CAMG AND THE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL

COMMANDERS AND MEMBERS OF CAMG UNITS IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND OTHER FRIENDS:

I am delighted to be in the great State of Connecticut on this occasion. I consider it most fortunate that this opportunity has arisen for us to meet together. This occasion makes it possible for us to share our views on what is perhaps the chief problem of our times. Toward the solution of this problem, you have important tasks to perform in the conduct of your Civil Affairs and Military Government operations.

I believe it can be stated without exaggeration that the chief intellectual problem confronting mankind, in this mid-decade of the twentieth century, is the problem of survival.

In the solution of this problem of survival, the precise technical knowledge of the physical sciences is essential, but also necessary is the less precise knowledge of the social sciences, the knowledge of the ways of man in his individual and collective life, the knowledge which study and experience will give you in the fields of economics, government, administration, public relations and services.

Above and beyond this mundane knowledge, you will require that quality which only the Supreme Being can give you, but which you will acquire only when your minds and hearts are open to its influx: wisdom.

In order to open my message to you, I would like your permission to quote freely from the first chapter of the Second Book of Chronicles:
"Solomon the son of David established himself in his kingdom, and the Lord his God was with him and made him exceedingly great ..."

"God appeared to Solomon, and said to him, 'Ask what I shall give you.'"

"And Solomon said to God, '...Give me wisdom and knowledge...'

"God answered Solomon, 'Because this was in your heart, and you have not asked possessions, wealth, honor, or the life of those who hate you, and have not even asked long life, but have asked wisdom and knowledge for yourself that you may rule my people over whom I have made you king, wisdom and knowledge are granted you...'"

(Second Chronicle 1:1-12 RSV)

As CAMG officers, you, too, like Solomon, have need of wisdom and knowledge, in order that you may wisely and skillfully perform your tasks in the government of people over whom your commander may be placed by appropriate authority.

Thus, it has ever been in all the ages since Solomon's time, Man has been seeking and gaining wisdom and knowledge. Modern science is a collation of that accumulated wisdom and knowledge. To paraphrase Will Durant in his introduction to The Story of Philosophy, science is useful for two purposes: To Heal and To Harm.

To Heal -- Science has overcome poverty, disease, and distress, to give us a standard of living, in terms of quality and abundance, and a length of healthful living, greater than all who came before us. Corollary to this, we have developed codes of conduct, of personal liberty, of protection of the individual from the mass. I could with enthusiasm devote my entire time to unfolding the magnificent scope of this purpose of science. However, permit me to pass on now to the other purpose of science.
To Harm—Science has conceived diabolical means for the waging of war. So vast have been the accomplishments in this regard that they seem to overshadow the saner gains I previously mentioned. I do not feel that I need to specify more than this, because you, by virtue of your membership in a Civil Affairs and Military Government organization, are fully aware that survival has become the overriding problem of our age and of our civilization.

Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whom President Eisenhower recently selected as Special Assistant in the area of Science and Technology, stated in an address in 1955:

"Survival as an intellectual problem, however, involves a great deal more than military strength. It involves the maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will, its confidence, and its moral purpose. It requires a preoccupation with those matters of the mind and spirit which give a society coherence and its people courage and stamina. It involves freedom of thought along with freedom for each man to realize his fullest potential. Survival involves the cultivation of a core of human excellence and integrity that can stand unafraid and unbowed before the prospect of horror and catastrophe."

This statement of Dr. Killian may be readily adopted and incorporated as part of a code of CAMG conduct. Bear in mind ever that in your conduct of CAMG operations, the reconstruction and "maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will, its confidence, and its moral purpose" and the "preoccupation with those matters of mind and spirit" are among the primary tasks given to you.

As CAMG officers, your business is conducted in a milieu of social disorganization, in the midst of the human and material destruction which warfare brings. In the service of humanity, your contribution to survival "involves the cultivation of a core of human excellence and integrity that can stand unafraid and unbowed before
the prospect of horror and catastrophe."

In a more mundane sense, as CAMG personnel, you are concerned with the problems of survival, first in terms of winning the war, then in terms of winning the peace that must inevitably follow.

In employing techniques for controlling the people, economy and governmental agencies, in areas where military forces of the United States engage in active combat operations, and in employing methods for handling problems of military-civil relationships, both in peacetime and in wartime, you have a complex mission in which is involved the survival of humanity.

Let us not forget that your first objective is to promote combat—to further military operations. This is accomplished by exploiting the civil potential and by preventing civilian interference with the military effort.

In a larger sense, the CAMG organization constitutes an instrument for implementing the foreign policy of our country and for assuring that the conditions of international law and agreements are observed.

While you must remember that it is with these matters you are primarily concerned, both in peacetime and in wartime, you have another task which is at the very core of the problem of survival that I have mentioned.

You have the task of reestablishing public order and safety out of the social chaos and disorganization which warfare engenders, of preparing occupied areas for a reconstituted, economically stable, representative form of government, and for the transfer of the area to acceptable civilian control.

This latter task arises out of the very nature of warfare. To
achieve combat success, the military commander must destroy the enemy and this includes the combat elements, the resources mobilized in their support, and the political agency which directs the effort against him. Consequently, it is axiomatic to say that destruction is essential to winning a war.

Karl von Clausewitz, in his 19th century work ON WAR, has stated, "War is an act of force and to the application of that force there is no limit." However, after the experiences during World War II with V-2 bombs in England, buzz bombs in Belgium, "block-busters" in Germany, and atomic bombs in Japan, reason dictates that force must be applied with discrimination. Destruction must be measured and it must be limited to the actual requirements of the hour. Hence, contrary to the views of those who advance massive strategic retaliation proposals of mutual annihilation, the force applied need not necessarily be massive, neither need the destruction be total.

We may recognize that conflict between nations has many aspects, planes or dimensions. First, and foremost is the plane of the spirit, sometimes suggested by the expression, "The battle for men's minds," and in which we may, in a most liberal sense, include Cold War techniques, diplomacy, international cooperation, technological competition, economic and psychological warfare, and similar engagements in peace and war time, though in peacetime the effort is often regarded as "short of war." Be that as it may, in war time there are three primary planes which may be identified as overland, overseas, and, if I may be permitted to coin a term, "overair."

Throughout the ages, overland has been the traditional plane of warfare. To destroy an enemy, he must be engaged in his own plane of existence. He may be weakened elsewhere by consumption, but he can
only be defeated when his plane of existence has been entered.

Consider the overseas techniques of the Norsemen. Their belligerent excursions out of Scandinavia found them in places wherever water could carry them. The Vikings sailed westward to Britain and the other islands of the North Atlantic, even to Iceland, Greenland, and these shores of New England, not far from where we are now assembled. Southward, the Normans RAIDed along the coasts of France and the Iberian peninsula to the African kingdoms on the shores of the Mediterranean, penetrating inland wherever rivers or streams would accept their boats. Eastward, the Swedish Varangians extended their sway over the Baltic to Novgorod, and southward throughout Kievan Russia, traversing the inland waterways of the Dvina, Dnieper, and Volga Rivers that took them from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and on to Constantinople.

Overseas techniques have been considerably improved, of course, since the days of the Vikings. Yet, as with the Vikings, the efforts of their modern counterparts in overseas warfare were effective in winning victory only when followed by overland operations.

Such a conclusion may also be reached with regard to overair techniques. In medieval times, the use of projectiles had considerably displaced the Roman emphasis upon the footsoldier, though for a time the horseborne soldier seemed to acquire some of the speed and travel characteristics of projectiles, although not exactly their overair features. However, such techniques were soon neutralized by development of fortified places, with wide and deep moats that neither projectiles nor cavalry could invest.

Again, there was a recognition that only by overland techniques could an enemy finally be defeated. Then, the overair projectile
became an adjunct to overland operations, as may be seen in a study of the wars of the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years War and the wars of Louis XIV, and later the campaigns of Napoleon and the wars of the nineteenth century.

The perspective of the present and its projection into the future can not be clearly prophetic without illuminating it with the light of recollection. Military science, however much it may seem to be distorted by marvelous developments in the physical sciences, is still based upon a study of military history.

Modern overair techniques have been spectacular, whether we consider the artillery and aircraft in both world wars or the development of piloted jet propelled aircraft and guided missiles since. However, it is significant that throughout military history, the effectiveness of overair techniques have always been neutralized by barriers or counteracting aggressive means. Essentially, this is the purpose of the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line.

As in the case of overseas techniques, so in the case of overair techniques, they must be followed by overland techniques if the war is to be brought to a successful conclusion. The example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be regarded by some as prophetic of the capability of modern overair techniques to bring wars to an end. Be that as it may, the novelty of the atomic weapon used, as well as the psychological shock of horror that its use induced, had as much to do with its effect as did its efficiency. Today, however, after over a dozen years of familiarity with atomic explosions, the novelty has worn off.

Atomic weapons are becoming as much conventional in this late twentieth century period as any other weapons. The aim of weapons
is to remove an enemy's capability to resist or inflict harm. This may be accomplished by destruction, by inducing starvation, by weakening the will or spirit, among many other ways.

The Communists have clearly shown that they regard a club as sufficient in some cases as a hydrogen bomb or long range projectile is in other cases. The diversity of weapons, from the simplest to the most complex, which the Communists have available for ready and immediate use, discloses the pattern for future war which the Communists anticipate.

Just last December, at the Convention of the Military Government Association in Boston, Mr. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army, stated: "It would be tragic indeed if, in concentrating our efforts in the field of long-range missiles and defenses against them, we neglected what may well be the greatest threat of all. This is the threat of huge Communist ground armies having conventional means of war."

One thing is certain. Regardless of whether the arrival of CAMG elements in an area may be by overland, overseas, or overair means, CAMG operations are contingent upon the continuance of the use of overland techniques. CAMG operations are corollary to overland operations where civil populations are involved. It may almost be said: "No people, No CAMG." Overseas and overair techniques are not likely to involve people to be controlled or protected, unless followed by overland operations.

It is also certain that from the moment the infantry first penetrates enemy-held territory, the commander is an occupier under the terms of international law. Consequently, the application of force, previously mentioned, even such controlled force as is required
to win a war, has a tremendous effect upon the civil population ... and the reaction of that population, in turn, can have a tremendous effect upon the commander's ability to continue the application of the required force.

It can be seen, then, that the commander's decisions are influenced not only by his own and the enemy's relative combat power, but also by the civil characteristics of the area of combat operations. In his estimates of the situation, the commander carefully weighs civil affairs and military government factors along with those dealing with personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. The Department of the Army has clearly established this procedure in its principal field manuals for commanders and their staff officers, and has confirmed it by the establishment of a fifth general staff section in the headquarters of Army organizations.

Furthermore, to the traditional two primary factors influencing the tactical commander's decision as to his courses of action in combat operations, there has been added a third factor. In the past, weather and terrain were the two factors affecting decision. The current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, which is the text of United States Army concept of military science, states that there is a third factor, civil conditions, namely, the political, economic, and sociological characteristics of the area of operations, which FM 101-5, Staff Procedures, sets out as the concern of the CAMG officer, the G5.

The Assistant Chief of Staff G5 is responsible to the commander for all matters pertaining to the government, economy, civil population and institutions in the area where United States Armed Forces are employed. It is his job to assure that CAMG planning is constant, continuous, and in full coordination with all other planning in order
that CAMG operations may best contribute to the overall mission of the commander, first and foremost. In addition, the G5 must assure that CAMG planning accomplishes two other important objectives, among others: one, To ensure CAMG support of tactical and logistical operations; and two, To resolve the civilian problems which handicap or interfere with tactical and logistical operations.

There is a tendency upon the part of some people to believe that the technological peculiarities of weapons developed since World War II will induce radical changes in the aims of warfare. However, I conservatively submit to you that Clauswitz's summation of the overall objectives of warfare are equally valid for nuclear warfare.

These objectives of warfare are threefold: one, to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; two, to take possession of his material and other source of strength; and three, to gain public support. These objectives are inherent in the mission of the Army, which is: "To defeat the enemy forces in land combat and gain control of the land and its people."

It is evident that modern nuclear weapons and highly technical military forces will require mobilization of the full industrial and resource potential of a nation involved in war. It is evident, also, that the threat alone of the use of nuclear devices affects not only whole nations but international balances as well. Consequently, under such conditions, it is even more evident that the combat commander must conduct his operations with full recognition of the effect upon the population involved and their political, economic and governmental structures, if ultimate victory is, in fact, to be achieved.

As we look ahead to the atomic age, we see in the combat commander's mission new elements introduced, deriving from the vast numbers of human beings affected by the extent and the intensity of
his operations when nuclear weapons are used.

Meeting such conditions demands the development and use of the most efficient CAMG organization which can be devised, an organization in which are inherent two of the characteristics implicit in organization for nuclear warfare: one, balance and flexibility, which recognizes the essentiality of the Army in gaining post war objectives and places greater reliance on air transportability; and two, continuing need for conventional forces, which means that while being relentless in the search to insure maximum combat effectiveness, it is necessary to be prepared to cope with aggression of any kind, at any time, at any place.

In this respect, it is significant to note that current CAMG doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic age battlefield. It is not old; it has emerged since World War II, and is derived from the lessons of military history. Four basic characteristics of this CAMG doctrine are:

One, CAMG units are the flexible cellular type, which can be tailor-made with CAMG functional specialists and CAMG officers necessary to meet the requirements of the area in which deployed, of any size battle unit, and of any type of transportation, including airborne.

Two, CAMG units, specially trained for both overland and airborne field operations under combat conditions, are assigned to divisions, corps, and field armies to give CAMG support to the command.

Three, In a mobile or unsettled situation, decentralization of command authority ("Operational Chain of Command") over all CAMG units, supplementary to those CAMG units providing direct support of combat, assures that the demands of dispersal can be met.
Four. A necessary aid to battle units operating over extended areas for prolonged periods is the primary function of CAMG operations, to insure maximum utilization of the resources of the area for the support of the combat forces.

While we tend to give greater attention to CAMG operations in foreign lands, we may be forgiven because that has been the historical projection of our work. However, we must not disregard the domestic projection, as a foreign enemy might attempt to attack us here in the United States. In view of this, we must not exclude from our consideration that CAMG combat support may be required in an area where the local population is not foreign but American.

We are all aware that in time of disaster, the Army has always provided a reservoir of strength, aid and comfort for American communities. In the event of enemy attack, it can be expected that the Army, in addition to resisting the attack, may also be called upon to assist in Civil Defense and in providing essential public services.

Against this contingency, it is of considerable urgency to national defense for the Army to have, both on active duty and in reserve status, a CAMG capability, alive and vital, to have trained and immediately available CAMG personnel capable of providing the skills and leadership ability that times of crisis would demand.

Survival, which I mentioned earlier, is very much involved; in this case, national survival. For this reason, it is of primary importance not only to have available the CAMG organization, as such, but also to have the technological and professional competence of CAMG personnel brought to peak efficiency.

There must be a continuing research program, in order to develop new techniques, procedures, testing criteria, and detection of new
research areas. The training of CAMG personnel must give emphasis to such subjects as the role of CAMG in combat operations; development of plans, orders and annexes; problem solving methods and techniques; cultural and environmental factors affecting the relationship between our military and the local governments and peoples; and procedures for allocating manpower and resources.

There must be a full realization on the part of all military commanders of the CAMG capability, in assuring the accomplishment of his missions. In this connection, military personnel throughout the services must be indoctrinated in CAMG capabilities, in order to provide the balanced force needed. The operational nature of CAMG activities, the G3-G5 relationship, must be fully understood. In addition, CAMG plans, units and staff sections must be included in all maneuvers and CPX's, in order that organizational and doctrinal developments may provide the combat commander of the future with a tested capability to handle his CAMG responsibilities.

With the chaotic conditions envisioned in atomic age warfare, the commander's ability to handle the multitudinous problems -- technological, ideological, logistical -- posed by civil conditions and the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the difference between his success or failure.

Whether the commander is operating in a domestic or a foreign area, the paramount problem will be survival. This will be true, whether it is national survival or the survival of mankind.

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