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Address of Brigadier General Strom Thurmond, U.S. Army Reserve, before the N.J., Conn. and R.I. Civil Affairs and Military Government Units, Theater #2, Fort Devens, Mass., 8:30 a.m., Tuesday, 1958 Sept 2

Strom Thurmond

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ADDRESS OF BRIG. GEN. STROM THURMOND, USAR, BEFORE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. CAMG UNITS, INTERIOR DEPARTMENT AUDITORIUM, WASHINGTON, D.C.; MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1958, 8:00 P.M.

CAMG COMBAT SUPPORT

COMMANDERS AND MEMBERS OF CAMG UNITS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AND OTHER FRIENDS:

"I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense."

These words are not uttered with any brassy purpose of displaying bravado, nor to vaunt virile virtues. These words comprise a statement of fact. I am, as are you and all CAMG personnel, first and foremost, a soldier. In military service, our job is to accomplish military victories.

The words I just recited are the opening words of Article I of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, as prescribed by Executive Order 10631, dated 17 August 1955, signed at the White House by Dwight D. Eisenhower, our President and Commander-in-Chief.

In this executive order the President states: "Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity."

With your permission, I would like to recite for you again Article I of this Code of Conduct. May I ask that you repeat after me, in your own minds, these words, and that you keep them ever in mind throughout this hour and all the hours of your future military careers.
"I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense."

If you have not already done so, I suggest that you obtain a copy of the full text of this Code of Conduct, that you keep it handily available during your periods of military duty, and that you refer to it often as a guide to your conduct as CAMG personnel, to remind you that you are first and foremost American fighting men, that your primary duty is to support combat operations.

The primary objective of CAMG is to provide CAMG combat support. Toward this end, all energies, all actions, all thought, must be focused.

For this reason, I feel impelled to exhort you to devote yourselves to acquiring a more specific, a more practical, understanding of the combat commander's needs and problems and of the CAMG support that you can give him, to assist him in accomplishing fully the combat mission which has been assigned to him.

Before we proceed further, let us stop here to consider what is the accepted meaning of the term "combat support" and its nature.

Referring to the Dictionary of United States Army Terms, published by the Department of the Army in November 1953, as Special Regulation 320-5-1, we find that combat support is defined as: "Operational assistance furnished combat elements."
This same authority tells us that a combat element would be "troops that actually take part in fighting, distinguished from troops engaged in supply or administration." It also states that a tactical element is "any unit, or part of a unit, taking part in a combat operation" and that tactical troops are "combat troops together with any service troops required for their direct support who are engaged under one commander to operate as a unit and engage the enemy in combat."

In addition, this official military dictionary reserves the term "service troops" to residual use as meaning "all troops not assigned to combat or combat support duty and not classified as combat troops." Consequently, to the extent that CAMG troops provide combat support they do not fall in the category of service troops.

Definitions of the sort quoted are fundamental to our understanding. However, we must recognize that precise definition can sometimes be over-done, especially when the effort to be specific, while being brief, often results in the exclusion of elements which our sense of values insists be included. This is particularly so when the excluded elements are observable in actual experience.

For this reason, based upon the definitions quoted from the official Dictionary of United States Army Terms, I submit to you the following definitions: "CAMG combat support is CAMG operational assistance furnished in a combat operation. CAMG troops provide CAMG operational assistance in direct support of combat troops, and are engaged under a combat commander, to
operate as a part of his unit in combat."

I would also like to offer you a more realistic definition. This is it: "Insofar as CAMG operations are concerned, our concerns are primarily operational."

At first glance, this latter definition may seem facetious. I assure you, however, there is some wisdom in making this statement, particularly in view of the tendencies of many persons in the military establishment. Some of them still regard the CAMG activity as Administration. Others see it as a Legal function, still others as a Police function. To some, it is an exclusively high level staff concern, while still another group thinks of it as a post-war activity, and so on.

Actual experience in the field of battle has demonstrated that the CAMG activity, while including these things, also includes much more than these. Ideally, the primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of all CAMG personnel should be "CAMG Operations", and, if anything, one of the numerous CAMG functional specialties would be reserved as a secondary MOS. In the Hall of CAMG Fame, we find many like General Winfield Scott, who was a lawyer, and General Leonard Wood, who was a doctor.

Our professional standing as members of the Armed Forces of the United States, rests primarily upon the basis of the contribution we can make to insure success in combat.

Another basic objective of CAMG is to support and implement our national policies. Foremost in these policies would be combating and neutralizing Communist social and political orientation of an area liberated from Communist control. CAMG
must be fully cognizant of the political military objectives of the armed forces of our Country. CAMG must constantly consider the human, political and economic aspects of the theater of operations. CAMG must remove or neutralize all Communist influence in the areas occupied. Any neglect of this responsibility will cause a vacuum quickly filled by Communist oriented policy.

In this connection, I would like to call your attention to a little known study of the three years of intensive Communist CAMG planning and subsequent occupation of a community. It is entitled: The Reds Take A City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul, and which was published in 1951. The authors were John W. Riley, Jr., and Wilbur Schramm.

One thing is evident, namely, that our CAMG planning must include a full comprehension of Communist CAMG planning. As a minimum, our CAMG planning must be directed at neutralizing the effectiveness of Communist aggressive efforts.

Furthermore, we must be vigilant in our awareness that the CAMG weapon, as an instrument of foreign policy, is, as much for us as it is for the Communists, a weapon for waging war. It is an adjunct to other military weapons, perhaps, but nevertheless an essential military accessory for winning not only the war, but also the peace.

Another basic objective of CAMG is to provide for the transfer of the responsibility from the military commander to a designated civil agency of government. Our job is to get things done as expeditiously as possible, to achieve actual military operational objectives and to withdraw as soon as the military operational need has been met. Our pace is quick, not leisurely.
I assure you, we are not do-gooders; we are not engaged in social or economic experiments or studies for our own delectation or for academic professional interest. Rather, the CAMG activity is a temporary practical operation expedient to meet actual military operational requirements.

As I mentioned earlier, the primary objective of CAMG is to assist military operations. Corollary to this, is the objective of providing for the early transfer of the area from military control to the control of a civil agency. When the military situation indicates that military control is no longer needed, the occupation or control by the military should cease. We must remind ourselves constantly that prolonged military occupation is not the task before us.

In order to facilitate the smooth transfer of control from the military to a civil agency, civilian organizations under the control of the military can be introduced as early as possible to assist in the handling of some indigenous problems. In the more stable parts of the Communications Zone, civilian organizations can gradually be introduced to replace some specialized activities and units of CAMG. These civilian organizations would be under the control of the Theater Army Commander, and in turn under the supervision of his G-5. This would definitely economize the utilization of CAMG personnel. The CAMG units replaced could be moved forward to further augment the CAMG combat support units. These civilian organizations introduced could handle economic aid, refugees, etc. An example of such an organization serving under military control is UNRRA in World War II and the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) in Korea.

The transfer of control from the military to a civil agency is a matter of high governmental policy, depending on the situation. There can not be divided responsibility for the control of an area. The civil or the military authority must control the area. The agencies of either, however, can be used to support the other before and after the transfer of control.

The remaining basic objective of CAMG is to fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or customary law. This is to insure that the combat commanders are advised of their responsibilities and limitations pertaining to the civil population, the government, and the economy of the area.

The CAMG activity is not new to the Army; only the organization of that activity is fairly recent. The CAMG experiences during World War I, and the preceding foreign military engagements of our armed forces, strongly indicated early in our participation in World War II the urgency and importance of organizing the CAMG activity that inevitably accompanies combat operations. The CAMG organization resulting, amply demonstrated the greater efficiency and effectiveness to be expected thereby, in accomplishment of the basic combat mission not only to win the war and the peace, but also to achieve the politico-military aims of warfare, without which peace is not assured nor is victory.

The scope of the CAMG activity is vast; the details of possible actions are numerous; volumes could be written on each segment or part of CAMG activity. Recognizing this, we are forced to summarize in order to distinguish and identify the elements of CAMG activity. Sometimes the generalizations resulting seem vague. Consequently, we have a continuing need
to search assiduously for clear axiomatic statements of our functional activity. We need concrete definitions, which are sufficiently comprehensive in scope and in conveying understanding, of the practical part performed by CAMG personnel as an operational element in the combat commander's organization.

Toward this end, let us explore together for axioms of CAMG combat support, and see if we can find how we achieve the CAMG objectives.

Were warfare conducted in an arena set apart, such as the jousts of medieval knights, or, for that matter, as in modern military exercises on military reservations, then terrain and weather and the disposition of friendly and enemy forces, their firepower and capabilities, would be matters of exclusive concern to the combat commander. However, this is not the way it happens.

Wherever we fight there are people, except perhaps in certain parts like the interior of deserts, at sea, or in an arctic region. It is because people interfere with war and war interferes with people, that military commanders must consider the effect on their projected combat operations of people, their actions, attitudes, institutions and resources.

Much independence of action often causes subordinates concerned with particular CAMG matters to believe that they are responsible. Let me disillusion those who are so inclined, by saying that you are not responsible for CAMG operations. That is the responsibility of the military commander of the area, to whom CAMG authority has been delegated.

The CAMG mission is part of the combat commander's mission,
which he is bound to accomplish, even without using the CAMG personnel specifically designated. The CAMG organization assists him as any other service assists him in its particular sphere; but, he is responsible. If anything, specially trained CAMG personnel, backed by CAMG organizations extending from the front to the rear, through all the echelons of command, increases the combat commander's CAMG capability many hundredfold. And, what is equally important, he is not compelled to divert from combat tasks, personnel whose special training and competence is needed elsewhere to engage with the enemy.

Upon the initial entry of our armed forces into enemy-held territory, it is the combat element which first contacts the civilian element; it is the combat commander who first establishes the military control which we must later transfer to a civil agency.

The manner in which the people are handled at this early moment, determines their first and most lasting attitude toward our armed forces. That attitude may become actively hostile or passively neutral. On the other hand, that attitude may be cultivated to become one of cooperation and, perhaps, even result in active assistance to our operations.

In view of the tremendous drain upon our own resources and manpower of modern warfare, it is essential that maximum utilization be made of the resources and manpower in areas where our armed forces are employed. While it is true that international law requires the combat commander to restore and maintain public order and safety and to provide for the well being of the
inhabitants of an area coming under his military control, the combat commander can do this in such a way that so doing will contribute to his combat success.

This conversion of formerly enemy-held territory to reinforce and even augment the commander's combat power, in terms of resources and manpower, is a significant aspect of CAMG combat support.

A paradox arises, however, in this CAMG conversion process. In order to exploit efficiently and effectively the resource potential in support of combat operations, it is not only necessary but also desirable to comply with the provisions of international law, regarding restoring and maintaining public order and safety and providing for the well being of the inhabitants.

In the resulting climate of good will, CAMG personnel, by working through civil officials, can make labor available for the building of military roads, bridges, warehouses and other facilities; can locate and cause to be utilized for military purposes sawmills, stone quarries, workshops, pure water sources, stockpiles of construction materials, raw and processed materials, and many other civilian supplies, services, and facilities.

In the search for weapons of greater combat effectiveness, we have found that the CAMG weapon, as an instrument of the foreign policy of our government, has proven on many battlefields throughout the world that it delivers on the ground, in the combat environment, an augmentation in terms of usable resources and manpower, of combat power of such magnitude as to be
comparable with the more recently developed missiles with atomic warheads.

Every person, organization, and echelon in the military structure, from the front to the rear, is required to contribute to the support of combat operations. Equally so is the CAMG organization, regardless of echelon of assignment or attachment. All actions must be directed toward this common goal, even at the expense, if necessary, of distracting long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in rear areas.

As we continue to explore for axioms of CAMG combat support, we find there are certain actions which are conditional/while there are others which recur in all cases. We may conclude from this, that CAMG combat support has two categories of tasks: Conditional and Recurring.

Conditional tasks are such as arise out of United States policy/with regard to a particular area/and the limitations imposed by the natural conditions of the area.

We shall now consider recurring CAMG combat support tasks. They may be defined, in general, as: Gaining assistance and avoiding interference of the inhabitants, their economy and institutions, in areas where United States Armed Forces are employed.

More specifically stated, this is accomplished by:

1. Preventing and suppressing disease, starvation, unrest and other conditions, which derive from the combat relationships/and which would handicap or obstruct tactical and logistical operations; and combating enemy efforts to
exploit such conditions.

2. Promoting the utilization of local resources, facilities and services, and of governmental, economic and social agencies, for the benefit of the tactical and logistical effort; and denying their use to the enemy.

3. Assuring the security of combat troops from civil sources; using public safety agencies to eliminate active and passive sabotage and guerilla activity; and coordinating civil defense with military rear area security and damage control operations.

4. Obtaining compliance with international laws and agreements, including provisions for civilian relief supply and for the care and movement of civilian war and disaster victims, such as casualties, refugees, evacuees, concentration camp internees, displaced persons, and other needy persons.

5. Reestablishing civil authority; transferring the area from military to civil control; and providing assistance to established civil authority in emergencies and disasters, where indicated, in the routine conduct of government.

6. Providing a focal point for handling all civil-military matters, and, thereby, avoiding a diversion of combat and other military personnel from their primary military tasks, by concern with civil as well as civil-military matters.

What has been presented, thus far, is intended only to be suggestive of the vast range of CAMG combat support. Exhaustive work must yet be done to define in practical terms all aspects of the CAMG capability to support the combat commander's opera-
tions. Furthermore, as we look ahead to the atomic age, we see in the combat commander's mission/new elements introduced, deriving from the vast numbers of human beings affected by the extent and the intensity of his operations/when nuclear weapons are used.

For this reason, it is of primary importance not only to have the CAMG organization, as such, but also to have the technological and professional competence of CAMG personnel brought to peak efficiency for functioning in the combat environment.

There must be a continuing research program, in order to develop new techniques, procedures and testing criteria, and to detect new research areas. The training of CAMG personnel must encompass the results of such research, and give emphasis to such subjects as: military science and tactics; the role of CAMG in combat operations; development of plans, orders, and annexes; problem solving methods and techniques; cultural and environmental factors affecting the relationship between our military and the local government and people; and procedures for allocating resources and manpower.

There must also be a full realization, on the part of all combat commanders, of the CAMG capability for assuring the accomplishment of combat missions. In this connection, military personnel throughout the services must be indoctrinated in CAMG capabilities, in order to provide the balanced force needed. The operational nature of the CAMG activity, the G3-G5 relation-
ship, must be fully understood. In addition, CAMG plans, units and staff sections must be included in all maneuvers and CPX's, in order that organizational and doctrinal developments may provide the combat commander of the future with a tested capability to handle his CAMG responsibility. Hence, every combat division headquarters, whether of the Active Army, National Guard, or Army Reserve, should have assigned not only the spaces but also the personnel of a CAMG staff section complement, as a minimum, to provide a focal point for all civil-military relationship matters of the division, in peace time and in War, and additionally, to provide a nucleus for monitoring the appropriate CAMG indoctrination of all personnel of the division.

It is urged that all CAMG personnel keep themselves indoctrinated by keeping in their possession, as part of their military gear, two books. One is the Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, which is the text of the United States Army concept of military science and tactics. The other is the Department of the Army Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Military Government Operations. These two books must be studied assiduously by all CAMG personnel, regardless of rank and regardless of assignment, with the full realization that our concerns are primarily operational.

I support unqualifiably the precept of Thomas Paine who has said: "Where knowledge is duty, ignorance is a crime."

It is the duty of every CAMG officer to delve deeply into the knowledge of military science and tactics. He must qualify himself fully as an alter-ego to the combat commander, capable
of contributing to estimates of the combat situation, and capable of participation in the formulation and implementation of combat decisions.

The Department of the Army recognizes, and has set it out in the Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, previously mentioned, that the combat commander's decisions are influenced not only by his own and the enemy's relative combat power and disposition of forces, and not only by such factors as weather and terrain, but also by civil conditions, namely, the political, economic, and sociological characteristics of the area of combat operations.

In his estimates of the combat situation, the combat commander carefully weighs civil affairs and military government factors, along with those dealing with personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. For this reason, there is in the modern atomic-age army/a fifth general staff section in the combat commander's staff, which is concerned with all civil-military matters, including all matters pertaining to the government, economy, inhabitants and institutions in areas where United States Armed Forces are employed.

Because our concerns are primarily operational in nature, it is desirable that CAMG personnel be thoroughly grounded in the various aspects of military science and tactics. So that we may be qualified to perform our mission in combat operations, CAMG personnel should have a comprehensive knowledge of the functions of the G3 section. Only in this way can we understand how the G5 section plays its role in the integrated staff/
of the combat commander.

If I may digress for a moment, I would like to inform you that the CAMG extension course program of the US Army CAMG School at Fort Gordon, has been planned in close cooperation and coordination with the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, to provide the rounded knowledge of military science and tactics and the competence in the conduct of military operations, which I have been discussing. If you have not already done so, you are urged to enroll at once in this CAMG program, to up-grade yourself professionally.

In the other Department of the Army publication, which I mentioned previously, Field Manual 41-10, CAMG Operations, are set out the objectives of CAMG operations.

With the chaotic conditions envisioned in atomic age warfare, the combat commander's ability to handle the multitudinous problems --- technological, ideological and logistical --- posed by civil conditions and the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the difference between his combat success or failure.

At this point, in order to conclude my message to you, I would like to recite for you the closing words of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, to which I referred at the beginning of this address.

Article VI of this Code of Conduct reads:

"I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America."