This morning I should like to talk with you briefly about our national defense.

The first thing we should bear in mind in discussing this vital subject is that, due to changed conditions, we can no longer treat national defense as an isolated category, separate and distinct from other aspects and functions of our national life.

Today it is indeed true that "the front is everywhere." Our national defense capabilities are no longer determined, as in the past, almost exclusively by our strength in matters purely military -- that is by the power of our army, our navy, our air force, our weapons -- but by the state of our total national strength.

For that reason, before I discuss the purely military aspects of our defense picture, I wish to emphasize that we must at all times remember that weapons and armed might alone are not enough. The Soviet Union is waging total cold war against us. It is the thinking of many of those who have studied the world situation most closely that the Soviet threat on the economic and diplomatic front is far more serious, far more deadly, than their military threat.

I think it goes without saying that the Soviet Union, or any nation, would prefer to avoid the horrors of a nuclear war, a war which involves at least some risk of being unsuccessful and which in any event will result in enormous destruction. So long as they can achieve their objectives by means of economic penetration, diplomatic victories, subversion -- possibly supplemented by "little wars," limited warfare such as that which was employed with success in Indo-
China—, they have no need to risk an all-out military conflict with the free world. In fact, there is probably much more danger of a major war's arising almost by accident, against the real wishes of either side, as a result of the tremendous accumulation of international tension that has been built up, than as a result of any deliberately planned surprise attack.

Many people seem to be unaware of the great danger to our national security which is posed by this economic and diplomatic offensive of the Russians. We have been too accustomed to thinking of defense in purely military terms.

Nothing would be more ruinous than a policy by which we would devote so much of our energy and our resources to building weapons for military defense that we would neglect these other fields and permit the rapid spread of Soviet control through "peaceful" methods, that is, through the methods of the cold war.

We would soon find ourselves in an isolated position, cut off from the rest of the world, and unable to service and maintain the elaborate and intricate military machine which we had been so busily engaged in building up. In a comparatively short time, we would become so inferior militarily vis-a-vis the Communist world that serious resistance would be out of the question. In other words, having lost on the diplomatic and economic fronts, we would find that our military position was hopeless also.

We cannot withdraw behind a wall, or behind two oceans. We cannot run away from the conflict. We cannot at this time afford to pull out of Europe and Asia and Africa. By abandoning those parts of the free world to Communist totalitarianism, we would be doing grave danger to our own position. Even if -- I should say, especially if -- we look at the picture from the cold standpoint of pure self-interest,
we cannot retreat to this hemisphere.

That is why, in addition to maintaining our bases abroad, it is important for stable non-Communist (and preferably anti-Communist) governments to be maintained abroad. Every time another country is brought within the Soviet sphere, either by political subversion or by economic penetration, the balance of world economic and political power tips more dangerously against us. The more the balance is tipped against us, the more painful and difficult it is to resist the pressure. Finally, a point is reached beyond which resistance is impossible. The loss of certain economically strategic areas in the Middle East and South Asia to Communist control might well represent that fatal point, beyond which the steady rise of Communist power would be irresistible.

To maintain these stable non-Communist governments, so vital to our own national security, requires a sound, alert and aggressive diplomatic effort. It is tragic to think of what we have already lost, since 1945, through diplomatic failure -- especially in the case of China.

The maintenance of strong non-Communist governments abroad is also going to require, in conjunction with our diplomatic effort, a certain amount of military and technical assistance. Such aid should, however, be restricted to those nations which are firmly allied with us/or at least which lean toward us rather than against us. I cannot see any sense in supplying arms, money, and technical know-how to countries which are as apt as not to use these assets against us.

Where those nations which are friendly are in need of economic assistance, as well as military and technical, I feel that this economic aid should be in the form of loans and not outright gifts.
Though we have tried to do so for years, we cannot buy friendship with gifts.

A great part of our foreign aid program up to now has been money down a rathole. To some extent, this has been due to maladministration of the program. There is no room for waste, for mismanagement, for a poor sense of selectivity in an area such as this. I believe that by revamping completely our aid program we can achieve far better results and yet cut the cost very very substantially.

It is essential that we practice economy in this field as well as in others. If we do not, we are endangering our national security at another vital point. As I said at the outset, the state of national defense in these times depends upon the total national strength picture; and a very vital part of that picture is the national economy. If our internal economy suffers a serious breakdown, we could be defeated without the firing of a shot. There is a limit to what our economy can stand. The Russians know that, and have expressed the belief that they can destroy this country by forcing it to spend itself to death.

We have tremendous tasks facing us on all sides. The expense involved is staggering. Obviously, at this time, we must supply without stint whatever funds are genuinely needed by the military for scientific research and weapons development. It should go without saying, then, that wherever waste and mismanagement can be found, they must be ruthlessly eliminated, in order that we get every ounce of value for every penny we expend. I believe that it can fairly be said that the field of foreign aid is a field in which we can effect substantial saving and at the same time achieve greatly improved results.
The greater cutbacks, however, should come in our domestic spending. We are going to have to cut the fat out of the Federal government's already-swollen domestic programs. We are going to have to halt the expansion of these programs. We as individual citizens are going to have to adjust to some belt-tightening too.

Up to this point, I have emphasized the foreign-relations aspect of our national security, and also the national economy aspect, because I fear that there has been a tendency on the part of many of us to lose sight of the importance of these aspects. The reason for this is, of course, that public attention during the past few months has been so pre-occupied with the problem of defense from the military preparedness standpoint.

This is, of course, the most immediately urgent aspect of the defense problem. Unless and until Russia and the United States are able to harmonize their relations and attitudes, which is scarcely foreseeable today, it is vitally necessary that we maintain a sound military defense posture.

And by this I mean not only in the missiles field but in the entire field of military preparedness, including the maintenance of strong ground forces.

We know the Russians have 175 divisions in their ground forces. They have the tanks and other heavy equipment for 300 divisions. The Russians are not relying wholly on push-buttons and long-range missiles; they are keeping their ground forces at a high level of efficiency.

I am strongly opposed to any cutbacks whatsoever in any phase of our military defense at the present. But if it is found to be absolutely necessary to reduce the division strength of our Army, then we should place increased emphasis on our Reserve and National Guard
programs. We can maintain six National Guard or Reserve divisions for the same cost of one regular division. This is no time to talk of cutbacks in our National Guard and Reserve strength. If we sharply reduce our Regular Forces, and then hack away at our Reserves and National Guard too, we will be left with practically nothing in the way of ground forces.

So long as we are strong, there is little chance of attack by Russia. As I said earlier, the Soviet leaders do not want to start a war which will involve any substantial risk of defeat or even of heavy destruction at home, especially when they can achieve their aims without it. But a war which the Soviet leaders would regard as a pushover would be viewed in a different light. We are in grave danger, and world peace is in grave danger, whenever we let our guard down, whenever our strength drops appreciably below theirs.

It is now tragically clear that the Russians are considerably ahead of us in rocket and missile development. Despite our recent success in launching a satellite, the fact remains that we are far behind the Soviets in this field of development. Just how far behind we are is hard to tell. Dr. Wernher von Braun, our foremost missiles expert, who is in charge of the Army's program, says that it may take us as much as five years to catch up with the Russians. I feel, though, that if the proper effort is exerted, we can catch up in a much shorter period of time.

I do not think that I need to discuss in detail the status of development of the various types and classes of missiles. The public is quite familiar with them, so much so that the names of these fearsome weapons have practically become household words. I will only point out that we are still quite a long way from having an operational
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Neither the Atlas nor the Titan, both being developed by the Air Force, has yet been perfected and may not be so for some time.

There is a device called the Snark which might be operational before that time, but the Snark is really a subsonic, air-breathing pilotless aircraft, vulnerable to interception, and is therefore not really a true ICBM.

Nor do we have an operational Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. The Army's Jupiter (not to be confused with the Jupiter-C vehicle which was used to launch our satellite) is not operational at this time; nor is the Air Force's Thor; though both should be by the end of this year, according to Secretary McElroy. The Navy has recently announced great strides in the development of its IRBM, the Polaris, but it will still probably not be operational for some time.

In addition to the field of rocket and missile development, with which we are all fairly familiar, there are two specific areas in which our defense program is seriously lagging, and these I wish to discuss with you briefly at this time.

The first is the matter of submarine development. Submarines are going to play a tremendously important part in any future war, not only in their traditional role as destroyers of surface shipping, but as mobile and elusive rocket launching platforms. Unfortunately we are peculiarly vulnerable to submarine attack. So many of our large cities and major industrial centers, and our capital, are situated either directly on, or near to, our long and easily accessible coastlines. Even with missiles of comparatively short range, think of the destruction which could be wrought by a fleet of Soviet submarines, strung along our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts,
launching a coordinated and simultaneous rocket attack against this country.

Due to the facts of geography, the Soviet Union is less vulnerable to this type of attack than we are. To come within even fairly close range of the Soviet social and industrial heartland, our submarines would have to penetrate the narrow waterways of the Baltic and Black Seas. Those portions of Russia's coast which do border directly on open sea, such as the Arctic and Kamchatkan coasts, are a long distance from any major concentrations of industrial targets. Nevertheless, industrial targets in some of the satellite countries, as well as the Soviets' outer military bases and air stations -- and especially their own submarine bases --, would not be immune to this type of attack; and we should push our nuclear submarine program as fast as possible.

This we are not doing. I regret to say that, while the Soviet navy has more than 500 submarines, ours has only 110. While the Russians are building a large number of submarines yearly, we are building only several annually. Thus the gap continues to widen.

Another vital factor in our national security program is our Strategic Air Force. For over ten years, the bombers of the Strategic Air Command have been the free world's greatest deterrent to aggression; they are so today and, pending successful development of our missiles, they will be for some time to come. That this is true has been generally recognized by most responsible officials, including President Eisenhower.

Yet, despite this, just six months prior to the launching of the first Sputnik, heavy reductions were made in the Strategic Air Command. Three months after Sputnik there had been no restoration of these reductions.
The Strategic Air Command suffers from a shortage of B-52 bombers and has been relying heavily on B-36's, which have been termed obsolete. The bomber bases are congested. Some units were actually grounded last year because of lack of funds for gasoline. Lack of funds has also hampered the Strategic Air Command's training and maintenance programs.

It is admitted on all sides that, until such time as we have perfected our missiles to the extent where they can be completely relied upon, the Strategic Air Command is vital to our national security. It is imperative, then, that it be kept in the strongest and most efficient condition at all times, ready for action at a moment's notice. That this condition has not been maintained is not the fault of any lag in scientific development. Nor is it due to any failure on the part of Congress to appropriate sufficient money, for we provided every cent that was asked for these purposes. It is simply a case of almost inexcusable administrative failure, or, rather, of inherent weakness in the organizational structure of our defense establishment.

Whatever part our failures in education and scientific studies have in our defense crisis, in a remote or indirect sense, the fact remains that the more immediate cause of our troubles can be found in the structure of our Defense Department. Harmful inter-service rivalry, duplication of effort, useless and time-consuming administrative procedures, waste, and poor coordination have been prevalent, and have prevented progress which should have been made.

The truth is that, back in 1947 when the structure of the military establishment was overhauled and the Department of Defense was created, true unification of the Armed Services was not achieved.
in any real sense. The Editor of one of our leading aviation magazines has recently summed up the result of this so-called attempt at unification, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Department which it established, as follows:

"The result was a hydraheaded compromise of military, industrial and political influences ..."

"The result was an economic monster whose hunger devours the national income without assuring the national defense.

"This intellectual travesty is represented to the American people as balanced power. In some respects, it is indeed balanced. It is balanced politically; balanced to usurp military leadership by secretarial bureaucracy; balanced to consume the tax payer; balanced to generate unrelenting interservice bitterness; balanced to compromise every known tenet of military command; balanced to swallow the talents of great officers in all services; ... balanced to waste manpower; balanced to assure the Soviet lead time in technology to the point that American conquest probably eventually will be accomplished without a shot in self-defense.

"But insofar as being balanced for the prevention of war; or balanced to secure the most defense for the least cost; ... or balanced to lead the United States into the cosmic phase of the air environment, no contrivance was ever more ill fitted to its mission."

It may be that this indictment is too severe. But it becomes increasingly obvious month by month that the Defense Department needs, not any mere superficial streamlining, but a complete overhaul of its basic structure. True unification of the services must be achieved, in spirit and in fact. We cannot let interservice competition degenerate into interservice rivalry, jealousy and bitterness that impede our defense effort.

With this in mind, I plan to introduce a bill which calls for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of Defense. This bill will strike at the root of many of our defense troubles; it will clearly establish responsibility for assignment of tasks; it will reduce decision time; it will retain civilian control of the defense
establishment; and it will promote economy. Under this reorganization proposal, the civilian control now exercised jointly by civilians in the three departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force with the civilians in the Department of Defense would be centralized in the hands of the civilians of the Department of Defense. The separate services would become divisions of the Department of Defense rather than separate departments within a department as they are now. On a level with these three divisions would be created a fourth service for research and development.

My bill also proposes to create a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Services, to be appointed by the President from the military personnel of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff would be vested with the functions now held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the additional function of command of combined forces. The senior officers of the four divisions of the Armed Forces would, as a group, act as advisors to the Chief of Staff in all of his functions.

In the interest of economy, I further propose in this legislation, that all items of supply common to two or more of the four divisions of the Department of Defense, be procured by a single agency at Defense Department level.

Another plan of unification is being prepared under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, who has said that he hopes to have it ready to submit to Congress around March 30.

It is not my intention that Congress should enact any legislation along this line before hearing the recommendations of the Defense Department. At the same time, I do not feel that Congress, which bears the primary responsibility for all legislation, should sit back and wait for the Executive Branch to draft the law.
The sooner we can begin the process of holding hearings and sifting ideas, the better we will be prepared to consider the Executive's ideas when they arrive.

I believe that a thorough revamping of our Defense Department's organizational structure, such as I have just outlined, is a necessary first step toward the establishment and maintenance of a sound security program.

But there is more than this. This is only a first step. We must overcome grave problems in the field of education. We must match the Russians in weapons research and development. We must preserve the strength of our free government at home, the free government that has made it possible for us to become the strongest and happiest nation in the world.

I have faith in America, and in the American people. I know what our people can do when the chips are down.

And let us make no mistake about it, the chips are down.

Let us pledge ourselves here today to a renewed devotion to the American spirit of determination, so that we can continue to go forward into a new and exciting era.