discourse and its linguistic system as a totalizing field producing a totalized history, as a pluralist, Foucault proposes “the historical construction of a subject through a discourse understood as consisting of a set of strategies which are part of social practices” (“Truth and Juridical Forms” 4). Foucault’s problem with the individualization of discourses, as he unpacks it in “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” is what drives his motivation to explore the alternative, ignored, and/or undermined criteria that play a role in the formation of discourses. This is why he does not speak of discourse as a singular concept such as a discourse of politics, economics, and/or power. According to Foucault, discourses undergo “constant change as new utterances (énoncés) are added to it” (54). He describes three sets of criteria: formation, transformation or threshold, and correlation.

These criteria make it possible to substitute differentiated analyses for the theme of totalizing history (‘the progress of reason’, ‘the spirit of a century’). They make it possible to describe, as the episteme of a period, not the sum of its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses: the episteme is not a sort of grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships. They make it possible furthermore to describe not a universal history which sweeps along all the sciences in a single common trajectory, but the kinds of history—that is to say, of remanences and transformation—characteristics of different discourses…The episteme is not a general development stage of reason, it is a complex relationship of successive displacements. (55)
To me, adopting this Foucauldian approach to discourse as a discursive plurality and episteme of successive displacements speaks to the dis/orienting rhizomatic mapping I am playing with in this chapter. As Foliard contends, the Middle East was, has been, and is a product of a cumulative process of geographical imaginations in the episteme of Western discourses. Western discourses of power re-invented the non-Western Eastern/Oriental other throughout the twentieth century through a series of successive displacements. It divided up the vast and arbitrary image of the Orient between Far, Near, and Middle East(s). Under the extensively totalizing discourse of Orientalism, this cumulative process on the surface appears to be a single common trajectory; yet, Middle East is a product of different Western discourses and multiple trajectories. These multiple trajectories produced multiple definitions and formations of borders within and across Middle East. I understand the mechanical reproductions of these multiple ways of defining Middle East as a complex process of dis- and re-placements of the geographical and spatial reality of the region and its inhabitants. In this complex process of displacements, however, there has been and is always a dominant discourse that presents a single and reduced image and history as the single universal reality in understanding the non-Western Middle/Eastern other. Today, this dominant discourse is the war on terror discourse. In the aspatial global world order, the language of power this discourse operates with forces us to internalize a justified totalized history of the region with a violent and barbaric legacy that is embodied in the image of political Islam. In this chapter, I will unpack how the Western discourse of power produced the image of the Orient as a bridge to start deconstructing how the Middle East was re-invented in this discourse and how this re-invention resulted in re-producing the Middle East in changing discourses of power. Now I am playing a game of my own as I continue to unbuild the ground logic of the West and non-West order of aspatial global world.
The Game of the Orient

In the image of the map, the non-Western ‘other’ does not belong; the ‘other’ is almost never capable of positioning its ‘self’ due to being taken over by the image the Western man narrated. According to Catalin-George Fedor, “otherness cannot be defined but by using with a pair term, identity. This articulation is the result of the categorization process tributary to each culture, in essence being the opposition between identical and different. The relation between me—the other one can be illustrated through a series of antagonistic pairs, of which we mention some: similar-different; local-foreign; close-far; friend-enemy; normal-deviant; majority-minority” (Fedor 322). The reality/knowledge of the Orient, then, is invented in these centered oppositional dichotomies that reproduce the identity of the Orient as the other. This reproduced image actually defines the Western Self more than it defines the identity of the Oriental other.

The myth, the tradition, the culture, the reality of the Orient belongs to the Western memory and the Western rhetorical invention. Edward Said explains that “the invention of tradition is a method for using collective memory selectively by manipulating certain bits of the national past, suppressing others, elevating still others in an entirely functional way. Thus memory is not necessarily authentic, but rather useful” (‘Invention, Memory, and Place” 179). In the making of the Oriental other, the interplay between invention, memory, and place resulted in the Orient being a dehumanized subject to be studied in the dominant European discourse of power: colonialism. Said explains that if we take the first experience of modern Orientalism as being enabled by the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt during the late eighteenth century, then “we can consider its inaugural heroes…to be builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the Orientalist brotherhood… [they placed] Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis” (Orientalism 122). I consider this scientific basis during the eighteenth and nineteenth century as a reflection of the enlightened Europe’s modern identity. The consciousness of modernization and
modernity framed the European colonial gaze as the dominant projection in ordering the spatial hierarchy of the global world around higher and lower spaces of European civilization and Oriental primitivity.

In Geographical Imaginations, by drawing from Stoddart and Foucault, Derek Gregory explains how the enlightened Europe’s modern scientific experience started the globalizing project of natural history. This resulted in the formation of a totalized history that was defined from the dominant trajectory of European colonialism and Orientalism, which ignored the other discourses at play. Napoleonic expeditions to Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century enabled the formation and experience of the modern vision of Orientalism and Oriental geography in the context of a globalizing natural history. In this process, the distinction, the difference between words and things, were in dissolution, which resulted in resemblance, similar links and connections between words and things yielding to representation. What the words, images, and signs represented was replacing the things in regional spaces. “And it was within that gap that the discourse of natural history was constituted as part of a project to navigate the passage between the two, or as Foucault puts it, ‘to bring language as close as possible to the observing gaze, and the things observed as close as possible to words’” (Gregory 21). The dominant language of European colonial power that formed the dominant discourse of the Orient set the rules of a game of alienation, marginalization, and subjugation that we have been playing to this day. This game has been constantly ordering a totalized system, a structure with a center rooted in the sovereign ground logic of Western subjugation. In this play of structure, as Derrida explains,

…the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center is at the center of totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere...The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis
of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself beyond the reach of
play. (“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” 352)

The playfulness of the center and its immobilized totality that is both within and outside
the structure of play is a striking point Derrida is making here for me. This playfulness runs the
cartographic and historical game of Orient in L’Orient or The Indian Travellers: A Geographical
Historical Game (Fig. 3). The totalized image of the Oriental land in this game is a structure
ordered by the West, yet the center of this totality is outside of the Western structure. It is outside
of the borders separating the West from the rest, because this Oriental center does not belong to
the Western structure. However, the totality of the Western structure, its metaphysical ground

Fig. 3. L’Orient or The Indian Travelers: A Geographical Historical Game

logic, has its center in the Oriental image. Said argues that “the Orient was Orientalized not only
because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered commonplace by an
average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be—that is, submitted to being—made Oriental” (Orientalism 6).

I argue that what made it possible for the Orient to be Orientalized, for the Orient to be Orient with a real physical representation in the natural history of the Western global gaze, was and has been the distance between the West/Europe and the Orient. This distance has been the distance of identification that placed Europe as the powerful and civilized colonizer in the deserted and powerful geography of the Orient. I define this distance of identification in the ground logic of as the alienating structure of the L’Orient game: a game of representation replacing the things/beings-in-the-world. The West and Orient structure has a playfulness in this sense, a playfulness that emerges from a desire for a center coupled with a fear of the other. This fear stems from an origin of desire within the Self for the Other: a desire to define the Other in order to define Self, which brings forth the fear of being taken over by the Other in this process. This desire that informs the ground logic of the game of L’Orient has been the same desire reproducing the global game of the West and East through the same trajectory of distancing and alienation: the dominant discourse of non-Western otherness.

The game of L’Orient is an actual board game made by James Richard Barfoot (1794-1846) and published by David Ogilvy in London. L’Orient’s ground logic is constructed in the dominant discourse of non-Western otherness, which appears as the discourse of Orientalism. In the structure of this board game, the dominant gaze is the colonial trajectory of Britain. This imperial trajectory displaced the totalized Oriental subject ‘as a game to be played’ and through playing the game of the Oriental subject, the purpose was to teach the players/audience about Britain’s most important Oriental colony: India. Educating the players/audience about India was a strategic rhetorical move for the British Self to justify and legitimize the subjugated otherness of the Orient. This persuasive justification effectively works in the ground logic of this cartographic
board game since the purpose of the game is to educate its players. The rhetorical purpose of education through play/game immediately implements ethical credibility to the structure of the game, because the purpose of the game is a noble one. This ethical justification is how the ground logic of this map-game actualizes what was already made Oriental: actualizing the Oriental Utopia.

**From a Western Utopia to a Global Heterotopia of Oriental Otherness**

In “Two Lectures,” Foucault explains the difference between the old form of power (juridical) and the modern form of power to illustrate how the subjugating control of the sovereign ground logic moved from possessing a direct power of the subjects of the sovereign control (king, the throne, the sultan) to power as a system of subjugation producing the knowledge of subjects (us the individuals) as certain kinds of beings (95-97). In the dominant discourse of the modern form of power that produced the knowledge of non-Western otherness as a single history, the subjects of otherness “are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power…[they] are the vehicles of power, not its points of application” (98). When two Muslim girls having iftar at a Mexican restaurant are verbally attacked due to their beliefs, both their attacker and themselves become the vehicles of power that strengthens the differentiating violent force of the war on terror discourse. These two Muslim girls were displaced into the geographical address of unjust stereotypes defining them as threats and possible terrorists, while the person who assaulted them displaced himself into the state of internalizing the faulty knowledge the war on terror discourse justified. In another case, when a Muslim couple is attacked by a white Western woman with a language charged with violence and anger, as she blamed him for forcing his wife to cover herself, both the couple and the woman

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are vehicles of power that inform the war on terror discourse’s narrative line that Muslims are terrorists. These cases show us how this dominant discourse has been truly producing individuals, subjects as certain kinds of beings within the binary structure of the modern/Christian West and barbaric/Muslim Middle East. We live within these actualized networks of power that exist across cultures; networks that have been constantly re-inventing the game of the Orient.

This re-invention happens through the actualizing power of the mirror image in-between (see Fig. 4). As the modern form of power actualizes its vision of a perfect unified global image it

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**Fig. 4.** *The Function of Mirror-In-Between: Actualization of Utopias to Heterotopias by Michel Foucault in “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias.”*

integrates the essential elements of differentiation between the West and non-Western other into the spatial representations in maps. John Agnew indicates that the Western experience of actualizing a one-world picture of a unified globe has never been “a composition of equal and pacific elements but a hierarchy of places, from known to unknown, from most friendly to most

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45 To see the full coverage of the incident, see *This Woman Completely Misses The Irony Of Her Islamophobic Rant*. Middle East Eye Facebook, 2 Aug. 2017. Web. <https://www.facebook.com/MiddleEastEye/videos/1454634911268559/>.
dangerous. The best-known representation of this character is that of a dichotomous global West and East, in which the former is seen as the total opposite and, hence, definitive standard for the latter” (15-16).

This process of actualization has been narrating the totalized discourse of otherness that defines the socio-spatial reality of geographies of exclusions. Through this process of actualization, the excluded Orient is pushed into the margins of our aspatial global world. However, the Orient as an actualized heterotopia is an Orient in the reality of the West; the Orient is rarely Orient by definition that is produced and/or framed by the inhabitants of this vast geography. In this sense, the alternative spatiality of the Orient in its own geographical reality as it is produced through the social and cultural relations of its own people is an open space. This alternative spatial reality holds the potential and possibilities to break the rules of the game and cross the borders of its exclusion and dis/placement. I consider this potential as a form of deconstruction that would disrupt and challenge the image of Oriental otherness. Ironically, this disruption is possible through the notion of globalization because one of globalization’s purposes is to bring differences together. While Western metaphysical practices bring differences together to keep them at a safe distance, the open space of a non-Western Orient produces multiple meanings and identities in relation to the complex engagements among diverse geographies of cultures. The unwanted change that comes with globalization, then, is the possibility that comes with open space, the chance of space. This makes the marginalized geography of the Orient “what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed” (Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”). For the modern West, this possibility the Orient holds as an open space always requires this spatial heterogeneity to be tamed and re-ordered. The roots of the West always already desiring to prevent unwanted change of globalization by defining the Oriental other as a deviation stems from a strong fear of
the alien ‘Other’: a fear the ‘Self’ experiences due to the imagined possibility of being taken over by the Other.

Responding to the Oriental Other

I suggest that the fixed relationship between West and East and the desire to identify the non-Western other in this closed engagement stems from a basic need in human nature: defining one’s ‘I/Self’ through understanding ‘Other,’ an intimate yet also a violent relationship as Roland Barthes perceives it. 46 This relationship is a process that forms a meaningful existence for one’s ‘Self,’ which consequently determines the meaning of the Other’s being. Levinas 47 examines this process of identity formation in the context of ‘face-to-face encounter.’ For Levinas, the relationship between ‘I/Self’ and ‘Other’ is the result of a lived immediacy which takes place during the face to face engagement between ‘Self’ and ‘Other.’ In this violent yet also very intimate relationship, the meaningful existence of ‘Self’ is formed through the (dis)recognition of ‘Other.’ The carto-historical game of L’Orient visually represents that modern Western Man formed a meaningful existence for its sovereign ground logic by (dis)recognizing the Oriental Other. The map of the game defines the visual-material existence of the Orient in the reality of the Indian’s colonized consciousness. Through the Indian’s colonized image, the players of the game engage with Britain’s colonizer consciousness under the ethical image of the modern White Man: path to salvation and civilization.

Said indicates that discourse of Orientalism is an “enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically,

sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (*Orientalism* 3). The imperial power system of the modern European states had produced the reality of an Oriental Man and Oriental land through official government reports, narratives, stories, travel writing, tourist guide books, letters, and most importantly maps. The Orient was produced not only as the non-Western other, but it was also produced as the colonized other in the sovereign ground logic of White Man. The consciousness of the colonized other functions to define the consciousness of the colonizer. This dual relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in the ground logic of the *L'Orient* game re-invents the cartographic reality of the non-Western geographies of the Indian subcontinent. Re-inventing the land as the homeland of the colonized other happens first by removing what was naturally within the land: bodies of other cultures, traditions, and social lives. Karen Piper indicates that “removing something from the state of nature means establishing sovereignty; and so ‘nature’ itself, as well as the indigenous peoples that resided within it, was seen as an obstacle that must be overcome” (163). This notion of considering the actualized reality of the Oriental other as an obstacle and a problem to solve has been at the center of how the West responds to a non-Western, Oriental, Middle/Eastern Other in the dichotomized hierarchy of the aspatial global world.

In *Orientalism*, Said’s research on the discourse of Orientalism, I suggest, reveals how the historical documents produced by the “White Man” have been transformed into cartographic monuments depicting an image of the Orient that is stable, closed, and fixed in time and space, in addition to transforming the Oriental people into mere subjects to be studied and understood. In studying the Orient as his main subject, according to Said, the West wrote the discourse of Orientalism by creating one identity, land, and history for the Orient. The language of the imperial power gave the ethical and political justification that made this discourse the dominant form of producing the knowledge of the Orient in the context of ‘will-to-knowledge-to-power.’ In
the game of *L'Orient*, the Oriental Other is always already lost. Their reality, identity, and spatial existence in the map of the game is narrated through the cartographic language of the European colonizer. In *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Antonio Gramsci indicates that the colonizer invents a discourse that justifies its oppression in the context of normalizing the state of being oppressed as a necessity for the colonized other. Gramsci defines this as ‘domination by consent,’ in which the colonized other internalizes the narrative the colonizer framed. To maintain this subjugating control, the colonizer continuously restores its hegemonic power by using a specific language forming a specific narrative for itself: the colonizer becomes the salvation and the colonized other becomes the saved and liberated one. In *Nation and Narration*, Homi Bhabha explains what happens as the colonized others reach the point of not being capable of thinking and deciding for themselves outside the language of the colonizer: the inevitability of not-escaping the narrative language of the colonizer.

The game of *L'Orient* actualizes the colonized consciousness of Oriental India in the colonizer narrative of the sovereign Britain. The players of the game play in the reality of this narrative and follow the rules this colonizing narrative dictates for them. In the cartographic reality of the game, the players encounter historical important events from the history of the British in India with each vignette framed in an unusual twining vine border. Scenes of interest include the Black Hole of Calcutta (1756) at the lower left corner, the burning fleet at the Battle of Yangon in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824) at the lower right, the wives of the Sikh Emperor Ranjit Singh committing sati on his funeral pyre (1839) at the upper right corner. The latest date given is 1846, on a battle scene from the Anglo-Sikh War at upper right. (Boston Rare Maps)

While the players move from one event to the next within the central map of the game, they not only identify the events, they also identify the sovereign on the throne during the time of
the event. As the printing at the top of the game indicates, this is a “geographical and historical game” that aims to educate its Western players on the Oriental subject that the Western sovereign ground logic orders and defines. I perceive playing the game in the ground of L’Orient’s map-frame as a process of further/alternative form of mapping. Players draw from the existing information and record the map-object this game offers to them, and they continue to map as they play. This unique movement between playing and mapping allows players to also re-invent the colonized consciousness of the Oriental other due to how each act of playing is yet another rhetorical situation re-narrating the reality of the Orient. As Denis Cosgrove indicates, “mapping is the creative probing, the tactical reworking, the imaginative projection of a surface. Here, mapping [playing/gaming] becomes the two-dimensional ‘staging’ of actuality or desire...

‘Perspective’ has a temporal as well as spatial meaning—looking forward, the sense of prospect. Thus the map excites imagination and graphs desire, its projection is the foundation for and stimulus to projects” (“Introduction: Mapping Meaning” 15). In the rhetorical situation of playing the game of L’Orient, the different players/audience bring different perspectives as they engage with the ground logic of the map that centers this game. Through these different engagements, each act of playing the game mechanically reproduces the spatial meaning of the Orient in a temporality that draws from the already existing received knowledge of the Orient.

Cosgrove explains that “All utopias require mapping, their social order depends upon and generates a spatial order which reorganizes and improves upon existing models” (“Introduction: Mapping Meaning” 16). In the ground logic of the L’Orient, the utopia of the Orient is actualized through repetition: repeating the game, continuing to play the game. Each situation of gaming/playing as a particular instance of mapping re-invents and re-organizes the colonized land of the Orient under the subjugating gaze of the imperial sovereign. In the ground logic of this mapping/playing, for the Utopia of modern Western civilization to have a reality across cultures,
the utopia of primitive Orient needed to first become a reality. The reality of the Orient was established as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Said, Orientalism 2). Through this distinction, the Oriental Other is recognized as a problem due to how the colonizer consciousness the players of the game adopt in responding to the Orient. I approach the nature of the response that frames the sovereign ground logic of this game as a response that emerges from the fear of the Oriental Other: the fear that continues to keep the home/sick Middle East in the margins.

**Fear of the Other**

The (dis)recognition of ‘Other,’ as the ‘Self’ forms a meaningful existence for its being, takes place through the involuntary participation with ‘Other,’ which creates the condition of horror. Involuntary participation of ‘Self’ with ‘Other’ is not an engagement that situates ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in an oppositional binary relationship. In this context, the horror stems from how ‘Self’ cannot define its being by defining what it is not, which is perceived to be its other, because ‘Other’ is not what ‘Self’ is not. In this collapse of distinction, one identity gets lost in another: an endless flow. The outcome of this depersonalization due to the fading lines of separation has become an extreme level of fear: the fear of being taken over by ‘Other.’

I see and feel this fear in the game of *L’Orient*. The map in this game empties the land of the Orient for it to be re-invented by players in the rhetorical setting of each act of gaming. Playing this game from the beginning in a temporal space-time condition is the very experience of involuntarily participating with the Oriental other. The fear of the Other becomes vivid in the visual-material experience of re-instating the sovereign power of imperial Britain through the symbolic presence of the throne placed on top of the game. This symbolic presence is embodied in the pictorial composites of the past monarchy: kings and queens of the British Empire. The

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48 Diane Davis European Graduate School Levinas Seminar Notes, Summer 2016.
distance is maintained between the imperial monarchy and the land of the Orient in a top-down spatial ordering. This spatial hierarchy gives control to the subjugating gaze of the imperial ground logic over the Oriental subjects of the monarchy. When I play this game as a game between the ‘Self’ and ‘Other,’ a game that happens in the open space of mirror image, I unpack how not only the fear but also the desire to control and obtain the Other is the underlying drive in making the rules of the game.

I understand this desire through Levinas’s description of the metaphysical desire that “tends towards something else entirely, toward the absolutely other” (Totality and Infinity 33). This is not a simple desire for what is merely different from one’s self. It is not a desire, for example, that one man has for another man. It is a desire that is beyond one’s self; a desire to understand what is absolutely other to protect the essential existence and being of self. As Levinas continues in Totality and Infinity, this desire is neither for longing for a past that once was nor a desire for what is lost or forgotten. “The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest upon any prior kinship. It is a desire that cannot be satisfied” (33-34). This un-satisfiable desire for the Other that is beyond the consciousness of the Self is what produces the reality and identity of the Western Self. According to Said,

The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expressed and
represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. (*Orientalism* 1-2)

This determinant relationship between the West/Europe and Orient is a reflection of the desire the Western Self has for its absolute, unnamed, and unknown alien Other. For the material being of European civilization and culture to have a meaningful existence, it is essential for the Oriental Other to belong to the spatial materiality of the European sovereignty. However, the possibility this unnamed Other holds as an open becoming rather than bounded being, the threat and danger of the Oriental Other to escape its subjugation, is the source of the fear the Western Self has towards its non-Western Other.

**The Desire for the Feared Oriental Other**

The desire for the Other coupled with a fundamental fear of being taken over by the Other becomes even more evident in the emptied land the central map of the game of *L'Orient* visualizes for the players. The framing of this map has its focus on Great Britain’s sailing to its most significant colony India. In the game, as the players use their markers/totems to move within the ground of the game’s central map, they are educated about how the imperial gaze of Great Britain scales and visualizes its center, its colonized other. Cosgrove indicates that “framing is a territorializing, even imperializing process, the map is inescapably a classificatory device” (“Introduction: Mapping Meaning” 10). This desire is what shapes the sovereign ground logic that orders the map that determines the rules of this game. The center of this game, which is the European map of the Oriental Other, functions to separate the geography of culture from the geography of space by emptying the land the map territorializes as the sovereign ground. The very act of ‘emptying’ the land of the absolute other plays a significant role in this game in actualizing the mirror-image and the unreal memory of the Oriental utopia in the Western
consciousness. What the central map classifies in this game is the oppositional relation between the ‘civilized British Man’ and the ‘barbaric Indians/Orients.’ The map accomplishes this through its selection. Cosgrove explains that “the map differentiates itself from the territory precisely through acts of selection: in James Corner’s terms, creating a field through processes of ‘de-territorializing’ and ‘re-territorializing’” (“Introduction: Mapping Meaning” 11). As a result, the map of L’Orient differentiates Europe from the non-Western geographies of the Orient, Africa and Asia, by simply using color-coding as a form of iconographic language of power. The neutral colors used in visualizing Asia and Africa—light yellow and orange—immediately creates the feeling of emptiness; however, the more vivid color—pink—used for Europe implements a clear distinction, a border, separating Europe from the Oriental land. The higher positioning of Europe in the central map-frame of this game complements the cartographic meaning in the color-coding.

Europe as the higher civilization represents the path to salvation for the colonized Oriental Other in the spatial territorialization of the map of L’Orient. The framing and the selection used in the cartographic visualization of this map de-re-territorializes the geography of Oriental space: emptied land re-gained its meaning as the colonized other in the sovereign ground.

Piper suggests that the notions of clearing space and emptying place to territorialize a less organized land became primary vessels and ways to establish sovereignty. Territorializing space in the ground logic of the metaphysical desire then “creates the idea of a socially [and culturally] empty space…Thus, we have the notion of ‘virgin’ or ‘empty’ land that is waiting to be filled. Sovereignty, in this sense, became linked to erasure, based on the notion of creating a territorial blank slate on which one could construct colonial rule and authority” (Piper 148-150). The centered map in the game of the L’Orient, I argue, is a territorialization that establishes and strengthens Britain’s sovereign power over the absolutely Oriental other or the India travelers. Filling the emptied space of the Orient to re-order its reality and meaning was a way to civilize
the land by turning the territorialized land into “an extension of the European’s body. The fear was that those who had been cast out of the body/land, like demonic ghosts, would return” (Piper 163-66).

**From Desire to Fear to Violence**

The act of emptying the space as it is evident in the map of *L’Orient* inflicts power, which is essential to the game of *L’Orient*. It is a game of power that has its source in the desire for the absolutely other, which actualizes the Western experience of the colonized Orient. This actualization that inflicts power is only a possibility due to the violence that is already inherent in space. Henri Lefebvre writes that

> The violence that is inherent in space enters into conflict with knowledge, which is equally inherent in that space. Power - which is to say violence - divides, then keeps what it has divided in a state of separation; inversely, it reunites - yet keeps whatever it wants in a state of confusion. Thus knowledge reposes on the effects of power and treats them as ‘real’; in other words, it endorses them exactly as they are. Nowhere is the confrontation between knowledge and power, between understanding and violence, more direct than it is in connection with intact space and space broken up. In the dominated sphere, constraints and violence are encountered at every turn: they are everywhere. As for power, it too is omnipresent. (358)

The game of *L’Orient* uses this violence inherent in space to create this state of confusion, which I connect with Bhabha’s notion of unhomeliness: “the condition of extra-territorial and cross-cultural initiations” (*Location of Culture* 9). Bhabha indicates that in the displaced condition of unhomeliness “the borders between home and world become confused; and uncannily, the private and the public become part of each other, forcing upon us a vision that is divided as it is disorienting” (9). In the game of *L’Orient*, the inhabitants of the Indian land are
forcefully re-invented and actualized in this condition of unhomeliness. The center of the game, which is British India, literally the maps the desired Oriental subjects by whitening the space to be occupied and territorialized. The rhetorical re-invention at play in the ground logic of this game is Heather Ashley Hayes’s notion of rhetorico-violence. The violent act is whitening the space of Indians by erasing their imprints and cultures from the map. Inflicting this violence into the cartographic visualization in this map is actualizing what the sovereign British power desired: owning the space of the absolute other to position the Self’s reality as superior to the feared Other. In the cartographic context of this game’s rhetorical situation, both violence and rhetoric work together to inflict power into the cartographic visualization of the European Self and Oriental Other. However, this reinvention through emptying space and filling it with a new meaning and reality that can be controlled and owned by Western Man still fails to satisfy the desire the Self has for the absolutely Other. As Levinas explains, this is

- a desire without satisfaction which, precisely, understands [entend] the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the other. For Desire this alterity, non-adequate to the idea, has a meaning. It is understood as the alterity of the Other and of the Most-High. The very dimension of height is opened up by the metaphysical Desire. That this height is no longer the heavens but the Invisible is the very elevation of height and its nobility. To die for the invisible—this is metaphysics. (Totality and Infinity 34-35)

The moment the centered map empties the space of the Orientals, there is an opening that needs to be organized; an opening that needs to be tamed and controlled to prevent any unwanted movements and crossings to happen. This taming of the open space is an opportune moment that Western ground logic creates for its Self to respond to its desired and feared Other. In this sense, taming the open space is yet another act of inflicting violence to maintain subjugating power over the Oriental Other. In the game of L’Orient, taming the open space of the Orient expands from
the central map that empties space. The British ground logic uses this emptied space to implement its sovereignty over Orient/colonized India at the top of the game by positioning the pictorial signifiers that personify the sovereign throne. The title of the game positioned at the top draws the attention to *L’Orient* and puts less emphasis on *Indian Travellers*. This emphasis on the Orient in the title of the game illustrates how the British sovereign power already erased the unique and open space of Indian identity and culture from the actualized geographical reality of the colonized Orient/India. In this sense, India means Orient and Orient encompasses colonized India.

The desire for the absolute other has a strong presence in the cartographic discourse and pictorial/iconographic language of this carto-historical game. The emphasis on Orient in the title is a hermeneutic reinvention of the socio-spatial identity of colonized India as the exotic land of the Orient. This actualization becomes a reality as the margins of this cartographic game fill the whitened space of the central map. The reality invented in the margins is the knowledge of the Orient that the enlightened white man of Europe defined within the binary structure of the dichotomized image of the global world order: West vs. East. Piper maintains that

To be sovereign, then, involved taking land from those who were considered less “organized.” It was based in the idea of invading a void, or an unoccupied space, which—of course—existed nowhere but in the colonial imagination. Sovereignty became a way to rhetorically clear space for invasion, and in this clearance, the concept of whiteness—as transparency—could emerge. (143)

As the game of Orient takes the land away from the less organized and uncivilized Oriental Indians, it justifies its desire for an invisible Other that passively waits for British sovereignty to arrive. This desire for a passive and submissive Oriental other stems from the ethical argument that the colonizer consciousness is creating a path to salvation for the colonized Oriental other. Jacques Lévy highlights that “in politics, maps can give rise to illusions about
spatial justice and its opposite” (183). The illusion about spatial (in)justice in the game of
L’Orient is the ethical responsibility the Western Self narrated for itself as the colonizer saving
the savage Orientals from their own primitive conditions, which is evident in the two-dimensional
staging of the game. The decorative pictorial narrations on the margins of this cartographic game
fill the void the central map of the game opens. These marginal iconographic compositions are
filled with scenes depicting different encounters that took place between the British colonizers
and the colonized Oriental Indians. What these encounters unfold is how the British colonizer and
its sovereign ground logic always positions the enlightened modern European Man as the
civilized one. This image is an embodiment of how the Western Self tries to satisfy its desire for
the absolute Oriental Other while it is trying to prevent unwanted return of the erased realities of
the Oriental land. This embodiment is justified with the ethical argument the Western Self
narrated.

Each scene of the marginal decors framing the cartographic discourse of the game of
L’Orient depicts the enlightened Western men as superior, fulfilling his destiny of saving these
savage people from their own ignorance. On one hand, the British colonizer attempts to satisfy
this desire to save the Oriental Other by introducing the uncivilized Orientals to modernity as
they set themselves up as examples of civilization. Various scenes of war and conflict are used to
depict how the British men are in this land to protect the innocent and fragile inhabitants from the
barbaric actions of the dangerous and deviant people of this land. The irony is that the British is
saving the people of the Orient from the people of the Orient. In “Can The Subaltern Speak?,”
Gayatri Spivak addresses this centuries long justification in how Western imperialism uses certain
aspects of life and tradition in non-Western geographies as a logical form of reasoning to justify
its noble agenda. This form of cherry picking is a logical fallacy that persuades the audience to
buy into the dominant narrative: We [the White Man] need to save and protect the fragile people
(women) and land of the Orient from barbaric and violent people (man). Feminizing what and who needs to be saved as the victim and masculinizing the enemy forms the noble image of the White Man: sacrificing his own life for the primitive other. When Spivak writes “White men are saving brown women from brown men” she uses the relationship between the brown and white men/women to unpack the “relationship between the imperialist subject and the subject of imperialism.” In the case of Oriental Other, the White Man as the imperialist subject is a reflection of the Orient, which is the subject of imperialism (“Can the Subaltern Speak?” 92-93). Saving the Orient from yet again the Orient is a way for the White Man to save its Self: to save its meaningful existence.

This dominant narrative in the marginal decors of the L’Orient strengthens the noble image of the White Man as he offers tokens from the modern enlightened Europe to the uncivilized Oriental Indians. This cultural exchange is another image depicting how the Western Self continues to satisfy its desire to liberate these people who are in need of being saved by Western man. The gratitude depicted by the Oriental Indians immediately creates the notion of gratefulness, which re-inscribes how they consider and perceive the White Man as their saviors. This cartographic narrative in the margins unpacks how Gramsci’s notion of ‘domination by consent’ was used to form the consciousness of the colonizer and the colonized. In the rhetorical context of inventing the images of the colonizer and the colonized, once again, the White Man is depicted as a path to salvation for the uncivilized Oriental Other. Internalizing the consciousness of the colonized is how Gramsci defines domination by consent, which provides power to the White Man to de-re-territorialize the geography of the colonized in order to establish sovereign power and control.

In the structure of this carto-historical game of L’Orient, Western Man is always superior and always already fighting for the betterment of the land and its people. In this sense, the
Western Self’s image of enlightenment and modernity gained for itself a meaningful existence outside of the land and territory of the Western ground. It had found itself a home and meaning in the actualized geography of Oriental subjects. However, while the desire for the absolute Oriental Other im/places the center of the West in the Orient, the fear of being taken over by the Oriental Other displaces the West. This fear is the reason why the West always escapes the Orient by emptying its space, erasing its cultures, diverse identities, traditions, histories, and myths from the official map. This fear is the reason for pushing the Oriental Other into the margins. In this totality, then, there is always already a disruption that dis/orients both the image of the Orient and the modern West. In this sense, the game of the West and East, more than being a game of systematic reproduction, is a game of disruption that always already breaks the rules, crosses borders, and responds to the chance of space without us seeing, hearing, and mapping these invisible rhizomatic movements.

The disruption of the West-East totality is an unwritten rule that opens a path to an alternative form of playing this game. This unwritten rule of disruption that informs the ground of a centered structure comes with a certain cartographic anxiety, which “is invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were at stake in the game from the outset” (Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” 352). The totality of otherness that I have to play with in this game is the invention of the West, yet I am thrown into the land of the Orient as the central map in the game situates me. As I play more, as I map rhizomatically through the power networks of this cartographic game, I realize that more than it belongs to the East, the Oriental memory belongs to the Western world and more than it belongs to the West, the European memory of modernity belongs to the East/Orient. However, while the Western Self is capable of maintaining its being in this spatial and material reality, the Oriental Other cannot have a spatial existence and being in
either the Western or in the Oriental space. This is why it is almost inevitable for the Oriental Other to feel and experience the strong emotional impacts of dis/im/placement: “homesickness, disorientation, depression, desolation” (Edward Casey, *Getting Back into Place* x). And today, in the geographical ordering of aspatial global world, the Oriental other is always homeless because the global space belongs to the Western memory. As a result, the heavy burden the Oriental other has to carry as an outcast in any given territorialized space is a strong “sense of unbearable emptiness” which is “most poignantly felt in the forced homelessness of the reluctant emigrant, the displaced person, the involuntary exile” (Casey, *Getting Back into Place* x). The Oriental other lives no/where, belongs to no/where, and is, unfortunately, going no/where.

I consider the Middle Eastern identity and the problem attached to it—Islamic terrorism—as the product of the differentiating gaze of the Oriental Other. The Western intellectual tradition has been using its ethical argument of saving the Orient from its own damnation in forming the problematic image of the Orient. In the context of this ethical line of argument, the problematic Middle Eastern identity has been constructed in the new discourse of the global war on terrorism, which was one of the many replacements of the discourse of Orientalism. This displacement of these discourses function within the machinic system of the modern State and its Modern Constitution and only continue to re-invent the same problematic line of narrative that always remains in the dichotomized vision of the aspatial global world order: centers and peripheries. And unfortunately, this narrative line and its vision has only continued to push the absolute Other of Western Self as its shadow into the margins of the official map.

And I pick up the call of the home/sick Middle East, once again, and open yet another path to jump off the official map!
CHAPTER 4: MAKING OF THE “MIDDLE EASTERN OTHER”

“In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitylessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography. Suárez Miranda, Viajes de varones prudentes, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lérida, 165.” Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science” in Jorge Luis Borges: Collected Fictions, 325

“The one truly transcendent law in the Middle East is that of unintended consequences.” Karl E. Meyers and Shareen Blair Brysac, Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East, 18

Rhizome 4-Un/Mapping the Ground Logic: A Story of Dis/Orientation #rhizomap

“I do not know where I stand. I am hovering above the ground/grund beneath me and I feel a strong pull. The ground/grund draws me into a spectrum that gives me a monolithic vision that makes everything feel the same and different all at once. The call of difference/differend is reaching out to me from the ground/grund and it tries to show me what the monolithic gaze of the ground/grund hides from me. I look through the glass eye of this monolithic view that totalizes everything into the map of a global empire. I do not know where to stand in the global map that this vision frames. I see the roots of the trees that hold this vision together. I see a window that calls me. I look above the ground, beyond this window, that opens to a sky offshore. The root-trees start to dissolve; the borders slowly loosen their fixed grasp. A country road in between the trees opens a space wherein I am dis/oriented by the fluidity of borderlands. With everything

49 A Video-Mapping project that I visualized through the practice of rhizomatic mapping. This description presented is a reflection on the mapping from 6:20-8:00 minutes. https://youtu.be/9u88GVqLzWA
slowing down, with everything turning into chaos and disorder, I look through the window of our moving car and jump off the official map of the ground logic once again."

I am at a crossroads again wherein I try to comprehend how the sovereign ground logic of the Oriental image and its privileged, yet also very subjective language of power, gave birth to the monolithic geospatial reality of Middle East within the global networks of the polarized world order: West-East-North-South. Within the order of this dichotomized ground logic, these monolithic geopolitical spatial entities construct the map of the global world order and its power relations. In the ground of the global map, the West appears as the dominant monolithic space that re-invents Middle/East as the non-Western Other that resides in the marginalized peripheries of the global map. Within this monolithic vision, I return to the ground logic and its cartographic language of power to explore how this language re-invented the Orient in the reality of the Middle East in addition to investigating how this re-invention worked as a rhetorical tool to re-gain sovereign control over the land of the different other.

The alienating rhetoric of the ground logic orders and constructs our spaces, which results in defining who we are in relation to where we should belong. Seeing an empty flammable boat washed up on the ground of the shore in my hometown two summers ago was when I accepted the unfortunate reality of our current political climate: devaluing human life. That empty boat was the fate of the displaced people, the refugees, for me. It is a fate that was already determined for them even before they had a chance of to be rescued. This is the fate of being the eternal other, the threat, and the enemy; the fate of being kept out, at a safe distance. It is a fate that costs the lives of the boat people, refugees, immigrants, and all the displaced people: a fate of being considered disposable.

This fate became more apparent to me during the 6th Rhetoric Society of Europe conference at Norwich/U.K. that I attended in July 2017. The Syrian refugee crisis in the political
discourses of different nation-states was one of the strongest themes at the conference. It was both disturbingly interesting and shocking for me how some European scholars reacted to the problems, poor judgments, and ill treatments of Syrian refugees by indicating that ‘well, what else would you do then? Do you think you would have done a better job? This is the best we (West/Europe) can do.’

It was unfortunate to see that the growing populist nationalism has been spreading its tentacles a lot faster and more strategically than I had imagined. These responses are the responses of the West/Europe that has always desired to keep these non-Western others out in the ground where they belong. Instead of letting them in, the West sends its armies, troops to bring “civilization to [these] primitive or barbaric peoples” which brings back the image of the Orient and its “disturbingly familiar ideas about flogging or death or extended punishment being required when ‘they’ misbehaved or became rebellious, because ‘they’ mainly understood force or violence best; ‘they’ were not like ‘us,’ and for that reason deserved to be ruled” (Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* xi). The displaced people of the non-Western ground, the home/sick people of the Middle East, share the fate of always already being the other, of being different. A fate of home/sickness in which either death or the unbearable emptiness of displacement is the permanent state of being.

In the ground logic of the global map of the Western gaze, the rhetorical re-inventions of Middle East throughout the twentieth century have resulted in shifting power relations among the Western and Middle Eastern countries. These complex inter- and intra-geopolitical relations among the different nation-states of the West and Middle East hold great merit in the cartographic

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re-constructions of the Middle East; however, unpacking the rhetorical and political role of each of these carto-historical relations is beyond the limits of this mapping project. Considering the cartographic trajectory of this project—the monolithic vision of the global map—I map the geopolitical relations between the Western tree-structure and the Middle/Eastern rhizome. This broader vision I adopt is a response to the alienating yet also unifying gaze of the Western globalization world and how this gaze has been re-inventing the Middle East as the extensively totalized non-Western Other on a global level.

I approach the networks of this global web image as root-structures forming the monolithic gaze of the global map as a world centered in the ground logic of the West, which immediately forms the monolithic yet also alienated image of the Middle East within the same tree-system. In the ground logic of this tree-image, I approach the geopolitical island Middle East as a rhizomatic formation that became part of the Western root-tree system. In other words, the diverse rhizomatic patterns of Middle East have been cut and re-identified as root-structures. Through these machinic cuttings, the Western tree has been able to re-invent its meaningful existence in direct contrast to its non-Western other: the Middle East. These violent cuttings reflect how the tree-structure works as a mechanical reproduction system, which was programmed to maintain the dichotomized global world order around the West-East binary.

This rhizomatic mapping starts, again, in the middle, by unpacking the rhetoricity of the ground logic of the global map that is centered in the multipolar European gaze during the first half of the twentieth century. In this context, the focus of this chapter is to map the re-invention of Middle East in the haunting image of the Oriental land. In this process of mechanical reproduction, the monolithic vision of the Western Self defined the Middle East, first, as a question—the great Middle Eastern question—and then transformed this question into a problem to be fixed: the problem of lack of democratic and self-governing nation-state structures in the
region. This monolithic image of the region was depicted in the problematic narrative of the Orient, which depicted the Middle East as uncivilized and primitive in the dominant imaginary of the West. This re-narration has become one of the central arguments in producing the problematic reality of political Islam in the rhetorical context of the global war on terror discourse. Today, the Middle East continues to be received as uncivilized and primitive and this perception is directly associated with the dominant representation of political Islam: its non-democratic, violent, and terrorist governing ideology. The question of Middle East became the problem of political Islam as it is narrated in the dominant discourse.

In this chapter, I start from and with this central question highlighting the perception of the Middle/East as a problem to be fixed both in its old (Oriental image) and new rhetorical consciousness (Land of Islamic Terrorism) in the Western global imagery. As I map with this question, I re-read the engagement between the Western Self and the Oriental Other through the metaphors of tree and rhizome. This re-reading functions as a path to unfold how the Western Self as a tree-system internalized the Otherness of the Orient in its monolithic geospatial identity. This chapter will unpack how this internalization invented the modern Middle East as we know it today as a root-structure that is grounded in the memory of Oriental Other and how this root-structure shaped the region as a land of chaos and violence before the region came to be identified with the terrorist image of political Islam as the dominant representation.

**Geopolitical Island Middle East in the Ground Logic of the Global Map**

As a world region, the geopolitical island Middle East has been a strategic geographical location that holds a significant role in the inter- and intra-national geopolitical relations in the stage of globalization. In *Middle East Patterns: Places, People and Politics*, Colbert Held indicates that “the Middle East has served as a tricontinental hub for millennia. Peoples, armies, merchants, and ideas have flowed to, from, and across the region. Political ideology and
processes in the flow were sometimes adapted and sometimes rejected but often influences the internal evolution” of the sixteen states framing the geopolitical identity of the modern Middle East today (215). On one hand, the region’s extreme geopolitical significance stems from its tri-continental location as global crossroads, its access to crucial transportation and trading routes, and its petroleum reserves (Ewan William Anderson, *The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics*). On the other hand, the accelerating internal conflicts that have resulted in war, violence, and terrorism are another layer that has been re-positioning the region as the focus of global attention, primarily on the ground logic of the popular media representations:

The Middle East has featured prominently in the news almost daily through more than six decades of warfare: five major Arab-Israeli wars plus several more limited conflicts; the almost uninterrupted cycle of violence involving Arabs and Israelis; internecine fighting in Lebanon in 1958 (ended by landing of U.S. forces) and from 1975 to 1991 (involving U.S. forces on two occasions); Turkey’s invasion and partial occupation of Cyprus beginning in 1974; Iraq’s war with Iran in the 1980s, its invasion of and consequent expulsion from Kuwait in 1990-1991, the international sanctions imposed on it afterward, and its occupation by the U.S.-led coalition from 2003 onward; U.S. operations in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001; and civil wars and insurgencies in Yemen in the 1960s, 1994, and the late 2000s. Beyond open fighting, there has been an ongoing Arab-Israeli “Peace Process” dating to Henry Kissinger’s “Shuttle Diplomacy” in the mid-1970s, hostage taking in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, the overthrow of the shah and the American Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran in 1979-1980, terrorist attacks in most of the countries in the region, Cold War crisis ranging from Iran and Turkey in the 1940s to peripheral Afghanistan in the 1980s, and dozens of other headline-worthy events. (Held 3)
I define the canonized geopolitical identity of the Middle East as chaos, war, and terrorism that the modern Western gaze and its global map have been using in constructing its ethical argument, which is at the core of the rhetorical alienation of Middle East: the Western man needs to save the people of the Middle East from terrorism and war in addition to protecting important natural resources and trading routes. On one hand, this geopolitical identity of the region has been placing the Middle East as the focus of global attention; on the other hand, I argue, it has been used as a universal form of justification in continuously re-defining and re-inventing the region as an excluded geography, as the Third World, in the margins of the ‘world map’. I approach this geographical exclusion as a form of geopolitical gatekeeping rooted in the ground logic of the global map.

Today, this geopolitical gatekeeping appears in the form of a strong desire to keep the terrorist Muslims out in the margins, where they can be controlled at a safe distance. Until the region arrived to its current geopolitical identity, its borders and socio-spatial consciousness have constantly changed throughout the twentieth century. As Michael Bonine at.al. argue in their collection, the new state of consciousness the region is currently in emerged from the ghost of the old West/East dichotomy, which has been re-inventing itself as the geopolitical relations shift and change (Is There a Middle East?). In this mechanical reproduction process, the region’s borders were reformed, its central and peripheral countries were re-defined, and the geographic location the very name of Middle East represents was re-imagined in a parallel relationship to the expanding spatial framework of the Western globalization. As the image of the Orient and its discourse gave birth to the Middle Eastern question during the early twentieth century, the ‘naming’ of the region had shifted among Far, Near, and Middle East/s in accordance to the spatial position of the West.
The Eastern Question, the Middle East, and the Oriental Despotism

The first official use of the term ‘Middle East’ as a geographical entity is associated with Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer that defined a vague route from Great Britain to its colony India in 1902. However, according to Faik Bulut, the roots of ‘Middle East’ as a term goes back to the seventeenth century (36). Bulut explains that Middle East as a term “was not created by the people of the region. To the Semitic peoples, the present day Middle East was the centre of the world…Europe and the Far East were peripheral” (36). The strong front of the Ottoman Empire along with Persia was the image of the region today known as the Middle East in the geopolitical theatre. In the ground logic of the West vs. East binary, the hierarchy of power was a singular line from East to West. During the seventeenth century, Middle East as a geographical term emerged “as a consequence of the colonialist mentality of Eurocentric capitalists…the ‘white man’ divided the world into High and Low civilizations. The Europeans saw it as their mission to civilize the backward people of the region. In this sense, the Middle East is an invention of the Europeans” (Bulut 36). This invention took place in the rhetorical context of the Eastern question. In “the Eastern Question and the Ottoman Empire,” Huseyin Yilmaz examines the evolution of the scope and nature of Karl Max’s label of ‘the Eternal Eastern question’:

at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the term “the Eastern Question” was generically applied to almost all conflicts taking place in Eastern Europe … Toward the late nineteenth century, however, within the context of a broader confrontation between Europe and the Orient, the scope of the Eastern Question was extended to all of Eurasia… Although the semantic range of the term “The Eastern Question” was extended to include the whole scope of relations between the West and the Orient, unless specified it commonly referred to the Euro-Ottoman context… It was this perception of the Eastern
question that gave rise to the notion of the Near Eastern Question by the late nineteenth century, from which current conceptualizations of the Middle East originated. (11-12)

The shifts in the scope of these questions impacted the changes in the geographical labels: from East to Far East, Near East to Nearer East to Middle East, which today arrived to Greater Middle East in the context of the war on terror discourse. 51 These changes made a significant impact on the cartographic constructions of Middle East as a vaguely defined geographical category. 52 While these shifting eastern questions and geographical borders provide complex networks of relations that constructed the Middle East, they were totalized under the homogenic cartographic image of the Orient during the early stages of the Middle East’s cartographic invention.

In “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East,” Karen Culcasi indicates that the modern Middle East as a geopolitical entity as we know it today was re-invented in the discourse of Orientalism (583-84). The dominant image and discourse that defined the non-Western Middle East in the rhetorical contexts of the colonizer Europe was the ‘Oriental’ land and the ‘Oriental’ people. The term Orient and its extensively homogenized image, as Said indicates, was a European invention. I approach the early usages of the term Middle East and its different meanings in relation to Said’s manifest Orientalism, while the overall construction of the Middle East in the memory of the Orient as latent Orientalism. As the ‘white man’ produced the knowledge of an extensively totalized Middle East, he, in its different positions of power (multiple interests of the different European powers), was also defining the region under categories of distinct representations to gain strategic advantage and detailed information about

52 In “The Eastern Question and the Ottoman Empire,” Huseyin Yilmaz offers more extensive reading of how the change in the scope of eastern questions impacted the shifts in the geographical labels.
the region. In other words, as the overall knowledge of Middle East changed (latent Orientalism), the manifestations of Middle East in different centers of power changed (manifest Orientalism).53

Middle East, as a result of these re-constructions in the context of imperialism, colonization, and war, has never been a stable and clear geographical region due to its always shifting borders. Especially since World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the region’s constantly changing geographical borders and names in addition to the countries that constitute the region have contributed to an intensifying image of chaos, conflict, terror, and violence. This unstable reality of the region stems from how Middle East was cartographically re-constructed according to the laws and rules of Western modernization and how these rules clashed with the internal and organic laws of the inhabitants of the region. I consider this clash as the roots of the contemporary terrorist image of Middle East that is embodied in the problematic narrative of Islam as it constructs itself inherently violent in the popular representation, which depicts the feared enemy image of the region. I map this feared enemy image back to the memory of the Ottoman Empire and how the empire’s identity was re-invented in the image of Oriental despotism on the ground logic of the European vision of the global map. In Contending Visions of the Middle East, Zachary Lockman explains that

For an entire historic period, the Ottomans were the great bogeyman of Christian Europe: they evoked considerable fear and in popular literature were often depicted as cruel, violent and fanatical, in ways that drew on long-prevalent caricatures of Islam… But some Europeans, while continuing to reject Islam and insist on the truth of Christianity, were able to adopt a more objective attitude toward the Ottomans. In fact, in the sixteenth century many educated European observers were awed by the immense power and wealth

53 In Orientalism, Said defines latent and manifest Orientalism by making a distinction, which “is an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call manifest Orientalism.” (206).
of the Ottoman state – it was they who gave Sultan Suleiman the epithet “magnificent,” not the Ottomans, who called him “the lawgiver” – and sought to grasp the secret of the empire’s success, often contrasting Ottoman virtues with the defects of their own societies. (42-43)

This relationship between Europe as the embodiment of Western civilization and the emerging modern identity of the Western Self during the age of discoveries (late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), and the Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of the strong Eastern civilization and the established identity of the East as the power center, mirrors the relationship between the Self and Other. Reading this engagement between the Europe/West and the Ottoman Empire/East first appears to position the identity of the Ottoman as the Self responding to Europe as the Other. However, during this epoch of time, the Ottoman Empire as the face of a powerful East/Orient did not actually define its identity by consciously defining its non-Eastern/non-Islamic Other. In this un/conscious response to the call of the Other, Europe/West picked up the call of the Ottoman Empire to define its identity as Western civilization, which was a way to determine how to form the grand-narrative of the modern Western Self. Lockman indicates that as a result of the age of discoveries, “the new European global empires and a new world economic order increasingly dominated by Europeans were coming into being. Inevitably, emerging new conceptions of what Europe and the West meant were profoundly influenced by the fact that western European states were simultaneously moving toward a position of global hegemony, exercising political and economic power over non-Western states and peoples” (56-57). This emerging shift was not necessarily a change in the relation between the Self and Other; but it was a power shift in how Self and Other are defined in the socio-economic and political context of the changing world. For Europe to produce its Self as more powerful, the power networks of
European empires defined their Europe defects by defining Ottoman Empire’s strengths and values in political, social, and cultural life.

I approach this emerging shift in the power balance of West and East dichotomy as the early stages of forming the extensively totalized image of the Orient and its systematic discourse. When Said opens his fundamental work *Orientalism*, he introduces his readers to several meanings of Orientalism that are both intertwined and interdependent. The first meaning of Orientalism is its study as an academic field, and the second one is Orientalism as a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (2). Said defines the third meaning of Orientalism as an interchange between the first two meanings, which roughly started from the eighteenth century and formed “the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (3). In this context, as the shift in the global binary of West-East was forming the modern identity of Western man and its grand narrative, it also started to produce the subjugating tree-system of the Western colonial gaze that produced the Oriental Other as part of its machinic tree-structure. During the epoch of the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, which also defines the golden ages of the Western modernization during Renaissance and Industrialization, the image of the Ottoman Empire was replaced with the image of despotism, a state characterized by the concentration of arbitrary, lawless and absolute power in the hands of the all-powerful sovereign (the sultan) and the reduction of all his subjects to virtual slavery… The Ottomans thus became a prime example of what European political thinkers came to call Oriental despotism, a concept which was most fully developed by the great French writer and jurist Montesquieu (1689–1755) … As
with earlier depictions of the Ottoman empire as tyrannical and profoundly alien, Montesquieu’s denunciation of Ottoman despotism had more to do with anxieties and debates within Europe itself than with Ottoman realities. The odious example of the Ottomans gave Montesquieu and others a safe way to criticize and resist what they saw as the despotic tendencies of European monarchs and to delineate, by means of a sharp contrast, their emerging vision of a new kind of rational and moral political order. Not all European political thinkers accepted Montesquieu’s assertions about Oriental despotism…the concept would live on and flourish, in a variety of forms, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (Lockman 47-48)

Re-inventing the declining Ottoman Empire in the totalizing image of the Orient that represented the primitive and uncivilized non-Western Other positioned the Western Self at the center of modern civilization. I argue that this re-invention happened in the rhetorical context of the Oriental despotism that European empires framed, which created the feared enemy image of the Ottoman Empire. The Sick Man of Europe (the Ottoman Empire) during the nineteenth century was being presented as the enemy to the Christian Western world in Europe and as the enemy to the many ethnic groups under the reign of the Ottoman Empire, but primarily the Arabs. This enemy image of the Ottoman Empire which was narrated in the rhetorical context of Oriental despotism could be read as the implementation of the Western Self’s ethical argument in justifying “why a socially, economically and culturally dynamic ‘West’ had come to dominate the world, including many parts of Asia and Africa inhabited largely by Muslims, and why that domination was necessary and good” (Lockman 57). Modern Europe used the weakness of the falling of the Ottoman Empire—its lack of governmentality, declining military power, and incapability of providing security for its subjects—as its primary rhetorical tool in forming its ethical argument for saving the diverse ethnic groups who were under the long-term suppression
of the barbar Turks. This ethical argument justified the growing presence and control of European nation-states in the region by positioning the inhabitants of the soon to be former Ottoman Empire area as in need of support and help to properly govern their land and help people to adapt to the new modern world order.

The rhetorical use of oriental despotism formed the ground logic of the global map centered in the multipolar power gaze of modern Europe at the dawn of the failing Ottoman Empire and the WWI. This ground logic of the newly emerging global map created internal inconsistencies, discomfort, but most importantly resentment against the Ottoman Empire among the many ethnic identities in the region that was soon to be defined Middle East. The growing internal chaos was evident in internal resistant movements, uprisings, and insurgencies against the Ottoman Sultan. These resistant movements were supported by the European power centers. In particular, the British support for Arab guerilla movement against the Ottoman Sultan created the necessary diversion and division of military forces as the Ottoman army was fighting in WWI alongside with Germany (David Fromkin 5-6). While European powers made promises to many ethnic groups in the region for independence—the most well-known case is the promise of the independent Kurdish State—they also used these insurgencies as logical reasoning to justify the necessary European control over these groups. European powers used these insurgencies to make a logical case for how these ethnic groups were incapable of maintaining their existence as self-governing independent nation-states. This rhetorical mood of chaos gave birth to the great Middle/Eastern question and European powers made their ethical responsibility to resolve this question.
From Eastern Question to the Middle Eastern Question: Multipolar European Gaze in Making of the Modern Middle East

Middle East’s critical location was the primary interest of the European powers in the region since the nineteenth century. As a world region, Middle East “forms the much trampled passageway linking Asia and Europe to Africa” (Karl Ernest Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac 17). In London and the Invention of Middle East, Roger Adelson writes that Mahan’s construction of the term ‘Middle East’ and what this geographical positioning represented was used “to describe the area north and west of India, and to distinguish it from Near East and the Far East” (1). This vague cartographic construction of ‘Middle East’ aimed at securing the route to Great Britain’s significant colony India. Pinar Bilgin explains that “throughout history, the driving purpose behind the identification and naming of geographic sites has almost always been military strategic interests” (2). Overall, Mahan devised the name of ‘Middle East’ as a geographical area in the context of colonial and military interests of Great Britain.

In the years leading to WWI, the new relations that were being formed among Britain, France, and Russia truly started the process of the making of the modern Middle East. Fromkin explains that

Great Britain had propped up the Ottoman Empire for generations as a buffer against Russian expansionism. Now, with Russia as Britain’s shaky ally, once the war had been won and the Ottomans overthrown, the Allies would be able to reshape the entire Middle East. It would be one of those magic moments in history when fresh starts beckon and dreams become realities. (4)

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In the early stages of cartographically constructing the Middle East, the colonizer gaze of the British played a primary role in shaping the new socio-spatial consciousness and the borders of the modern Middle East. As Fromkin indicates, “It was clear that the British needed to maintain control over the Suez Canal, and all the rest of the route to their prized colonial possession, India” (5). The colonizer gaze of the sovereign ground logic of the British resulted in Mahan visualizing Middle East as an arbitrary path to India (see Fig. 5). In “Where Is the Middle East?” Roderic H. Davison informs us of Mahan’s vision in framing the ‘Middle East’ as a geographical term in relation to the necessity of gaining naval power for Great Britain in the context of war: “Mahan considered the Anglo-Russian contest along with the new element of the projected German Berlin-to-Baghdad railway with its probable terminus on the Persian Gulf. Envisioning the desirability of the Anglo-German cooperation to keep the Russians out, he affirmed the need for Britain to maintain a strong naval position, with bases, in the Persian Gulf” (667). In “The Persian Gulf and International Relations,” Mahan writes that

*The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar…The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion arises, about Aden, India and the Gulf.* (qtd. in Davison 667)

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55 I created this cartographic representation by using the data from “Where Is the Middle East?” by the Carolina Center for the Study of the Middle East and Muslim Civilizations.
During the early years of the twentieth century, “the first priority of London’s policymakers was to defend the Empire and India, a priority they saw as justifying British protection of the Suez Canal and domination of the Persian Gulf. The second major concern was to maintain the balance of power in Europe, and third to exploit the area’s copious resources of oil, discovered near the Persian Gulf, to meet the needs of the British navy” (Adelson 2). The ground logic of Mahan’s Middle East put its emphasis on gaining military advantage in addition to securing the colonial control for the Britain, which resulted in this early cartographic visualization of Middle East to be “an indeterminate area guarding a part of the sea from Suez to Singapore” (Davison 667). The ground logic of Mahan’s first cartographic framing of the Middle East in the discourse of colonialism and in the rhetorical context of war gave birth to the great ‘Middle Eastern Question.’

In “Is There a Middle East?” Nikki Keddie indicates that this geographical term has become a decisive geopolitical misnomer. In the context of the upcoming first world war, the meaning and function of the Middle East started to change. Middle East became a strategic location to control and secure to military advantage. In 1903, Valentine Chirol reflected on this rhetorical shift in the meaning of Middle East in his book titled *The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence*. Chirol defines the Middle Eastern question in the broader geopolitical context of Asia by considering the multiple political, economic, and military interests of the European powers in Asia. In the context of political

Fig. 6. Valentine Chirol’s 1903 Middle East
discourse and the discourse of war, Chirol defines this question in the geographical and cartographic construction of Mahan’s Middle East (see Fig. 6)\(^{56}\) and

in those regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India, and which are consequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as well as military defence. The Middle Eastern Question is itself only a part of a much larger question upon which the future of Asia depends. It is not indeed a new question, for it has occupied the minds of far-sighted statesmen for generations past. It is a continuation of the same question with which we have long been familiar in the Near East. It is closely connected with the more novel development of international rivalry in the Far East. It is the outcome of that constant projection of European forces—moral, commercial, and military—into Asia which is slowly but steadily transforming all the conditions that enabled us to achieve, and so far to retain, as the masters of India, a position of unparalleled ascendency in the Asiatic Continent. (5)

In between the Far and Near East within the broader geopolitical context of Asia, Middle East’s strategic political and military significance was becoming a central focus and importance to the European powers in the ground logic of the Eurocentric global map. Especially during the early twentieth century, the tension between Britain and Germany due to establishing control over the Middle East had a strong impact on the early cartographic constructions of the region. Germany was a threat to the British empire and its colonial interests during the pre-WWI context. Adelson explains that “Following Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905, the old geopolitical bogey of Russian armies rolling over the Indian subcontinent gave way to new fears of German railways bringing troops to challenge British ascendancy” (2). With its Berlin to Baghdad railway proposal, Germany as “a British rival for global power…established political along with military

\(^{56}\) I created this cartographic representation by using the data from “Where Is the Middle East?” by the Carolina Center for the Study of the Middle East and Muslim Civilizations.
relations with Ottoman Turkey, this fueling fears in Britain about German regional aspirations” (David Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East* 853). Germany was a strong threat for the colonial power of Britain.

This pre-WWI German threat to the colonial British Empire appears within the ground logic of the 1905 German map titled “Persien, Afghanistan und Belutschistan” (see Fig. 7). This early twentieth century German map, which is part of the *Andrees Handatlas*, focuses on Middle East as a region with a close trajectory to Afghanistan, Iran (Persia), and Pakistan. The ground logic of this map aligns with Mahan’s arbitrary definition of the Middle East with its cartographic focus on the critical location of the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf and the route to Pakistan/India (before the partition in the 1940s, it was just India). The cartographic logic and visual focus of this German map illustrates the threat the British Empire perceived especially considering how this map provides specific information on the “settlements, telegraphy cables, railways, forts” (David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, “Note: Persien, Afghanistan und Belutschistan”). The early German interests in the Middle East were focused on mapping the knowledge of Middle East’s communication systems and transportation paths. Adelson writes that

To counter German influence, Britain instigated a defensive diplomacy with France and Russia. It traded recognition of France’s predominance in Morocco in return for French
acknowledgment of British dominance in Egypt. Meanwhile, Persia was divided into a British southern sphere [one of the richest locations of oil resources], a Russian northern sphere, with a neutral area in between. (2)

The 1907 British map (see Fig. 8), titled “Europe and Near East-General Commercial Chart,” illustrates the British’s focus on securing and controlling the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf during the early years of the twentieth century. This commercial map not only traces the trading routes that go through the Suez Canal, it also maps detailed information about “products, imports, exports, commercial conditions and economic statistics of the countries of the world” by using “descriptive text and diagrams” (David Rumsey Map Collection).

The emphasis given on the Suez Canal in the ground logic of this British Map aligns with the primary interests of the British policy during this time period. The upper right corner of the map presents a smaller map that has a focused trajectory of the Suez Canal. This window within the overall ground logic of this map reveals the importance of Suez Canal to the British Empire. The publisher’s note to this map indicates that “[t]his is a path breaking statistical atlas of world commerce, using imaginatively formatted maps and diagrams to show the immense growth and pattern of international trade at the beginning of the 20th century” (David Rumsey Map Collection, “Pub Note: Europe and Near East General Commercial Chart”)
Commercial Chart”). The use of statistical information serves the primary British interests in the Middle East: maintaining control over the Suez Canal. This is why the focused map of the Suez Canal is accompanied by a diagram, titled “Diagram Showing Relative Amount of Shipping Passing Through Suez Canal in 1905.” This information is designed around which country used how many vehicles in addition to the net tonnage of their overall shipment. The countries listed in this diagram, with the same order, are United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Other Nations. Considering the existing power balance among the European countries during this time, the primary rivals to the British Empire was Germany and France in establishing control over the Suez Canal in the Middle East. Britain turned its rivalry with France to alliance in the context of WWI to fight against the threat Germany held against Britain’s colonial, military, and economic interests.

The primarily political, colonial, economic, and military significance of Middle East was doubled “with the initial discovery of its underground ocean of oil” (Meyer and Brysac 17). In the context of war, the discovery of oil resources was extremely important for the European powers due to the high costs of military defense and the need for oil to run the war machine. In this sense, Britain, in rivalry with France and Germany, sought their advantage and secured “their first significant oil production” in Persia (Daniel Foliard 3792). With the discovery of oil in Persia, as Foliar unfolds, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was established under the colonial gaze of the British Empire. By establishing a strong control and dominance over the region’s strategic military locations, routes, and finally oil resources, Britain had a primary impact on the cartographic construction of the borders in and of the Middle East during the first half of the twentieth century. I approach this primary impact of the British gaze and its colonizer and the colonized image in the ground logic of the global map as the first layer of the European tree-system implementing its root-structure into the Middle East.
Following the ‘the Eternal Eastern Question,’ almost all “attempts to give a consistent geographical or cultural definition to the term all followed major international development or were made in anticipation of major geostrategic shifts, ultimately creating multiple ‘Middle East’ that were based on different sets of criteria” (Yilmaz 11). In the context of WWI, these geostrategic shifts that served the interests of multiple European powers started to become even more visible. The use of ‘Middle East’ as a geographical term was becoming more frequent in the British context especially after the contextualization of the ‘Middle Eastern’ question. Chirol played an essential role in helping to “popularize the term and the idea of the Middle East” by addressing “British security issues as an ‘Asiatic Power’” (Culcasi, “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East” 585). As Chirol popularized the term as a question to be addressed, he focused on the expansive area Mahan identified as the ‘Middle East,’ and considered this region as “the ‘cornerstone of the British Empire,’ and he believed that securing it was ‘most urgent…from an Indian point of view” (Culcasi “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East” 585). However, before Mahan and Chirol

British General Thomas Edward Gordon had published an article in the journal The Nineteenth Century entitled “The Problem of the Middle East” (1900). Gordon did not specifically delimit or define the region, but his concern was with Afghanistan, Persia, Russia, and British India. What is interesting in Gordon’s article is the casual usage of the term “the Middle East,” which seemingly implies that it may have been commonplace in British India, where he was stationed (Koppes 1976, 96; Drysdale and Blake 1985, 10). Regardless of who was the first to use the term, it emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century in reference to British geopolitics (C. G. Smith 1968, 4). (qtd. in Culcasi, “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East” 585)
While the “British-centric term ‘the Middle East’” was cartographically re-invented in the haunting image of the Orient to serve the colonial geopolitical interests of the British empire during the early twentieth century, “not until after World War I and British military conquests in the region did both the term and the idea of the Middle East become common in the United Kingdom” (Culcasi, “Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East” 585). In this period, especially in the broader context of the European usages of the term ‘Middle East,’ there is a vivid movement between the two geographical terms that were in use to refer to the expansive region we know as ‘Middle East’ today: Near East and Middle East. This was primarily due to how the broader scope and meaning of the Eastern Question was more prominent to the interests of the many European power centers. Even in the British usages, “outside of government circles, British interest groups and individual experts continued to use the term ‘Near East’ more often than they used the term ‘Middle East,’ despite a Royal Geographical Society resolution in 1920 that prescribed that the ‘Near East’ should denote only the Balkans, whereas lands from the Bosporus to the Indian frontiers should be named ‘Middle East’” (Adelson, “British and U.S. Use and Misuse of the Term ‘Middle East’” 43). Yilmaz explains that the Eastern Question was primarily about the colonial projects; yet this question created “more abstract and broader confrontation[s] between the West and East” which produced “new series of ‘questions’”57 (27). In the context of these shifting relations and interests, as Yilmaz continues,

In broad terms, the Eastern Question was about establishing a new world order. In other words, it was European intellectuals’ self-proclaimed mission to accord the rest of the world. Yet, more specifically, it was about envisioning Europe vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, for it represented an alien civilization still surviving on the same continent these

57 In this context, as Yilmaz continues, “the China Question became the Far Eastern Question, the India question and Persian Question became the Middle Eastern Question, and the Turkish (Ottoman) Question became the Near Eastern Question” (27).
Europeans saw as the dispenser of modern civilization, uncompromised by inferior races and cultures. The Eastern Question in this way became integral to the process of purifying Europe from cultural contamination by enlightening out driving out its Asiatic elements. (27)

This alien image of the Ottoman Empire as it is framed in the systematic discourse of European imperialism and colonization echoes the discourse of Orientalism. The Ottoman Empire represented the deviant other threatening the modern sovereign image of the European Empire and it needed to be eliminated. In this context, I consider the Ottoman Empire the early image of the enemy for the Euro-centric modern Western civilization and society. This early image later was re-invented in the context of the Middle Eastern question by becoming one of the central ethical reasonings in narrating the socio-spatial reality of the Middle East as a problem to be fixed. In the context of WWI, the problem of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the partition of many Ottoman territories among the European powers with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Treaty (see Fig. 9).

While Britain already formed an ally with France and Russia against the Ottoman Empire, Italy was aligning with Germany and Austria, which allied with the Ottoman Empire during WWI. In The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics, Anderson writes that to break Italy’s commitment to the triple alliance with Germany and Austria, the policy of
France and Britain was to offer the territories that Italy had already seized “during the Turkish-Balkan wars of 1910-12”: the Dodecanse Islands, the coastlands of Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica. To accomplish this policy, these territories were “offered [to Italy] in the Sykes-Picot Treaty (1916) which delimited the future intended territorial allocations within the Middle East” (103). Even though, the Sykes-Picot Treaty was never put in effect due to the fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917, how the Ottoman Empire territories was already divided among European powers had a primary impact on the formation of the mandate states in Middle East after the fall of the empire.

The cartographic construction of the Sykes-Picot Treaty mainly focused on establishing control and power over the Middle East with an emphasis on defeating the enemy, the Ottomans, and keeping the deviant non-Western ‘Other’ out. Michael Heffernan explains the logic of the treaty, which mirrored itself into the ground logic of the cartographic construction of the Middle East before the fall of the Ottoman Empire:

Once the Turks were defeated, the Middle East was to be divided into Russian, Italian, French, British, and international zones plus Italian, French, British ‘spheres of influence.’ The coastal belt of the eastern Mediterranean and much of Mesopotamia were to be shared between French, British and (in the case of Palestine) international control. The ‘independent’ Arab lands lying between the Mediterranean strip and the Gulf were to be further divided between British and French ‘spheres of influence.’ These desert lands would be colonies in all but name and isolated from the sea other than through the proposed British, French or international coastal zones. (518)

I read this ground logic rooted in the systematic discourse of European imperialism and colonialism that visualized the geography of Middle East as an imagined land through the notions of heartland and world-island to unpack the extreme geopolitical importance of the Middle East since the early twentieth century. Held writes that
early geopolitical concepts of “Heartland” and “World-Island” [which] appeared in Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s paper of 1904…Mackinder defined the Heartland bastion basically as Siberia, which he conceived of as ringed by an Inner Crescent extending from northwestern Europe through southern Asia to northeastern Asia. Beyond the Inner Crescent he viewed an Outer Crescent—the Americas, southern Africa, and Australia. He labeled tricontinental Europe, Asia, and Africa the “World-Island” and proposed in 1919 that: *Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World.*

Although the Mackinder dictum has received its just share of criticism, the idea of World-Island emphasizes the links among three “inner continents.” Emphasizing those links, it coincidentally spotlights the pivotal location of the Middle East in the World-Island. (215)

In the context of the shifting international and geopolitical relations of WWI, the region that was imagined to be the Middle East in the European gaze represents Mackinder’s world-island considering the region’s critical location that connects Europe to Asia. For the European powers, building transportation and telecommunication routes in the Middle East was a way to have the advantage in having strategic control over the region. Knowing how to move and communicate across the Middle East in the context of the changing geopolitical world order meant receiving significant intelligence about the region, which was a necessity for each European power to accomplish political advantage over one another.

Approaching the Middle East as a world island provides an explanation for why it became essential for European powers to have a balanced control over the Middle East. On one hand, each European power sought to gain dominant power and control over the region; on the other hand, risking having shared control was too great of a danger for many European powers
especially considering the danger of one power center to accomplish maintaining hegemonic power over the region. To prevent a hegemonic power controlling the Middle East, the the Sykes-Picot Treaty was formed as an alliance against the central German and Ottoman Empire threat by the British and French. However, while Great Britain was collaborating with France in controlling the Middle East, the policy-makers of the British Empire made sure to have more advantage and critical control over the region. Adelson explains that

The Sykes-Picot memo envisaged a ‘confederation of Arab States’, under the ‘suzerainty’ of an unnamed ‘Arabian prince’. Area A, along the Mediterranean coast of Syria and Palestine, could come under direct French rule. Area B, from the head of the Persian Gulf to Baghdad and beyond, would come under British control. In a Blue Area adjacent to A and a Red Area next to B, France and Britain would respectively ‘establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire’. Dividing the French A and Blue areas from the British B and Red areas was a diagonal line running northeasterly from the port of Haifa to Baghdad, along which the British could build a railway. Finally, a Brown Area around Jerusalem was set aside for ‘an international administration’, in the light of specific ‘requirements’. (125-126)

Even though the Sykes-Picot Treaty was never put in effect officially due to the fall of Tsarist Russia in addition to how Turkey and Iran became independent nation-states, the cartographic ground logic of this treaty still impacted how the Middle East was formed and divided among the European powers with the creation of mandate states in the post-war period. In *The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics*, Anderson explains that “Following the Sykes-Picot Treaty (1916) …and subsequent treaties, France and Britain redrew the political map, delimiting new boundaries, which often cut across existing social and economic divisions as new
states were created” (267). This Anglo-French domination over the Middle East defined the post-war context of the region.

**Anglo-French Domination and Re-Constructing Middle East in Post-WWI Period/Inter-War Era**

During the post-WWI period, the European Powers’ imagined cartographic constructions of the Middle East went through varying levels of transformations. The Paris Peace Conference after the war was to determine the new borders and nations of the Middle East. The vision of the conference reflected the “idealistic Wilsonian rhetoric…with its open covenants of peace, openly arrived at” which was supposed to sweep away the old imperial and colonial “European secret diplomacy” (Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis* 1175; 1179). However, the League of Nations’ continuing colonial vision aimed to “subordinate the Middle East to imperial interests and to Europe. Allied peace treaties were concluded in 1919 with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and with the Turks in 1920” (Adelson 167). In particular, the “1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which unsuccessfully proposed the partition of Turkey” was strong evidence for this continuing post-war colonial and imperial control of Europe over Middle East (Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis* 1171-3). The Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination initially sought to move away from this old problematic of Europe. However, the Wilsonian rhetoric ended up supporting the imperial and colonial sovereign ground logic of the European “cold calculus power politics” (Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis* 1179). This was primarily because of how the needs of the people of the Middle East were never the main concern for the European Powers in the peace process. The main purpose was the well-being and wealth of modern European society and the Middle East was just another strategic source of prosperity for the people of the Europe.

Determining the fate of the Middle East and drawing its map was a process that was shaped primarily under the colonial gaze of Great Britain; but French interests played a
significant role in this process as well. Foliard writes that “On March 12, 1919, the Middle Eastern Political Section of the British delegation in Paris met at the Astoria Hotel to discuss the ‘territorial arrangements in Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, in the event of Syria being assigned to France.’ The discussion focused on Clemenceau’s memorandum of February 5, 1919, which recognized the transfer of Mosul to Mesopotamia in exchange for the establishment of a French mandate over a large, unified Syria” (4483-87). The rhetoric of this memorandum shows France’s efforts in establishing and maintaining colonial power in the Middle East as a way to compete with the British government.\(^5^8\) For the European powers, the important agenda was to serve their own interests rather than considering the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of Middle East. Overall,

it was intended by the victorious Allied powers who constructed the new international order symbolized by the Fourteen Points, the Versailles Peace Conference, and the League of Nations, that this new order would deal differently with the Middle East than had the old European system. The Middle East was adjudged by the victors of the Great War to be deficient, among other things, in not having states organized along the national principle. The victors proposed to remedy this deficiency by creating new nation-states there, as they did in Central and Eastern Europe, regions judged to be similarly deficient. They did not do so, of course, in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned.

(Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis* 1204-08)

The mandate states formed in the Middle East were a product of Europe’s imperial agendas in the post-WWI context. This imperial discourse in re-inventing the region was justified with the central line of ethical argument of the European modern vision that focused on the primitivity of the people of the Middle East. The central image, which was at the heart of this

\(^{58}\) For the full text of the memorandum, please see Rashid Khalidi *Sowing Crisis.*
ethical argument, brings back the image of the Orient and re-invents the region in the context of the new world order after the WWI. Under the gaze of the changing world, the Middle East lacked proper political organizations with decent governing skills, which depicted the region as in need of proper guidance and support to meet the expectations of the new modern world order. This portrayal of the region legitimized the formation of the mandate states in the region.

On a broader level, these mandates states were formed under the gaze of the multipolar European power centers. In particular, the Anglo-French domination over Middle East became the primary imperial control that constructed the region in the post-WWI context. The 1922 British map, titled “South-Western Asia,” is a color-coded map cartographically visualizing the European protectorates of newly formed nation-states in the Middle East (see Fig. 10). In the ground logic of this map, the dominant control of the Anglo-French gaze is strongly visible, along with Russian intervention. Considering the WWI alliance between Britain, France, and Russia to keep the German threat away, the continuing Russian presence in the Middle East in the post-war context appears as a logical decision made by the British and French governments to avoid any possible future conflicts Russia might had caused.

The pink borders representing the British control aligns with the interests of the British government in continuing to secure transportation routes to India in addition to gaining more power over oil.

Fig. 10. 1922 British Map South-Western Asia
resources in Persia. While the majority of Persia is marked by the yellow of Russian control, the critical location of Britain’s pink border moving from Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Libyan Desert, Palestine, Syrian Desert to the borderline in-between Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf is a strategic line of control over some of the richest oil resources in the Middle East. The French domination over Syria, marked by a light purple, in addition to the French presence in Western Asia indicates how France was making sure Britain did not become the center of power controlling all the critical locations in the Middle East. In particular, France’s intervention with British presence in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Punjab, and the surrounding territory of India, is a strong indication for France’s rivalry with Britain in maintaining balanced power over the Middle East.

While the ground logic of the post-war period’s re-construction of the Middle East was shaped by political and strategic military and economic interests, the ugly face of the alien Orient that was racially, ethnically, religiously, and socio-culturally the eternal non-Western Other played an extremely significant role in the cartographic and socio-spatial construction of the Middle East. It could be argued that beneath the geopolitical relations and arguments the European powers used to justify their colonial presence and imperial control over the region after the WWI was the problematic of the West-East binary opposition. The non-Western Other needed be to kept out and distinctly separated from modern Europe. The maps I have worked with so far were produced within the political discourse of the imperial gaze of Europe, and they do not directly unveil the continuing impact of the racially, ethnically, and socio-culturally alienated and differentiated Oriental other in constructing the Middle East. I suggest that the colonial gaze of the European power centers used the old Oriental images by coupling them with the new realities of the modern Middle East to justify their hidden agendas. I understand the visual absence of
these old Oriental images in these cartographic constructions as an effective rhetorical move.

According to Brian Harley,

the silences in maps act to legitimize and neutralize arbitrary actions in the consciousness of their originators. In other words, the lack of qualitative differentiation in maps structured by the scientific episteme serves to dehumanize the landscape. Such maps convey knowledge where the subject is kept at bay. Space becomes more important than place: if places look alike they can be treated alike. Thus, with the progress of scientific mapping, space became all too easily a socially empty commodity, a geometrical landscape of cold, non-human facts. ("Silences and Secrecy" 99)

This silenced image of the old rhetoric of Orient becomes visible within the discourse of popular representations of the Middle East in the post-war context. The 1934 French map, titled “Air France: Réseau Aérien Mondial,” which is a commercial map produced by Air France (see Fig. 11), is a reflection of the haunting image of the Orient that also inflicted a violent absence and created a silence in the new map of the modern Middle East.

![Fig. 11. 1934 French Map Air France: Réseau Aérien Mondial](image)

The absence in the ground logic of this commercial map is rooted in the same alienating rhetoric devised by European powers in forming the mandate states in Middle East: ignoring the
needs, concerns, and realities of indigenous people of the Middle East that was coupled with a lack of understanding about the diverse identities in the region. The implementation of the European nation-state system in the Middle East, created for European powers to have a legitimate reason to justify their presence, caused serious identity issues within the Middle East, especially in the post-WWII context. Khalidi explains that “many of the states that exist today in the Middle East—notably Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan—were direct products of these great-power interactions, and of the eventual implementation of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination” (Sowing Crisis 1212). As Khalidi argues, “it is open to question whether these existing states were constructed out of already existing “nations,” or whether new nations have since grown up inside these states and others that were arbitrarily conceived by the Allied powers.” In any case, the diverse identities in the region and the diverse needs of the people were ignored in forming these nation-states (Sowing Crisis 1212-16). In the ground logic of the 1934 French map, what was ignored and not understood was, once again, the heterogeneous identities of the Middle East. The extreme totalization comes with, first, the over-use of old Oriental images to depict the social and cultural identity of the region; and second, how there is almost no acknowledgment among the different socio-cultural patterns across the two continents this map identifies the Middle East in: Africa and Asia. In other words, non-Western others, within their totalized socio-spatial realities, are represented almost as the ‘same’ as long as their non-Western stereotypical realities are clearly represented. This extreme homogenization in the ground logic of this map, I suggest, is because of two main reasons: 1) The early focus of European superpowers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was on the extensively broad geography of Asia that included Near, Middle, and Far East(s) and that became the image of the Orient, on which the cartographic discourse of this map relies heavily; and 2) In the post-war context, the naming of the region was still in-between the old Near- and new Middle-East, which might have created
confusion for the popular representation of the region and made it easier to present this area under
the old image of the Orient as part of the broader geography of Africa and Asia.

This extreme totalization in the map of 1934 is complemented by the cultural icons and
representations of people that are problematic, all of which reflects the haunting image of the
Orients as they were imagined by Europe. The focus on the pictorial images of the exotic animals
and pictorial representations of the Oriental people draw from the already existing “repertoire of
grand generalizations, tendentious ‘science’ from which there was no appeals, reductive
formulae” produced by the late nineteenth century projects of Orientalism (Said, Orientalism
234). As this map advertises Air France’s route to Africa and Asia, it unveils the internalized
stereotypical representations and images about the non-Western Otherness of the overly
generalized Eastern world that remained in-between the old rhetoric of the Orient and the new
rhetoric of the Middle East. The absence in this map is the presence, experience, and engagement
of the indigenous inhabitants of this region to the geography of their homeland. The silence of
these rhizomatic formations of the Middle East constitutes a very visual absence of the diverse
realities and identities of the Middle East. These silences and absences created in the sovereign
ground logic of European maps is one of the indicators for the “antihuman and [yet] persistent”
reality of Orientalism and Western rhetoric of otherness that continues to re-invent the image and
identity of the Middle East today (Said, Orientalism 44).

As the region’s borders continued to change under the shifting names from Near to
Middle East during the post-WWI context, Middle East was already about to enter another
process of re-invention that started to transform this region during the post-WWII era and the
Cold War period. The rhetorical alienation of the European powers and their colonial and
imperial ground logic that invented the modern Middle East found itself a new voice, image, and
agenda in the shifting power balance of the new global bipolar world order during the Cold-War period: United States and Russia.

And I pick up the call of the home/sick Middle East, one more time, and start again in the middle, from the middle of the East to the greater middle East, in the context of war and violence!
CHAPTER 5: RE-WRITING THE MIDDLE EASTERN OTHER/THE MIDDLE EAST WRITING HER/SELF

“I shall speak about women’s writing: about what it will do. Woman must write her self: must write about women and bring women to writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from their bodies—for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal. Woman must put herself into the text—as into the world and into history—by her own movement.” Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of Medusa,” 875

“The Single story creates stereotypes and the problem with stereotypes is not that they aren’t true but that they are incomplete; they make one story become the only story.” Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story”

Rhizome 5-Mapping the Other Writing Her/Self: A Story of Dis/Orientation59#rhizomap

“The roots of a tree covering the ground float through sky, the river, the valley, and the country road. I hear the car passing and my dad’s voice reaches out to me from a distant memory-place and I can only see a blurry image, a vision that I hear and feel in my body that takes me to when I was a little girl and the first time it snowed in my hometown, at least it was the first time for me, a rare occasion. I am looking through a steamy window and I keep falling too short to exactly see through what’s outside the window, yet I somehow know that the earth is changing and it is becoming something other than what it is/being and I desire to imagine something other than my being who is already out there under the sun, walking the earth covered with white ink which I want to touch, feel, squeeze, and jump in to see how it will change and I draw/write myself on that steamy window without knowing that my writing was always going to be drawing on a steamy window that is neither outside nor inside. And I am thrown back to

59 A Video-Mapping project that I visualized through the practice of rhizomatic mapping. This description presented is a reflection on the mapping from 8:00-15:00 minutes. https://youtu.be/9u88GVqLzWA
mapping what floats in-between the ground, the sky, and the country road and I always imagine the stem-canals underneath. The Desired Other in me writes her/self by mapping her imprint on me. The Other I have never met is the accidental neighbor that offers me chance in space.”

When I was in middle school, I did something stupid. We had a new “Religious Studies and Ethics” teacher transferred to our school. One morning during a class break, I saw her right outside of the school entrance removing her head scarf. Back then, no one was allowed to enter any government building with a religious outfit in Turkey, and the head scarf was on the top of the list. I ran up to my classroom and told my friends that I saw her removing her head scarf and told them “she is probably one of them.” Them, the radical Islamists, who hated our secular country, civilized constitution, and the democracy Mustafa Kemal Ataturk implemented with the new Republic of Turkey. Little did I know that my own perception was shaped by a one story line that the external gaze of the Western civilization imprinted on us. If one does not look like a Western woman, she must be one of them; she must be oppressed, submissive, and backwards. My friends and I were afraid that she was going to try to brainwash us. Little did I know that we bought into the one story line that the subjugating language of otherness the Western power networks have been using to write us. We all agreed that our new teacher and women like her were threatening our democracy; ‘they’ were the reason, the obstacle for Turkey, to not becoming a member of the European Union (E.U.). We were sure that she was being forced to cover herself up. The barbaric, violent, and ignorant Muslim man was oppressing her. Little did I know that the dominant discourse in my own country perpetuated an ungrounded racial bias as a political manoeuvre to buy his way into the privileged geopolitical position of the E.U. The worst is that I was growing up to be tool, a puppet contributing to this story line.

We all gave into the Muslim women stereotype that continues to divide Turkey and many other countries in Middle East today. My own bias was a product of the internal ideological
borders and frontiers that had physical outcomes; my teacher was not allowed to be who she wanted to be, while many of my other teachers had the freedom to wear what they wanted as long as it was not a head scarf. On a broader level, I knew that the majority of these ‘other’ Muslim women were living outside of the central areas of the modern cities wherein we were free to walk around by wearing what we wanted. The problem was that they were moving into our cities. They were supposed to remain in the forgotten, ignored, and almost silenced regions within the country: primarily the East and South-East sides of Turkey. We were already divided by invisible frontiers the dominant ideological discourse drew. Little did I know that one day my own unconscious racial bias would become an ethical force for me to write about these women and that this writing would become a way to write myself as these women would bring me to writing. I did not know what this writing would do, and I had no clue that my writing would be a mapping in-between the lines of these divisive borders: a mapping within and across the borderlands of Muslim women writing herself and writing her own space.

Mapping the Middle East in this project has become, on one level, an un/conscious writing about the Muslim women of the Middle East. Today, the demonic stereotype that writes Middle East is being challenged and resisted by these brave women. Women are taking back their rights to their own bodies and voices. Muslim women, like myself and beyond myself, chose to wear their head scarves because they want to; they chose to remove their head scarves because they can. Brave women in Turkey taught me a lesson by telling me their stories, their right and freedom to wear a head scarf not because they are forced to but because they chose to. The brave women in Iran showed me that they have the courage to remove their head scarves as a reaction to the oppressive regime in Iran that has been forcing them to be the proper ‘Muslim woman’ that is written as a counter-image to the Western woman. These women stand up to be who they are; they fight for their own being as Muslim women, and they refuse to be victims of the epistemic
violence of categorization that stabilizes and constitutes them as other. They are mothers, sisters, cousins, and daughters whose fathers shed tears and write letters for them while they are in prison, like sixteen-year old Palestinian Ahed Tamimi, because they are not scared to write themselves and tell their stories.

The Middle East woman is writing herself and telling stories about the violation of human rights and lack of democracy across the region from different perspectives. The women of Middle East tell us that the chaos, disorder, and war in the region is not because of Islam; it is the governments and their political ideologies that always seek an advantage to gain power in the global arena of geopolitical relations. The governments of both West and Middle/East make decisions at the expense of peoples’ lives and freedom. Middle East is writing herself and I am writing with Middle East.

This chapter picks up her mapping from where chapter four left off, the inter-war period (between WWI-WWII), and it maps the roots that prepared the ground work that contributed to the formation of the current enemy image of the region in the popular representation of Islam as a demonic political ideology. I present a close reading of the bipolar Cold War rivalry—United States and Soviet Russia—and examine how this rivalry intensified the already rooted Arab-Israeli conflict that continues to haunt the region today. By drawing from this close reading, the mapping of this chapter conducts a carto-rhetorical discourse analysis of Israel’s 1957 national atlas—Israel in Pictorial Maps—and compares the results of this analysis to the current state of the Israel-Palestine conflict with a particular focus on the Ahed Tamimi case in media representations.

60 Throughout the essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak unpack the impacts of the epistemic violence of codification that the legal power system of imperialism has been applying to “constitute the colonial subject as Other” (76).
From the Inter-War Period to the Post-WWII Period

The inter-war and the post-WWII periods mark a particular epoch of time for the Middle East: decolonization of Middle East and the pan-Arabism movement. The intertwined connection of these two movements, in the context of post-WWII, necessitates that we reflect on their impact on the Middle East in the same context of dialectical relations. There are different approaches to historically marking the origins of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism.

It is generally agreed that...[though] there were inklings of an Arab nationalist movement among educated class prior to World War I, it was not until the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire that Arab nationalism materialized. The goal of the Arab revolt was to create a sovereign Arab territory out of large portions of the Ottoman Empire... The imposition of European control over territories that were promised to Arab leaders during World War I fueled the burgeoning pan-Arab movement. Then in 1948, when the new state of Israel was declared and Israeli territorial expansion was wreaking havoc among Palestinian Arabs, the pan-Arab movement gained significant momentum and support. (Karen Culcasi, “Cartographies of Supranationalism” 420)

In An Introduction to the Modern Middle East, David Sorenson explains that “at least three factors fueled the rise of the Arab nationalism. The first was the intrusion of the Europeans, the second the void in Islamic leadership created by the end of the Ottoman Empire, and the third the communication technology that allowed the transnational expansion of Arabist ideas” (974-79). These three factors that formed the Arab nationalism movement produced “three expressions of identity—regionalism, Pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic solidarity—...[and] the variety of alternatives [of these three expressions of Arab national identity] circulated through the Arab Middle East” during the inter-war period in the absence of the “Ottoman-Islamic order” (William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton 237). These three expressions shaped the Arab nationalism in
connection to using Islam as another tool to bring all the Muslim Arabs together in the Middle East. In this context, pan-Arabism was coupled with the idea of pan-Islamism; however, there was a distinction between the pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism both in terms of ideology and territorial extent. Culcasi unpacks this difference:

The demise of pan-Arabism left a literal and figurative space for pan-Islamism to grow; however, these two “isms” are remarkably different, particularly in that the pan-Arab movement was expressly secular. Nevertheless, the central way in which territory configures into both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism is important to underscore. Within strict or idealized interpretations of Islam, territory is divided between the sacred land of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the land of infidels (dar al-harb, literally translated as “land of war”) (Elden, 2009, p. 44e49). The idea or goal of a united Muslim nation in dar al-Islam, known in Arabic as the ummah, successfully materialized as the Islamic Empires (Caliphates), which ruled much of north Africa and southwest Asia from the death of Muhammad in 632 till the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. Though the histories and motivations of the pan-Islamic and pan-Arab movements differ greatly, and the territorial extent they claim also differs (dar al-Islam has a much larger territorial extent that stretches to southeast Asia), both movements have used territory to mark lines of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, territory has a very literal or material importance in connecting the Arab Homeland to Islam. (“Cartographies of Supranationalism” 420)

Connecting Pan-Arabism with pan-Islamism to unite “all Arab-speaking people who were separated by European drawn territories” became stronger during the decolonization period due to Israel becoming an independent state in 1948. In this context, I approach the formation of the Arab nationalism movement as an internalization of the external Western-tree system because
this internal counter-movement was another level of extensive totalization that marginalized diverse non-Arab and non-Muslim identities of the region.

**Decolonization of the Middle East and the Arab Homeland as Counter-Mapping**

In the context of post-WWII, the three core identity categories, particularly the Islamic solidarity under the socio-spatial Arab unity, continued to define the region; yet the decolonized nation-states of the Middle East gaining “the sovereignty that they had demanded since their creation in 1919” resulted in creating more complex identity problems across the internal borders and frontiers of the region (Cleveland and Bunton 273). The identity crisis in the context of decolonization, as Mortensen explains, was similar to the post-WWI period in terms of how the inhabitants of the region never had a clear distinction between their national, religious, ethnic, and tribal identities. For example, Peder Mortensen continues, “Asking a man at the Meidan al-Husein in Cairo about his identity might perhaps, after some confusion, lead him to identify himself as a Muslim and an Arab, but he would not necessarily reveal his national identity—not because he wanted to hide it, but because it would seem inferior to him compared to his ethnic and religious status” (16). For the people of the Middle East, the ethnic, religious, and tribal connections to the land were always more important than the national identities the European mindset had imposed upon them.

In “Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East,” Amatzia Baram explains that after the WWII, these nation-state structures the European powers had left as their legacy have created a state of anxiety and fear in the Middle East. To form a unified national identity in the structure of the European sovereign state system, these new independent nation-state formations in the Middle East have started to assimilate ethically and culturally diverse groups. The source of this newly emerging identity crisis was rooted in how the European nation-state structure and the borders in which the Middle East was re-constructed were insufficient in responding to how the
people of the region were defining who they were in relation to their complex and diverse ethnic and religious identities. In the process of narrating new national identities during the post-WWII period, the Arab and non-Arab nation-states have started to go back to their pre-modern roots to ground a specific national identity defining their reality within the territorial boundaries formed by the previous European superpowers.

In addition, this transition period was the invention of another discourse of power that resulted in the internalization of the Western tree-system and its nation-state structure within the region. The internal discourse of power in the context of decolonization was forming a counter-narrative that aimed at shifting the binary structure from West-East to East-West. In “Mapping the Middle East from Within,” Culcasi defines this counter-narrative in the socio-spatial context and meaning of the term ‘Middle East.’ The counter-narrative of Arab nationalism re-constructed the cartographic reality of the region as the Arab Homeland that aimed to resist the Euro-centric label ‘Middle East.’ According to Culcasi, “considering its direct imperialist roots, it is perhaps unsurprising that from within ‘Middle East’ there is a strong hesitation to accept and use this geographic category…The cartographic rejection of the ‘Middle East’ and the construction of a specifically Arab geographical entity is a subtle but powerful form of counter mapping that echoes the practice of a newly independent state removing its colonial place names and adopting more internally meaningful ones (Cohen and Kliot 1992; Hagen 2003; Kadmon 2004; Monmonier 1996:110; 2006:72–89; Ramaswamy 2004:209; Rundstrom 1991:9)” (“Mapping the Middle East from Within” 1099-100). In the context of decolonization and producing a counter-mapping of the Western ‘Middle East’ under the unifying socio-spatial territoriality of the Arab Homeland, Culcasi argues that

the new states began to cultivate national identities within European drawn lines (Ajami, 1978; Anderson, 2001; Baram, 1990; Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 149e194; Muslih,
1991). Rashid Khalidi (2004, p. 67), a historian of the Middle East, observes that it was remarkable that “over time the peoples of these new nation-states developed a strong sense of national identity within their artificial, European drawn frontiers, and these states eventually came to represent the aspirations of their peoples. Lebanese feel Lebanese, Syrians feel Syrian, Iraqis feel Iraqi, and Kuwaitis feel Kuwaiti.” Yet, in the mid-twentieth century as these new national identities were being imagined and constructed, a wider supranational Arab movement was also becoming highly influential. Around this time, pan-Arabism became a popular and powerful ideology across state borders, yet it did not negate state-based nationalisms nor did it erase historic, religious, familial, or sub-national identities. Instead, multiple identities were being created and embraced simultaneously, creating an incredibly complex web of historic, cultural, and territorial based identities (Anderson, 2001; Baram, 1990; Dawisha, 2003, p. 75e105; Gershoni & Jankowski, 1997, p. xv; Goldschmidt, 2004; Luciani & Salame, 1988; Muslih, 1991). ("Cartographies of Supranationalism" 420)

Baram indicates that these distinct national identities emerged from pre-modern cultural and ethnic histories and were used by these new nation-states to memorialize the great ancient civilizations in their national identities: ancient Mesopotamia with Iraqi nationality, ancient Persian empire with Iranian nationality, the Greater Syria (the area of today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel where the great Mamluks and Umayyads had ruled) with Syrian nationality. 61

According to Culcasi,

the growing strength of individual state nationalisms was a major factor that led to its [pan-Arab movement] decline, but the swift Israeli victory over Arab forces (specifically Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria) in the Six Day War of 1967 was another major cause (Dawisha 2003 251). The ease of Israel’s victory not only resulted in the loss of significant Arab territories, including the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, but it cast doubt on the power and effectiveness of Arab unity and strength.” (“Cartographies of Supranationalism” 420)

Baram claims that the growing strength of individual state nationalism negatively impacted pan-Arabism for three main reasons: 1) these modern national identities did cross the territorial borders the European superpowers have set due to being formed in the historical spatial regions of the pre-modern identities: distinct national pasts that made unification difficult; 2) the refusal of sharing economic resources among different nation-states; and 3) the reluctance of ruling elites giving up on dominant power (445). The overall problem was the dis/alignment and dis/orientation between the ancient homelands of these pre-modern identities, the totalizing borders of the Arab Homeland and the Pan-Arabism movement, and the borders the European superpowers set while forming the mandate states.

I read the re-construction of the Middle East in the context of post-WWII period through the relation between the tree and rhizome. This reading provides a clarification of how and why this internal counter-movement resulted in being an adaptation of the Western tree-structure.

While Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari present tree and rhizome as two different forms of

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understanding Western and Eastern thinking systems, they do not present these models in the context of an oppositional binary. They indicate that “the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing…the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map” (20). I claim that this relation between the tree-system and rhizome mirrors the relation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’: a violent and yet an intimate one. In this intertwined dialectical relationship, Deleuze and Guattari write,

there are very diverse mapping-tracing, rhizome-root assemblages, with variable coefficients of deterritorialization. There exist tree or root structures in rhizomes; conversely, a tree-branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The coordinates are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities. A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, the crook of a branch. Or else it is a microscopic element of the root-tree, a radicle, that gets rhizome production going. (15)

Considering this dialectical relationship between tree and rhizome, I read the counter-movement of the decolonization process in Middle East as a rhizomatic movement of resistance that failed because of how the pan-Arabism movement aimed at switching the West-East dichotomy to an East-West binary: the very danger of Oriental determinism/Occidentalism. In the state of post-colonialism, the nation-states of the Middle East re-invented the problematic narrative line the European superpowers constructed in the first place. The gaze of decolonization re-centered this narrative line by still positioning the Middle East in a state of needing to be liberated and saved from the colonial and imperial subjugation of the ‘white man.’ While the imperial interventions of the European powers in the region were the detrimental reasons for the internal chaos and disorder the region was going through, the Arab nationalist movement and its counter-cartographic construction of the Arab Homeland also contributed to the already existing
chaos in the region. This rhizomatic movement of resistance against the imperial gaze of the Western tree was not able to avoid Occidentalism, which resulted in the Arab governments remaining ignorant of the needs and expectations of the diverse ethnic groups across the region. In the context of the Arab Homeland, restoring power in the region against imperial Europe meant privileging the unifying Arab identity over others. As it is the case in any system of power networks, the desire to be the dominant power center created an internal rivalry among the Arab elites, which only intensified the subjugation and alienation of non-Arab and non-Muslim groups. The formation of internal imperialism in the socio-spatial reality of the Arab Homeland created internal resentment across the region. This internal resentment became a gateway to the second stage of re-inventing the Middle East in the external gaze of the West during the Cold War period.

In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Spivak argues that this positioning and remaining in the same problematic narrative line the external Western gaze constructed for its colonized other is an act of romanticizing the decolonized identities in their state of post-colonialism. Today, one of the reasons the Middle East continues to be a problem to be fixed is due to how many of the scholars both from the Middle East and the West are studying the region by remaining in the same narrative line and contributing to romanticizing the victimized state of the Middle East in its colonized consciousness. In The Post Colonial Aura, Arif Dirlik explains that postcolonial discourse fails to address the conditions and struggles of the diverse ethnic and religious groups in post-colonial societies and nations/nation-states due to re-positioning the colonized as a violently victimized object to resist against the colonizer West. This romanticizing totalizes the different struggles and experiences of colonized others under one big narrative of ‘colonization’ and ‘hegemonic subjugation and assimilation.’
This narrative reduces the different experiences and struggles of diverse subordinated groups in one big picture: the colonized other in a subordinated position with a distinct consciousness of being the victim of Western imperialism. The central problem Spivak sees is that this dramatization follows the narrative the Western Self has been writing. I argue that the West has formulated this narrative by asking the great question of how to fix the Eastern problem in its various spatial realities: Far, Near, Middle. Even though post-colonial responses to this question have been formulated as a path to de-colonize and liberate the colonized other, they still position the colonized in the subordinated reality the West invented. As the Middle East attempted writing itself during this period, staying in this same narrative line only resulted in providing the logical reasoning for external interventions to intensify during the Cold War period. The Middle East’s failure to properly implement democratic nation-state structures contributed to its already existing incompetent image of self-governance, which became a reason for the United States and Soviet Russia to save the Middle East from herself.

**Bipolar Gaze of the Cold War Period and the Rise of the Palestine Question**

The seeds of inventing a Jewish State in Middle East in Palestine were planted with the 1917 Balfour Declaration. With the notion of Zionism, an early Jewish Immigration to the imagined homeland of Israel had already started in the early twentieth century. The following consequences of this was forming the Palestine question in 1947 as the British government sought a solution from the United Nations due to the already occurring conflict between the Jewish people and the Arab States. With Israel declaring its independence in 1948, the Palestine question entered into the process of constantly being disposed into the stateless condition of unhomeliness. Since then, the people of the Palestinian nation have been experiencing the violent consequences of forced movements and accelerating dis/im/placements under the alienating

vision of the State of Israel. The direct association of Palestine’s socio-spatial identity and its problematic image as an enemy/the feared Other took place in the bipolar vision of the Cold War period.

By the early 1950s, the Cold War rivalry between the two new great powers of the new global world order, the United States (U.S.) and Soviet Russia (USSR), had already spread its tentacles around the world. In *Sowing Crisis*, Khalidi explains that the power tension between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War “provoked a high degree of polarization, as states and political parties aligned themselves with the two superpowers in virtually every region of the world, exacerbating and aggravating pre-existing local conflicts or producing new ones, and envenoming the political atmosphere in numerous countries” (1). This shift from the multipolar European vision dominating the Middle East to the bipolar vision of the Cold War period resulted in re-constructing the narrative line of the feared Other. Due to the violent impacts of WWII, the image of the feared Other was situated in the image of the Holocaust: the global enemy of humanity and the most feared enemy of the Jewish people. The great powers of the Cold War era entitled themselves with the ethical responsibility of preventing another catastrophe like WWII from ever happening again.

In this reconstruction, both the U.S. and USSR put their focus on preventing the return of the violence of Nazi Germany. To prevent the return of this memory, both of these great powers needed to define whom the new enemy was. Re-defining the face of the new enemy was re-writing the ethical responsibility of the Self in opposition to an enemy image of the Other, which resulted in producing the image of the victimized Other: the populations who are in need of being saved by the powerful defenders of the global peace. The images of enemy and victim have become central to the ethical arguments of both the U.S. and USSR throughout the Cold War era and produced two similar yet also different discourses of enemization and victimization. The
U.S.’s ethical argument in justifying its discourse of keeping the enemy out was its war against International Communism that formed the enemy image of the USSR: saving the Middle East (victim) from being controlled by the communist ideology of the USSR (enemy). Soviet Russia’s ethical argument was its fight against capitalism and imperialism that formed the enemy image of the U.S.: saving the Middle East (victim) from being controlled by U.S. (enemy) hegemonic capitalism and imperialism. In these two narrative lines, the Middle Eastern (primarily Arab States) States that aligned with USSR were the enemies of the U.S., and the states that aligned with the U.S. (the primary ally has always been Israel, which was followed by Arab States shifting sides as the Cold War progressed) were the enemies of USSR.

This narrative line of enemization and victimization of the bipolar Cold War period was internalized in the cartographic consciousness of the Middle East, and this internalization is apparent in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core question of Palestine. Khalidi explains that “each superpower made mighty efforts to exploit the [Arab-Israeli] conflict to achieve advantage for itself at the expense of the other [and at the expense of the stateless Palestine], and to prevent its rival from being able to portray an outcome in the Middle East as a triumph for its Cold War policy” (Sowing Crisis 129). In between the broader power tension of the Cold War, in addition to the local power tensions between Israel and the Arab States, the question of Palestine has always remained as an unresolvable problem, a question that echoes the fixed problematic of the great Middle/Eastern question. As the Middle/Eastern question was re-invented in the narrative of enemization and victimization —the question of whether the Middle East was going to be the enemy to be kept out or the victim to be saved in the narrative lines of the Cold War powers—the Palestine question also went through a similar process of transformation as a result of Israel’s response to this question. This response had formed the national identity of Israel, being the eternal victims, and resulted in dis/placing the Palestine
question into the placeless condition of being the enemy: yet another form of alienating rhetoric using the productive networks of power.

Israel’s alienating rhetorical re-invention of its enemy image is a violent exercise of power that disposed the Palestine nation into the spaceless memory of the Holocaust. Dag Jorund Lonning indicates that “In the first decades of Israel’s existence, Palestinians were openly labeled anti-Semites by Israeli leaders. For example, the symbol of the Holocaust—one of the greatest evils of humanity—has been taken out of its historical context and repeatedly been projected at the Palestinians who thus are presented as being capable of repeating what the Nazis did, if not harshly prevented by Israel from so doing” (144-145). I approach this violent rhetorical re-invention as an internalization of the bifurcated Cold War narrative of enemization and victimization because I consider the tension in the Israel and Palestine conflict as the mirror image of the broader Cold War tension between U.S. and USSR. The mirror function rooted the enemy and victim images depicted by U.S. and USSR deeper into the region and resulted in the still continuing violent relationship between Israel and Palestine. Through this mirror effect, the narrative line of enemization and victimization became the core discourse defining the socio-spatial identities of both Israel and Palestine.

I re-read the dichotomized equation of this narrative line through the metaphors of tree-system and rhizome. Palestine is a rhizome constantly being cut in its joints by the roots of the tree-system of Israel; yet for the tree-system of Israel to survive, the lines of the Palestinian rhizome need to form new connections within and in-between the roots and radicles of Israel for Israel’s tree to reproduce more roots from the rhizome of Palestine. I diagnose the rhizome of Palestine with the disease of home/sickness due to how the people of Palestine have been under

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63 This function of the mirror and the internalization of its enemy image becomes more apparent with the full alignment of Israel with U.S. and as a result Soviet Russia’s escalated attempts of keeping Arab proxies like Egypt and Syria on its side in the outcome of the 1967 war: the alignment of the enemy and victim images under the narrative lines of the bipolar Cold War vision. See Rashid Khalidi Sowing Crisis.
the close surveillance of Israel and its strong will to secure its promised safe Homeland at any
cost.

**Israel’s Socio-Spatial Constructions of Victim and Enemy Images: A Carto-
Rhetorical Deconstructive Reading**

Within the Middle East’s broader chaotic dynamic, the Israel-Palestine conflict has been
a continuing internal crisis within the region. This long-term conflict in the shadow of war,
violece, and terrorism, as Lonning explains, “has gradually become cultural…[and] symbolic” in
the socio-spatial identities of both nations. Especially during its early years, the State of Israel
was inventing a collective vision bringing European and Oriental Jewish people under one
umbrella against the common enemy: Palestine. To unpack how Israel has been producing the
enemy image of Palestine within the spatial territory that has been a home for the Israeli-Palestine
conflict, I present a carto-rhetorical deconstructive reading of the 1957 national atlas of Israel:
*Israel in Pictorial Maps*.64 The reason behind performing with maps stems from a consideration
of the very land itself at the core of this conflict. For Israel, establishing a strong national
ownership in its promised homeland was one of the central rhetorical moves in re-inventing its
national identity. I argue that Israel inflicted a form of cartographic silence in this national move
to “dehumanize the landscape” that presented an absent image of Palestinian people (Brian

The cartographic narrative in *Israel in Pictorial Maps* presents an absent image of
Palestine that is presented beyond the borders in a land of nothingness, which is a way to erase
the social-cultural historical connections Palestinians have to the land over which Israel claimed

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64 This Atlas is digitally available through the David Rumsey Map Collection Database. The home of
the physical map collection is the David Rumsey Map Center at Stanford University Library. To view this atlas
visit
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/view/search?q=publication_author=%22Department%20of%20Surveys%2C%20Ministry%20of%20Labour%22&sort=Pub_List_No_InitialSort,Pub_Date,Pub_List_No,Se
ries_No
ownership. Lonning indicates that the State of Israel “was defined more or less before the nation itself existed as an imagined community. The state was even defined before the nation was physically present” (43). Benedict Anderson defines the notion of nation “as an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (6). Israel actualized the physical existence and presence of its national identity within the imagined borders of its national homeland. A cartographic narrativity of this national atlas, then, works to establish the particular cultural characteristics of the Israeli nation within the borders of its national space. The overall pictorial story this atlas narrates for its audience is about “progress, homogeneity, cultural organismism, the deep nation, the long past—that rationalize the authoritarian, normalizing tendencies within cultures in the name of the national interest or the ethnic prerogative” (Homi Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* 4): the modern and civilized image of Israeli nation. The rhetorical context shaping the cartographic visualization in this atlas presents how Israel narrated its national identity as a cultural product of a Western modern nation. In this sense, Israel made a map and it made sure to erase the existence of Palestine from the socio-spatial reality representing the national identity of the Israeli Homeland.

This atlas opens its narrative structure with a map of Israel (see Fig. 12) complemented by a written commentary that defines Israel’s historical, geographical, and physical characteristics.
that form its overall cultural image as a great nation that had a “deep imprint of civilization.” The geographical location in the map is distinctly divided under the categorizing lines of a territorial chart, a chart that marks cities and regions in their exact spaces. The written commentary that defines the meaning of the cartographic representation of Israel illustrates how eternal connection and belonging to the Homeland is historicized and imagined in the cultural reality of the Jewish people, which legitimizes the rightful claim to the territory:

*Indication of the unbroken contact between the people and the land are to be found in every part of the country and dating from every period. The Jewish People retained in dispersal its memory of the land, and carried in its heart and soul the names of its mountains and valleys, its towns and villages, and above all, the memory of Jerusalem, the Holy City.*

This part from the commentary to this first map is an example of how the socio-spatial identity of not only Israel and but also Palestine was re-written: by detaching the land from its diverse geographies of cultures and by totalizing and homogenizing the land under so-called indigenous ownership, almost like a birth right. This entitles the space of the geography to its rightful owners and occupiers, the Israeli nation, and results in defining and also justifying getting the alien invaders out, the Palestinian nation. This cartographic absence and erasure of Palestine stems from the desire to keep the enemy out, away from the safe haven Israel embraces as its national homeland.

What follows this first map is the content page (see Fig. 13) which unpacks the central symbols that form Israel’s national identity, and which Loning describes as 1) fear, 2) victimization, 3) security, 4) the soldier, and 5) collectivization and separation (144-51). The content page provides an explanation of the symbols that form the overall cartographic language of this atlas and the rest of the maps that this atlas uses. I suggest that this cartographic discourse,
with its iconographic language, is a reflection of the national symbols and images of Israel. In addition to iconographic signs that define rivers, dry wadis, beautiful views, and historical events that form a unified socio-cultural connection to the physical space of the national space, the cartographic language in this atlas uses particular signs that represent fear, security, soldiers, and collectivization and separation symbols. The color-coding image distinctly divides the Israeli territory and the excluded Arab territory with an approximate armistice line. This iconographic sign shows that Israel uses a neutral beige color to represent its own national territory. This preference of a lighter color functions as a rhetorical tool to effectively empty the land for Israel to produce a meaningful existence for its national identity in its national space. Through the armistice line and a darker color choice in representing the Arab territory, this iconographic sign works effectively for Israel to separate its national territory from the unwanted Arab deviations.
Additionally, the armistice line that separates Israel from Arab territories implements the notion of securing Israel from their enemies, and this desire to secure the land stems from the notion of fear: the fear of losing the safe haven the eternal victims were promised.

The two soldier images in this cartographic glossary, on one hand, represent the two important victories Israel had won in its efforts to establish ownership over its homeland: the War of Liberation (1948) and Operation Kadesh (Oct. 29th-Nov. 5th, 1956). The War of Liberation represents Israel’s independence, which is why the historical representation of this event with a soldier image reveals the importance of the soldier as a national symbol for Israel. This military victory for Israel’s independence is an event Palestine remembers as al-Nakba (the catastrophe). In the context of keeping the enemy out of its national space, then, the soldier image for Israel represents a memory of military victory, which resulted in establishing ownership over the land by causing catastrophic consequences for the displaced Palestinian people. In this sense, the soldier image is a symbol for securing Israel’s national homeland by pushing the enemy out through the use of excessive violence due to the deep fear that continues to haunt the Israeli nation today.

This soldier image immortalizes the place-memory of independence and the Palestinian catastrophe in the consciousness of Israel’s national identity, which justifies the violent displacements of Palestinian people: violence is a necessity to secure the national homeland. In this place-memory of independence embodied in the soldier symbol, however, the Palestinian experience is present through absence. This silent presence is a form of indirect representation of the enemy image of the Palestine. The victory that brought Independence was a victory won against the Palestinian enemy. This indirect representation is yet another rhetorical move in the cartographic discourse of this atlas, which keeps any direct representation and/or presence of Palestine experience and memory out of sight/site. The use of rhetorical cartography as a form of
rhetorical invention, then, serves Israel’s purpose of dehumanizing Palestine in an empty, deserted space with a strong enemy image, which echoes the dehumanized reality of the Oriental Other. Within the overall reality of the Middle East, which became another Oriental/Eastern problem to be fixed for the modern West and its political power networks, Palestine became a problem for Israel to overcome as well. Israel aimed to effectively resolve this problem by pushing Palestine out and erasing its socio-cultural and historical presence in the land.

The iconographic language presented in this atlas’s content page frames the context of rhetorical alienation and marginalization, which forms the cartographic narrative. The pictorial maps in this atlas contribute to the overall narrative, which presents Israel as a rich land filled with natural resources, beautiful views, and historical roots. It is the modern land of Israel connected with railways, roads, schools, and resorts, a peaceful and nourished land that is secured, protected and distinctly separated from the enemy: the cartographic image of Israel’s safe haven. Each map is a cartographic pictorial visualization of individual cities in Israel, and these cities are narrated through the repetitive use of this atlas’s cartographic language. The repetition of central iconographic signs strengthens the core argument this atlas makes: the Jewish people are finally safe in their promised homeland.

The emphasis on this central argument stems from how the national symbols of Israel were formed in the catastrophic violent experience of WWII. As the victims and survivors of the Holocaust, the people of Israel were already a nation with the imagined reality of a homeland wherein they can finally be safe. The Palestinian territory was a promised land for Israel, which is why “many of the Jewish emigrants arriving in Palestine were genuinely surprised to find a settled population living there. Palestine had be characterized as, ‘A land with no people for a people with no land’” (Oliver James 404). This characterization resulted in emptying the geography of this space, which made it possible to re-write the socio-spatial consciousness of this
whitened space under a new identity and reality: finally, the suffering nation, the eternal victim, was safe in its promised homeland. However, this came with a certain level of paranoia: who was the enemy now? The response to this question, I argue, came with determining how to secure the homeland against the unwanted others. The unwanted other in this land, the Palestinian nation, immediately became a threat for Israel to actualize its safe haven. As a result, securing the land defined Palestine as the new enemy for Israel. The national symbols that inform the cartographic language of this atlas have “connotations to such horrible manifestations of Jewish suffering, bridges internal differences by the use of one central logic: We are all Jews, and we must stand united in the face of our collective enemy. The most central symbol used to communicate Israeli identity is not ‘what we are,’ but ‘what we are not’” (Lonning 144-45). The repetitive use of these national symbols in the cartographic space of each pictorial map in this atlas serves to define what Israel is not: not being subjected to violence/finally being safe. Each map re-invents Israel at peace in its homeland through the use of set borders, signs pointing to where Israel is, and the illustration of what is on the side of the borders as emptiness and nothingness. For example, the maps of Safad and Nahariya (see Fig. 14 and Fig. 15), the two cities in between the borders to Lebanon and Syria, use the symbol of a soldier to persuade their audience of the existing threat that is beyond the borders and how the
brave soldiers of Israel keep this threat out: the feared enemy. According to Lonning, the roots of Israeli fears “can be ascribed to symbolic and ideological manipulation. These fears are an important and essential part of Israeli identity, and are frequently used by individuals to communicate this identity…While Palestinian fears are directed at a particular collective political manifestation of their enemy, Israeli fears are directed at an almost meta-physical inherent property—some kind of a violent urge—of the individual Palestinian” (147). This argument is being used to convince the public to understand and support the decisions the Israeli government makes: their strategic policies in taking drastic measures and violent precautions and actions. This is a way to bring the people of Israel under one goal, one image, and one purpose: keeping the homeland safe, keeping the enemy out in order to be safe—the narrative line of victimization rooted in the notion of fear.

The national symbol of security is strongly established in the pictorial maps in this atlas through the use of the solider symbol. For example, in the pictorial map of Tel Aviv (see Fig. 16), the notion of security and peace is evident pictorial representation of how Jewish people arrive to their safe Homeland with boats, while the borders are closed and the land is protected. In this pictorial narrative, what is outside of the borders is exactly what Israel is not: nothingness, a no-man’s land, the excluded other echoing the image of the Orient; and the inside of the borders is the safe and peaceful Israel welcoming Jewish people to their home. The strategic use of cartographic language in presenting the space of Tel Aviv functions as a rhetorical tool that...
illustrates Israel in a rich land with a rich history, culture, and modern society. This pictorial spatial representation is in perfect consonance between what is present outside of the borders: the silent absence of Palestinian people.

The notion of security and the important role of the soldier, as part of Israel’s national identity, are generated from the symbols of fear and victimization: fearing the enemy on the other side of the border. These symbols also generate the other national characteristics that I have discussed so far: collectivization and separation. In this equation, the symbolic representation of the soldier plays a significant role to prevent the feared terrorist activities of the Palestinians and other Arab nations supporting the liberation of Palestine.

The soldier symbols in the pictorial maps of Ashqelon and Natanya (see Fig. 17 and Fig. 18) are located either at the borders separating Gaza from Israel or in different parts of these cities. In these two cartographic representations, the soldier symbols are watching over the safe land and its people.
The main purpose is keeping the enemy out at any cost: at the expense of Palestinian lives, at the expense of their social and economic balance.

The cartographic narration of the Israeli homeland resulted in an imagined invisible presence of the Palestinian people as the enemy beyond the borders, almost out of sight, with a strong presence of being a threat to the Israeli nation. This fear of the enemy and the strong desire to keep Israel safe with a strong soldier image that initiates Israel’s strong and masculine identity is evident in how Israel has been responding to the Palestinian resistance to the occupation. Lonning maintains that “when a terrorist activity occurs in Israel, boundaries are placed on the Occupied Territories. Politicians employ the security concept as legitimization… Thus it is impossible to argue that closing the Territories leads to a halt in terrorism. On the contrary, it often leads to acts of revenge by Palestinian extremists. It has other effects, however. Firstly, it is collective punishment, as the flow of capital into Palestine society is severely damaged…Secondly, and more importantly, it is a temporary measure against fear; simple reducing the Palestinian presence in Israeli streets” (148-149). This collective punishment is a reflection of the collective identity of Israel: a totalization under one land and one national image continuously reproducing its victimization and as a result its strong will to secure and protect its Homeland under the closer surveillance of Homeland Security.

Today, the Israeli government continues to delete the existence of home/sick Palestine from the map. The Israeli government’s effort to implement a de-facto annexation of Palestinian land is an indication of how Israel continues to re-construct its national homeland in alignment with its national identity: Israeli homeland for the Israeli Jewish State. These political efforts are supported by physical actions aiming not only to keep Palestinians out but to also erase them

from Israel’s national homeland. Especially following President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the Israeli Government’s efforts in keeping Palestinians out became a form of “ethnic cleansing.” Territorial ownership continues to be one of the primary denominators in defining Israel as a State only for Jewish people. In this stateless in-transition condition, Palestine has been a problem, a deviation that needed to be fixed and eliminated for Israel.

From the Enemy-Victim Dichotomy to the Enemy-Heroine-Victim Triad: Israel-Palestine Conflict in Middle East Today

Today, these enemy and victim images continue to shape and inform the long-term Israel-Palestine conflict in the dominant networks of media outlets. However, in the rhetorical context of this conflict, a new image, a counter-image has been emerging with the arrest of a blonde haired Palestinian girl: Ahed Tamimi. Her inhumane, non-democratic, and violent treatment by the Israeli government as a response to Tamimi slapping an Israeli soldier has attracted a growing global respond to Israel and its long-lasting occupation of Palestine. In many global media platforms, particularly reporting news from the Middle East such as Al-Jazeera, Middle East Monitor, and Middle East Eye, Tamimi became the new image and face of resistance and most importantly the embodiment of the new heroine image as the real wonder woman that represents the Palestinian freedom movement. The emergence of this new heroine image in the global media representation had an impact on how the Israeli people have also been responding to Tamimi as a

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heroine of the Palestinian resistance movement. The division around enemy, victim, and the new heroine images in responding to Palestine and Tammi within Israel’s public discourse is evident in the opinions pieces published in one of Israel’s well-read news media outlets, Haaretz. These pieces reflect the public opinion about Tamimi in Israel and illustrate that even though this new heroine image has been challenging Israel’s dominant discourse, the enemy and victim images continue to be at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and shape how the Israeli government and people respond to the Palestine question/problem.

In re-constructing the broader Middle Eastern problem as a result of the violent 9/11 terrorist attacks, the war on terror discourse established a zero tolerance policy against any possible terrorist threats. While I do not support any violent action, and I do believe that terrorism is an act that deserves a zero tolerance policy, the problem at hand is not necessarily about how to deal with the violent and inhumane consequences of terrorism. The war on terror discourse resulted in extensively totalizing the Middle East under the enemy image of terrorist Muslims as the popular Western representation narrates it. Mahmood Mamdani indicates that the war on terrorism discourse called “for a war to the finish… in the name of justice but understand justice as revenge… [and it] has processed by dishing out collective punishment, with callous disregard for either ‘collateral damage’ or legitimate grievances” (3244). The Palestine problem within the current context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been receiving a similar response from the Israeli government. The zero tolerance for any terrorist activity and collectively punishing the Palestinian people have been central to how the Israeli government has been dealing with the Palestinian problem. This zero tolerance policy and the intensifying acts of displacing Palestinian people have recently been receiving more attention in the global arena due to the actions of one brave Palestinian girl: Ahed Tamimi.

Since her arrest after slapping an Israeli soldier, Tamimi became the face of a heroine image, which has been attracting global support for [Ahed and the Palestine resistance movement against the occupation](http://freeahed.org). While her heroine image in the global networks of media outlets present this new representation in clear contrast to the how the Israeli government continues to respond to her action as a terrorist activity, Israeli public opinion is still primarily divided between the victim and enemy images in responding to the Israeli-Palestine conflict. From December 20, 2017, to February 07, 2018, *Haaretz* published ten opinion pieces responding to Tamimi and the Palestinian occupation/resistance movement by different editorial contributors who are well-established journalists, historians, professors, researchers, activists, including Ahed’s father Bassem Tamimi [with his letter for Ahed](https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/-premium-ahed-is-16-and-i-couldn-t-be-prouder-of-my-daughter-1.5629934). The range of diverse voices these opinion pieces present is effective in reflecting the division in Israel’s public opinion about Tamimi and Palestine. Among the ten pieces, there is only one article that directly aligns with the ideology of the alt-right Israeli government in responding to Tamimi: “*Ahed Tamimi and Her Family Aren’t the Palestinian Saints You Want Them to Be*” by Petra Marquardt-Bigman.

The central argument Bigman makes in this piece is presented right at the beginning of her opening statement: “Ahed Tamimi and her family aren’t fighting for peace, and they’re not just fighting the occupation: They’re fighting to destroy Israel, and their fight is seasoned with Jew-hatred.” The rhetorical use of an enemy image coupled with the notion of fear and victimizing the Jewish people are the central elements forming Bigman’s argument. Her focus is on how Tamimi, and consequently the Palestinian resistance movement, is out to get Israel,

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waiting to ruin Israel. This fear has been at the core of Israel in forming its national identity within the safe space of its homeland as the 1957 national atlas presented. To support her argument, Bigman attacks Tamimi’s and her family’s character images with the purpose of ruining their credibility. Bigman indicates that their fight for freedom is not a real fight for freedom; it is a fight to destroy Israel. She uses her analysis of the multiple family members’ social media posts in addition to a previous bombing committed by Ahlam Tamimi in 2001 in Jerusalem to illustrate how their actions are driven by their anti-Zionist ideology, intense Jew-hatred, and enthusiastic support for terrorism. The evidence she provides is logically biased, especially considering how Bigman remains one-sided in her selection of proof to support her argument. She does not mention the violent crimes committed against Ahed and her family along with the many Palestinians who have been suffering the catastrophic conditions of occupation for decades now. Instead, she chooses to remain biased and closed-minded and says that the “Tamimis never wanted a peace agreement. They have always wanted the elimination of the world’s only Jewish State.”

I am neither denying nor refusing to believe that the Israeli people did not suffer by the ugly face of occupation due to the Palestinian re/actions; however, if a comparison needs to be made in the name of democracy and human rights, Israel is in a position to seriously consider the everyday life of Palestine under occupation. This lack of consideration has been a central critique among the rest of opinion pieces published in Haaretz. Gideon Levy75 explains why Tamimi has been receiving such violent and inhumane treatment by the Israeli government and the military court (she is still under arrest and not allowed to see her parents throughout the whole of her trial, which is closed to the public). His main argument focuses on the fact that Tamimi insulted the

strong and masculine soldier image that is at the core of Israel’s national identity. As Levy indicates, Tamimi slapped a soldier and the alt-right Israeli government and public reacted “How dare she…She broke the rules. Slapping is only permitted by soldiers. She is the real provocation, not the soldier who invaded her house” and severely wounded an “unarmed boy from Salfit” and her cousin Mohammed Tamimi and definitely not the soldier who “killed Ibrahim Abu Thurya” a couple of days before Ahed dared to slap an IDF soldier. Instead of slapping a soldier, as Levy continues, Ahed “was supposed to fall in love with the soldier” who violated hers and many Palestinians’ basic human rights; but instead “she rewarded him with a slap. It is all because of the incitement. Otherwise she wouldn’t hate her conqueror.”

Levy’s insightful reading and analysis of the revengeful responses to Tamimi asking her to spend the rest of her life in prison, or even worse asking for her death, reveal a crucial point: the lack of understanding of the everyday reality of the Israeli occupation of Palestine due to how the Israeli media outlets refuse to provide any space to represent the Palestinian experience. However, with one slap Levy writes, Tamimi’s continuing appearance on the Israeli media outlets “shattered several myths for Israelis. Worst of all, she dared to damage the Israeli myth of masculinity.” Her actions damage the security that the strong Israeli soldier image has been providing for the Israeli people, and fear took over the Israeli government. They needed to fix this damage and save the reputation of their soldier image. As a result, Israel showed zero tolerance for the terrorist Ahed. However, the image of the girl with the golden curls has already been challenging the “demonization and dehumanization” of the Palestinian terrorist, the eternal enemy. She challenges this image not only because she does not look like the dark and violent image of the Palestinian enemy the Israeli public internalized, but also, as Levy indicates, because she made the Israeli public question how a sixteen-year-old girl who slapped a soldier and who did not have any weapons on her is able to represent a threat, a danger to the security of Israel.
Many other opinion pieces published in *Haaretz* support Levy’s point of view. Ahed has never been a danger. Understanding what happened prior to her out-burst at an Israeli soldier coupled with a life spent under occupation explains why Ahed did what she did. Who can blame her? It is apparent that “*Its Not a Fair Fight*” as the *Haaretz* Editorial piece uses as its title. This piece, while acknowledging the unfair arrest and treatment of Ahed, also claims that the soldier Ahed slapped presented a noble behavior by not using force against Ahed. The video shared widely in various news media outlets support this argument. It is true that the soldier remained calm, he did not hurt Ahed while her cousin and mother were recording the entire incident. This comes as an interesting yet also a common opinion among the other opinion pieces published in *Haaretz*. The overall argument says that Ahed is not the one to blame, and the soldiers should not be blamed either. It is the occupation, the Israeli government. Ahed is a brave young Palestinian girl who rightfully wanted to provoke a response from an Israeli soldier due to how the occupation severely hurt her cousin and many other Palestinian youth; yet soldiers are not to blame. They are both victims of the occupation: noble victims who are also heroes/heroines due to their noble actions. Apparently, this is the reality of occupation that both Palestinians and Israeli soldiers experience on a daily basis. While these opinion pieces show support for Ahed and ask for occupation to end as a solution to stop these violent crimes, the desire to save Israel’s beloved soldier image functions as a rhetorical move to re-narrate Israel’s place in the story of occupation: it is the government we must blame; not the Israeli people who are also the victims of occupation.

Saving Israel’s noble and modern national identity in the global representation is a strong force among these opinion pieces. Yes, the public supports Ahed and wants for occupation to end; however, this emerging support for Ahed un/consciously works to tell the story of

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occupation and the Israel-Palestine conflict primarily in the Israeli experience to save Israel’s national image. She is a heroine; she is the “Joan of Arc in a West Bank Village” as Uri Avnery presents her in the title of his piece. This is actually a response to the poem posted on Instagram by the “iconic Israeli poet Jonathan Geffen” who portrayed Ahed “as a victim of occupation” and compared her to the historical—white—women heroines including Joan of Arc in addition to Hannah Senesh and Anne Frank, as Fishman reports in “Once Israeli Pop Culture Icons Publicly Criticized the Occupation. What Silences them?” According to Fishman, it is the outraged responses from the Israeli public: “How dare Geffen compare ‘Palestinian criminal’ with Anne Frank. Was Geffen comparing Jews to Nazis?” This rage to present her as a heroine, which is becoming one of the central images of the Palestinian freedom movement, needed to stop her, which resulted in the Israeli government arresting her and putting her behind bars. Avnery writes that “abusing her in jail will only enhance her ability to impress others her age who are living under occupation.” This stupidity of the Israeli government, the stupidity of occupation, will bring Israel down according to Avnery. So, how can the Israeli public fix the outcomes of this stupidity? How can they prevent this stupidity from ruining the Israeli image?

A piece by Avshalom Halutz, titled “Ahed Tamimi is The Palestinian Bar Rafaeli,” presents how the Israeli left has been responding to these concerns by not only embracing Tamimi’s heroine image, but also narrating this image in the Israeli voice and experience. Halutz also refers to Geffen’s comparison of Ahed to iconic historical female heroine figures in his argument, yet he presents a different approach: “the repeated attempt to glorify Tamimi through

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comparisons with other, white, women exposed the Israeli left’s desire to take control of that gaze that she triggers in us [Israeli public.] Rather than allowing the Palestinians to define their own heroes, the left insists on creating its own narrative surrounding Tamimi, shaping her story through simultaneous translation into Western imagery.” Halutz indicates that Ahed actually looks less heroic for the Israeli public than she is, but there is a desire for her to be the heroine that also reflects the Israeli image as part of the Palestinian movement. I claim that this desire is for saving the Israeli nation’s image more than it is for saving the Palestinian people. Finally, Halutz says that if we are going to glorify Tamimi as a heroine through Western metaphors, then let’s do it right: “Tamimi is the Palestinian version of Israeli supermodel Bar Rafaeli. Like Rafaeli, who paradoxically symbolizes the ultimate Israeli because she allows Israelis to maintain the lie that they so much love regarding their ethnic and cultural identity, Tamimi also frees the Palestinians from their actual reality, taking them in the Israeli eyes into the realms of imagination and fantasy. The result is either adoration or loathing, depending on the observer’s point of view.” I add to Halutz’s final statement in his piece only one thing: this adoration or loathing in regards to Tamimi’s heroine image either victimizes due to how her bravery resulted in her continuous suffering or enemizes her due to how her actions threatened the masculinity of Israel’s soldier image.

While Tamimi’s heroine image has definitely started a change in Israel’s public opinion of the Palestinian occupation, her actions, her fight for freedom, and especially any kind of critique and support coming from Israel for her and Palestine, still continues to prioritize protecting Israel’s national image in the global representation, international safety of Jewish people, and the national peace. I read this outcome as a desire to protect the national symbols that define Israel and its national homeland. While the Israeli public is divided between either seeing Tamimi as the enemy or as the victim who did a heroic act, for the alt-right Israeli government,
the safe haven that the 1957 *Israel in Pictorial Maps* atlas depicts is still not open to any negotiation. The dream of turning Israel into a state for only Jewish people, to the only Jewish State in the world, continues to keep Tamimi and Palestinian people behind the in/visible bars, borders, and check points of occupation, colonialism, and imperialism: the life of living in an open prison.
CONCLUSION: HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE MIDDLE EAST AS
THE GLOBAL ENEMY

“Part of power is to be able to domesticate the unfamiliar, in other words, to create home in distant
and foreign places.” Joanne P. Sharp, Geographies of Postcolonialism, 66

I have been following Ahed’s trial since her arrest in December, 2017. It finally reached
an end. Not only Ahed, but also her mother, Nariman, are sentenced to eight months in prison.
For every day Ahed will spend in prison, she is also going to be paying 5,000 shekels ($1400) to
the Israeli government. 80 Ahed’s cousin Janna Jihad Ayyad, whom I met as the youngest
journalist of Palestine while she was ten years old, 81 told AJ+ that she was very proud of Ahed
because she saw the hope in her eyes; she said that she saw how strong Ahed was for trying to
protect her friends who were playing near her house. 82 Ahed’s response to the Israeli court’s
decision shows why Janna saw hope and bravery in her: “There is not justice under the
occupation and this court is illegal,” Ahed said. 83 Ahed, and many other young girls like her, are
fighting for the right not to fear being killed as they play in their homes, backyards; they are
raising their voices not to be afraid as they walk home from school; they are resisting the
occupation, the war, the violence so that they are not forced to leave the land they know as home;
they are writing their own stories so that they can save many other children who were condemned

80 For details about Ahed’s trial and sentence, see: Ashly, Jaclynn. “Ahed Tamimi Gets Eight Months in
81 Meet Janna through Al-Jazeera’s cover of her on April 28th, 2016: Sarkar, Urvashi. "Janna Jihad: Meet
82 Learn more on Ahed’s trial and hour cousin’s statement from: AJ+Facebook. “Ahed Tamimi
83 To see her response to the Israeli court’s decision, see: Middle East Eye Facebook. “Ahed Tamimi to
https://www.facebook.com/MiddleEastEye/videos/1678858025512912/.
to be refugees and lost their lives on the shores far away from home like Aylan. They refused to be the enemy or the victim, and they certainly do not let anyone domesticate them. They are writing the Middle East and I am writing with them.

The current reality of the Middle East as a region of chaos, a land wherein people experience violations of human rights on a daily basis, is rooted in the dominant storyline that has been blaming Islam. Rashid Khalidi argues that

With little or no serious historical other scholarly underpinning, a plethora of commentaries purport to ascribe the undemocratic nature of most current Middle Eastern regimes to something inherent in Islam, the predominant religion in the region. These ahistorical, essentialist, and occasionally borderline-racist theories…are belied by the growth of democracy, albeit often in a troubled fashion, in large majority-Muslim countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria. They are belied as well by the lengthy history of struggles for democracy and constitutionalism in Middle Eastern countries between the latter part of the nine-teenth century and the middle of the twentieth century.” (Sowing Crisis 2388-92)

These complex struggles, as Khalidi continues, invented the Middle East as a region lacking democracy; however, blaming Islam for the problems of the Middle East does not do justice to the real issues that have been ruling the region. The reasons for lack of democracy in Middle East, is due to “the well-known obstacles to democratic governance: much of the Middle East is certainly affected by having powerful states with a tradition of strong rulers; elites loath to give up their privileges or their control of the political system; high levels of poverty and illiteracy in some sectors in certain countries; and weak political parties, unions, and professional associations” (Khalidi, Sowing Crisis 2403). These well-known obstacles are indicators for how
Gramsci defines the notion of domination by consent. The Middle East has been dealing with these obstacles due to internalizing Western power rivalries over the region throughout the twentieth century.

**From the Multipolar European Gaze to Bipolar Cold War Gaze over Middle East**

In the post-WWII period—decolonization of Middle East—the independent nation-states of Middle East adapted the European nation-state structure, which failed to represent the diverse identities. During the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Russia, while USSR supported the secular pan-Arab movement, U.S. aligned with the conservative political ideology of pan-Islamism to prevent USSR supported progressive Arab nationalist movements to turn the Middle East into another communist entity (Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis* 381-85). In this context, Khalidi continues, it might be hard to believe that considering the current dominant American discourse on demonized Muslim, “Islam as an ideological tool thus proved useful to the United States and its allies among the conservative forces in the Arab and Islamic worlds, which…seemed largely on the defensive in the face of the Soviet-backed ‘progressive’ Arab regimes” (*Sowing Crisis* 385-89). According to Mahmood Mamdani, “as the battleground of the Cold War shifted from southern Africa to Central America and central Asia in the late seventies, America’s benign attitude toward political terror turned into a brazen embrace: both the contras in Nicaragua and later al-Qaeda (and the Taliban) in Afghanistan were American allied during the Cold War. Supporting them showed a determination to win the Cold War “by all means necessary,” a phrase that could refer only to unjust means. The result of an alliance gone sour, 9/11 needs to be understood first and foremost as the unfinished business of the Cold War” (190-3).

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84 Chapter 3 provides an explanation of Gramsci’s notion of domination by consent.
As the U.S grew stronger during the Cold War period and took all measures and necessary means to win, the implementation of conservative Islamic regimes in the Middle East widely succeeded over the secular nationalist movements. This second level of internalization of the Western root-system only left the region with more excessive violent formations or disseminations of more localized regions and territories and unfulfilled democracy, freedom, and security promises. In particular, the growing expansion of the ideas of political Islam as a movement of resistance against American imperialism was yet another form of seeking to return the pre-modern political structure of Islam/the caliphate order: the days of power and glory of the Islamic Empires. Shadi Hamid observes that “the Islamic State is only the latest but perhaps the most frightening manifestation of this ongoing struggle” in the Middle East (12).

**From Middle East to Greater Middle East and Intensification of Enemization**

The way that the U.S. has been re-constructing the cartographic reality of the Middle East since the Cold War period is closely tied to oil resources and strategic military locations in the region. Gaining control over these resources and critical locations during the Cold War period was a reflection of how the U.S. was moving away from its rhetoric of isolation and intention to become the dominant center of power on a global level. Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the invention of the discourse of war on terror, in the rhetorical context of zero tolerance for terrorism that the Bush Doctrine produced as the dominant story line, the political ideology of Islam as the reason for terror and no democracy in the Middle East became the center of the ethical justification for keeping the Middle East under close political, economic, and military surveillance for global peace and order. The post-9/11 era resulted in the formation of a Greater Middle East (Dona Stewart “The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination”). According to James Sidaway, the growing violent and terrorist

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85 U.S. usages of Middle East since Cold War video.
activities within and from the region have transformed the Oriental image of the Middle East into a more problematic stereotype, which emerged from the prejudice associating Islam with terrorism due to the actions of Al-Qaeda. What has followed the 9/11 events has been the continuous intensification of this image in the popular media, which is grounded in the discourse of the global war on terrorism as a form of legitimization. Mamdani explains that “the events that are 9/11 present the world with a particular difficult political challenge, even if this challenge appears the most immediate for Muslims. Both the American establishment led by President Bush and the militants of political Islam insist that Islam is a political, and not simply a religious or cultural, identity. Both are determined to distinguish between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims,’ so as to cultivate and target the latter” (3573-77).

Distinguishing between who the good Muslims are from the bad Muslims is another form of epistemic violence of codification that Gayatri Spivak explains in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” These labels that were narrated in the discourse and language of the war on terror in the post-9/11 world are rooted on the political contexts of Islamic terrorism and the political response of the U.S./West to the ideology of the political Islam. The function of these labels reflect the us-versus-them binary under the continuing global gaze of the West-versus-East binary, which in political Islam replaced the Eastern cultures and reduced the diverse societies of the East to a problematic political context. In Covering Islam, Edward Said unpacks the complex meanings and function of ‘Islam’ and West’ by, first, explaining the how ‘Islam,’ “for most of the Middle Ages and during the early part of the Renaissance in Europe, …was believed to be a demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy, and obscurity” (1073). The already existing negative and unpleasant historical roots that defined ‘Islam’ as a primitive, violent, and demonic political structure in the Western/European political context defined the modern culture and society of the West in direct contrast to the politically charged Islamic culture and society. The political networks of both the
West and Islam surpassed the political cultural and social identities of both entities and reduced these diverse socio-cultural formations to the dominant reality and discourse of the extreme polarization of the global West-East dichotomy. Said writes that

To a Muslim who talks about ‘the West’ or to an American who talks about ‘Islam,’ these enormous generalizations have behind them a whole history, enabling and disabling at the same time. Ideological and shot through with powerful emotions, the labels have survived many experiences and have been capable of adapting to new events, information, and realities. At present, ‘Islam,’ and ‘the West’ have taken on a powerful new urgency everywhere. And we must note immediately that it is always the West, and not Christianity, that seems pitted against Islam. Why? Because the assumption is that whereas ‘the West’ is greater than and has surpassed the sage of Christianity, its principal religion, the world of Islam—its varied societies, histories, and languages notwithstanding—is still mired in religion, primitivity, and backwardness. Therefore, the West is modern, greater than the sum of its parts, full of enriching contradictions and yet always ‘Western’ in its cultural identity; the world of Islam, on the other hand, is no more than ‘Islam,’ reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics despite the appearance of contradictions and experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West. (1157-74)

The historical roots of these labels continue to mirror the global West-East dichotomy into the current discourse of war on terror that defines the Middle East under the extensive totalization of political Islam as the terrorist enemy of modern Western civilization as the dominant and popular representation continues to re-narrate the reality of these geopolitical labels. In the context of the discourse of the war on terror constructed by the Bush administration, re-construction of the spatial consciousness of Middle East as ‘Greater,’ on the surface level, is an
act of defining the vast and diverse regions and identities from Morocco to Pakistan as terrorist others who are dangerous Muslims and threats to the global peace and unity: a new level of extensive and unjust totalization. Both in the political climate of the pre- and post-9/11 context, the politically charged and ethically justified reality of the war on terror discourse was the result of the post-Cold War tension and conflict between the U.S. and once dominant face of political Islam, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Mamdani writes that

Both Bush and bin Laden employ a religious language, the language of good and evil, the language of no compromise: you are either with us or against us. Both deny the possibility of a third response. For both, political loyalty comes before political independence. The danger of bringing notions of good and evil into politics cannot be underestimated. The consequences of bringing home—wherever home may be—the language of the war on terror should be clear: it will create a license to demonize adversaries as terrorist, clearing the ground for a fight to the finish, for with terrorists there can be no compromise. The result will be to displace attention from issues to loyalties, to criminalize dissent, and to invite domestic ruin. Worse still, if the struggle against political enemies is defined as a struggle against evil, it will turn into a holy war. And in holy war, there can be no compromise. Evil cannot be converted; it must be eliminated. (3577-85)

The demonization of political Islam and militant fundamentalist Muslims as the terrorist enemies in the popular conversation of the U.S. has been the most recent form of re-construction and re-totalization of the diverse identities of the Middle East. Both Said and Mamdani clarify why the popular reality of Islamic terrorism in the context of political Islam is an unjust generalization by explaining how Islam as a political system does not represent the culturally and socially diverse meanings, functions, and practices of Islam as a belief system. In this context,
understanding the current terrorist representation of the extensively totalized Islamic world should happen with a focus on the fact that this narration is a reflection of the political conflict that has been only intensifying since the end of the Cold War between the overly generalized Western State under the hegemonic gaze of the U.S. and the overly generalized Middle East under the hegemonic gaze of political Islam and the Islamic State of the Arab world.

Overall, throughout the twentieth century, the Middle East has been shaped by the continuing external interventions of the Western powers and internal reactionary resistance movements that totalized the region, which were “ideologically opposed to democracy in any form, and all of which tended to undermine democratic regimes whenever these obstructed their economic or strategic interests” (Khalidi, Sowing Crisis 2407). The ideological oppositions of Western powers to any democratic regime in the Middle East constructed and fixed the region as the unresolvable problem that the West—today the U.S.—always has to fix. The eternal question of the Middle Eastern problem leaves almost no room for any alternative question, response, and/or representations. However, the brave women of the Middle East are moving against this one storyline.

Today, the Middle East is writing herself and I have been writing with her! Responding to the cartographic realities that contributed to the current reality of the region throughout this project revealed a cruel reality for me. Under all the layers of geopolitical, economic, and military conflicts within and beyond the borders of the region, the root of the Middle East’s terrorist image is the product of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination, which was shaped as a polarized differentiation under the global gaze of the West-East dichotomy. The political conflicts and tensions among the nation-states of the West and the Middle East have been a reflection of this dichotomy. The totalized states of power of the West and the Middle East have taken all the measures to domesticate and alienate what they perceived to be the different other from their own
problematic positions. Unpacking this polarized power dynamic on a global level revealed how, on one hand, the West had an undeniable role, through its colonial and imperial agendas, in inflicting chaos and disorder into the Middle East; on the other hand, adopting this global lens also showed how the Middle East, as a totalized entity of geo/political power system, also imposed violence and terror throughout the region.

Both overly totalized systems of power re-produced the same problematic narrative of the grand-myth from slightly different positions of the imperial gaze. The modern West targeted its eternal non-Western Other as the deviant Oriental alien and re-memorialized the meta-narrative of the Orient under the mere label of ‘Islam’ “either to explain or indiscriminately condemn ‘Islam’” as the demonized enemy of the modern West (Said, Covering Islam 139). The colonized Middle East under the haunting memory of the domesticated Orient had a strong desire to reverse this power dynamic by aiming to restore the glorified days of the hegemonic power of the Islamic rule under the caliph as a political system; yet trying to re-invent the Islamic State as a political form of Islamic power only resulted in centralizing Arab nationality as a unified force of resistance against the modern West, and this centralization of power only resulted in discriminating and subjugating non-Arab and non-Muslim ethnic identities within and across the region. Today, the Middle East continues to be a problem in the global arena; yet this problem, more than it is Islamic terrorism and/or Western imperialism, should be understood as a problem of socio-cultural injustice, racial and religious discrimination, equality and freedom. It is a problem of human rights, which is a daily reality that the inhabitants of the region have been suffering the consequences of this crude violation of their being and existence.

Remaining in the binary structure of the West-East opposition on a global level might come as a determinist and limited reading of the cartographic construction of the Middle East throughout the twentieth century especially considering the complexity of the region. The Middle
Eastern question as a problem to be fixed, however, was a question that is a Euro-centric contextualization within this limited global context. This question moved from the extensive totalization of the Oriental Other to the Middle Eastern Other and was internally re-invented to frame the problem of Western imperialism in the context of Occidentalism. The West-East/Orient-Occident global binary has been the central mechanism of power that always re-positioned both the West and the Middle East as overly generalized realities. These extreme homogenic political systems came to be perceived as cultural identities that were justified as universal truths about the people of these geopolitical constructs. On a global level, then, these bifurcated socio-spatial closed constructs set in/visible borders that today continues to re-invent a global world order within the same problematic conflict of the us-versus-them discourse. This discourse has been producing the enemy and victim images, and these images within the subjective geopolitical positions of the West and the Middle East have only been contributing to re-narrating the Middle Eastern question as a problem to be fixed. This question remains either a problem of primitivity in the Western context (the deviant Muslims terrorist threatening the modern Western society) or a problem of Western imperialism in the Middle Eastern context (the infidel Westerners threatening the values of the Islamic society).

In this context, adopting the West-East global perspective with a focus on the impacts of Orientalism and Occidentalism revealed how the changing centers of power both in the West and the Middle East remained in the same narrative line and intensified the polarization of the political tension in the context of war and terror. In addition, this global lens provided an understanding of how the internal movements of in the Middle East started as rhizomatic movements of resistance and failed due to not being able to avoid the black hole of oriental determinism, which uses the ethical argument of justification that the Euro-American colonial domination over the region set forth as the sole reason for the lack of proper governmentality and
democracy in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{86} This global lens allowed me to respond to the spatial reality of the maps of the Middle East I have analyzed in this project. This analysis showed that the Middle East is a problem and it will be a problem, and the heart of this problem is what we are ashamed of and scared to admit—racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination—in our global age in which we should strive to foster racial and religious equality across the borders of the global geographies of the West-East/the North-South. We should use discourses of Orientalism and the global West-East dichotomy as critical lenses with an intellectual awareness and sensitivity about the complexity and diversity of the issue at hand. We cannot continue to keep attacking the West or the Middle/East for all the chaos and violence because what needs to matter should be the lives, voices, needs, and rights of the people who are of and from these geographies of cultures. The question of the Middle East should be a question of how to restore faith in humanity, and the problem we need to deal with should be the problem of human rights, social justice, and equality.

Today, the Middle East is writing herself and I am writing with her! And I hope that you will write with me, with the brave women of Middle East as part of this project: Dis/Orienting Middle East.

\textsuperscript{86} In \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, \textit{Covering Islam}, and “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Said reflects on how this deterministic approach of Orientalism has become a limited lens of studying and understanding the diverse Oriental cultures and identities due to how, as a domain of study, Orientalism was used primarily attacking the West rather than being applied critically to unpack the multiple layers of complex relations among the Western and Eastern societies, cultures, and traditions.
Appendix

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