WHAT DO YOU MEAN I HAVE A BAD REVIEW?: THE EFFECTS OF RACE ON PERCEPTIONS OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FAIRNESS AND DEVIANT BEHAVIORS

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WHAT DO YOU MEAN I HAVE A BAD REVIEW?: THE EFFECTS OF RACE ON PERCEPTIONS OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FAIRNESS AND DEVIAN BEHAVIORS

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
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Master of Science
Applied Psychology

by
Theresa Patricia Atkinson
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Accepted by:
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ABSTRACT

Perceptions of unfair performance appraisals have been found to be associated with various negative organizational outcomes, including increases in workplace deviant behaviors and decreases in organizational citizenship behaviors. A main goal of the present study was to examine the process through which perceptions of performance appraisals lead to different behavioral outcomes by using psychological contract breaches within the framework of Affective Events Theory (AET). Another major goal was to investigate if race and core self-evaluations affected outcomes associated with performance appraisals. Results from the present study revealed that race did not impact perceptions of psychological contract breaches, and that the framework described by AET did not influence any outcomes. The three-way interaction between psychological contract breach, procedural justice, and distributive justice did predict participants’ feelings of violation, but only for the organizational form of violation. The two-way interaction between psychological contract breach and procedural justice was also found to significantly affect the organizational form of violation. Additionally, it was found that time 1 measurements of core self-evaluations interacted with the experimental vignettes to significantly predict time 2 core self-evaluations. Results from the present may be used to design selection systems and aspects of the workplace.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this paper to my family and friends, all of whom have helped me to become the person I am today.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee for all of their help and guidance during this process. I am incredibly grateful for their patience and support.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

There have been numerous studies in the extant literature on the topic of how race relates to organizational outcomes including termination, selection, and performance appraisal (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990; Hargis, Baltes, Fried, & Levi, 2006; Wilson & Jones, 2008). Although there have been a few studies that have found contradicting results, the general consensus in the research literature is that race does indeed have an effect on organizational outcomes and decisions (Greenhaus et al., 1990). Although considerable progress has been made in racial equality in the past 20 years, resulting in policies that prohibit discrimination in the workplace, racial minorities still have to contend with less obvious discriminatory behaviors, such as unequal treatment in regards to assignment of demanding work tasks (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Multiple possible sources of this kind of biased behavior have been suggested, ranging from stereotyping to comparison to self issues (Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2010; Wilson & Jones, 2008).

The purpose of the present paper is to not only contribute to the area of racial discrimination and performance appraisals, but to also investigate how individuals react when they feel they have unjustly received a poor performance appraisal. It deserves noting that the present paper will not examine whether performance appraisals are accurate or not; research has found that appraisals are often subject to many biases
(Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2010; Greenhaus et al., 1990; Wilson & Jones, 2008). Instead, the focus, as mentioned above, will be solely on reactions following a perceived unfair performance appraisal.

The literature review of the present paper is divided into five sections; the first section will review research concerning observed biases associated with performance appraisals, as well as the routes through which individuals may view biases associated with their appraisals. The second, third, fourth, and fifth sections, respectively, will discuss psychological contracts, workplace deviant behaviors, and core self-evaluations, and how they relate to performance appraisal reactions.

**Performance Appraisals and Race**

During the past few decades, there has been considerable improvement in policies that prohibit discrimination in the workplace, such as Affirmative Action and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Although these attempts to equalize treatment for all employees in the workplace have been important steps toward nondiscrimination, more subtle prejudice still remains (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Past research has shown that women are often treated differently than other employees with regard to how often they are promoted, assigned challenging tasks, and given equal wages (Greenhaus et al., 1990). According to Roberson, Galvin, and Charles (2007), a large majority of managers who are both female and African-American feel as if they have to work harder than other managers who were male. Accents have even been shown to have an effect on assessment, with individuals who are perceived as having different
accents being judged more unfavorably in the workplace than others (Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2010). In addition, it has been found that race affects individual employees’ experiences in the workplace (Greenhaus et al., 1990). Past research, for example, has discovered that African-Americans are more likely to be given negative performance evaluations, compared to Caucasians (Greenhaus et al., 1990; Wilson & Jones, 2008). This should not be surprising, as it is commonly known that performance appraisals are often influenced by personal biases of raters (Wilson & Jones, 2008).

Real Differences in Performance

Although it is generally accepted that raters do have biases that could potentially affect their ratings of individual employees, it is necessary to discuss whether these differences in performance appraisals among minorities and Caucasians are solely due to raters’ biases, or if there are, in fact, real variations in the level of performance among minorities and Caucasians. For example, a study by Dewberry (2001) found that there were significant differences in the level of performance among minorities (African-Americans and Asians) and Caucasians who were training to become lawyers. Moreover, minorities were more likely to receive lower grades than Caucasians, regardless of whether raters were in a blind or non-blind condition (Dewberry, 2001). These results suggest that there might be factors, other than rater bias, responsible for the perceived differences in performance among minorities and Caucasians. One such factor might be that minorities may not have access to the same experiences that foster growth and development, such as mentoring by others and personal support (Dewberry, 2001).
Wilson and Jones (2008) also state that in addition to rater bias, it is probable that there might be true differences in performance between African-Americans and Caucasians, which account for disparities in levels of performance between the two groups. Again, lack of mentors and role models, as well as not being included in the “in group,” are cited as reasons for the lower levels of performance among minorities (Wilson & Jones, 2008). A lack of demanding work assignments and attention from supervisors may also be responsible for negatively affecting minorities’ ability to develop in their respective jobs (Greenhaus et al., 1990). In addition, minorities may also be disadvantaged with respect to their performance not only because of a lack of opportunities in the workplace, but also due to a life filled with inequality (Hargis et al., 2006). Hargis et al. (2006) suggest that African-Americans often do not experience the same level of education as Caucasians, which can then lead to lower levels of performance.

Differences in Performance Due to Biases

However, it is important to note that it is not likely that differences in ratings of performance between minorities and Caucasians are completely due to actual dissimilarities in performance. Rather, as discussed in preceding paragraphs, rater bias is also a factor that impacts the ratings minorities receive. For example, managers’ opinion of the “ideal performer” may cause them to give lower ratings of performance to employees who do not fit their view of what the perfect performer should be like (Wilson & Jones, 2008). It has been found that this “ideal performer” has many of the same
characteristics that the managers themselves possess; this is consistent with research that has found that managers prefer employees who are very similar to themselves (Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2010; Wilson & Jones, 2008).

Another factor that may influence performance appraisals of minority employees is stereotyping. That is, negative stereotypes of employees may have an adverse impact on the outcome of their performance appraisals (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Negative stereotyping has also been linked to the issue of the “ideal performer.” Specifically, employees who are perceived negatively are automatically excluded from being perceived as possessing qualities of an “ideal performer” (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Past research has found support for negative race-based stereotypes. For example, a study by Tomkiewicz, Brenner, and Adeyemi-Bello (1998), as cited in Wilson and Jones (2008), found that when managers were asked to comment on characteristics of Caucasian employees, African-American employees, and successful managers, there was a strong association between the characteristics of successful managers and Caucasian employees, but no relationship between the characteristics of African-American employees and successful managers.

The issue of stereotyping is also related to another factor that may influence the performance appraisal process, namely, selective use of information. Selective use of information refers to the process through which individuals form opinions about others, and then actively search for information to support these opinions (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Past research has found that individuals are more likely to remember examples
that confirm their opinions of others than examples that do not support their opinions (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Applied to an organizational context, managers may be more likely to remember instances of behavior that support their view of an employee, and less likely to recall information that does not support their previously formed view. Thus, it is plausible that managers who have negative views of minority employees will be both on the lookout for information that supports their stereotypes of these minority employees, as well as more likely to remember that information, even if there are very few instances that support their negative stereotypes.

Justice Perceptions

When forming an opinion about performance appraisals, there are many reasons why employees may consider appraisals to be unfair. For example, organizational justice may affect the process through which subordinates form perceptions about an appraisal (Thurston & McNall, 2010). For instance, subordinates have been shown to react more positively towards an appraisal system if they are involved in the appraisal’s construction (Thurston & McNall, 2010); it has also been found that subordinates’ evaluations of the appeals process associated with an appraisal affected their job satisfaction (Shrivastava & Purang, 2011; Thurston & McNall, 2010). Involvement in the appraisal’s construction and perceptions of the appeal process are both considered as factors in employees’ procedural justice perceptions of a performance appraisal. Tang and Sarfield-Baldwin (1996) also found that perceptions of procedural justice were related to several outcomes, such as commitment, job involvement, and satisfaction with supervision.
Judgments about what is received in a performance appraisal, or distributive (outcome) justice perceptions, have also been shown to affect subordinates’ opinions of the fairness of an appraisal system. Similar to perceptions of procedural injustice, subordinates who view the outcomes of their appraisal as unfair are more likely to engage in behaviors that are counter to what an organization expects (Shrivastava & Purang, 2011). Subordinates’ perceptions about the fairness of their appraisal may also be influenced by their views of how the rater behaves toward them, or interpersonal justice perceptions; past research has shown that subordinates tend to view the appraisal process more favorably if raters exhibit signs of thoughtfulness (Thurston & McNall, 2010). Additionally, informational justice perceptions encompass subordinates’ perceptions of whether they have been adequately informed about expectations, been given adequate feedback, and have been thoroughly informed of why and how decisions were made by the employer (Shrivastava & Purang, 2011; Thurston & McNall, 2010). Again, subordinates are more likely to view the appraisal process favorably if they perceive that they have been sufficiently informed about different components pertaining to it.

Fairness perceptions are important because they are related to many organizational outcomes, such as organizational commitment and satisfaction (Brown, Hyatt, & Benson, 2010; De Cremer, Brockner, Fishman, van Dijke, van Olffen, & Mayer, 2010). For example, Thurston and McNall (2010) state that perceptions of bias in performance appraisals often lead to outcomes such as dissatisfaction. However, as described in the previous paragraph, there are many channels through which perceptions
of appraisal fairness can be affected; that is, perceptions of the fairness associated with procedures involved in the appraisal process or the outcomes of the appraisal could have an effect on overall reactions to appraisals. For instance, past research has found that employees engage in more positive work related behaviors when they perceive both the procedure and outcomes associated with workplace events to be fair (De Cremer et al., 2010). De Cremer et al. (2010) also suggest that there may be a moderating effect between procedural fairness and outcome fairness, and that this interaction may be stronger when workplace outcomes are perceived to be more biased. According to De Cremer et al. (2010), when employees receive what they perceive to be an unfair outcome, they try to understand it through the procedures involved in the process. When employees perceive the process to be fair, they are more likely to conclude that they are valued by the organization, which may then increase the likelihood of employees engaging in behaviors that are beneficial to the organization (De Cremer et al., 2010). Thus, in the present paper it is hypothesized that perceptions of procedural fairness will moderate the effect of perceptions of outcome fairness on employees’ overall affective reactions (such as feelings of violation). It is believed that if employees perceive the outcome of their appraisal to be fair, they will not examine the process involved in the appraisal. But, if employees perceive the outcome of their appraisal to be biased, it is expected that they will then examine the procedural fairness of the appraisal; employees will be more likely to have negative reactions (i.e., feelings of violation) if they perceive both the appraisal process and outcome to be biased.
Hypothesis 1: There will be a three-way interaction between perceptions of psychological contract breach, procedural justice, and distributive justice on feelings of affective reactions (violation).

When evaluating reactions to performance appraisals, it is also important to consider whether there is a difference in perceptions of bias between minority and non-minority employees. That is, if both a minority employee and a non-minority employee were to receive a negative appraisal, would one employee be more likely to judge it as being biased or too critical than the other? In the present paper, it is predicted that minority employees will be more likely to perceive a negative appraisal as being unfair or biased due to the struggles that many minorities have had to face in the past. For example, regulations such as Affirmative Action and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act were created to ensure equal opportunities for minorities (Wilson & Jones, 2008). Also, although there have been more recent attempts to equalize opportunities and treatment for minorities, past research has shown that bias against minorities is still prevalent (Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2010; Greenhaus et al, 1990). Thus, because of the prejudice that minority individuals have had to endure, I examine how minority employees will perceive a negative performance appraisal; that is, will minority employees be more likely to perceive a negative performance appraisal as being unduly critical or severe than non-minority employees? Thus, this forms the basis for the first research question.

Research question 1: Will minority individuals (i.e., African-American, Asian,
Hispanic, Native American) be more likely to have negative reactions (perceptions of psychological contract breaches, to be discussed later) after receiving a negative performance appraisal, compared to non-minority employees?

It is also important to note that this differential treatment in the performance appraisal process can result in minority employees experiencing other discriminatory treatment related to training opportunities, promotions, and salary (Greenhaus et al., 1990). This is because opportunities and benefits such as promotions and increased salaries are often based on results obtained from performance appraisals. It is believed that this lack of equal resources and opportunity will have a negative impact on minority employees’ attitudes about the organization for which they work and negatively affect employees’ perceptions of their psychological contracts.

**Psychological Contracts**

One the simplest definitions of psychological contracts may be that they are the results of both employees’ and employers’ opinions about what is owed to each other (Restubog, Hornsey, Bordia, & Esposo, 2008). Stated differently, psychological contracts are the beliefs about the exchange that exist between employees and employers; these contracts contain beliefs about terms of the exchange process that are not present in a formal, written contract (Henderson, Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2008). In other words, psychological contracts are the result of employees’ (and employers’) perceptions of the workplace (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998).
Psychological Contract Breach

A psychological contract breach is said to take place when an employee feels that their employer has not provided what they expected (Restubog et al., 2008). However, it is important to understand that there may not have been any discrepancies in what an employer provided to an individual employee and what the individual employee expected (Robinson, 1996). In other words, a psychological contract breach usually occurs following employees’ perceptions of breach; an employer may not have actually committed any transgressions. Results of contract breaches can include feelings of frustration, anger, betrayal, and turnover intention (Bal, Chiaburu, & Diaz, 2011; Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Kiewitz, Restubog, Zagencyzk, & Hochwarter, 2009).

Although there are two types of psychological contracts that have been studied in the literature, transactional and relational, only relational contracts will be examined in the present study. This is because relational contracts generally involve a closer relationship between an employer and employee, compared to transactional contracts, which typically represent a more basic monetary relationship (Grimmer & Oddy, 2007). Because of the closer working relationships associated with relational contracts, past research has found that breaches of these contracts may result in increased adverse employee reactions (Montes & Irving, 2008; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007). For example, Zhao et al. (2007) discovered that relational contract breaches resulted in more negative outcomes, such as increased thoughts about turnover, as compared to
transactional contract breaches. Thus, because of relational contracts’ greater effect on subsequent behavioral outcomes, I will examine how individuals with varying levels of relational contracts will be affected by perceptions of injustice.

It is often assumed that the process through which psychological contracts are broken is linked to a simple “social exchange” phenomenon (Restubog et al., 2008). According to this process, employees simply reduce their contributions to their employer to more fairly match what they perceive they are receiving from their employer. Thus, if an employee feels as if he/she has not been given what he/she expected, then he/she might reduce his/her personal contributions to his/her employer, in an effort to create a more equal exchange between the two parties. However, Affective Events Theory (AET) may provide a more useful explanation of how psychological contract breaches occur (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Zhao et al. (2007) propose that after an initial perceived contract breach, employees become emotional, which, in turn, leads to new cognitive appraisals about the employer. This change eventually results in employees altering their behavior (Zhao et al., 2007). Following the pattern proposed by Zhao et al. (2007), in the present study, it is hypothesized that employees who initially perceive a breach in their contracts, as a result of a perceived unfair performance appraisal, will have emotional negative reactions, such as feelings of violation. These emotions will lead employees to think about their employer in new ways (such as having new appraisal reactions), ultimately resulting in employees adjusting their behaviors toward their employer.

Furthermore, the probability of outcomes such as promotions, increases in salary,
training opportunities, termination, being assigned more challenging tasks, and other organizational outcomes often relies, at least partially, on how employees’ performance is assessed in performance appraisals (Greenhaus et al., 1990). Past research by Brown et al. (2010) suggests that employees may view performance appraisals as a delicate issue, due to the fact that multiple outcomes (promotion opportunities, etc.) often hinge on the results of these appraisals; for example, Brown et al. (2010) found that the actual performance appraisal process, implementation of these processes, and interpersonal interactions during the process can result in feelings of attachment to an organization. Because opportunities for certain outcomes are often dependent on appraisals, it is thought that an appraisal perceived as unfair will cause employees to perceive their psychological contract as having been broken. This is because psychological contracts are often based on impressions about the exchange relationship between an employee and his or her employer (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). For example, an employee might believe that he or she will receive support, in addition to advancement and training opportunities from his or her employer in exchange for high levels of performance. Thus, if an employee perceives that he or she has received an unfairly severe or critical appraisal, he or she may also feel as if his or her psychological contract has been broken. This is because “bad” appraisals may preclude an employee from advancing within an organization, or experiencing other positive organizational outcomes. This lack of opportunities may be construed by employees as a psychological contract breach, because they may feel as if they have not been offered what they were expecting to receive from
their employer.

Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of psychological contracts will interact with the manipulated vignettes to predict psychological contract breach perceptions.

Workplace Deviant Behavior

Although employees may engage in work related behaviors that are conducive to organizational functioning, such as voicing opinions or other citizenship behaviors, employees may also engage in certain behaviors that do not help an organization to function effectively. Workplace deviant behavior, or WDB, can be defined as actions that can be damaging to an organization, and occur when employees engage in behaviors that are in some way contrary to what is expected by the organization in which they work (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Bennett and Robinson (2000) suggest that WDBs range along a continuum, from more violent behaviors (e.g., physical assault) to less violent behaviors (e.g., gossiping), and that WDBs can be directed toward either the organization or an individual employee. In the present paper, the focus will be on WDBs as a whole (i.e., both organizational and individual targeted behaviors); no investigation will be made into what specific types of behavior occur, or whether individuals or organizations are targeted.

As mentioned above, WDBs do not benefit an organization; past research has found that potential consequences of WDBs can include loss of productivity, decreased morale, and increased turnover, as well as an increase in organization spending to counter problems caused by WDBs (e.g., expenses associated with litigation or recruitment and
training of new employees) (Gill, Meyer, Lee, Shin, & Yoon, 2011; Ménard, Brunet, & Savoie, 2011). Furthermore, WDBs are not an uncommon phenomenon; according to Gill et al. (2011), as many as two-thirds of employees have committed some form of WDBs during their working career, and, according to Menard et al. (2011), about 90% of employees have committed some type of deviant behavior during their working career. Thus, organizations may have to spend much of their time and money to counteract issues created by employees engaging in WDBs.

Bennett and Robinson (2000) suggest possible reasons for why employees may decide to engage in WDBs; these reasons vary from job dissatisfaction to perceptions of injustice. Workplace deviance may also be affected by perceptions relating to interpersonal and distributive justice (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008). Indeed, results from Menard et al. (2011) demonstrate that employees are more likely to engage in violent acts after perceiving procedural injustice. This could be because employees may feel angry or violated if they feel the organization for which they work has been unfair to them.

In the present paper, it is hypothesized that perceptions of psychological contract breach will lead to an increase in WDBs among employees. It is thought that this increase in WDBs will result from the process described by AET. Specifically, after a perceived breach, employees will experience affective reactions, such as feelings of violation, and employees will form new cognitive appraisals, such as performance appraisal reactions; these new cognitive appraisals will eventually lead to employees changing some of the
behaviors in which they engage. This is consistent with results from Bordia et al. (2008); they found that feelings of violation mediated the relationship between perceptions of breach and revenge cognitions, with revenge cognitions leading to deviance in the workplace.

Thus, it is hypothesized that employees will be more likely to engage in WDBs following a perceived breach. Specific targets (individuals vs. organizations) of these deviant behaviors will not be examined; rather, whether or not WDBs occur or not will be the focus of the present study.

*Hypothesis 3:* Feelings of violation and appraisal reactions will partially mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach perceptions and workplace deviant behaviors.

**Core Self-Evaluations**

Core self-evaluation (CSE) is a higher-order construct that is composed of four underlying constructs—generalized self-efficacy, self-esteem, locus of control, and neuroticism (Bono & Judge, 2003). These four underlying traits have been found to be highly correlated with one another, and research has shown that they do indeed load onto a more general factor, CSE (Judge, 2009). More specifically, CSE has been defined as stable judgments individuals have about themselves, or feelings of self-worth (Bono & Colbert, 2005; Judge, 2009), and have been shown to affect individuals’ reactions to certain situations (Bono & Judge, 2003). For example, Bono and Judge (2003) found that individuals with higher levels of CSE were better able to handle changes within an
organization. CSE has also been linked to higher levels of job performance, as well as job satisfaction (Bono & Judge, 2003). However, research shows that this relationship between CSE and job satisfaction may be partially explained by the finding that individuals who have higher levels of CSE tend to choose more demanding jobs, which then leads to increased job satisfaction (Bono & Judge, 2003). In addition, CSE is believed to affect motivation; that is, it has been found that CSE may affect individuals’ willingness to persevere in certain situations (Bono & Colbert, 2005).

In the present study, the relationship between negative performance appraisals and CSE will be investigated. Although CSE has been shown to be a stable construct in the literature (Bono & Colbert, 2005), I examine whether negative performance appraisals may serve to lower individuals’ level of CSE. For instance, it is possible that when employees receive negative feedback in their performance appraisal, this may cause them to re-evaluate their actual performance capabilities. Minority employees may be especially susceptible to the effects of negative feedback due to stereotype threat, which occurs when individuals do not perform to their true potential because of existing negative stereotypes about the group to which they belong (Ståhl, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2012). Because past literature (Bono & Colbert, 2005) has found that CSEs are relatively stable, whether or not performance appraisals can impact CSEs forms the basis for a general research question in the present paper.

*Research question 2:* Employees’ level of core self-evaluations will interact with manipulated vignettes to predict later levels of core-self evaluations.
CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Participants

Participants included approximately 124 individuals who were at least 18 years old and worked at least 20 hours per week.

Design of Study

The present study included two manipulated variables in a 2 (distributive justice) × 2 (procedural justice) design. Participants were only presented with one combination of all the possible levels of the manipulated variables, resulting in a between-subjects design.

Manipulated Independent Variables

During the course of the study, participants were prompted to read vignettes; these vignettes contained different scenarios that involved each of the manipulated variables (refer to Appendix B). Both the procedural and distributive justice sections of the vignettes involved two levels, incorporating scenarios involving procedural fairness, procedural unfairness, distributive (outcome) fairness, and distributive (outcome) unfairness (in the present paper, fairness and justice are used to describe the same concept).

Procedure

Data was collected through several different methods. The first method utilized the psychology student participant pool at the university where the present study took
place. The researcher also sent out individual e-mails directly to potential participants and posted information about the study, as well as a link to the study, on websites such as LinkedIn.

Participants signed up to participate in the study on a website used as the psychology student participant pool at the university where the present study took place. When logging into the website, participants were able to see a list of possible studies available to participate in, along with a list of available session times and a brief description of each study. After they signed up for a session, participants were responsible for remembering to attend their session at the given date, time, and location. Before attending their respective session, participants were instructed to fill out the survey (a link was proved on the participant website); in each session, participants were debriefed as to the true reason for conducting the study and were then asked to initial a form giving the researchers permission (or not) to use their responses.

Both emails sent directly to potential participants, as well as information posted online, contained a short description of the study and a direct link to the survey. The researcher had no knowledge of who agreed to participate in the survey or who declined to participate. The format of the survey for all participants is described below.

When beginning the survey, participants completed measures pertaining to psychological contracts, psychological contract breach, violation, CSE, and WDBs. After completing these initial measures, participants were presented with vignettes describing situations involving procedural justice and outcome justice (participants were randomly
assigned to these vignettes; refer to Appendix B for a complete list of all vignettes). After reading the vignettes, participants were instructed to imagine themselves at their current job, but three years in the future. Participants were then instructed to complete the remaining measures while applying the situations described in the vignettes to their current jobs. Then, participants completed measures pertaining to psychological contracts, psychological contract breach, violation, appraisal reactions, procedural and outcome justice, CSE, and WDBs.

**Measures**

As stated in the previous paragraph, participants were required to complete several measures (psychological contract, psychological contract breach, violation, CSE, and WDBs) twice; once before the vignettes and once after the vignettes. Other measures were only completed after reading the vignettes (appraisal reactions and justice measures). Participants were asked to respond to all measures on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*, 9 = *Strongly agree*). Refer to Appendix A for a complete list of all measures.

Psychological contract -- Seven items relating to relational contracts from Grimmer and Oddy’s (2007) psychological contract measure were used. Grimmer and Oddy (2007) found the Cronbach’s alpha for this measure to be .65. An example item is, “I expect to grow in this organization.”

Psychological contract breach -- Robinson and Morrison’s (2000) five item measure of perceived psychological contract breach was used. Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure has been found to be relatively high; Robinson and Morrison (2000) found Cronbach’s alpha for this measure to be .92. An example item is, “Almost all of the promises made by my employer during recruitment have been met so far” (reversed).

Appraisal reactions -- Volpone, Avery, and McKay’s (2012) five item measure was used to assess appraisal reactions. In their study, Volpone et al. (2012) discovered Cronbach’s alpha for this measure to be around .83. An example item is, “I understand how my performance is evaluated.”

Justice perceptions -- Two subdimensions (procedural and outcome justice) of Thurston and McNall’s (2010) measure of justice perceptions were used (for a total of 12 items). The procedural justice component of the measure can be divided into three parts, relating to assigning raters, setting criteria and seeking appeals. The Cronbach’s alpha for the assigning raters section ranged between .90 and .95. An example item is, “Procedures ensure my rater knows what I am supposed to be doing and how to evaluate my performance.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the setting criteria section ranged from .80 to .90. An example item is “My organization requires that standards be set for me before the start of a reporting period.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the seeking appeals section ranged from .86 to .91. An example item is, “A process to appeal an appraisal is available to me anytime I may need it.” Similarly, the outcome dimension of the justice measure can be divided into two sections. The Cronbach’s alpha for the ratings based on equity section ranged from .87 to .93. An example item is, “The appraisal I get reflects how much work I do, how well I do my work, the many things I do that help at work, the many things I
am responsible for at work, and the effort I put forth at work.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the absence of political goals section ranged from .68 to .87, and an example item is, “My rating is a result of my rater applying standards consistently across employees without pressure, corruption, or prejudice.”

WDB -- Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) 28 item measure of workplace deviant behaviors was used. Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) discovered Cronbach’s alpha for this measure to be approximately .82. An example item is, “Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer.”

Violation -- Robinson and Morrison’s (2000) four item measure of violation was used; Robinson and Morrison (2000) found that Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .92. An example item is, “I feel a great deal of anger toward my organization.” In order to assess whether violation was directed toward organizations or supervisors, another four questions with ‘supervisor’ replacing ‘organization’ were used (otherwise, the questions were identical).

Core self-evaluation -- Judge et al.’s (2003) 12 item scale was used. Past research has found Cronbach’s alpha to be relatively high; Judge et al. (2003) stated that it ranged from .81 to .87. An example item is, “I am confident I get the success I deserve in life.”

CHAPTER THREE

RESULTS

Table 3.1 depicts means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for selected variables. Although 151 participants completed the survey, 27 participants’ data had to be
removed from the data set due to most, or all, of the questions being left unanswered (leaving 124 participants). For each hypothesis and research question, leverage (Mahalanoba’s Distance) and discrepancy values (studentized deleted residuals) were obtained for the full model of the analysis to determine if outliers were present. If there were outliers, they were filtered out from the data set for that specific hypothesis or research question. The number of outliers filtered out for each research question or hypothesis ranged from one to three. All continuous independent variables were mean centered in order to aid in interpretation of results. In the following sections, ‘time 1’ refers to measures that were completed before participants read the vignettes, while ‘time 2’ refers to measures that were completed after participants read the vignettes.

Of the remaining participants, 43 indicated that they were male, while 81 were female. Refer to Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for more description of the participants in the present study.
Table 3.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-Correlations for Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Psych Contract</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Psych Contract Breach</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Violation (org)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Violation (sup)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CSE</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. WDB (org)</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. WDB (ind)</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 2</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Psych Contract</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Violation (org)</td>
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<td>2.37</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Violation (sup)</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>12. CSE</td>
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<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.61**</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. WDB (org)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
<td>0.59**</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. WDB (ind)</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.28</td>
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<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
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<td>15. Appraisal Reactions</td>
<td>5.31</td>
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<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>16. Procedural Justice</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Distributive Justice</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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*Note:* * p < .05,  ** p < .01

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>8</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Psych Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Psych Contract Breach</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Violation (org)</td>
<td>-0.59**</td>
<td>-0.27**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Violation (sup)</td>
<td>-0.61**</td>
<td>-0.313**</td>
<td>0.92**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. CSE</td>
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<td>0.40**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. WDB (org)</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. WDB (ind)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Appraisal Reactions</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
<td>0.55**</td>
<td>-0.62**</td>
<td>-0.65**</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Procedural Justice</td>
<td>0.60**</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>-0.49**</td>
<td>-0.53**</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Distributive Justice</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>0.51**</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>-0.49**</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.76**</td>
<td>0.87**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* * p < .05,  ** p < .01
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length with current employer</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month or less</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Few months</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 - 11 months</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 years</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4 years</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more years</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 3.2: Participants’ Length of Employment With Current Employer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 - 20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 23</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 - 26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 - 29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 and older</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Participants’ Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African - American</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Participants’ Race
Hypothesis One

Ordinary least squares linear regression was used to analyze the data for hypothesis 1 (there will be a three way interaction between perceptions of psychological contract breach, procedural justice, and distributive justice on feelings of violation). Time 2 variables, or variables occurring after the experimental vignettes, were used. Time 1 (occurring before the vignettes) versions of psychological contract breach and violation (supervisor and organizational) were entered into the model as control variables. Additionally, three two-way interaction terms, as well as a three-way interaction term, were created before being entered into the analysis. Control variables, main effects, and interaction terms were entered in separate steps, with control variables comprising step 1, main effects comprising step 2, two way interaction terms comprising step 3, and step 4 consisting of the three way interaction term. Two models were estimated, with violation (supervisor) serving as the dependent variable in one model and violation (organization) serving as the dependent variable in the other.

In the first model analyzed, violation (supervisor) was the dependent variable. After accounting for the effects of the control variables (time 1 versions of psychological contract breach and violation-supervisor), psychological contract breach (time 2) was found to be marginally significant, $t(109) = -1.96, p = .052 (B = -.46)$. Procedural justice was found to have a significant effect on perceptions of supervisor violation, $t(109) = -2.78, p < .05 (B = -.61)$, but distributive justice was not. Additionally, none of the two-way interactions, or the three-way interaction, was significant. Although the full model
accounted for 42% of the variance in perceptions of supervisor violation ($R^2 = .42$), the unique variance accounted for by each of the predictors was much smaller. Psychological contracts accounted for approximately 2% ($sr^2 = .02$) of the variance in the dependent variable, while procedural justice explained 4% of the variance in the dependent variable.

The second model had violation (organization) as the dependent variable. After accounting for the effects of the control variables (time 1 versions of psychological contract breach and violation-organization), psychological contract breach (time 2) was found to have a significant main effect on participants’ feelings of violation, $t(109) = -2.46, p < .05 (B = -.56)$. Procedural justice was found to have a significant effect on perceptions of supervisor violation, $t(109) = -2.22, p < .05 (B = -.47)$, but distributive justice was not. Additionally, the two-way interaction between procedural justice and psychological contract breach (time 2) was marginally significant, $t(109) = -1.95, p = .054 (B = -.50)$, but the other two-way interactions were not significant (refer to Figure 3.1 for a depiction of the significant two-way interaction).
Figure 3.1: Simple Slopes for the Two-way Interaction Between Psychological Contract Breach and Procedural Justice.

However, the three-way interaction between psychological contract breach, procedural justice, and distributive justice was marginally significant, $t(109) = 1.93, p = .053$ ($B = .08$). This result is especially compelling, due to the relatively small sample size of the present study. Overall, the full model explained 40% of the variance in participants’ perceptions of organizational violation ($R^2 = .40$). Perceptions of contract breaches accounted for the largest amount of unique variance ($sr^2 = .04$), while procedural justice perceptions explained approximately 3% of the variance in the dependent variable ($sr^2 = .03$). The significant two-way and three-way interactions each explained 2% of the variance in organizational violation ($sr^2 = .02$).

Refer to Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 for depictions of the significant two-way interactions that comprise the three-way interactions. Although the three-way interaction
was not significant for violation (supervisor), a figure was created to better investigate the two two-way interactions. After examining the three-way interaction for violation (organization), it was found that condition 3 (distributive injustice and procedural justice) and condition 2 (distributive justice and procedural injustice) had significantly different slopes, \( t(109) = -4.84, p < .05 \). In addition, condition 3 (distributive injustice and procedural justice) and condition 4 (distributive injustice and procedural injustice) had slopes that were significantly different from one another, \( t(109) = -2.32, p < .05 \). Thus, hypothesis 1 was partially supported.

![Figure 3.2: Two-way Interaction Between Psychological Contract Breach, High Procedural Justice, and Distributive Justice. Dependent Variable = violation (supervisor)](image)
Figure 3.3: Two-way Interaction Between Psychological Contract Breach, Low Procedural Justice, and Distributive Justice. Dependent Variable = violation (supervisor)
Figure 3.4: Two-way Interaction Between Psychological Contract Breach, High Procedural Justice, and Distributive Justice. Dependent Variable = violation (organization)
Research Question One

In order to analyze the data for the first research question (will minority individuals be more likely to have negative reactions--perceptions of psychological contract breaches--after receiving a negative performance appraisal, compared to non-minority employees?), a new variable (‘minority’) was created so that participants could be split up into two groups (0= non-minority, 1=minority) based on their race. Participants who indicated they were Caucasian were entered as non-minorities. All other participants were entered as minorities. Another new variable, ‘all_conditions,’ was
created so that there would be a single variable containing the condition that each participant was subject to (0 = condition 1, 1 = condition 2, 2 = condition 3, 3 = condition 4). Refer to Appendix B for a description of each condition. For this analysis, perceptions of psychological contract breach (time 2) served as the dependent variable. Perceptions of psychological contract breach (time 1) served as a control variable.

A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to address data from this research question. Main effects of the control variable, psychological contract breaches (time 1), ‘minority’ and ‘all_conditions’ variables were entered into the model, along with the nominal by nominal interaction between ‘minority’ and ‘all_conditions.’ The ‘minority’ variable did not have a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of their contract breaches, $F(1, 109) = 1.44, p > .05$. However, the ‘all_conditions’ variable was found to significantly affect perceptions of contract breaches, $F(3, 109) = 7.33, p < .05$. Similar to the ‘minority’ variable, the interaction between ‘minority’ and ‘all_conditions’ failed to have a significant effect upon contract breaches, $F(3, 109) = 1.37, p > .05$. Overall, the entire model accounted for 25% of the variance in perceptions of psychological contract breaches ($R^2 = .25$). The condition variable by itself accounted for 15% of the variance in the dependent variable ($sr^2 = .15$), while the minority variable accounted for only 1% of the variance in the dependent variable ($sr^2 = .01$). Thus, research question 1 was not supported.

Because the ‘all_conditions’ variable was significant, LSD post hoc tests were then examined to determine which of the four levels were significantly different from one
Condition 1 was significantly different from condition 2 ($p < .05$) and condition 4 ($p < .05$), while condition 4 was found to be significantly different from condition 3 ($p < .05$).

**Hypothesis Two**

Hypothesis 2, which examined the interaction between psychological contracts and the experimental vignettes to predict psychological contract breach perceptions, was also examined using univariate ANOVA. For this hypothesis, psychological contracts (time 1) and the condition variable (‘all_condition’) were the independent variables of interest. Psychological contract breaches (time 1) served as control variable, while the dependent variable was perceptions of psychological contract breaches (time 2).

Two models were run for this hypothesis. The initial model contained psychological contract breaches (time 1) as the control variable, and also included the main effects of `all_conditions` and psychological contracts (time 1). Results of the analysis revealed that perceptions of psychological contracts (time 1) did not, in fact, have a significant effect on later perceptions on contract breaches, $F(1, 111) = .50, p > .05$ ($B = .57$). However, ‘all_conditions’ did have a significant $F$ value, $F(3, 111) = 8.34, p < .05$, as did the control variable, $F(1, 111) = 20.14, p < .05$. The entire model accounted for approximately 32% of the variance in the dependent variable ($R^2 = .32$). The condition variable explained 15% of the variance by itself ($sr^2 = .15$).

Further examination of the post hoc tests (LSD) revealed that the mean for
condition 1 was not equal to the means for conditions 2 or 4, condition 2 was not equal to condition 4, and condition 3 was not equal to condition 4. Refer to Table 3.5 for the means and standard deviations for all of the conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition 1</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 2</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 3</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 4</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Means and Standard Deviations for Conditions Comprising ‘all_conditions.’

A second model was then estimated that included the interaction between psychological contracts (time 1) and ‘all_conditions.’ As with the first model, psychological contract breaches (time 1) was entered into the model as a control variable. In this model, only ‘all_conditions’ had significant main effects on perceptions of contract breaches, $F(3, 108) = 8.11, p < .05$ (the control variable also remained significant, $F(1, 108) = 19.73, p < .05$). Psychological contracts (time 1) still remained insignificant, $F(1, 108) = .31, p > .05$. The interaction between ‘all_conditions’ and psychological contracts (time 1) was not significant, $F(3, 108) = .47, p > .05$, and only accounted for about 1% of the explained variance ($sr^2 = .009$). Overall, the entire model accounted for 33% of the variance in perceptions of psychological contract breaches ($R^2 = .33$). Thus, hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis 3 was stated as the following: feelings of violation and appraisal reactions will partially mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach perceptions and deviant behaviors. Time 2 variables (occurring after the vignettes), as well as both organizational and individual forms of deviance and organizational and supervisor forms of violation, were used in these analyses. Time 1 versions of psychological contract breach and violation (the form of violation depended on which one was used in the analyses) were the control variables for these analyses.

In the literature section, it was projected that an increase in deviant behavior would result from the process described by Affective Events Theory, or AET (refer to Figure 3.6). Thus, a three-path mediation model was used to examine the relationship between variables. For each model examined, ordinary least square regression was performed three times to determine the path coefficients and standard errors for the independent variable (IV), first mediating variable (MV1), and second mediating variable (MV2), which would then be entered into an excel spreadsheet to determine the $t$ statistic for the data. The excel spreadsheet utilized equations that were an expansion on the typical Sobel approach used to examine mediated models (Taylor, MacKinnon, & Tine, 2008).
In the first model examined, psychological contract breaches served as the IV, violation (organization) served as the MV1, appraisal reactions served as the MV2, and deviant behavior (organization) was entered as the dependent variable (DV).

Psychological contract breach was a significant predictor of violation (organization) in the first regression equation, $t(115) = -3.89, p < .05 (B = -.74)$. In the second regression equation, both psychological contract breach, $t(114) = 4.61, p < .05 (B = .67)$, and violation (organization), $t(114) = -7.77, p < .05 (B = -.53)$, were significant predictors of appraisal reactions. In the third regression equation, neither psychological contract breaches, appraisal reactions, nor violation (organization) were significant predictors of
deviant behavior (organization).

The path coefficient and standard error for psychological contract breaches were then taken from the first equation, the path coefficient and standard error for violation (organization) were taken from the second equation, and the path coefficient and standard error for appraisal reactions were taken from the third equation to determine the $t$ statistic ($t = -1.51$) for the first model. Unfortunately, the three-path mediation proposed in the first model was not supported, due to the small $t$ value (a cutoff value of 1.96 was used, since this test was considered a large sample $t$, similar to a $z$ test). Overall, the entire model accounted for 13% of the variance in perceptions of organizational deviance ($R^2 = .13$). Appraisal reactions explained the largest portion of unique variance ($sr^2 = .02$), followed by psychological contract breaches ($sr^2 = .01$).

The direct and indirect effects associated with this model were then examined. There were a total of three indirect effects (one three-path indirect effect and two two-path indirect effects), as well as one direct effect. The three-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ organizational violation $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not statistically significant ($t = -1.51$; a cutoff value of 1.96 was used again) and accounted for approximately .04 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (organizational deviance). It should be noted that this analysis, as well as the following mediation analyses for this hypothesis, provided evidence for inconsistent mediation (suppression). This is due to the fact that the summed indirect effects and the direct effect canceled each other out, resulting in a total effect that was close to 0. The first two-path
indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ organizational violation $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not significant ($t = -.51$), and accounted for approximately .02 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (organizational deviance). Additionally, the second two-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not significant ($t = -1.57$), and accounted for approximately .07 of a standard deviation change in organizational deviance. On the other hand, the direct effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) accounted for approximately .12 of a standard deviation change in organizational deviance (and was previously found to not be significant in the above analyses).

In the second model examined, psychological contract breaches served as the IV, violation (supervisor) served as the MV1, appraisal reactions served as the MV2, and deviant behavior (organization) was entered as the DV. Psychological contract breach was a significant predictor of violation (supervisor) in the first regression equation, $t(113) = -4.26, p < .05 (B = -.82)$. In the second regression equation, both psychological contract breach, $t(112) = 4.00, p < .05 (B = .57)$, and violation (supervisor), $t(112) = -8.81, p < .05 (B = -.57)$, were significant predictors of appraisal reactions. In the third regression equation, neither psychological contract breach nor violation (supervisor) were found to be significant predictors. However, appraisal reaction was a significant predictor, $t(112) = -2.18, p < .05 (B = -.31)$.

Based on the path coefficients and standard errors generated for each variable from the equations, the $t$ statistic was found to be not significant ($t = -1.89$). Thus, the
three-path mediation proposed in the second model was not supported. Overall, the entire model accounted for 7% of the variance in perceptions of organizational deviance ($R^2 = .07$). As with the first model, appraisal reactions accounted for the largest amount of unique explained variance ($sr^2 = .04$). Both perceptions of psychological contracts and violation had unique variances less than one.

The direct and indirect effects associated with this model were then examined. Similar to the previous model, there were a total of three indirect effects (one three-path indirect effect and two two-path indirect effects), as well as one direct effect. The three-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ supervisor violation $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not statistically significant ($t = -1.89$; a cutoff value of 1.96 was used again) accounted for approximately .07 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (organizational deviance). The first two-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ supervisor violation $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not significant ($t = .30$), and accounted was responsible for .01 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (organizational deviance). Additionally, the second two-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) was not significant ($t = -1.91$), and only accounted for approximately .08 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (organizational deviance). On the other hand, the direct effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ organizational deviance) accounted for approximately .09 of a standard deviation change in organizational deviance (and was previously found to not be significant in the above analyses).
In the third model examined, psychological contract breaches served as the IV, violation (organization) served as the MV1, appraisal reactions served as the MV2, and deviant behavior (individual) was entered as the DV. Psychological contract breach was a significant predictor of violation (organization) in the first regression equation, $t(113) = -4.34, p < .05 (B = -0.81)$. In the second regression equation, both psychological contract breach, $t(112) = 4.08, p < .05 (B = 0.59)$, and violation (organization), $t(112) = -8.36, p < .05 (B = -0.58)$, were significant predictors of appraisal reactions. In the third regression equation, neither appraisal reactions, psychological contract breaches, nor violation (organization) were significant predictors of deviant behavior (individual). Based on the path coefficients and standard errors generated for each variable from the equations, the $t$ statistic was not found to be significant ($t = -0.33$). Thus, the three-path mediation proposed in the third model was not supported. Overall, the entire model accounted for 7% of the variance in perceptions of psychological contract breaches ($R^2 = .07$).

Appraisal reactions explained a unique amount of variance approximately equal to 1% ($sr^2 = .01$), while both psychological contracts and violation had unique variances less than one.

The direct and indirect effects associated with this model were then examined. Again, there were a total of three indirect effects (one three-path indirect effect and two two-path indirect effects), as well as one direct effect. The three-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ organizational violation $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ individual deviance) was not statistically significant ($t = -3.33$; a cutoff value of 1.96 was used again) and
accounted for approximately .01 of a standard deviation change in individual deviance. The first two-path indirect effect (contract breach → organizational violation → individual deviance) was not significant ($t = .84$), and accounted for approximately .04 of a standard deviation change in individual deviance. Additionally, the second two-path indirect effect (contract breach → appraisal reactions → individual deviance) was not significant ($t = -.33$), and only accounted for approximately .01 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable. On the other hand, the direct effect (contract breach → individual deviance) accounted for approximately .04 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (and was previously found to not be significant in the above analyses).

In the fourth model examined, psychological contract breaches served as the IV, violation (supervisor) served as the MV1, appraisal reactions served as the MV2, and deviant behavior (individual) was entered as the DV. Psychological contract breach was a significant predictor of violation (supervisor) in the first regression equation, $t(113) = -4.26$, $p < .05$ ($B = -.82$). In the second regression equation, both psychological contract breach, $t(112) = 4.00$, $p < .05$ ($B = .57$), and violation (supervisor), $t(112) = -8.81$, $p < .05$ ($B = -.57$), were significant predictors of appraisal reactions. In the third regression equation, neither appraisal reactions, psychological contract breaches, nor violation (supervisor) were significant predictors of deviant behavior (individual).

Based on the path coefficients and standard errors generated for each variable from the equations, the $t$ statistic was not found to be significant ($t = -.11$). Thus, the
three-path mediation proposed in the fourth model was not supported. Overall, the entire model accounted for 6% of the variance in perceptions of psychological contract breaches ($R^2 = .06$). All three of the predictor variables had unique variances smaller than .001. Because none of the four analyses resulted in a significant three-path mediation among the variables, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

The direct and indirect effects associated with this model were then examined. Again, there were a total of three indirect effects (one three-path indirect effect and two two-path indirect effects), as well as one direct effect. The three-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ supervisor violation $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ individual deviance) was not statistically significant ($t = -.11$; compared to a cutoff value of 1.96) and accounted for approximately .004 of a standard deviation change in individual deviance. The first two-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ supervisor violation $\rightarrow$ individual deviance) was not significant ($t = .39$), and accounted for approximately .02 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (individual deviance). Additionally, the second two-path indirect effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ appraisal reactions $\rightarrow$ individual deviance) was not significant ($t = .11$), and only accounted for approximately .004 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable. On the other hand, the direct effect (contract breach $\rightarrow$ individual deviance) accounted for approximately .002 of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable (and was previously found to not be significant in the above analyses).

Research Question Two

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As with hypothesis 2, research question 2 required the use of univariate ANOVA to examine the data. Research question 2 was concerned with whether or not participants’ CSE (time 1) would interact with the manipulated vignettes (the conditions) to predict later levels of CSE (time 2). Before beginning the analysis, CSE (time 1) was mean centered. Main effects of CSE (time 1) and ‘all_conditions’ were entered into a first univariate ANOVA. Then, a second univariate ANOVA was run containing main effects and an interaction variable between CSE (time 1) and ‘all_conditions.’

In the first model run, CSE (time 1) was found to have a significant main effect on later CSE perceptions, $F(1, 109) = 73.65, p < .05 (B = .74)$. The condition variable did not have a significant main effect on later CSE perceptions, $F(3, 109) = 1.29, p > .05$. Further investigation of the parameter estimates revealed that none of the four condition levels comprising ‘all_conditions’ were significant. Overall, the entire model accounted for 44% of the variance in later levels of CSE ($R^2 = .44$). CSE (time 1) accounted for approximately 38% of the variance in the dependent variable by itself ($sr^2 = .38$).

The interaction term was then entered into the second model examined. The main effect for CSE (time 1) remained significant, $F(1, 106) = 45.79, p < .05$ while ‘all_condition’ failed to reach significance again, $F(3, 106) = 1.32, p > .05$. However, the interaction term was indeed significant, $F(3, 106) = 2.67, p = .05$. For the interaction, each condition had a positive slope: condition 1 ($B = .94$), condition 2 ($B = .87$), condition 3 ($B = .57$), condition 4 ($B = .21$). Overall, the entire model accounted for 48% of the variance in later levels of CSE ($R^2 = .48$), while the interaction had a unique
variance of .04 ($\sigma_r^2 = .04$). Thus, research question 2 was supported.

Figure 3.7: Simple slopes for two-way Interaction Between Core Self-Evaluations (time 1) and the Experimental Vignettes. Dependent Variable = core self-evaluations (time 2)

It is also important to note the differences in the means of each condition for both time 1 CSE and time 2 CSE. When predicting time 2 CSE, time 1 CSE had a positive slope for each of the four conditions. However, when examining the time 2 CSE mean for each condition, the means were found to be lower than the means for time 1 CSE (refer to Table 6). Results of the analysis revealed that the difference in total means between time 1 CSE and time 2 CSE was significant ($p = .008$).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>CSE (time 1)</th>
<th>CSE (time 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: ‘All_conditions’’ Means for Both Time 1 and Time 2 Core Self-Evaluations.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION

Past studies have found that the workplace is subject to individuals’ biases and stereotypes. These biases and stereotypes have the potential to then impact important organizational decisions, despite efforts to curb the influence that they may have (Greenhaus et al., 1990). In particular, performance appraisals have the potential to be affected by supervisors’ or managers’ biases, especially concerning race (Deprez-Sims & Morris, 2011; Greenhaus et al, 1990; Wilson & Jones, 2008). Because of the numerous ways in which appraisals can be affected by biases, there are many channels through which employees’ perceptions of appraisal fairness can be influenced, including procedural, distributive, and interpersonal justice (fairness) perceptions (Thurston & McNall, 2010).

That being said, a main goal of the present paper was to investigate aspects of the organizational environment, such as performance appraisals, justice perceptions, and
psychological contracts in a different manner than has been done in the past. More specifically, it is thought that examining the manner in which justice perceptions associated with performance appraisals lead to later behaviors using the framework provided by AET and psychological contracts may shed light on how all of these variables interact to affect certain behaviors. Another goal of the present study was to investigate whether there were racial differences in perceptions of injustice, due to evidence that racial biases and stereotypes still exist in the workplace. The results of the present study are discussed below. Although not all of the hypotheses were supported, there were some interesting results that provide an important contribution to the general literature.

Hypothesis 1 dealt with whether or not the three-way interaction between perceptions of psychological contract breach, procedural justice, and distributive justice perceptions would affect later perceptions of violation. The effects of these variables were investigated in relation to perceptions of both supervisor and organization forms of violation. Interestingly, distributive justice perceptions failed to have significant main effects on either supervisor violation or organizational violation, while psychological contract breaches and procedural justice perceptions significantly affected both forms of violation. Although most of the two-way interactions between the independent variables were not significant, the two-way interaction between psychological contract breaches significantly affect perceptions of organizational violation. Additionally, the three-way interaction in the second model analyzed significantly affected organizational violation.
This outcome is of especial interest, considering the low sample size of the study, and lends support to assertions made by De Cremer et al. (2010). It appears the justice perceptions may not affect outcomes independently of one another, but may instead interact with each other. It may also be important to pay more attention to aspects of the organizational environment that may affect perceptions of procedural justice; this is because procedural justice was found to have more of an effect on the dependent variables, as opposed to distributive justice. Additionally, the importance of psychological contract breaches on feelings of violation should also be noted; employees who feel like they have been cheated out of what they expected to receive are likely to have negative reactions towards both their supervisors and organization itself.

Although it was not found that participants’ minority status affected their perceptions of later psychological contract breach in research question 1, the experimental vignettes did. Post hoc tests revealed that participants in condition 1 (distributive and procedural justice) had significantly different contract breach perceptions than participants in condition 2 (distributive justice and procedural injustice) and condition 4 (distributive and procedural injustice). Furthermore, participants in condition 4 (distributive and procedural injustice) had significantly different contract breach perceptions than participants in condition 3 (distributive injustice and procedural justice). The two-way interaction between the minority and conditions variables did not prove to have a significant effect on later contract breach perceptions. It is possible that the minority variable did not have a significant effect in the present paper due to the small
sample size of the present study. The small sample size significantly decreased the power
associated with the analyses performed in the present study, thus making Type II errors
(not finding an effect when there is one) more probable. A second issue related to the one
just described is that a majority of the participants in the present study were Caucasian;
thus, there may not have been enough participants identifying as minorities to discover an
effect associated to the race of participants. In any case, it is also interesting to see that
condition 1 (distributive and procedural fairness) was not significantly different from
condition 3 (distributive unfairness and procedural fairness). It is possible that, in
condition 3, the procedural unfairness may be more important than the lack of distributive
fairness. Again, this finding lends supports to De Cremer et al. (2010); in their paper, De
Cremer et al. (2010) hypothesize that procedural (in)justice may have more of an effect
on individuals than distributive (in)justice.

Another contribution of the present study is associated with the interaction
between the manipulated vignettes and psychological contracts on later perceptions of
breach. Results from hypothesis 2 suggest that prior perceptions of psychological contract
breaches may have more of an impact on later perceptions of breach than psychological
contracts themselves. This may be thought of a spiral effect, in which prior perceptions of
breaches lead to individuals becoming more prone to perceive breaches in the future.
And, although the manipulated vignettes did prove to significantly affect perceptions of
contract breach, the effect was in the opposite direction than expected. Condition 4
contained both procedural and distributive injustice scenarios, and so it was thought that
participants in this condition would have the strongest contract breaches. This was not the case, however, as condition 4 had the lowest levels of perceived breach. On the other hand, it was thought that condition 1 would have the lowest levels of perceived breach due to it containing procedural and distributive justice scenarios. As with condition 4, the mean levels of perceived breach in this condition were opposite than expected; condition 1 proved to have the highest levels of perceived contract breach. These results associated with the mean levels of contract breach per condition may be due to a variety of factors, such as participants not clearly understanding the directions associated with the vignettes.

Hypothesis 3 examined the three-path mediation described by AET (Zhao et al., 2007). Contrary to prior thought, none of the four models found evidence of three-path mediation among the variables. It is interesting to note, however, that psychological contract breach was a significant predictor of many of the other variables. It appears that most of the problems in the model centered around appraisal reactions, the second mediating variable, not having a significant effect upon either form of the deviant behaviors. This draws into question whether or not the appraisal reaction variable was the correct variable to include in the model, since evidence of AET has been found in other studies (Zhao et al., 2007). Another potential problem that could have led to hypothesis 3 not being supported is related to the small sample size of the present study; it is possible that there was not enough power to discover significant effects. Furthermore, it was also found that evidence of inconsistent mediation was present in the analyses. This become apparent after more closely examining the indirect and direct effects associated with each
model. Because the inconsistent mediation was present, the total effects for each model were close to 0, which then made calculating the percentage of each model’s effects on the dependent variable impractical. Regardless of problems with the AET model in the present study, it was found that perceptions of contract breaches are related to many adverse employee reactions.

After examining results from research question 2, it was found that CSE (time 1) did indeed have a significant effect on participants’ later perceptions of CSE (time 2). Although the slope of time 1 CSE was positive, participants’ time 2 CSE levels were significantly lower than their time 1 CSE levels. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the interaction between CSE (time 1) and the condition variable was significant. These findings help to answer the call made by Judge (2009) concerning the issue of whether CSE is subject to changes over the course of time, or is completely immutable. What’s more, certain situations in the workplace (and in general) may serve to impact individuals’ basic, innate perceptions of themselves.

As stated earlier in the discussion, not all of the hypotheses were supported. However, results from the present study provide information that can be easily incorporated into the workplace. For instance, procedural justice perceptions were found to be important aspects of the workplace; employers may want to pay more attention to features of the environment that may impact procedural justice, such as employee involvement during performance appraisals. Employers should also pay attention to aspects of the work environment that have the potential to alter employees’ psychological
contracts. If possible, employers should refrain from failing to follow through on incentives or promises made to employees, whether they are included in an official contract or not. This is because of the fact that, if employees do perceive that they have not gotten what they thought they would, they are likely to have feelings of violation against the organization itself. These feelings of violations then have the potential to negatively impact employees’ behavior and other organizational outcomes. Additionally, core self-evaluations may also be subject to change throughout the years, even though they are thought to be a very stable personality trait (Judge, 2009). This is important because of the fact that negative events in the workplace may potentially decrease employees’ perceptions of their worthiness and abilities; outcomes such as job satisfaction may then also be decreased, due to the established link between core self-evaluations and job satisfaction (Judge & Bono, 2001).

Limitations

The present study had several limitations. The most influential limitation was related to the small sample size of the study; the negative effects of a small sample size have been discussed in previous sections of the present paper. Related to the small sample size was the lack of participants who were not Caucasian. It is probable that the non-significant results obtained for research question 1 were due to the lack of minority individuals who participated in the study. There seems to be a consensus that racial biases still exist in the workplace, based on past research, so it would seem likely that some sort of effect due to race would have emerged in the present study. Thus, future studies should
continue to examine how race functions in the workplace, specifically in terms of performance appraisals. By better understanding how these biases affect organizational aspect, we can better understand why individuals behave in certain ways.

Another potential limitation of the current study is commonly seen in research studies and is again related to the sample. Despite the fact that some of the participants were working adults from around the country, many of the participants were also college students at the university where the study took place. It is commonly known that college students are not the most representative population. Ideally, it would have been best to only collect data from working adults around the country, but practicality prevented this.

Participants in the present study provided all of the answers to the measure; thus, all of the data was obtained from a single source. This has the potential to lead to distorted responses, as it is typically best practice to obtain information from multiple sources. However, for purposes of the present study, it made the most sense to obtain information from a single source, the participant (for reasons such as only the participant knows how violated he/she may feel after reading a vignette).

Additionally, there was no manipulation check included in the present study. Because no manipulation check was included, there was no way to know if the participants perceived the experimental conditions as the conditions were meant to be perceived. That is, participants in condition 1 should have perceived it as a very fair condition, while participants in condition 4 should have perceived it as a very unfair condition. Effects of failing to include a manipulation check may be seen in hypothesis 2.
Past research has found evidence for the AET model (Zhao et al., 2007). It is possible that no support was found for the three-path mediation in the present study due to the selection of certain variables to use in the mediation. More specifically, the appraisal reaction variable that was included in the mediation often failed to have a significant effect on the dependent variable of interest. Although this non-significant relationship may possibly be due to the small sample size, it is also probable that the appraisal reaction variable was not the correct variable to include in the model. The use of another variable to represent individuals’ cognitions may have resulted in support of hypothesis 3.

**Conclusion**

Despite the fact that the present study did include several limitations, these limitations do not reduce the importance of the findings that were gathered from the data. The present study attempted to look at the relationships among several commonly studied variables in a different manner than is usually done. What’s more, results from the present study have answered the call made by past researchers (Judge, 2009). Results from the present study suggest that core self-evaluations have the potential to change over time. Moreover, not only may core self-evaluations change, but they may also change as a function of individuals’ experiences. Although an individual may have high core self-evaluations, it is possible that a negative experience in the workplace may cause him/her to reexamine how he/she feels about him/herself and his/her ability to complete tasks. Thus, besides using core self-evaluations in the selection process, employers
should be aware of organizational design issues that have the possibility to alter individuals’ fundamental view of themselves and their abilities. Organizations should also be aware of organizational design elements that may impact individual’s fairness perceptions, as well as perceptions of promises made by the organizations (related to a variety of variables, such as promotion, guidance, and pay issues).

Future research studies should focus on more complex relationships among psychological variables. Oftentimes, the relationship among variables may be examined without inclusion of potential mediators or moderators. It is very likely that the relationship between two variables exists due to the mediating or moderating effects of a third variable. Examination of complex relationships should provide a more rich understanding of how variables are related to each other.
Appendix A

Measures

Below are the measures used in present study. A 9-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) was used for all measures.

*Psychological contract*
Relational items (Alpha = .65): 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16 and 17. Transactional items (Alpha = .62): 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 15. (although Alphas were below .70, items were still considered reliable)

1. I do this job just for the money.
2. I prefer to work a strictly defined set of working hours.
3. I expect to gain promotion in this company with length of service and effort to achieve goals.
4. It is important not to get too involved in your job.
5. I expect to grow in this organization.
6. I expect to be paid for any overtime I do.
7. I come to work purely to get the job done.
8. I feel part of a team in this organization.
9. My loyalty to the organization is defined by the terms of my contract.
10. I feel this company reciprocates the effort put in by its employees.
11. I only do what is necessary to get the job done.
12. I am motivated to contribute 100% to this company in return for future employment benefits.
13. I have a reasonable chance of promotion if I work hard.
14. My career path in the organization is clearly mapped out.
15. I work to achieve the purely short term goals of my job.
16. I will work for this company indefinitely.
17. I am heavily involved in my place of work.

*Psychological contract breach*

Alpha = .92

1) Almost all of the promises made by my employer during recruitment have been met so far. (reversed)
2) I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the promises made to me when I was hired. (reversed)
3) So far my employer has done an excellent job of fulfilling its promises to me. (reversed)
4) I have not received everything promised to me in exchange for my contributions.
5) My employer has broken many of its promises to me even though I’ve upheld my side of the deal.

### Appraisal reactions

Alpha = .83; items are unidimensional

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>I understand how my performance is evaluated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>I am rated on all relevant competencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>I can impact my performance goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>My appraisal helps my performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>The results of my performance appraisal are accurate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Single measure of justice perceptions

Only the Assigning raters, Setting criteria, Seeking appeals, Ratings based on equity, and Ratings not based on politics sections will be used.

- Alphas reported are for pilot and sample
- Assigning raters (Alpha = .90, .95)
  1) I am assigned a rater who is qualified to evaluate my work, understands the requirements and constraints of my work, and is familiar with the rating formats and procedures.
  2) Procedures ensure my rater who knows what I am supposed to be doing and how to evaluate my performance.

- Setting criteria (Alpha = .80, .90)
  1) My organization requires that standards be set for me before the start of a reporting period.
  2) Procedures make sure that performance standards measure what I really do for the organization and are stable over time; and procedures allow me to help set the standards used to evaluate my performance, and ensure that my performance standards are changed if what I do at work changes.
Seeking appeals (Alpha = .86, .91)
1) I have ways to appeal a performance appraisal that I think are biased.
2) I can get a fair review of my performance appraisal if I ask for one and challenge a performance appraisal if I think it is unfair.
3) My performance appraisal can be changed if I can show that it is incorrect or unfair.
4) A process to appeal an appraisal is available to me anytime I may need it.

Ratings based on equity (Alpha = .87, .93)
1) The appraisal I get reflects how much work I do, how well I do my work, the many things I do that help at work, the many things I am responsible for at work, and the effort I put forth at work.

Ratings not based on politics (Alpha = .68, .87)
1) My rater gives me the rating I earn even when it might upset me.
2) My rating is not the result of my rater trying to avoid bad feelings among employees, higher than one I would earn based on my contribution to my organization or based on how much status I have.
3) My rating is a result of my rater applying standards consistently across employees without pressure, corruption, or prejudice.

Raters show respect (Alpha = .91, .93)
1) My rater is rarely rude to me, almost always polite, and courteous to me; and my rater treats me with respect and dignity.

Raters show sensitivity (Alpha = .92, .93)
1) My rater does not invade my privacy, is sensitive to my feelings, treats me with kindness, shows concern for my rights as an employee, and does not make hurtful statements about me.

Clarifying expectations (Alpha = .87, .94)
1) My rater explains to me what he or she expects for my performance, the standards that will be used to evaluate my work and how I can improve my performance.
2) My rater gives me a chance to question how I should meet my work objectives and regularly explains to me what he or she expects of my performance.

Providing feedback (Alpha = .93, .94)
1) My rater frequently lets me know how I am doing, gives me information I can use to improve my performance, routinely gives me feedback relevant to the things I do at work, reviews with me my progress towards my goals and lets me know how I can improve my performance.

Explaining and justifying decisions (Alpha = .88, .96)
1) My rater helps me to understand the process used to evaluate my performance, takes
time to explain decisions that concern me, lets me ask him or her questions about my performance appraisal and gives me real examples to justify his or her appraisal of my work.

2) My rater’s explanations help to clarify for me what to do to improve my performance.

WDB

Alpha = .82
1) Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer.
2) Taken property from work without permission.
3) Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working.
4) Made fun of someone at work.
5) Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses.
6) Said something hurtful to someone at work.
7) Taken an additional or a longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
8) Repeated a rumor or gossip about your company.
9) Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work.
10) Come in late to work without permission.
11) Littered your work environment.
12) Cursed at someone at work.
13) Called in sick when you were not.
14) Told someone about the lousy place where you work.
15) Lost your temper while at work.
16) Neglected to follow your boss's instructions.
17) Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked.
18) Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.
19) Left work early without permission.
20) Played a mean prank on someone at work.
21) Left your work for someone else to finish.
22) Acted rudely toward someone at work.
23) Repeated a rumor or gossip about your boss or coworkers.
24) Made an obscene comment at work.
25) Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job.
26) Put little effort into your work.
27) Publicly embarrassed someone at work.
28) Dragged out work in order to get overtime.
Violation

\[ \text{Alpha} = 0.92 \]

1) I feel a great deal of anger toward my organization.
2) I feel betrayed by my organization.
3) I feel that my organization has violated the contract between us.
4) I feel extremely frustrated by how I have been treated by my organization.

Core self-evaluations (CSE) scale

\[ \text{Alpha} = .81-.87 \]

1) I am confident I get the success I deserve in life.
2) Sometimes I feel depressed. (r)
3) When I try, I generally succeed.
4) Sometimes when I fail I feel worthless. (r)
5) I complete tasks successfully.
6) Sometimes, I do not feel in control of my work. (r)
7) Overall, I am satisfied with myself.
8) I am filled with doubts about my competence. (r)
9) I determine what will happen in my life.
10) I do not feel in control of my success in my career. (r)
11) I am capable of coping with most of my problems.
12) There are times when things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me. (r)
Appendix B
Experimental Vignettes

Directions: It is now three years in the future. Please imagine yourself at your current job while reading the information below, and later when answering questions.

**Condition 1**: outcome (distributive) justice/ procedural justice

It is now three years in the future, and you are still working for your current employer. During the past few years, you feel like you have been the model employee. You rarely ever miss a day of work, and you always complete the tasks that are part of your job. In addition, you make sure to give your full attention to your work, and you are willing to work on a task or project until it is done right. Recently, your employer conducted a performance appraisal for all employees.

In general, it seems like the organization for which you work has generally rewarded you fairly when taking into consideration the amount of work, quality of your work, effort, and responsibilities associated with your job. In addition, the rewards you have been given by the organization for which you work help to make up for the amount of stress that is involved in your job, as well as for the amount of time you have had to spend training in preparation for your job.

Before conducting your performance appraisal, your supervisor made sure to familiarize himself/herself with all the tasks and duties associated specifically with your job, as well as informing you of how the appraisal process would be completed. In addition, your supervisor took the necessary time to complete your appraisal, and was not in a rush to get it done. When looking over your final performance appraisal with your supervisor, your supervisor has made sure to clearly state ways to improve your future performance, as well as provide you with opportunities to express any concerns or ideas you may have that are associated with your appraisal or the appraisal process.

**Condition 2**: outcome (distributive) justice/ procedural injustice

It is now three years in the future, and you are still working for your current employer. During the past few years, you feel like you have been the model employee. You rarely ever miss a day of work, and you always complete the tasks that are part of your job. In addition, you make sure to give your full attention to your work, and you are willing to work on a task or project until it is done right. Recently, your employer conducted a performance appraisal for all employees.
In general, it seems like the organization for which you work has generally rewarded you fairly when taking into consideration the amount of work, quality of your work, effort, and responsibilities associated with your job. In addition, the rewards you have been given by the organization for which you work help to make up for the amount of stress that is involved in your job, as well as for the amount of time you have had to spend training in preparation for your job.

However, before conducting your performance appraisal, your supervisor did not take the time to familiarize himself/herself with all the tasks and duties associated specifically with your job, and did not explain to you how the appraisal process would be completed. In addition, your supervisor seemed almost in a rush to get your appraisal done. When looking over your final performance appraisal with your supervisor, your supervisor did not tell you ways in which to improve your future performance, and did not let you voice any concerns you may have had associated with your performance appraisal.

**Condition 3: outcome (distributive) injustice/ procedural justice**

It is now three years in the future, and you are still working for your current employer. During the past few years, you feel like you have been the model employee. You rarely ever miss a day of work, and you always complete the tasks that are part of your job. In addition, you make sure to give your full attention to your work, and you are willing to work on a task or project until it is done right. Recently, your employer conducted a performance appraisal for all employees.

Although you feel like you have been a good employee, it seems like the organization for which you work has not matched the rewards it provides you to the amount of work, quality of your work, effort, and responsibilities associated with your job. In addition, the rewards you have been given by the organization are insufficient when compared to the amount of stress that is involved in your job. Also, you have had to spend a large amount of time training for your job, with little compensation for the training.

However, before conducting your performance appraisal, your supervisor made sure to familiarize himself/herself with all the tasks and duties associated specifically with your job, as well as informing you of how the appraisal process would be completed. In addition, your supervisor took the necessary time to complete your appraisal, and was not in a rush to get it done. When looking over your final performance appraisal with your supervisor, your supervisor has made sure to clearly state ways to improve your future performance, as well as provide you with opportunities to express any concerns or ideas you may have that are associated with your appraisal or the appraisal process.
**Condition 4:** outcome (distributive) injustice/ procedural injustice

It is now three years in the future, and you are still working for your current employer. During the past few years, you feel like you have been the model employee. You rarely ever miss a day of work, and you always complete the tasks that are part of your job. In addition, you make sure to give your full attention to your work, and you are willing to work on a task or project until it is done right. Recently, your employer conducted a performance appraisal for all employees.

Although you feel like you have been a good employee, it seems like the organization for which you work has not matched the rewards it provides you to the amount of work, quality of your work, effort, and responsibilities associated with your job. In addition, the rewards you have been given by the organization are insufficient when compared to the amount of stress that is involved in your job. Also, you have had to spend a large amount of time training for your job, with little compensation for the training.

Before conducting your performance appraisal, your supervisor did not take the time to familiarize himself/herself with all the tasks and duties associated specifically with your job, and did not explain to you how the appraisal process would be completed. In addition, your supervisor seemed almost in a rush to get your appraisal done. When looking over your final performance appraisal with your supervisor, your supervisor did not tell you ways in which to improve your future performance, and did not let you voice any concerns you may have had associated with your performance appraisal.
WORKS CITED


