Address on the Geneva Conference before the American Bar Association's regional meeting

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ADDRESS BY SEN. STROM THURMOND (D-SC) TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S BIG SEVEN REGIONAL MEETING AT THE NETHERLAND PLAZA HOTEL IN CINCINNATI, OHIO, FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1955.

Optimism is a general characteristic of the American people. This is true of the individual American and it has been true also of America as a nation.

I am glad we have retained this optimism in spite of our experiences which have proved that we must be strong militarily. Optimism is good, but it must be tempered by experience.

Our experience in the realm of international affairs has, or should have, taught us that preparedness is a prime requisite for dealing with nations that are apparently less concerned with peace than we are.

As our President plans to meet with the prime ministers of England, France and Russia, we should temper our optimism with the salt of past experience.

We should not, and must not, expect all our difficulties with other nations to be resolved by this meeting. Rather, we should expect little and be grateful for any small successes attained.
Winston Churchill was realistic regarding England's relations with Russia in 1941, even as he joined hands with Stalin to fight Hitler as a common enemy. When Hitler disregarded their treaty of 2 years and invaded Russia, this is what Churchill told Britain:

"No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have been/ for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay/no word that I have spoken about it." But, he continued..."Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid."

President Eisenhower also knows the Russians(by experience). He has expressed a realistic view of the proposed meeting of the Big Four.

On May 11, the President told his news conference:

"Trying to reach a clarification of issues, if such a thing is possible, is so important/that you can't stand on any other principles except to do your utmost/ as you preserve your own strength of position, as long as you are not sacrificing, as long as you are not expecting too much..."
That is realistic. The United States and a world that desires lasting peace would gain nothing/if we go into the Big Four meeting expecting too much, and consequently, concede too much, in an effort to arrive at an agreement/which in the end might be worse/than no agreement at all.

Our people should be united behind our President/in his efforts for world peace. Partisan politics must be kept out. World peace/is more important/than any political party.

As we discuss this search for peace, let us review our relations with Russia.

Russia's Bolsheviks chose the height of World War I/to seize the government. This permitted the Germans to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front in November 1917/and to intensify her attacks on the West.

But on January 9, 1918, when President Wilson announced his Fourteen Points as a basis for peace, he included Russia. His sixth point provided for the"evacuation of Russian territory/and the independent determination by Russia/of her own political development and national policy."
Outside interference has not prevented Russian self-determination. But the Communists have never been willing for other peoples to have the same right.

In the fifteen years between the end of World War I and diplomatic recognition of Russia in 1933, the Soviets transformed a weak government, born in revolution, into a strong and aggressive dictatorship under Stalin. Even then, the Communists had infiltrated other nations of the world.

But in the agreement under which the United States extended diplomatic recognition, Russia agreed to "restrain all persons... under its direct or indirect control... from any agitation or propaganda having as an aim... the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the United States."

Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, soon reported "evidence of violations" and such evidence has continued even to this date. Such bad faith on the part of Russia is the cause of continuing world tension.

All of us recall the disbelief and horror with which we heard in 1939 of the Soviet invasion of Poland and Finland.
However, at that time the actions of the Soviets were somewhat subordinated by Hitler's invasions of Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France. To us the greater danger at that time was the mad man in Germany.

When Hitler attacked Russia, his ally in 1941, we thought the Soviets would soon fold up as the Czar's Army had in 1917. But, as the war progressed, we realized that Hitler had taken on a tough and ruthless foe.

On August 14, 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter. It embodied what came to be known as the Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and religion and freedom from want and fear. The United States and Great Britain pledged themselves to fight for those rights for all peoples, and to seek the establishment of peace on that basis. Territorial rights and self-determination were guaranteed to all nations.

The Atlantic Charter stood as a beacon of hope to all subjugated peoples, and Russia subscribed to the principles of the Charter in a joint declaration.
on January 1, 1942, of the United Nations fighting against Germany.

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Tehran in November and December 1943. They issued a statement on December 6 which declared:

"The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom are at one with the government of Iran in the desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran."

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met again in Yalta, and following that conference, issued a report on February 12, 1945, which said in part:

"Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world."

At Yalta, Stalin also joined in a reaffirmation of the principles stated in
On July 17, 1945, after the defeat of Germany, President Truman, and Prime Ministers Stalin and Churchill met in Potsdam. After the British elections, Mr. Atlee, who had accompanied Churchill, replaced him. Also present were Foreign Secretaries Byrnes, Eden, and Molotov. Again stating their unanimity of purpose, the Big Three issued a report saying:

"...It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world." 

This agreement pledged that "all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany." A Council of Foreign Ministers was established for the purpose of doing the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements with Germany and her
The conference took up many other important questions: unification of Austria, the Polish frontier, reparations, the desirability of concluding peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania, the withdrawal of troops from Iran, etc.

On July 26, 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, the Big Three issued a proclamation calling on Japan to surrender and setting forth the terms. The meeting ended on August 2, and the Soviets declared war on Japan six days later. That was two days after the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Japan.

Russia, in her declaration of war on Japan, became a party to the terms of surrender which had stated the determination of the Allies to carry out the terms of the Cairo agreement. The Cairo agreement had been entered into by Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek in November, 1943. It said in part:

"The United States, Great Britain and China are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan...It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped..."
of all the islands in the Pacific/which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China... The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

In December, 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes and Foreign Ministers Bevin of Great Britain and Molotov of Russia met in Moscow. At this first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, they reached agreement on the preparation of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

They also agreed on the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan. The principal function of this Commission was to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender" might be accomplished.
Korea was specifically provided for by the establishment of a Joint Commission "with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government..." The Commission was charged with "assisting ...the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

On China, the Foreign Ministers agreed "as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government... They re-affirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China."

In that same report of December 27, 1945, Foreign Secretaries Byrnes, Bevin and Molotov/recommended that the United Nations General Assembly establish a Commission/"to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters." Specified in this proposal was the establishment of "effective safeguards by way of
inspection and other means/to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions."

At the London meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in January, 1946, the resolution for the establishment of a U. N. Commission on control of atomic energy was adopted unanimously--Russia included.

But even while the Soviets were making agreements, they were in the process of breaking them.

In spite of her pledge in 1943 to respect the territorial integrity of Iran and in spite of a treaty of 1927 between Iran and Russia, the Soviets violated their pledges by refusing to withdraw troops from Iran at the end of World War II. The Soviets would not respond to reminders and persuasion. Secretary of State Byrnes, speaking for the United States in the United Nations Security Council in January 1946, denounced the failure of Russia to comply with her agreement.

Only then, under pressure and possible fear of direct action, did Russia remove her troops. But, the Soviets continued to
broadcast vicious attacks on the Iranian Government in support of the Azerbaijan separatists and the illegal Tudeh party.

In Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, Russia has violated directly and indirectly many agreements and provisions of the Balkan Treaties, which were ratified September 15, 1947. The Soviets have in many instances condoned, and in others abetted, violations of the treaties and the Moscow Agreement. Russia has made these countries her satellites.

In Poland the situation has been much the same. The Polish election of 1947 fully bore out the fears our observers had expressed prior to the voting. Of the 444 deputies elected to the Parliament, only 28 places were secured by the Polish Peasant Party, which is believed to represent a majority of the people.

The Communists also have tried to subvert larger governments, like Italy and France, since the end of World War II.

What happened in Korea is too recent and too sorry a story to require details. Soviet support of the so-called Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea above the 38th parallel cost the lives of thousands of
American fighting men in the war launched under Soviet sponsorship in 1950. Russia has completely disregarded her obligations of the Cairo and Moscow agreements to permit the Koreans unity and self-government.

Russia has refused to comply with many obligations in the Far East/including those toward Japan. So, in 1951 the United States concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan. Only in recent days has Russia been courting Japanese favor in conferences in London. The Japanese should demand full explanation of what happened to the 369,000 prisoners taken by Russia.

Russia left substantial military supplies to the Communists in Manchuria/after the short period in which she participated in the Pacific war. Nationalist China, therefore, owes no thanks to Russia for the aid which helped the Reds take over the government. Apparently Russia's pledge in the 1945 declaration from Potsdam/to restore the Pescadores and Formosa to the National government/means nothing to the Soviets, in view of recent threats by the Red Chinese to seize these islands.
Developments in Europe also are of vital concern to us as we look toward the Big Four meeting on July 18.

In Germany, we tried for nearly 10 years to have Russia agree to establish a unified nation under a democratic government. They refused every plea. They tried to force us out of Berlin and failed only because of the success of the air lift in 1948. The conclusion of a peace treaty with West Germany by the United States and France has awakened the Soviets. Chancellor Adenauer has been invited to Moscow to discuss "normalization of relations" between Germany and Russia. The invitation also indicates the Soviets are now willing to consider the unification of Germany.

We can only conclude that our treaty with West Germany spurred the Soviets to action in an effort to neutralize all of Germany. Our treaty with Germany also was the probable cause of Russia's willingness to sign an Austrian treaty.

Previously, Russia resisted for nearly 10 years all efforts of the United States and the United Nations to end the occupation of Austria by conclusion of a peace treaty. Again the evident purpose of her sudden
agreement was to create a neutral state and prevent our making a separate treaty with Austria.

Only two weeks ago, Russian Communist Party Chief Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin flew to Yugoslavia to mend relations with the independent Communist state. At the end of the visit, there was little to comfort the United States in the official statements issued from Belgrade. Certainly the gap between Russia and Yugoslavia was narrowed, and not widened, by the bowing and scraping of the top Communists to Tito.

We have provided nearly a billion dollars in aid to Tito since 1948. There is no justification for us to continue to supply the military machine of ANY Communist dictator unless he pledges himself as an ally. Spenders of our funds must also be defenders of our position in world affairs.

An effort has been made to lull us into optimism during the past 10 days by the release of the American airmen who had been held in Red China. We owe no gratitude to the Red Chinese for "trying and expelling" these men. Red China slaughtered thousands of Americans in Korea who would have lived, had not the Reds supplied North Korea and
sent troops to help our foe.

In view of the violations I have cited and many others by the Soviets, what course must we follow at the Big Four Meeting?

1. We must not be led into making concessions which might be construed to violate any of the agreements or treaties to which we are a party.

2. We must not consent to any new agreements which have any possibility of being labeled as appeasement.

3. We should not consider the admission of Red China to membership in the United Nations. The Chinese Communists seized China by force and have denied self-determination to the Chinese. The Reds could not have done this without outside assistance. She should be reminded of her obligations under the Cairo and Potsdam agreements that Formosa and the Pescadores belong to Nationalist China.

4. We must again call upon Russia to join us in restoring unity and political self-determination to Germany, Korea and the satellite nations.

5. We must exercise the utmost care in dealing with the Soviets on the subject.
of atomic energy. On December 27, 1945, Secretaries Byrnes, Bevin and Molotov issued their report from the Second Moscow Conference recommending the establishment of a United Nations Commission for international control of atomic energy. The following January, in London, the U. N. established the Commission.

Then, on June 14, 1946, Mr. Bernard Baruch presented the proposal of the United States to create an International Development Authority, which would control the development of atomic energy by a system of inspection.

Through six months and 70 meetings, the U. N. Commission and its committees sought the co-operation of the Soviets. Finally, the plan was presented to the Security Council, in spite of the lack of co-operation. The vote was 10 to 0 in favor of the Baruch Plan/ with Russia and Poland abstaining.

Because of Soviet non-cooperation, we are as far from agreement with the Russians on international control and development of atomic energy as we were nine years ago.

We must be sure that any plan the Soviets might propose on this subject now/
is not a trap. Only through the right of international inspection of the facilities of all nations/could we hope to have real control of atomic energy. We must emphasize this point over and over to the world.

6. The United States should insist that the meetings at the conference of the Big Four/be open to representatives of all news media. The peoples of the world/whose fate is at stake/have the right to know/all the Big Four does.

We can not prevent the Soviets/from breaking the agreements they make with us and other nations. But we can and must/establish safeguards around the conference, to make certain the world knows/just what is agreed to at the meeting, or why no decision is reached, is none is.

We have gained nothing by secrecy/in dealing with other nations. I believe we have lost prestige. Little nations have suspected and accused the large nations/of having no interest/except self-interest. We still argue over the results of some such conferences.

Open meetings/would protect our representatives against charges based on
lack of knowledge of what happened at the conference.

When Wilson announced his Fourteen Points, he called first for "open covenants, openly arrived at."

History should have taught us that had we always followed this policy, we would not have been so vulnerable to the propaganda attacks of our enemies. Military security is the one justification for secrecy. Military security is not a consideration at the Big Four meetings. Russia will know all that is said and done. The world should know. If Russia dooms the conference to failure, the world should have no doubt as to where the responsibility lies.

We do not know how much time is left to us to attain a basis for world peace or, failing, face atomic war. The United States must always be willing to negotiate for peace and a better world. There is no doubt this is the objective of the President as he approaches the Big Four Conference. If any step can be taken on that road, in
the road to enduring peace, I am confident that he will lead us on that road, in spite of the barriers which have been erected by the Communists since our alliance with them in World War II.

The End