It is an honor to be invited here to address this distinguished gathering, and I have chosen as my subject "Civil Affairs Military Government in the Atomic Age".

By observations and study of military operations lead me to believe that the basic principles and theory of war do not change materially, regardless of the age in which they take place.

As stated by Clausewitz, Warfare has three main objectives:

1. To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy.

2. To take possession of his material and other sources of strength.

3. To gain public opinion. These objectives may be summed up as the mission of the Army, which is "to defeat the enemy forces in land combat and gain control of the land and its people".

From the time the first wave of infantry penetrates enemy territory the commander is an occupier under the terms of international law and he immediately affects and is affected by the civilians in his area of combat. CAS decisions must immediately be made, not only to conform to the obligations imposed by international law, not only to initiate CW programs that will facilitate the attainment of United States policy objectives, but also as an immediate means of directly supporting and facilitating his military operations.

His success in combat requires that he destroy the enemy force . . . and such force includes not only combat elements but the resources mobilized in their support as well as the political agency that directs such force against him. This destruction is essential to the primary objective of winning a war. Reason, however, dictates that force must be applied with discrimination: that destruction must be measured and limited to actual requirements of the hour — not necessarily massive or total.

The application of even such force as is required to win a war has a tremendous effect upon the civil population . . . and the affected civil population, in turn, can have a tremendous effect upon the Commander's ability to continue the application of required force.
The Commander's decision is influenced not only by the relative combat power of opposing forces but also by the characteristics of the area of operations. Accordingly, he makes decisions with respect to his responsibilities to a population by carefully weighing the CAGI estimate of the situation in conjunction with the estimates of his staff members dealing with personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics.

This CAGI planning must be a constant, continuing operation in full coordination with other staff sections to determine the manner in which CAGI operations may best contribute to the over-all mission, to insure the coordination of CAGI activities with tactical operations, and to insure the capability of the Commander's CAGI operations to cope with the civilian problems caused by war.

As the scope of warfare enlarges with the appearance of weapons of increased destructiveness, the scope of the commander's CAGI responsibilities becomes correspondingly intensified. Modern military operations, even if carried out with discrimination, will create problems of unparalleled magnitude.

**MILITARY CONCEPTS OF THE ATOMIC AGE.**

To cope with these problems on the atomic battlefield of the field army —— for it is here that the battle is won by combat —— let us examine some of the concepts which will apply. This search for maximum combat effectiveness is a continuing process and has a direct relation to CAGI.

First, —— in the Atomic Age the battlefield will be of much greater depth and width than ever before.

This consideration plus the fact that our own manpower available for control of these lands and populations therein will be limited, highlights the necessity for us to increase our effectiveness through developing CAGI technological proficiency to the maximum.

In the political science field it can be expected that research, valuable to CAGI, can be achieved not by only discovering unknown phenomena but by discovering new explorations of cause and consequence. In substitution for older views found to be erroneous or superstitious. For instance, it makes a great deal of difference in an individual's approach to a problem if he believes that wars are consciously intended human actions perpetrated by the actions of certain individuals or groups, or that wars are more the character of economic depressions — the resultant of human actions arising quite irrelevant to the conscious purposes of the participants.
Similarly, with respect to the development of new CAGE techniques, we realize that the systematic development of the "CAGE science" is in its infancy. Certain areas of research have been defined, and I am sure the Army is working on them. But new CAGE research fields remain to be uncovered in the unknown. However, undoubtedly large areas, currently unexplored, will be defined. As in the past, it will be the responsibility of the U. S. Army CAGE School to "absorb" the results of both today's known and tomorrow's unknown research, by converting it into CAGE doctrine and usable training material applicable to the atomic battlefield.

The task ahead is a challenge which can and will be met, for our Army proposes to maintain technical superiority over our potential adversaries, and furnish our combat commanders with qualified CAGE personnel for use when accomplishments of extraordinary efficiency must be routine if we are to survive.

Second, basic combat units, under atomic conditions, will probably take the form of small integrated battle groups of all arms. They must be semi-independent, self-contained, and capable of operating over extended distances on a fluid battleground for prolonged periods with minimum control and support by higher headquarters.

Such tactics will call for a greater measure of self-sufficiency on the part of our commanders, their staffs and their men than that to which we were accustomed. The demand on leadership due to such dispersal, while at the same time employing complex weapon systems, will require full utilization of the capabilities of the CAGE organization to assist in the accomplishment of the mission. This means the use of 21 staff sections; deployment of CAGE units; the thorough education of officers and men in the roles and capabilities of the CAGE organization; and making provision for carrying out CAGE functions in those lower echelons which are not authorized CAGE staff sections.

In this respect, it is significant to note that current CAGE doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic battlefield. It is not old; it has existed since 1945 and is derived from the lessons of history. It is expressed in FM 100-5, "Operations"; FM 101-5, "Staff Officers Field Manual"; FM 41-15, "CAGE Units"; and FM 41-10 "CAGE Operations". The basic characteristics of this doctrine, pertaining to organization, are:

a. Organization of CAGE units is not rigid, it is extremely flexible, being based on FM 41-500R. This cellular type TM provides the capability for organizing units with those functional specialists and CAGE officers necessary by the requirements of the area in which deployed. These units may be adjusted to any size battle group to which they may be assigned, and may be adapted to whatever type transportation is required.
b. CAG units may be assigned to Army, Corps and Divisions, in which case they are employed to give CAG support to the command to which assigned.

c. Decentralization of command authority ("Operational Chain of Command") over CAG units is provided in a mobile or unsettled situation; then the demands of dispersal can be met; and

d. A primary function of the CAG operation is maximum utilization of the resources of the area for the support of the combat forces; a necessary aid to battle groups operating over extended areas for prolonged periods.

Third, ——— The staggered tactical formations of the static battlefield, dispersed in great depth, places heavy emphasis on reconnaissance and surveillance to cover void areas. There will be an even greater need for timely and accurate intelligence in order to reduce to a minimum all uncertainty regarding the enemy.

The vital place which CAG Intelligence can play in keeping the responsible combat commander informed of the political and economic effects of the population on courses of action given to his has been recognized, and it is incorporated in FM 100-5 as the CAG estimate of the situation. The recently published FM 41-19, "CAG Operations," expands the chapter on CAG Intelligence. It covers the development of appropriate essential elements of information in the functional, functional collection agencies, both military and civilian; and, procedures for collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence. A sample CAG Intelligence collection plan is included therein. The purpose is to develop a systematic procedure which will furnish the combat commander with the type of intelligence he needs regarding the people in his area. It will, thereby, be able to take action to preclude the economic, political, and governmental reactions of the population from erupting into threats to the security of his forces or the accomplishment of his mission.

4th aspect of dispersal, the surveillance of lightly held and unoccupied void areas presents even greater intelligence and security problems than anything we have previously faced. For some time it has been recognized that the main factor for effectively gaining control over guerrilla forces is the restoration of law and order coupled with a basic economic stability. For lightly held areas, the task is primarily one of generating confidence among the population in the local government's ability and willingness to furnish protection. This is done by furnishing those government services (such as communications, employment, social needs as necessary, etc) including protection, so that when the guerrilla steals the farmer's pig, the farmer, instead of being intimidated, will have the courage to report the incident.
Unoccupied void areas present a more difficult problem. This can be met by extension of local governmental influence into these areas. Studies relative to German experiences in W.W. point up many of the problems pertinent to this situation. One of the most logical solutions is that of extending local public safety agency personnel and organization into the void areas to act as a guerrilla and subversive force deterrent.

## TASKS OF THE ARMY BATTLEFIELD COMMANDER

Let us now turn our attention to the examination of some of the problems of an essentially civilian nature which irrevocably confront a commander in the conduct of his operations on the atomic battlefield.

Civilians, in larger numbers perhaps than ever encountered before, will commonly suffer the effects of war in personal loss, injury, devastation and lack of the barest essentials of life. They will not have the guidance, assistance or control normally provided by the former local levels of government. Continuing damage will contribute to mass hysteria and tend to convert the previously normal populace into an uncontrollable mob; a multitude of scared, hurt and disrupted people who seek only to flee further injury with whatever possessions are intact, and obtain, by any means possible, that which is necessary to remain alive.

From the commander's point of view, what is the effect of the problems posed by these civilians on his combat operations? The answer is not hard to imagine. They clutter the roads and interfere with or prevent the essential movement of troops and supplies, and often are injected directly into the combat operation. They require seizing, camouflaging of military supplies necessary to remain alive, and can compel a diversion of combat troops to protect lines of communications and supply installations. They can require a similar diversion of troops to neutralize guerrilla action, foisted upon us by unidentified enemy agents among them. They can do all this and more. They can all but stop a military operation in its tracks, unless proper action is taken to anticipate and plan in advance such O.C. controls, as a part of the military action, as will effectively counteract these otherwise probable conditions.

The commander's operations are not limited to civil control and relief. In coordination with U.S. civilians are screened to insure the detection of enemy agents and the prevention of sabotage and rear area disruption. Local civil defense and damage control activities are coordinated with those of U.S. forces. Steps are taken to enforce directives and maintain a condition of law and order among civilians. Public health and sanitation are kept under surveillance to insure the prevention of epidemic diseases that might affect the combat effectiveness of our armed forces. Information media are exploited to inform the civil populace of the purposes and aims of United States effort, and to improve the relations between our forces and the people of the country with which we are at war. Resources of the country are mobilized in support of military requirements, as well as minimum essential civilians.
needs— and certainly not least, the extensive CAMG organization, functioning constantly at the grass roots level, constitutes an effective source of information and intelligence of importance to the combat effort.

HUMAN NATURE REMAINS THE SAME

To summarize, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, "Although weapons change, human nature remains the same" is a fact which greatly increases the problem of the future combat commander.

Modern nuclear weapons and highly technical military forces require mobilization of the full industrial and resource potential of a nation involved in war. Even the threat of their use affects not only whole nations but international balances as well. Under such conditions, the combat commander must conduct his operations with full recognition of the effect upon the population involved and their political, economic and governmental structures, if ultimate victory is, in fact, to be achieved.

Successful military commanders throughout history, such as Julius Caesar and Alexander, recognized the problem of controlling the populace and took measures appropriate to the stage of weapons development of their time to cope with it. On the other hand, outstanding examples of less fortunate military leaders who could not adapt are found in the experiences of Napoleon I and Hitler, in their Russian campaigns.

As we look ahead to the atomic age, the combat commander's mission remains the same. The new elements introduced, however, are the vast numbers of human beings affected by the extent, and, when nuclear weapons are used, the intensity of the operation. Such conditions will demand the development and use of the most efficient CAMG organization which can be devised, in order to cope with the characteristics implicit in atomic warfare, which include:

Balance and flexibility in our armed forces.
A continuing need for conventional forces.
Necessity to be prepared to cope with aggression of varying forms.
Essentiality of the Army in gaining our postwar objectives.
Continuing search to insure maximum combat effectiveness.
Extreme mobility of self-contained battle groups which are deployed over wide areas in great depth.
Increased need for accurate intelligence and surveillance over unoccupied areas.
Forces which must be able to concentrate rapidly, attack hard, and disperse quickly.

Great reliance on air transport.

MEETING THE CAMG REQUIREMENTS

Some proposed measures for meeting the CAMG requirements of the Atomic Age are as follows:

1. G3 staff sections and CAMG units must be included in the combat commander's force. Military personnel throughout the services must be indoctrinated in the CAMG capabilities, in order to provide the balanced force needed to carry out the commander's mission.

2. The operational nature of CAMG must be reflected throughout military doctrine; the G3-G5 relationship must be understood by commanders and planners.

3. G5(CAMG) representation should be established on Military Assistance Advisory Groups in order to develop a capability within indigenous armies to conduct CAMG operations.

4. Close liaison should be maintained between agencies concerned with our relations with other peoples such as the Foreign Service, ICA, USIA, UN - in order to make maximum use of techniques developed and smooth out transition of authority problems.

5. Development of an appreciation of the need of the field commander for clearly defined national objectives and policies.

6. Encouragement of the development of a viable doctrine to counteract communist propaganda.

7. Making maximum use of the free intellectual and religious traditions of the U.S. in combating communism and gaining our postwar objectives.

8. Increasing CAMG personnel efficiency by:

a. Maintaining a continuing research program in order to develop new techniques, procedures, testing criteria and detection of new research areas.

b. Placing emphasis during training on

(i) The role of CAMG in combat operations, development of plans, orders, and annexes.
(2) Problem solving methods and techniques.

(3) Cultural and environmental factors affecting the relationship between our military and local governments and peoples.

(4) Procedures for allocating manpower and resources.

9. Emphasizing CAMG orientation in all branch service schools.

10. The problem of training CAMG personnel in area characteristics and language will be greatly magnified during the Atomic Age because of the wide areas of great depth which are contemplated. To meet this requirement area documentation will have to be kept current and extremely concise. Also, every effort will have to be made to designate early the areas of deployment in order that the language training requirements may be met.

11. It is essential that CAMG plans, units and staff sections be included in all maneuvers and CPX's, in order that organizational and doctrinal developments within the Army may provide the combat commander of the future with the capability to handle his CAMG responsibilities.

12. Increased emphasis should be placed on CAMG intelligence training, including the estimate of the situation and intelligence collection plan.

13. The indigenous public safety organization should be extended throughout the unoccupied areas as far as practicable, to act as a guerrilla and subversive force deterrent.

14. Increased emphasis should be placed on refugee control in order to prevent interference with ground mobility.

In conclusion, the critical point of atomic warfare will hinge on the combat commander's ability to exploit the advantage gained from the use of the weapon. With the chaotic conditions envisioned, his ability to handle the multitudinous problems—technical, ideological, logistical—posed by the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the difference between his success or failure. It is for this task that CAMG is organized. It is a profound command responsibility. It behooves all of us to develop a better understanding within our military establishment of CAMG activities, and to implement the objectives in war and in peace.