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What of the Cosmopolitan? Or Approaching the Absent Patriarch in Transnational Theory

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WHAT OF THE COSMOPOLITAN? OR APPROACHING THE ABSENT PATRIARCH IN TRANSNATIONAL THEORY

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ABSTRACT

In this essay I will argue that there are embodied, privileged cosmopolitans, that merely masquerade as ghosts in order to avoid border detainment and a critical inquiry into their status. I will, further, argue that it is in the best interests of these cosmopolitans to avoid detection. Transnational discourse allows these cosmopolitans to exercise this privilege by dwelling on the ideal versions of cosmopolitanism. The discourse further obscures the embodied cosmopolitan by focusing upon already excessively embodied exorbitant citizens, which has the double effect of increasing the embodiment of exorbitant citizens while obscuring the privileged cosmopolitan. In order to conduct this analysis, I will use Kristeva’s theory of the absent patriarch. Furthermore, I will examine the disappearance of this privileged figure by looking at the privileged cosmopolitanism of Mr. Edward Fairfax Rochester in Charlotte Bronte’s mid-century Victorian text *Jane Eyre* and the elusive cosmopolitanism of Eric Packer in Don DeLillo’s post-9/11 novel *Cosmopolis*. Further, I will show how both of these authors present embodied, male cosmopolitan patriarchs, whose appearance of absence is an illusion consciously constructed by concealing themselves behind other embodiments. That each of these authors is situated during a period of Empire and global expansion seems like no mere coincidence. In the case of DeLillo, I will also examine how he theorizes the cosmopolitan figure in the absence of a visible, contemporary cosmopolitanism, and how that theorization directly implicates the cosmopolitan as embodied, permeable, and fearful of the discovery of his fallibility. I will close by examining the concept of power
through absence (or disappearance) that characterizes the exercising of power in both
Kristeva’s work and, as Zygmunt Bauman has it, in *Liquid Modernity* at large.
DEDICATION

To Hilary Hughes, my mom, for her constant support and encouragement throughout my lifetime. Onwards, toward the dissertation! (I hope you’re ready Mom).
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WHAT OF THE COSMOPOLITAN? OR APPROACHING THE PATRIARCHAL SPECTER IN TRANSNATIONAL THEORY

There exists a gap in transnational theory. The gap is between euphoric theories of cosmopolitanism and the exposés on citizenship and the ways in which it disrupts rather than serves human rights, the conflict between citizenship as constituting human rights and human rights as necessarily moving beyond citizenship is an emblem of the conflict arising from the transition out of a modernity characterized by nation-states and into a globalized political, economic, and social structure. The former imagines an ideal that is rooted in a fundamental belief in democracy and equality. This cosmopolitanism offers itself as a solution to the contemporary problem of the type of nationalism that defines itself through exclusion. The commonly theorized cosmopolitan is a foil to that problematized nationalism because it is presented as a legitimizing identity that is available to any individual, without discrimination. Any human can actively cultivate this kind of cosmopolitanism, which Kwami Appiah has termed “rooted cosmopolitanism”, although such cultivation is largely dependent upon the influence of globalization, and, ultimately, the availability of the texts like Appiah’s, and sociological texts that build off his philosophy of rooted cosmopolitanism, such as those by Hiro Saito and Gerard Delanty, which outline the euphoric cosmopolitan. The latter focus of transnational theory examines the exclusionary violence that takes place at the now arbitrary boundaries of nations—especially the borders of the United States. These exposés examine the abuse of displaced, immigrant, and exilic subjects. They scrutinize the failures of INS policy, and question the validity of the INS’s publicly stated mission,
suggesting that the public purpose and policy are at odds. They theorize the economic
gains of a cheap labor force. Within this latter half of the discourse, theorists gesture to a
second cosmopolitan. This cosmopolitan is not a utopian theory, but an embodied (yet
obscured) reality: “a cosmopolitan identity allowed to traverse national borders freely”
(Marciniak 5). However, this cosmopolitan is elusive and never directly theorized. He
fails to appear in the corpus on cosmopolitanism, and he glides in and out of the social
critiques with unnerving ease. He slips through the gap in the discourse, and disappears.
It is this figure of the elusive cosmopolitan that I seek to elucidate, so that this gap in
transnational theory can be filled, and the privileged cosmopolitan—undoubtedly a
subject of transnational discourse—can no longer sneak into the shadows of the discourse
under a pretense of disembodied existence.

In this essay I will argue that there are embodied, privileged cosmopolitans, that
merely masquerade as ghosts in order to avoid border detainment and a critical inquiry
into their status. I will, further, argue that it is in the best interests of these cosmopolitans
to avoid detection. Transnational discourse allows these cosmopolitans to exercise this
privilege by dwelling on the ideal versions of cosmopolitanism. The discourse further
obscures the embodied cosmopolitan by focusing upon already excessively embodied
exorbitant citizens, which has the double effect of increasing the embodiment of
exorbitant citizens while obscuring the privileged cosmopolitan. In order to conduct this
analysis, I will use Kristeva’s theory of the absent patriarch, which suggests that “the
father is the mainstay of the law and the mother the prototype of the object” (Kristeva,
32). In other words, the father is disembodied, since he becomes the discourse itself, and
the mother embodied, as that which the discourse regulates. I will link the “prohibition placed on the maternal body” (14) to the “prohibition placed on the [alien] body” (14), and the “apparition” (6) of the father with the “apparition” (6) of the cosmopolitan, both of whom exercise power and privilege through their respective disappearing acts, and both of whom utilize embodied subjects as camouflage. Furthermore, I will examine the disappearance of this privileged figure by looking at the privileged cosmopolitanism of Mr. Edward Fairfax Rochester in Charlotte Bronte’s mid-century Victorian text *Jane Eyre* and the elusive cosmopolitanism of Eric Packer in Don DeLillo’s post-9/11 novel *Cosmopolis*. Further, I will show how both of these authors present embodied, male cosmopolitan patriarchs, whose appearance of absence is an illusion consciously constructed by concealing themselves behind other embodiments. That each of these authors is situated during a period of Empire and global expansion seems like no mere coincidence. In the case of DeLillo, I will also examine how he theorizes the cosmopolitan figure in the absence of a visible, contemporary cosmopolitanism, and how that theorization directly implicates the cosmopolitan as embodied, permeable, and fearful of the discovery of his fallibility. I will close by examining the concept of power through absence (or disappearance) that characterizes the exercising of power in both Kristeva’s work and, as Zygmunt Bauman has it, in *Liquid Modernity* at large. I will conclude the discussion of power through absence by examining the necessary transition between visible and invisible leadership, in order to demonstrate the unequal distribution of power that the invisibility of the cosmopolitan enables.
Section 1: Where did the Privilege White Male Go?

The privileged white male has disappeared from academia at large. He has become unfashionable, a symbol of anachronistic conservatism. He represents the authority who silences. He presides over the phallocentric, top down power structure. He belongs to an exclusive set, participates in elitism, and upholds the status quo. One does not gaze at him directly, for he has become the Medusa’s head of humanities discourse. He stands against everything interdisciplinary, pluralized, appropriated, reclaimed, exhumed, equalized, and diverse—that fashionable word of university admissions committees. He represents the supposedly antiquated model of the high seminary of learning university, built for the elite, who, in turn, stink of eau d’parfum Oxbridge in the early 20th century. We, on the other hand, have arrived in the era of democratized education, as well as democratized subject matter. Although we know we are only in the early stages, when it is imperative to carefully guard the seedlings of plurality of voice. This guarding is twofold, firstly against the uprooting forces of privilege. Secondly, against that supposedly upwardly mobile class that sees privilege just beyond their grasp, and scramble for some scapegoat upon which to blame the elusiveness of their mirages of grandeur in the desert of economic turmoil. Meanwhile, how and why did that old figure of privilege disappear? As privilege rarely sacrifices itself, and as there is a growing body of work on power through absence and invisibility, I would like us to entertain the notion that the privileged male figure was not deposed by our plurality junta, but willingly handed over his celebrity, and so called voice, the better to exercise his power.
I propose that one such embodied example of how the privileged figure has disappeared from discourse, the better to escape scrutiny, is the cosmopolitan. While much work has been done to reclaim the term cosmopolitan in the name of democracy, equality, and the escape from the bounds of the nation-state (escape from the limits of our stratified conception of the world), it is undeniable that the cosmopolitan figure is the most appropriate transnational figure of privilege to be had. If much of transnational theory is devoted to examining the impossibility of true globality, of detainment and selection at the borders, and the exclusionary practices that are put in place by the border keeping (border demarcating) institutions, cosmopolitans represent the figure invested with the right to move, to cross, and to elude detainment. They are, the opposite of Susan Koshy’s minority cosmopolitan that “emanates from not being home in the world” (608), meaning they are those who are at home in the world, or those who belong anywhere, and by extension everywhere. Minority cosmopolitanism is a positive reframing of those whom Koshy also terms “exorbitant citizens” (597), which she defines as “those whose citizenship is eccentric, erratic or irregular. . . minorities, indigenous people, queers, the Romani, the homeless, and diasporic are paradigmatic exorbitant groups” (597). In other transnational theories these exorbitant citizens are often the displaced, immigrant, or exilic subjects whose identities have been de-legitimatized. They are, always, those subjects who have no room to call their own. Koshy seeks to turn the negative frame provided by popular discourse into a positive one by imagining the exorbitant as cosmopolitan, however, her minority cosmopolitan turns into the cousin of euphoric cosmopolitanism. The minority cosmopolitan is yet another attempt to imagine a global
citizen, through understanding humans as larger than the bounds of national citizenship. This is true in the sense that the stakes of human rights need to be understood as larger than the stakes of citizenship, however, like iterations of euphoric cosmopolitanism Koshy’s minority cosmopolitanism fails to take into account the “majority cosmopolitanism.” The majority cosmopolitan being a majority of purse and privilege rather than the number of cosmopolitans. Understanding humans as untotalizable, and frequently exorbitant in terms of the regulation of national citizenship, however, is helpful in re-imagining denationalized subjects as a positive addition to society rather than necessarily negative. But enough space has been devoted to the embodiment of this figure—in transnational discourse—and the purpose of this study is to examine the long elusive and unexamined cosmopolitan. I present the exorbitant subject to illustrate my point that the fully explored and embodied exorbitant citizen or minority cosmopolitan must be paralleled by an equal exploration of the disembodied privileged cosmopolitan.

The state, then, of transnational theory is this: there are no clearly explored figures of privilege. The discourse presents itself as a protector of those disenfranchised along the borders, and a lobbyist for the democratization of free movement. Insofar as cosmopolitanism stands for free movement and global citizenship, it presents itself as a term that is helpful in imagining how transnational movement and minds would work in a utopian setting. Understandably, it has been appropriated for this purpose. However, if policies are to change, if abuse is to be stopped at the borders, and privilege of movement is no longer to be a privilege but a right, then attention must be paid to those who already exercise this privilege, and benefit from it. The cosmopolitan privileges of the wealthy,
the corporate, the political, and the academic must be counted and considered. Otherwise all we will accomplish will be to further embody an already overly surveyed subject, while allowing the privileged access to and at the same time freedom from this surveillance. A privileged form of cosmopolitanism of the kind lauded by Kant, undoubtedly exists. He is invoked in Marciniak, when she argues that “to be marked as a cosmopolitan, a term that exudes an aura of sophistication and elegance, is more readily linked with a desirable economic and racial position” (24). This sophisticated and elegant figure is implied throughout the discourse—someone, after all, must be crossing the borders. It is time this privileged cosmopolitan became an explicit subject of transnationalism. But, first, let us begin to imagine why he might resist this subjectivity, and why he has and will continue to attempt to perform his disappearing act.

Section 2: Euphoric and Privileged Cosmopolitanisms

Transnational theory exemplifies the notable disappearance of the privileged white male in academia that I gestured to in the previous section. It renders him disembodied, while the pluralized voices of the marginalized, once repressed, now make up the embodied representation of the state of transnationality. They are those who are embodied in the discourse. Now, embodiment, like cosmopolitanism, has a double agenda ascribed to it by contemporary new media theories, one being a positive reclamation—much like the prolific reclamation of cosmopolitanism—in which the re-uniting of the body and mind in an interactive new media represents our greatest hope for mending the schism that defines the negative embodiment, which Caroline A. Jones informs us we have lived with since the Enlightenment. For the duration of this essay we
must leave behind the works on positive embodiment. It is the negative effect of embodied rhetoric and the privileging of disembodiment rhetoric that will provide us with the necessary framework for understanding the forms of embodiment and disembodiment that threaten to render transnational theory a mere tool for upholding the status quo in which disembodied privilege exercises power through invisibility and camouflage. This negative embodiment is explored in Julia Kristeva, whose book *Powers of Horror* provides the cornerstone upon which embodiment is discussed in transnational theory. I will not stop at examining negative embodiment, however, but will move into discussing the neutral embodiment that needs to be enacted in transnational theory. In other words, the embodiment of both privileged and unprivileged subjects. After all, bodies and embodiment are a part of humanity. It is only the use of bodies as a means of disenfranchisement that makes embodiment a problem. Let us, then, briefly understand transnational embodiment and disembodiment through a Kristevan lens.

For transnational scholars Kristeva’s discussion of the embodied maternal and the abjection that comes out of this prove to be fruitful ground for examining the negative portrayals of the immigrant subject in popular culture and media, through the coding of their bodies. However, there is a flipside to this embodiment. Kristeva sets up the familiar maternal and paternal binary -- “the father is the mainstay of the law and the mother the prototype of the object” (32) -- providing us with a second figure, the father as law rather than body. In Kristeva, the father is always seeking to be “symbolic law,” meaning he seeks to be abstracted from his body. Although Kristeva observes “does Hans’ father not play a bit too much the role of the mother” (35), indicating that the father is always in
danger of losing his status as law and symbol. He knows that he gains and maintains his power through absence, through inhabiting the symbolic, while the maternal provides the façade, the body behind which to masquerade. Yet, he cannot help the body that makes him one with the maternal embodiment he enacts so that he can reject its identity. Thus, Hans’ father “play[s] a bit too much the role of the mother” (35), in that he cannot escape his embodiment, in spite of his attempts to conceal it. His body inevitably manifests itself.

If there is a maternally embodied subject in transnational theory, or that is analyzed within transnational theory and created by popular media rhetoric, then, somewhere, there is this disembodied paternal figure. If we choose the binary opposition of Marciniak, displaced subject and cosmopolitan, it becomes important to note that there is no discussion in popular media of successful border crossing, as such. There is no attention paid to those border crossers who move through customs without a hitch, hidden—as Marciniak’s writing seems to suggest—behind “the abyss of nonbeing that is already coded as belonging to the crossers whose transnational position is not a cosmopolitan identity allowed to traverse borders freely but a location of painful quivering” (5). Note that the displaced is “positioned” (or fixed) as embodied through her “location” in “painful quivering.” Pain and quivering are primarily bodily functions, on occasion invested with a metaphoric meaning when thoughts and words are described as mental anguish. The cosmopolitan, on the other hand, is invested with freedom and mobility. He is not fixed, nor is he available for examination, and this is worth noting about popular media—at least as it is understood within transnational discourse. It does
not take the cosmopolitan as a subject, or even an object, of inquiry the way it does the displaced or those coded as immigrants. Yet does the cosmopolitan not share the same border crossing lifestyle as these other subjects? Sociologist Victor Roudometof observes that cosmopolitanism is understood as

“an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences. . . Ordinary folk—ranging from migrant workers to exiles or refugees—do not necessarily possess such cultural and intellectual predispositions (114),

indicating that there is an inherent class distinction in the definition of cosmopolitanism. The lifestyle of movement required to cultivate “openness” is present in both lifestyles, but as Roudometof indicates it would be difficult, if not impossible, for exorbitant citizens to cultivate the above cosmopolitan stance. ¹ Ultimately, although Roudometof goes on to confirm euphoric approach to cosmopolitanism as the sociological definition of cosmopolitanism, the beginning of his article indicates the “manifestation of the mentality of the upper and middle classes” (113) that is still inseparable from the term cosmopolitan. Likewise, transnational theory struggles with this interplay of meaning. Marciniak’s cosmopolitan, who Roudometof gestures to briefly, shares nothing in common with Koshy’s exorbitant citizen, for all he is and all he can be is encapsulated in this glamorous label: cosmopolitan, which signals the elite travel of political delegates, the marketability of transnational white-collar employees, the glossy pages of

¹ Roudometof references a “working class cosmopolitanism” that is the sociological answer to Koshy’s “minority cosmopolitanism” confirming Roudometof’s argument that transnational terminology needs to be more carefully defined and maintained.
Cosmopolitan magazine, the jet setting lifestyle of the movie celebrity who perpetually travels to movie sets and foreign film festivals in France—itself the symbol of Western sophistication.

Consider David Cronenberg’s Cosmopolis (2011), and the movement of the cast and crew across U.S. borders into Canada, where he reconstructs New York in Toronto. The cast, then, travels to the prestigious Cannes film festival to be photographed and promoted, but these movements are not coded as displaced, immigrant, exilic—although actors and actresses in contemporary film are exiled from their homes for long periods of time in the name of filmic spectacle. They are displaced into hotel rooms. They do, sometimes, immigrate from their native Hollywood, to escape their unfortunate political situation, a la George Clooney and Johnny Depp. They immigrate away from the constant exposure to media attention and harassment. Yet they are not displaced, exiled, or immigrant. They are cosmopolitans, a different coding and therefore a different species. These figures are not discussed in terms of their border crossing. Their movements across borders are not scrutinized as such, in spite of the fact that they are frequently under media scrutiny. Abuse of border policy is unspeakable in reference to the cosmopolitan, which, in Brenda S. A. Yeoh’s writing on Singapore’s use of cosmopolitanism and the term cosmopolis, inevitably gestures toward the privileged rather than Koshy’s minority or Roudometof’s working class. Casting Singapore as a “cosmopolis” becomes “a key strategy to attracting and retaining foreign talent” (2436), talent from a Singaporean perspective consisting of “talent in business, academia, or in the performing arts” (2435). Note the upper-class tenor of the fields listed. Yeoh goes on to say “‘cosmopolitans’
speak English, are international in outlook, skilled in banking, information technology, engineering, science and technology, and able to navigate comfortably anywhere in the world” (2434-2435). For Singaporeans in Yeoh’s essay the ability to speak English is indicative of an international outlook. The jobs defined as cosmopolitan require a high level of training, which takes money and social status to procure. As Yeoh later points out, lower class immigrants and transnationals prove to be exorbitant in terms of Singapore’s cosmopolitan goals. Singapore, like the movements of film stars, provides yet another example of practiced cosmopolitanism and its elitism, as opposed to the theoretical euphoric cosmopolitanisms, which promise acceptance for the privileged, the minority, and the working class alike. This understanding of cosmopolitanism simply does not exist outside of the discourse itself.

Transnational theory far from exposing this paradigm actually perpetuates it. In the first instance because it treats cosmopolitanism as wholly separate from the border crossing existence of any other human subject. For example, in Kwami Appiah’s writing, as well as Amanda Anderson’s work in *Cosmopolitics*, cosmopolitanism is a mindset rather than an embodied existence. Anderson calls it “a term that throughout its long philosophical, aesthetic, and political history has been used to denote cultivated detachment from restrictive forms of identity” (“Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity” 266). Anderson’s definition lays out the stance of euphoric cosmopolitanism. Note the way in which travel as an inherent attribute of cosmopolitanism disappears. Instead, cosmopolitanism becomes associated with the mind. It “denote[s] cultivated detachment,” indicating that the cosmopolitan subject is
one who cultivates an intellectual outlook instead of participating in embodied movement. Cosmopolitanism is identified as an “identity,” an identity through “detachment,” both of which could be linked to a privileged cosmopolitan. It is a privilege to choose or cultivate an identity, rather than being identified; this is the difference between classification as a subject and an object. Detachment and travel are certainly linked, in the sense that to move is to be detached from any given location. The privileged cosmopolitan is implied in Anderson, however, rather than examining the ways in which cultivated detachment is only available to a privileged class of people, Anderson theorizes the democratization of this privilege.

While Appiah, like Anderson, advocates the democratization of a cultivated cosmopolitan mindset, he cannot help but gesture to the cosmopolitan I have been discussing. However, he gestures to it as an an imagined figure rather than an embodied reality. “You imagine a Comme des Garçons—clad sophisticate with a platinum frequent-flyer card regarding, with kindly condescension. . . And you wince” (xiii). I do wince, at the way in which Appiah casts this cosmopolitan as a collective delusion. We “imagine” this seeming caricature of privilege, the debunking of which will be Appiah’s goal throughout his book. Juxtapose this caricature with Appiah’s presentation of himself in a later chapter, where he describes the palace in Asante. Here he admits he is related by marriage to the previous king (90), and later he describes the current king:

he was born across the street from the palace to a member of the royal Oyoko clan. But he belongs to other worlds as well: he went to Oxford University; he’s a
member of one of the Inns of London; he’s a Catholic with a picture of himself
greeting the pope in his sitting room (90)

Appiah means to present the ways in which twenty-first century humans are no longer
defined by their nation state, in order to render his call for a cosmopolitan ethics relevant,
but he ends up demonstrating an embodied example of the figure he rejects as mere
imagination in his introduction. To hearken back to the privileged cosmopolitan of the
Enlightenment is not Appiah’s goal. However, that he cannot avoid discussing privileged
cosmopolitans in his book demonstrates that they are not a disembodied part of our
collective imagination, but an embodied reality that there is a deliberate attempt in
Appiah to obscure or forget.

Ultimately, Appiah, an icon in defining twenty-first century cosmopolitanism,
opts for a disembodied ideal: cosmopolitan ethics, or the rooted cosmopolitan. Once
again the cosmopolitan is encoded in Kristeva’s paternal disembodiment, which seeks to
order the rest of humanity. He exists in the mind, and the ways in which we think, rather
than in our bodily movement. Most theories on cosmopolitanism seek to perform this sort
of ordering. Take, for example, Jonathon Rée’s piece in Cosmopolitics, in which he
briefly invokes the idea of cosmopolitanism as an antidote to the restrictions of
nationalism and internationalism. “We can perhaps imagine a world where local
peculiarities are no longer subsumed under national types. . . a new cosmopolitan world,
which could put the illusions of internationality behind it, for good” (88). Rée’s
cosmopolitan world, like Appiah’s cosmopolitan viewpoint invokes cosmopolitanism as a
solution, without addressing cosmopolitanism. He takes it to mean without national
affiliation, or a viewpoint that is without national or international interests, however, he also fails to include what viewpoints it does have, creating the feeling that cosmopolitanism is the antidote to nationalism and internationalism in a globalizing world. Here and in Appiah’s cosmopolitanism comes to stand for the citizen of the world” (xv), a term that delightfully invokes ideas of a global (although Appiah rejects global) democracy. This is further disembodied by its status as an agenda that Rée and Appiah are providing, rather than a practiced reality.

Like Appiah’s and Rée’s philosophical approaches, sociological approaches to cosmopolitanism outline what cosmopolitanism could be, and how this form of cosmopolitanism is necessary in a rapidly globalizing world. These theorists use currently popular network theories, rife with their promise of movement away from a top down approach. Sociologists Hiro Saito (who builds off of Appiah’s work) and Gerard Delanty, also gesture to a privileged form of cosmopolitanism. Also like Appiah, Saito and Delanty are determined to reclaim the possibilities of cosmopolitanism from the limits of what Saito terms “elite cosmopolitanisms” (136). Unlike Appiah, Saito acknowledges the existence of an elite cosmopolitan class, and the validity of sociological studies on elite cosmopolitanism, which is defined in a transnational corporate context. However, he ultimately assigns these cosmopolitans the title of “imperialists” (136), and revokes their cosmopolitan status. This renders the previously transnational “elite cosmopolitans” beyond the purview of transnational theory, which disembodies them within the discourse. Likewise, Delanty indicates that cosmopolitanism “became associated with the revolt of the elites against the low culture of the masses” (26), using the phrase “became
associated” to suggest that there is an older form of cosmopolitanism that he is going to remind his audience of, one that is before “became” and intrinsic to the meaning of the word rather than merely “associated.” Saito’s and Delanty’s articles, like Appiah’s, demonstrate the fashionable uses of cosmopolitanism in the twentieth and twenty-first century. “[T]he cosmopolitan imagination occurs when and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness” (Delanty 27) language like “imagination” highlights the splitting of cosmopolitanism as associated with embodied travel. Delanty creates a new definition that associates cosmopolitanism with disembodied movements of the mind. Cosmopolitanism becomes a work of imagination, a state of mind that is born out of openness. This upholds the privileged status of the symbolic, of the law, while the bodies of elite cosmopolitans are demoted. It is a convenient demotion for them, however. If embodied cosmopolitans cannot escape their bodies, concealing those bodies behind an idealistic law of cosmopolitanism becomes a convenient way of escaping surveillance. There is no such ideal for “exorbitant citizens” (597). It is precisely because these less attractive transnational labels are denied the liberation of a disembodied law for their existence, it is imperative to question how cosmopolitans gained such a loophole.

Far from demystifying the negative embodiment of immigrant subjects and the avoidant disembodiment of the privileged cosmopolitan, transnational theory imitates the binary opposition. It presents cosmopolitan disembodiment as an ideal, and conceals the embodied cosmopolitan behind a veneer of theoretical texts like those of Appiah, Anderson, Roudometof, Saito, and numerous others. Meanwhile, by examining negative
portrayals of exorbitant subjects, transnational theorists repeat the act of rendering those subjects embodied. The transnational theorist focuses the gaze of the reader upon the exotic other of U.S. culture, and by doing so compels the reader to look away from the cosmopolitan. It is not that the reader ignores the cosmopolitan, but he is not given access to that privileged world. Instead, he is encouraged to gaze upon the disenfranchised. On some level, the theorist makes a spectacle of the displaced, while offering figures of privilege a position behind a screen. It seems far from a mistake that there is a parallel between the continued negative embodiment of exorbitant citizens and the continued disembodiment of cosmopolitans.

As Jones acknowledges, disembodiment has been associated with privilege and the Western World since the Enlightenment. Smell and the desire to be scentless offers one example of the privilege of disembodiment. Jones points out in her essay, “Although smells are entirely social in the way we learn to code them. . . we are trained, after centuries of olfactory denigration, to experience the individual as ideally, instrumentally odor free” (17) indicating that there is an idealization of disembodiment. Jones goes on to point out “of course, class is deeply implicated in this subjectivation, since both deodorization and education are available only to the rich” (17), in other words, smell and education are used to create an illusion of human disembodiment. This disembodiment is only available to those wealthy enough to for water, soap, perfume, and other materials used to erase human odor, which creates a hierarchy in which the wealthy disappear amidst their carefully cultivated illusion of scentlessness, while the poor become marked and classifiable through their supposedly uncontainable bodily odor. . Yet, humans,
whether our rhetoric indicates it or not, are embodied beings. The mind, that privileged creator of the law, cannot be separated from its dependence upon the body. Therefore, embodiment ought to be a neutral state, which is to say it ought to be understood as a part of being human, rather than subhuman. Rendering the privileged cosmopolitan embodied within transnational discourse would create both a more balanced discourse and a more balanced view of embodiment, in that it is a move toward equalizing transnational subjects. As of right now, the embodied subjects of transnational discourse, largely the overrepresented minority groups known as displaced and exilic subjects, are made available for surveillance by the very discourse that proposes to protect them from such surveillance. Meanwhile, in an odd kind of shift the cosmopolitan has become underrepresented, and through this underrepresentation has completely sidestepped the watchful eye of transnational discourse. This represents a turn in underrepresentation. Where, before, it was solely a means of repressing the unprivileged, it has become a way of disassociating from the maternal embodiment that is governed by patriarchal law. However, cosmopolitans are embodied, and cannot escape this; therefore, it is time that the studies of transnationalism acknowledge this embodiment, and force the surrender of privilege through disembodiment, lest this gap in representation continue to perpetuate the illusion of disembodiment at the expense of those coded as that other of disembodiment, the burdensomely embodied. Let us, then, in the absence of any clear cosmopolitan figure, look at literature, where the historical disappearance of the embodiment of privileged cosmopolitans takes place.
Section 3: Mr. Rochester, Anachronism or Hidden Cosmopolitan?

One does not often examine the cosmopolitanism of Mr. Edward Fairfax Rochester of *Jane Eyre*. Indeed, studies of cosmopolitanism in Charlotte Bronte’s writing tend to examine Bronte’s Belgian novels, as do Amanda Anderson in *the Powers of Distance*, and Richard Bonfiglio in “Cosmopolitan Realism: Portable Domesticity in Bronte’s Belgian Novels.” This is due to what Bonfiglio points toward as the changing definition of cosmopolitanism during the Victorian period, which renders Rochester a mere “anachronistic survival of an earlier aristocratic age” (604). In other words, in Rochester one can chart the disappearance of the embodied, privileged cosmopolitan. He is the last of his kind. His disappearance is twofold, for he disappears both from Victorian literature, and, later, from scholarship on Victorian literature, demonstrating just how cleanly the slate was wiped of the embodied cosmopolitan. He is replaced by a different embodiment, one who, like the displaced, smacks of ill repute. The newly embodied cosmopolitan of the Victorian period is exactly the sort of unattractive subject that confirms the negative stereotypes of embodiment. The word becomes a signifier for “foreignness, Jewishness, effeminacy, [and] homosexuality” (605). Being Cosmopolitan, then, becomes something to be avoided, and, suddenly there is no longer a word or symbol for that embodied, privileged cosmopolitan, who begins his adult life with a grand tour; who may travel around the European continent at his leisure as Mr. Rochester does; who cannot help but travel beyond the so-called civilized Western world in the name of imperialism and the gaining and defense of fortunes. He describes himself as “provided with plenty of money and the passport of an old name, I could choose my own
society: no circles were closed against me” (Bronte 311) This description suggests that Mr. Rochester does not have, nor does he need, an official passport. Exhorbitant citizens often have no passport, or may find their passport is not enough to render them desirable. In stark contrast, Mr. Rochester states that money and name always render him welcome and at home, with or without his passport. This type of cosmopolitan, as represented by Mr. Rochester, slips into anonymity when the definition of cosmopolitanism changes. He becomes impossible to categorize as a cosmopolitan, and because no new category is created for him, he becomes impossible to discuss. It is no longer possible to associate him with cosmopolitanism, which is newly coded as undesirable.

In a similar movement, Mr. Rochester passes beyond the bounds of scholarly interest in cosmopolitanism. Scholars of Victorian literature have become so caught up in writing about the norms, and challenges to those norms, if one looks at Bonfiglio and Pallovi Rostogi, that the curious elision of Kantian cosmopolitanism fails to appear within the context of this discourse. Of course, it does not help that the privileged white male is now the dirty word of academia, while Rostogi’s reclamation of Cornelia Sorabji from the position of “Anglophile do-gooder who died in obscurity somewhere in England” (742). Rastogi revival of Sorabji as an Indian woman who “presents her gendered and racialized social location as a mode of analyzing metropolitan society and thereby undermining its normative urges” (741) is the height of fashionable scholarly conversation. One is used to thinking of curse words as a means of rendering language illegitimate. Take the appropriation of Anglo-Saxon words by their Norman conquerors for use as curses. However, in an age where invisibility is quickly becoming the means
through which one exercises power, making cosmopolitanism a curse word seems to have provided an excellent means through which to disappear from the conversation. Indeed, the introduction of pluralized voices, at the almost complete expense of university courses on privilege is another example of how the cosmopolitan has escaped scrutiny. How many courses called “the privileged white males of contemporary literature” are taught? As compared to the now institutionalized postcolonial literature, African American literature, literature by women, Chicano literature, all of which do the positive work of giving voice, but also render these voices embodied and present where their privileged counterparts are allowed to slip out of the conversation entirely.

As Michel Foucault darkly observes “[t]he chronicle of a man, the account of his life, his historiography, written as he lived out his life formed part of the rituals of his powr. The disciplinary methods reversed this relation, lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made of this description a means of control and a method of domination (191)

Foucault’s observation indicates that bringing plural voices to the forefront of academia may be both a sign of progress and a symptom of surveillance. Consider, briefly, how much attention is paid to Jane Eyre as either an empowering or disempowering novel for women, or how Mr. Rochester is often seen through the lens of scholarship on Jane. He is hardly a character in his own right.

It is impossible to think of Mr. Rochester without Jane, the novel itself makes it impossible to gaze upon him directly, and it is the very structure of the novel that provides the material example of how Mr. Rochester and other privileged cosmopolitans
began to disappear. Consider, first, that *Jane Eyre* is written by a female author, which is a departure from privileged male authorship. With the introduction of women who write under masculine pseudonyms onto the Victorian literary scene, *Jane Eyre* becomes less about the subject matter of the novel, and more about discovering the woman who wrote it. This, already, draws attention away from male authors, raising questions about the gendered identity of all Victorian authors, so that male authors are screened from visibility by the Victorian imaginary, in which the maternal body can be seen lurking behind any male pseudonym. Naturally, the Mr. Rochesters of the world do not write for money, a vulgar task implicit in the production of novels, dependent as they are upon popular consumption.

As cosmopolitans go, Mr. Rochester is a relatively visible one, as we will see when we discuss Don DeLillo’s post 9/11 cosmopolitan Eric Packer. He is open, with Jane, about his ability to travel, stating “provided with plenty of money, and the passport of an old name, I could choose my own society, no circles were closed against me” (310). The mention of a passport indicates that he is crossing borders, although he indicates he is also crossing social borders. Because he is wealthy and in possession of “an old name” he may enter into the highest circles as an equal, but his travel is unrestrained, as indicated by his affair with the French singer Celine Varens. If Mr. Rochester were a woman he would not be allowed such unrestrained movement, even if he possessed a fortune and an old name, he would be subject to the surveillance of society. However, because he is male, Mr. Rochester’s movement is unrestricted, and he exercises the true mobility of a transnational cosmopolitan. However, the Eurocentric leanings of the pre-
Victorian cosmopolitan, who is associated with the Grand Tour, is made clear through Mr. Rochester’s love affairs.

Mr. Rochester’s hunt for a replacement wife, and later affairs stand in for the specifics of a grand tour, suggesting where he has travelled. They also indicate the ways in which travel through the western world, specifically the European continent, is privileged over other forms of cosmopolitan movement. Indeed, if we think of Mr. Rochester as not truly cosmopolitan until he indicates the free range mobility discussed above, then he does not become a cosmopolitan until he has crossed the channel into Franch. While there we are given to understand that he travels through France, Italy, and Germany, although he does not state that he crosses the borders of countries, instead “I sought my ideal of a woman amongst English ladies, French countesses, Italian signoras, and German Grafinnen” (311), and later “[t]he first I chose was Celine Varens. . . She had two successors: an Italian, Giancinta, and a German, Clara” (311). The use of women to denote countries implies a sense of “motherland,” or the femininization of nations. It also points to the materiality of women, as Kristevan embodied subjects, available as wives and mistresses. The wife inherently becomes a maternal role, but the mistresses are also maternal, as indicated by the presence of Adele. Thus, through their inherent link to motherhood, these women become the motherland. The materiality of women is also linked to the materiality of movement and mobility, which is a bodily action. It is important to note that Mr. Rochester’s cosmopolitanism is not the popular cosmopolitanism of the mind, the cultivation of detachment and identity that Anderson and Appiah offer. Instead, it is physical movement of the body, the materiality of
sexuality, of penetrated countries, the leakage of bodily fluids and national identity, the mess of the physical. Mr. Rochester cannot escape his body, even if his body can be concealed behind the bodies of others.

Like male authors, Mr. Rochester is always screened by Jane’s role as narrator. This is to say, while Mr. Rochester continues to function as the visible anachronism, he is, already, disappearing behind the story of Jane. While Bronte presents us with this privileged cosmopolitan figure, he is a side character. Notably, while Mr. Rochester serves as Jane’s romantic lead, he is absent for over half of the novel. He does not exist during volume one, which consists of Jane’s childhood, where we are presented with a visceral account of the life of an orphan. Comparatively, details about Mr. Rochester’s childhood are nonexistent, and all stories of his life prior to meeting Jane are narratives embedded in her narrative. Consequently, we are always twice removed from his travels. Jane’s immobility serves as another way to create an illusion of disembodiment for Mr. Rochester. In a scene that seems designed to be contrasted with Mr. Rochester’s confession of his careless and easy movement, Jane “desire[s] liberty; for liberty [she] gasp[s]; for liberty [she] utter[s] a prayer; it seem[s] scatter[s] on the wind then faintly blowing. [she] abandon[s] it.” (85). As “abandon[ment]” of this prayer indicates, Jane has no hope of “liberty,” which she links with travel in the moments preceding her prayer. Jane’s abandonment of her hope for freedom demonstrates her inability to survey Mr. Rochester, and the necessity of his cosmopolitan movements remaining imaginary. This is reiterated through Jane’s inability to follow Mr. Rochester when he leaves Thornfield unexpectedly, prior to the house party that leads to his proposal. She can cultivate
Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism—designed to be available to those who cannot afford to travel—but she cannot gain access to the elite cosmopolitanism of Mr. Rochester. Therefore, her narrative of his movements only succeeds in concealing the embodied reality of privileged cosmopolitanism. The lack of direct access to transnational movement in *Jane Eyre*, versus Bronte’s Belgian novels goes some ways in explaining why Mr. Rochester’s cosmopolitanism has been ignored in favor of imagining him as a relatively immobile character in a story about womanhood.

When Jane leaves Thornfield, Mr. Rochester disappears from the narrative again, and by the time we return to him at the close of the novel, he is coded as an invalid and no longer capable of playing the role of the cosmopolitan “he’s in England; he can’t get out of England, I fancy—he’s a fixture now” (429). Note that he “can’t” get out, all choice of movement has been taken away from him, that he is referred to as a fixture reiterates Mr. Rochester’s fixed position in the country. He is incapable of leaving his manor house, Ferndean, for another part of the country, and, therefore, incapable of transnational movement. As a consequence, Mr. Rochester the privileged cosmopolitan has ceased to exist. Our last memory of him has been stripped of its cosmopolitan coding, and we are led to believe that the time has arrived for the empowered female Jane to take the reigns of running the Rochester estate. In this way, Rochester’s narrative follows the trajectory of the disappearing cosmopolitan, confirming rather than denying its narrative.

Yet, for the moment that we are given to see Mr. Rochester as a cosmopolitan figure, he is exemplary of the cosmopolitan that scholars like Marciniak gesture to. Examine the similarities between Marciniak’s cosmopolitan: “a cosmopolitan identity
allowed to traverse national borders freely” (5) and Bronte’s: “provided with plenty of money and the passport of an old name, I could choose my own society: no circles were closed against me” (311). They are the same figure. Each “traverse[s] national borders freely,” although Mr. Rochester works to complicate Marciniak’s definition further by suggesting that, like the displaced subject she examines, Mr. Rochester has no official identification in the form of a passport. Unlike those subjects detained at the border, Mr. Rochester is exempt from having to identify himself. He is always rendered desirable through his position in society—based on the reputation of his family, a decidedly Victorian sign of status, and his money, a still relevant way of defining status, insofar as transnational corporate interests are governing factors in who is allowed to move where, as Yeoh’s article explores through the example of Cosmopolitan Singapore.

Section 4: Eric Packer “A World Citizen with a New York Pair of Balls” (DeLillo 313-327)

If Mr. Rochester represents the last glimpse of the privileged cosmopolitan prior to being replaced by the unattractively embodied cosmopolitan of the Victorian period, and recent attempts by transnational scholars to reclaim the term cosmopolitan in the name of theorizing the ideal world citizen have continued to ignore the privileged cosmopolitan, then Don DeLillo’s antihero Eric Packer is a strange resurfacing of the embodied, privileged cosmopolitan. Where Bronte’s Jane Eyre provides a pathology of the disappearance of the cosmopolitan figure, DeLillo’s novel offers a theorizing of the embodiment of the privileged cosmopolitan as he might look in today’s increasingly globalized world. He is wealthy and mysterious. He is cloistered from the rest of
humanity by his means of transport, but at the same time constantly in motion. He is located in a cosmopolis. He is also distinctly embodied.

DeLillo sets his novel in New York in 2000, although this New York seems to be an alternate reality. Subsuming the city’s name is the novel’s title *Cosmopolis*. Through this title DeLillo strips the city of its national affiliation, a move that is in keeping with his characterization of the city as a center of global commerce. DeLillo is not the only one to characterize the city in this way. Theorist Saskia Sassen names New York as one of three global cities where flows of capital are centered. The other two Sassen offers are London and Tokyo. Sassen states that these cities are set adrift from their nations, and positioned as the key cities in a global economy, functioning “first as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and for specialized serve firms” (Sassen 4). DeLillo’s novel puts into words the realization of this shift in economic centrality, and he positions the novel’s main character, Eric Packer, as a key investor, and, therefore, player in New York as the economic capital of the world. Although exactly how Eric Packer has achieved this position and the work he does remains vague. “[Y]ou know things. I think this is what you do. . . I think you acquire information and turn it into something stupendous” (Location 221), Packer’s wife Elise Shifrin speculates. This shadowy existence of Packer’s role in New York economics is one way DeLillo theorizes twenty-first century cosmopolitanism. The uncertainty of how cosmopolitans occupy themselves is reflected in the ambiguity of the occupation Elise ascribes to her husband. “[Y]ou know things” could mean anything, as could “acquire information.” Furthermore, it hearkens back to
that disembodied lifestyle that belongs to privilege. As Jones points out, education is a privilege of the rich. That Eric Packer’s occupation may be to “know things” indicates he is a part of this privileged, disembodied elite. His work is relegated to tasks of the mind rather than bodily labor, and his body is rendered entirely useless to his occupation, confirming Packer’s status as separated from his body, which does not appear in public the way the results of his work do. He is a virtual subject to the world.

Where Bronte’s Rochester appears to be an open book concerning his financial situation and free-ranging lifestyle, as he enacts his disappearing act, Packer’s life and history are as opaque as privileged cosmopolitanism. Yet, in spite of Packer’s concealed history, he exists within the novel in a viscerally embodied way that bears a lot in common with those displaced subjects whose bodies have been negatively coded. Examine, for example, the scene in which Dr. Ingram performs Packer’s prostate exam, for Packer has a full medical checkup every day, indicating the importance of his body., “He felt the pain. It traveled the pathways. It informed the ganglion and spinal cord. He was here in his body, the structure he wanted to dismiss in theory even when he was shaping it under the measured effect of the barbells and weights” (Location 601). Here, as I have theorized earlier, Packer cannot escape his body, he is “here in his body” and his only possible “dismissal” is the kind of mediation of disembodiment that Jones points to as, again, the privilege of the wealthy. For her it is scentlessness, and for Packer it is the “shaping” of it through “barbells and weights.” This narrative indicates that Eric wishes to escape his body, to become completely disembodied, but he cannot. In this way Cosmopolis enacts the opposite narrative arch from Mr. Rochester’s narrative in Jane
Eyre. Packer goes from an anonymous man on an anonymous night in New York city, to a fully embodied representation of a day in the life of the wealthiest, most powerful man in New York. Mr. Rochester begins as a man willing to reveal his history as a cosmopolitan, although he is always concealed behind the maternal bodies of the narrator and author, and ends an obscure man who can no longer represent the privileged cosmopolitan.

Because Packer never leaves the New York setting of Cosmopolis, some might question whether Packer is a cosmopolitan, or if it is only the city that is coded as a cosmopolis. In this respect, as well, he is an incredibly different cosmopolitan from Mr. Rochester. Rochester represents a cosmopolitan in a time of nations, which causes him to stand in sharp contrast to the characters who do have a national affiliation. In order to be cosmopolitan he must travel, and he must clearly express his disassociation from the nation, especially because some of his travel takes place within the bounds of the Empire. Packer, on the other hand, lives in a global city, and is, therefore, affiliated with cosmopolitanism through his global positioning. He identifies himself as “a world citizen with a New York pair of balls” (DeLillo Location 313-327), exactly the citizenship that Appiah and other cosmopolitanism theorists code as cosmopolitan. In many ways this status as cosmopolitan without movement is exactly the utopian cosmopolitanism that is theorized by contemporary transnational scholars. Both Appiah and Saito advocate rooted cosmopolitanism, a cosmopolitanism that does not require mobility. For these scholars, this form of cosmopolitanism enables the democratization of cosmopolitan ideals. It requires only an open mindset, willing to accept difference. For Saito it is about products
coming to us, performing the cosmopolitan travel so that we may consume them and broaden our understanding of the world. Packer is DeLillo’s embodiment of these ideals in a capitalist system. Indeed, we learn at the end of the novel that Packer was not born a wealthy man. He has no family name, and in this way he is the embodiment of the self-made man that free-market capitalism idealizes. His cosmopolitanism does not require travel. Capital travels to him. As the story progresses Packer’s discussion of currency conversions, of speculating in currency exchange, transnational flows of capital become a key source of his cosmopolitanism. The Chinese currency especially. Capital, then, divorced from products, divorced from the necessity of exchange value beyond the incestuous changes between currencies, is the only real travel in the novel, but it is enough. Packer both legitimizes his position and establishes his presence on a global scale through this conversion of capital.

While Packer’s money is tied up in disembodied currency conversion, his body is viscerally present in the novel in taboo ways. The vicious murder of a rival, as seen on television, serves as the first reminder of the permeability of bodies that theories of disembodiment seem eager to avoid. Or, perhaps it is the catalyst for Packer’s movement within the novel: his inability to fall asleep, that is the first reminder of his body. Indeed, bodily needs drive Packer’s narrative. Security threats and system breeches come up repeatedly, and like his computer networks, Packer’s body is breeched. During a routine examination Packer is probed by his doctor “the whole physiology of neural maneuver, of heartbeat and secretion, some vast sexus of arousal drawing him toward her, complicatedly, with Ingram’s finger up his ass” (601). All of this denies the myth of the
clean and contained body that has come to symbolize wealth in the Western world. DeLillo characterizes Packer as permeable, in much the same way exorbitant citizens are rendered as permeable and at the same time infectious. Through this DeLillo demystifies the disembodied power of the privileged cosmopolitan, and creates an equality through embodiment that transnational theory must imitate.

It is the novel’s climax, however, that fully demonstrates Packer’s embodied vulnerability. I am referring to the moment when Packer shoots himself in the hand, having tracked down Benno Levin—a man whose only power to threaten seems to be in the form of disembodied threats.

It seemed separate from the rest of him, pervertedly alive in its own little subplot. The fingers curled, middle finger twitching. He thought he could feel his pressure drop to shock level. Blood ran down both sides of the hand and a dark discoloration, a scorch mark, began to spread across the palm. (DeLillo Location 2518)

Packer demonstrates his own bodily permeability to the reader through this act of self-mutilation. He permanently loses his status as clean and whole. Examine his separation from his body, his loss of his sense of self in “pervertedly alive.” The blood is like menstrual blood, coming from a hole, “dark and discolor[ed]” and consider the menstrual blood of Kristeva, representing maternal abjection and infection from within. “A scorch mark” carries the feminine characteristics of the stained woman, the stained bodies of immigrants. Packer has stained himself, committing the cardinal sin of privilege by admitting his embodiment. In these ways DeLillo offers us an embodied cosmopolitan.
He takes the cultural archetypes of the immigrant body, with its fictionalized infectiousness and permeability, and he invests the body of a privileged cosmopolitan with the same vulnerability, the same permeability, and the same mortality as other human subjects. He reminds us that no man, not even the privileged one, can escape his body to become the law.

However, the narrative continues to mimic the concealment from which embodied cosmopolitans draw their power. As readers it is easy to forget that Eric Packer is not visible to the public eye in *Cosmopolis*. The entire novel takes place with Packer concealed in his limo, a location that is concealed within a sea of white limos: “his chief of security liked the car for its anonymity. Long white limousines had become the most unnoticed vehicles in the city” (location 106). Packer rarely leaves his limo, and when he does he moves with a purpose that does not invite approach. He spots his wife on the street and joins her, but she is powerless to recognize him, concealed as he is, surveying her but not surveyed in return. Indeed, the only thing that threatens Packer’s anonymity is himself. Unlike Rochester, whose attempts at concealment are thwarted by another, his brother-in-law through his hidden wife, Richard Mason, it is Packer who gives himself away. He tracks down his stalker, Levin, and reveals himself, demonstrating that Eric Packer is so well concealed he does not need to be disembodied to remain safe and powerful, he only needs the appearance of disembodiment. This appearance of disembodiment is exactly what the privileged cosmopolitan is accorded in transnational theory. Don DeLillo’s novel of globalization, transnational flows of capital, a cosmopolis, and a cosmopolitan are, sadly, the closest study we have of the privileged
cosmopolitan that transnational theorists sometimes gesture to but ultimately give into the pressure to elide.

**Section 5: Absence is Power and Presence is Plebian**

Having examined the absence of the cosmopolitan in transnational theory, and the ways this absence falls in line with empowered disembodiment, as well as the vanishing act of the privileged cosmopolitan in the Victorian period, and his tentative reemergence in the twenty-first century, I will conclude with the linking of this now established absence with the exercise of power, and its implications for transnational theory. As we have seen in the case of Mr. Rochester and Eric Packer, as well as elusive references to the privileged cosmopolitan, exercising power through absence (and therefore beyond the reach of surveillance) has become an efficient method of maintaining their privileged positions. We see it in Kristeva, and her implicit argument that the father rules by establishing himself as a symbol and as law, while the mother fails to rule because she has been cast as the physical body present and available for abjection through that presence. To be embodied is to be available for abjection, which is to say, available not for exile from the abjector, but assimilated into that person’s identity as an other against which he can begin to define himself by rejection. Any embodied person is available to perform this othered role, as can be seen in Foucault’s work on the prison system. As Foucault examines, the lower classes began to resent the elite because the punishments for certain crimes were lighter for those privileged subjects. “This was why these disadvantages became a political danger—the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the
invincibility of power” (63). This realization of visible social inequality led to unrest that had to be accounted for. “For the people who are there and observe, there is always, even in the most extreme vengeance of the sovereign a pretext for revenge” (61). On the other hand, if these inequalities were to pass unnoticed, through intentional obscuring, that unrest would no longer arise, in spite of continued inequality. Power exercised invisibly, then, is the easiest power to maintain in the sense that attention and surveillance are perpetually deflected away from those exercising power. If uprisings occur they can never be directed at an absent power, they must always direct themselves toward that which screens the absent rulers. Because of this misdirection uprisings must always fail. Similarly, because privileged figures like the cosmopolitan maintain their status through absence, analysts of border policies must always fail because they can only access half of the situation. To examine mass detainment at the borders without examining the exceptions that pass through is to fail to properly assess the borders.

In *Liquid Modernity* Zygmunt Bauman examines the transition from the visible powers of modernity, to the seemingly absent power structure that he attributes to post/liquid modernity. “Domination exists in one’s own capacity to escape, to disengage, to ‘be elsewhere’, and the right to decide the speed with which all that is done” (120). There is a careful interplay of movement and absence in this passage that speaks to the position of the privileged cosmopolitan. This cosmopolitan escapes, as do both Mr. Rochester through his trips to the continent and Eric through his jaunts into the city. Both exercise their right to disengage through this escape from social and personal responsibility. And does the privileged cosmopolitan not, in general, exercise a right to
escape engagement? He escapes stringent border policies as well as the surveillance those policies invite, and through this escape he disengages from the system, escapes beyond its ability to survey. “To ‘be elsewhere’” is the very definition of the cosmopolitan, who is always on the move, perpetually somewhere else. Packer is persistently elsewhere, to the point that most of his interactions with other people are a matter of chance. He runs into his wife, his employees, he approaches them, but these interactions are always his decision. He is perpetually in the position of revealing himself, and because of this beyond their reach. Likewise, the cosmopolitan commands the speed of his border crossing process, by Marciniak’s description. He is not subject to the INS, nor any other form of border policing. He determines his movement and the speed with which he moves.

For Bauman this “substitution of escape and elision for engagement and mutual commitment” (109) is the dominant mode of exercising power in a postmodern, increasingly globalized world. The elision of the privileged cosmopolitan as an embodied subject confirms this power structure, while Bauman’s theory of power and governance, alongside Kristeva’s theories of paternal power through symbolism, metaphor, and law, and Foucault’s discussion of the pitfalls of visible privilege offer a compelling argument for the willful disappearance of openly visible privilege in transnational theory. It also provides the reason why it is imperative that the privileged cosmopolitan become embodied within the discourse, that reason being that disappearance and elision has ceased to be a method of silencing the marginalized, and has become a way to conceal and maintain the privilege of the few.
Section 6: Conclusion

With the increasingly transnational makeup of the job market and human movement, it is impossible to continue ignore the disparity between privileged and unprivileged movement. To do so would be to participate in a willful ignorance of social inequality in a transnational context. One side of this inequality, that involving exorbitant citizens, is embodied through ongoing discussion within transnational thought. These subjects are viscerally present within the discourse, however, as demonstrated in this essay, their privileged counterpart has gone unseen. Not only has the privileged cosmopolitan remained unseen, but scholars approaching cosmopolitanism have willfully set him aside in favor of imagining the ideal cosmopolitan. While these euphoric versions of cosmopolitanism certainly have their place within discourse, it is important to acknowledge that many of these contemporary cosmopolitanisms are problematic both in imagining a democratization of cosmopolitanism on the horizon, and in their sometimes condescending approaches to democratizing cosmopolitanism. Further research on the disparity between the well traveled cosmopolitan and the transnational subject with a cosmopolitan outlook (as opposed to movement) is necessary in order to fully understand the ways in which democratized cosmopolitanism is still a watered-down dream compared to the free-range movement of a privileged cosmopolitanism. Meanwhile, this privileged cosmopolitanism must continued to be documented alongside the documentation of other social inequalities in transnational discourse, as must positions of privilege in general. This documentation must be enacted in order to level the playing field of embodiment, and render human subjects in general embodied and available for
criticism as they are, rather than extending the privilege of invisibility to some while others are discussed and embodied at great length. At this moment privileged cosmopolitanism exercises this right to invisibility within the discourse, and this imbalance must be rectified. In this essay I put forward the idea of privileged cosmopolitanism, its absence, power through absence, and the ways in which this absence manifests in a mid-century Victorian novel and a post-9/11 novel, but between these two works of literature is a range of other literature that undoubtedly gestures—if peripherally—to the disappearance of figures of privilege from social surveillance, although not from society. It is my belief that if a significant portion of transnational research were devoted to studying positions of privilege, and the disparity that currently exists between the privileged and the unprivileged, transnational discourse would have a greater chance of enacting the changes in outlook called for in current euphoric iterations of cosmopolitanism.
WORKS CITED


**Further Readings**


