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CALL IT COURAGE: THE EFFECTS OF PERSPECTIVE, HUMILITY, LOCUS OF CONTROL, AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY ON PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOLADE COURAGE IN MALE STUDENT AND MILITARY POPULATIONS

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CALL IT COURAGE: THE EFFECTS OF PERSPECTIVE, HUMILITY, LOCUS OF
CONTROL, AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY ON PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOLADE
COURAGE IN MALE STUDENT AND MILITARY POPULATIONS

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Abstract

Courage – despite millennia of contemplation – is only now seeing efforts at empirical study and definition. Recent studies have attempted to break down the component parts of courage, but do not address why courage appears to only be bestowed on others and rarely to oneself: a phenomenon known as courage blindness (Biswas-Deiner, 2012).

This paper examines how individuals attribute courage to themselves and how they attribute it to others. Male military personnel ($n = 86$) and male college students ($n = 106$) read 14 scenarios of varying courage, rating the courageousness of themselves or another person based on the action. Multiple ANOVAs were conducted for scenario courage ratings based on attribution perspective, military involvement, courage type, risk level, and nobility level; correlations with humility, locus of control and social desirability were also conducted. Results showed increased courage ratings when reporting for others rather than self, and lower ratings by military servicemen as compared to civilians. This indicates support for a courage blindness effect as well as a professional attitude separating military and civilian perceptions of courage.

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Call it Courage: The Effects of Perspective on Perceptions of Courage

On June 30th, 2011, Nazar Melis risked her life to save a two year old boy from a burning house (Parsons & Blunden, 2011). While driving by a house up in flames Melis heard a mother screaming. She parked her car, ran into the building and grabbed the child with no thought for her own personal safety. But Melis slipped away soon after, and the family and bystanders were left wondering who exactly this mystery woman was and clamored for a commendation or at least some kind of recognition for her bravery. After a few days she was identified, and when asked about her courageous act, she claimed that she “didn't really think for a second - I just ran in there, got the baby and ran back out” (Parsons & Blunden, 2011) This act of courage serves as an excellent example, and exhibits some key behaviors of both the actors and observers of courageous acts.

Courage is a noble virtue, one particularly celebrated on the battlefield or in times of moral crisis (Rorty, 1988). Why, then, does it seem that those labeled as courageous either downplay or do not wish to call attention to those acts? Anecdotal accounts suggest that people readily label others as courageous, but rarely do the same for themselves. United States Air Force Staff Sgt. Salvatore Giunta, a recent Medal of Honor recipient who risked his own life to save a fellow soldier from being taken captive by Taliban militants, follows this notion. In a 2010 interview, Giunta reveals that “everything kind of slowed down and [he] did everything [he] thought [he] could do, nothing more and nothing less (Shane & Harris, 2010). He also gives credit to his comrades: “I wasn't the only one there that night. They were all doing their jobs. As we're talking right now, there are people deployed, fighting for their nation. This dismissal of incredible behavior

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is referred to as *courage-blindness* (Biswas-Deiner, 2012). But why might people do this? This question has gone unanswered, but there are some possibilities for its occurrence. It could be an element of humility involved in courage and a potentially false or insincere version at that. There could be an inherent difference between calling oneself and naming others courageous, where “people often see their own actions as so unavoidable, so natural, so correct, that they miss the basic fact that their actions are extraordinary” (Biswas-Deiner, 2010). A final possible explanation appears to lie in the attributional nature of accolade courage.

Despite its consideration by philosophers for thousands of years, courage has only recently begun to see empirical validation and structured study. In this renewed exploratory stage of research, psychologists now delve into the fundamental aspects of courage. Some, like Norton and Weiss (2009) consider courage in sparse, behavioral terms: overcoming one’s fears. However, this view seems inadequate. Simply overcoming fear alone cannot adequately explain why courage is considered a virtue. What is the rationale behind overcoming that fear? What motivations are there for ignoring or surpassing inhibition? It seems that overcoming one’s fear cannot by itself define courage, but rather reduces it to something less valuable socially, such as risk-taking. One study by Muris (2009), found a high correlation between a children’s version of the Norton & Weiss scale and sensation seeking. This study revealed that when courage is defined with only standing up to fear, courage is more directly related to risk-taking. But risk is not the only component of courage.

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Rate, Clarke, Lindsay, and Sternberg (2007), in an attempt to understand the general definitional conception of courage, conducted a study to ascertain the fundamental parts which make up courage. A sample composed of both Air Force Academy cadets and Yale undergraduates revealed participants' own definitions, when compared to one another and ranked, fell into distinct dimensions. Their operationalization of courage sometimes includes fear, but also considers intentionality, risk, and noble purpose as requisites for courage. This definition indicates that there is more to courage than simply overcoming fear, as suggested by the behaviorist viewpoint. An individual might be afraid of snakes, but if that individual is offered a thousand dollars to hold a snake despite his fear, the element of courage suddenly diminishes. Similarly, the fellows on MTV's Jackass are admittedly performing risky actions, but they seem to be less noble and falling short of the label of courageous. For an act to be labeled as courageous, the actor must have some meaningful purpose in mind.

Courage can take many forms, so it is important to determine whether it should be operationalized as a course of action which people use in their own daily lives for overcoming hazards or as a rare and celebrated occurrence. Pury and Starkey (2010) described these two views as processes and accolades respectively. Put more simply, process courage is overcoming a personal sense of risk or discomfort while accolade courage is the attribution of the label "courage" to an action taken by the self or, more commonly, by others. The Pury and Starkey analysis of the 2007 Rate et al. study recognized the participant-derived definition as best representing the accolade model. One reason for this separation is that courage as an accolade calls into question the role of

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fear. Rate et al. (2007) suggest that fear may or may not be necessary for describing or recognizing courage, and a later study by Rate (2010) removes this element from the definitional requirements entirely. McGurk and Castro (2010) propose that courage is not dependent on fear or the lack thereof, in the specific context of the battlefield during war. Rather, it is being aware of the situation and reacting despite unfavorable or potentially dangerous knowledge. Courage as a process, particularly when considered in the context of psychotherapy, almost requires that fear be present. When Norton and Weiss (2009) asked undergrads to face their fear of spiders, they measured success in terms of overcoming fear. The process of being courageous for their participants involved facing and conquering their distress, but it seems lacking when contemplating exemplary acts of bravery.

The accolade conception of courage embraces these infrequent, extreme acts. The rarity of accolade courage gives insight into how individuals perform exceptionally, and how the world exalts these rare actions. Oftentimes, these acts of courage are recognized and rewarded. Many commendations and awards for courage all have similar criteria (e.g., Lifesavers Award, Royal Humane Society, 2008; Anne Frank Award for Moral Courage, Anne Frank Awards, 2011; Godfrey Philips Bravery Award, Godfrey Philips, 2011). For example, the Lifesavers Award considers “degree of risk, duration of risk, choice to act, persistence, advance warning, and impact of physical surroundings” and the Anne Frank Award for Moral Courage looks for “people who have used respect, integrity, responsibility or a commitment to social justice to really change things for the better” along with “determination to stand up for what is right”. The idea that courage is

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an accolade is closely tied with the celebration of courageous acts. When courage is praised, society indicates that something good or beneficial has occurred, and similar acts would be welcomed. With regard to Norton and Weiss (2009) on individual levels, overcoming disproportionate or irrational fears certainly has merit, but from a societal and moral standpoint, that conception of courage does not seem quite so worthy of praise. The admiration of things good implies a moral component to courage; judgment and celebration of bravery result from the act being worthy of praise. It also adds a scale component: smaller acts of courage seem to be less noteworthy.

A qualitative analysis of Carnegie Medal recipients – awarded for altruistic, civilian heroism – indicates that the reasons many courageous actors give for their deeds are socially based and not based on overcoming fear (Oliner, 2009). That someone might enter a burning building for the sake of overcoming fear seems foolish at best. These heroics can easily be labeled as courageous if only overcoming fear is considered and point to the inadequacy of the Norton and Weiss definition. Seventy-eight percent of those interviewed cited learned beliefs and values as a driving force behind their actions, while 66 percent mentioned social responsibility. In the heat of the moment, these heroes did not consider their own fear but rather their responsibility to their fellow man and the ethical guidelines by which they had been brought up. Those in professions of service and safety must acknowledge this every day.

For many professions, courage is an integral component. Service and protection oriented occupations, such as police officers, firefighters, and members of the armed forces recognize that they may be called upon to rush into danger at a moment's notice.

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Diving deeper into the elements of accolade courage will grant a deeper understanding of the virtue of courage, and hopefully explain why the courageous dismiss while society celebrates. It can help explain why Giunta and Melis don't consider themselves heroes, but rather only as people doing their duty or what felt right. At the same time, the desire of others to elevate and reward their acts can be explored.

Literature Review

Courage

Originally a philosophical undertaking, the concept of courage was first studied in depth by Aristotle (trans. 1985) and his writings on virtue ethics. In an analysis of Aristotle's ideas, Daniel Putman (2010) makes an excellent case for considerations of courage and its qualities as it was first understood. For the ancient Greeks, courage fell between two extremes: rashness and cowardice. The happy medium of these two actions is courage. Where a coward would run away from or avoid menace, a courageous person would not. Rashness does involve facing danger, but in a foolhardy and careless way. To act out in either extreme would be considered a vice. Courage falls between both of these poles: facing fear for the right reasons, which is a vague definition at best. Aristotle also wrote of acts that look courageous, but are not. These erroneous acts have confounds of overconfidence, instinct, fear, and ignorance. If courage can be faked or misconstrued in these fashions, then certainly there is some merit in uncovering and presenting a model of courage (Rate, 2010).

Much of the focus on courage since Aristotle's definition has been extremely directed onto acts of overcoming physical danger for some kind of noble goal (Putman,

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2010) such as running into a burning house to grab a child, diving on a grenade to save comrades, or jumping into a flooded river to assist a drowning victim. Yet courage is not defined strictly by bodily acts of valor (Putman, 2010; Rate, 2010).

While the previous examples exude physical courage, contemporary courage research has provided some other brands of courage. Moral courage is standing up for what is right, despite possible social condemnation (Lopez, O’Byrne, & Peterson, 2003). Acts of moral courage can take great audacity, though they may be more passive in nature. Rosa Parks’ refusal of her bus seat as a symbol of civil disobedience is a prime example of moral courage: by sitting down she stood up for herself, despite great physical and social risk. Another more recently defined type of courage is psychological courage, or possessing mental fortitude when confronted with physical and/or mental illness (Putman, 2010). From an accolade perspective, this determination of what is right is made by the observer, rather than the actor though the two may not necessarily be different in their determinations. It is the observer who bestows awards and recognition, and it is the observer who either ostracizes or celebrates an act against injustice.

Some process courage research places an emphasis on fear and one’s reaction to it. This distinction from accolade courage is important to note. The Norton and Weiss study (2009) is one such example of considering only fear and the behavioral response to threatening stimuli. Rachman’s 1990 book on fear and courage directly addresses courage in only two of its chapters, and then only as a model where the behavioral component of fear is not present. A World War Two study on United States Air Force pilots focused on the role of fear during combat missions, but did note some determinates of courage:

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confidence, morale, keeping busy and social stimulation (Shaffer, 1947). The problem with considering only fear is that it reduces the notion of courage to nothing more than a form of risk-taking, where one does something they fear because it will be good for them. However, it is much easier to collect biophysical data on fear. There are clear physical responses to stressful stimuli (Lang, 1978; Rachman, 1990; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002), and while limiting the effects of fear is certainly an admirable and effective goal, it does nothing to explain the cognitive processes by which people “decide” to be courageous. This decision making process fits well into the freely chosen intentionality component of Rate’s model (2010) as acts of courage by definition are performed with purpose and intent, but do not require fear.

Courage is obviously present in society and has been noted for thousands of years, as made evident by Aristotle, but the origins and causes of courage blindness have yet to be fully addressed. Courage serves well as an example of moral goodness, so from where does this apparent discrepancy between people’s own account of their courageous action and the assessment of others come? Five possible mechanisms are proposed to play some part in these differences. (1) The nature of courage as an accolade. (2) Varying locus of control. (3) The distinction between actors and observers and its inherent bias. (4) The influence of humility and social desirability. (5) Involvement in a professional culture such as the military.

The nature of courage as an accolade points to a process of socially beneficial behavior serving as an example to others. By rewarding those who act valiantly, the behavior is encouraged. But because the actor puts himself at risk while observers and

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those awarding citations of bravery do not, there appears to be fundamental difference between a self-induced courage-blindness and the courage-focus of observers. Because of the inherent risk of courageous acts, encouraging individuals to perform them is good for the society, but potentially dangerous for the individual. As a result, the individual may seek to downplay the act to avoid considering the danger he escaped. The attribution of courage from others can only include what is seen, heard and felt, but does not include the subjective experience of performing the act itself. Additionally, there might be discrepancies on the value of the goal between actor and observer, leading to inflation on behalf of the latter. Pury and Kowalski (2007) found that many of the attributes associated with courage (e.g. vitality, leadership) were associated more so with a general courage – an act which would be courageous for *any* person – rather than personalized accounts of courage. This would suggest a relationship between those acting and those watching, the former coupled with personalized accounts and the latter with general courage. An intense goal-focus, as is required by courageous actors, may lessen awareness of the risk at hand. Downplay could result from a desire to acknowledge the lack of intense feelings of fear or risk because. There could also likely be elements of humility and social desirability present, where an accurate self-perception or craving for approval might influence perception of courage. Finally, the nature of one's work culture might also influence how the individual and outsiders qualify courageous acts, particularly if courageous acts are expected by that profession.

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The nature of courage as an accolade must first be explored to understand why these differences exist, in terms of attributing courage, humility, and expectations of certain professions.

Courage as an Accolade

Morality shares much in common among different parts of the world; it appears to have some fundamental similarities between peoples. Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt, 2005) looks at five fundamental moral values shared between cultures. These values are care, fairness, loyalty, respect, and purity. Because all cultures share these values to an extent, there appears to be some common denominator of morality. This commonality is important, because it indicates that there is a natural inclination that different peoples share. Different values may be more or less important to certain cultures and religions (or even political denominations, see Haidt & Graham, 2007) but these five values are fundamentally incorporated in all cultures. For example, most cultures consider unprovoked and thoughtless killing of individuals a crime; there is something inherently wrong about murder that is recognized by all societies. Yet, saving lives appears to be universally celebrated, as are the values of courage (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005; Rorty, 1988). The accolade approach to courage includes the socialization process as it takes place. When people hear of or witness a courageous act, these behaviors are encouraged because they have been deemed admirable and desirable.

According to Pury and Starkey (2010) the accolade model of courage, “looks at courage from the outside in...directs us to study rare and extreme acts ... [and] studies the behavior of praising an action” (p. 85). It is the rare and notable deeds which garner

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the most attention, as they further inspire action themselves. When these acts are celebrated, there is intent to inspire others to do the same, because society has deemed there is value in that type of behavior. However, simply going out seeking courageous opportunities, or even creating them oneself serves to deteriorate the noble goal necessary for courage; consider a person who starts a large fire and lets it burn solely so that he might put it out later to be celebrated as a hero. As a result, the act must also be seemingly organic. Because of this need for a natural occurring act instead of a manufactured one, awards typically have several requirements which must be met before they can be distributed (Lifesavers Award, Royal Humane Society, 2008; Anne Frank Award for Moral Courage, Anne Frank Awards, 2011, etc;). For example, the United States Medal of Honor is awarded for “Conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against any enemy of the United States;” and rarely at that (Congressional Medal of Honor Society, 2011). It is the highest military decoration in the United States Armed Forces, the only accolade worn around the neck and bestowed by the President of the United States. With so much pomp and recognition, it is clear that battlefield courage is desired. The honor associated with the accolade is made even more so by the likelihood of a posthumous award; more than half of the medal winners have died during the events which won them accolades since 1941 (Pullen, 1997).

The nature of accolades ties into the moral sensibilities of a community, and society wants and needs courageous actors. Because of this moral imperative, courageous action serves as a beacon and example for others, but that only addresses an altruistic

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notion on the part of the actors. It acknowledges that the public sees, understands, and praises acts of bravery. It does not explain how that process comes about. Courage's accolade nature is crucial for identifying the noble causes and social aspects of courage, but is also useful for examining how others assess and ascribe worth to a courageous actor. Award givers and witnesses see worth in praising the courageous, but are unable to read minds. Somehow, they must attribute acts and characteristics to those they see perform great acts of bravery.

Actor Observer Bias

Because an individual can only know with certainty what they themselves were thinking, it is important to understand how others assume causes to both events and the behaviors of others. First published by Fritz Heider (1958), the theory of attribution concerns this very issue. That people must use their own observations and perceptions to determine the rationale behind the behaviors of others assures that only guesses can be made. Still, the explanatory attribution makes an attempt to explain the thought processes behind attributing intent to a particular act. It does so by separating the explanations of behaviors into two separate categories of internal and external attributions. Internal, or personal, attributions are derived from the conception of the target's characteristics, abilities and moods. For example, the person might do something because they are kind, skilled, depressed or so forth. External, or situational, attributions assume that a cause stems from the environment or the task itself. These attributions have less to do with the person involved than the situation in which the person is involved. Even if people can only make inferences about why someone acted in a particular way, they still have the

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power to deem someone courageous or not. There is a difference between a courageous act and a courageous actor (Rachman, 2010). The act itself can be performed by any person in a given situation provided they are present; a courageous actor is one who acts courageously in multiple situations on a regular basis, as in the case of firefighters. In observing and contemplating the reasons for a courageous act, the observer can decide whether or not courage was present, citing both internal and external reasons. At the same time, in the mind of a courageous actor, the scenario may have played out differently, and they may not consider themselves courageous. Possibly, they may focus more on the external factors of the situation at hand as Oliner's (2009) interviews suggested, than their own abilities or disposition. That courageous actors often perform courageous acts might also dull their sensitivity to the act; for them it is rote. However, others do not make the distinction between act and actor, calling firefighters, police, and soldiers heroes at every opportunity.

Correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1967) examines how people make attributions of intent solely about the person involved, and attempts to understand whether the effects of an action were intended. In order to consider an action intentional, three requirements must be met. The actor must be aware of the consequences of the action, possess the ability to perform the action, and intend to perform the action, and these components must be assessed by the observer. There is both a notion of "I'm thinking what you're thinking", as well as a tendency to misattribute the intention. Intentionality is a key part of Rate's (2010) model of courage, and Jones and Davis suggest a compatible model of other-based perception of intentionality. The goal of

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correspondent inference theory is to account for how perceivers infer from an action they observed; in the case of a courageous act, it could be used to decipher all three of Rate's requirements. A witness easily could make assessments based on whether or not the cause was noble or noteworthy and see the risk involved but intentionality would require additional assessment as outlined above. If a bystander sees the courageous act through to completion, then the observer can say with certainty that the actor had the required ability and intent. If a courageous actor is unaware of the consequences of the action, then he lacks intentionality, but this judgment the witness must make alone.

Because attributions made can only be based on one's own perception, the position a scenario is witnessed from is incredibly important. It stands to reason that there will be a difference in how first and third person observers might react to the same event, as they cannot share the same perceptions. For those directly involved in a courageous act, the event is personal and risky. The actor could have an emphasis on the external situation, claiming that it was simply the situation he was thrust into that resulted in his actions. For those who are indirectly witnessing the act, it is a moral exemplar worthy of praise. Because courage is celebrated, the attribution would focus on the internal attributes of the actor, despite having no insight into the actor's mind.

Because of the distinct differences in mental perspective for actors and observers, there is likely to be some kind effect of perspective on ratings of courage which can help explain the courage blindness problem. One explanation for this was Jones and Nisbett's (1971) actor/observer asymmetry theory, which suggested each role would have a different explanation for a particular scenario. Actors tend to provide a situational

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explanation, while observers would propose it was because of the actor's character traits.

A meta-analysis by Malle (2006) showed that there was no distinct separation of attributions by these parameters for intended or rote behaviors, and that the traditional dichotomy of situational and dispositional explanations is potentially fatally flawed.

However, this only refers to behaviors and typical situations. Idiosyncratic behaviors and exceptional situations could still be subject to this formulation (Malle, 2006) which would include acts of great courage.

The essence of the Actor/Observer asymmetry is the distinct and separate perceptions and reactions of the actors and observers. Accolade courage can be affected by this dichotomy because by its nature it requires extraordinary acts. From the courageous actor perspective, courage ratings should decrease because what the act means about themselves or what they thought at the time is less important to those individuals. The actor did what the situation demanded. From the observing, external angle, courage ratings should be increased, because there is social advantage to celebrating courage. Furthermore, their perspective does not allow insight into the actor's mind, so they might attribute more courage than the actor might have felt. The observer sees an extraordinary person. Neither the actor nor observer is correct, but rather each sees from his own perspective and responds to inquiries from this mindset.

How an individual perceives their own control over their life may also be an important factor. The concept of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) looks at how people interpret events that occur. An individual with a high internal locus of control believes that they have power over things that happen to them. For example, a poor test score

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would be a result of poor preparation for that test. The end result is attributable to something that they have control over, that is, their study habits. An individual with an external locus of control believes that outside influences, such as the environment or chance, control events. These individuals would blame their poor test score on the teacher or questions being too difficult. This is important to consider, as locus of control might affect how individuals consider a situation requiring courage. An individual with high internal locus of control may view a courageous individual as acting of their own volition and against their better self-interest. An external locus might consider a courageous act solely as being in the right place at the right time, or being destined for the act, thereby downplaying its value. For this reason, it is suggested that those with an internal locus of control will more easily identify with courageous acts, and in turn rate them higher.

H1: Compared to other-attributional focus, scenarios with self-attributional focus will have decreased ratings of courage.

H2: Participants with greater internal locus of control will have higher ratings of courage.

Humility

Like courage, humility is also a celebrated but scarcely researched virtue. This similarity seems to arise from not from scarcity, as momentous acts of accolade courage often are, but rather a lack of consensus on what it means to be humble and the difficulties inherent to measuring humility (Kachorek et al., 2004; Tangney, 2000). Humility embodies a wide range of difficult to capture behaviors, and has several different definitions, including negative perspectives. Tangney (2000) challenged the

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negative associations paired with the term – namely weakness, passivity, humiliation, and shame – and presented a coherent view of humility which espouses it as a virtue.

Humility, like courage, falls between two extreme poles: those of narcissism and self-loathing. Tangney's support for virtue status focuses first on what humility is not – it is not narcissism, arrogance, low self-esteem, or intentional underestimation – and the indirect evidence for its psychological, social, and physical benefits.

Tangney's 2000 review of the humility literature listed the key components of humility. These components include: an accurate sense of one's abilities (not underrated); ability to acknowledge shortcomings, mistakes, and ignorance; openness; keeping abilities in perspective; a lower focus on self; and wide appreciation for all things and all contributions. Other-focused behavior and accurate self-assessment seem to be involved with the downplaying of risk inherent to courageous acts; wide appreciation and diverted self-focus may also contribute to the noble cause involved in courage, as well as provide a reason of intent. Furthermore, because so many situations of courage involve scarce or uncommon behaviors, perhaps the accurate sense of ability is used to prevent dwelling on the risk that was involved. It is also possible that knowing one's own aptitude provided the rationale for acting in the first place (e.g. I am capable of acting, therefore I must act). Kachorek et al. (2004) stress the importance of the willingness toward accurate self-assessment and proper perspective of one's own ability. Others suggest that humility involves a world view beyond the self, a broader perspective (Murray, 2001; Tangney, 2000). Humble individuals recognize that they are relatively insignificant in a grand scheme or compared to a higher power, and this pairs well with the Oliner (2009)

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interviews which revealed significant percentages of courageous actors attributing their behaviors to higher callings, either religious or humanitarian.

Humility researchers have had difficulty establishing scales which adequately measure humility while meeting acceptable levels of validity or reliability (Exline, 2008; Tangney, 2000). The lack of a consensus definition and difficulty measuring this social concept has hindered its operationalization. For one, self-report techniques tend to result in low internal consistency because there are diverging opinions about what humility actually means in the population. Tangney suggests that humility should not be shoehorned into a single dimension, particularly because it is so often defined as being the absence of an action. Social desirability is another issue with this type of measure. The idea of measuring a humble person brings up an interesting paradox. How can a humble person accurately respond that he or she is humble? The humility will manifest itself as rating oneself lower than they truly are, thereby bring their score down lower than is actual. Landrum's (2002) study proposes that there is a positive correlation between self-reported humility and social desirability. The other issue involves non-humble people rating themselves much higher than is actually the case. Furthermore, in issues of morality, people tend to talk themselves up (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989). As humility is a moral issue, there could easily be some upward skewing when asking participants to report this virtue.

Despite these difficulties, a recently published 32-item humility self-report scale (Elliot, 2010) has shown promising results. The scale attempts to separate humility into as many component parts as possible. These scale sections include: openness, self-

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forgetfulness, modest self-assessment, and focus on others. By looking at the different pieces which make up humility, the scale enhances its divergent validity and increases its internal consistency between scale items.

People tend to talk themselves up, rather than be self-deprecating (Myers, 2000; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and also self-enhance in moral domains more often than intellectual domains (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989). Why then does it appear the courageous balk at acknowledgment of their desirable deed? Humility and courage intuitively appear to be related in more significant ways than being virtues. The limited acknowledgment of one's own courageous acts may be tied to humility, while observers have no problem bestowing lavish praise on others for bravery. Humility's accurate self-assessment may account for the dismissal of accomplishments performed by courageous actors.

H3: Humility will be positively correlated with courage self-ratings.

H4: Social desirability will be positively correlated with courage self-ratings.

H5: Social desirability will be positively correlated with the distance between self and other ratings.

Professional Expectations

Franco, Blau and Zimbardo (2011) propose two distinctions regarding heroism, separating out heroic acts involving physical peril and social acts of sacrifice. These are similar to the concepts of physical and civil/psychological courage respectively. The authors also seek to further distinguish the physically dangerous heroic acts by separating out those specialized courageous actors who are required by their code and profession to

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face risk from those everyday folk who are thrust into extraordinary situations. It is these “duty-bound, physical risk heroes” (p. 100) and the professional communities from which they come – the military, police, and firefighters, for example – which account for a large part of the notion of courage.

In a professional culture such as the military, which places great emphasis on honor and is typically held in high esteem by the public, there is an expectation for certain types of behavior. That is to say, those in the military are supposed to be courageous by the very nature of the job, and the organization purports that value (Wynne, 2006). An average citizen will see the noble cause of the armed forces and the risks they undertake as exceptional. As such, there should be an expectation from those outside the organization of great courage which could manifest itself as celebratory. Meanwhile, those inside the organization are held to the expectation of courage and become desensitized to it. For them, it is simply “all in a day’s work”. This could result in lowered ratings of courage for themselves. At the same time, military members are familiar with what courage requires and should readily be able to recognize it in others. They could be considered “experts” in courage, potentially leading to increased acknowledgment of courageous action by others.

Soldiers are also required to focus intensely on their goals, because of the high cost of failure. This focus could negate the effects of fear. Kruglanski et al’s (2002) Goal Systems Theory proposes that, in general, actors have two types of goals in mind when undertaking action: prevention goals, where the actor seeks to prevent something from happening and promotion goals where the actor works to make something happen. Most

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physical and courageous acts appear to be prevention oriented goals – to prevent something bad from happening (Pury et al., 2007). As more attention is paid to the noble goal, fear and anxiety would receive less mental attention. After a successful courageous action, the actor could remember back to the event and recall only their focus but not any fear. Anecdotal evidence suggests (Oliner, 2009) that in putting all but the goal out of the mind, the actor could consider himself as having instinctively acted or “just doing what anyone would do.” Of course, this is not true as courage requires exceptional actions, but this phenomenon could also account for lower self-ratings of courage if courageous actors do not remember enough to acknowledge their feats. Finally, it is proposed that military service will increase understanding of courage, making it easier for military members to discern and report courage acted upon by others.

H6a: Military service will decrease self-ratings of courage.

H6b: Military service will increase other-ratings of courage.

Napoleon cynically claimed that “a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon” suggesting that these accolades are ultimately meaningless. Yet, often the soldier does not claim to have been seeking a ribbon or reward, nor are these brave acts limited to the battlefield. Drowning people live, bullies are stood up to, and social wrongs are righted. Are these courage accolades simply to improve fighting ability, or do they mean something more?

Courage has been difficult to shape into a cohesive model, despite being a desired social action. This is because its very nature makes courageous behaviors rare, at least those which draw accolade attention from others. Obviously participants cannot be forced

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into dangerous situations for sake of measuring and examining their reactions, but by having individuals contemplate the nature of courage and mentally placing themselves into these situations, we discover why people see courage as so admirable in others, but prefer not to crown themselves with glory. If there is a cultural reason for celebrating acts of courage, and there is a distinction between praising others and avoiding praise for oneself then looking more closely at how people understand courage will reveal it.

Method

Participants

Research participants came from both military and civilian student backgrounds. Military enlisted and officer personnel from various Clemson area recruiting stations, Clemson Veteran's group members, and senior ROTC cadets made up the military sample ($n=86$). To assist in protecting anonymity, an age range was used for these participants rather than exact values. As can be seen in Figure 1, the plurality of military participants was between ages 18 and 24. The civilian sample consisted of Clemson University students from the psychology pool ($n=106$; mean age=19.7). A power analysis for multiple analyses of variance (ANOVAs), based on an α of .05, a $1 - \beta$ of .8, and an estimated effect size of .25, determined that the study requires 179 participants. Power analyses for point-biserial correlations based on the same parameters require 95 participants.

Because of gender difference concerns, only male participants were used in this study. Were both men and women to provide data, there would have been trouble separating out how individuals would perceive the characters between the character

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scenarios and the imagine-self scenarios. Scenarios had only male protagonists.

Furthermore, this helped minimize the number of experimental factors, simplifying data collection and analysis. This does raise questions of whether men or women receive higher ratings by virtue of the actor being a man or women (i.e. are men in general considered to be more courageous, simply because they are men?), this approach will allow for consistency and a simpler analysis.

Both the military and civilian samples were predominantly white. The military sample consisted of 87% white participants, while the civilian sample consisted of 82% white participants. The civilian sample, due to its restriction to college participants, had a consistent educational level of some college for nearly all participants. Only one civilian participant had a Master's degree. The military sample was more varied: 58.1% of the sample had at least a college degree, with 24.4% having obtained a Master's degree in some field. The student sample had only one participant with prior military experience; his data was moved to the military sample and he was included in the n of 86 for that sample. Military rank was split fairly evenly. 47.1% of respondents were cadets or enlisted. The remaining 52.9% were officers. More demographic information on the military sample can be seen in Table 1.

Design

Scenarios were based off of three courage types (physical, moral, and psychological), two attribution focuses (self and other), two nobility levels (high and low), and two risk levels (high and low) between two sample groups (student and military). Four scenarios of each type were created, to look for any potential differences

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between these courage types. Because accolade courage is most typically associated with physical courage, an extra scenario for both the high nobility/high risk and low nobility/low risk condition was added, bringing the total number of scenarios to 14. Scenarios were then altered to fit into the attribution focus. Self-scenarios used first-person perspective and ask the participant to imagine themselves in the situation; other-scenarios used third-person perspective with male protagonists. The same 28 scenarios were used in both the student and military populations. Participants were randomly assigned either the self or other condition for each scenario as they progressed through the survey. This process was not perfect due to the surveying software; as a result, the number of responses to each survey varied slightly from scenario to scenario. Reported degrees of freedom in the Results section will reflect these differences. Additionally, the scenario orders were randomized to help mitigate priming effects. Table 2 shows each of these scenario factors.

Materials

First, demographic data was collected from the participants. The demographic questionnaire (Appendix A) included basic questions concerning age, ethnicity, and educational level. It also addressed the question of previous employment in professions which require physical courage, such as the military, law enforcement, and fire-fighting. Time spent in these professions, as well as time spent deployed and rank achieved was also requested.

Because there are no previous methods of measuring the effect of attribution on courage, stories of courage were created. Scenarios are varied across types of courage

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(Putnam, 2010), degree of risk (Rate, 2010), and nobility (Rate, 2010) to allow for a wide range of the different aspects of courage. These stories are to be considered from both a self and other perspective to assess potential actor/observer bias while assessing the multiple combinations of risk, nobility, and type. Questions regarding risk, meaning and goodness were also included to look at the component parts of courage as established by Rate (2010). This was done to ensure consistency between the scenarios (e.g. high risk scenarios should see higher risk ratings) and potentially reveal differences between the two sample groups.

Additionally, Elliot's 2010 humility scale was used to measure the relative differences in humility between participants. This scale has 32 items and incorporates a number of different elements. Although it is new and has little outside replication, Elliot's scale shows particularly good reliability for humility, which has a history of being difficult to assess (Tangney, 2000). Elliot (2010) reported a Cronbach's alpha of .842. This measure allows examination of whether a link between humble self-assessment and how that person attributes courage to others exists. Elliot separated items into four factors: openness ($\alpha=.60$), self-forgetfulness ($\alpha=.64$), modest self-assessment ($\alpha=.63$), and focus on others ($\alpha=.37$). While these factors are on the low end, the nebulous nature of humility makes the first three acceptable. The focus-on-others factor is low, but it was also most consistently associated with related factors. All four categories were shown to be distinct from other similar measures of empathy, psychological well-being, and mindfulness, while opposite of measures involving narcissism.

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Crowne and Marlowe's social desirability scale (1960) was used to measure the degree to which people desire to please others in social situations. High scores reflect a greater emphasis for a participant wishing to achieve social goals such as wanting others to like them. This scale is included to ensure that participants are not giving favorable answers solely to portray themselves positively. Internal consistency was rated at .88 (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), while test-retest reliability was acceptable at .86 (Crino, Svoboda, Rubinfeld, & White, 1983).

Rotter's (1966) locus of control scale was used to measure participants' feelings of control over events that affect them. High scores reflect an external locus, meaning that outside forces do more to affect events than anything they can do themselves. Low scores reflect an internal locus. These individuals believe that events occur because of their own behavior and that they can impact events that include them. Internal consistency of the scale was acceptable, calculated at .79 (Spector, 1988). Test-retest reliability of the scale was found to be adequate at .83 (Rotter, 1966).

Procedure

Participants were asked to both read about other people in and imagine themselves in various scenarios of courage (Appendix B), and then answer a series of questions (Appendix C) regarding how courageous they think the actor was and why. The shift in perspective allowed for different attributional approaches of internal and external assessments. Both perspectives were randomly assigned throughout the survey, so as not to prime the participant to thinking about courage in one respect or another. Participants also took Elliot's (2010) humility scale (Appendix D), Crowne and Marlowe's (1960)

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social desirability scale (Appendix E) and Rotter's (1966) locus of control scale (Appendix F). Sample items for Elliot's scale include: "When I get in trouble, it is important to me to be able to explain what happened" (openness), "It frustrates me, when others are praised and I am not" (self-forgetfulness), "I often wish I were as talented as my peers" (modest self-assessment), and "I am deeply touched when others sacrifice for me" (focus on others). "I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble" is a sample item from Crowne and Marlowe's scale. A sample item from Rotter's scale asks, "Which statement do you agree with more? A. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. or B. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make."

After collecting basic demographic information, participants were asked to read some brief scenarios about courageous situations. For each scenario, participants were asked to either imagine themselves as the protagonist of the stories or to assess the courage of a third party protagonist of the stories, while paying careful attention to the actions taken, the reasons for doing so, potential dangers, and outcomes. Participants were then asked to rate how courageous they thought the protagonist was in the situation on a 10 point Likert scale (0 = not at all and 9 = as much as I can imagine), along with a series of questions regarding the story and assessments of courage. This approach allowed for different attributional perspectives for each participant, both internal and external. Participants imagining themselves in situations acted as the self-oriented/internal attribution condition while participants assessing others' courageous

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scenarios rated the other-oriented/external attribution condition. Finally, participants completed the social desirability, locus of control and humility scales.

Data Analysis

Following data collection, a number of analyses were conducted. First, descriptive statistics were collected for the participants, to examine mean ages, education, ethnicity and military experience. Data was sorted and split in order to look more closely at the various factors present within the scenarios; scores were compiled and categorized by courage type, risk level, and nobility level in addition to the original responses. Second, correlations were conducted for the additional scales of humility, social desirability and locus of control, where they were compared to the ratings given by. Scores were then compared between the military and civilian samples, to see if ratings were significantly different between the two. Correlations were run on the scenario ratings for courage, risk, meaning and goodness, and compared amongst themselves and the outside measures to look for potential relationships. Multiple ANOVAs were conducted to look at the between-participants variable of sample (military or civilian) and the within groups differences of attribution (self or other perspective) in addition to the various factors of courage type, nobility level and risk level. Additional post-hoc tests were conducted for results indicating relationships.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Means and standard deviations were within reported norms for the humility, social desirability, and locus of control scales. See Table 3 for means, standard deviations

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and coefficient alphas for each scale. Note particularly the extremely low alpha for the humility scale, suggesting it is a weak measure in terms of reliability. Table 4 contains means and standard deviations for all scenario questions (Appendix C): courage and courage type ratings, as well as ratings for risk, goodness, meaning and ease of imagining both self and others. Additionally, normality and heteroscedasticity were both measured, and were found to meet assumptions.

Courage Components

To assess the effectiveness of the scenarios, manipulation checks were included in the participant survey. Based on Rate's (2010) definition, scenarios were also rated on risk, meaningfulness, and goodness. Correlations were conducted between these ratings (see Table 7) Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 4. As Rate's definition suggests, each of these components was a strong predictor of courage.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted for each of the courage components, where sample (military versus civilian) and attribution (self versus other) were tested using participant ratings. For risk, a significant main effect was found ($F(1,190) = 6.43, p = .01$; see Figure 3), showing civilians rating scenarios as more risky than the military. Both attribution ($F(1,190) = .16, p = .69$) and an attribution by sample interaction ($F(1,190) = .30, p = .58$) had no significant results.

Goodness was significant for a sample by attribution interaction effect ($F(1,190) = 4.43, p = .036$; see Figure 4) such that civilians rated goodness higher for scenarios describing themselves, while military participants rated goodness higher for scenarios describing others compared to scenarios describing themselves. Both sample ($F(1,190) =$

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1.99, $p = .16$) and attribution ($F(1,190) = .73, p = .39$) were nonsignificant for goodness ratings.

Meaningfulness saw no significant main effects (maximum $F(1,190) = .617, p = .43$) or interaction (maximum $F(1,190) = 1.64, p = .2$).

Locus of Control

Combining both samples, locus of control had no significant correlations. There was no significant relationship with courage ($r = -.022; n = 189; p = .76$). Correlations with additional scenario question ratings of risk, goodness, and meaningfulness were not significant (maximum $r = -.076; n = 189; p = .30$), nor was locus significantly correlated with the various types of courage (maximum $r = -.115; n = 189; p = .12$). When inspecting the difference between the military and civilian samples (see Table 6), there was a significant correlation for civilian participants between locus of control and courage ratings for other-based scenarios ($r = -.259; n = 105; p = .008$), but not the self-based scenarios ($r = -.025; n = 106; p = .80$). The military did not see this effect for either attribution (maximum $r = -.050; n = 84; p = .65$). The correlations between military and civilian locus of control and self-based scenarios were significantly different from one another ($z = 2.12; p = .02$). H2 – that greater internal locus of control would lead to greater ratings of courage – was supported only for civilians in other-based scenarios.

Humility

Humility was not significantly correlated with courage ratings ($r = .119; n = 191; p = .10$). Humility was also not significantly correlated with the additional scenario question ratings of risk, goodness and meaningfulness (maximum $r = .096; n = 191; p =$

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.19), nor was it significantly correlated to the various types of courage (maximum $r = .124$; $n = 191$; $p = .09$). This is likely a result of the low reliability of the scale. Though reported values of Cronbach's alpha were relatively high, in this analysis the calculated alpha was .275. Checking the corrected item-total correlations found to items with markedly lower correlations; using the 13-item scale, and scoring by sample all failed to appreciably increase the scale's reliability. Further analyses were not performed on humility because of this scale's low reliability.

H3 – that greater humility would be correlated with greater courage ratings – was not testable with the current humility scale given its low reliability

Social Desirability

Combining both samples, social desirability did not significantly correlate with courage ratings ($r = -.096$; $n = 190$; $p = .186$). Social desirability had no significant impact on the difference between imagining ratings ($r = .069$; $n = 190$; $p = .34$) nor the difference between self and other courage ratings ($r = -.107$; $n = 190$; $p = .144$). When looking at the differences between military and civilian ratings there was no significant correlation for attribution (maximum $r = -.050$; $n = 84$; $p = .65$).

However, when looking at courage based on type, there was a pair of significant correlations. Both moral ($r = .175$; $n = 192$; $p = .016$) and psychological ($r = .171$; $n = 192$; $p = .018$) courage were generally rated slightly higher by those with higher social desirability scores (see Table 5). Ratings of physical courage scenarios was not significantly correlated to social desirability scores ($r = .058$; $n = 190$; $p = .42$).

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H4 – that social desirability would increase self scenario courage ratings – was supported only for psychological and moral courage. H5 – that social desirability would increase the distance between self and other ratings – showed no significant difference between these ratings and is not supported.

Interrelationship of Locus of Control and Social Desirability

Nothing was hypothesized about the relationships between the additional scales, and Table 5 presents these correlations. There was one interesting significant correlation. Locus of control had a significant negative correlation with social desirability ($r = -.339$; $n = 189$; $p < .001$). When compared by sample (see Table 6), this relationship was consistent in both the military ($r = -.303$; $n = 84$; $p = .005$) and civilian samples ($r = -.259$; $n = 105$; $p = .008$).

Courage Ratings

Although results were in the predicted direction for H1, the self-other attribution effect was only marginally significant within participants. A 2 (Attribution: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Sample: Military vs. Civilian) ANOVA found a non-significant main effect trend of Attribution on courage ratings in the predicted direction ($F(1,190)=3.00$, $p=.08$, see Figure 2) where imagined scenarios about the self were rated marginally less courageous than actions read about others. There was no interaction effect ($F(1,190)=1.19$, $p=.28$), but there was a significant main effect of courage between the military and civilian samples (see Figure 2), in the same direction for both the self and other conditions: civilians routinely rated courageous acts higher than did the military, despite the scenario protagonist ($F(1,190)=6.75$, $p=.01$). H6a – that military service

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would decrease ratings of courage for the self based scenarios – was supported. H6b – that military service would increase ratings for other based scenarios – was not supported.

Like H6a, the relationship was the same: military service reduced courage for both attribution conditions compared to the civilian sample.

Nobility Level Scenario Differences

When considering the nobility of an action, military and civilians rated differently once more: a 2 (high versus low nobility) x 2 (self versus other attribution) x 2 (military versus civilian sample) mixed-design ANOVA on courage ratings found significant main effects for nobility ($F(1,183) = 340.31, p < .001$), where high nobility scenarios received higher ratings, and sample ($F(1,183) = 8.72, p = .004$), where civilians rated the scenarios higher than did the military. These were modified by a significant interaction effect for nobility and sample ($F(1,183) = 9.77, p = .002$) such that in high nobility scenarios the military was more strict in labeling acts as noble: their ratings were lower than were civilians. Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 8; Figure 5 shows the differences in courage ratings between levels of nobility and attribution.

Risk Level Scenario Difference

The role of high and low risk scenario levels in perceiving courage also played a large part. An ANOVA was conducted, based on a 2 (high versus low risk) x 2 (self versus other attribution) x 2 (military versus civilian sample) mixed design. There was a main effect for sample ($F(1,185) = 9.03, p = .003$), where civilian courage ratings in high and low risk scenarios were greater than military ratings. There was also a main effect for risk level ($F(1,185) = 236.99, p < .001$) where high risk scenarios saw greater ratings than

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low risk scenarios. A triple interaction was also found between sample, risk level, and attribution ($F(1,185) = 4.24, p = .04$), where civilian ratings in high risk level scenarios had an effect in the self-condition. High risk situations are perceived as more courageous. Civilians were more likely to rate a high risk act as more courageous than were the military when reading about someone else in a courageous scenario. Attribution had a marginal significance ($F(1,185) = 2.50, p = .12$) and no other tested relationships were near significant levels. See Table 9 for means and standard deviations and Figure 6 for the differences in courage ratings between levels of risk and attribution.

Courage Type Scenario Differences

Finally, the scenarios were broken down by type of courage using a mixed-design ANOVA, comprised of 3 (moral versus physical versus psychological types of courage) x 2 (self versus other attribution) x 2 (military versus civilian sample). Here, there was a significant main effect for type of courage ($F(2,270) = 99.17, p < .001$), such that ratings for each type were significantly different from one another. Physical courage was rated highest ($M = 6.85; SD = 1.6$), followed by moral courage ($M = 6.45; SD = 1.9$) and psychological courage ($M = 5.15; SD = 2.1$). Main effects were found for sample ($F(1,135) = 5.23, p = .02$), such that civilians ($M = 6.42; SD = 2.4$) rated each type of courage higher compared to the military ($M = 5.89; SD = 2.3$), and for attribution ($F(1,135) = 6.48, p = .01$) such that other scenarios ($M = 6.27; SD = 1.8$) received greater ratings of courage than did self scenarios ($M = 6.02; SD = 1.8$), were also found. When controlling for type of courage, the marginal differences for attribution became significant differences, giving support to H1. There were no significant interactions.

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A follow-up 2 (sample) x 2 (attribution) ANOVA was performed for each type of courage. See Figure 7 for differences in courage ratings for courage type. Physical courage was significant between samples ($F(1,186) = 5.16, p = .02$) such that civilians rated physical courage scenarios higher than the military. Physical courage was not significant for attribution effect ($F(1,186) = .565, p = .43$). Moral courage was significant for both sample ($F(1,167)=3.77, p = .05$), and attribution ($F(1,167) = 7.31, p = .01$). Civilians rated moral courage scenarios higher than did the military. Moral courage self scenarios saw lower ratings than did the other-based scenarios. Psychological courage was not significant (maximum $F(1,170) = 1.79, p = .18$).

Post Hoc Analyses

Further analysis revealed a significant difference between military and civilians with regard to how easily they can imagine themselves in the scenarios (see Figure 8 and Table 4). Here, there was an interaction effect between sample and attribution ($F(1,190) = 3.77; p = .05$). Compared to the civilian participants, the military participants had an easier time imagining themselves or others in the other-condition. There was no significant effect for sample ($F(1,190) = .98; p = .32$) or attribution ($F(1,190) = .002; p = .97$).

To determine that military and civilian differences were not an age effect but rather a result of military exposure, separate analyses containing only the 18-24 military sample ($n=37$) were conducted. These analyses compared the younger military sample to the entire civilian sample, and had results in the same direction as the full military sample. This indicates that age is not solely responsible for the military/civilian rating

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differences, and that the professional culture does have some effect, even in limited exposure.

Discussion

Courage Components

The correlations found between the different ratings of scenarios were all very strong, further supporting the relationship between how courage is perceived and the importance of risk and nobility. While risk was assessed by a single item (“How risky was this action?” see Appendix C) nobility was assessed by two separate questions (How good was this action?” and “How meaningful was this action?” see Appendix C), hoping to get at some of the different aspects of nobility. Unfortunately, no question asked about nobility directly – future studies might wish to use this as an item as well, especially for determining whether proposed scenarios of high or low nobility match up cleanly to perceptions of nobility. Still, these items worked for comparing levels of risk and nobility between ratings of courage. The high relationship between courage ratings and the risk and nobility ratings shows both that these are important parts of courage as well as suggesting that the scenarios did an adequate job of encompassing these values.

Hypotheses

H1: There was significant effect for the attribution effect in the predicted direction when controlling for type of action, so H1 is supported. Courage ratings for others were often higher than for ratings of themselves, as is predicted with the phenomenon of courage blindness. When tests were run independently for each type of courage, the self-other difference was only significant for moral courage scenarios. The influence of

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attribution perspective on courage ratings did appear, and with further study and a larger sample, this trend could be expanded into a significant effect. The attribution main effect for moral courage was not present for physical or psychological courage (Figure 7). This was a surprising result, as it was assumed the attribution effect would be present for all types of courage or none of them. Instead, the difference suggests some interesting considerations for moral courage.

Perhaps the nature of moral courage makes it more susceptible to the Actor-Observer asymmetry (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). One difference between physical and moral acts of courage hinges on threat of physical risk. Physical courage is more risky than moral courage and the data reflects this (see Figure 7). Extreme physical risk might influence ratings between perspectives, because obvious situations of courage involve this sort of risk and in turn require higher ratings. Moral courage, by contrast, does not include physical risk as a requirement in all cases. Rather, it might be social or status risks that an individual is taking. This may not translate quite as well, and as a result, does show a difference between actor and observer. This difference in perspective could stem from differing views on what a “risky” act is, and whether or not to define an action as risky. For the self, the risk is undermined because of the nobility or goal; for others the risk is played up, as they might more easily see repercussions. Since others are in fact the ones judging an action based on courage, this seems to make sense. There could simply be more room for maneuverability and interpretation in these scenarios than in physical courage.

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Physical courage is the normal conception of courageous acts, but it involves commendation of physical acts, many of which take place in extreme circumstances. Ratings of courage for these acts could be closer together between the self and other conditions because they are less likely to occur, and the distinction matters less. Commendable acts of moral courage might be more approachable: they are less risky and more likely to occur for the average person (e.g. standing up to a bully or confronting someone cutting in line). Participants may have been more willing to rate other-condition scenarios as more courageous because of a familiarity or desire to see more acts of moral courage in their daily lives.

Alternately, in line with Malle's (2006) research, the moral courage could be seen as a more idiosyncratic and distinctive action, in that these actions challenge social norms where physical acts do not. Physical courage, while commendable, may not elicit the same sort of response that moral courage does because it falls more neatly into society's definition and is seen as more "commonplace". Imagining saving a child from a burning building might not elicit the "self-other" response because it is undoubtedly courageous. This approach would look more closely at the nobility factor of courage. The high level of nobility could be negating any difference between attributions: regardless of the actor, the act is brave and overcomes the blindness effect. In a less noble situation this effect does not impact the ratings because there is room for discussion about the actual level of nobility. It would be interesting to see a more detailed study focused on a more varied set of morally courageous acts and more detailed participant responses regarding the nobility and risk of the scenarios.

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At the same time, psychological courage does not seem to have the same level as support as either physical or moral courage; it has less recognition as a type of courage (see Figure 7). The lack of difference between self and other attribution conditions may have been a result of this lack of familiarity. Because psychological courage is not readily recognized as a type of courage, the distinction made between actors was not a factor. It is hard to distinguish whether mental fortitude or treatment-seeking behaviors are courageous, and the lack of distinction between the attribution groups reflects this thought process. Should an individual be rated as courageous because they sought treatment for their own mental illness, or possibly even their mental weakness? There is again the room for maneuverability in interpretation, but in this case the notion of psychological courage appears to be more nebulous. It seems that in this study the moral scenarios hit a healthy medium that led to this effect, avoiding the popularity of physical courage and the unfamiliarity of psychological courage.

H2: Locus of control found only one significant correlation with courage ratings of other-based scenarios. This finding shows support for the second hypothesis of greater courage ratings for internal locus of control, albeit only for a single attribution. The participants with high internal locus when reading scenarios about others may have been influenced by their mindset of being able to enact change on their environments. The other-based scenarios allowed for them to imagine a character who was acting to better their immediate surroundings, and they gave higher courage ratings accordingly. The suspension of disbelief may have been lifted when imagining themselves in the scenarios; though they believe in their ability to control their environment, they were not actually

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doing anything and would not consider themselves courageous. For external locus participants, the opposite was likely true. In their other-based scenarios, they may have seen the actors as less courageous because they were simply in the right place at the right time.

The idea that an individual's beliefs about control could possibly affect their perceptions of courage is an interesting one, and could be an area of potential further study. Though non-significant, the trend of external locus to lower courage ratings does raise an interesting question regarding the necessity of volition for courageous acts. For example, a person walking down the street who has a baby fall into their arms lacks any active decision to be courageous. Rather, the event simply occurred. Of course, an outsider might not recognize the lack of volition (and thereby consider the act courageous) while the individual actor would likely not. This hearkens back to Rate's (2009) finding of intentionality as a defining feature of courage. Like those with an external locus of control, he might believe he simply ended up in the right place at the right time and had no personal influence over the events taking place. Oliner's anecdotal interviews (2009) for courage accolade winners show this attitude for many of the recipients: they do not consider themselves courageous, but fortunate to have been where they were, when they were. From the other side, those with an internal locus of control might find themselves more willing to rate themselves courageous, as they are willing actors in a situation they can affect. A study which looked exclusively at the differences between attribution and people's beliefs about control might reveal further interesting results.

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H3: Unfortunately, the alpha of the scale was very poor, which suggests that this is not a particularly reliable result or measure. Without more study and a more reliable scale it is difficult to tell whether this relationship is relevant. The difficulty stems from the different conceptions of humility; creating a scale which takes these different views into account is extremely challenging. Elliot's (2010) humility measure tried to do too much with its various subscales. Instead of focusing solely on downplay of ability or an accurate self-assessment approach, incorporation of both was attempted, resulting in a scale that has trouble pulling apart the various subcomponents and merging them into a cohesive rating.

H4: Results did not show any significant relationship between social desirability and courage ratings, though additional analyses did see significant correlations with both psychological and moral courage. This was not an anticipated result, but it is an interesting one. Foremost, the lack of a relationship with physical courage suggests an understanding on the part of the participants that courage of that sort is heavily weighed by risk rather than social convention. However, psychological and moral courage do heavily depend on social situations, so it makes sense that those more inclined to be looked upon favorably would rate these scenarios higher. Moral and psychological depend on changing social cues and interpretations of morality in culture, but physical courage is not so dependent. The notion of physical courage has changed little in thousands of years, whereas these new models of courage are more recent. It could be that participants caught on to the difference between the more physical acts and the more social acts, and those higher in social desirability rated social courage higher, thinking it

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to be the focal point of the study. Alternately, they may have identified more with the social aspect of these types of courage and rated them higher because of their familiarity: physical courage might have been less meaningful because of its relative rarity.

H5: Social desirability did not have an effect on the difference between ease of imagining or attribution for courageous situations. This result was interesting, because of the revealed effect of social desirability on moral and psychological courage ratings. It would seem that if a relationship occurred for ratings of those scenarios, that participants high in social desirability might also want to portray themselves as more effective at imagining themselves in these situations or rating themselves higher for self-attribution conditions.

H6: The impact of professional culture on perceptions of courage is particularly interesting, though no hypotheses beyond the courage ratings were offered. What most bears mentioning is the consistent lower ratings for each of the fundamental parts of courage by the military – this was observed in nearly every condition. Civilians were consistently rating courage, goodness, risk, and meaning higher than servicemen would. This difference also supports the courage blindness effect. Because of their lack of involvement in a professional culture, they rated the different aspects of the scenarios more leniently. Meanwhile, military members - who experience greater risk and work within a professional moral code - had stricter ratings. Things which would normally seem heroic or risky from a normal perspective are seemingly mundane for the military. Civilians ranked nobility of an action significantly higher than did the military for low nobility scenarios, but the two were more in agreement for the high nobility situations

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(see Figure 5). This supports the courage blindness effect: exposure to risky and courageous situations dull the effect these acts have on the individual performer, while still looking remarkable to outsiders. This disconnect between how courageous acts are perceived not only helps to account for the courage blindness effect, but also speaks to the respect which is so often given to members of the professional military. It would be interesting to see how this relationship changes a sample of those in a similar job with similar risk but less prestige – namely, mercenaries or guns-for-hire. Would they see a similar distinction in ratings because of the nature of the job, or would the lack of social support and celebration actually reduce their ratings?

Interestingly, the only item for which military members scored higher was the question regarding ease of imagining oneself in the courage scenario. Servicemen, presumably familiar with the potential consequences of their careers and being committed to an organization requiring courage, found it easier to picture themselves in courageous situations. Again, those in the military find themselves in a position where they are normally called on to be courageous or noble and as such do not see it as a big deal. It is interesting to see how military members self-identify and find it easy to imagine themselves in situations which require courage; further research looking at this behavior might reveal how to increase this behavior or possibly even select for those who see courageous potential in themselves.

Additional Findings

The significant negative correlation between social desirability and locus of control was initially surprising; after checking the literature on the subject, it was found

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to have been studied before, with similar results (Cone, 1971; Hodkinson, 2006).

Essentially, those with a high internal locus of control feel that they have the power to affect change. In this fashion, they have no problem using socially desirable responses or actions. Similarly, those with an external locus of control care less about what others think, because they have a belief that there is little they can do to affect outcomes or change others' behaviors. It is interesting to look at the relationship of courage to locus of control, and consider how the two are different. Courageous actors tend not to talk themselves up, while observers do tend to talk up courageous actors. The idea of an internal locus suggests that an individual is an agent of change and capable of influencing the environment. This would support a positive relationship with acts of courage, as the situation has presented an opportunity to have a significant and beneficial impact on the surrounding environment. The notion of having to do something because the actor was capable seems to fit here, and could account for the subsequent deferment of accolades. At the same time, an individual with an external locus might consider themselves to just have happened upon the right place at the right time and downplay their courageous act in that fashion. Alternately, they may decline to act at all, not seeing themselves as capable of remedying a dangerous situation. Regardless, there is some mechanism at work which causes dismissal of bravery; perhaps further study in this area can eke that mechanism out.

Though weak, the positive correlations of social desirability to moral and psychological courage are intriguing. The relationship between risk and physical courage has been and ingrained into society: it is well established and accepted as a virtue. The

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concepts of moral and psychological courage are relatively new and as such have not had as much time to develop in society. Individuals who are seeking to please others – particularly in the context of a psychological study – might recognize that aspects of courage beyond the physical are being studied and as a result bump up their scores for non-physical acts accordingly. The correlations are not particularly strong ones, so this is likely a non-issue for the current study.

Limitations

Because of the nature of this study, there were some limiting factors which could be remedied in future studies. First, only male participants were used in order to limit variability when responding to scenario questions. For the sake of simplicity, only males and male scenarios were used, thereby eliminating any variability that might have occurred between male-female, female-male, or female-female. A larger study with a greater scope might want to look at how these different combinations interact. Second, the randomization used to separate out the various scenarios was imperfect; as a result, participants could potentially have answered all imagine-self scenarios, but no imagine-other scenarios. While this happened only a few times, it occasionally led to some gaps in the data, where there was no information for a particular participant because they only received one condition for that particular set of scenarios (e.g. the self-condition for all hi-risk scenarios). This is the reason for varying degrees of freedom for many of the analyses. An algorithm or manual system which balanced out these scenarios to ensure proper counterbalancing would be useful for future studies using this framework.

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The military sample also had a lot of variation. It included ROTC cadets, veterans, and active-duty personnel. All of these subgroups have varying levels of experience, however, limited sample size forced an analysis with all of these groups together. In the future, a larger sampling of each of these groups might yield better results and information more specific to each of these groups. For example, research suggests that locus of control tends to become more internal with age (Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995). The cadets, being younger, might have increased the average locus of control score for the sample and thereby decreased overall relationships. Cadets also had less experience with the military and may have answered questions from a more civilian mindset, as that is what they are more likely familiar with. The demographic statistics seem to support this (see Table 1) as cadets have no more than five years of experience in the military or any combat experience.

One consideration which should be noted was the lack of any military scenarios. This study used only situations which could potentially be experienced by both samples. Because it is reasonable to assume that most civilians would not have exposure to these sorts of courageous acts beyond popular media, these sorts of scenarios (e.g. a military firefight) were excluded to avoid any speculation on the part of civilians (though it likely would have increased significance). Further study might want to include these sorts of scenarios for a military sample and compare them to the sorts of courageous situations portrayed in this study – a difference in courage ratings between these might reveal some insight into how the military perceives their own career.

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Additionally, the humility measure was not particularly helpful in determining any significant relationships. This was a likely possibility given its recent development and the difficulty of creating a self-report survey on humility. If humility can be better understood at its most basic level or defined more consistently, then perhaps the scale's validity can increase. As it stands, the nebulous nature of humility seems to be the limiting factor in the effectiveness of its study. With a more developed scale there may be opportunity for further study in this area in the future. One possible solution for improving self-report scales could be an initial set of questions intended to understand an individual's definition of the term – perhaps even a qualitative answer which could be coded into different conceptions of humility. By separating out those who think of humility as being deferent or not speaking highly of themselves and those who consider it to be an accurate self-assessment of one's abilities, separate questions could be administered for each humility “type”. Because of the presumed difference between each definition of humility, it seems reasonable to assume that item responses from supporters of each definition will score differently, thus allowing simpler comparisons and usage of humility data.

Conclusion

There is support for a courage blindness effect, and the military has higher standards for courage than do civilians. The latter should come as no surprise due to the professional culture of the military, the risks soldiers undertake, and the societal expectations and celebration of the military, but this sort of analysis has not seen much study and as such is relevant. The higher standard for courage that the military sets helps

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explain much of the anecdotal evidence suggesting a courage blindness effect. This research could influence approaches on courage throughout the military. For example, in a clinical setting soldiers with PTSD often fail to see the courage they had while in combat (C. Pury, personal communication, April 16, 2012). By understanding that soldiers do have a higher standard for courage, it might be easier to reach out and explain that their deference is unnecessary. This research could also assist in awarding accolades for courageous action.

Physical courage coupled with high risk is the current standard, but perhaps inclusion of differing types of courage could start a new trend. Military moral courage has a distinct separation from the civilian perception, according to this data. This separation makes sense when considering the physical risk inherent to military service, but is a bit more convoluted when considering moral courage. The significant moral courage data could indicate a higher threshold for morality or nobility from soldiers than civilians and be attributed to the professional culture or even perhaps the moral considerations necessary for becoming a soldier (e.g. the potential to take a life). Finally, the lack of significant data regarding psychological courage raises an interesting question of how the values of psychological courage are seen in the military and civilian communities. While mental health treatment seeking behaviors and mental fortitude are acknowledged to be good things, the possibility of stigma in mental health remains. A possible explanation for similar ratings could be the relationship of mental health treatment to psychological courage. More research courage blindness is necessary to

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draw further conclusions, but at the very least, it does appear that courage blindness is a real phenomenon.

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APPENDICES

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Appendix A

Civilian Demographic Questions

- 1) What is your age? _____
- 2) What is your ethnicity? _____
- 3) What is your highest level of education? _____
- 4) Do you have any prior or current military experience? Yes / No
- 5) If yes, how many years have you served? _____
- 6) If yes, how much total time have you spent deployed? _____
- 7) If yes, what was your highest rank? _____
- 8) Do you have any prior experience in any of the following professions: police/law enforcement, fire-fighter, and emergency medical technician? Yes / No
- 9) If yes, how many years did you serve in this profession? _____

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Appendix B

Courage Scenarios – Self

1A: Physical/HN/HR) Imagine you are walking home, when you suddenly see and smell smoke from up the road. There is a home on fire, and you can hear shouts for help from inside the building. You run into the building, covering your mouth with your arm and coughing from the smoke. Inside, you see the seven year old child who had been crying out, cowering in a corner. You pick the child up, and run outside to safety. Two minutes later, the building collapses. With the exception of a brief coughing fit, both you and the child are fine but you could have both easily have died in the fire.

2A: Physical/HN/LR) Imagine you are walking downtown when glance at the other side of the street. A stranger is being confronted very loudly by two shady looking characters. They appear to be getting up close and personal and the stranger looks scared. Immediately, you cross the street and greet the stranger as a friend. The two goons are startled by your interference and begin to walk away. As they leave, one turns around and shoots a dirty look at you. You and your new acquaintance immediately go to the police station to report the situation.

3A: Physical/LN/HR) Imagine you are at the beach, when you hear a shout for help. A young child standing on the beach is pointing out to the water, where a toy is floating. Though you are not a strong swimmer and the waves are fairly tall, you run into the water and swim out to grab the toy. You manage to grab it and swim back onto the beach. You hand it to the child, who thanks you and walks away. It was not an easy swim, and you could have easily drowned.

4A: Moral/HN/HR) Imagine you work at a Fortune 500 company, and have a stable, well-paying job which you enjoy. One day, while eating lunch in the break room, you overhear your boss talking about some illegal business practices. You have long suspected that some backroom deals are going on since your numbers have not added up, and this is an unquestionable admission of guilt. Despite great risk to your career in a poor economy, you contact the national office and report what you've noticed.

5A: Physical/HN/HR) Imagine you are in a convenience store, looking for a snack. Suddenly, a masked person bursts into the store, yelling for everyone to hit the floor. There is no gun that you can see, but the person is holding a baseball bat. You haven't been noticed behind the aisle, and you decide to act. You run up unseen and tackle the robber to the ground. You are able to pin the robber to the floor. Another customer, seeing you have stopped the thief, helps you. The cashier grabs the fallen bat, and calls the police. The robber is arrested shortly thereafter.

6A: Moral/HN/LR) Imagine you are driving down the highway, when you suddenly see two cars collide in front of you. You pull over, unharmed, and see a dazed person exit

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one of the vehicles. There is no one else around, and no one has gotten out of the second car. You pull over and immediately dial 9-1-1. After reporting the accident, you approach the second car. The passenger is awake but pinned inside, and there is no chance of removal. You talk to and keep the passenger calm until help arrives. The paramedics say that keeping the patient awake may have saved his life. It's good that you were there.

7A: Physical/LN/LR) Imagine you are out for a walk in the park. As you pass by a jungle gym, you hear a cry from somewhere nearby. You see a young child clinging to the top of a set of monkey bars. The child is unable to get down alone, and seems to be about to fall the four feet to the ground. You walk over, reach up, and catch the child. You place the child on the ground gently, who then runs to a nearby woman and tells her what happened. The mother, after hearing what you did, thanks you.

8A: Physical/LN/LR) Imagine you are eating dinner with your family in your favorite restaurant. Suddenly, a stranger at the next table begins to choke. You have previous training in helping choking victims and know what to do. Jumping to your feet, you run around to the table and give a few abdominal thrusts. The hunk of steak is coughed up and the choking victim thanks you. The restaurant bursts into a spattered applause, and you carefully resume eating your dinner.

9A: Moral/LN/HR) Imagine you come from a very socially conscious and active family, and have always been very involved and invested in politics. However, over time you have come to disagree with many aspects of your parents views, many of which correspond with political views. Your parents are staunch members of one party, while you now lean heavily to the other. They are not aware of your new political views, but you think that they would disapprove tremendously. You feel the need to let them know, despite the consequences. You sit them down and tell them about your new political views. They are incredibly disappointed and leave the room angrily.

10A: Psychological/HN/LR) Imagine you are chatting with a relative when the conversation turns into an argument. The two of you hang up angry and without resolution. Later that week, you hear that your relative has been in a car accident and has passed away. Because you last spoke angrily with that relative, you feel guilty. This eventually becomes a major issue – you have trouble sleeping and are often feeling down in the dumps. After a few months of bereavement and sluggishness, you decide to see a psychologist to help you get over. You realize that you will have to face your guilt and the painful memory of your relative's death, but seek treatment anyway. Eventually, the guilt subsides and you are able to move on.

11A: Psychological/HN/HR) Imagine you are at the bank to run some errands. As you are standing in line, three masked bandits brandishing guns enter and tell everyone to lie down on the floor. After removing your money and jewelry, you are corralled into a corner with the other patrons and bank employees. The robbers escape, but are eventually

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caught a few weeks later. Despite being unharmed physically, you begin to experience bad nightmares, often feel on-edge and begin to have trouble interacting with others. You decide to see a psychologist, who diagnoses you with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD. Though you will have to face some terrifying memories of your hostage situation, you follow through. After some therapy sessions, you are able to manage your fear and things return to normal.

12: Moral/LN/LR) Imagine you are at home reading a book, when the telephone rings. It's an old friend - one whom you have not seen or spoken with in ten years - with a proposition for you. Your friend has recently come into a number of high end electronics, and wonders if you'd be able to store them for a few weeks. This seems suspicious to you, so you ask where they came from. Your friend skirts the question, again asking for your help. Despite being an old friend, you refuse to help. After yelling and cursing at you, the phone is hung up with a slam.

13A: Psychological/LN/HR) Imagine you are piloting an airplane, cruising tens of thousands of feet above the ocean. You have to fly directly through a thunderstorm. Everything seems to be fine, but suddenly the plane lurches and begins losing elevation. The passengers begin to clamor at the turbulence, but are unaware of how bad things are in the cockpit. The plane is quickly getting out of control. You, however, have trained for this and remain calm. Using your knowledge and experience, you eventually ease the plane back onto course and through the storm. The passengers cheer, unaware of how much danger they were in. Thanks to your mental resilience and calm demeanor, you managed to save the plane from crashing.

14A: Psychological/LN/LR) Imagine you are a contestant on a low-stakes local game show, competing for a prize of 500 dollars. After several turns of shifting positions, you enter the final round. You are currently in second place, not far behind the leading contestant. The host looks to you and your opponent, and reads the quiz question off of his card. You know the answer! You hit the buzzer first and the host looks to you for an answer. Though you are nervous beyond belief, you remain calm and clearly state the correct answer. The lights flash, bells sound, and you are 500 dollars richer, thanks to your composure.

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Appendix C

Scenario Questions

0 = Not at all 9 = most imaginable

- 1) How courageous was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 2) How risky was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 3) How good was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 4) How meaningful was this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 5) How easily can you imagine yourself performing this action? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 6) How easily can you imagine someone else performing this action?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

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Appendix D

32-item Humility Scale

Please circle the response that most accurately describes you.

1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3=Uncertain 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree

1. When it seems like God is ignoring my prayers, I become frustrated. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I enjoy spending time reflecting on the majesty and power of nature. 1 2 3 4 5
3. It is easy for me to accept the honest criticism of a friend. 1 2 3 4 5
4. When asked I can give an accurate assessment of my personal strengths. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I often spend time thinking about my personal inadequacies. 1 2 3 4 5
6. When I have put myself out for another, I want them to acknowledge my sacrifice.
1 2 3 4 5
7. I often feel bad for wanting more, when so many have less than me. 1 2 3 4 5
8. The challenges ahead of me often cause me to feel overwhelmed. 1 2 3 4 5
9. When asked to do something I usually think of others who are more qualified. 1 2 3 4 5
10. During times of prayer/meditation I reflect on areas in my life where I need
improvement. 1 2 3 4 5
11. When someone else is being recognized, I think about my accomplishments. 1 2 3 4 5
12. I feel honored when others ask for my help. 1 2 3 4 5
13. I often struggle with being selfish. 1 2 3 4 5
14. Compared to the greatness and vastness of the universe I feel so insignificant. 1 2 3 4 5
15. It frustrates me, when others are praised and I am not. 1 2 3 4 5
16. I don't have my act together the way I'd like. 1 2 3 4 5

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17. Recently, I have felt ashamed of my arrogance. 1 2 3 4 5

18. I often wish I was as talented as my peers. 1 2 3 4 5

19. When I don't know an answer, I get upset because I think I should have. 1 2 3 4 5

20. I get angry with know-it-alls. 1 2 3 4 5

21. When I see inspiring examples, it reminds me of what I could be. 1 2 3 4 5

22. When confronted with my mistakes, my first response is to explain why I did it.

1 2 3 4 5

23. I am deeply touched when others sacrifice for me. 1 2 3 4 5

24. It is hard for me to accept others' praise because I am far from perfect. 1 2 3 4 5

25. It irritates me when people below me don't fulfill their responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5

26. I feel valuable doing "lowly" things for others. 1 2 3 4 5

27. When friends ask for my counsel, I feel like "why me"? 1 2 3 4 5

28. When I get in trouble, it is important to me to be able to explain what happened.

1 2 3 4 5

29. I try to downplay my part when I help others. 1 2 3 4 5

30. Death usually reminds me how needy I am. 1 2 3 4 5

31. When I have been confronted with the reality of death, it causes me to think how quickly life passes by. 1 2 3 4 5

32. I am usually quick to rationalize my failures. 1 2 3 4 5

(Reverse score items: 1, 5, 6, 11, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32)

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Appendix E

33 item Social Desirability Scale

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to your personally. It's best to go with your first judgment and not spend too long mulling over any one question.

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
 - a. True
 - b. False

2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
 - a. True
 - b. False

3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
 - a. True
 - b. False

4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
 - a. True
 - b. False

5. On occasions I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
 - a. True
 - b. False

6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
 - a. True
 - b. False

7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
 - a. True
 - b. False

8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
 - a. True
 - b. False

9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it.
 - a. True
 - b. False

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10. On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability.

- a. True
- b. False

11. I like to gossip at times.

- a. True
- b. False

12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right.

- a. True
- b. False

13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.

- a. True
- b. False

14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.

- a. True
- b. False

15. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.

- a. True
- b. False

16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

- a. True
- b. False

17. I always try to practice what I preach.

- a. True
- b. False

18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people.

- a. True
- b. False

19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

- a. True
- b. False

20. When I don't know something I don't mind at all admitting it.

- a. True
- b. False

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21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

- a. True
- b. False

22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

- a. True
- b. False

23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

- a. True
- b. False

24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrong-doings.

- a. True
- b. False

25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.

- a. True
- b. False

26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.

- a. True
- b. False

27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

- a. True
- b. False

28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.

- a. True
- b. False

29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

- a. True
- b. False

30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.

- a. True
- b. False

31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.

- a. True
- b. False

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32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.

a. True

b. False

33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

a. True

b. False

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Appendix F

29 Item Locus of Control Scale

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.
10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying in really useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

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12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power; there is not much the little guy can do about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.
b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends on ability. Luck has little or nothing to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

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- 25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.
- 26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.
- 27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
- 28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
- 29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.

Appendix G

Tables

Table 1. *Military Demographic Information*

	<i>n</i>	Mean Age	Mean Years Served	Percent Deployed	Mean Number of Deployments	Mean Time Deployed	Combat Experience
Cadets	18	21 (0)*	2.8 (1.5)	0%	0 (0)*	0 (0)*	0%
Enlisted	22	32.6 (9.1)	9.7 (6.6)	70%	2.1 (1.9)	18.2 (17.5)	48%
Officers	45	N/A**	11.4 (8.2)	56%	2.1 (2.4)	9.7 (11.8)	36%

*All reported ranges were the same. **Military participants were provided with age ranges.

Table 2. *Courage Scenario Factors*

Attribution	Courage Type					
	Physical		Moral		Psychological	
Self	HN	LN	HN	LN	HN	LN
	HR(x2)	HR	HR	HR	HR	HR
	LR	LR(x2)	LR	LR	LR	LR
Other	HN	LN	HN	LN	HN	LN
	HR(x2)	HR	HR	HR	HR	HR
	LR	LR(x2)	LR	LR	LR	LR

Note. HN=High Nobility, LN=Low Nobility, HR= High Risk, LR=Low Risk

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Table 3. *Humility, Social Desirability, and Locus of Control*

Means and Standard Deviations

Measure	α	Sample			
		Military		Civilian	
		<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>
Humility	.275	97.57(6.75)	85	98.19(6.24)	106
Social Desirability	.744	18.38(4.92)	84	15.08(4.44)	106
Locus of Control	.810	8.56(3.96)	84	10.79(3.90)	105

Table 4. *Courage Scenario Means and Standard Deviations*

Measure	Sample			
	Military	Civilian	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>		
Courage Ratings (all)	5.97(1.71)	6.54(3.90)	2.60	.01
Moral Courage	6.21(1.95)	6.65(1.79)	1.61	.11
Physical Courage	6.51(1.73)	7.11(1.41)	2.69	.01
Psychological Courage	4.99(2.27)	5.28(1.91)	.94	.35
Risk Ratings	5.45(1.61)	5.95(1.12)*	2.54	.01
Goodness Ratings	7.15(1.17)	7.39(1.17)	1.41	.16
Meaning Ratings	7.21(1.19)	7.20(1.26)	-.04	.97
Imaginability of Self Performing Action	6.79(1.41)	6.31(1.24)	-1.75	.08
Self-described Actor	6.70(1.59)	6.59(1.36)	-.51	.61
Other-described Actor	6.87(1.48)	6.31(1.39)	-2.70	.01

Note. *N* = 192

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Table 5. *Correlation Table for Courage Types, Social Desirability, LOC and Humility*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Courage Ratings	-						
2. Moral Courage Scenarios	.069	-					
3. Physical Courage Scenarios	.068	.608**	-				
4. Psychological Courage Scenarios	.050	.583**	.539**	-			
Other Scales							
5. Social Desirability Scores	-.096	.175*	.058	.171*	-		
6. Locus of Control Scores	-.022	-.078	-.047	-.115	-.339**	-	
7. Humility Scores	.119	.097	.124	.054	-.062	.071	-

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 6. *Sample-based Correlations for Attribution Courage Ratings and Scale Scores*

Civilian	1	2	3	4
1. Courage Rating (self scenarios)	-			
2. Courage Rating (other scenarios)	.616**	-		
3. Social Desirability Score	-.025	.019	-	
4. Locus of Control Score	-.049	-.259**	-.249**	-
Military	1	2	3	4
1. Courage Rating (self scenarios)	-			
2. Courage Rating (other scenarios)	.682**	-		
3. Social Desirability Score	-.044	-.050	-	
4. Locus of Control Score	-.058	.050	-.303**	-
Sample Comparison	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>		
1. Courage Ratings (self/other)	.77	.22		
2. Locus of Control / Self Attribution	.03	.49		
3. Locus of Control / Other Attribution	2.12	.02		

** $p < .01$.

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Table 7. *Courage Component Correlations*

	1	2	3	4
1. Courage	-			
2. Risk	.845**	-		
3. Goodness	.750**	.651**	-	
4. Meaning	.712**	.623**	.916**	-

** $p < .01$

Table 8. *Courage Component: Nobility Courage Rating Means and Standard Deviations*

Measure	Sample					
	Military		Civilian		Overall	
	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>
High Nobility	6.90(1.63)	86	7.25(1.38)	106	7.09(1.50)	192
Low Nobility	4.91(2.10)	86	5.84(1.60)	106	5.42(1.89)	192

Table 9. *Courage Component: Risk Courage Rating Means and Standard Deviations*

Measure	Sample					
	Military		Civilian		Overall	
	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>m(sd)</i>	<i>n</i>
High Risk	6.64(1.59)	86	7.18(1.37)	105	6.94(1.49)	191
Low Risk	5.20(1.97)	86	5.92(1.61)	106	5.60(1.81)	192

Appendix H

Figures




Figure 1. Age Ranges for Military Sample. Most military participants were between 18 and 24 years of age, due to the inclusion of cadets.




Figure 2. Bar chart of differing values for courage ratings between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. Other courage ratings were slightly higher than self ratings, though this was non-significant ($F(1,190) = 3.00, p = .08$). The difference between civilian and military ratings was significant ($F(1,190) = 6.75, p = .01$).

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


Figure 3. Bar chart of the differing values for risk ratings between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. Civilians routinely rated scenarios as more risky than did the military ($F(1,190) = 6.43, p = .01$).




Figure 4. Bar chart of the differing values for goodness ratings between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. There was an interaction effect for ratings of courage based on attribution and sample $F(1,190) = 4.43, p = .036$ where goodness was rated higher by civilians than the military for the self-condition only.

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


Figure 5. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings in high and low nobility scenarios between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. Ratings between high and low nobility scenarios were significant ($F(1,183) = 340.31, p < .001$) as were courage ratings between samples ($F(1,183) = 8.72, p = .004$). Ratings between high and low nobility also interacted with sample, where differences were only significant for low nobility scenarios sample ($F(1,183) = 9.77, p = .002$).

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


Figure 6. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings in high and low risk scenarios between military and civilian samples for self and other contributions. There were significant differences between high and low risk scenarios ($F(1,185) = 236.99$, $p < .000$), as well as for military and civilian samples ($F(1,185) = 9.03$, $p = .003$). Additionally, a 3-way interaction occurred between sample, attribution, and risk level, where courage ratings increased for civilians reading high risk self-attribution scenarios.

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


Figure 7. Bar chart of the differing values for courage ratings for the moral, physical and psychological types of courage between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. Civilians always ranked courage higher than military ($F(1,135) = .524, p = .02$). The other condition was also always rated higher than the self condition, though it was only significant for moral courage ($F(1,161) = 7.37, p = .007$).

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


Figure 8. Bar chart of the differing values for the difficulty of imagining oneself or someone else between military and civilian samples for self and other attributions. There was a significant interaction effect between attribution and sample ($F(1,190) = 3.77, p = .05$). Military participants had an easier time imagining themselves in the other attribution condition than did civilians. This was the only analysis where the military had consistently higher ratings than civilians.

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