MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

I wish to comment in detail on the lack of merit of each of the so-called civil rights proposals under consideration by your committee. I shall address myself to the detailed provisions, subject by subject. First, however, I would like to comment briefly on the philosophy which apparently breeds such proposals.

The philosophy of which I shall speak is responsible for all of the bills on this subject, directly or indirectly, but is most evident in the provisions of S. 810. This proposal is extreme. It is punitive. It is flagrantly abusive. It is palpably and viciously anti-Southern. It would, in effect, treat the South as a "conquered province," to be ruled over, insofar as race relations are concerned, by a czar in the person of the Attorney General of the United States. It is, in every respect, a "conquered province bill."

That the bill has this sweeping purpose is not surprising to me, in view of the curious attitude exhibited toward the South by those who adhere to the philosophy which bred it. On occasions, I have heard those enslaved to this philosophy, when speaking with regard to the South's effort to turn aside, or at least to soften, some of the more extreme legislative blows aimed at it, remark, somewhat ruefully, that they sometimes wonder just which side did win the "Civil War." Such a remark, spoken in a serious manner, reflects, I repeat, a curious attitude—an attitude which seems to be that the North, having been victorious in war, should by right, or might, have a free hand to work its will on the South; and that there is something altogether unreasonable, almost outrageous, or shocking—about the South actively offering any objections. There would seem to be almost a sort of resentment that the South should offer any resistance at all to Northern efforts to remake the South or to write new laws for it.
This strange attitude toward the South—which has become increasingly noticeable on the part, not only of certain political figures, but of various editors, authors, professors, and national labor leaders,—is reminiscent of the attitude which prevailed in the North after the War Between the States and even long after Reconstruction.

This attitude on the part of the North was very ably described by a Southern scholar, Frank Lawrence Owsley, who wrote on the subject nearly three decades ago. Mr. Owsley wrote: (and I quote)

"After the South had been conquered by war and impoverished by peace, there still appeared to remain something which made the South different—something intangible, incomprehensible, in the realm of the spirit. That too must be invaded and destroyed; so there commenced a second war of conquest, the conquest of the Southern mind, calculated to remake every Southern opinion, to impose the Northern way of life and thought upon the South, write "error" across the pages of Southern history which were out of keeping with the Northern legend, and set the rising and unborn generations upon stools of everlasting repentance. Francis Wayland, former president of Brown University, regarded the South as 'the new missionary ground for the national school teacher,' and President Hill of Harvard looked forward to the task for the North of spreading knowledge and culture over the regions that sat in darkness."

Wayland and Hill, of course, dealt with what might be called the educational and cultural front. Their counterparts on the political and governmental front were Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts; and the theoretical rationalization of the line of thinking—or of malice—on which Stevens and Sumner operated, in dealing with the South, is known as the "conquered province" theory. In essence, this theory held that the South, having been defeated in war, was a "conquered province," to be dealt with by the victorious North as the North saw fit.

The whole curious attitude toward the South reflects, it seems to me, something of this same attitude of treating the South as a conquered province. Certainly this bill, emphasizing as it does the forcible integration of Southern schools, proceeds upon that theory. Certainly, beyond any possible dispute, this bill makes a mockery of the fundamental and once
cherished principle, apparently now discarded from our government system of "government by the consent of the governed."

Speaking of this idea of "consent of the governed," I sometimes wonder if it has ever occurred to those Senators and others who are constantly proposing new methods of integrating Southern schools that the people of each and every one of the Southern States could, at any time they should so wish, either through their legislatures or through amendment of their State constitutions, abolish segregation of the races in any sphere of activity controlled by their State? I further wonder if it occurs to the Senators that the reason why these States have not taken this action is that the overwhelming majority of the people of these States do not wish to take such action? I further wonder if it occurs to the Senators that, whatever may be the opinion of the majority of the people of the North as to integration, to force the integration of Southern schools in the face of the obvious and manifest opposition of the overwhelming majority of the Southern people, is the very negation of the principle of "government by consent of the governed"?

The philosophy, which breeds a conquered province bill, is a disgrace to our country's heritage. No such attitude has reared its ugly head after any other war in which we have engaged. Our attitude toward the Axis' powers following World War II was magnanimous. Yet, the conquered province bill is the offspring of the same philosophy which prompts Russia's treatment of its East European conquests and which we heartily, --and correctly--condemn and deplore. Is the outgrowth of this philosophy any less despicable when evidenced in our own land? It would not be remiss to apply the words of the third verse of the seventh Chapter of St. Matthew, "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" I sincerely hope that objectivity and reason will triumph over the philosophy which bred this conquered province bill, for only this mother philosophy can nurture the offspring, and without this philosophy the bill will die as it justly deserves.
I turn now to the lack of merit of the various proposals. Two of the proposals pending before the committee, specifically Title I of S. 810, and S. 958, provide in varying degree for the endorsement by Congress of the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions.

I will not discuss the demerits of those decisions beyond saying that they ignore the existence of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, the doctrine of *stare decisis*, and the wisdom of all previous Courts; they are based solely on erroneous sociological theories rather than law, and they are a living exemplification of the lack of judicial restraint which has characterized the present Court. I would address myself, rather, to the foreseeable effects of a congressional endorsement of these decisions.

The endorsement by Congress of a Court decision, would, in the first place, constitute an invasion by the Legislative Branch of the functions of the Judicial Branch of our Government. Is this to set the precedent for Congress to express its approval or disapproval of each controversial decision of the Court? If we are indeed to so intermingle the functions of the Legislative and Judicial Branches, I suggest that the committee is remiss for not already entering into a study to express Congressional opinion on the cases mentioned and referred to last fall by the State Supreme Court Justices in their report on the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and also the pronouncements on Internal Security decisions issued recently by the American Bar Association.

Obviously, this endorsement has no purpose except to heap coals on the fires of devisiveness created by the decisions. It is an effort to add insult to injury, and to insure that the tremendous setback to race relations is magnified and perpetuated. It is an effort to commit the Congress, once and for all, to a course of punitive and arbitrary action, devoid of reason and understanding. This proposal has no constructive purpose; it seeks not a solution of the problem, but rather a compounding of the problem.
In this regard, I would digress for a moment. The thought has occurred to me that history is repeating itself. At the time of the "Civil War," and subsequently during Reconstruction, many elements promoted the belief, to a large extent successfully, that the cause of that war was the issue of slavery. Slavery was played up as an emotional issue, and while it was a contributing factor, the basic cause of the war lay in the economic field. I believe it is somewhat analogous that the recent sudden outburst of righteous indignation over segregation in the South just happens to coincide with the emergence of a rapid industrialization of the South, perhaps to the economic disadvantage of other sections of the country.

This endorsement is the most basic issue in the proposals before the committee, for the action on this issue will decide whether the hate-dominated conquered province philosophy, or reason and judgment, is to control.

I turn now to the subject of Titles II and III of S. 810 and S. 958, which would authorize Federal financial assistance to schools which "desegregate," and also put tighter reins on aid to schools in Federally impacted areas. I realize that S. 958 is not technically before this committee, having been referred, and I believe correctly, to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The provisions of Titles II and III of S. 810 cover the same subject, albeit more expensively, and it occurs to me that this portion of the bill S. 810, is equally within the jurisdiction of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Since these provisions of S. 810 are part and parcel of the bill under consideration by this committee, I shall address myself to them, and my remarks are also applicable to the provisions of S. 958. The fact that I comment on the proposals in no way alters my conclusion as to this committee's jurisdiction.

Essentially, these proposals embody the concept that the apparently prevailing god--MONEY--shall be utilized to bring the South to forsake its principles. It is apparently based on the belief that bribery will accomplish what force and bayonets failed to secure.
I have long suspected that the descriptions of our foreign policy as "dollar diplomacy" were more truth than fiction. Having failed in foreign relations, dollar diplomacy would now be applied to race relations. There has long been a hint of bribery in the Federal programs, which have accomplished the surrender of invaluable individual rights with a sugar coating of Federal grants, but the bribe offer appears in this proposal unveiled and naked, clearly recognizable in its most despicable form.

I think it is fitting that this proposal comes at a time when the financial condition of the United States is so embarrassed that the bribes would have to be borrowed before being offered. I am reminded of the words of John Ruskin, that "Borrowers are nearly always ill-spenders, and it is with lent money that all evil is mainly done, and all unjust war protracted."

Titles IV and V of S. 810 apparently recognize that the bribery proposed in earlier provisions of the bill will not seduce the Southern people, for it provides that should the money-bait fail--and I assure you it would--there would be a return to force.

Education, in all aspects, would be turned over to the Federal Government, and administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The tool proposed to be utilized to accomplish this unconstitutional step is the so-called "desegregation plan." It would have the Secretary of HEW proceed as far as possible by use of intimidation and threats, and to complete the process with a Court injunction.

While the demerits of this proposal are almost unlimited, the destruction of education itself looms largest. I recall the hearings last year before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the National Defense Education Act. If there was one point upon which almost all witnesses, from every field, agreed, it was the essentiality of local control of the schools. To be sure, there were differences on how to maintain local control, and even to increase local interest, but from all came
the admonition that without local control, education would perish. It should be obvious, then, that the death of education is inherent in any proposal, such as this, which would give control of education to a Federal bureaucrat. There is difficulty enough in attempting to maintain our educational process at a level on which we can survive the threat of Communism and other false ideologies. To sound the death knell of education would surely be a folly, most aptly described as "cutting off your nose to spite your face."

Titles VI and VII of S. 810 can most accurately be summarized as the "National Police State" proposals. They would crown the Attorney General of the United States as Czar. The stature of this official, as proposed here, would be the equivalent to that of 1984's "Big Brother," who would be the caretaker of everyone's rights.

Section 601 would give the Attorney General the power to bring so-called civil rights suits on behalf of individuals or groups and prosecute these suits at government expense.

Have the laws of our country degenerated to such an extent that an individual can no longer bring legal actions to protect himself? Some may answer that question in the affirmative, but the negative answer was practically unanimous at the time it was asked in regard to the victims of labor violence and bossism. Why the about face? Traditionally, we have relied on the democratic philosophy that it was the duty of government to provide only the opportunity and machinery for our citizen to protect himself—and I might add, our historical approach has been successful. Such a benevolent attitude, as is proposed to be implemented here, could only stem from a belief that basically, the American citizen is suffering from disabilities that go to the very heart of the soundness of self-government. It smacks of the instigation of officious intermeddlers and even barratry itself.

Section 602 of S. 810 would authorize the Attorney General to seek injunctions in Federal Courts to prevent interference with officials who were proceeding with desegregation.
The Attorney General would be crowned, not only as the protector of the individual, but as the champion and protector of Federal, State and local officials. The Federal Government already has sufficient statutes on the books to deal effectively with anyone who interferes with Federal officers performing their duties, although the conclusion that these statutes are unknown to Federal officials is strengthened by the recent incident when bayonets of the Armed Forces were the first resort. Similarly, the States and local municipalities have laws protecting their own officials in the performance of their duties. If the latter be less stringent than those of the Federal Government, it is easily understandable, for the laws of the States and local municipalities are more in accord with the consent of the governed, and extreme measures are less essential to the enforcement of laws which are not so repugnant to the citizenry.

This provision, Section 602 of S. 810, raises some additional questions by virtue of its shotgun approach. Would a local official be interfered with if he were subjected to recall? Is his retention in office, against the wishes of his constituents, a part of the protection which Big Brother Attorney General is to provide? If the official be appointed, could the appointing authority be enjoined from removing this official for failure to adhere to local and State laws? These are but a few of the dangers of this proposal. Lest anyone be complacent from the knowledge that this measure is aimed at the South, let me remind you that there are such things as backfires, ricochets, and just plain misses which "accidentally" strike bystanders. If you will play with loaded guns to frighten your adversaries, don't be surprised if you get your head blown off.

There is another feature of this particular section, which is similar to that of S. 955. The provision to which I refer is the part that deals with "threats" concerning court desegregation decisions or orders. Section 602 of S. 810 would authorize the use of injunctions in this connection, while S. 955 would
deal in criminal offenses. They have at least one demerit—and that is an understatement—in common. Both these provisions would abolish the free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, the former through the threat or use of the injunction, the latter by threat or use of criminal prosecution. In neither proposal is there any contingency or condition hinged to either the commission of an overt act or the setting of a time certain for committing an act—these being the two dividing lines which have always been utilized to distinguish the realm of free speech from punishable trespasses. This reckless disregard of constitutionally-guaranteed individual liberty is typical of the philosophy which spawns these so-called civil rights measures.

Another part of Title VI of S. 810, specifically Section 603, is designed to negate the operation of State police power. The very appearance of this section, composed of one all-inclusive 125-word sentence, brings to one's mind the word "camouflage." If the smoke-screen words are brushed aside, there emerges a diabolical plot, the deviousness of which can best be illustrated by a specific example of what is apparently contemplated. For example, this section could be employed to prevent a Bar Association Grievance Committee from investigating allegations of barratry. It could also be used by Big Brother Attorney General to prevent criminal prosecutions based on State statutes or local ordinances about which there can be no doubt of validity from a constitutional or other standpoint. The only favorable aspect of this provision is consistency, for it conforms to the other proposals in this bill by ignoring limitations on Federal Government jurisdiction as provided in the Constitution, as well as being in derogation of the most basic safeguards of individual liberty. If, perchance, some might conclude that my characterization of this section be in the extreme, consider the language which authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctions, etc., against, (and I quote) "any individual or individuals, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, . . . deprives or threatens to deprive any
any person or group of persons, or association of persons, of any right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution..." It is truly a sacrilege to use the word "Constitution" in such a context.

About Section 604 of S. 810, I can only say that this would authorize the Attorney General, by intervening in lawsuits, to pose as a judicially-despised, officious intermeddler, in derogation of real-party-in-interest statutes of the various States.

The all-powerfulness of the Big Brother Attorney General is emphasized by the provision of Title VII of S. 810, which would nullify the laudatory judicial principle that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before resorting to litigation.

The next general category of these proposals on which I should like to comment is that connected with the bombing of schools and residences. Let me say initially that I deplore any resort to violence, and bombing is one of the most despicable examples of an unforgivable crime. Nevertheless, I oppose each and every one of the proposals pending before this committee which deal with this question.

Several approaches are advanced to empower the Federal Bureau of Investigation with jurisdiction in this field. All of them ignore the fact that this particular specie of crime, like any other crime, is a local matter, and can be most effectively controlled and prevented by local authorities. If the Federal police force is given jurisdiction, there will be a strong inclination on the part of local authorities to wash their hands of the matter. Responsibility must necessarily go hand in glove with authority, and separation of the two in the field of law enforcement will result in deterioration of its effectiveness.

S. 188 gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation original jurisdiction of bombing cases by use of a statutory presumption that bombings are accomplished with explosives transported in interstate commerce. It ignores the constitutional test which
has always been applied to statutory presumptions—to wit, that they must be based on a succession of circumstances which would reasonably and logically lead to the presumption. This test applies despite the fact that a statutory presumption is, by statute, made rebuttable. In fact, the very definition of the word "presumption" implies a quality of rebuttability, so that this qualification in the proposal has no material bearing on the question. It would be a completely unrealistic stretch of the imagination, falling in the category of pure speculation, to presume that for every explosion, the explosive used had been transported across State lines. Anyone who has had a course in elementary chemistry is aware that an explosive can be compounded with the simplest of materials, available in the raw state within the boundaries of almost every State in the Union. For example, one of the most powerful of non-atomic explosives is nitroglycerin. This substance, which is a liquid, is made by treating glycolic acid with nitric and sulphuric acid. Obviously, nitrogen and sulphur exist in the raw state almost everywhere. Glycolic acid, the other component of this explosive, while readily, and usually, produced artificially, exists ready-made in unripe grapes, and also in the leaves of a common plant pest, the Virginia Creeper. With these materials, and the instructions found in any book on elementary chemistry, anyone can produce an explosion of great proportions without any importations. I might add that this illustration is not nearly so absurd as is the proposed presumption contained in this bill.

Can anyone really believe that the commerce clause of the Constitution can be stretched to this point without destroying that document? Why limit the jurisdiction of the F.B.I. to crimes where explosives are used? Is there not just as much reason to presume that a murder committed with a knife or a gun could be related through the weapon to interstate commerce? The logic would be much sounder if applied to any crime in which the automobile was used as an instrument to flee the scene, or for that matter to get to the scene of the crime in the first place. If we adopt this jurisdictional standard, we will have erased
all distinction as to a crime which comes exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State. The commerce clause was never intended for use as a wedge for criminal jurisdiction.

With reference to the approach of S. 499, which would make a Federal crime of interstate transportation of explosives with knowledge that they are to be used for bombings, it is sufficient to say that no conviction would ever result, due to the very essential requirement of knowledge of the ultimate use during interstate transportation. Its only result would be that described previously, which inevitably follows the shift in responsibility for law enforcement.

The provisions of S. 956, which would create a Federal offense for interstate flight to avoid prosecution for bombing, can best be characterized as totally unnecessary. There is not one example known to me where a person has avoided prosecution for bombing any structure by flight across State lines. There is no reason to believe that persons guilty of this crime, to any greater extent than persons guilty of other crimes, will flee over State lines to avoid prosecutions, nor that there is any less likelihood of their return through normal extradition procedure. In the absence of a death resulting from an explosion, there is in fact less reason to expect interstate flight, than there is in the event of a murder or other serious crime, the penalty for which is more severe—often death itself.

The Federal system of government has many advantages, most of which we do not fully appreciate, and indeed, to some of which we appear oblivious. The advantage of having the machinery, by which our Federal officials are chosen, divided, as to control, between 49 separate entities is so effective in preventing a perpetuation in office of a President, that its importance is often overlooked. The necessity for this safeguard can be realized, if one will but consider the political history of some of our larger cities. Through effective control of the election process, many a political machine has bled a city for years, despite the efforts of the citizenry to escape its grasp. Too often such a machine has literally died of old age, falling only
for lack of continuity from one generation to the next.

It is, therefore, with suspicion, that we should view any proposal for Federal authority in the voting process. History is replete with proof that the lust for power lies in the most unsuspected man, latent only so long as not the slightest opportunity for exercise is offered. An opening wedge is all that a would-be tyrant needs to remove him from the "would-be" class. Just such a wedge in our election process is proposed by both S. 957 and Title III of S. 499, which would give the Attorney General subpoena power over election records. The gravity of the consequences of giving the Executive Branch, or any other branch for that matter, even slight authority in this field should send shudders down the spine of every liberty-loving individual. To tamper with such a basic safeguard as the States' control of election machinery, is playing with fire, and I sincerely trust that in this case we shall avoid the proverbial approach with its painful lesson.

I would next like to comment briefly on the proposals of S. 960 and Title II of S. 499, to extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission. I have previously stated my convictions at some length with regard to the creation of such a body. The idea behind the creation of the commission is still dangerous. Despite the potential dangers, which may yet prove disastrous, the Civil Rights Commission itself has so far been somewhat of a joke, because the great flood of complaints from the South about civil rights denials, which were so widely predicted, somehow failed to materialize. Consequently the Commission has had little to do. It has thus far been able to concentrate on making as much capital as possible out of two isolated cases it dug up in Georgia and Alabama. By far the better part of discretion is to let the commission die.

There remains one proposal on which I should like to comment. S. 955 proposes to set up a Federal conciliation service, which would provide the same service in local race disputes that labor mediators provide in strike situations.

Now this is indeed a novel approach to the civil rights
question. It reflects a line of thinking, a mistaken notion, which is prevalent among so-called "liberals"--a line of thinking, the fallacy of which ought to be obvious, I should think, to anyone who has had an opportunity to observe the racial situation as it actually exists in the South.

The uninformed so-called "liberals" refer to what they call the "deteriorating race-relations situation in the South" and call for Federal law and Federal action to remedy the situation. The impression sought to be conveyed is that, somehow, left alone and of its own accord, the status of race relations in the South has reached a terrible and serious pass, with the white and colored races lined up solidly in mutual opposition, with actual conflict imminent; and that, in order to save the situation and promote healthy race relations, positive action by the Federal Government is imperative.

Now, Mr. Chairman, anyone who has been familiar with the South knows that, left alone, the racial situation actually was very harmonious, very peaceful. Prior to 1954, certainly, probably nowhere else in the world, where two such different races inhabit the same territory in large numbers, have race relations been so peaceful and so harmonious. What deterioration has occurred since then, has been, certainly not an indication of any need of Federal action, but rather, the result of Federal action and Federal interference in the field of race relations--especially the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision of 1954.

But even though the past four years have seen some grave developments in the South, it should be emphasized that there is no such state of conflict between the white Southerner and the Negro as the "liberals" seem to imagine. To the contrary, relations between the two races in the South are still good, by and large, and let us hope they remain so. Where in the South can one find what can properly be called a racial dispute? Where in the South are the white people and the colored people arrayed against each other?

The Southern Negro is not fighting the Southern white man.
The Southern Negro is not fighting the Southern white man. The white people of the South are not fighting the Southern Negro. We are fighting a vicious, white-led pressure group known as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and we are fighting a usurping, power-mad Federal Government which is backing the NAACP down the line. Now, even though conflicting views on race, and conflicting theories about race relations may be involved, this fight between the South, on the one hand, and the NAACP and the Federal Government, on the other, can in no sense be termed a racial dispute. Oh, to be sure, the NAACP, in violation of all the ancient legal traditions against barratry, makes use of handfuls of Negro children here and there as stooges; but to indict the whole Southern Negro people for this would be gravely wrong. To call these NAACP-inspired situations "racial disputes," implying that the white people and the colored people involved are fighting each other as groups, is to do a grave injustice to the Southern Negro, to the Southern white man, and to the truth.

Thus a Federal conciliation commission, set up to mediate local racial disputes in the South, would be about the most superfluous, the most totally unnecessary, agency anyone could think of.

Now it is true that in New York City, in Buffalo, in Philadelphia, in Chicago, and in some other cities in Northern States, there do exist situations which can truly be termed racial disputes; and it is possible that a Federal conciliation commission, such as that proposed by the Senator from Texas, might find some valuable work to do in those localities. However, being a believer in constitutional government, States' Rights and States' responsibilities, I am firmly opposed to the creation of any such Federal commission. It is up to the State of New York, the State of Pennsylvania, the State of Illinois, and whatever other Northern States are troubled by racial disorders, to handle these situations; and I am confident that these States are perfectly capable of doing so, just as our Southern States are likewise capable of running their own affairs.
So much for specific proposals, but I would like to make a few general observations in closing.

Since the end of the "Civil War," our country has survived many serious crises, including two global wars, a great depression and we are now engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the godless forces of Communism. During these crises, our citizens from all parts of the country have shown an amazing ability to work together, and when necessary sacrifice together, for the common good of the country. No country has ever come so far toward harmony after such a long, bitter war between its own peoples. The South has borne the brunt of Reconstruction, which enlightened persons consider to be the severest blight on our history by far. At the same time the South has made great strides in dealing with the problems wrought by Reconstruction—principally poverty, which in itself strained race-relations.

In the last few years, there has been an astounding growth of the philosophy which bred Reconstruction, and which has culminated in the conquered province bill before this committee. It is not a philosophy embraced by a majority of people in any major section of the country. It is the philosophy embraced and vociferously espoused by a minority of a few minority groups. The adherents of this philosophy would exploit by exaggerations the humanitarian instincts of the members of this body, among others. If, through appeal to emotions, they can gain their end, it is of no consequence to them, if, in the process, they sacrifice the most basic assets of our Republican form of government and seduce our people to acts to which even the Communists would exhibit scruples.

It is my sincere belief that the majority of the members of this committee, the Senate, and Congress itself, in the inner recesses of their own judgment, know and believe that the enactment of the measures pending before this committee today is not in the best interest of the country; but on the contrary, the enactment of such measures will actually aggravate the very problems they ostensibly seek to solve.

At the same time, I am aware of the force of practical
politics. In all too many instances, the adherents of the conquered province philosophy can control the balance of power in a given electorate.

In seeking objectivity, and the proper course to follow on the consideration of this question, I commend to each member of the committee, and indeed to each Senator and Member of Congress, the words of one of the earliest and staunchest of America's foreign friends, Edmund Burke, who stated to his British constituents, on November 3, 1774: (and I quote)

"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion."

Thank you for your attention.

E N D