Civil Affairs Military Government in the Atomic Age

It is an honor to be invited here to address this distinguished gathering, and I have chosen as my subject "Civil Affairs Military Government in the Atomic Age".

By observations and study of military operations lead me to believe that the basic principles and theory of war do not change materially, regardless of the age in which they take place.

As stated by Clausewitz, Warfare has three main objectives:

1. To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy.
2. To take possession of his material and other sources of strength.
3. To gain public opinion. These objectives may be summed up as the mission of the Army, which is "to defeat the enemy forces in land combat and gain control of the land and its people".

From the time the first wave of infantry penetrates enemy territory the commander is an occupier under the terms of international law and he immediately affects and is affected by the civilians in his area of combat. CAPT decisions must immediately be made, not only to conform to the obligations imposed by international law, not only to initiate CAPT programs that will facilitate the attainment of United States policy objectives, but also as an immediate means of directly supporting and facilitating his military operations.

His success in combat requires that he destroy the enemy force . . . and such force includes not only combat elements but the resources mobilized in their support as well as the political agency that directs such force against him. This destruction is essential to the primary objective of winning a war. Reason, however, dictates that force must be applied with discrimination; that destruction must be measured and limited to actual requirements of the hour - - - not necessarily massive or total.

The application of even such force as is required to win a war has a tremendous effect upon the civil population . . . and the affected civil population, in turn, can have a tremendous effect upon the Commander's ability to continue the application of required force.
The Commander's decision is influenced not only by the relative combat power of opposing forces but also by the characteristics of the area of operations. Accordingly, he makes decisions with respect to his responsibilities to a population by carefully weighing the CAGS estimate of the situation in conjunction with the estimates of his staff members dealing with personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics.

This CAGS planning must be a constant, continuing operation in full coordination with other staff sections to determine the manner in which CAGS operations may best contribute to the over-all mission, to insure the coordination of CAGS activities with tactical operations, and to insure the capability of the Commander's CAGS operations to cope with the civilian problems caused by war.

As the scope of warfare enlarges with the appearance of weapons of increased destructiveness, the scope of the commander's CAGS responsibilities becomes correspondingly intensified. Modern military operations, even if carried out with discrimination, will create problems of unparalleled magnitude.

MILITARY CONCEPTS OF THE ATOMIC AGE.

To cope with these problems on the atomic battlefield of the field army —— for it is here that the battle is won by combat —— let us examine some of the concepts which will apply. This search for maximum combat effectiveness is a continuing process and has a direct relation to CAGS.

First, —— in the Atomic Age the battlefield will be of much greater depth and width than ever before.

This consideration plus the fact that our own manpower available for control of these lands and populations therein will be limited, highlights the necessity for us to increase our effectiveness through developing CAGS technological proficiency to the maximum.

In the political science field it can be expected that research, valuable to CAGS, can be achieved not by only discovering unknown phenomena but by discovering new explorations of cause and consequence, in substitution for older views found to be erroneous or superstitious. For instance, it makes a great deal of difference in an individual's approach to a problem if he believes that wars are consciously intended human actions perpetrated by the actions of certain individuals or groups, or that wars are more the character of economic depressions — the resultant of human actions arising quite irrelevant to the conscious purposes of the participants.
Similarly, with respect to the development of new CAG techniques, we realize that the systematic development of the "CAG science" is in its infancy. Certain areas of research have been defined, and I assure the Army is working on them. But new CAG research fields remain to be uncovered in the unknown. However, undoubtedly large areas, currently unexplored, will be defined. As in the past, it will be the responsibility of the U.S. Army CAG School to "absorb" the results of both today's known and tomorrow's unknown research, by converting it into CAG doctrine and usable training material applicable to the atomic battlefield.

The task ahead is a challenge which can and will be met. For our Army proposes to maintain technical superiority over our potential adversaries, and furnish our combat commanders with qualified CAG personnel for use when accomplishments of extraordinary efficiency must be routine if we are to survive.

Second, basic combat units, under atomic conditions, will probably take the form of small integrated battle groups of all arms. They must be semi-independent, self-contained, and capable of operating over extended distances on a fluid battlefield for prolonged periods with minimum control and support by higher headquarters.

Such tactics will call for a greater measure of self-sufficiency on the part of our commanders, their staffs and their men than that to which we were accustomed. The demands on leadership due to such dispersal, while at the same time employing complex weapon systems, will require full utilization of the capabilities of the CAG organization to assist in the accomplishment of the mission. This means the use of CAG staff sections, deployment of CAG units, the thorough education of officers in the role and capabilities of the CAG organization; and, making provision for carrying out CAG functions in those lower echelons which are not authorized CAG staff sections.

In this respect, it is significant to note that current CAG doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic battlefield. It is not old; it has emerged since 1944 and is derived from the lessons of history. It is expressed in FM 100-5, "Operations"; FM 101-5, "Staff Officers Field Manual"; FM 41-15, "CAG Units"; and FM 41-19 "CAG Operations". The basic characteristics of this doctrine, pertaining to organization, are:

a. Organization of CAG units is not rigid, it is extremely flexible, being based on PM 41-500B. This cellular type PM provides the capability for organizing units with those functional specialists and CAG officers necessitated by the requirements of the area in which deployed. These units may be adjusted to any size battle group to which they may be assigned, and may be adapted to whatever type transportation is required;
b. CAGE units may be assigned to Army, Corps, and Divisions, in which case they are employed to give CAGE support to the command to which assigned.

c. Decentralization of command authority ("Operational Chain of Command") over CAGE units is provided in a mobile or unsettled situation, then the demands of dispersal can be met; and

d. A primary function of the CAGE operation is maximum utilization of the resources of the area for the support of the combat forces; a necessary aid to battle groups operating over extended areas for prolonged periods.

Third, the staggered tactical formations of the static battlefield, dispersed in great depth, places heavy emphasis on reconnaissance and surveillance to cover void areas. There will be an even greater need for timely and accurate intelligence in order to reduce to a minimum all uncertainty regarding the enemy.

The vital place which CAGE Intelligence can play in keeping the responsible combat commander informed of the political and economic effects of the population on courses of action and to the missions of the situation. The recently published FM 100-5, "CAGE Operations," expands the chapter on CAGE Intelligence. It covers the development of appropriate essential elements of information in the functional, stable, collection agencies, both military and civilian; and, procedures for collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence. A sample CAGE Intelligence collection plan is included therein. The purpose is to develop a systematic procedure which will furnish the combat commander with the type of intelligence he needs regarding the people in his area. He will, thereby, be able to take action to preclude the economic, political and governmental reactions of the population from erupting into threats to the security of his forces or the accomplishment of his mission.

With aspect on dispersal, the surveillance of lightly held and unoccupied void areas presents even greater intelligence and security problems than anything we have previously faced. For some time it has been recognized that the main factor for effectively gaining control over guerrilla forces is the restoration of law and order coupled with a basic economic stability. For lightly held areas, the task is primarily one of generating confidence among the population in the local government's ability and willingness to furnish protection. This is done by furnishing those government services (such as communications, employment, social needs as necessary, etc.) including protection, so that when the guerrilla steals the farmer's pig, the farmer, instead of being intimidated, will have the courage to report the incident.
Unoccupied void areas present a more difficult problem. This can be met by extension of local governmental influence into these areas. Studies relative to German experiences in 1944 point up many of the problems pertinent to this situation. One of the most logical solutions is that of extending local public safety agency personnel and organization into the void areas to act as a guerrilla and subversive force deterrent.

PROBLEM OF THE ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER

Let us now turn our attention to the examination of some of the problems of an essentially civilian nature which inescapably confront a commander in the conduct of his operations on the atomic battlefield.

Civilians, in larger numbers perhaps than ever encountered before, will commonly suffer the effects of war in personal loss, injury, deprivation and lack of the barest essentials of life. They will not have the guidance, assistance, or control, normally provided by the lower local levels of government. Continuing damage will contribute to mass hysteria and tend to convert the previously normal populace into an uncontrolled mob; a multitude of scared, hurt, and disrupted people who seek only to flee further injury with whatever possessions they can intact, and obtain, by any means possible, that which is necessary to sustain alive.

From the commander's point of view, what is the effect of the problems posed by these civilians on his combat operations? The answer is not hard to imagine. They clutter the roads and interfere with or prevent the essential movement of troops and supplies, and often are injected directly into the combat operation. They require constant presence of military supplies merely to remain alive, and can compel a diversion of combat troops to protect lines of communications and supply installations. They can require a similar diversion of troops to neutralize guerrilla action, foisted by undetected enemy agents among them. They can do all this and more. They can all but stop a military operation in its tracks unless proper action is taken to anticipate and plan in advance such CCP controls, as a part of the military action, as will effectively counteract these otherwise probable conditions.

The commander's 11 operations are not limited to civil control and relief. In coordination with CCP, civilians are screened to insure the detection of enemy agents and the prevention of sabotage and rear area disruption. Local civil defense and damage control activities are coordinated with those of U.S. forces. Maps are taken to enforce directives and maintain a condition of law and order among civilians. Civil health and sanitation are kept under surveillance to insure the prevention of epidemics which might affect the combat effectiveness of our armed forces. Information media are exploited to inform the civil populace of the purposes and aims of United States effort, and to improve the relations between our troops and the people of the country with which we are at war. Resources of the country are utilized in support of military requirements, as well as minimum essential civilian
needs—and certainly not least, the extensive CAMO organization, functioning constantly at the grass roots level, constitutes an effective source of information and intelligence of importance to the combat effort.

HUMAN NATURE REMAINS THE SAME

To summarize, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, "Although weapons change, human nature remains the same" is a fact which greatly increases the problem of the future combat commander.

Modern nuclear weapons and highly technical military forces require mobilization of the full industrial and resource potential of a nation involved in war. Even the threat of their use affects not only whole nations but international balances as well. Under such conditions, the combat commander must conduct his operations with full recognition of the effect upon the population involved and their political, economic and governmental structures, if ultimate victory is, in fact, to be achieved.

Successful military commanders throughout history, such as Julius Caesar and Alexander, recognized the problem of controlling the populace, and took measures appropriate to the stage of weapons development of their time to cope with it. On the other hand, outstanding examples of less fortunate military leaders who could not adapt are found in the experiences of Napoleon I and Hitler, in their Russian campaigns.

As we look ahead to the atomic age, the combat commander's mission remains the same. The new elements introduced, however, are the vast numbers of human beings affected by the extent, and, when nuclear weapons are used, the intensity of the operation. Such conditions will demand the development and use of the most efficient CAMO organization which can be devised, in order to cope with the characteristics implicit in atomic warfare, which include:

Balance and flexibility in our armed forces.

A continuing need for conventional forces.

Necessity to be prepared to cope with aggression of varying forms.

Essentiality of the Army in gaining our postwar objectives.

Continuing search to insure maximum combat effectiveness.

Extreme mobility of self-contained battle groups which are deployed over wide areas in great depth.

Increased need for accurate intelligence and surveillance over unoccupied areas.
Forces which must be able to concentrate rapidly, attack hard, and disperse quickly.

Great reliance on air transport.

MEETING THE CAMG REQUIREMENTS

Some proposed measures for meeting the CAMG requirements of the Atomic Age are as follows:

1. G3 staff sections and CAMG units must be included in the combat commander's force. Military personnel throughout the services must be indoctrinated in the CAMG capabilities, in order to provide the balanced force needed to carry out the commander's mission.

2. The operational nature of CAMG must be reflected throughout military doctrine; the G3-G5 relationship must be understood by commanders and planners.

3. G5(CAMG) representation should be established on Military Assistance Advisory Groups in order to develop a capability within indigenous armies to conduct CAMG operations.

4. Close liaison should be maintained between agencies concerned with our relations with other peoples such as the Foreign Service, ICA, USIA, UN - in order to make maximum use of techniques developed and smooth out transition of authority problems.

5. Development of an appreciation of the need of the field commander for clearly defined national objectives and policies.

6. Encouragement of the development of a viable doctrine to counteract communist propaganda.

7. Making maximum use of the free intellectual and religious traditions of the U.S. in combating communism and gaining our postwar objectives.

8. Increasing CAMG personnel efficiency by:

   a. Maintaining a continuing research program in order to develop new techniques, procedures, testing criteria and detection of new research areas.

   b. Placing emphasis during training on

   (1) The role of CAMG in combat operations; development of plans, orders, and annexes.
(2) Problem solving methods and techniques.

(3) Cultural and environmental factors affecting the relationship between our military and local governments and peoples.

(4) Procedures for allocating manpower and resources.

9. Emphasizing CAMG orientation in all branch service schools.

10. The problem of training CAMG personnel in area characteristics and language will be greatly magnified during the Atomic Age because of the wide areas of great depth which are contemplated. To meet this requirement area documentation will have to be kept current and extremely concise. Also, every effort will have to be made to designate early the areas of deployment in order that the language training requirements may be met.

11. It is essential that CAMG plans, units, and staff sections be included in all maneuvers and CPX's, in order that organizational and doctrinal developments within the Army may provide the combat commander of the future with the capability to handle his CAMG responsibilities.

12. Increased emphasis should be placed on CAMG intelligence training, including the estimate of the situation and intelligence collection plan.

13. The indigenous public safety organization should be extended throughout the unoccupied areas as far as practicable, to act as a guerrilla and subversive force deterrent.

14. Increased emphasis should be placed on refugee control in order to prevent interference with ground mobility.

In conclusion, the critical point of atomic warfare will hinge on the combat commander's ability to exploit the advantage gained from the use of the weapon. With the chaotic conditions envisioned, his ability to handle the multitudinous problems — technical, ideological, logistical — posed by the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the difference between his success or failure. It is for this task that CAMG is organized. It is a profound command responsibility. It behooves all of us to develop a better understanding within our military establishment of CAMG activities, and to implement the objectives in war and in peace.