CAMG Combat Support Axioms

Brigadier General Strom Thurmond, United States Army Reserve

This article supplements “CAMG Operations in Atomic Age Warfare” written by Brigadier General Strom Thurmond and published in the January 1958 issue of the Military Review.—Editor.

The primary objective of civil affairs and military government operations (CAMGO) is to provide CAMG combat support. Toward this end, all energies, all actions, and all thought must be focused.

For this reason, CAMGO personnel devote themselves to acquiring a more specific, a more practical understanding of the combat commander’s needs and problems and of the CAMG support that they can give him to assist in accomplishing fully the combat mission which has been assigned to him.

Before proceeding it would be well to decide what is meant by the term CAMG combat support.

Referring to the Dictionary of United States Army Terms, published by the Department of the Army in November 1953, as Special Regulations 320-5-1, we find that combat support is defined as: “operational assistance furnished combat elements.”

After considering also the definition, therein, of such other terms as combat element, tactical element, and tactical troops, the following synthesis is submitted:

CAMG combat support is CAMG operational assistance furnished in a combat operation. CAMG troops provide CAMG operational assistance in direct support of combat troops, and are engaged under a combat commander, to operate as a part of his unit in combat.

Communism

Another basic CAMGO objective is to support and implement our national policies. Foremost of these policies is to combat and neutralize Communist social and political orientation of an area liberated by military force from Communist control.

The combat commander, as the one personally responsible for achieving CAMGO objectives, must be fully cognizant of these political military objectives of the Armed Forces of our country. He is the one who must constantly consider the human, political, and economic aspects of the area of his combat operations. The CAMG organization at his disposal is the instrument with which he removes or neutralizes all Communist influences in areas occupied by the military forces he controls. Any neglect of this responsibility will cause a vacuum quickly filled by Communist oriented policy.

Of value in this connection is a little-known study of the three years of intensive Communist CAMG planning and subsequent occupation of a community entitled The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul, by John W. Riley, Jr., and Wilbur Schramm, and published in 1951.

It is evident that our own CAMG plan-

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ning must include a full comprehension of Communist CAMG planning. As a minimum, our CAMG planning must be directed at neutralizing the effectiveness of Communist aggressive efforts.

Furthermore, we must be constantly vigilant in our awareness that, as an instrument of foreign policy, CAMG is for us as it is for the Communists a weapon for waging war. It is an adjunct to other military weapons, perhaps, but, nevertheless, an essential military accessory for winning not only the war, but also the peace.

Military versus Civil Authority

Still another basic objective of CAMG operations is to provide for the early transfer of responsibility from the military commander to a designated civil agency of government.

CAMGO personnel are not engaged in social or economic experiments or studies for their own delectation or for academic professional interest.

The CAMGO job is to get things done as expeditiously as possible, to achieve actual military operational objectives, and to withdraw as soon as the military operational need has been met.

The pace is quick, not leisurely.

It must be kept in mind that prolonged military occupation is not the task before us.

Transfer to Civil Control

In order to facilitate the smooth transfer of control, civilian organizations under military supervision should be introduced early in the more stable parts of the area of operations and gradually replace specialized CAMG units and activities.

It is a cardinal rule, though, that there cannot be divided responsibility for the control of an area. Either the civil or the military authority must control the area. The agencies of either, however, can be used to support the other before and after the transfer of control, which must be accomplished smoothly, whether control is being transferred from civil to military authority or from military back to civil authority.

Historical examples of civilian organizations which served under military control are the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in World War II and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) in Korea.

Such civilian organizations, under the control of the theater army commander, and in turn under the supervision of his G5, definitely reduce the requirement of CAMGO personnel. CAMG units replaced move forward to augment the CAMG combat support units.

International Obligations

The remaining objective basic to CAMG operations is to comply with international treaties, agreements, or customary law.

For this reason, among others, there is in the modern nuclear age army a fifth general staff section concerned with all military-civil matters including the government, economy, inhabitants, and institutions in areas where United States Armed Forces are employed.

This ensures that the combat commander is properly advised of his responsibilities,
of the limitations on his courses of action, and of his capabilities deriving from political, economic, and societal factors.

In his estimates of the combat situation, the combat commander carefully weighs these civil affairs and military government factors along with those dealing with personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics.

The combat commander's decisions are influenced not only by his own and the enemy's relative combat power and disposition of forces, and not only by such factors as weather and terrain, but also by civil conditions in the area of his combat operations.

**CAMG Activity**

The CAMG activity is not new to the Army; only the organization of that activity is fairly recent.

Our CAMG experiences during World War I, and the preceding foreign military engagements of our Armed Forces, strongly indicated early in World War II the urgency and importance of organizing the CAMG activity that inevitably accompanies combat operations.

The scope of the CAMG activity is vast; the details of possible actions are numerous; and volumes could be written on each functional segment of the CAMG activity.

Because generalizations often seem vague, there is a need to search assiduously for clear, complete axiomatic statements to identify the elements of CAMG activity.

Concrete definitions are needed, sufficiently comprehensive in scope and in conveying understanding, of the practical part performed by CAMGO personnel as an operational element in the combat commander's organization.

Toward this end, axioms of CAMG combat support will be explored in an effort to determine how to achieve the basic objectives of CAMG operations previously mentioned.

Were warfare conducted in an arena set apart, such as the jousts of medieval knights, or as in many modern military maneuvers on military reservations, the combat commander could limit his concern to the factors of terrain and weather and the dispositions of friendly and enemy forces, their firepower, and capabilities. However, this is not the way it actually happens on the fields of battle.

Wherever we fight there are people, except perhaps in certain parts like the interior of deserts, at sea, or in an arctic region. It is because people interfere with war and war interferes with people that military commanders must consider the effect on projected combat operations of people, their actions, attitudes, institutions, and resources.

**Combat Commander Responsible**

Independence of action often results in the belief that subordinates concerned with particular CAMG matters are responsible for CAMG operations.

This is far from true and we must reemphasize again that the responsibility for CAMG operations is lodged only in the military commander of the area to whom CAMG authority has been delegated, whoever he may be, and regardless of whatever other concerns he may have.

The CAMG mission is part of the combat commander's mission. He must accomplish it even without using the CAMGO personnel and units specifically designated and available to him.

The CAMG organization assists the combat commander as any other service assists him in its particular sphere, but he is responsible.

Specially trained CAMGO personnel, backed by CAMG organizations extending from the front to the rear through all the echelons of command, increase the combat commander's CAMG capability many hundredfold.

And, what is equally important, the combat commander is not compelled to divert from combat tasks personnel whose
special training and competence is needed elsewhere to engage with the enemy.

**Combat Element**

It is the combat element which first contacts the civilian element upon the initial entry of our Armed Forces into enemy-held territory. It is the combat commander who first establishes the military control which must later be transferred to a civil agency.

The manner in which the people are handled at this early moment by the combat commander determines their first and most lasting attitude toward our Armed Forces. That attitude may become actively hostile or passively neutral. On the other hand, that attitude may be cultivated to become one of cooperation and, perhaps, even result in active assistance to the operations of the combat commander.

In view of the tremendous drain upon our own resources of modern atomic-age warfare, it is essential that maximum utilization be made of the resources, including manpower, in areas where our Armed Forces are employed.

While it is true that international law requires the combat commander to restore and maintain public order and safety and to provide for the well-being of the inhabitants of an area coming under his military control, the combat commander can do this in such a way as will contribute to his combat success.

**Conversion Process**

The conversion of formerly enemy-held territory to reinforce and even augment the commander's combat power, in terms of resource utilization, is a significant aspect of CAMG combat support.

A paradox arises, however, in this CAMG conversion process. In order to exploit efficiently and effectively the resource potential in support of combat operations, it is not only necessary but also desirable to comply with the provisions of international law regarding restoring and maintaining public order and safety and providing for the well-being of the inhabitants.

In the resulting climate of good will, CAMG personnel, by working through civil officials, can make labor available for building military roads, bridges, warehouses, bunkers, and other facilities. They can locate and cause to be utilized for military purposes sawmills, stone quarries, workshops, pure water sources, stockpiles of construction materials, raw and processed materials, and many other civilian supplies, services, and facilities.

**CAMG Weapon**

In the search for weapons of greater combat effectiveness, it is found that the CAMG weapon, as an instrument of the foreign policy of our Government, has proved itself on many battlefields throughout the world. It delivers on the ground, in the combat environment, an augmentation of combat power—in terms of usable resources—of tremendous magnitude.

Every person, organization, and echelon in the military structure, from the front to the rear, is required to contribute to the support of combat operations. This is equally true of the CAMG organization, and all CAMG actions must be directed toward this common goal, even at the expense, if necessary, of long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in rear areas.

**Personnel Competence**

It is of primary importance not only to have the CAMG organization, as such, but also to have the technological and professional competence of CAMGO personnel brought to peak efficiency for functioning in the combat environment.

Because CAMG concerns primarily are operational in nature, it is necessary that CAMGO personnel be thoroughly grounded in the various aspects of military science and tactics. To perform their part in combat operations, CAMGO personnel must have a comprehensive knowledge of the
functions of the G3 section. Only in this way can they understand how the G5 section plays its operational role in the integrated staff of the combat commander.

The precept of Thomas Paine unqualifiedly applies: "Where knowledge is duty, ignorance is a crime."

It is the duty of every CAMG officer to qualify himself fully as an alter-ego to the combat commander, capable of contributing to estimates of the combat situation and of participating in the formulation and implementation of combat decisions.

**Combat Support Tasks**

The exploration for axioms of CAMG combat support reveals that there are certain actions which are conditional while there are others which recur in all cases. It may be concluded from this that CAMG combat support has two categories of tasks—conditional and recurring.

*Conditional* tasks are such as arise out of United States policy with regard to a particular area and the limitations imposed by the natural conditions of the area.

*Recurring* CAMG combat support tasks, on the other hand, may be defined, in general, as: gaining assistance and avoiding interference of the inhabitants, their economy, and institutions in areas where United States Armed Forces are engaged in combat.

More specifically stated, recurring CAMG combat support tasks fall into six additional categories:

1. *Civil conditions.*—Preventing and suppressing disease, starvation, unrest, and other conditions which derive from combat relationships and which would handicap or obstruct tactical and logistical operations; and combating enemy efforts to exploit such conditions.

2. *Resource utilization.*—Promoting the availability and utilization of local resources, facilities, and services, and of governmental, economic, and social agencies, for the benefit of the tactical and logistical effort; and denying their use to the enemy.

3. *Civil security.*—Assuring the security of combat troops from civil sources; using public safety agencies to eliminate active and passive sabotage and guerrilla activity; and coordinating civil defense with military area security and damage control operations.

4. *International law.*—Complying with international law and agreements. This includes provisions for restoring and maintaining public order and safety, for civilian relief supply, and for the care and movement of civilian war and disaster victims, such as casualties, refugees, evacuees, concentration camp internees, displaced persons, and other needy persons.

5. *Civil authority.*—Reestablishing civil authority; transferring the area from military to civil control; and providing assistance to established civil authority in emergencies and disasters and, where indicated, in the routine conduct of government.

6. *Military-civil matters.*—Providing a focal point for handling all military-civil matters and, thereby, avoiding a diversion of combat and other military personnel from their primary military tasks by concern with civil as well as with military-civil matters.

**Conclusion**

This presentation is intended only to be suggestive of the vast range of CAMG combat support. A great deal of effort is yet required to define in practical terms all aspects of the CAMG capability to support the combat commander's operations.

There must be a mutual understanding on the part of combat commanders and CAMGO personnel of the responsibilities and capabilities of each in this increasingly vital field.
The Role of Civil Affairs and Military Government

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army

The importance of CAMG outlined in the preceding article by Strom Thurmond was underscored by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, in an address to the Military Government Association at its annual conference at Augusta, Georgia, on 25 October 1958. The MILITARY REVIEW presents excerpts of the Vice Chief of Staff's address.—Editor.

Basically, the role of civil affairs and military government today may be said to be unchanged from what it has been in the past. Simply stated, that is to relieve commanders of combat units of the problem of administering the local population in the zone of operations; and beyond that, to influence the civilian population so that their cities and facilities not only cease to be liabilities but become assets. While the conditions which can be expected in modern war greatly complicate this task, the task itself is in principle the same obvious, basic one which has always existed in war.

An important part of our chances for success in any undertaking in the future depends upon the soundness of the actions which we take in the present. This fact emphasizes the importance of some of the major functions which are performed by the Chief of the Civil Affairs and Military Government agency in the Department of the Army Staff.

In my opinion, the development of clear understanding of civil affairs and military government functions throughout the Army and the maintenance of CAMG units which are ready to perform their functions promptly in case of emergency are of greater importance today than ever before.

One of the characteristics of a nuclear war would be a great expansion in the area of the combat zone, with a corresponding increase in the number of people who would be caught in the path of the combat forces. Another pertinent factor would be the mass hysteria which the use of atomic weapons, or even the rumor of such use, might well be expected to cause in the civilian population of the combat zone. Still a third significant point to be noted is the greater tactical dispersion of combat units which would prevail. Finally, there is the fact that an atomic battlefield would be marked by extreme destruction.

All of these characteristics combine to intensify the importance of the civil affairs and military government role. If ground combat units are to operate successfully in a nuclear war—and their successful operation will be an essential element of victory—they must be able to concentrate rapidly from dispersed positions, to strike swiftly in exploitation of their nuclear strikes, and to disperse again quickly. The emphasis in each of these phases, as I have indicated, is on speed. But if the roads and the countryside are thronged with refugees it will not be possible to move speedily, and it may not be possible to move at all.

In short, in future operations, whether or not atomic weapons should be used, the responsibilities of civil affairs and military government will not only be no lighter than they have been in the past, but in all probability will be tremendously magnified. Therefore, we cannot sit back and assume that the organization and doctrine to carry out these vital functions can be created after hostilities begin. We must make every possible preparation now, so that in case of emergency the urgently needed steps could be taken promptly and efficiently. This is a need which, I am glad to say, is generally recognized and which is being met by a continuing and effective effort.