Using Social Media to Foster Identification in Indonesia's 2014 Presidential Election: An Examination of Facebook Politics from Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Perspective

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USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO FOSTER IDENTIFICATION IN INDONESIA'S 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN EXAMINATION OF FACEBOOK POLITICS FROM KENNETH BURKE'S DRAMATISTIC PERSPECTIVE

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design

by
Dina Septiani S. Basuki
May 2017

Accepted by:
Dr. David Blakesley, Committee Chair
Dr. Cynthia Haynes
Dr. Erin Ash
Dr. David Reinking
ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the intersection of rhetorical studies with social media studies, investigates the particular use of social media in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, and address relevant theories such as Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic perspective, Henry Jenkin’s participatory culture, and Douglas Eyman’s digital rhetoric. I focus on the rhetorical principle to analyse Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election by applying the following selected examples of identification categories: 1) The Common Ground Technique, 2) Identification through antithesis, 3) The assumed or transcendent "we."

The two candidates running for the 2014 Indonesian presidential election were Prabowo Subianto Djokoahadikusumo, and Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. The first candidate tends to personify these following traits: nationalist, firm and superior leader. The second candidate manages to represent these following characters: modest and populist, the ordinary people leader. Subianto promoting “anti-discrimination” and Widodo arguing for “pluralism,” Subianto firmly defended his nationalism, while Widodo emphasised his support of diversity.

From analyzing the text element, the visual and audiovisual elements, and the rhetorical situation from the above three social media artifacts, I could firmly determine that the first candidate aims to reach the older generations, which includes: 1) The Patriotic generations, and 2) The Baby Boomer generations. Meanwhile, the second candidate sought to reach the younger generations, which includes: 1) The Millennial generation, 2) The First-Time voters, and 3) The Commoners.
Based on the analysis of Indonesia's two presidential candidates' Facebook page, the dissertation a) shows how a rhetorical situation is created by establishing common ground through social networking sites; b) reveals the set of texts on identification performed in political uses of social media includes the politically motivated common substance, and sometimes unconscious division; c) understands the symbolic of semi-conscious motives includes religious values and properties, and of course power and wealth; d) shows how the rhetorical analysis of Facebook politics in Indonesia's election implies to use religion and race issue to gain political support.
DEDICATION

In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful.

I dedicate this dissertation to Papa, Mama (mertua), and Ibu, who sacrifice many things for us.

I share the degree with my husband, my son Radit I., and the many new lives coming to our life.
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CHAPTER ONE: USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO FOSTER IDENTIFICATION IN INDONESIA'S 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Social media plays a significant role in modern society and can dramatically transform world politics. Indonesia is no different in this respect, as CNN recently designated Indonesia as an “online social networking addict” society (Shubert). Although growing disputes remain regarding the role of social media for political means, Indonesian politicians have increasingly utilized social media for their political platforms. Maintaining their social media accounts became an integral strategy to win the presidential election of 2014.

We need to know Indonesia’s history of reformation, restoration, and economic progress to understand the significance of social media in Indonesia. Therefore, this dissertation focuses the premises on two periods in modern Indonesian history. The first period includes the technological development in Indonesia that supported the emergence of virtual communities, particularly during the 1998 movement. The second period occurred when social media helped create a participatory cultural and political process in the 2008 elections and onward, especially when polarization and division grew during more recent elections.

Patriotic feeling and efforts have influenced the early history of Indonesia as a country, especially since it was the Indonesia's nationalist movement that ended the
Dutch colonial period that lasts for over 350 years. In 2012, The U.S. Commercial Service described Indonesia as “the world’s fourth-largest country with 240 million citizens, and a thriving democracy” (2). Indonesia declared the independence in 1945, and Liberal Democracy in Indonesia began in 1950 and ended in 1957 when the first president, Sukarno, introduced Guided Democracy as part of his attempt to bring about political stability.

Following Indonesia's communal and political conflicts in the early days of independence, there was a need to form a national identity, or also known as a sense of belongings for a country. The economic collapse and social breakdown of the late 1950s through to the mid-1960s triggers an indoctrination, to maintain the political order and economic development. The “New Order” regime came to power in 1966 and ruled for 32 years. Indonesia's colonial past and new order regime have perpetuated the shared "substance" of Indonesians in this age of information and technology, which is their national identity. The "New Order” committed to promoting a national religious ideology, which represents the ancient wisdom of Indonesian people. The new order regime ended after the country hardest hit by the East Asian Financial crisis in 1998 and led to the Reformation era.

Joseph T. Salazar discusses how the year 1998 marked “a significant turning point in Indonesian society” (188), which he refers to as the Reformation era. The year 1998 marked the beginning of Indonesia’s restoration efforts, triggered by widespread discontent with the new order. The Reformation Movement in 1998 represented a shift in social and cultural outlooks for Indonesians; it was also the year when the Internet and
mobile technology grew significantly in Indonesia, although the Internet had globally arrived in 1994. Under the new order regime, Suharto, the second President of Indonesia, constructed a military-dominated government. After the more open and liberal groups overthrow Suharto in 1998, the Reformation Movement paved the opportunity for free access to information and began public deliberation. The emergence of freedom of expression through the Internet that allows people to share their dissatisfaction towards the new order has also influenced the construction of collective identity online in Indonesia.

Many scholars have researched Internet activism in Indonesia since then, and their findings indicate how the Internet supported 1998’s social and cultural shift through online freedom of expression. Krishna Sen and David T. Hill’s *Media, Culture, and Politics in Indonesia* suggested that, during the final months of Suharto’s rule, it was not so much the content of public discourse on the Internet that seemed important but the sense that people can say absolutely anything with impunity. Merlyna Lim’s “Archipelago Online” also discusses how activists use the Internet to support political activism in the transition period from the late period of Suharto to the post-Suharto period. Suharto's new order regime dominated Indonesia’s political system with aristocracy and military controlled system, and Lim argues that the Internet became the powerful tool to oppose this authoritarianism.

During the last two years of Suharto’s rule, the urban middle-class opposition used the Internet extensively to represent their dissatisfaction among the general public. The “technophilic developmentalists” in the new order government and the middle-class
opposition to the Suharto government embraced the Internet warmly (Sen and Hill, 194). During the late period of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Lim adds that the Internet ‘worked’ in supporting widespread political activism. She also emphasizes the importance of context:

In the Indonesian case, how the Internet ‘worked’ in supporting the popular political activism of the May 1998 reformasi, that resulted in political regime change, cannot be separated from the particular context of Indonesia both over its long sweep of history and at the particular historical juncture of 32 years of one regime’s rule and a collapsing economy. (188)

Lim adds, "The Internet was popularized during a severe financial crisis that enabled it to develop with relative autonomy from the state, which was unable to financially keep the Internet in its grasp" (188). She also acknowledges that to gain a rich understanding of the complex dynamics of relationships between the Internet and politics, much more comparative research in other settings is needed.

The Internet in general and social media, in particular, has a different role in the 2014 Indonesian's political election context. I focus on the 2014 presidential election because this election was marked as the most polarizing since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998. The elements of a socially mediated communication situation for the
presidential candidates in Indonesia includes the digital divide, digital literacy, and digital nativism.

Since Indonesia is a developing country, the digital divide is still an issue. There is a gap in Internet access between those with access and those without, and the growing middle-classes with their discontent define the political function of the Internet. The Internet may compress time and space and intensify issues class differences, but it does not necessarily democratize. Sen and Hill indicate the political agenda that determines how particular political actors used the Internet as a political medium and using technology for political propaganda.

After the 1998 movement, a few big players in Indonesia still dominate the Internet and the discrepancies between who had access to this technology and who didn’t become strikingly apparent. As of 2014, 70 million Indonesians were using the Internet, and "approximately 90 percent of them were on Facebook" (The Economist). However, the 70 million Internet users in Indonesia represent "only 30 percent of the archipelago’s 250 million people" (The Economist). This percentage apparently contradicts the ideal of a free society, especially if, as I contend, the Internet supports democracy.

Teresa Dobson and John Willinsky’s “Digital Literacy” considered the importance of digital literacy and the digital divide. The relation between those two is also contextual, since “digital literacy is so closely connected to the traditional association of literacy and democratic rights, as well as to more specific notions of e-government” (Dobson & Willinsky 12). Lim shows that "The 'context' makes the outcomes of the development and the use of a technology of the Internet differ from place
to place. Context is the 'where' and the 'when' of the Internet being introduced, reinvented, developed and used" (226). Internet activists from countries in South East Asia offer contrasting experiences when standing at two ends of an authoritarian-democratic continuum.

Factors such as geographic location played a role in the existence of a digital divide. Therefore, the 'where' and the 'when' do matter in looking at this movement.

Shinto Nugroho claims that the use of Internet technology in a political campaign should consider the social environment, and this depends on the where and the when the election took place. In the 2014 Indonesian’s election, she notes, "[the] elections will be the first in which the Internet, mobile technology, and social media play an important role" (qtd in *The Economist* par. 3). From Indonesia’s 2014 general election, Nugroho also identifies the young and first-time parliamentary candidates as those who struggle the most to raise campaign funds. She states:

As more candidates take up the new tools, they are beginning to challenge the widely held belief that only the rich can run for office. Women candidates are particularly interested in social media; they often need to care for children while fighting elections, which makes travel especially difficult. (qtd in *The Economist* par. 3-4)

There is a much greater focus on political and cultural aspects of digital technologies in digital literacy, especially since the spread of hoax news intensified during the 2014 presidential election. Therefore, it is important to investigate the degree
of digital literacy and the ease with which young people learn to make use of unfamiliar technologies. Wan Ng's “Can We Teach Digital Natives Digital Literacy?” explores the 'digital nativeness' of the generation in the highly literate societies that produce digital technology. Ng suggests "the ability of digital natives to embrace information and communication technologies (ICT) [particularly] the use of mobile phones and social media technology means that they possess a certain level of digital literacy" (1066).

Ideally, digital natives should be able to use critical thinking to assess the credibility of an Internet source when confirming some political issues.

The digital natives are the generation of people born in or after 1980, and political campaigners in Indonesia focus on this generation of highly literate societies that produce digital technology. John Postill, in his review of RightsCon 2015, assumes the digital battleground in Indonesia involves "urban middle-class people with advanced digital skills and ready access to laptops and/or smartphones" (4).

With a growing number of politicians in Indonesia using social media to reach out to the public, politicians are trying to meet the challenge of keeping up with information while targeting the digital natives. Andreas Ufen explains "nearly every age, race, and socioeconomic background are represented on Facebook, which has become the second most important campaign medium since the last Indonesian national election in 2009" (21). Television remains the most influential media to date, with a decline in the importance of direct communication between voters with the campaign team. While Twitter and Instagram are also popular in Indonesia, Facebook is the most popular site for social networking overall.
Both candidates in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election maintained a social media presence via several channels, including Facebook. These strategies were effective when they mainly targeted younger voters because young voters are typically active online. According to the *Handbook of Political Communication Research*, young citizens are the largest group to report frequent access to the Internet. One of the findings from their analysis shows:

[...] among the youngest generation studied, recreational use of the Internet for information exchange increased trust among the Generation X participants. Thus, if the motivations to use the Internet for information rather than entertainment dominate, the impact of the Internet seems encouraging for the next generation. (521)

Studies from the handbook also provide evidence that "traditional information-seekers, or individuals who seek information from traditional media sources, are the individuals most likely to use the Internet for informational motives" (522). Therefore, two reasons why social media works in reaching out to the public is that social media enables its users to formulate their personalities and to build citizen's faith and trust in government. The presidential candidates in 2014 election attempted to create identification with the young voters through social networking sites, instill the belief that young voters could understand and influence political affairs. In this study, I argue that
Kenneth Burke’s methods of identification are relevant to analyze how the politician is practicing identification. In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, he outlines his rhetorical theory and also introduced the notion of identification as:

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so. Here are ambiguities of substance. In being identified with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (20-21)

Burke's "Rhetoric—old and new" adds:

'Identification’ at its simplest is also a deliberate device, as when the politician seeks to identify himself with his audience. In this respect, its equivalents are plentiful in Aristotle's Rhetoric. But identification can also be an end, as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may be acting upon themselves to this end. In such identification
there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences or divisions, which the rhetoric of identification would transcend. (p. 203)

It is a shift from argumentation to identification to describe how selves are mutually transformed by the influence of each other, in which the universal access to the Internet could have an exceptionally significant contribution to this.

To tell how social media creates a sense of identification in a political campaign, and thus gains young voters’ support, we have to go back to the issue of how people form communities in the digital world. Ernest Z. Bower and Brian Kraft discuss how Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election shaped up since no single party emerged from parliamentary elections, which forced the ten parties to form coalitions that could garner enough votes to enter parliament. The result was weeks of political horse-trading, backroom negotiations, and party infighting. Bower and Kraft suggest:

[But] Indonesian voters tend to elect personalities, not party platforms. While the two candidates are very different personally, and their governing styles will likely be quite different, neither will be able to deviate too far from what Indonesian voters want if they hope to be reelected. (par 2 - 11)

Since I argue that the individual's symbolistic development is rhetorically determined, politicians therefore ultimately develop their personality through self-imposed rhetorical strategies. 'Identification' is a deliberate device, that's what makes
Burke's methods of identification is relevant in this study. Further, I will elaborate the context of this dissertation, which is the Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential Election. I will also elaborate my conjecture, which focuses on two premises that illustrate the utopian perspective and dystopian perspective. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss the significance of this study and the methodology used.

**The Context**

The two candidates running for the 2014 Indonesian presidential election were Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo, and Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Joko Widodo was the current president of Indonesia, and he represented the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Prabowo Subianto is an Indonesian businessperson and politician. In the 2014 election, he represented the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra).

This study aims to describe how we negotiate differences and similarities between the candidates that were already different in status, wealth, education, and experience, and both tried to project a reputable ethos and sympathetic pathos on their Facebook accounts. Joko Widodo, who started his working life as a furniture dealer in Surakarta, or “Solo,” near Yogyakarta in Central Java, has been described as a “child of the slums.” Meanwhile, Subianto is a former army general, the son of Indonesia’s former leading economist, and a son-in-law of former longtime President Suharto. With such a polarized division, how can these politicians create a sense of identification through social media?
Arguably, social media played a key role in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election because it created a shift in cultural outlook in Indonesian’s collective participation. Social media influences the political cultures in Indonesia, whereas the rhetorical artifacts become collaborative rather than individualist. In digital rhetoric, identity in a virtual community might be a rhetorical construct. Social media might enable participatory culture and political engagement, but it might create division as well. If identity in a virtual community is a rhetorical construct, that means such efforts to unite and establish political movement, will only create further division. That is why it is also important to understand that social media creates identification and division because of the nature of identity formation in virtual communities.

Indonesia’s two presidential candidates managed their personal Facebook page and created a rhetorical situation by establishing common ground through social networking sites. The questions remain on the extent of the use of identification and how it may have influenced the election result, particularly in gaining young voters’ support. Using social network sites alone may not drive previously inactive respondents to political participation, although it might be true in the Indonesia’s 1998 movement.

Stephen Coleman's "Connecting Parliament to The Public via the Internet," hypothesizes that "[o]nline consultations provide a space for inclusive public deliberation, [but] there is no evidence that the Internet, as a medium, is intrinsically inclusive. Public participation had to be actively promoted" (12). Coleman also states that netizens amplify and reinforce today's development, information, ideas or beliefs by transmission and
repetition inside an "enclosed" system. Therefore, I argue that social media can also become a place that causes what social scientists call "an echo chamber."

The lack of digital literacy may trigger echo chambers since participants interact primarily with those who share the same views and may be less likely to encounter differences. A digital gap also emerges with particular groups being left out of other social groups because of their maladjustment, and this refers to the technological unconscious consubstantiality. The digital divide or digital gap creates confusion regarding their identity representation in digital space due to the blurred nature of identity across offline and online contexts. The nature of the unconscious self is stored and accessed through digital technology, and the algorithms or cookies built into electronic texts have become the "digital substance." This study uses the notion of digital substance in relation to Burke’s substance, in which users are unconsciously being persuaded with what was being shared digitally.

I begin with studying the political participation in social media in general and then move to the attitude of digital natives toward Facebook. I situate the digital text as distinct from the print text to develop digital-native methods for born-digital texts. Combining existing statistics on the use of social media in political contexts with a deeper principle in social media research, I offer a critical perspective on the existing literature about rhetoric in social media.

**The Conjecture**
My first premise is that the technological development in Indonesia supports virtual communities, particularly after the 1998 movement. To a certain extent, the Internet also supports democracy, particularly during Indonesia’s political election after the new order era ended. In addition to that, the Internet tends to endorse collective identity rather than personal identity. Guided by these principles of digital utopias, social media can foster identification. With social media, collective identity no longer remains solely in the hands of the politicians, because the citizens wield a stronger role. But by creating a sense of identification through social media, I argue, it enables the politicians to participate, engage and transform a virtual community, to create a preferred collective identity.

My second premise is that, although social media might lead to participatory culture or political participation, it might create an echo chamber and polarization. The echo chamber is especially apparent in several of Indonesia’s political campaign after the 2012 elections, and the polarization becomes evident in the 2014 presidential election. Social media can create division because there is a significant divide between politically identifiable communities online, and this applies too in much recent of Indonesia's contemporary political context.

Political activities through social media could expand collective actions through identification between the politicians and their constituents. However, can the act of identification unite a segregated community? With so much emphasis on distinctions and differences in the Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, identification arises as a communicative, cooperative response. But will such efforts create further division, in
particular among the young (or digital native) and possibly first-time voters, against someone that is not cyber savvy (sometimes labeled as Luddite or those opposed to new technologies in general)? The young and potentially first-time voters, in particular, have collectively refused to retract the hard-fought gains for “New Order nostalgia.” Will efforts to unite one side create a division from the other? By examining the two opposing candidates in the 2014 election, I will highlight the rhetorical strategies they used to sway voters.

I apply Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification, and consider the role of identification strategies and tactics in the larger process of identification in politics. In a political election, digital media has created many different associations in which an individual comes to have a variety of "political identities." Burke's “Rhetorical Situation” concluded that identification could be vague, "[...] a person may think of himself as 'belonging' to some special body more or less clearly defined [...] or to various combination of these." (268)

Our political identities are vital because they grant us personal meaning. Identity politics plays a role since “… the poignancy of the rhetorical situation attains its fullness in its spontaneously arising identifications whereby, even without deliberate intent upon the part of anyone, we fail to draw the lines at the right places” (Burke 271). Therefore, politicians lobbying for equality have often used 'identity politics' to forge alliances.

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1 To expand further on the issue, for the particular non-Western context, I extend the problem in rhetoric to go beyond the aspects of delivery. As digital technology becomes increasingly ubiquitous, it is necessary to rethink how our devices fundamentally alter the nature of identity. The question lies in the social construction of an individual’s sense of self and on what point an individual comes to accept collective identity in a political context.
among disparate groups, and form a collective identity that can be both a source of protection and perceived as a threat.

Burke provides a theoretical foundation of identity and identification in social media research, and I am using Burkean identification to examine digital technology and its impacts. Thus, the conjecture here focuses on the idea of identification and concentrates on how social media can foster identification in a collective yet segregated community such as Indonesia. I am developing my analysis based on two premises; the first premise focuses on the utopian perspective of how social media supports democracy and public deliberation during 1998 – 2008 era in Indonesia. The second premise is on the way social media create identification and division during Indonesia’s political election, particularly during 2008 – 2014, with specific emphasis on Indonesia’s 2014 presidential campaigns.

**Research Significance**

I draw on Burkean rhetorical thought to reveal how certain statements posted online aim to persuade the reader, which involves analyzing the identification process. I use rhetorical analysis as a way to understand how digital media create the surrounding rhetorical situation. In Burke’s *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Rhetoric is “[r]ooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” (43) I consider digital rhetorical identification as a process of
technological unconscious consubstantiality, in which users believed in an argument in the digital form based upon their digital substance, and "[the] attitude of assent may then be transferred to the matter which happens to be associated with the form." (Burke 58) The act of consubstantiation - a bridge between identities - with another is at the cooperative level of meaning making².

Digital rhetorical identification can create a framework for the implementation of social media strategies in political campaigns, particularly to stipulate social media’s significant contribution for political campaign purposes. The rhetorical dimensions of social media offer important political and social implications and justify social media political deliberation. This dissertation will make three contributions to rhetorical study: the findings will reveal the work of digital rhetorical identification, they will offer a way to understand motives for using social media, and they will provide a new idea for digital rhetoric. All of these three contribute to social media analysis because they will help scholars better understand the way people share interest on social networks.

² Diane Davis's "Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are" referred to Burke's description that neither A nor B is an absolute identity because they share no essence in common. It is "because they are not identical or conjoined in any actual sense, that there can and must be rhetorical identification, a "mediatory ground" that establishes their consubstantiality without accomplishing their complete unity." (127) And according to Burke, "there is no essential identity; what goes for your individual "substance" is not an essence but the incalculable totality of your complex and contradictory identifications, through which you variously (and vicariously) become able to say "I." (qtd in Davis, pg 127) Hess adds that Kenneth Burke provides "the theoretical foundation of identity and identification, and elements of his theorizing can illuminate discussions of technology, especially the use of online digital "cookies" and their respective algorithms." (2) In current digital contexts, "the substance of the Internet user has been drastically affected by the use of Internet 'cookies'." (Hess 1) Burke's A Grammar of Motives argued, "Substance was understood in geometric, familial, and directional terms, among others." (29-58)
The contribution at the level of rhetorical theory to social media analysis comes from the rhetorical uses of social media that include understanding the reasons people create or share social media content. Knowledge arises from arguments within communities that share assumptions and beliefs that could indicate several rhetorical options and other appropriate ways to foster identification. Therefore, persuasive rhetoric could also determine the nature of the polarization of social media. Identifying the characteristics, affordances, and constraints of social media will reflect the work of digital rhetorical identification. The result from this analysis may help politicians and social media practitioners create an effective campaign using social media.

Finally, yet importantly, the contribution to social media analysis comes from its contribution to digital rhetoric because I will draw the technical analytic categories not only from contemporary rhetoric but also from digital rhetoric. The findings will enable us to reconstruct classical rhetoric into a comprehensive system for social media analysis. At the very least, it could offer a new perspective on the digital rhetorical analysis of successful social media campaigns in a political context.

Methodology

This dissertation borrows from various theoretical constructs and methods from communication and rhetorical studies. “Rhetoric” is the art of persuasion and this approach provides the foundation to analyze effective and persuasive communicators.
Identification is the most significant of these for my purposes, as it points to conceptual and methodological tools to the study of social media on political communication.

Scholars still consider social media as a new form of communication, and it was not until the 1990s that scholars consider the computer as a new category of medium for a mass public. I am proposing rhetorical analysis on Facebook pages, and it is applicable to analyze the personal and social interaction between the user and the public. Using a particular Facebook page to project rhetorical appeal as an illustrative case, the rhetorical analysis will demonstrate the complexity of social media communication.

Through reference to Aristotle, Burke illustrates a simple example of an identification strategy. In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke explains the simplest case of persuasion where "identification is the way in which a rhetor states explicitly to an individual." (55) George Cheney’s “The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational Communication” broaden the application of identification in rhetorical criticism to include other domains of discourse, which is organization communication.

Three types of identification strategies can now be derived from Burke and "operationalized" by most communication scholars (Cheney 148):

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3 Klaus Bruhn Jensen's "Contexts, Cultures, and Computers" conceptualized the studies of the computer as a medium about other forms of communication and culture. Following the introduction of the World Wide Web and many more network connections in the industrialized world, "research is simultaneously being institutionalized in relation to a variety of disciplines and fields across the social, natural, and human sciences." (183) Regarding which methodology works best to demonstrate the importance of content in social media discourse, cultural divergence will profoundly influence the answer about which media devices enable more diverse and more dispersed, forms of interaction. "The dual process of convergence and divergence poses a methodological challenge for research." (Jensen 183).
1. The Common Ground Technique

2. Identification through antithesis

3. The assumed or transcendent "we."

This study is intended to portray the role of identification strategies in the Facebook page of two Presidential Candidates from the 2014 Indonesian’s presidential election. The data collection tools would be the Facebook posts, and the online contents will be seen as a group or as a whole. The data serves to explain how the online posts work together to create a particular effect, whether to persuade, entertain or inform.

The rhetorical analysis will be carried out to examine the content in the presidential candidates’ Facebook profiles and analyzing the significations. By conducting a rhetorical analysis of Facebook posts and the rhetorical situation surrounding the discourse, the study shows the importance of content, context, and other symbolic artifacts of discourse. I consider "digital substance," in these three elements: the subject and the kinds of evidence used to develop it, the audience, and the character of the rhetor. In these parts, working on 'identities' might involve division, because

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4 Jensen believes that "'audience' or, better, 'user' studies must gain access to and document more, and more differentiated, contexts of media use." (183) The study offers a critical perspective to the existing literature of rhetoric in social media, to respond to the phenomena of 'mobile' and 'ubiquitous' computing. I developed the rhetorical triangle (or Aristotelian triad) that has its roots in the work of Aristotle, focusing on the idea of "technological unconscious consubstantiality."
"Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division." (Burke 22)

The latest revealing studies on social media provide insight into social media timing, content sharing, users’ profiles, and more. The existing methodologies include data mining and surveys, which big industry even uses themselves. What I am proposing here is to move forward from numbers and statistics and go deeper with rhetorical analysis. The rhetorical analysis included in the social media research should, at least, answer these following questions:

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5 David Blakesley's *The Elements of Dramatism* also helps us understand the resources of ambiguity that make identification possible is because of the implied congregation and segregation. Burke's *The Philosophy of Literary Form* centers on the naming function of identification, and how people "carry with them other identifying 'baggage' in the form of values, interests and the like." (27) But Burke's dialectical basis for the rhetorical situation also suggests that it is always focused on congregation and segregation. Identification always suggests a "we" and a "they," therefore, it also helps to study identification's counterpart, division, as "a dialectic between competing and cooperating forces." (Blakesley 42) Rhetoric, for Burke, becomes the act of consubstantiation. To foster an attitude of identification through digital technology “underscores the relationship between humans, identity, and our machines, directly affecting our ability to communicate.” (Hess 2) Hess contends, "networked digital communication technologies have fundamentally altered the substance of Internet users, leading to changes in offline and online rhetorical interactions." (2) Thus, this study considers digital substance because of the pervasive use of digital technology.

6 In understanding digital media, I consider Kenneth Burke’s rhetoric as a means of understanding the complexities of contemporary identification, and this includes understanding persona, understanding appeals to an audience, and understanding subjects. I also consider the context, intention, and genre in the digital rhetorical identification, because "theorizing digital rhetorical identification means that rhetorical theory and practice recognizes the function of the machine in forming an ever-evolving sense of self." (Hess 10)
1. What is the central theme of political discourse created by a particular politician on their Facebook account?

2. How does a particular politician use Facebook to create that discourse?

3. What is the motivation of the political discourse?

4. Who is involved in the act to establish a particular conversation on the politician’s Facebook page?

5. Who created the messages on their Facebook account?

6. When was the online content posted?

7. What is the author’s aim?

8. To what issue(s) does s/he seek to respond?

9. What are the central themes & key points s/he wishes to convey?

10. How does the message relate to the surrounding rhetorical situation?

11. What are the pros and cons of this discourse presented in its online context?

12. What resistance emerges from the discussion presented in its online content?
Using the documentation of Facebook posts during the active campaign period, this research will analyze the recurring Burkean theme of identification and its implications for the division. I adapt Cheney’s common ground technique used to illustrate the significance of tactics in the organization context and apply it to the digital media in political communication. Cheney also considers the strategies that are more dissociative in nature, which is identification by antithesis, and also the most subtle of the three identification strategies, the assumed “we.” From this organizational rhetoric context, I use the same way of analysis to examine the digital rhetorical identification.
CHAPTER TWO: FACEBOOK POLITICS AND INDONESIAN 
POLITICAL CULTURE

This chapter focusses on how social media sites allow political candidates to foster identification with their constituents. The subtle nature of Facebook politics includes not only conscious or deliberate actions but also the unconscious and unintended benefits, it involves political expression on Facebook, particularly in creating trending topics during an election period. The use of new media tools in politics, including social networking, and the like, enables people to coordinate political movements against the existing power. Social media is a long-term tool that can strengthen civil society and the public sphere, and from the standpoint of the roots of democracy, social media as new media has contributed to important changes in political culture.

Political culture involves discourse and many symbolic practices, and new media has arguably become the medium to articulate that relationship with power. In Political Culture, Walter A. Rosenbaum refers political culture as "the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system" (4). Facebook politics can be one form of political culture in which active supporters have voices through their

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7 This chapter examines the rise of Facebook politics in creating a new hybrid political culture, in which the public embraces certain aspects of democracy, while others are unconsciously opposed. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture describe the term “political culture” as the pattern of orientations to political objects (13). Meanwhile, “Facebook politics” involves political expression on Facebook, particularly in creating trending topics during an election period.
personal accounts on Facebook, and use symbolic artifacts to articulate their political orientation.

However, the community of Facebook users and supporters are more likely to share and re-share content from the same sources. For that reason, I argue that many social networking sites form "homogenous clusters," that lead to polarized and homogeneous communities. The challenge for the candidate is to connect with a polarized community of Facebook users and supporters. With the homogeneity nature of groups on Facebook, those who follow a particular candidate are likely to be individuals who are already somewhat sympathetic to the cause or the representative candidate. Thus, politicians are using the medium of Facebook to appeal to the particular community, especially those who share similar ideology, belief systems, and conviction.

This chapter addresses the rise of social media in Indonesia and how creating a social media strategy has become essential for political candidates. It also covers how social media has created a new hybrid culture that assembles and spreads cultural and social information in Indonesia. This trend is the basis of this chapter, which attempts to describe how Indonesian politicians are addressing the homogeneity nature of Facebook and fail to recognize the polarization nature of social media.

Every type of social media has multiple roles to play in society, and every role entails a different set of functions and responsibilities; microblogging in citizen journalism has different roles than creating videos in content communities. Users use Twitter for posting quick updates and distributing content via mobile devices, and other

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8 Although viral patterns related to particular online materials differ, homogeneity is clearly the driver of information diffusion.
users use various types of content, including videos on YouTube. A thorough exploration of how social media functions in Indonesian culture will follow an examination of the sociopolitical and cultural backgrounds of Indonesian elections.

Cultural differences, along with the digital divide, digital literacy, and digital natives, are essential elements to consider when communicating on social media. Political culture is another aspect to be considered to explain this digital revolution. Social media is thought to be especially accessible to those in the upper classes of society as well as those with higher educational backgrounds. This gap has become one the strongest criticisms of social media, as Indonesia is very ethnically diverse and it is a given that social media cannot reach all the classes of society⁹.

The upcoming sections of chapter two offer a detailed description of the sociopolitical and cultural background of the 2014 presidential election, including how the history of colonialization influences Indonesia’s collective culture. These sub-chapters will also describe the function of social media in Indonesian culture and political elections more generally and how political campaigns used Facebook during the 2014 elections and the development afterward.

**The Socio-Political Context of the Election in Indonesia**

⁹ Kacung Marijan’s "The Study of Political Culture in Indonesia" emphasizes how the study of political culture among Indonesia’s elite is critical because "the political culture of Indonesian society still embodies paternalistic values" (61-62). Indonesian societies are, to the same degree, stratified or divided into different social groups. Even though Indonesia is very ethnically diverse, Internet technology may also be a way to meet the challenges of bridging the diversity that exists. There is significant indication that social media environments significantly influence Indonesians when it comes to their political decision-making.
A social and political background is a combination of social and political factors in which the social aspect refers to a community of people and their shared customs, while the political aspect relates to the government and public affairs of a country. To understand the socio-political background of the election in Indonesia, one must also understand the history that has led to Indonesia’s modern society.

*The Islamic Movement in Java during Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era*

As the world’s fourth most populous nation, Indonesia is also the world’s largest archipelago nation. Indonesia is located astride the equator in the humid tropics and extends some 2,300 miles (3,700 kilometers) east to west, about the same as the United States. Java makes up the geographical and population center of the archipelago. The island of Java accounts for about 60 percent of Indonesia's population, about the size of New York State. Thus, Java's population is equivalent to 40 percent of that of the United States.

The pre-colonial era began shaping Indonesia’s socio-political culture; the culture formation mainly started with pre-historic Hindu-Buddhist civilization. The Javanese ethnic group and the Islamic group then heavily influenced Indonesia's overall political culture up until the colonial era. According to Kacung Marijan’s "The Study of Political Culture in Indonesia", since Islam came to Indonesia in the thirteenth century, there has been an acculturation process. "To some extent, Islam absorbed the pre-Islam traditions,
while Javanism also took on parts of Islamic values" (Marijan 63). As a result, Indonesia's elite political culture is not only heavily Javanese but also piously Muslim.

Indonesia's size and ethnic diversity have made defining a national identity a task that is problematic and widely debated. In the pre-colonial era, the symbol of Indonesia’s political culture was marked by the pre-history (to 4th century), Hindu-Buddhist civilizations (7th century to 15th century), the age of Islamic states (from 1200 to 1911), and slightly irrelevant *kongsi* federations and the *lanfang* Republic (1600–1904). Religious values help form Indonesian's cultural identities in the colonial era, but the pattern of political and ethnoreligious pluralism were still put to the test.

The European colonisation started with the Portuguese arrived in Indonesia from the 16th century, and in 1602, the Dutch established the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and became the dominant European power in Indonesia by 1610. But several scholars argue that the European influence during the times of the early arrivals of the 16th and 17th centuries was limited, and rather, the major expansionist force of that time was Islam. European influence, particularly that of the Dutch, would not have its greatest impact on Indonesia until the 18th and 19th centuries.

The age of Islamic countries began when the Indonesian archipelago was famous among early Muslim sailors, and Muslim traders traveled through South East Asia. The spread of Islam\textsuperscript{10} among the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago dated to the 13th century and became the dominant religion in Java and Sumatra by the end of the 16th century.

\textsuperscript{10} Clive J. Christie's *A Modern History of Southeast Asia* discusses the considerable differences in the interpretations of Islam that had taken root in different pre-colonial states.
Islam has informed the identities of Indonesians, and the nationalism they embraced was plural and multi-ethnic. Robert W. Hefner's *Civil Islam* examines the relationship of Islam to democratization in the majority-Muslim nation of Indonesia, and how it was contested and complicated during the colonial period. As Hefner described:

[The] Dutch replaced the archipelago’s many states with a unified empire. The colonial government placed strict limits on Muslim participation in public affairs, trying to squeeze Islam into an illiberal version of Enlightenment privatism. Rather than reinforcing a union of religion and state, then, colonialism pushed Muslims away from the corridors of power and out into villages and society. (14 - 15)

The colonialism in Indonesia created social dislocation as Muslims struggled against the occupation under the strategy of the Islamic organization’s establishment. During the late colonial period, the politicization of Islamic leaders was visible, with religious change coming to the Javanese in the 19th century. The Dutch surrounded themselves with some of the same aura and social rules in their interactions with native peoples until the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which the independence movement began.
Democracy and authoritarianism have influenced Indonesia’s socio-political background, especially with the Netherlands colonializing Indonesia for 350 years. The European influence, particularly that of the Dutch, would not have its greatest impact on Indonesia until the 18th and 19th centuries until the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation in 1942-1945 during WWII ended Dutch rule. Following colonial domination and Japanese occupation, Indonesia’s nationalist leader, Sukarno declared independence and became president in August 1945.

Merle C. Ricklefs's *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java* analyzed this tumultuous period and the entrenching democracy vs. authoritarianism. The polarization and politicization had a great impact, which was further enhanced by “the increasingly polarized and volatile politics of the early years of independence.” (Ricklefs 79) Although Muslims had a significant role when Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the Japanese occupation and the Revolution still left bitter memories of social conflict.

During the first decade of independence, Indonesia's political situation was uncertain. Sukarno held the title of President of Indonesia, serving in office from 1945 to 1967. After independence, the new country was facing the need to pull together the diverse archipelago. However, there had already been a vast spread of Islam and the adoption of this religion as part of the national identity formation. There were also
regional differences in customs, religion, the impact of Christianity and Marxism, and fears of Javanese political domination.

To unite the diverse archipelago, Sukarno promulgated the five principles (sila) or Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. The Pancasila affirms, "The state shall be based on the belief in the one and only God," indicated how religion, particularly Islam in Java, overlaid and mixed with existing cultural influences. Other than Islam, it is also compulsory for every Indonesians to have a religion based on these state’s accepted religions: Islam, Christian/ Catholic, Hindu, Buddhism, and mysticism.

Many traits define Indonesian national identity, and one of those identities is based on the Five Principles in Pancasila. However, Java and its ceremonial isolation of the princes and aristocrats and high court artistic and literary cultures also form Indonesia’s aristocratic cultures. Even the Indonesia's national motto comes from an old Javanese expression, which is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, usually translated as "unity in diversity."

In 1956, Sukarno started to receive criticism because he sought a system based on the traditional village system of discussion and consensus and proposed a threefold blend of nasionalisme ('nationalism'), agama ('religion'), and komunisme ('communism'). Following Indonesia's communal and political conflicts, Suharto was appointed President of Indonesia in March 1968, overthrowing Sukarno. Suharto used the term "New Order" to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, Sukarno. The "New Order" had its ideology, Pancasila Democracy, but upheld the practices of Suharto’s authoritarian
regime. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti’s “The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia” described the problematic form of Pancasila Democracy. There is a sense of government control and dictatorship in Suharto’s Pancasila, which led to people protesting the broken structural systems. Suharto’s New Order regime dominated Indonesia’s political system for 32 years, ending in 1998.

The year 1998 marked the beginning of the Reformation era in Indonesia, throughout all aspects including business, education, and politics. After 1998, "[M]ost people have enjoyed freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government, and a depoliticized military." (Bhakti 195) However, Indonesian’s post-authoritarian situation adds to the complexity of Indonesia’s rising religious intolerance because there was another factor that emerged. The growing democracy led to autonomy and tolerance toward dissent, and along with it, comes the rise of Islamic religious-political movement in Indonesia especially since Indonesia is the country with the world’s largest Muslim population. Bhakti stated, “The country needs political endurance to answer the many challenges” (196) and “it is important to bear in mind that a compromise between authoritarian and democratic powers took place.” (202) With the lack of understanding of the diversity aspect, Indonesia still has a long way to go to become a mature democracy.
Indonesia's post-authoritarian era constructs the nation as a religious community, a body of the faithful in need of protection from internal and external assault. Mary E. McCoy's “Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia” describes the democratic uprising in 1998 and states that "freedoms brought by Suharto’s fall and wide access to alternative interpretations of religion via the Internet have shaken religious hierarchies in Indonesia" (315). Urbanization and new technologies threw old regimes into crisis and challenging the dominance of religion in Indonesia. The creation of new technical devices presents occasions around which the practices and relations of everyday life are powerfully redefined.

In the early stage of political transition, Indonesia had three presidents—B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). Bhakti notes that in the period of 1998 to 2004, Habibie's short period was "an opening to the next stage of political liberalization from authoritarianism." (201) As a technocrat, his progressive thinking impacted the sociopolitical democracy in Indonesia. In a way, Habibie successfully portrayed political liberalization as the first step in the transition toward democracy.

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11 Vedi R. Hadiz's "Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia" states the various influences on the trajectory of political Islam. He argues, "What is today labeled ‘Islamic radicalism’ in Indonesia is essentially the product of the long phase of authoritarian capitalist development under New Order rule." (Hadiz 4) There was a discourse mixing physical and container metaphors, reminiscent of Suharto’s corporatist rhetoric. The discourse involves a statist, totalitarian ideology long dominant under Suharto.

12 He began to allow freedom of the press or the establishment of political parties, although many believed that it was because of political pressure from the opposition, particularly university students. In general, Indonesians rely on their religious beliefs, and
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 2004 election, the first election that
Indonesians were allowed to vote directly for their president and vice-president. Although
political blogs had not yet gained popularity in Indonesia during the 2004 presidential
election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono used other forms of ICT by giving out his mobile
phone number to his constituents and promise them that he will solve all of their
problems.

In a true democracy, being elected means winning the interest of constituents. The socio-political background of Indonesian elections is so challenging because the
country’s citizens have competing interests and values. Social media could effectively
help the elections of leaders and foster healthy political discussion, as it might work as the middle ground for competing interests and values. Social media could also cause division, as it becomes an open platform for expressing ongoing political differences.

The Cultural Background of the Election in Indonesia

Soeharto’s New Order brought “aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound change from Java’s past.” (Ricklefs 259) However, in several elections after the 1998 Reformation, many Muslim leaders were pragmatic and often liberal-oriented. There was Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), a widely respected leader within the elite. With a strong mass base among rural Muslims in East and Central Java, he was elected in 1999 but only ruled for 23 months. His vice president was a nationalist party symbol, Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of the late President Sukarno), and she replaced Gusdur when the legislative impeached him. She was also in the presidential race in 2004 but then lost. There was also a modernist and semi-liberal Muslim leader, Amien Rais, with a mass following among urban Muslims. He held the highest position as the head in the House of Representatives from 1999 to 2004, but he also lost in the presidential election of 2004.
Although Indonesia is constitutionally a secular state, with Islam being the dominant religion in the country, Islam has influenced Indonesia's cultural identity. Saira Yamin defines identity as "the representation of one’s unique personal experience, memory, ethnicity, culture, religious orientation, gender, or occupational role, amongst various other factors" (6). Meanwhile, cultural identity is the identity or feeling of belonging to a group. There was five political culture adopted during Sukarno era, namely Radical Nationalism, Java Traditionalism, Islamic, Democratic Socialism, and Communism.

To add to this dimension, Dodi Wirawan Irawanto's "An Analysis of National Culture and Leadership Practices in Indonesia" offers insight on leadership on Java. The leadership role is heavily influenced by "the outcome of a complex mixture of traditional Indonesian custom (tradisi), Islamic law, and more recent social and political developments." (Irawanto 45) In this sub-chapter, I will describe the influence of cultural and background in Indonesia’s election into two parts, which is the era before the 1998 movement and the era post-1998 movement.

The Movement of Javanisation and Islamisation before the 1998 Reformation

I situate Indonesian political culture\(^\text{13}\) in the context of transformation from traditional to modern culture. The Dutch-Islamic discourse throughout the long centuries

\(^\text{13}\) Indonesian political culture transformed from a traditional to modern culture. Political culture encompasses a group’s set of attitudes and practices that shape their political behavior, and therefore it is enough to say that culture is multifaceted. In Indonesia, traditional political culture is symbolized by various ethnicities, religions, and other local cultures, whereas modern political culture is understood as influenced by Western
of European colonialism helped give rise to Indonesia's distinctive national and religious culture and led to a power that united the Javanese and Muslim worlds. Cultural identity is part of a person's self-conception and self-perception, and in Indonesia, the historical period in Java heavily influences Indonesia’s cultural identity.\(^{14}\)

It is important for politicians in Indonesia to understand the Javanese social structures as the dominant culture.\(^{15}\) Indonesia acknowledges the mixture of mystical religious elements, which combine more firmly structured along communal (aliran) rather than class lines to form Javanese mysticism. A prominent American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz in the 1960s, divided the Javanese community into three aliran or "streams": santri, abangan, and priyayi. Although Javanism dominated the society’s cultural orientation, the fusion of different religions brought by the traders created something like Javanese Abangan belief.

Under the colonial rule in the 1930s Javanese society was polarized along the lines of identity between santri and abangan, a polarization that had become politicized political culture. Culture has long been a prominent subject for Western analysts to examine Indonesian politics. As Marijan argues, "[S]ocial scientists studying Indonesian politics have applied a cultural perspective in which culture is assumed to be one of the important instruments in understanding political phenomena in Indonesia" (62). Orientalism heavily influenced Indonesia's set of attitudes and practices, which means that Western culture impacts Indonesia as a non-Western society.\(^{14}\) With Indonesia’s past being centrally located along ancient trading routes, a multitude of religions strongly affects many cultural practices.\(^{15}\) In the colonial era, Java remained under Dutch rule, except for a brief period of British rule. Ricklefs states that with indoctrinated armed groups trained to resist an Allied reconquest, Java was ripe for revolution in which Islam would play a significant role; but "it should not surprise readers by this stage to learn that this role was not always a unifying one" (68). Java is adamant on kinship, and later, the Javanese uprising led to a unifying struggle to secure Indonesia's independence. However, there were contending parties within the Islamization of Java, due to conflicting interpretations of Islam.
more so in recent Indonesia’s political situation. *Abangan* is an indigenous blend of native and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs with Islamic practices sometimes also called Javanism, *kejawan*, *agama Jawa*, or *kebatinan*. For the *santri* side, “*abangan* or *kejawan* is sometimes taken to mean just followers of *kebatinan* sects rather than a broader social category.” (Ricklefs 269) This first freedom experiment is crucial because *aliran* politics characterizes the period of liberal democracy and the subsequent “Guided Democracy” period (from the late 1950s to 1960).

Meanwhile, *priyayi* is the elite politics, and they manifest a unique religious tradition. The *priyayi* is regarded as a high class because most of the *priyayi* are descendants of a respected leader in the Java community. While *abangan* identical as farmers and *santri* identical to traders, *priyayi* is either a descendant of the palace, the rich, or bureaucrat. *Priyayi* also has a closer relationship with a respected leader in Java, while *abangan* and *santri* are just a commoner. *Priyayi* focuses on their status in the community, and in religious belief, *priyayi* have their own faith but can be categorized under *abangan* or *santri*. The concept of the stream of beliefs (*aliran*)\(^\text{16}\), according to Geertz, "contributed to the rise of the political tensions in Indonesian politics" (qtd in Marijan 62). Started in the period of the 1940s to 1960s, Indonesians consider Pancasila as the alternative to *aliran Islam*, consider Pancasila as the non-Islamic philosophical option.

\(^{16}\) Javanism is a Javanese religious tradition, consisting of an amalgam of animistic, Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic beliefs and practices. There were divisions in Javanese society and politicians mobilize the group of Muslim *santri* and Javanist *abangan* around political parties and their satellite mass organizations.
The newly independent Indonesia proclaims "Unity in Diversity" (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) as the national motto, and it was an aspect of genius in the Sukarno regime, which Suharto further develops under his new order regime. Merle C. Ricklefs's "Unity and Disunity in Javanese Political and Religious Thought of the Eighteenth Century" explains that this Old Javanese phrase *bhinneka tunggal ika* is familiar to students of Indonesia as the national motto of the Republic and known to Javanists as a passage from the *kakawin Sutasoma* by Tantular. "Unity in Diversity" was able to orchestrate public policies, which engaged all ethnic groups in the process of constructing new national identities virtually.

During Indonesia’s first attempt to create a democracy in the years after the Revolution, *santri-abangan* conflict deepened still further. The politics of this period followed the *aliran* style, that is to say, polarization followed socio-religious-cultural identities more than lines of class. Ricklefs's *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java* explains the death of *aliran* politics and Islamisation from below and emphasizes the significance for the Islamisation of the Javanese of the final destruction of old political parties. At least, Islam takes “its proper place among Javanese and in Indonesian society more broadly.” (Ricklefs 115) Even in its modern sense within Indonesian social, cultural, and political perspective, Javanisation still also influences Indonesia's moral judgments, political myths, beliefs, and ideas about what makes for a good society.

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17 Analyzing the metaphorical base common to Suharto’s corporatist rhetoric […] sheds light on […] the nation’s historical commitment to ethnic, religious, and cultural pluralism, immortalized in the state motto “Unity in Diversity,” and embedded in the official state ideology called Pancasila (McCoy 276).
Javanese culture dominates, assimilates, and impacts other cultures in general, including the relationship of the ruling elite with the public.

During Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998), the majority of Indonesians perceived the political culture as being Javanised, although there was also the nature of Islamisation of Java or the Javanisation of Islam. Ricklefs also states that there was contending views of what an Islamic Java – and, of course, a more Islamic Indonesia, and “the contending parties will be less abangan and santri than defenders of conflicting interpretations of Islam.” (256) The political regime in Java facilitated certain developments in the sphere of religion and culture and inhibited others. The military doctrine was also very pronounced for over 32 years of the new order regime and scholars identified this era with budaya orde baru (the culture of the new order). During the New Order, several government policies are discriminatory, and many argue that Prabowo Subianto is a pure product of the authoritarian New Order.

The Dialectics between Extreme Islamic Ideology and Pluralistic Pancasila Ideology

In applying a cultural perspective to the study of Indonesian politics, Marijan explains the need to look at the interplay between the political cultures of the “defenders” and the “innovators” in Indonesia. Liddle’s perception of “defenders” is different from the concept of hegemony, however, because, in his understanding, it means more pluralism (qtd. in Marijan 64). The defenders’ political culture seeks to maintain the political status quo. In contrast, the innovators “attempt to change the political culture to
obtain a more democratic political system” (64). The group that Marijan refers to as the innovators could be the political activists, intellectuals, and members of state institutions.

Indonesian national culture is multicultural by nature, especially in cities, and this influences the historical interaction of peoples and political-administrative policies. Many Indonesians share the historical roots, institutions, customs, values, and beliefs. However, Indonesian national culture was also work in progress that began undergoing particular stresses at the beginning of the twenty-first century18. After Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998, the country adopted a pluralist, liberal-democratic model of government (McCoy 282). Since then, everyone regards Indonesia as a plural society regarding ethnicity, race, religion, and class19.

The Indonesian constitution promises religious freedom, but also requires belief in one God. Although Islam has shaped contemporary Indonesia, it leaves an unclear

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18 The stresses were the result of Indonesia’s democratic uprising in 1998. Since then, Indonesia has held open elections, welcoming all comers and unshackling society from decades of constraints on political activism and public expression.
19 However, sharia law becomes even more popular among ordinary Muslims of Indonesia. Some Muslims in Indonesia tend to prescribe the importance of unifying Islam and the state in a single entity (al-dīn wa al-dawla, Islam is a religion and the state). Instead of adopting The Five Principles, Pancasila, Indonesian Muslims propose al-dīn wa al-dawla for their political system. Hefner's "Indonesia, Islam, and the New U.S. Administration" argues that complex and shifting coalitions drive Indonesian politics, and religious culture influences the political developments in Indonesia. From a historical perspective, the tremendous changes in the political economy under the New Order leave a mark on modern Javanese Islam. In the freewheeling and democratic atmosphere of the post-Suharto era, “Islamists cited the coercive excesses of the New Order to reject the Five Principles and multi-confessional nationalism, calling instead for a state based on Shariah.” (Hefner 61) However, several Islamic organizations were soon jointly declaring their opposition to imposing shari'a law, emphasizing their commitment to the Indonesian national state.
relation between the state and religion. There were several political reforms were set in motion via amendments to the Constitution of Indonesia since the 1998 Reformation, which resulted in changes to all branches of government. Although mostly Islamic parties won shares large enough to be seated in the parliament, “polls consistently show that support for democracy is high, hovering around 70 percent, as is voter turnout (69.6 percent in the 2014 election).” (NYSEAN Voices)

Changes to all branches of government follow the Indonesian riots of May 1998. Denny Indrayana's Indonesian Constitutional Reform of 1999-2002, illustrates the change in Indonesian political system (361, 443, and 440). The president and vice-president are selected by the vote of the citizens for five-year terms; the reform changed the voting process. Before 2004, the People's Consultative Assembly chose them. The President of Indonesia is directly elected for a maximum of two five-year terms and is the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed forces. Additionally, the president is responsible for domestic governance, policy-making, and foreign affairs. The reform also accomplishes some changes in appointing a cabinet, whose members do not have to be elected members of the legislature.
The period of far-reaching constitutional reform\textsuperscript{20} has made today's Indonesia, if not a perfect democracy, then at least one of the Muslim world's most promising

\textsuperscript{20} Issues over the period of the post-Suharto era are the push for a stronger democracy and civilian rule, elements of the military trying to retain their influence, a growing Islamism in politics and society, and demands for greater regional autonomy. The Indonesian riots of May 1998 arguably were triggered by religious intolerance, an apparent backlash against the political and religious pluralism of the new democratic era (McCoy 275). After Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998, the country adopted pluralism as a political theory of the state and policy formation, but some scholars argued that the theory was too simplistic, leading to the formulation of neo pluralism. After 1998, a recent rise in Muslim-led religious intolerance sparked concerns over an apparent backlash against the liberalism and religious pluralism of the democratic era (McCoy 276). The Islamisation of Java and the Javanisation of Islam trigger this religious intolerance. The Islamic feature in Java seems "more paternalistic than in Islam as stated in the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad tradition" (Marijan 63). For example, both a Muslim and a
exponents of Western-style liberal governance (*The Economist*). Hefner's *Civil Islam* also concluded that Indonesia does have ample community precedents, as well as the world's most significant movement for a democratic and pluralist Islam. However, a lack of any democratic culture among students and political elites, and if the Army see itself as 'the guardian of the state,' it makes substantiated political democratization particularly challenging.

Indonesia is regarded as "a plural society regarding ethnicity, race, religion, and class" (Marijan 64). In the following two sub-chapters, I will discuss the role of social media in accommodating the citizens' competing interests and values. In this particular section, I situate the rhetoric of social media in the utopian context, in which social media may work as the middle ground for conflicting interests and values. In the later section of this chapter, I consider a different rhetoric under the dystopian context, in which social media may amplify the loudest voices to the point that people perceive it as the representation of public opinion.

Christian can hold a position in the government. However, having a non-Muslim leader in Muslim Java will create an issue. According to Hefner, although Indonesia is not an Islamic state, "Islam has influenced the country’s political situation in Indonesia" (xi-xx).

21 Neopluralism is a label concerning itself with political power that addresses what proponents see as the rise of the corporates and the decline (or partitioning) of government. A common challenge to pluralist understandings is that authorities in society assert the dominance of their interpretation of reality, and do so in a way that violates or contradicts the praxis and life experience of other people. I use the term neopluralism and neoliberalism interchangeably and make them less distinct because there are some apparent interaction and interplay between those terms. Neoliberalism plays in an economic as well as political field, but with neopluralism, views differ about the division of power in democratic society. Unfortunately, the hardliners tend to have the loudest voices. Meanwhile, since the majority people in Java profess the large-Power Distance, Collectivist, and Feminine culture, silence is considered as more acceptable. When those who profess mainstream and pluralistic views choose to silence others, it seems that the hardliners are representing public opinion.
The Development of Social Media and Its Impact on Indonesian Culture

Social media, unlike traditional media forms, offer interactive ways to communicate facilitated through user engagement. For this reason, users integrate social media sites into such contexts as politics, business, and marketing to communicate with customers or interact with constituents. Marketers realize the benefits of social media due to their high-impact and low-cost.

For people who work in digital spaces and politics, social media is still adequate to build a brand as long as we understand the obstacles and know what it takes to work on a campaign. In business, many Indonesian companies have tried to implement social media in their corporate culture; some succeeded while others failed. In Indonesian political contexts, social media is also used to engage citizens through the sharing of political information and opinions.

Politicians around the world have also seen the importance of using social media to communicate with their constituents, the most notable example being Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential campaign. According to Pew Research Center’s National Election Pool exit polls, Obama used Facebook to communicate interactively with young voters, a demographic that was a critical factor in his victory.

However, the US election in 2016 is a game changer in social media politics. The fear of fake news, struggling to burst or embrace ideological bubbles formed on Facebook, and hateful speech on social media are just some of the after effects of the US election in 2016.
When U.S. President Barack Obama visited Indonesia in 2010, after having lived in Indonesia during his childhood for a few years in the 1960s, he mentioned that a new generation of Indonesians is among the most wired in the world, connected through cell phones and social networks. Now, particularly in the major cities, many Indonesians are active smartphone users and are always connected to the Internet.

The sharing of information, especially through social media, is evidenced by the growth of social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. For example, Ron Davies’ “Social Media in Election Campaigning” indicates that 44 percent of Europeans used SNS at least once a week during that year. More specifically, "Facebook has rapidly expanded from 700 million global users in mid-2011 to 1.28 billion by March 2014 and 1.71 billion by June 2016" (Facebook.com). In its early emergence, Facebook had a positive impact because it allowed users to share their stories and express their opinions. However, an attempt to share an opinion to find support in like-minded communities may lead to a surprising twist when people within our networks push alternative viewpoints. Users begin to question their friendships, “deleting social apps from their phones, rationing time spent on Facebook and Twitter, and shrinking their digital friend lists” (Selyukh). Facebook can be a source of news for a majority of adults, but in the vitriol and propaganda of an election, I questioned this utopian view of social media. Therefore, in the later section, I consider different social media rhetoric under the dystopian context. However, here, I will focus on the idealistic role of social media in supporting Indonesia’s 1998 movement.
The rhetoric of Indonesian technology development that changed the politics of everyday life began from the Indonesia’s 1998 Reformation and expanded after BJ Habibie succeeded Suharto. Karishma Vaswani’s "Indonesia's Love Affair with Social Media" describes how Indonesians are obsessed with the Internet and its social media. Vaswani believes "many Indonesians in rural areas struggle to get connected, but the social media phenomenon is widespread amongst Indonesia's urban elite" (par. 13). Indonesian people are very critical of government and society, and using social media to impact social change has become a growing trend. The social media explosion has sparked a new conversation, and Desi Anwar argues "social media is becoming an increasingly natural and normal way for Indonesians to communicate.” (qtd. In Vaswani par. 18)

In mid-2000, the website Friendster became one of the earliest social platforms to be active in Indonesia. Smaller social networking sites like Friendster that offered the ability to chat in real time through a computer had a successful run because social networking was still a new concept back then. However, when Facebook became available, it took over Friendster’s popularity. Facebook could offer new, unique cultures because users have their vocabulary and norms about what is acceptable on social media platforms.

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Peter Suwarno published an article in 2009 analyzing BJ Habibie's campaign speeches (1983–1993) and concluded that Habibie’s rhetoric points to a “technologically modern society” as the national goal. As a technocrat, BJ Habibie was pointing out technologies and scientists as the leaders of political change and intensive science and technology as the means for political leadership. BJ Habibie’s time in power marked the dramatic change in the already shifting traditional concepts of political leadership in Indonesia.
The use of Facebook encourages more people to engage with and participate in social media, which leads to a technoculture or interactions between technology and culture. Technoculture is also a newly coined word or expression that refers to the politics of technology and culture. Facebook was not only capable of challenging and removing the power of Friendster, but it has also enabled the ‘have-nots’ to combat the power of the ‘haves.’

The Internet promises participatory culture, with social media opening the political conversation to voices that have never been heard before. Hamideh Molaei's "Discursive Opportunity Structure and The Contribution of Social Media to The Success of Social Movements in Indonesia" suggests that the diffusion of the movements’ messages into the public sphere, along with the politicians’ supportive resonance, are initiated and supported by social media.

Actively using all kind of social media is considered cool in Indonesia although social media also creates a tremendous noise, and the noise is beginning to have an impact off-line as well. Vaswani claims a recent protest against Muslim groups was "organized entirely through Facebook and Twitter" (par. 21). Although social media helps people in developing countries improve their communication, using technology for political movement could lead to a superficial level of engagement. Despite a massive outpouring of online support for a particular cause, not everyone actively supports the cause off-line.

In understanding the interactions between, and politics of, technology and culture in Indonesia, we have to understand how new technologies have enabled movement
organizations in Indonesia. The Internet presents opportunities for engagement, inclusion, public deliberation and civic reconnection. Some challenges in using technology for political movements include the superficial level of engagement, or what some call 'clicktivism' or 'slacktivism,' that some believe undermine established practices in activism. David M. Cook et al.'s “Twitter Deception and Influence" argues that new media tolerates slacktivism, and it is sufficiently manipulated away from authentic discrete usage so that the trustworthiness of identity, narrative and authority are in a constant state of uncertainty. The slacktivism demonstrates "the emergence of ‘social-loafing’ where followers will retweet political and election narrative without regard for author identity, authenticity or narrative information." (Cook 5) By joining certain kind of campaigns and groups, Facebook users were aiming to portray a particular identity or perhaps different from the one they display on ‘about me’ pages. Social cause, or even election, encourages Facebook users to reveals more about who they are because of the range of virtual entities accompanies the movement or cause, in which then influences their identity.

Manuel Castell's *The Power of Identity* suggests that identity has a strong force for the person to whom the identity was attached. In *Communication Power*, Manuel Castell argues that Facebook could exert a counter-power through its awareness-raising capability, and therefore, global information sharing is itself a form of resistance.

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24 Therefore, it is important to see the importance of audience and to envision the Internet as an escape route from affirmed identities. "There are two forms of identity, individual and collective identity" (Castells 11). However, social transformation is happening very quickly in Indonesia, and changes occur in almost all areas of life, including the rise of Internet culture.
Facebook is one of the indications of the rise of the network society, in which there are countervailing processes that resist established domination. This countervailing process is the idealistic view of social media, where Facebook can balance the effect of existing power by encountering it with something of equal force. This idealistic view is especially true when referring to the role of the Internet in supporting Indonesia’s 1998 reformation movement.

One of the utopian views from social media is the way within the network society; the identity formation for resistance can lead to the formation of communities. Castell's *The Power of Identity* states that this type of identity building in the network society “constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression.” (9)

Social media allows the resisting community to avoid the oppression based on their apparent identity; this is the actual meaning of the new primacy of identity politics in the network society. Social media can change communities and share not only customs but also the government and public affairs of a country, but it can also give an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world\(^5\).

In this section, I mainly focus on the utopian view of social media and how it has supported the emergence of virtual communities. I will further discuss social media polarization in the later section of this chapter, including how fake news, ideological bubbles, and hate speech on social media create division. Because, even though the social

\(^5\) There is this idea that media and communication become political through the explicit community that they create, but social media did not require anything more than joining a Facebook group for example. The invention of social media resulted in the creation of a new type of political community in a networked public sphere that would bring nationalism into being and created new discourses for imagining community.
networking sites have sufficient credibility to influence the public’s perspective and opinion, I still question the extent to which social networking sites determine our identity as a society. In the next section, I conduct the rhetorical analysis on both candidates’ Facebook page. I am using Kenneth Burke’s methods of identification to analyze how the politician fosters identification, and the shift from political deliberation to identification can help to explain how selves are mutually transformed by the influence of each other. In the latter section, I briefly discuss social media development in Indonesia after the 2014 election.

The function of social media in Indonesian political election

The two candidates running for the 2014 Indonesian presidential election were Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Both men maintained a social media presence and tried to project ethos and pathos on their Facebook accounts. Joko Widodo was a furniture dealer in Surakarta in Central Java, while Subianto is a son-in-law of Suharto, the former President.

Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election was the most polarizing election since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998. Social media allows the candidates to

26 Indonesia’s 2014 general election was the fourth general election conducted after the downfall of the past authoritarian regime, with the number of undecided voters remains between 7-10%. As the largest group of Internet users in Indonesia, young adults made up 30 percent of total voters in this general election. Preliminary studies have investigated the impact of social media use for political activities by young adults. The results indicate that social media use for political activities have profoundly influenced young adults’ political efficacy, but it has not had much impact on political participation and political knowledge.
campaign with no time limitation, and at a certain level, with no ethical constraints. On their social media campaign, the two candidates chose a particular theme for their key campaign issues, both online and offline. For their key campaign issues, Prabowo Subianto promoted “anti-discrimination” and Joko Widodo emphasized “pluralism.”

It is important to remember that Joko Widodo’s ability to break the “glass ceiling” of elitist politics was possible only due to Indonesia’s democratic revolution. With his background and grassroots history, he was able to portray himself as a commoner and “the people’s leader.” Meanwhile, Prabowo Subianto used the public’s dissatisfaction with the previous president to suggest that Joko Widodo’s experience of only a decade in politics would be bad for the country.

The emergence of freedom of expression through the Internet post-Suharto era allows people to share their dissatisfaction towards the new order, especially the young and first-time voters. In post-Suharto Indonesia, according to Mietzner, "every president has shied away from radical or divisive rhetoric. Instead, they have all tried to present an image of a moderate, inclusive, and open-minded Indonesia, both to their domestic audiences and to the outside world." (119-120)

Indonesians believe the Internet is a powerful tool to oppose authoritarianism, and that has been particularly true of these two presidential candidates. Bower and Kraft’s “Indonesia’s Elections Become a Two-Horse Race” emphasized how critical it

27 Even before the campaign season started, the smart usage of social media and mobile technology caught the political candidates’ attention. Sam Bollier reveals how Indonesia’s two presidential candidates crisscrossed the country and faced off in five debates during the official campaign period (Al Jazeera).
was for the candidates to use social media to reach out to the public because Indonesian voters tend to elect personalities, not party platforms.

Social media has also influenced the construction of collective identity online among the voters and instilled the belief that voters could understand and influence political affairs. In the next two sections, I elaborate how the two candidates create an identity, one that their constituents can identify with and became the basis of their rhetoric. Both men maintained a social media presence via several channels, including Facebook. To tell how their social media creates a sense of identification during their political campaign, I am using Burke's "Rhetoric—old and new" references on Identification. Burke states “'Identification’ at its simplest is also a deliberate device, as when the politician seeks to identify himself with his audience.” (203) The following sections illustrate how Indonesia’s 2014 presidential candidates used Facebook to identify themselves with some group or other earnestly.

*Prabowo Subianto*

Prabowo Subianto, the patron leader of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), ran for president in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election. Prabowo Subianto has always been viewed as a former general by the public and was exceedingly ambitious. He is the quintessential “blue blood,” and he maintained this identity on Facebook by sharing his ancestral links to the Javanese aristocracy.
The ex-general Prabowo Subianto launched serious campaigns on social media, particularly on Facebook, to appeal to voters on these platforms before the official election campaign started. Judging by the friendly, welcoming message on his Facebook page, which he launched in June 2008, Prabowo Subianto wanted to project an image suggesting that he considered Internet users more than connections or voters. He was embracing them as his friends — much as they are labeled “friends” by the social media site itself.

One of his first posts included the title, “Gerindra asks me to be the next president,” referring to his political party. Prabowo Subianto also shared his military past, detailing his career and achievements on the awards section of the page, and he posted a photograph that shows a moment of calm and perhaps perceived stability. By doing this,
he was trying to create an image of a soldier, a nationalist, and an independent, disciplined, firm leader. Such is the power of creating ethos via social media.

He posted an image to prove that he manages his own Facebook page, and this sample post represents part of his larger effort to win over his audience:

Figure 4 Prabowo Subianto, Prabowo Subianto's Facebook, Web.

Selamat pagi sahabatku. Tidak jarang saya membaca, sebagian dari sahabat bertanya di dinding saya: Apakah benar ini Facebook saya? Apakah benar Facebook ini saya kelola sendiri? Saya mulai aktif menggunakan media sosial sejak tahun 2008. Saya yakin, media sosial ini, jika saya gunakan dengan baik, serius dan konsisten, akan banyak manfaatnya. Dalam menulis status, memahami serta menanggapi hal-hal yang teman-teman sampaikan disini, tentu saya lakukan sendiri, dan
dibantu oleh staff-staff terdekat saya. Terima kasih saya kepada semua, sahabatku dari Sabang sampai Merauke, dari dari seluruh dunia yang tidak dapat saya sebutkan satu per satu, yang telah bergabung di Facebook saya ini. Mari kita terus galang kekuatan, jaga kesatuan, demi Indonesia yang lebih baik. Salam Indonesia Raya

Roughly translated into English, this read:

Good morning, my friend. Often I read half of my [Facebook] friends asking on my [Facebook] wall: Is it my real Facebook’s account? Is it true that I run this account by myself? I have become active in using social media since 2008. I believe, with this social media, if I am using it in a good, serious and consistent way, it will bring benefits. In writing a status [update], understanding and responding to whatever people are posting here, I did it all by myself, and also with the help of my closest staff. My gratitude for all, my friends from Sabang until Merauke, from all over the world, which I cannot mention one by one, who have joined on my Facebook page. Let’s gather our power, maintain our unity, for a Better Indonesia.

Consistency is particularly important in social media because everything is digitized and recorded for posterity (Burton and Shea 135). As part of Subianto’s attempt to appear consistent and forthright, he stated that he maintained his Facebook account and as proof even posted a picture of himself updating it. Subianto uploaded pictures, music videos, and movies to his account, to connect with others in more personal and emotional ways. Subianto tried to appeal to nationalistic voters by uploading an image of Indonesian’s founding father — suggesting that he is a nationalist leader by association.
Other images included army uniforms to symbolize courage and nationalism. He explained the photos this way:

Selain alasan praktis, setelan yang saya gunakan mengingatkan saya untuk selalu berbuat yang terbaik selama saya masih diberikan hidup oleh Allah SWT. Seperti sahabat ketahui, setelan yang saya gunakan adalah setelan yang sama yang digunakan oleh para pendahulu kita, para pejuang di masa perang kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia.

Roughly translated into English, this reads as follows:

Other than practical reasons, the uniform I am wearing reminds me always to do good deeds as long as I shall live. Like you all know, this suit that I am wearing is the same suit used by our founding fathers, the Warriors back during the war for the independence of the Indonesian Republic.”
Subianto also used movie clips and short videos featuring his heroic predecessors to develop an emotional connection with the Facebook audience. He adopted the shared values of the veterans and advocacy of Indonesian heroes’ nationalist spirit.

![GerindraTV, Videos, Web.](image)

One video used the song of "Gugur Bunga di Taman Bakti" (The Fallen Flower in the Garden of Devotion), for background music. "Gugur Bunga" is sometimes used to honor the Indonesian soldiers killed during the Indonesian National Revolution. Another video, called “bergabunglah dengan gerakan revolusi putih” (Join with the white revolution movement) illustrated a short narrative with glorious original scoring and animated eagles meant to conjure optimism and superior leadership. The video itself was made to encourage Indonesians to consume milk since Indonesia’s milk consumption per
capita is on the bottom row of milk consumption in Southeast Asia and other developing countries.

Figure 7 GerindraTV, Hungry Is The Tiger, Web.

He added longer videos, too, as part of his image-building strategy. Through his Facebook account, Subianto linked viewers to a film titled “Hungry Is the Tiger,” which ran slightly more than an hour. The movie tries to analyze complicated societal issues, but with a simple and humanizing approach, making Subianto appears to be a concerned and compassionate candidate for the masses.
**Joko Widodo**

Joko Widodo was previously the governor of Jakarta and, before that, the mayor of Surakarta. In a political system dominated by figures that rose to prominence during Suharto's authoritarian regime, Joko Widodo was a wildcard, defying the wealth and privilege that have come to dominate Indonesian politics. As a modest man from outside the “system,” (the son of a carpenter, Joko Widodo was a former furniture exporter), many constituents referred to him by the familiar nickname “Jokowi.” Jokowi is a very common name in Indonesia, and his team added honorific titles to distinguish him from the rest. He used the title of “Ir.” for his engineering degree, for instance, and “H.” for having made the hajj pilgrimage.

![Image of Joko Widodo](image)

**Figure 8 Joko Widodo, Joko Widodo's Facebook, Web.**

Unlike his opponent, Jokowi did not specify who managed his Facebook account, and several Facebook Fan Pages existed in addition to the main namesake page created in the early period of campaign race. For politicians, social media requires a particular balance of projecting emotional appeal without being too personally passionate and risking the appearance of vulnerability or weakness. Jokowi is famous for his populist
leadership style, his charismatic personality, and his political achievements. Known for visiting slums to talk to residents (blusukan) and inspecting sewers first-hand, Jokowi told Indonesian voters through his Facebook page that he wanted to start a new political tradition based on his experience and progressive breakthroughs as mayor of Surakarta.

Figure 9 keziagw, #salam2jari, Web.

Its upside cannot be denied: Facebook and other mediums present a unique opportunity for politicians to target every audience imaginable. Jokowi focused on targeting young people in both urban and rural areas. One way was by acting young: rock bands often were invited to outdoor campaign events to cover Jokowi’s catchy campaign song "Salam Dua Jari" (or “Two-Finger Greeting”), which referred to his number two position on the ballot. He used “salam dua jari” or two-fingers salute — developed into the hashtag #salamduajari — to attract young people and spread the word.
Jokowi had gained support from local communities relatively easily because he had regularly arranging well-publicized visits to communities, often in poor areas. During the campaign, Jokowi traveled to many parts of Indonesia and posted his activities on Facebook, and these “blusukan” activities boosted his popularity tremendously. But to win the Indonesian presidential election, he also needed to call on a vast social media network of young activists to defeat Prabowo Subianto’s better funded and better managed campaign.

Figure 11 Sting, "Use your rights-every vote count #Jokowi9Juli", Web.
Because of Jokowi’s interest in music, musicians from around the country, including the cast of the movie Jalanan, volunteered to create a campaign song titled “Salam Dua Jari,” (referring to the two-finger salutation).

In fact, several international artists — including Jason Mraz, Arkarna, and Sting — posted their support for him on Twitter and Facebook, tagging #Jokowi9Juli or, in Arkarna’s case, #ArkarnaVoteJokowi. Jokowi claimed to be a fan of Metallica, Led Zeppelin and Napalm Death, a band known for its liberal political views. The candidate saw music as reflecting the desire to fight for change, which was an essential thrust of his political platform; he believed many heavy metal fans have a high degree of social conscience, saying that many rock anthems “…revolve around the themes of love and humanity, and offer lessons on life. [Therefore] the government should give their support so those bands can succeed internationally.”

Joko Widodo, like Prabowo Subianto, shared a variety of media on his Facebook account, including short movies aimed at generating empathy and an emotional connection with his followers. A June 2013 film depicting Joko Widodo's childhood and youth revealed that he was called Mulyono and then changed his name after a childhood
illness. Joko Widodo expressed some objections to the movie, saying that he felt his life
had been a simple one and was not worthy of being presented as a movie. Those personal
experiences and his modest background successfully generated pathos, and he was being
consistent in portraying his populist view.

A Glance to the Second Premise: A Dystopian Perspective

The points discussed in previous sections indicate a support to the first premises,
and the sheer number of individuals using Facebook makes it an excellent point of
analysis. Facebook, Whatsapp, and Twitter are the most popular social media in
Indonesia. Currently, there are over 35 million Facebook users in Indonesia, making it the
country with the second highest number of Facebook users. In the last six months,
Indonesian Facebook membership has increased by over 28 million, and over the past
year, it has grown 600 percent. Indonesian netizen comprises 59 percent males and 41
percent females, and most users are between 18 and 24 years old. Although this group
may have historically low voter turnout, their vote is of particular importance as they just
recently surpassed baby boomers as the largest cohort.

The first premise of this dissertation focuses on the connectivity of social
networking sites with the increasing number of youth populations on social networking
sites creates homogeneity of groups on Facebook and leads to political engagement.
Based on the first premise, many politicians in the 2014 election focus on youth
populations on their social media campaign because these youth populations can corral a large number of young adult voters by engaging with them on Facebook.

However, since identification is a deliberative device, there is “a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences or divisions, which the rhetoric of identification would transcend.” (Burke 203) Therefore, I argue that the homogeneous aspect of social media contradicts with the pluralistic aspect of society. The second premise of this dissertation highlights the nature of individual's diversity in which social media failed to accommodate. In this section, I will begin my discussion on the second premises, although it will also be further elaborate in the last remaining chapters of this dissertation.

The second premise acknowledges the pluralistic aspect of society, which the nature of social media polarization highlighted the differences between ideology and create further divisions. In the 2014 election, several groups in the society were using social media to connect. However, later, they also began to start utilizing social media account to incite and spread hatred. After the election, the government has attempted to penalize a site manager who spread hatred\textsuperscript{28}.

\textsuperscript{28} At the beginning of 2015, Indonesia's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology blocked 22 websites that are supported by Radical Islamic movement. The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) requests this censorship, although it raises the pros and cons in the community. Many argue that blocking the access to that website also shackle freedom of the press and freedom of expression. BNPT recommend the blocking because the site's content includes writings that incite and spread hatred, and based on these reports, the ministry Communications and Information Technology able to block the sites proposed.
Animosity also becomes a big issue after the election; questions emerged regarding who manages the official Facebook account Joko Widodo. This issue surfaced early in 2016 after Indonesia's cabinet secretary said that the president does not have a Facebook account and Twitter. Cabinet Secretary Andi Widjajanto in a statement to BBC claims that the president does not own or hold social media accounts on Twitter and Facebook, even though the two accounts already have a verified mark.

The issue of anonymity, false news or hoaxes news is one thing, but the problem of social media polarization leads to a bigger problem. Starting in the 2014 election, some people publish something in the virtual world not because of a personal desire but because of encouragement from others. Based on this understanding, I believe that the two 2014 presidential candidates were using social media to reinforce pre-existing beliefs and values, or their beliefs and values. This rhetorical situation encourages political polarization, in which politicians’ identification with a particular political party or ideology defines their stance on a given issue.

Anonymity becomes an issue in social media because it eliminates the role of authenticity and authority; no one is accountable for false news or hoaxes posing as news. Now in Indonesia, individuals who spread false news or hoax news will likely be charged with violating Article 28 pars 1 of Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE). Article 28 pars 2 UU ITE prohibits any person disseminating information that is intended to cause hatred and animosity based on ethnic background, religion, race or class.

In 2014, “out of a population of 246 million, more than 70 million Indonesians are using the Internet, most of whom are living in the cities” (In Asia). Aside from Java and Bali, many parts of Indonesia are still very rural. People barely have electricity, much less Internet access. However, since both urbanization and living standards are on the rise, more Indonesians may be exposed to the Internet sooner than later. Even though "only 30 percent of Indonesians use the Internet on a daily basis," (Balea) social media have room for growth in Indonesia. However, by looking at the development of social
Social networks are the spaces in which people connect and communicate, but social media is also a place to exhibit the connection and promotes “an echo chamber.” People post certain things on social media because they were in the same class or group, or likely from certain political parties that promised some money. During the election, there were indications that social media created an extended division because it amplifies one side of an opinion.

During Indonesia’s election in 2014, social media was used to create buzz, in which information, ideas, and beliefs are amplified or reinforced by buzzers. Some political party promised money for the cyber armies to defend a particular candidate. Scholars refer them as buzzers, and sometimes the buzzer does not present an objective view and just follows the brief given. In the political field, the buzzer should not just say, "Come on, select candidate X." However, they also have to explain the reasons why people should choose candidate X.

Romel Tea's “Media Sosial Indonesia Darurat Hoax dan BuzzerPolitik, Waspada!" discusses the social media emergence of fake news and buzzers, which are paid by politicians to put up posts featuring certain causes to raise public opinion. Hoaxes media in Indonesia after the 2014 election, it offers a more dystopian view of social media.

31 There was propaganda scattered across the Internet and through social media such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and others, during the 2014 election. After the election, the growing number of social networking sites and a large number of Facebook users made the threat of radicalization in the virtual world more dangerous by inciting through propaganda. Krithika Varagur's “Indonesia's Cyber Warriors Battle ISIS with Memes, Tweets and WhatsApp” describe the “cyber warriors” who are using social media to counter the propaganda machine.
and buzzers began to bloom in Indonesia after the last presidential election campaign in 2014 and expanded during 2017's gubernatorial election in Jakarta.

The complexity of contemporary identification in understanding digital media includes understanding personas, understanding appeals to an audience, and understanding subjects. In the context of social media or information on the Internet, the buzzer is the influencer, someone who influences or attempts to influence others to listen to their opinions, beliefs, and make others react afterward. Not just a hoax and a buzzer, there are also websites or blogs that serve as media propaganda and act as journalistic media. However, hoaxes are commonly found on Facebook, with users often encouraged or forced via hijacks and hacks to share and like content. Based on the context, intention, and genre in this digital rhetorical identification, I will analyze it further in the later chapters by applying rhetorical theory and digital rhetorical identification.

**Conclusion**

Social media played a crucial role in Indonesia’s 2014 election, with both candidates’ campaign attracting posts, comments, shares, and likes. The emergence of new media offers a new experience of the relationship between identity and community. It shifts the personal and social experience. In this case, Facebook allowed Subianto and Jokowi to cross boundaries and create their stories and create a collective identity.

Both candidates managed to touch on a very sensitive issue through their social media campaign, which is a racial issue. Subianto promoted “anti-discrimination” and
Jokowi argued for “pluralism.” Both are delicate issues that could invite a never-ending debate. Both candidates took a different angle in defending their arguments about this issue. Subanto firmly defended his nationalism, while Jokowi emphasized his support of diversity. The later chapter of this dissertation will further discuss this issue, which focuses on identification and division.

Visual input and symbols are important for voters, and both candidates try to create identities via social media visually that would connect them with their audience effectively. These were two very different candidates with different beliefs, yet both capitalized on the power of Facebook to create support and emotional connections with their electorate. Subianto hoped to appear a decisive leader and attract a younger population that would not dwell on controversies of the past. Jokowi, however, presented himself as an “everyman” who would be capable of bringing change through sincere and honest leadership. His victory signaled widespread support for that approach and a casting aside of the “old” style of Indonesian politics — one that was established well before the era of Facebook and social media.

Questions have arisen as to whether these candidates ran their Facebook account or relied on a team of experts or so-called ghostwriters. The credibility and character of the communicator are one essential element of strong rhetoric, and whoever ran the account influenced each candidate’s image. Interestingly, while Subianto tried to prove that he maintained his Facebook page by himself, Jokowi did not make the same effort. It is unfortunate that voters failed to recognize the man behind Jokowi's Facebook page because it may well have impacted Jokowi's credibility. Later it was discovered that the
person who managed Jokowi's Facebook page did not communicate with the secretary of state when he posted something on the official website. Social media has presented a more complicated scenario for voters. Other than credibility and validity, there are also issues such as social media polarization, fake news, and slacktivism.

There are several expanded applications of social media in both candidates' political communication, with an attempt to create identification and consubstantiality. I will further analyze this expanded use of social media from the perspective of rhetorical theory in the next chapter. The previous chapters contribute to the development of social media theory in political communication, which encourages a more critical theory as an expansion of social media theory. In the later chapters, I will discuss the theories surrounding the conversations of digital media and everyday life, and integrate rhetorical theory and social media theory as an analytical foundation to explain identity formation. Other instruments of identification will be analyzed in Chapter 4 to examine the function of social media in Indonesian political elections to create identification in participatory culture.
CHAPTER THREE: IDENTIFICATION IN PARTICIPATORY CULTURE

This chapter begins with reviewing Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical theory, Kenneth Burke's concept of identification, and Henry Jenkins's participatory culture\(^\text{32}\). The chapter then discusses the approach I am using in the analysis and the two theoretical apparatus used are the theories of identification and identity in networked culture. Burke's theory of identification is the main theoretical concept since it provides a broad view on the study of language as a human action with intentions (motivations). Meanwhile, Sherry Turkle's ideas on writing identities into the virtual spaces is an important point since it emphasizes multiple identities in online environments. I also consider Douglas Eyman's understanding of the rhetorical situation, identity, networks, and digital rhetoric, to explain the connection between identification and networked culture.

The outcome of this review is that a collective participation in social media is, in fact, promising (paradoxically) for the particular use of social media to create identification. Thus, rhetoricians should not reduce the goal of identification in a presidential campaign to matters of appropriateness, but to the proper governance of the self-acting society. There are three sections in this chapter, with the first one focusing on the concept of identification, the second one on the imagined community and collective culture, and the third one on the politics of networked culture.

\(^{32}\) In addition to Jenkins’ influential account of Web 2.0 culture, I will also use Howard Rheingold’s reflections on social uses of mobile computing devices to counter Jason Lanier’s attacks against Web 2.0.
Kenneth Burke’s Concept of Identification

I use Kenneth Burke’s theory of dramatism as a lens to examine how Facebook brings about identification and consubstantiality between presidential candidates and their constituents. My research project utilizes Kenneth Burke’s identification as a binding theory to explain motivations in creating a rhetorical situation. This section has two parts, the first part focuses on principles of identification and the second part focuses on identity in a networked culture.

Theories of Identification

This section reframes the notion of the rhetorical situation, and discuss some of the key concepts such as consubstantiality, identification, and division. Lloyd Bitzer's “The Rhetorical Situation” construction of the rhetorical situation includes three key elements: exigence, audience, and constraints. He believes that rhetorical discourse is called into existence by the situation, and the rhetorical activity frames the interaction of rhetoric, text, audience, and rhetorical purpose as an exigence. The following understanding serves as a lens that frames the exigence and also helps in analyzing an issue or situation (topic):
“[P]rior to the creation and presentation of discourse, there are three constituents of any rhetorical situation: the first is the exigence; the second and third are elements of the complex, namely the audience to be constrained in decision and action, and the constraints which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience.” (Bitzer 6)

Bitzer defined the rhetorical situation as, “A complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence, which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence." (6) The essential key element here is the exigence, the need or desire to say something in response to a situation. The academic definition and use of "rhetoric" have evolved to

33 Bitzer's focus on the sense of timing needed to speak about a situation in a way that can best remedy the exigence, calls for argument or agreement. The "situations" can be exigent because they call for the "meeting of the minds" that we understand as identification, and therefore, identification can be the source of exigency as well. Richard E. Vatz's "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation" argues that there is an intrinsic nature of events from which rhetoric follows or should follow inexorably. “Situations are discrete and discernible. They have a life of their own independent in meaning of those upon whom they impinge. They may or may not ‘require’ responses” (Vatz 155). Bitzer acknowledges this very limitation to his process when reasoning, "One might say metaphorically that every situation prescribes its fitting response; the rhetor may or may not read the prescription accurately" (11). A scientific method promotes the agency of the author but ultimately guarantees nothing in a dynamic situation. Vatz demonstrates the subjectivity in all rhetorical situations and writes “the world is a scene of inexhaustible events which all compete to impinge on what Kenneth Burke calls our ‘sliver of reality’” (156). Although we may draw discursive clues from every rhetorical situation, there will be uncertain and undaunted discursive subjectivity effects.
include any situation in which people consciously communicate with each other, and emphasize the importance of understanding rhetoric as "identification."

Strong ethos and pathos appeal also constitute the material of a dynamic composition; therefore, although we may draw discursive clues from every situation, the exigency that arises outside of language is just as transformative in influencing a moment of mis/communication. “The scope of the rhetorical situation narrows in its inability to account for the role of non-discursive [and therefore, to Bitzer, non-rhetorical] exigencies on human communication structures” (6).

In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Kenneth Burke explains the realistic function of rhetoric, in which Burke asked only that this function could be recognized as “a linguistic function by nature as realistic as proverb.” (44). Meanwhile, Bitzer explains that "a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task” (3-4). In the face of changing exigencies, how can we choose between competing values?34

Others have used different words to describe the art of persuasion, but Burke explores identification and its function in the realm of rhetoric. He considers rhetoric as “[r]ooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and

34 A rhetor needs to take account the first semantic representation of the situation in determining the difference between the "ideal" case and the "actual" case. Contending that the world was not a plot of discrete events, a rhetor must take two steps to communicate: 1) choose what facts or events are relevant and 2) translate the chosen material to make it meaningful (Vatz 157).
is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” (*A Rhetoric of Motives* 43)

Burke's essay, “The Rhetorical Situation” concludes that identification could be vague, "[...] a person may think of himself as 'belonging' to some special body more or less clearly defined [...] or to various combination of these" (268). Burke’s *A Rhetoric of Motives* also illustrates how an individual found meaning in the fluctuating line of differences and this fluidity can impact individual autonomy.

Burke lays out his crucial definition of the realm of rhetoric in this important discussion of identification, consubstantiality, and division. I use the term identification, then, to refer to a dimension of rhetorical expression or a rhetoric of motives that evaluates the traditional perception of rhetoric as persuasion. I consider rhetoric as the study of language as a human action that has intentions (motivations) and effects. Kenneth Burke's *Permanence and Change* believes that any set of motives is part of a larger implicit or explicit rationalization regarding the human purpose for a while, and "since we characterize a situation with reference to our general scheme of meanings, it is clear how motives, a shorthand words for situations, are assigned with reference to our orientation in general." (31). Burke, in Freud’s footsteps, set out to expose human motivations by analyzing language.

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35 and “... the poignancy of the rhetorical situation attains its fullness in its spontaneously arising identifications whereby, even without deliberate intent upon the part of anyone, we fail to draw the lines at the right places” (Burke 271).
Diane Davis’s “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are” discusses the different ways Burke and Freud base their theory of identification, in which Burke insists that identification is a symbolic act while Freud reflects on an affective identification that precedes the distinction between “self” and “other.” Davis states that although both Freud and Burke describe identification as a social act, it "partially unifies discrete individuals, a mode of 'symbolic action' (as Burke would say) that resides squarely within the representational arena (or the dramatistic frame).” (125) But the changes in public deliberation and interaction on the Internet have changed our substance, and the virtual and real selves position identity as a strategic performance and contextual interaction. Later, I also refer to Aaron Hess's "You Are What You Compute," in which he uses Burkean identification to examine digital technology and introduce the concept of digital substance and the technological unconscious consubstantiality.

Burke is heavily invested in Freud, as there are psychological elements in Burkean rhetoric. The psychological self is always seeking unity with others, and change invites a new sense of motivation for the individual actor. In political communication, people tend to "rely heavily on the Internet and other media to make choices about politics through blogs and news sites, [...] and who we know through social networking." (Hess 1) There is a certain degree of unconsciousness in a community that all its members share.

There is a set of words comprising what we might call the Stance family, in which contributed significantly to the choice of identification. The most prominent one is
"subStance," and from the contradiction or opposition of a stance, we will see how identification emerged as a “positive negative,” a program for negative thinking. In *A Grammar of Motives* (1945), Burke introduces the key term “substance” and deals with its universal paradoxes. This term involves resources of placement and is common to all thought. He argues, "Substance was understood in geometric, familial, and directional terms, among others." (29-58) From analyzing Samson Agonistes in *Empedocles on Etna*, Burke eventually concludes that the states of two “substances” share a common “property.” Burke asserts that substances have ambiguities—they are joined and separate, at once distinct and consubstantial with another.

In the last chapter of *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud described “the conscious of unknown motives,” which throws light on the complex problems of human behavior:

> Certain inadequacies of our psychic capacities — whose common character will soon be more definitely determined — and certain performances, which are apparently unintentional, prove to be well motivated when subjected to the psychoanalytic investigation and are determined by the consciousness of unknown motives. (159)

This passage poses some interesting points about psychoanalysis and the problem or conflict that involves the unconscious imitation of behaviors, attitudes, and goals. Freud gave some examples from his psychoanalysis, in which he found that speech is either
"under the influence of thoughts which have become active simultaneously, or under absolutely unconscious thoughts [...]" (Freud 329)

In the next following section, I expand Burke’s identification as a means of analysis and Freud’s writing primarily on psychological issues and determinism to understand the substance shared (or not) by Internet users in social media contexts. Identification is the desire for consubstantiality, a sharing of ambiguous substances. Hess’s expansion of identification into digital media context argues that “the process of group identification explicated by organisational scholars is useful for seeing how identification occurs about others, because [...] the unconscious process of group identification occurs in subtle ways while online." (Hess, 8) He argues that Burkean concepts, such as consubstantiality and equipment for living, can illuminate the ways in which users are identified and organized.

To begin with “identification” is to confront the implications of the division. Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. "One need not scrutinize the concept of 'identification' very closely to see its ironic counterpart, division, implied at every turn" (A Rhetoric of Motives 23). Three types of identification strategies can now be derived from Burke and "operationalized" by most communication scholars (Cheney 148):

1. The Common Ground Technique

2. Identification through antithesis
3. The assumed or transcendent "we."

I adapt Cheney’s common ground technique used to illustrate the significance of tactics in the organizational context and apply it to social media in political communication\textsuperscript{36}. According to Cheney, "as an individual response to the divisions of society, a person acts to identify with some target(s), i.e., persons, families, groups, collectivities; and to a lesser extent, values, goals, knowledge, activities, objects." (145) Cheney believes that the connection between organizations and rhetoric is more evident in Burke's discussion of the terms "order," "hierarchy," "mystery," and "identification." Burke's "Rhetoric—old and new" described how selves are mutually transformed by the influence of each other\textsuperscript{37}.

Therefore, in talking about identity in networked cultures, we must understand how identity is constructed and experienced in the contemporary world. This current turn toward digital media and networks resulted in the fragmented, shifting, and partial identities in the digital age. Identity constructions in networked cultures evoke the wider

\textsuperscript{36} Another scholar who may also contribute to our understanding of the concept of identification is Jonathan Cohen in “Defining Identification.” Cohen describes identification with media characters as “an imaginative process invoked as a response to characters within media texts” (250) that leads to empathy with the character, perspective-taking, shared motivations, and absorption into the content.

\textsuperscript{37} He writes, "Identification" at its simplest is also a deliberate device, as when the politician seeks to identify himself with his audience. In this respect, its equivalents are plentiful in Aristotle's Rhetoric. But identification can also be an end, as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may be acting upon themselves to this end. In such identification there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences or divisions, which the rhetoric of identification would transcend. (203)
collectives of peer group and family and facilitate a dialectical relationship between personal and social identities. This shift ruptures both the imagined community and the actual audience, allow users to react to new information, situations, and contexts, and define participation on their terms.

Identity in Networked Culture

This section discusses the notion of digital rhetoric, how it accounts for the nature of such blurred offline and online identities. Networked digital communication technologies have fundamentally altered the shared substance of social media users, leading to changes in offline and online rhetorical interactions. On the one hand, Burke’s paradox of substance holds that a human, the symbol-using animal, can only refer to the intrinsic essence of a thing by an extrinsic referent (a word). When digital rhetoric scholars seek to admit technology and nonsymbolic factors into the rhetorical situation, electronic information not only changes what is meant by “author” and “text,” but also “desubstantializes” the arts and letters.

James Zappen's "Digital Rhetoric" explores the uses of persuasion in digital media, especially digital texts, and offers an integrated theory of digital rhetoric. Meanwhile, even though Kenneth Burke did not focus on politics or digital media in some of his notable books, Burke’s concept of identification has attained preeminence in rhetorical theory and criticism and therefore could justify/ support the exploration of the rhetoric of everyday life and political communication praxis. The advent of digital and
networked communication technologies prompts renewed interest in fundamental questions such as what counts as a text. To echo Burke’s words, “a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing” (*Permanence and Change* 49). I suggest that computational devices and services can be the inherent “ordering” involved in enframing that prevent us from seeing alternative “orderings.” Some of the issues raised by technology occur when human wants to enable a machine to understand the human relationship as it will require additions to the way users represents data on the web, hence the identification of social classes.

Hess offer "an understanding of digital rhetorical identification which contends that part of our unconscious self is stored and accessed through digital technology, including its inherent programming, or algorithms, and user digital identifiers, or cookies." (1) Digital rhetorical identification entails a process of technological unconscious consubstantiality and accounts for the nature of such blurred offline and online identities in the contemporary digital era. Hess adds that Kenneth Burke provides “the theoretical foundation of identity and identification, and elements of his theorizing can illuminate discussions of technology, especially the use of online digital “cookies” and their respective algorithms." (2)³⁸

³⁸ Meanwhile, Zappen attends to identity as a complex negotiation between various versions of our online and our real selves, between our many representations of our selves and our listeners and readers, and, not least (as Manovich suggests), between our many selves and the computer structures and operations through which we represent these selves to others. (323)
Douglas Eyman's *Digital Rhetoric* makes a strong claim for the field identity of digital rhetoric, in which social media exerts a rhetoric of its own. Digital rhetoric is the application of the integrated rhetorical theory that attends identity as a complex negotiation between various versions of our online and our real selves and considers the ideological function of discourse (connecting people as communities with commonly held beliefs) as an interest in rhetoric. As the study of language as human action, digital rhetoric is defined as "an analytic method or heuristic for production." (Eyman 44) Digital rhetoric focuses on intentions (motivations and effects) in digital texts and performances, and complex negotiation between our many representations of listeners and our ourselves and readers.

In digital rhetoric, several methodologies can be generated automatically, including extracting the most common phrases or several other systems. Eyman offers several methods, in which he believes that this form of data visualisation has clear potential as a digital rhetoric method (111). I am not using specific computer software to analyse the online updates, instead, I adapt Cheney's common ground strategy in the sample of online updates studied regarding (1) frequency of appearance, (2) the variety of types of articles manifesting the approach, and (3) the diversity of ways in which similarity or commonality is expressed. I agree with the idea that cookies and algorithms can disrupt the potentially rhizomatic form of the Internet by creating tracks. Identity within digital rhetoric exerts a rhetoric of its own, one that "forces" people to interact in ways that might falsely suggest identification (or group-think). Therefore, it is important to examine relevant lines of the theory that inform our understanding of both digital
technology and identity. It is not exactly the computational device that does this but the discursive practice that social media, such as the Facebook interface fosters, with "likes" and such.

Hess examined the intersection between computer technology and identity, and there are two lines of thinking, "First, the notion of a separate, fluid online identity that problematizes offline identity has been rethought. Second, users of digital technology often conceptualize online identity in ways that are tied to traditional notions of embodied identity." (4) In the digital sense, this would seem that “individuals should share common cookies, but identification online happens in much more subtle ways” (Hess 13).

When it comes to online identity formation, with the construction of identity politics still shaped by others, online identity cannot be completely free from the social constraints. In digital media, we cannot avoid or downplay the object’s presence simply because communication cannot occur without it. In digital rhetoric, complex negotiation also involves the many selves and the computer structures and operations through which we represent these selves to others.

The Internet can become a major technological factor in identity formation by enabling people to access and interpret global sources of information in local identity contexts through key nodes and sources. David Blakesley and Thomas Rickert's "From

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39 Davis discusses how “identity is not something concretely possessed by the individual; it is the enactment of a series of dissociated and frequently contradictory roles defined by the groups with which one identifies.” (127)
Nodes to Nets" describes how networks, information, and complexity have implications for rhetoric. Blakesley and Rickert cite Mark C. Taylor's *The Moment of Complexity*, which proposes that “the contemporary world can be best understood as a network culture subject to the transformative forces of complexity, forces which allow for randomness and order to coexist in systems continually adapting to new contexts.” (qtd. in Blakesley and Rickert 823-24)

Some scholars have written about social media as a promising vehicle for community—or, in Burke’s terminology, consubstantiality. As we struggle to make meaning of our lives on the screen, scholars consider the Internet as a place for a fundamental rethinking of identity as anonymous, fluid, and unfixed. Sherry Turkle’s *Life on The Screen* proposes a view of nature and society and one’s sense of personal identity due to the complex and ultimately random nature of Internet interactions. She also explores at length the possibilities of online communication for identity construction, stating that “in the daily practice of many computer users, windows have become a powerful metaphor for thinking about the self as a multiple, distributed system." (14) Online identity construction stimulates conversation about technology as it relates to our inner lives, and although it has grown up in a communication culture, it is not necessarily a culture of self-reflection. "Exploring the Web is a process of trying one thing, then another, of making connections, of bringing disparate elements together." (Turkle 61) Turkle also explores at length the possibilities that, through the process of localization, construction, or creation from a diverse range of available things, online communication offers identity formation.
Burke’s *Essays Toward a Symbolic of Motives, 1950-1955* introduces the term “identity,” explaining how it deals with unique individuals. Identity is a titular or ancestral condition, and every individual’s identity is a product of his or her peculiarly constructed act or form. Burke offers a lens for rhetorically examines the performances and negotiations involved in both real and virtual experiences. Meanwhile, Turkle identifies points of slippage wherein identity becomes conflated with user's sense of self to create an authentic self-predicated on both experiences. Turkle believes that online experiences challenge the way we see ourselves, and therefore encourages the examination of the influence of technology on the way we create and experience identity.\(^4\)

Humans are complex beings, and although people consider some computers as intelligent, they are machines that could never grasp human meanings that reach beyond language. Computers are objects against which we can measure ourselves; they have an evocative quality in that “interacting with them provokes reflection on the nature of the self.” (Turkle, 1093) Therefore, successfully engage in social media, in general, involves carefully constructing personal narratives on Facebook.

\(^4\) "Certain human actions depended on the soul and the spirit, the possibilities of spontaneity over programming." (Turkle 82) When one applies the assertions of Turkle to identity fluidity on the Internet, it would seem that communication moves towards consubstantiality. Consubstantiality is a desire for an imaginary (and ambiguous) shared substance and the blurring of identities allows users to existing separately as agents while also acknowledging their overlap. With the projected and patchwork identities, there would be even more possibilities to imagine shared identities, because where there is division, the desire for identity get stronger.
Social media offers more possibilities, more means, and more potential for creating identities. I believe that we can use Burke’s concept of identification to understand how Facebook shapes rhetoric and how to reconfigure unpersuasive approaches on social media. Social media operates within a certain rhetorical situation, and this is what Burke refers to the notion of orientation, in “a bundle of judgments as to how things were, how they are, and how they might be” (Permanence 14). The rhetorical situation in social media is more complicated as the rhetor must assume a kind of ready stance in which, according to Burke, orientation is the rhetor’s position in relation to choices and considerations.

If orientation is the rhetor's position concerning opportunities and attention, to what extent does the use of identification influence election results, particularly in gaining young voters’ support? Aporia and paradox might play relatively minimal roles in the unconscious mind, but play bigger roles as candidates establish common ground with their constituents. The problem is that there is a significant and consistent relationship between Burke’s descriptions of identification and other facets of identification discussed by other scholars in the realm of rhetoric. There is also a strong correlation between identification and identity.

Burke’s Language as Symbolic Action elaborates the concept of identification by extending its meaning beyond what he writes about it in A Rhetoric of Motives. Identification begins with a problem in Aristotle’s Rhetoric that centers on the speaker’s

41 Identification takes place well before conscious articulation.
explicit designs. In “Further Essays on Symbolism in General,” Burke introduces the concepts of identification and administrative rhetoric. Cheney applies these concepts in discussing organizations, identification, and persuasion. Persuasion is inherent in the process of organizing, and the concept of administrative rhetoric involves “a theory of persuasive devices which have a directly rhetorical aspect, yet include operations not confined to sheerly verbal persuasion.” (Burke 301)

Burke suggests that there are also ways in which we spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously persuade ourselves. In informing ideas of our personal identity, we “spontaneously identify ourselves with family, nation, political or cultural cause, church, and so on” (Burke 301). Cheney focuses his work on identification as “the symbolic process underlying basic tendencies in social relations,” (143) and therefore I consider his selected examples of identification categories:

1. Expression of concern for the individual
2. Recognition of individual contributions
3. Espousal of shared values
4. Advocacy of benefits and activities
5. Praise by outsiders
6. “Testimonials” by employees
Applying this concept to my research, I focus on the substance of Indonesia as the country, including the adoption of shared values of the veterans and advocacy of the nationalism nationalist spirit. I also consider the motives of the candidates, the prominent figures and the supporters of each candidate. According to Burke, there is no essential identity; what goes for your individual “substance” is not an essence but the incalculable totality of your complex and contradictory identifications.\(^{42}\)

One difficulty in reading Burke is that he attempts to ground identity in contexts that are either impersonal or nebulous: in property, in one’s identification, and in language. In the social sciences, identification refers to a person’s sense of identity, a concept in psychoanalysis, and a concept in psychology. Meanwhile, Burke insists that identification is a symbolic act that therefore remains available for conscious critique and reasoned adjustment. Burke suggests that identification is a symbolic act—whether conscious or unconscious—which therefore remains available for sober evaluation and reasoned change.

Other research suggests identification and the merging of one’s self-concept with that of the target of identification may have positive implications when the outcomes associated with elevating media are considered. Since identification is an intersubjective process, identity goes beyond being merely personal or interpersonal because an individual identity is elaborated and complicated in networked culture.

\(^{42}\) I am applying identification within the context of rhetoric, and it will fall within the rhetoric of motives.
In *The Elements of Dramatism*, David Blakesley suggests that the rhetorical or linguistic turn became the visual turn and heightened awareness of the ways that our verbal means of representation cannot be easily (or rightly) separated from our ways of knowing. Blakesley argues, "Identification is never absolute, but must be asserted because of division or difference" (197). Therefore, identification is distinguishable from persuasion because it allows for an unconscious factor in the appeal. Social media becomes the terministic screen that allows certain groups to assert themselves, unconsciously, as a collective through particular cultural signs and features. Social media becomes the signifier, in which users desire to become the other and to inhabit the psychological state unconsciously. It can be done through language; wherein social media is demonstrated by terms like "followers," "like," "#," and by the known use of the language of a particular discourse community.

People identify with each other by a real or imagined (unconscious) overlap in interests, ideas, experiences, or feeling. The act of identification allows for an unconscious factor, but the key is to look at the way identification establishes a symbolic sense of consubstantiality between unequal beings. The challenge in understanding how social media plays a role in Indonesia’s political mobilization is on how to provide an original contribution that utilizes psychoanalytical theories of identification and identity to create inventional strategies for identification. In taking up these challenges, I refer to

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43 Krista Ratcliffe’s *Rhetorical Listening* offered a concept to supplement Burke’s rhetorical theory and explains why identification, especially cross-cultural identification, is sometimes difficult to achieve (1).
my other themes or contexts: Indonesian collective culture and Indonesia’s participatory culture.

The Narrative of The Collective Indonesian Cultural Identity

This subchapter aims to review the literature on Indonesia's collective culture and discuss how narrative theory and post-colonial theory applies to illustrate Indonesia’s culture. Since its appearance, post-colonialism has questioned and reinvented the manner in which we view culture, challenging the narratives of Indonesia, which expounded during the colonial era. I focus on the issue of Indonesia's strong collective culture, with the underlying assumption that collective identities are narrative constructions\textsuperscript{44}.

Alison Gilchrist, Mel Bowles, and Margaret Wetherell’s “Identities and Social Action” discuss how social movements and equality campaigns also use social media to create identification and division. "Identities are shaped by personal and cultural expectations and vice versa" (Gilchrist et al. 19) and as digital media becomes everyday media, politicians appropriate it to influence identity politics, sometimes in ways unanticipated or unintended by the users of the social network.

One of the guiding research questions of this study is how did the identification process operate during a presidential campaign? Merlyna Lim's dissertation on the

\textsuperscript{44} The integrity of narrative representation and the unified subject position of Indonesians as a founding subject provokes a genuine confrontation of discrepant histories and cultures by taking a combative stance on the legacies of the application of such parts of the “Western tradition” as the reason, progress, and history to non-European cultures.
Archipelago Online shows how the Internet was instrumental in facilitating political activism that contributed to establishing collective action and popular social movement. Gilchrist, et al. state:

Claiming the relevant identity in order to be part of these networks allows people to enjoy positive affirmation of their experience, contribute to collective action and may open up new insights into how to gain opportunities in an unfair world. Problems can arise, however, when equality perspectives become confused with ethnicity or with other aspects of identity such as gender, sexuality or age. (22-23)

As an “online social networking addict” society (Shubert), Indonesians follow a narrative as a gratification of their desire to express themselves. On such assumptions, narrative theorists have expanded their frameworks to incorporate reader response. Such an approach resembles communication theory, which, in some respects, has provided a foundation for theorizing the role of the reader, or user. However, “reader expectation” is also problematic, particularly in the light of recent developments in post-colonial theory, where the task is to see post-colonial discourses from colonized subjects.

Therefore, this section includes an intersection between psychoanalysis, political, and postcolonial theory. The section shows the dynamics of narrative theory and postcolonial theory, including some critiques of these theories, to deliberate an interpretative approach in analyzing the cultural aspect of Indonesia. Social media content can be seen
as a narrative, and Lim’s Archipelago Online has provided an excellent theoretical contribution to explaining the relationships between the Internet and political activism. Lim cites Turkle’s Life on The Screen in discussing cyberspace, in which “the Internet has been argued to be a medium of possibility where the individual can go beyond his or her social self.” (39) One of Lim’s focuses in her dissertation is on cultivating nationalist meta-narratives to fully grasp the socio-political uses of the Internet in a transition period. Her dissertation reveals that the dynamics of social change do not form linear pathways, but are instead “marked by breaking points and disjuncture that have no pre-conceived or necessary future destinations” (178). In the next chapter, I discuss how social media can be a tool to amplify collective actions and the narratives of resistance created by a group. In the later section, I discuss the long-term tensions in Indonesia as the result of Dutch colonial rule, which then influenced Indonesia’s nationalist meta-narratives.

**Narrative Theory**

The narrative theory argues that when one or more speakers engage in sharing and recounting an experience or event, the self is revealed and exposed. However, when one’s psychological criterion is presented and portrayed online but does not cohere with reality, it cannot be considered as a full self. Social media users carry ideas about a world one does not so much analyze as inhabit, and some online content has given way to branching narratives. Typically, the telling of a story occupies multiple turns in the course of a conversation, and stories or narratives may share common structural features. The
narrative is an essential means through which people produce an identity. Therefore, analyzing the narrative involves examining any change and even consistency or coherence among setting, appearance, and manner performed on social media.

Since social movements and equality campaigns also use social media to create identification and division, personal and cultural expectations shapes identities and vice versa. My research looks at the political candidates' Facebook’s timeline, in which the feature creates a visual narrative of each user’s life. Narrative theory's attention to plot, traditionally, has been more concerned with the temporal than with the spatial, and I consider the timelines as a chronological narrative of a Facebook user’s life. One might be able to perform their identity, but the identity itself involves a dialectic process, which exceptionally explained by Paul Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another*.

I also review how selves are created in social media by drawing from Marja Schechtman's *The Constitution of the Selves*. Schechtman suggests that a full self appears in social media when there is a unity in the subject’s psychological criterion, which is when their sense of survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation are unified. Therefore I argue, social media can be used as an unfolding project of understanding and form the self.

Social media users are keen to re-create their offline self online but engage in editing facets of self. Ricoeur’s notion of the dialectic relationship between *ipse* (selfhood) and *idem* (sameness) implies that in creating ‘selves’ in social media, one does not only enact a role or a function that has been assigned to them. Ricoeur argues, “The
narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. (147-148) This dialectic process helps in creating selves in social media because one’s *ipse* and *idem* shapes the narratives set up in social media.

Ricoeur argues, “It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character.” (147-148) Thus, the narrative identity that appears in social media is a dynamic one, and the dialectic builds the narrative identity. In Adrianne Cavarero’s *Relating Narratives*, the stories are touchstones in the creation of personal identity and self-understanding. Stories posted on social media may represent our lives as physical features that are staged, which imply a desire to manipulate others’ impressions of us on the stage. Selves are portrayed online in a circular reciprocity, and the selves are created depending on the story created by others. "The narratable self desire(s) a unity that only the tale of his/her life story can provide (Cavarero xxii)," and social media provide spaces for the formation of a full self that coheres with reality.

I focus on the identity construction and how selves are created on Facebook, and for the purpose of this research, I focus on the political candidates’ desire to create selves with which people identify. Impression management lies in the idea of there is an individual identity or personal identity, and a social identity in which it is more cultural. The concept of impression management is also why Cavarero emphasizes that “between identity and narration, there is a tenacious relation of desire.” (32) Saira Yamin defines identity as "the representation of one’s unique personal experience, memory, ethnicity,
culture, religious orientation, gender, or occupational role, amongst various other factors." (6)

Ricoeur designates three philosophical intentions before he answers the question of “what is personal identity?” and his last philosophical intentions seemed to contribute to the discussion of identity construction on Facebook. Ricoeur’s final philosophical aims addressed dialectic complementary to selfhood and sameness. In relation to identity construction on Facebook, the dialectic complementary to selfhood and sameness means that users’ character traits might influence the way they represent their lives on social media.

The concept of narrative identity developed by Ricoeur has its apparent juxtaposition and impulsiveness of action and character. Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity involves the dialectic between selfhood and sameness, and the narratives made should be coherent, between a beginning and an end. People can grasp their identities on social networking sites through storytelling urged another notion of a governing dialectic. A governing dialectic also means systematization of the stories told in social media, in creating a coherent identity.

Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity also utilizes the notion of emplotment, which in social media, is a way to assemble a series of historical events into a narrative identity on social networking sites. Social media, particularly Facebook, has introduced the idea of a timeline, or a collage of posted updates, links, photos and comments. I believe that Ricoeur’s concept of emplotment is similar to the way people post online
content in a timeline, both by us and by others. Alberto Romele’s “Narrative Identity and Social Networking Sites” suggests that the introduction of the timeline on Facebook has made it possible for the user to have a more coherent narrative of its activities online45.

One may argue that we narrate our life through everything we post on our timeline, which involves assembling a series of historical events into a narrative with a plot. Selves are created on Facebook when identity is being constructed explicitly to present oneself to a variety of interconnected audiences. There is a double hypothesis on whether we can only consider timelines as the assembly of a series of historical events, or whether they also enable people to share “their entire lives” on Facebook, as Zuckerberg suggests (The Telegraph). Social media is the “site” of conductive linkages that emerge across our personal, popular, and expert discourses. The idea does not try to claim authority or marginality, but to make electrate “sites.” The emphasis moves from productive knowledge to introduce the importance of shifting/shuffling “e-idents.”

A cultural identity affects the development of personal identity, and one’s culture may influence attachments and emotions as well as concepts and ideas in an online post.

45 To relate that to Ricoeur’s notion of personal identity, I believe that Facebook allows an uninterrupted continuity from all the things users have shared with their interconnected audiences.

46 On social media, youth culture provides the framework for identity, creating online communities and online relationships that might otherwise not exist offline. Users aged 18-29 might form their sort of collective “one true self” youth culture by possessing a shared culture that hides inside many others. Whether or not this is all that people are (as the narrative view of self-maintains), the fact is that we do tell stories. Based on the brief analysis in chapter 2, the candidates’ rhetoric shared on social media are not meant for a general audience, because they were telling stories about themselves on Facebook to anyone who will listen.
If a sense of self can only be obtained from coherence between everything that is presented in a narrative, then it will be tough to achieve a full self from a narrative created on Facebook. From Schechtman to Ricoeur, our self-concept is a storied concept. By looking at the way they are using Facebook, retrospectively, one may believe that the identity is the drama they are unfolding over time.

Cavarero develops a theory of selfhood as a “narratable self,” coming from one’s desire for narration or a desire for one’s story. As the title indicates, *Relating Narratives*, the book is a very useful review of personal identity literature. She explores how others provide narratives that foster our conceptions of the self. Therefore, the next section discusses the importance of self-concept and national understanding in post-colonial theory.

**Post-Colonial Theory**

In relation to the Post-Colonial Theory, I argue that new media produces a site of "beyond the border." In considering cultural identity in a global society, we need to explore the effects of displacement, alienation, exile, diaspora, transnationalism, hybridity, and cosmopolitanism. Dodi Wirawan Irawanto’s "An Analysis of National Culture and Leadership Practices in Indonesia" believes that the leadership role in Indonesia is heavily influenced by "the outcome of a complex mixture of traditional

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47 In terms of defining the cultural identity, Indonesians find themselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion.
Indonesian custom (*tradisi*), Islamic law, and more recent social and political
developments." (45) Indonesia has a long colonial history, and as a new hybrid cultural
form of colonial identity, social media culture in Indonesia becomes a way to alter the
authority and power. Kacung Marijan’s "The Study of Political Culture in Indonesia"
emphasizes how the study of political culture among Indonesia’s elite is critical because
"the political culture of Indonesian society still embodies paternalistic values" (61-62). It
is important to review post-colonial theory in this dissertation to explain and respond to
the cultural legacy of colonialism and imperialism.

Robert J. C. Young’s *Postcolonialism* explains the historical and theoretical
origins of post-colonial theory, in which he believes that post-colonialism will always
operate through the dimension of time, history, and space, both geographically and
politically. This section presents a brief story of the Dutch colonialist's impact in creating
Indonesia's narratives to elucidate the challenges of developing the Internet as a symbol
of the disciplinary society of surveillance under this panoptic situation⁴⁸.

According to Indonesia’s founding father, Sukarno, the creation of nationalist
meta-narratives was necessary for constructing the Indonesian nation out of a Dutch

⁴⁸ In applying a cultural perspective to the study of Indonesian politics, Marijan explains
the need to look at the interplay between the political cultures of the “defenders” and the
“innovators” in Indonesia. Liddle’s perception of “defenders” is different from the
concept of hegemony, however, because, in his understanding, it means more pluralism
(qtd. in Marijan 64). The defenders’ political culture seeks to maintain the political status
quo. In contrast, the innovators attempt to change the political culture to obtain a more
democratic political system (64). Since the Islamic feature in Java seems "more
paternalistic than in Islam as stated in the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad
tradition"(Marijan 63), the innovators play a role in maintaining the democratic system.
administrative territorial framework. He argues that Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism are the ideologies and movements within Indonesia that could work cohesively to create a free and independent nation-state. Clive J. Christie's *A Modern History of Southeast Asia* explains how there was no common sense of identity or a unifying historical memory throughout the Dutch-controlled Indies. Even though Islam was the dominant religion, there were some substantial differences in the interpretations of Islam and localized acculturations, which had taken root in the various areas of the vast colony.

Hefner's *Remaking Muslim Politics* suggested that the question of Muslim politics loomed larger than at any time in modern American history, and therefore, scholars often challenge its compatibility with pluralism⁴⁹ and democracy. Merle C. Ricklefs's *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java* states that with indoctrinated armed groups trained to resist an Allied reconquest, Java was ripe for revolution in which Islam would play a significant role; but "it should not surprise readers by this stage to learn that this role was not always a unifying one."(68) At least, Islam takes “its proper place among Javanese and in Indonesian society more broadly” (Ricklefs 115).

In the first decade after the independence, Indonesia’s political situation was uncertain. Hefner's "Indonesia, Islam, and the New U.S. Administration" argues that complex and shifting coalitions drive Indonesian politics, and religious culture influences the political developments in Indonesia. On 1 June 1945, Soekarno introduced the five principles, known as *Pancasila*, consisted of five common principles which Soekarno

⁴⁹ Indonesia is regarded as "a plural society regarding ethnicity, race, religion, and class" (Marijan 64).
saw as commonly shared by all Indonesians. Following Indonesia's communal and political conflicts, Suharto is appointed as President of Indonesia in March 1968, overthrowing Soekarno. Suharto’s New Order brought “aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound change from Java’s past.” (Ricklefs 259) Suharto used the term "New Order" to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, Sukarno. In the freewheeling and democratic atmosphere of the post-Suharto era, “Islamists cited the coercive excesses of the New Order to reject the Five Principles and multi-confessional nationalism, calling instead for a state based on Shariah.” (Hefner 61)

Hefner's *Civil Islam* discussed Indonesia's military-dominated New Order government in creating the Islamization of Indonesia to make political and economic stabilization its top priority. After the pro-reform successfully overthrown Suharto's New Order, many new Muslim political groups emerge. However, "despite the victory of pro-reform parties in the elections of June 1999, then, the road toward justice and reconciliation are still far from clear" (Hefner 20). During this time of transition, those who have wanted Indonesia to be a Muslim state are challenging forces of tolerance. The outcome of that conflict is uncertain.

**Participatory Culture**
From modest alterations such as voting online to more ambitious ones such as the rise of direct democracy and a new public sphere (Rheingold 2000; Jenkins 2009; Lanier 2010), social theories discussed in the previous chapters greatly influences this review. While global and national meta-narratives emerge from the cyberspace, we need to try to understand every important context in the network culture.

In *Confronting the Challenge of Participatory Culture*, Henry Jenkins defines participatory culture as a “culture in which private persons (the public) do not act as consumers only, but also as contributors or producers” (5). The idea of participatory culture began with the study of the audience, which is a relatively new area of research for modern culture theorists, where the audience officially became a producer of content. In digital media, the issues are studied through the lens of the fan as creator (Bacon-Smith 1992; Kucklich 2005). The act of creation gives agency and power to an otherwise a passive viewer, and this is where the study of media made by minorities emerged.

There are this postmodern sensibility and suitability for virtual space at the beginning of Internet research in which all were supporting the utopian line of argument. The Internet, in this utopian line of argument, has positive impacts on political participation, civil society, and democracy. McLuhan's *Understanding Media* was a leading indicator of the upheaval of local cultures by increasingly globalized values, and the source of the well-known phrase "the medium is the message." This

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50 In *Political Culture*, Walter A. Rosenbaum refers to political culture as "the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system." (4) Much of the early literature has noted the beginning of an important revolution in political communication.
section reconnects the medium/message mantra of Marshall McLuhan, in which the new medium brings along effects that might be detrimental to our society or culture.

*The Politics of the Network Culture*

McLuhan’s *Understanding Media* describes how the new millennium means electronic mass media collapses space and time barriers in human communication and the Internet becomes a medium containing traces of various mediums. Inspired by McLuhan’s term, “global village,” many scholars claim that in contemporary society, called “the network society” or “the information society,” the Internet has a significant global transformative potential.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye.’s “Power and Interdependence in The Information Age” describe the "global village," but fail to analyze how holders of power can wield that power to shape or distort patterns of societal interdependence\(^5\). The Internet is a medium of possibility where the individual can go beyond his or her social self, and create the narrow type of network society in the Internet-based community, which is cyberspace. I use Turkle’s *Life on The Screen* to engage in new ways of thinking.

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\(^5\) McLuhan also says, “A characteristic of every medium is that its content is always another (previous) medium” (8-9). The boom of virtual communities in cyberspace enables more rapid decision making, particularly in politics. Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Joseph S. Nye's *Democracy.com* suggested that the Internet has positive impacts on political participation and civil society. Information technology has been a critical factor in globalization, and the information revolution is transforming the institution of government.
about how the private sector and the public sector play a role in introducing the technology.⁵²

There was little attention given to research into the social and contextual environments where the new media are supposed to work, particularly the importance of digital literacy and the digital divide. Turkle's writing on the test of competence of an identity in the politics of network culture is cautious and guarded. She reserves final judgment regarding the effectiveness of the Internet to bring people together by putting an emphasis on the apparent correct representation appearing at the right time in the right context. The offline multiple identities already cause existential doubt; therefore, the construction of identities online makes it harder.

Jan van Dijk’s *The Network Society* discusses perception and the new media, from direct experience to mediated perception. He opposes to all restrictions of the old and new media in relation to direct experience, and believes that “these media also offer additions to experience.” (235) According to Dijk, there are several social effects of social media. The first societal effect is the blurring of several dividing lines of life and communication; the following societal effect of the social media is that they put vested institutions under pressure. The last (inter) personal effect is the unknown manners that belong to this new type of social networking and other social media use. In online environments, “users are not corrected, and they can assume another identity when they

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⁵² Janet H. Murray's *Inventing the Medium*, and several new media activists has been using computer-mediated communication to create alternatively planetary information networks. The seduction of Internet communication, as Murray claims, is that it “creates for us a public space that also feels very private and intimate” (99).
want to.” (Dijk 268). Therefore, the focus of the next section is the problem with participatory culture on the limited ability of its users to examine the media themselves. Since escapism is the significant risk of playing with identities on the Internet, we need to understand how one’s identity emerges from whom one knows, one’s associations and connections.

The Participatory Culture

Rheingold's *The Virtual Community* suggests the distributed nature of the telecommunications network might help revitalize the public sphere, this becomes another version of technological utopianism. Rheingold introduces the concept of "electronic agora," claiming that virtual communities act on the public square. Meanwhile, theorists such as Henry Jenkins discuss the importance of individual opinions in participatory culture triggered by the relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement. In grassroots group minds of the virtual community, different communities that use the time-shared service of the various computers in different places can participate in a kind of intellectual community constructed from the structured interchange of messages.

Since a society’s technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values, members in a participatory culture feel some degree of social connection.

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53 A participatory culture is "culture with strong support for creating and sharing creations and features some type of informal mentorship whereby experienced participants pass along knowledge to novices" (Jenkins xi).
with one another. With cities around the world providing wireless Internet access for their residents, participatory culture shifts the focus of literacy from one of individual expression to community involvement. There are patterns of digital youth culture that foreshadow future new media use when this young generation gets older, and Dijk discusses the patterns following social-cognitive theory in this respect. The first one is that technology will be even more integrated into daily life. Dijk believes that the ‘digital natives’ “have learned to use and adapt the new media for about every purpose in their young lives” (225). However, Wan Ng's “Can We Teach Digital Natives Digital Literacy?” explores the "digital nativeness" of the generation in the highly literate societies that produce digital technology and suggests that they need to be made aware of what constitutes educational technologies and be provided with the opportunity to use them for meaningful purposes. Therefore, Dijk’s second pattern on the need and the experience to have more control on forging contacts and relationship should also be balanced with skill across contexts.

With the needs and experiences grown to such an extent that they shall not disappear from our lives anymore, this phenomenon becomes “a reflection of network individualization in a new media environment.” (Dijk 225). A third pattern is the self-presentation in online environments that young people have learned, and growing up with peer-to-peer networking, young people have learned to share information without hesitation. Another pattern that is relatively new is the creation of user-generated content on a substantial scale, then creating and sharing user-generated consent leads to a participatory media culture.
Despite the instability of the digital world, technological determinists interpret technology as the basis of society in the past, the present, and even the future. Technological determinism is a reductionist theory, which presumes that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values. Reductionist theory considers the Internet as part of the new network culture that requires media literacy.

Teresa Dobson and John Willinsky’s “Digital Literacy” considers the importance of digital literacy and the digital divide. The relation between digital literacy and the digital divide is also contextual, since “digital literacy is so closely connected to the traditional association of literacy and democratic rights, as well as to more specific notions of e-government." (Dobson & Willinsky 12) According to a recent study from the Pew Internet & American Life project (Lenhart & Madden, 2005), more than one-half of all teens have created media content. However, Dijk brought an important final remark for this generation, “Not all of them are equally motivated to use digital media. Many young people in poor countries or in poor households of rich countries have no physical access to computers and the Internet” (226). Participatory media culture does not imply high levels of social and political participation, because young people are very different in possession of digital literacy skills,

As Jenkins points out, “the youth become the biggest part of the entire networked society, and some defenders of new digital cultures appear to believe that youths can simply acquire these skills on their own without adult intervention or supervision” (15).
In its extreme form, technological determinism suggests that technology determines the participation of young people. In the political arena, it is a testament to the work of young campaign teams, who have an insight into youth culture.

There is also the participation gap, in which only big cities in the developed country can provide wireless Internet access for their residents free of charge. Therefore, to appreciate the significance of emerging network culture, it is also necessary to explore the specificity of a locality. Jason Lanier’s *You Are Not a Gadget* offers a provocative look at the way the Web is transforming our lives. Lanier comments on the openness, equality, and horizontality of the modern world system and his Bourdieusian practice theory implies that power and practice rely on the principle territorial form of context. Contexts are multi-scalar, and Lanier’s virtual reality associates the individual to the household, community, and local regions and upward to the nation-state and the world.

Participatory culture has proven to be a vast and varied topic, and as an interdisciplinary field, rhetorical studies welcomes and hosts a plethora of methodologies. Textual analysis, rhetorical analysis, and personal observances of cultural trends and interviews seemed to be the common methods of analysis. The most convincing studies are ones that combine specific examples with cultural analysis, such as Henry Jenkins’ studies and Jason Lanier’s specificity of a locality. In the next chapter, I use the discussion and reviews in this chapter to support my analysis on the utopian perspectives of social media.
CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL MEDIA TO FOSTER IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

There has been much ongoing research addressing topics such as whether or not the Internet is leading to increased political polarization — the tendency of like-minded individuals to cluster even closer together in their habits and viewpoints. To conceptualize every side of the polarized debate over the politics of the Internet, I refer to Tim Jordan’s *Cyberpower*. His book introduces the politics of cyberspace and suggests that the nature of the Internet itself is contradictory and paradoxical. The context of utterances, genres of discourses and social situations in light of the tendencies of the Internet leads to polarized Internet users.

The following subsections present these visions of the Internet and social change within the context of utopian and dystopian writings. In this chapter, I start with the utopian vision, which focuses on the benefits of social media in a political situation, and the positive relations of Internet use for information in politics. However, I also acknowledge the different points of social views of the Internet and the positive and negative aspect of it. I will continue with the dystopian vision to counter the utopian vision. In this chapter, I focus on applying the rhetorical principles to analyze Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election. I use Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theories to explain the strategies of the common ground technique, identification through antithesis, and the
assumed or transcendent “we,” three methods also outlined by Cheney. The final chapter concentrates on the dystopian aspects of social media in fostering identification.

Burke’s dramatism is rhetorical criticism that centers its analysis on human motivation through terms used in studying drama. Rhetorical criticism examines the symbolic artifacts of discourse — the words, phrases, images, gestures, performances, texts, films, etc. that people use to communicate. The rhetorical analysis shows how the artifacts work, how well they work, and how the artifacts convince and persuade the audience. Rhetorical criticism studies and analyses the purpose of the words, sights, and sounds that are the symbolic artifacts used for communication among people. The field of communication’s turn towards constitutive models of communication has skewed researchers’ attention to the symbolic as opposed to the material, but there are numerous accounts drawn from sociological studies of how scholars treat technologies purely as symbolic as opposed to “material.”

54 The use of rhetorical theory in this dissertation has moved toward the rhetorical uses of social media, due to the heavy social media use linked to politics and the rhetoric of everyday life. Even when real persuasion might lie within truth and reality, I must add that language use could have a persuasive function. Beyond his contemporary influences, Burke took Aristotle's rhetoric and oriented his writing about language specifically to its social context. “The new rhetoricians regarded persuasion as only one potential function of discourse, and their analyses frequently focused on the use of language as a means for addressing social exigencies.” (Bitzer 5) As imaginary and ephemeral as it is, Burke has argued that rhetoric works to bring about change in people. The temporary sense of empowerment that people develop when isolating and defining a point from which to argue on a particular topic is a valuable practice. The exigencies of the new age of human experience involve the power to penetrate the roots of human motivation and of altering behavior, and it has homogenizing and yet isolating effects.
From Richard Lanham’s essay, “Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Practice, and Property,” Douglas Eyman found that there had been a relatively wide gap between Lanham’s attempt to define digital rhetoric and use it in digital literacy. Since the word "digital" maintains some of the division between offline and online identity, the kind of production in social media that exemplifies digital rhetoric would be the inseparable offline and online selves. Therefore, later I will use Eyman's construction of digital rhetoric and related fields such as digital literacy and new media. Several other scholars have examined the use of social media in several different settings and indicate how it has reached people of all ages with varying motives in using social media, within the scope of education, politics, or business and marketing. These utopian perspectives are the bases of my first premise that technological development supports virtual communities.

The Rhetorical Situation

Theresa Sauter and Axel Bruns's research report on Social Media in the Media examined how Australian media perceive social media as political tools differently and believe that social media as additional tools in politics have become normalized and routine. While several preliminary studies cover most of the world, one may argue that different parts of the world will deliver a different result. Every case will require the different context of a rhetorical act made up (at a minimum) of a rhetor (a speaker or writer), an issue (or exigency prompted by a situation), a medium (such as a speech or a
written text), and an audience. This section mainly focuses on the rhetorical situation during Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, although I will also discuss the rhetoric during the 2016 US presidential election and in Indonesia’s 2017 local election. Chapter 5 will mainly discuss the last two cases, which highlight the direct and even personal ways social criticism has become the new norm for politicians.

A rhetorical situation is an event that consists of an issue, an audience, and a set of constraints. David Holmes and Sulistyanto's “Understanding the Indonesian Mediapolis," suggest some clear trends in the efficacy of social media for election campaigns in Indonesia’s reform era. Their most significant finding is the fact that Jokowi, the winning candidate, was not as frequent a social media user as his rival but managed to engage his constituents much more. Holmes and Sulistyanto believe that Twitter works better than Facebook for political purposes, and "it is not how many tweets a candidate puts out; it is the degree of retweeting that demonstrates the intensity and attachment of voters." (74) However, I argue that there is a deeper rhetorical situation that needs to be investigated.

In general, three exigencies surround the use of social media in political contexts, particularly in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election:

1. The general utopian perspective of how the Internet supports virtual communities, although equality of status among participants within the communicative action domain also leads to both utopic and dystopic views.
2. The key moments during the 2014 election indicate the questionable role of ideology, decreasing role of the political party, and the increasing role of social media to swing the presidential election\(^{55}\).

3. The highly influential religious identity in Indonesia encourages us to identify the forces that drive the contemporary resurgence of nationalism, as part of the effects of democratization\(^{56}\).

To examine public debate in social media during Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, I develop a rhetorical perspective of public discourse to explore the three issues above. A thorough examination is necessary to understand the relationship between rhetoric and politics, and how social media affects political discourse and outcomes. Below is the discussion of social media in political contexts, including the issues, attributes, and influences.

*The Utopian Perspective*

In early 1993, Howard Rheingold published “The Virtual Community” and provided an in-depth discussion of community and computer-mediated communication.

Jokowi has over 1.3 million Twitter followers, more than twice as many as Prabowo Subianto during the active campaign period. Meanwhile, Prabowo Subianto has the

\(^{55}\)[...] as candidates in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election use more social networks than politicians of the past, in hopes of tapping the millennial market.

\(^{56}\)[...]as well as deeper feelings of insecurity about Indonesia's achievements.
fourth largest Facebook following of any politician in the world. Arguably, the candidates’ use of social media enables them to form a community. Rheingold acknowledges a virtual community as "social aggregations that emerge from the [Internet] when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace" (5).

The candidates’ social media use illustrates an evolution of the CMC theory to encompass community enabling, with the idea that the Internet supports virtual communities. Social media provides a lower cost and more efficient approach to mobilizing voters, especially young voters. Sara Schonhardt's "Twitter, Facebook Made a Splash in Indonesia’s Election" analyses how the candidates began to integrate social media with their overall political strategy. She tracked the intensification of conversation on social media in the final month before the presidential election on July 9, 2014, and she indicates:

Mr. Widodo currently has 1.76 million followers on Twitter and has picked up around 755,000 followers since the start of the year, according to Twitter. Mr. Subianto has seen his follower base grow by 110%, from around 500,000 at the start of the year to 1.03 million. Mr. Subianto has a stronger presence on Facebook, with 7.9 million likes compared to Mr. Widodo’s 3.5 million. (par 3-6)
Presidential candidates go viral in Indonesia’s social media elections, while many other politicians used the sociological approach and the psychological approach as part of their socialization in other social media campaigns. In the lead-up to presidential elections on July 9, 2014, Indonesians were using innovative social media tools, and smartphone gaming to sell their candidates, promote their interests and even tackle corruption. One of the key claims in this dissertation focuses on the rhetorical aspect of social media in this election in influencing the traditional voting behavior, as the 2014 election has been dubbed the “social media elections.”

The sociological approach focuses on the groups of people, while psychological approach concentrates on the individual. In Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, both candidates were aware of the psychological approach and thus created their social media content by addressing several psychological aspects. However, the constituents had a reified sense of group identity and were thinking as part of a society. The candidates’ social media platform enables the followers to express their feelings or opinions as much as possible to increase the interaction between the users and their sites. From language processing that examines opinions, appraisals, attitudes, and emotions toward entities, individuals, issues, events, and topics, the people behind each candidates’ social media account helped create an emotional attachment to each candidate’s political party and also expressed their orientation on certain issues.\(^57\)

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\(^57\) Although the Internet can network human beings, there is a difference between offline and online identity. Jokowi used several rhetorical strategies as a way to reconstruct the identities on the other side of the looking glass through self-presentation. Both candidates
The Key Moments of Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential Election

Several key moments identified in the political campaign includes the different ideologies between the two candidates and the swing voters’ characteristics. Data from electoral surveys from the past elections show political parties have increasingly lost the trust of the electorate, and there was a lack of shared ideology among the parties. Sandra Hamid’s “Is the Party Over for Indonesia’s Political Parties” questions what role political parties play in Indonesia's political election. She studied the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012, which was arguably Indonesia’s single most important ballot before the 2014 presidential polls. The Jakarta election solidified the narrative around how Indonesian voters feel about politics and political parties: "political parties are less and less relevant to Indonesian voters." (Hamid, par 3)

Jokowi’s political party needed 25 percent to nominate him, but no single party won at least 25 percent of the national vote. Andrew Thornley's "Nine Takeaways from Indonesia’s Legislative Elections" argues that coalitions of convenience have colored the 2014 presidential elections. Thornley believes that such coalitions are inevitable, "with weakly defined platforms, there is no ideological magnetism drawing parties together." (Par 5).

were already different from one another, and they managed to represent the opposing characters toward each other, however the race turned out to be much closer than people expected.
In Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, both candidates made their debut as a presidential candidate by exposing unrealistic promises that were very ambitious. In fact, it led to “inflation of promises.” Roughly a fifth of Indonesians remained undecided in the 2014 election, and the gap between Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto was closed dramatically. The number of swing voters was shrinking, and the decision to provide support and votes depends on voter loyalty. What is interesting about social media campaigns is that the outcomes did not put voting decisions as important. More stress was placed on the emergence of underrepresented ideologies and the rise of unpopular opinion. Indonesia's direct election systems encourage political party elites to incorporate results of political surveys and strategies prescribed by political consultants to influence potential voters in their favor.

The 2014 election was the first time power was being handed from one directly elected president to another because after serving a maximum two five-year terms in office, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is ineligible to seek a third term. The lack of violence of the 2014 presidential poll showed how deeply Indonesia's democratic habits took root under SBY, and how Indonesia needed a leader who could unify one of the world's most diverse nations.

The two presidential candidates offered vastly different styles of leadership, but on social media, they tried to portray themselves according to what their audiences perceived as leadership potential. Both candidates used a nationalist thread in their argument and showed some assertiveness and determination. The constituents were able
to function as the mediators of change. Leaders now must meet the expectations of traditional benevolent paternalism leadership and also as candidates who display transformational leadership.

The different ideologies these two candidates have impacted the way they were handling their social media. In hindsight, Jokowi would have benefited greatly with his presence on social media. But his announcement came out on 14 March 2014, just weeks before the parliamentary vote on 9 April, and the presidential election was held on 9 July 2014. Arguably, he didn't have enough time to establish his social media campaign for this election, while his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, had already managed his social media campaign since 2008-2009.

David Holmes and Sulistyanto's "Understanding the Indonesian Mediapolis" discusses social media and 2014 Indonesian presidential election, confirming the power of social media. It was argued that incorporation of social media in the 2014 election campaign endeavors were due to a combination of two factors: "the large number of social media users in the country, and that these were predominantly young people, and a large number of young voters had registered for the election." (Holmes and Sulistyanto 64) Their examination of the Facebook pages of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014 indicated that Facebook and Twitter were suitable to become election campaign vehicles to reach and influence young voters. This dissertation obtains some quantitative data from Holmes and Sulistyanto, to illustrate the Facebook activities of the presidential candidates from 19 May to 9 July 2014 (52 days).
Table 1: Facebook activities of the presidential candidates 19 May to 9 July 2014 (52 days)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Likes / Fans</th>
<th>Posts</th>
<th>Likes to Posts</th>
<th>Comments to Posts</th>
<th>Shares to Posts</th>
<th>Average Posts / Day</th>
<th>Average Likes / Post</th>
<th>Average Comments / Post</th>
<th>Average Shares / Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prabowo</td>
<td>5,917,776</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7,390,097</td>
<td>887,987</td>
<td>302,825</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>199,732</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>8,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jokowi</td>
<td>1,637,103</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>637,626</td>
<td>51,568</td>
<td>55,620</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Holmes and Sulistyanto, "the coinciding development of rapid Internet literacy, together with the introduction of a direct election system that appeals to identity-driven politics, came together to make social media a central part of Indonesian elections." (52) It was argued that the emergence of religious identity was also developed because of the political and media industry transformations that date back to 1998.

*The Religious Identity*
Indonesia has a long history of democracy with liberal democracy right after independence, guided democracy during Sukarno's era, and then Pancasila democracy during Suharto's era. All of them do not necessarily allow free speech because those democratic forms still uphold a certain degree of authoritarianism, and therefore through social media, both candidates showed their paternalistic and autocratic leadership style.

The fact that Indonesia is a 90% Muslim country also shaped the Indonesian culture and leadership style. Indonesians emphasize collective well-being and show a strong humane orientation within their society. Indonesia has more Muslims than the entire region of the Middle East, but many political and religious freedoms were curtailed during Suharto's era. With the fall of Suharto, democracy and Islam have thrived. Both candidates were conscious of the new rise and presented a moderate form of Islam. Religion colored Indonesia's 2014 presidential race, and what matters for the candidates were whether they could identify themselves to both the Muslim majority and also to the minorities at the same time.

The moderate representation of their religious identity triggered a more extreme opposition, with both the majority and minority religions wanting more representative leaders. Indonesia's constitution protects religious freedom, but under Yudhoyono, religious intolerance has been on the rise. Arguably, Prabowo Subianto's coalitions also included Islamic-based parties. Arguably as well, the freedom that comes with the emergence of social media has encouraged not only a constructive discussion but also a destructive one. Including, although not limited to, religious debate. With the open access
of information but a lack of social media literacy, the online debate easily led to religious intolerance against the minorities.

Those were some of the constraints in this election, and each candidate had to deal with different groups, motives, and dynamics that limit the candidates' decisions and action in managing their online posts. Indonesia does not require the heads of the country be Muslim, but Indonesia needs the Pancasila ideology to be upheld by its head of state. Mixing religion with politics has created ideological constraints, with the emergence of slightly radical religious groups that force a stronger Islamic ideology into the country.

Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country; Pancasila is a summation of “common cultural elements” of Indonesia, including belief in God. Pancasila ideology has always been the indispensable tool to unite the nation, but lately, political radicalism is gaining momentum to try to replace Pancasila with a more religious ideology. Ideological constraints might produce unconscious limitations for subjects in society. Thus, it becomes a challenge for the candidate to represent the kind of ideology they wish to identify with their constituents.

**The Case Review: Identification and Consubstantiality in Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential Election**

The two social media campaigns reviewed as a case study are:

But as I have mentioned in previous chapters, the second Facebook link is no longer valid. However, I have saved all the digital materials posted during the campaign period. I have also obtained another digital archive of what is now considered Jokowi’s official Facebook page:


I analyze how Jokowi using the text element, the visual/audiovisual elements, and the rhetorical situation, to form virtual communities, to create online movements and to help him win the election. I also consider Prabowo Subianto’s use of those three elements to foster identification. I start with analyzing Prabowo Subianto’s online artifacts, continue with Jokowi’s online artifacts, and then conduct a case review on how Jokowi won the election. The next sections present the variety that exists in the analysis of

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58 The analysis focuses on issues, information, audience, persuasion, and assumption. Using a visual rhetoric framework (similar to stasis theory) to investigate a rhetorical situation allows us to make the importance of multiple modes visible and to move beyond the text. Only when reading rhetorical situations in a modally holistic way, can we see how visual text has a direct impact on creating a moment of stability.
Subianto’s online artifacts and Jokowi’s online artifacts, and examines their creative campaign to foster identification in digital rhetoric.⁵⁹

**Prabowo Subianto’s Online Artifacts**

![Prabowo Subianto's Online Artifacts](image)

**Figure 14** Pustaka Pandani, Prabowo Subianto's Website, Web.

⁵⁹ Arguably, we can analyze all objects through visual rhetoric. We can analyze an image posted on social media, especially as it pertains to creating a moment of stability, linking these classical theories to recent technological developments.
The website showed Prabowo Subianto (Subianto) with his running mate, Hatta Rajasa. Subianto's character as the rhetor might be bound by the image of a powerful past president and assuming that politics is about invoking power, Subianto's appointment of Hatta Rajasa as his running mate shows a balance of his performance. Again, this was not only a pragmatic move but also an attempt to take on an experienced and respected political leader or figure (Rajasa was a former minister in the Indonesian government during SBY era), to provide the solemnity of manner.

![Figure 15 Prabowo Subianto, Prabowo Subianto's Facebook, Web.](image)

Subianto and Jokowi ran on similar populist platforms but presented differently. According to the visual elements, Subianto showed his character as extreme patriotism. The use of horse resonates the memory of the fallen veterans who fought for the independence, and his cover picture portrays himself in the form of aggressive or warlike situation. The digital substance was created through subjects such as safari suits, the habit of saluting, and his penchant for riding horses at campaign events and also posted on their
social media. The audiences consider the use of horse represents Subianto's image as a firm leader, but it also suggests the New Order style of leadership.

Figure 16 Prabowo Subianto, Prabowo Subianto's Twitter, Web.

Subianto used (or worn) white safari suits as an attempt to develop a digital substance of widespread nostalgia for military rule that exists in Indonesia. The audience, who mostly were the middle class, was leaning towards Subianto to an apparent longing for the New Order's style of stability. The way Subianto dressed up and performed, reiterates the emperor's new clothes and acts. By wearing white safari suits all the time, Subianto has initially adopted the appearance of President Sukarno. Riding horses with white safari, Subianto shows a hawkish gesturing. Although Subianto has advocated an aggressive or warlike policy, his supporters were still attracted to his militaristic campaign and the machismo attitude.

In Subianto’s mind, everything about a country depends on the “leadership factor.” Subianto uses, or wears, the white safari suits and riding the $300,000 Lusitano horse, not only to show his greatness but also to offer solutions for all of Indonesia's ills,
which is a "strong national leadership." Offering solutions for all Indonesia’s problem are, of course, a little bit disconnect, especially since the smear campaign against Jokowi was a reminder of the manner of discrediting people in the Suharto era, the era, which Subianto was heavily affiliated.

According to Subianto, the quality of its economic system, culture, and international standing relies on strong national leadership. Strong national leadership was also shown through Subianto's use of Peci, the traditional Muslim head cover. Subianto maintains his Javanese Muslim image with the use of Peci, while Jokowi tend to wear something popular. Even though Subianto has consistently been linked to human rights violations, but his campaign focused on projecting a strongman image and stoking rumors on social media that Jokowi is a Chinese Christian. Jokowi's accusation that he was a Catholic ethnic Chinese was unfounded, also the other mudslinging narrative that Jokowi is a communist who hailed from a communist family.

Subianto played in this discourse very well, Peci symbolized his Muslim identity, and then he played into the fears of the highly conservative Muslims. Subianto has been cultivating himself as the latest installment of a line of successive Indonesian leaders that exudes power (berwibawa), with a strong Islamic identity. Meanwhile, Jokowi was purportedly tied to Chinese-Christian politicians, and this smear campaign started out with racial and religious issues.
From analyzing the text element, the visual and audiovisual elements, and the rhetorical situation from the above three social media artifacts, I could firmly determine that the first candidate aims to reach the older generations, which includes:

1. The Patriotic generations, those who fought for the independence in 1945. These generations may not only limit to the retired veterans but also those who are still active in the military.

2. The Baby Boomer generations, not only confined to those who were born in the 60s but also generations who lived under the new order regime throughout their adult years.

![Figure 17 Prabowo Subianto, Prabowo Subianto's Facebook, Web.](image)

In Subianto’s Facebook page, his “about me page” stated “If not us, who else? If not now when? Come join #selamatkanindonesia and [our] homeland true sovereignty.” From this statement and other text-based posts, including the profile picture and mainly
the cover photos used, I could determine the generations, which Subianto aimed to target, have several traits and characteristics:

1. Nationalist

2. Aristocratic

3. Military-oriented

The first candidate uses his background in the military to assure peace, although he also had a bad reputation when it comes to the human rights violations. Per Liljas, in his article titled “Here’s Why Some Indonesians Are Spooked by This Presidential Contender,” states that Subianto has "refashioned himself as a decisive political leader, the champion of rich and poor alike, and a well-oiled campaign has catapulted him to social-media fame, with a Facebook following that trails only the likes of Barack Obama and Narendra Modi" (par. 5). Although his position was weak when it comes to justice, young people still idolize a leader who looks strong and assertive. Some young supporters ignored Subianto's impending human rights case because they had never lived under an authoritarian leader.

Subianto's firm stand against opposing values triggers discrimination. He was also rather weak on his position towards democracy, because of his background as a former son-in-law of the new order regime. His social media didn't encourage political participation, and mainly focused on a particular group of people only. It shows his aristocratic background that appreciates structures and a top-to-bottom order.
In this very close race, according to Randy Fabi and Kanupriya Kapoor's "Behind Subianto's Campaign to Become Indonesia's President, A Questionable Crew," Subianto’s campaign to become Indonesia’s president always consistently portrayed him as the strongman. However, one important point that showed even on his social media platform was his primary focus on prosperity. He identifies the foundation of this country as a stable and prosperous nation and mainly centers on encouraging economic growth in agriculture. Most of his other cover photos portrayed him working together in the field with the farmers and other types of workers.

*Jokowi’s Online Artifacts*
The second candidate running for Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election was Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, and he won this election. His opponent, Subianto, was stronger in his oration of macro-populist and protectionist measures that were intended for the consumption of the Indonesian people. While Subianto used the horse to portray a firm leadership, Jokowi tried to portray his natural look. Jokowi decided to use formal attire, as visually shown on Jokowi's page, to compete with Subianto's firm leadership. Although Jokowi came off relatively favorably on the images.
used, he could not shake off his rather stiff image in formal attire. Meanwhile, Jokowi's mild-mannered approach still implied on his text-based post, and not to mention, Jokowi also emphasized his online posts on a meticulous reiteration of his policy platform.

Figure 19 Joko Widodo, Joko Widodo's Facebook, Web.

Jokowi focus his text-based post on his main program "Jokowi Untuk Negeri" or "Jokowi for The Nation." Jokowi portrayed himself as "man of the people," which is populist and a hard worker. He put himself as approachable, and he was backed by a bevy of highly creative and multimedia savvy volunteers who produce games, apps, animation, comic books, and music. These audiovisual elements were integrated and available on his social media platform, and it will be thoroughly discussed in the later section.
Many of Jokowi’s images used as his profile picture and cover photos tend to mimic Obama's style. Many have created the Obama-Jokowi comparison, which is evident from the picture used on Jokowi's social media account. There was much hype surrounded Jokowi’s campaign, similar to Obama’s. Subianto’s message of firm resolve and national dignity differed from Jokowi, Jokowi’s charisma is similar to Obama. Jokowi is also called “Indonesia’s Obama,” with man-of-the-people persona and modest upbringing endeared him. Jokowi use Obama-style to rule the world’s fourth-biggest population, with Jokowi's well-known traits such as Mental Revolution and the “Kampung Face.”

From analyzing the text elements, the visual and audiovisual elements, and the rhetorical situation from the above three social media artifacts, it clear that he aimed to reach the younger generations, which includes the following:
1. The Millennial generation was the first to grow up with computers in their homes. The older group in this generation were actively involved in the 1998 movement, and the younger groups actively participated in many political campaigns.\textsuperscript{60}

2. The First-Time voters, or those who can be referred as the Centennials. Those who were born in 1996 and later turned 18 by the time this election was being held and thus first-time voters.

3. The Commoners. As a commoner who was born in a Java slum area, Jokowi didn't emerge from the country’s political elite and wasn’t an army general.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig21.png}
\caption{Joko Widodo, Joko Widodo's Facebook, Web.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{60}The majority of the actions were started through social media.
Reeling from negative campaigns and false allegations regarding his race and religion, Jokowi persistent in portraying his nationalistic aspect. He introduced some symbolic nationalistic, such as the use of Indonesian national flag. The flag is made up of two colors, red on top of white. It was shown as a background on his profile picture and often appeared on his timeline post. Jokowi’s “Success Team” (Tim Sukses) also emphasized on the nationalistic posturing on minor or "sub-text" issues, but also attempted to regain Jokowi’s standing and Islamic credentials among the unpersuaded. Jokowi's nationalistic posturing remains constant, but his weakest link is perhaps one that is being seen as too much of a “traditionalist” or a nominal Muslim (abangan).

According to Jokowi’s Facebook “about me” page, he aims for “simple in its simplicity.” Thus, these generations he aimed to target have the following traits and characteristics:

1. Rational
2. Open-minded
3. Practical
4. Lower- to middle-class

Jokowi created a common ground through his portrayal as a commoner, using his background as the son of carpenters to target the lower- to the middle-class group. He also portrays himself as young and a music lover, and with the help of volunteers on social media, Jokowi managed to gain support from the young millennial, technocrats,
and first-time voters. During the election, Jokowi promised a decisive break with Indonesia's authoritarian past and better social welfare for the poor. Many technocrats helped his social media campaign; therefore, part of his campaign message was that he promises to implement "e-governance" to help cut bureaucratic corruption. When it comes to peace, Jokowi had little support from the army. However, instead of portraying himself as a strong and firm leader, he portrayed himself as a soft-spoken Javanese. He received a higher support from female voters, and he got most votes from provinces in Java, the main island.

Jokowi may have been weak on the prosperity issue, but with his clean track record in the government, he didn't have any reason not to gain trust from his supporters as a decent politician. Jokowi had a very relatively clean history, with no criminal violations in his background. Throughout his career both as an entrepreneur and also as a leader, he always upheld the law. Thus, the young generations were in favor of him. Jokowi also managed to attract some dedicated volunteers who were willing to work tirelessly to spread his messages to voters via social media. The volunteers also organized political participation and managed to mobilize youth voters to support Jokowi, efforts that intensified during the final weeks of the elections, with some elections-related hashtags, such as #Jokowi9Juli, reaching worldwide trends.

Case Review of How Jokowi Won the Election
Indonesians were looking for sustainability assurance policies from the government, after suffering some notable political turmoil in the past. Both candidates were well aware that their voters were looking for a consensus, which the political direction for the coming years would not change a lot. Subianto and Jokowi tended to personify themselves as "politically experienced."

Jokowi’s official social media platforms managed to emphasise three clear personas in messages, portraying him as an experienced and clean politician, as aligned with *aliran* politics that endorse pluralism and diversity, and supportive of Soekarno’s Pancasila ideology. Indonesia is still young in its democratic journey, and in the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia, political parties with a decidedly *Pancasialist* orientation turned out to be the winners. In 2014, Jokowi won the election by creating common ground to the target audience through an effective grassroots and democratic deliberation. Jokowi came from *aliran* politics, in which his political party did not hold certain religious ideology.

Jokowi was popular among netizens, indicated by the many who supported Jokowi’s creative campaign. His social media platforms were created and managed by volunteers, and his popular hashtag #SalamDuaJari calls for unity. As the President-Elect of Indonesia, Jokowi asserted a political desire to lead Indonesia with a wealth of pluralistic humanism. Jokowi chose to interpret the teachings through Sukarno’s *trisakti* political sovereignty: political sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and national identity.
Identification, Digital Rhetoric, and The Creative Campaign

I wish to focus on the creative content that supported the political campaigns, and this becomes an ideal rhetorical concept applied for this study. Berakar Komunikasi produced the story of Jokowi's impromptu walkabout campaign, and Mohammad Nashihan also created a comic book for Subianto. An article written by I Made Sentana, titled “Comic Book the Latest Creative Campaign Tool in Indonesia” discusses the emergence of the comic book in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election.

Figure 22 Berakar Komunikasi, The Story of Jokowi's Impromptu Walkabout Campaign, Web.

Berakar Komunikasi's artworks highlight Jokowi's strengths by leveraging his iconic 'rolled-up sleeves' and character's similarity with Tintin's: both are action-oriented and problem solvers. Meanwhile, the supporter of presidential hopeful Prabowo Subianto and running mate Hatta Rajasa launched a comic book listing 101 reasons to vote for the pairing, with the race tightening ahead of the July 9 election.
According to the creator, Mohammad Nashihan, “pictures are an effective medium (to convey ideas), and are easier to be digested by the public.” (qtd. in Sentana par 2) These comic books were just one of the many creative efforts campaigners from both sides used to drum up support for the candidates, along with the various songs, smartphone games, and videos. The creative campaigns have arguably made elections in Indonesia some of the most colorful in Southeast Asia.
From the above illustration, Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa stand at the bow of a traditional boat in style strikingly similar to the famed post struck by actors Kate Winslet and Leonardo DiCaprio in the 1997 film *Titanic*. The caption reads, "Achieve Social Harmony." It was argued that while the comics were meant to make it easier for the public to digest information about Subianto and his platforms, some of them were not so easy to understand.

These creative approaches were created by the supporters of each candidate, and some of the supporters did it voluntarily. Jokowi's digital campaign, in particular, was done in a creative way and very dynamic. The online contents from both candidates were targeting the digital generation, and the comic book or the graphic novel format were also
shareable on social media. The digital native, in particular, were mostly interested in these forms, and the shareable visual media transfers the enthusiasm to the candidate.

Identification is an assertion of a margin of overlap in cases where we are also clearly divided, where shared values or beliefs are arguments or propositions as much as they are a pre-existing basis of acting together. During the new order, people never openly disclosed their personal political stances, therefore in social media era, there are many discomforts with several rhetorical practices that was using a pleasing form to say things people may or may not want to hear. Politicians using social media to share and distribute, hoping they could get their constituents to attach any sense of pleasure with the form of the message.

**Political Communication in a Social Media Era**

This section focuses on the set of texts on identification performed in political uses of social media, using Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism as a means of analysis. It applies the dramatistic pentad, a form to interpret situations through five elements: agents (actors), acts, scenes (settings), agencies (tools, instruments, or means) and purposes. In this rhetorical analysis, I include several interviews with the candidates' campaign strategists, and the interview was available on selected publications. The strategists were the agents (actors) who act (creating the plots) in particular scenes (the settings was the 2014 presidential elections). The focus is on Jokowi’s campaign team as
they won the election, addressing how the campaign strategists handled the official online media. By visiting and seeing how the Facebook account was created and maintained for the campaign, it is obvious that the purpose is to win the election. However, the rhetorical analysis includes more than just analyzing those aspects. By interviewing the campaign manager for presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and the digital marketing strategist for Joko Widodo, we could determine the central theme of political discourse created by each candidate on their Facebook account.

I pulled out several interviews with the campaign managers of both from the digital archive and analyzed using dramatistic pentad. The campaign strategists include Farina Situmorang (digital marketing strategist for Joko Widodo), Tantowi Yahya (Subianto’s campaign manager), Denny JA an anti-discrimination campaigner (at camp Jokowi), and Rob Allyn (a political consultant in Subianto campaign team).

Subianto’s campaign was far more systematic with well-coordinated political messages because he began to manage his social media platforms even before the elections started, contrary to Jokowi's campaign. Many argued that Jokowi's social media campaign provided many different messages, in part because random and unpaid volunteers managed different accounts. Various initiatives were supporting Jokowi; even the Islamic organizations differed themselves in terms of who they supported. I argue that this is why many disparities emerged. Social media allows its users to express their opinions, which can lead to a parliament of conflicting voices.

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61 The social media account, or other agencies such as internal social network, becomes the platform for other social media supporters to interact.
The Indonesia’s 2014 presidential campaign was a battle between campaign strategies prepared by an American PR consultant in camp Subianto, and those of Indonesian expert in public opinion and voting behavior in camp Jokowi. Subianto portrays himself as a professional and well-prepared leader. Subianto’s motivation was to show how well prepared he is, and his campaign was more like a well-oiled machine. Jokowi’s digital marketing strategist, Farina Situmorang, verifies, “Subianto not only had more time, but he also had stronger coordination and much more funding.” (qtd. in Kim par. 9) Subianto managed his Facebook professionally; although he claims that, he posts all the updates himself. Meanwhile, volunteers managed Jokowi’s Facebook. Given the diverse political backgrounds of Jokowi’s advisors, Jokowi’s political discourse is more contested.

A presidential election is not only a battle between two presidential candidates and two political machines; it is also a battle between strategists. Denny JA was also at camp Jokowi, and he is an anti-discrimination campaigner. Meanwhile, Subianto hired Rob Allyn, an American political consultant and a well-known expert in negative and smeared campaigning. Denny JA countered the Allyn orchestrated “black campaign” with positive campaign to attract grassroots and upper-middle-class engagement in the Jokowi campaign.

Kate Grealy's "Campaign Strategies" argues that Jokowi aimed at portraying himself as clean politicians and huge supporters of entrepreneurs and people in the tech industry. Jokowi’s central themes and key points were on his clean track records, and this message relates to a particular rhetorical situation of Subianto as a human rights abuser.
With this contrasting rhetorical situation, the Subianto versus Jokowi battle has become negative versus positive campaign battle.

According to Jokowi’s digital marketing strategist who created the messages on Jokowi’s Facebook account, Jokowi “only had a chance to start executing [the] digital marketing strategy two months before the election, and basically had zero Facebook followers as against Prabowo [Subianto]’s five million.” (qtd. in Kim par. 10) Thus, Subianto supposedly had a stronger political discourse established on social media already.

After several failed attempts to connect with the candidate, Situmorang and Denny JA, dubbed ‘Efek Jokowi’ or ‘The Jokowi Effect,’ ended up showing the fastest acceleration in users of any political Facebook page in history. Based on an LSI survey (Indonesian Survey Foundation) done in early June 2014, the margin of victory in the Jokowi camp was at 6.3%. However, at the end of June 2014, it plunged again to only 0.5%, below the margin of error.
The Subianto versus Jokowi battle became increasingly colorful in its last weeks, indicating how vast Jokowi’s social media campaign was in creating his political discourse. Holmes and Sulistyanto compared Jokowi's and Subianto's social media during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election quantitatively counting the likes and shares. Jokowi’s first posts, immediately after his official declaration to run for the presidency on 19 May 2014, received 187,413 likes and 27,929 comments and was shared by 3,688 users. Situmorang says, “Within one month we had two and a half million users and engagement at over 100 per cent. 2.8 million users were liking or sharing content from our page, which was neck and neck with the number of users engaging with Prabowo [Subianto]’s page despite the fact that he had over double the number of followers.” (qtd.
Social media is more of social than media. Thus the use of digital tools such as social media is very common to improve engagement. However, the psychology behind social media interactions involved minimal or constrained social cues. From analyzing the online artifacts such as ‘like,’ ‘comment,’ and ‘share’ of Jokowi’s Facebook posts, there were indications that certain social groupings were vital in influencing the individual's political behavior. The digital production in social media might foster identification in a way that is unexpected and impacts the unconscious, argumentation,
and public deliberation. The set of texts on identification performed in the candidates' political use of social media can be categories into three strategies: creating the common ground, establishing identification by antithesis, and creating the assumed "we."

*The Common Ground*

Jokowi's campaign team aimed to leverage the most viral political Facebook page in history and based on Jokowi's political uses of social media, we could determine the set of texts on identification performed in which applied the common ground techniques. Therefore, the first strategy being discussed in this section will be creating common ground through the formation of collective identity in a community.

When Jokowi posted a huge crowd of his supporters, a sense of common bond was composed, created, and distributed through multimedia. You would feel like part of the community if you joined the crowd, although the nature of the relationship was not well defined. The strategy is not only to appeal to the potential voters but also to appeal to social media activists and volunteers, who helps secure the means of media production that enabled people to produce and circulate new information.

The audience is not a given but created. Each candidate was aware of the need to look for a common ground to persuade constituents. The shared values in which Jokowi expressed on social media were his Pancasila ideology, his life as a commoner, and his populist, inclusive and non-confrontational approach. The assertive nationalism was re-
emerging at the center of Indonesian politics, which was what motivated the candidates to create this particular political discourse.

The common ground strategy is the most important technique used in the sample of social media artifacts studied, mainly looking at how Jokowi equates or links himself with others in an overt manner. Jokowi was more hands on (or appear to be so) on issues of public concern. He seemed to be more approachable and relatively easy to have a dialogue with, supported by a less hierarchical structure in the campaign team.\textsuperscript{62}

Arguably, Indonesia is now facing the new kind of democracy, in which regular people can be the leader of the country. Jokowi, a former furniture maker who grew up in a small village to later become Jakarta governor proved to be particularly popular with urban and rural youth. The youth become the biggest part of the entire networked society. In its extreme form, technological determinism suggests that technology determines the attitudes of young people. The participatory culture endorsed by the Internet encourages civic engagement and political support for creating and sharing ideas, allowing Jokowi to establish a connection with his biggest supporters, the urban and rural youth.

The biggest and strongest Jokowi’s supporters were the young, educated technocratic populist, from a middle-class group who put emphasis on anti-

\textsuperscript{62} Mietzner’s “Indonesia’s 2014 Elections” explores the dynamics between Subianto and Jokowi, and analyses in what ways the populist campaigns can be successful. His analysis indicates that Subianto’s campaign was ultimately defeated because Indonesia’s post-Suharto democracy was not in a state of acute, life-threatening crisis. By contrast, his opponent, the down-to-earth former carpenter and Jakarta governor, Jokowi, advanced a new form of technocratic populism that was inclusive, and non-confrontational.
discrimination, inclusive society, and non-confrontational positive campaign. The distributions of social media content were directly or indirectly impact the sense of identification with those particular groups, by producing and circulating the online content, it tells the member of this group that they are similar and have the same substance. However, these findings rely heavily on creating a conversation on social media that are affecting young voters. Thus, these suggestions may not be applicable for a political campaign in different context.

Identification by Antithesis

The second strategy being discussed in this section is identification by antithesis, through the creation of symbolic action. By looking at the distinction between Subianto and Jokowi’s symbolic action, there were indications that an over-reliance on symbolic activities can lead to significant divisions. What it is needed as part of identification by antithesis is to develop unifying symbols.

When targeting the young people, the campaign strategists stresses the significance of its name, logo, and trademark. From the preliminary rhetorical analysis, it is apparent why Jokowi’s campaign strategists develop a strategy to establish common meanings through the social media campaign by using unified symbols such as the use of

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63 From Jokowi’s case example, we can develop several basic campaign strategies. For example, the last status update he posted was his article on his top 20 performance one year after his inauguration; the types of the online post he shared were mainly on his down-to-earth populism.

64 These might include unethical manipulation, divisions, and unexpected interpretations.
A twibbon campaign is a microsite where users can support their cause, brand or organisation with a variety version of image they can use as their profile picture or post it on any social media account. Below is one the example of Jokowi and Subianto's twibbon campaign, with Jokowi emphasis his populist and righteous aspect and Subianto emphasis his distinct nationalist and leadership aspect.

![Sihar Harianja, Asal Usul "I Stand On The Right Side," Web.](image)

In the presidential election 2014, Jokowi’s supporters were massive but unorganized. “I Stand on the Right Side” is a statement that the right people choosing the one on the right side of the ballot to lead the country, and a way to unite voters and create a group identity. People created an avatar template and used it on social media so people could use it express their identity. “I Stand on the Right Side” became a trend and widely spread. Many people, ranging from celebrities to politicians used it as their avatar to confirm them as Jokowi-JK voters.

Identification through antithesis is also can be based on polarization. To counter this iconic "I Stand on The Right Side," Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa also created a viral meme, but their slogan was "Choose One Because I Love Indonesia." The political purposes of using social media are meant to create persuasion and identification, but I am questioning how social media can foster identification in a collective yet segregated
community such as Indonesia. It becomes interesting that the above viral meme was able to classify this segregated community into mainly two groups. The viral memes were created by the campaign to encourage people to visually identify themselves, and used by the supporters of each candidate. It was left or right, number one or number two.

Symbolic action is a system of communication that is based on language, but some unethical groups or organisations might use gimmickry on their social media campaign to obtain some advantage. Voters were urged to "unite" against a common "enemy," sometimes involving superficial pleasantness to cover up dishonest activities or intentions. Voters were relied on symbols for meaning, not realising that those symbols might provide misleading or incorrect information or provide untrue explanations.

The rhetoric of polarisation was evident in the type of constituents both candidates targeted, with Jokowi targeting the young people and Subianto's supporters were mostly from the conservative group holding traditional values. Jokowi did pretty well in getting the support from the swing voters through the use of social media, by creating solidarity through symbolic action. However, by doing this, he or his campaign team were also suggesting to oppose a common foe, and the symbolic action was transmitted through culture. Subianto's values were reminiscent of the new order ideology and were considered as the threat by the new movement led by Jokowi, and individuals were urged to make a choice between one of the two competing candidates.

Political practice in participatory culture involves seeking out, gathering, and analyzing political information. But it doesn't matter what the content is because people
automatically segregate themselves into similar groups, one example could be by joining a certain Facebook group or following the candidates' Facebook account. Ideally, the candidates should be actively engaged in dialogue and practices of weighing in on issues of public concerns.

Despite the fact that Subianto had over double the number of followers compares to Jokowi, Jokowi's social media engagement was over 100 percent during the final month before the election. Subianto’s frequent emotional outbursts didn't reflect his intention on issues of public concern. Thus his pro-poor and anti-capitalist rhetoric sounded hollow to many of the underprivileged he aimed to cultivate. Jokowi’s non-confrontational moves were able to form a sense of identification with the Jokowi’s supporters, and the supporters associated with Jokowi’s positive campaign. Jokowi’s pragmatic populism was also not only considered the natural product of sharing values and goals but also necessary to oppose threats from outsiders.

*The Assumed “We.”*

The third strategy being discussed in this section is the assumed “we,” a subtle and powerful identification strategy that often goes unnoticed. An assumed "we" can be based on similar ideology, believing that political parties or electoral contestants transcended the same ideology. As discussed earlier, Indonesia is a country with various tribes and customs to different religions and faiths. With such a complex sociocultural condition, people tend to voice a neutral ideology to maintain stability towards the range
of diversity that exists in Indonesia, and this was also a well-known act during Suharto’s era.

During the campaign, each candidate brings their ideology to interact with their constituents. One sacrosanct national ideology is Pancasila, which both Subianto's and Jokowi's political morality also derives from Pancasila. The meaning of Pancasila evolves over time, but it was essentially a statement of political consensus rather than ideology. The candidates used Pancasila as a political ideology in the 2014 election by presenting it as a national identity, and many can relate their lives with Pancasila because it was an attempted amalgamation of different religions, cultures, or schools of thought. However, this amalgamation was often taken as a face value. I’d say taken at face value because back in the new order era, Indonesians were not used to question anything. People were seeking for stability to gain unity, especially right after the independence, and Suharto used Pancasila to repressed different values or beliefs outside the stated ones.

Suharto glorified Pancasila as the only acceptable value, and he suppressed the other values outside Pancasila. He obliged all organisations in Indonesia to adhere to Pancasila as a fundamental principle, as a way to emphasise the communitarian values. Suharto exploited the vagueness from this combination of occidental and oriental ideas to justify their actions and to condemn their opponents as “anti-Pancasila.” Therefore, Indonesians still tend to accept any assumption or any ideology offered by the

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65 The country’s first President Sukarno founded Indonesia’s official ideals, and the New Order administration of Indonesia's second president, Suharto, was also a strong supporter of Pancasila.
government or prominent leaders, and its corollaries unquestioningly. Having just experienced a new era of democracy after 32 years of dictatorship, most Indonesians never openly disclose their personal political stances and tend to describe themselves as neutral, regardless of their personal beliefs. However, social media allows dissenting opinions to emerge.

The power of social media encourages people consciously and unconsciously to express their political stance, and the competing ideologies in Indonesia are drawing we/they distinctions. According to Burke, we have a desire for consubstantiality. Consubstantiality can be achieved through different means and meanings, and there is a process of technological unconscious consubstantiality that needed to be taken into consideration. What we share is ambiguous, and merely the result of our unconscious minds. Even though the social media allows social movement actors to unite, but the sense of We-ness is actually full of assumption.

The assumed or transcendent "we" is also related to the blurred identity because the assumed “we” and the corresponding “they” highlighted the unconscious form of identification and identity formation. There was a process of affirmation and subversion in determining Pancasila ideology as the foundation of Indonesia's national identity, and the local elections that come after the 2014 election tend to contest the religious identity with the foundation of Indonesia as a country.

In building the national identity, the most important part in identification imagines the substance, the part we share. The Javanese ethnic group and the Islamic group have
heavily influenced Indonesia's overall political culture, but there were considerable differences in the interpretations of Islam that had taken root even since the pre-colonial era. The differences in the interpretation led to a battle to define Islam in Indonesia with a cacophony of diverse voices during the campaign period on social media⁶⁶.

The public grouped themselves according to whom they are supporting in this election and led to a cyber-war when constituents with the same ideology distanced themselves and also alienating other Muslim with the different ideology. Elections in Indonesia is all about one big referendum on the Javanese ethnic group and the Islamic group, and by identifying themselves with one race or one religion, they exclude others. The assumed “we” was the Javanese Muslim, and the corresponding “they” was the Chinese Christian.

Marcus Mietzner's "Reinventing Asian Populism" discussed Jokowi's less strident approach but leads to ultimately victory. Jokowi was the candidate that encouraged diversity, and it was magnified with the presence of social media. In using social media, Jokowi was trying to fit into the substance of the digital native. Bellow is the symbolic actions formulated by Jokowi's supporters, involving the "I Stand On The Right Side", Gulungkan Lengan Bajumu, Jokowi Adalah Kita, The White Shirt, the square-patterned clothing, the Obama-like profile picture, and the #salam2jari.

⁶⁶ They were still easily provoked and believed that social media is a battlefield, and they became a victim of the war on social media. There were certain groups or political parties who use social media as a battlefield, especially in war ideology and mindset.
Figure 28 Jokowi's Visual Identities

Above is the result of creative visual identity that was shareable on digital media, created by Relawan Jokowi and Tim Sukses. Social media made campaign messaging fragmented and incomprehensible, and this is especially true for Jokowi’s case. One supporter group created the Twibbon and the famous hashtag for young electoral, while others used the roll your sleeves – TinTin’s style and the Obama-like profile picture were for the pragmatic populist. Jokowi Is Us (the movie and the slogan) and the white shirt were targeting the commoners while the square-patterned clothing (red and white, represents the color of Indonesia's flag) was for the nationalist.

With Subianto promoted “anti-discrimination” and Jokowi argued for “pluralism” on their social media campaign, it has encouraged division and fragmentation. However, Subianto uses nationalism to create the assumed "we," and he built his campaign appeals most exclusively on a nationalist platform. Jokowi won the election, and he was able to
offer the new kind of nationalism, the new (national) identity that encourages diversity. More of Sukarno’s pluralistic way rather than Suharto’s authoritarian way.

**Conclusion**

The rhetoric of network culture urges simplicity to explain the world, and the identification process during Indonesia's 2014 presidential campaign indicated the complexity in the identity formation. The presidential candidates representing blurry offline online identities, and their personal narratives created on Facebook were meant to fit with the rhetorical situation they are having. Social media content plays a role in creating a particular political discourse, especially in implying the new nationalism as promised by Jokowi. The production and reproduction of online contents supports the idea of social network theory on collective action.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the role of the digital native in this election. The massive use of social media in the 2014 election was dominated by the digital native, which led to an opposition toward the digital immigrant who still needs to adapt the various existing technologies. From the analysis of how social media works over the course of Indonesia's political election, there were several values highlighted. Next, I conclude the recurring Burkean theme of identification to target the digital native generation, although I also introduce the Post-Truth rhetorical situation.
Chapter 4 synthesized the method of applying Burke’s concepts of identification into the social media campaign, emphasizing the nature of Facebook politics and putting it into the context of Indonesia's social and political background. I have also introduced the political actors that were using the Internet as a political medium and some that were using the technology for political propaganda. I mentioned in chapter one, the term “technophilic developmentalists” in which first coined by Sen and Hill (2000) and refer to a group of people with strong enthusiasm for technology. Different terms were also applied to define this group with keen interest in new technologies, depending on the context it was used. In the context of Indonesia's 2014 presidential election, these groups of innovators were the campaign strategists and the volunteers who supported Jokowi’s digital movement. The 'digital nativeness' of this group enabled them to embrace the use of mobile phones and social media technology in a constructive way, but there was still a group with a lower level of digital literacy who may not have been reached.

Social media is still adequate to build the politician’s image as long as we understand the obstacles and know what it takes to work on a campaign. Indonesia’s 2014 general election was the fourth general election conducted after the downfall of the past authoritarian regime. The number of undecided voters remains between 7 and 10%, the majority was born in the 1980s to the 2000s, and some of them were the first time voters. This generation grew up in the digital age, and they existed in the world when the
Internet began rampantly. They can be referred to as digital native generation, or generation millennial.

As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, social media provide a virtual space where even the less educated people in this group could actively involve in important aspects of practical politics. But Indonesia's worsening problem of fake news calls for digital literacy education. The political strategist also needs to be aware of post-truth politics in the age of social media, which involves managing perception and belief of segmented populations through the strategic use of rumors and falsehoods. This last chapter aims to bring up the issue of division caused by the post-truth politics era, and how political activists need to consider the dystopian perspective of Facebook politics.

The Recurring Burkean Theme of Identification

The year 1998 marked the beginning of online freedom of expression in Indonesia, and social media has dramatically transformed Indonesia’s politics since then. Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election was the most polarising election because it has the most complex dynamics of relationships between the Internet and politics. In this election, the digital native generation became the political actors in the production of symbolic action by using social media to form virtual communities and expand collective actions. However, there were groups with different interests, engage in various types of debates and create a concern of division. One of the groups was the digital immigrant
group, although they tried to blend to not being labeled as outdated, the different ideology caused a different interpretation of the symbolic system created. Using dramatistic pentad to interpret the situations, I also discovered that the digital native generation is vulnerable with social media invitation to be radical and intolerant.

After examining Facebook politics from Burke’s Dramatistic perspective, I aim to illustrate both the utopian perspective and dystopian perspective, in which the keys lie in negotiating differences and similarities between the candidates who were already different in status, wealth, education, and experience. Both candidates managed their personal Facebook page and created a rhetorical situation by establishing common ground through social networking sites. However, another dystopian perspective lies in the idea that identity in a virtual community is a rhetorical construct. The construction of cyber personalities or online identity can be dystopian when the “public” has largely been a blurred picture of anonymous individuals, which leads to the question of how to establish a common ground with multiple anonymities on the Internet. Jokowi was known to have cyber forces in charge of managing social media, and the digital natives were part of this cyber force. Jokowi's cyber force relied on young volunteers, and meanwhile, Subianto's campaign supported by the digital immigrants.

The digital native generation in Indonesia might be only less than 30 percent of the archipelago’s 250 million people, but in this context, they became the political actors in using technology to win the 2014 election. Many in this generation were born in or after 1980, and they became the majority of Internet users during the 2014 election.
Facebook was the second most important campaign medium in this election, and the campaign strategists were using Facebook to target the younger voters. The *Relawan Jokowi*, the group of volunteers that supported Joko “Jokowi” Widodo in the presidential election, was able to endorse the sense of identification and motivate young voters to participate in influencing political affairs. Professional campaign managers could be considered as political actors, but their strategy was also using young volunteers on Facebook to foster identification through the voluntary action that emphasizes the joint cause.

The 1998 movement in Indonesia, 2008 United States presidential election, 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election—each has indicated how the digital community became an expression of collective identity. However, how social media can foster identification in a collective yet segregated society such as Indonesia, of course, cannot be completely free from social constraints\(^67\).

An Examination of Facebook Politics from Kenneth Burke’s Dramatistic Perspective has identified the recurring Burkean theme of identification:

\(^67\) We must not forget that each comes to have a variety of political identities, and there are other factors shape the construction of identity politics. Several aspects to consider when dealing with the networked digital communication technologies are the naming function of identification and the idea of "digital substance." The networked digital communication technologies have fundamentally altered the substance of Internet users, and the digital substance lies in these three elements: the subject and the kinds of evidence used to develop it, the audience, and the character of the rhetor. Other than statements posted online that aim to persuade followers, political campaign strategists need to be aware of the influence of Internet “cookies” in creating a series of dissociated and frequently contradictory roles defined by the groups with which one identifies.

2. Identification by Antithesis: The symbolic action through meme and other visual elements that were easily produced and circulated digitally.

3. The Assumed "we": The Javanese Muslim identity.

The recent elections have shown that a blend of populism and nativism, with a 21st-century touch for social media, has reinforced division. The Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election pitted someone with the quintessential “blue blood” against a modest man from outside the “system.” The supporters of both candidates were mostly coming from different generations, different social economic status, and different educational background. The complexity of technological development has reinforced division. The focus is more on the lack of information and the polarization of the online debate. Online activity may lead to civic engagement, but it may also result in sheltered views. The subsequent section discusses several dystopian perspectives, which impacted the overall socio-cultural and political issue.

**The Post-Truth Rhetorical Situation**

This section focuses on the dystopian perspective concerning post-truth politics, which emerged mainly in the United States’ 2016 Presidential election and Indonesia’s
2017 local elections. Langdon Winner's article “Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia?” argues that the conventional views of technological utopians lack understanding of the complexity of technological development as a social, cultural, and political phenomenon. In the era of the Internet of things, social media makes us a dystopian society, and this was described thoroughly in Sherry Turkle's *Alone Together*. This phenomenon is due to the hypernormalization of technological utopians, who have built a simple "fake world" that is run by corporations.

There is something distinctly dystopian about social media: surveilled conformity, simulacra, hoaxes, anonymity, slacktivism, and the concept of the echo chamber. Patricia Wallace's *The Psychology of the Internet* discusses several vulnerable aspects of the Internet, and one of them involves trust and how it plays out in many different online environments. When fake news fills the Internet, it forms an intent to carry out an action or to premeditate an action. Richard Grusin's "Coda on Premediation and Preemption" suggests that social media is spreading panic in vast swatches of people that the platforms’ propagation of bogus "news" is the latest "blame anyone except us" theory.

In the social media world, bad news spreads quicker than good news. The speed of exchanges is unfathomable, and people share thoughts and feelings even as we have them, and perhaps things that are not necessarily true. Wallace points out that "anonymity, or the perception of it, is another potent ingredient that can lead to

68 The emergence of post-truth politics in Indonesia after the 2014 elections is triggered by the way social media is spreading bogus “news” in vast swatches. The rhetorical situation in this election also leads to the rise of conservative, fundamentalist, and radical groups.
aggression” (103). Users can present the self as they want it to be, and social media has transformed self-representation.

New technologies are indeed involved in changing the practices and patterns of everyday life, but trust has become an issue in social media. Fake reviews and data breaches further erode trust. Winner elaborates how digital transformation has redefined our lives, including our material artifacts and associated social practice:

The creation of new technical devices presents occasions around which the practices and relations of everyday life are powerfully redefined, the lived experiences of work, family, community, and personal identity, in short, of some of the basic cultural conditions that make us “who we are.” (992)

There has been a continuing digital transformation of and astonishingly wide range of material artifacts and associated social practice, and politicians need to know how to develop engaging conversations on social media. Politicians need to think of themselves as a brand, and must be able to determine the Facebook algorithm which includes filters that allow users to have more control over what they see. Since the algorithm was first introduced in 2009, users have the ability to fine-tune their status
updates and include multimedia with their posts and make specific lists of friends allowed only to see updates from other friends.\textsuperscript{69}

Off the net, young people tend to split into ingroups and outgroups rather easily. Within the group, polarization can occur when members' pre-existing tendencies are enhanced as a result of their in-group interactions. "Many argue that the Internet has actually increased polarization because it is easier to pick and choose what to view, seeking out the opinion of others of like mind rather than exposing yourself to divergent viewpoints" (Wallace 73)\textsuperscript{70}.

To understand the post-truth rhetorical situation, it is also necessary to explore the specificity of a locality. The importance of exploring locality is due to the second dystopian element, which explains that social media may not be necessarily beneficial. Nowadays, people begin not only to blame the technology for a change in lifestyle but also to believe that technology exposes the quality of having unlimited or very great power. This unlimited power points to a technological determinist perspective regarding

\textsuperscript{69} But the algorithm itself has its perks since it is highly dependent on similarity to identify potential pairs, choosing friends who are similar demographically or in terms of particular attitudes and behavioral choices.

\textsuperscript{70} Turkle's \textit{Alone Together} argued that we are sacrificing conversation for mere connection. Social media acts as a mirror, a vain tool to view our virtual construction as a reflection of ourselves. The Internet enables people to support favorite causes, with as little effort as clicking a "like" button on the organization's social media site. We wander around, which might lead to slacktivism, which according to Wallace happens when "people think they've done their part with a small effort and earned a kind of moral license to stop contributing" (182). Several other dystopian results include biased discussions in online work groups, online ingroups and outgroups, and minority opinions in online workgroups.
reification. One of the biggest threats is a personification of deceit, as anonymous social networks become the next big thing.

In the next subsections, I discuss the emergence of post-truth politics after the 2014 elections and describe the rhetorical situation that focuses on the state of undecided voters in coping with the rise of conservative, fundamentalist, and radical groups. This post-truth politics is the result of polarization and the dystopian elements of social media. In Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election, the social media strategy led to two outcomes. It has indeed revealed another form of participatory culture, particularly in supporting the second candidate. However, the second outcome, the most significant one, is the fact that social media allows polarization and division. Thus, my conjecture states that the identification process in social media might not necessarily unite a segregated community.

The difference in the online postings was mainly due to the different rhetorical situation each candidate faced. When you identify yourself with one side, you are alienating the other. The 2014 elections targeted the four pillars: prosperity, peace, justice, and democracy. However, many political elections after 2014 show a different situation on the three constituent parts that make up any rhetorical situation: exigencies, audiences, and constraints.

*Audience: Conservatism and Democracy*
With the emergence of social media, Indonesia has moved from centralized rule to a boisterous democracy. The rhetorical situation mostly surrounds Indonesia's democratic journey, in which each candidate faced a different exigency. Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy, and all the 187 million voters in the 2014 election were capable of positive modification. With relatively high first-time voters, the act of persuasion might require a different approach.

After the 2014 election, Indonesia had a high view of democracy. Many seemed to forget that democracy is not a mechanism for fighting intolerance is just the mechanism of decision-making by majority vote. After reviewing the social media campaigns for the 2014 election, it appears that there was division resulted from both candidates' social media content. Such neutrality makes everyone (politically speaking) staggered, and the radical voice tends to get more attention from the public. Therefore, the candidates then aim to create a strong claim to represent their standpoint.

Social media allows each candidate to channel important elements of popular sentiment; some of their strategies worked, but some did not. For example, Subianto posted his old pictures when he was serving in the military. He played up his military background in his social media campaign, to assure prosperity, peace, justice and democracy in Indonesia. Surveys suggest that a proportion of Indonesia’s voters were looking for a president who was tough and decisive, and although this may favor Subianto, the audiences already had a predisposition regarding his past human rights.
crimes. Voters in greater numbers were also tired of the arrogance and corruption of elected officials.

Although the young people who supported democracy influenced the Indonesia’s 2014 election, conservative Muslims tried to dominate politics in Indonesia once again. When Donald J. Trump was elected president in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, many began to consider the role of the fundamentalist evangelicals in influencing the political result. In Indonesia, the elections after 2014 tend to put forth the Islamic fundamentalism as the primary value to gain voters’ support.

With the radical Islamists seeking to force their agenda, the fundamentalist agenda alters the already well-known issues such as prosperity, peace, justice and democracy. Any election always raises prevalent social problems such as gender, class, and race. However, topics such as health, the economy, or climate change seemed to be missing from debates. Issues of gender, class, or race have historically been full of controversies which politicians often play exploit to build their personal character, formulate their logical proofs, and use the emotion of their constituents.

**Constraints: The Undecided Voters**

In the 2014 election, the candidates used their social media platform as an attempt to create one voice, with little attention to how social media tends to polarize rather than unify. The young voters held the key to the 2014 election, and they were considered as *Golongan Putih* (the undecided voters). However, although these undecided voters
consciously followed a political candidate's Facebook page, the algorithm controls what updates appear on our timeline. Therefore, they were unaware that they were in a bubble with digital substance.

Indonesia has held together since its foundation in 1945, but how can we expect the polarized nature of social media to accommodate the very diverse country with hundreds of ethnic groups and languages? Under the utopian view, social media does stand as an example of the benefits of togetherness. However, schism, separatism, and division also beset the development of social media conversations in Indonesia. Although undecided voters believed that the political updates shared on social media influenced their voting decision, they were unaware of the ambiguities in that online content due to the algorithm.

Blakesley’s *The Elements of Dramatism* define rhetoric as the art of elaborating or exploiting ambiguity to foster identification or division. Ambiguity is our state of being; therefore, rhetoric is important for our well-being. Ambiguity works as an invitation to connect or impose a separation, and users should be attentive to the ways that digital cookies and algorithms affect our ideas, our desires, and ourselves.

The two-party systems enhance the level of ambiguity and complicate the situation for undecided voters, and this is particularly the case in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election and United States’ 2016 presidential election. Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election was the first time that the candidates were head to head from the beginning because no single party won at least 25 percent of the national vote, and
coalitions of convenience became unavoidable. In United States' 2016 presidential election, there was less than 10 percent of undecided voters. They have no firm candidate preference or even strong party affiliation but were presented with a vast political divide. They tend to be young, profoundly dissatisfied with Clinton and Trump. The leading Republican candidate, Donald J Trump, has capitalized on people's fears, anxieties, and suspicions. But many believed that it was because of the frustration with government, gained himself the support from the undecided.

In many elections, the polarized positions the candidates increase the ambiguity for the first-time voters in deciding which candidate they can identify. In Indonesia, many are still concerned with the future of Indonesian democracy. The concept of negative sovereignty emerges during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election in Indonesia; many news reports attacking candidates have appeared in social media. With the gubernatorial candidates having turned to patrons to persuade the 20 to 30 percent of undecided voters, this 'sovereignty' is manifested through the spread of fake news and the mobilisation of mobs. Anti-Chinese and anti-Christian slurs directed toward one of the candidates have circulated widely on social media in recent months, which gives power and authority to those who utilize social media. While constant furious campaigning by each candidate targets the undecided voters, the result of this election will be seen as a barometer of Indonesian secularism.

Division
The division is the result of differences, a situation that exists in every rhetorical situation. When the act of persuasion aims to create identification, at the same time, we are ignoring another discourse. Rhetoric is about the relation or the connection between identification and division, as people proclaim unity when there are division and vice versa. This next subsection discusses the political rhetoric behind two recent elections and looks at the rhetoric of identification used to persuade constituents and how it created division. The first case review is the US presidential election, and the second one is Indonesia’s local elections.

*Division in the US Presidential Election – The Key Moments*

The contemporary world has described Post-truth politics as a problem, but it was less notable before the advent of the Internet. The United States’ 2016 presidential election included the daily changing of historic records to fit the propaganda goals of the day and is the result of an increasing ubiquity of social media, where facts are pointless in an era of post-truth politics. Free speech has met social media, and life in post-truth times becomes a revolutionary one.

Colin Crouch’s *Post-Democracy* used the phrase “post-democracy” and attributed it to the “advertising industry model” used to persuade constituents. However, “public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected
by those teams” (Crouch 4). This type of political communication leads to a crisis of trust and accusations of dishonesty, in which it is similar to the current post-truth politics.

Before the United States’ 2016 election, large groups of people who were quite and reasonably disappointed with the current government were falling for fake or bogus or sensationalized news. The rise of post-truth politics coincides with polarized political beliefs, to which social media adds depth. The desire to identify ourselves with something/others forces us to find the thing that fulfills us, and that creates the echo chambers and the filter bubble. People no longer trust the experts, but instead, they unconsciously trust the things they consume on social media. The desire to fulfill their digital desire has made them believe in a wide range of fake news with little or no critical perspective, which leads to today’s battleground in the information wars.

But Facebook’s algorithm and “echo chamber” or “filter bubble” should not be the only cause that leads to this situation. There was an ethical struggle on the policy of controlling information, liberal and non-partisan complaints of censorship, and fake news. The propaganda emerges on social media in the form of false news in a similar way to the uses of propaganda during the war, when the enemy is demonized. The Nazis built their pathos, ethos, and logos, to create the desired substance through division and dissension. Trump has also pointed out people in sub-categories to keep all grievances alive and to create division. Thus, although social media might amplify this cause, the reason why Trump won was that many voters wished to get out from the current
situation. Arguably, this was also the reason why Indonesians voted for the populist and hard worker Jokowi in the 2014 election.

During the United States’ 2008 presidential campaign, Obama realized that, as a young senator with little exposure running against well-known Senators Clinton and McCain, he needed to create an intimate relationship with U.S. citizens. Thus, Obama created a social networking Web site that allowed supporters and potential voters to participate in creating content as well as to communicate with the campaign and with each other.

The rise of social media brought rhetoric more prominently into people's lives, but social media also presents a more complicated scenario for voters. Obama might tap into social networks' power in the 2008 election, but with the popularity of new rhetorical media like Twitter, Facebook, and mobile applications, social media has changed how campaigns disseminated information and how candidates interacted with voters. With that success in the 2008 presidential campaign, Republican nominee Mitt Romney needed to create a social media campaign in 2012 that rivaled Obama’s personable approach and new media use so that Romney could attract young voters.

In the United States’ 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney failed to obtain support from young voters and votes from minorities because his social media content was out of tune with fast-growing segments of the population. But now when looking at the United States’ 2016 presidential election, the role of social media has created growing fake news sites and the rise of click bait, which all leads to a post-truth politic. Donald
Trump won the 2016 election because he was using social media to embrace the dissenting views, and it became a key indication of how technology disrupted the truth.

*Division in the Local Indonesian Election – The Key Moments*

The Indonesia’s 2017 local election indicated the same tendency with the US 2016 Presidential election, with a growing dissenting view on several ideologies of neither capitalism nor communism but one that merged nationalism, religion, and humanism. Humanists seemed to rise with the victory of Jokowi, the president of all people. However, the regimes of post-truth and post politics take its toll when social media magnifies the many political differences.

Part of the political culture is a social commitment to be careful when managing differences. The commitment to dampen ferocity and make a rational speech as a way out for many politicians leads to post-truth politics. In the 2014 election, Subianto would be seen having a stronger nationalist ideology, i.e., establish a close relationship with the farmers. However, a strong ideology does not guarantee the presidency. Constituents were looking for someone able to get things done, which is why a populist leader like Jokowi won the 2014 election.

One strong ideology that could hold the Indonesians together was Pancasila, although the way it is applied was different in each era. From the 1998 movement to the 2014 election, Indonesians are aware the importance of Pancasila ideology, because, without ideology, there will not be any path to lead to the same direction. However, after
the 1998 movement, there was a widely held view of policy, instigated by Muslim members of parliament, who were against diversity. Over the course of ideological debate between the national ideology Pancasila (an overarching umbrella for a pluralistic nation) and democracy, the militant Islamic such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders' Front) campaigned for Islamic law and mobilized protestors against perceived violators of Islamic rules.

The idea of an Islamic state also colors Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial elections, with Islamic State (IS) fighters publicly supporting the protest against one of the candidates via social media. The incumbent in this election is a Christian of Chinese ethnicity, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok. Anti-Ahok sentiment emerges with growing support for fundamentalism in Indonesia. In November 2016, radical religious group the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) urged the government to arrest Ahok for religious defamation, and even urged the government to change its constitution from the secular nationalists to Islamic State.

There was a menace of outrage, atrocity, and hatred between FPI and most middle class, not only non-Muslims but also Muslims. The resistance came from those who had a college degree and who stigmatized FPI as "thugs dressed in religion." We have then two opposing forces in Indonesia: the intellectual group that comes from the upper middle class and the radical religious group who mostly originates from the middle class with lower education status. Based on this particular rhetorical situation, I believe that
Indonesia is having a shared delusion, especially in doing whatever it takes to reach “harmony.”

Conclusion

As stated in the first chapter, this dissertation focuses the premises on two periods in recent Indonesian history. This dissertation analyzed the first period, particularly during the 1998 movement. This research believes that the Internet has allowed individuals and groups to find shared interests, particularly in the political context. In the second chapter, the dissertation briefly analyzed the use of social media in the Indonesia's 2014 presidential election to examine the social media polarization and division that was growing since this last election.

There were several motivations for connecting to online political information during Indonesia’s 2014 presidential campaign, namely to create identification among young voters and volunteers through social networking sites. The third chapter indicated the challenges in establishing a sense of identification with the young voters. But, beyond any dispute remains the role of social media for political means. Politicians increasingly use social media for their political platforms to reach the first-time voter.

The fourth chapter elaborated the many ways that the candidates created a sense of identification with the electorate. The first-time voter is between the ages of 17 and 21. Many were college students, who at this age are particularly avid users of social media.
In the midst of this connectivity, social media allows the first-time voters to interact with their peers. The rise of social media creates a portfolio of opportunities for politicians and plays a significant role in modern society. However, the possibilities of these first-time voters to reach an informed decision on whom to vote for are limited if not impossible. The usage of social media is contextual, and significant cultural, historical, and political exigencies necessitated a concept accounting for the self in society, which has been overlooked and undervalued.

From the fourth chapter, we can conclude that the rhetorical situation surrounding the Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election supports the notion that Facebook supports democracy, in a way that democracy unites people for all different reasons. Facebook provides a platform from which previously silent voices are beginning to be heard, and users can share personal information as well as form or join similar interest groups.

The first parts of this dissertation have emphasized the human uses and social consequences of telecommunication technologies in modern society and how the Internet has allowed individuals and groups to find shared interests. However, there is also significant division in online political communication, something that we cannot simply ignore. Chapter 4 indicates that social media can foster identification through antithesis, the assumed or transcendent “we,” and digital substance. Chapter five focuses on the element of social media polarization, and how the use of social media has reinforced the sense of polarization in the atmosphere and changed the way we talk to each other about politics.
Social media can create division because there is a significant divide between politically identifiable communities online, and this applies too in much of Indonesia's recent political context. The division between gender, religion, and race colors the Indonesia's 2017 local political election. The most prominent example is the Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, which pits Christian against rising tide of Muslim extremism. The spread of fake news indicates the lack of awareness to research and select the credible news sources, and not to haste in deciding the issue regarding both laws and policies.

Early in this chapter, I indicated the many backward ideologies that continued to oppress "Others" during the United States’ 2016 presidential election and the Indonesia's 2017 local election, with massive use of social media. Algorithmic digital cookies position users in polarizing groupings of knowledge and people were unaware that social media controlled what information they can see. They were unconsciously grappling with the notion that those who are perceived as "different" are viewed as "threats," even though the problem is not precisely right. This last point becomes a starting point to understand the ways digital rhetorics can guide further research.

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