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U.S.-Taiwan Economic And Military Relations
In The Context Of American Presidential Administrations, 1949-2008

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By

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FOREWORD

Literally, hundreds of books, articles, research studies and media stories have been written about U.S. - Taiwan (Republic of China on Taiwan) relations covering every facet of that relationship—military, economic, cultural, historical, political and philosophical, many in the time frame of centuries while others concentrate a limited number of years and specific subjects.

This study takes a somewhat different approach. Chronological time is divided into American presidential administrations and their policies with respect to Taiwan's political status, its economy, and military capabilities.

Two individuals have played a large role with respect to Taiwan's place in the international community—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist Government since 1928 and Mao Zedong, leader and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1934.

Beginning with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, seven American presidents have dealt with these two leaders. For over 30 years after the end of World War II, Chiang and Mao were key players in shaping American foreign and military policies in East Asia. Ironically, both died within a year of one another, i.e., 1975 and 1976. Their deaths, however, did not end the conflict between the two Chinas and the continuing role of the United States in preventing a major war in the Taiwan Strait.

In some presidential administrations, programs and policies in other than East Asia are discussed, the purpose being to widen the context in which East Asia policy was made. Examples include President Harry Truman's policies in post World War II Europe, President H.W. Bush's policies in the Middle East—the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq's occupation, and President Lyndon Johnson's policies during the Vietnam War.

Chapter headings include the names of the key Republic of China and People's Republic of China leaders during a particular presidential administration. Appendix A is a map of Taiwan and nearby coastlines. Appendix B and C are short biographies of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. Appendix D is a summary of the Taiwan Relations Act. Several content footnotes also discuss non East Asia events and policies.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

CCP — Chinese Communist Party
DMZ — Demilitarized Zone Between North and South Korea
DPRK — Democratic People's Republic of Korea
KPA — North Korean Army
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NV — North Vietnamese Army
PLA — People's Liberation Army
PRC — People's Republic of China
ROC — Republic of China
ROK — Republic of Korea
SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SEATO — Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
In the immediate post World War II period (1945-48) the military and economic policies of President Truman and his chief advisor, Secretary of State General George C. Marshall were concentrated on Europe—The Marshall Plan (1947) which focused on reviving the economies of Western Europe and containing the expansionist efforts of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. In this regard, President Truman is quoted as stating that the Russians only understood an "iron fist," a position that was solidified with his statement to Congress (March 1947) that America's responsibility was to advance freedom and resist totalitarianism, meaning, of course, the Soviet Union. This was followed by a call for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine). In 1948 President Truman countered the blockade of Berlin (1) by a massive U.S. airlift of supplies of every kind to the city. The success of the airlift convinced Joseph Stalin, then head of the Soviet Communist Party, to accept diplomatic efforts to end blockade. The year 1949 also saw the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance composed of the United States and 11 European countries. It would seem fair to say that President Truman's containment policy in Europe, without a major war, was a success.

Europe had settled into a "cold war" mode. The communist bloc, lead by the Soviet Union, included most of Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Poland and East Germany. To the West was NATO led by the United States. For the next 40 years Europe's boundaries would remain relatively stable.

In the East Asia the long, drawn out conflict between the Chinese Communist party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek for control of mainland China ended on October 1, 1949 when Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China, naming Beijing as its capital. By then an estimated 1.5 - 2 million nationalists and nationalists forces had fled to Taiwan and established the Republic of China with Taipei as its capital and with the avowed goal of retaking the Mainland.

In April of 1950 PRC forces captured Hainan Island and by August the only territories under control of the Nationalists was Taiwan and the islands of Penghu, Quemoy, Matsu and Lanyu. See map in Appendix A. By the end of 1949, President Truman and his new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, not only had to contend with a divided Germany but also a divided China. (2)

The initial Truman administration policy with respect to Taiwan was ambivalent—on the one hand it had to contend with a pro Chiang Kai-shek "China lobby," and on the other a U.S. Joint Chief of Staff statement (1949) that "the strategic importance of Taiwan does not justify
overt military action." This statement supported Secretary of State Acheson's policy of non-intervention but was somewhat contradictory since the U.S. opposed PRC admission to the United Nations, in essence recognizing the ROC as the continuing government of China.

Further complicating America's far eastern policy was Mao Zedong's avowed intent to become an ally of the Soviet Union, ending in a December 1949 visit to Moscow with the purpose of negotiating a military and economic assistance agreement. A thirty-year pact was signed on February 14, 1950 by which the Soviet Union agreed to supply technical assistance and a $300 million dollar loan.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman made it abundantly clear that the United States would not take sides in China's continuing civil war, aid the nationalists in any way, nor dispute that Taiwan was a part of China. Five days later on January 12th Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a speech before the National Press Club, drew a strategic American defense line running south from the Aleutians, including Japan and the Philippines. Taiwan and South Korea were omitted. (3) This policy, however, would take a 180 degree turn when, on June 25th, North Korea launched a massive, cross border, attack on South Korea.

Two days after the attack (June 27th), President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Straits of Formosa, i.e. prevent an attack on Taiwan by the People's Republic of China or an ROC attack on mainland China, the latter an oft-stated goal of Chiang Kai-shek. This part of Truman's Straits Policy, restraining the ROC, was severely criticized by some in the media and by those in the Republican Party in particular. The President's initial response was to assure (by air cover) the safe evacuation of American civilians followed by a commitment of U.S. ground, naval and air forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. There were two goals. First, to repel the North Korean onslaught and second to secure a UN resolution condemning the attack by North Korea. On July 7th a UN resolution gave the United States command of all UN forces in Korea. Nineteen nations contributed to this UN force, the main contributions being a British Commonwealth division and a Turkish brigade.

The Korean War was initially fought by the Korean People's Army (KPA) with much of its military hardware (mainly tanks), supplied by the Soviet Union. It is unclear as to the extent that the Soviet Union and Mao were involved in the decision to invade the South Korea. Clear, however, is that North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, would not have attacked without the tacit approval of Stalin and Mao. In the early stages of the conflict, Mao's China was not extensively involved. Nor were there any indications of any planned extensive involvement. (Reportedly several small units of the Red Army had volunteered to fight with the North Koreans.) But this was to change.

The offer by Chiang Kai-shek of 33,000 troops to fight in Korea (initially accepted by President Truman but later turned down), the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, strong support for the Nationals by the China Lobby in the United States, together with President Truman's harsh rhetoric about aggressors, alarmed Mao's government with respect to U.S. war aims. The Chinese government on September 30th warned that China
would enter the war on the side of North Korea if UN forces continued their drive toward the Yalu River, China's border with North Korea. President Truman called the warning attempted black mail.

The success of the Inchon landing by General MacArthur's forces, together with the breakout of the Pusan bridgehead by General Walton Walker's Eighth Army, left no doubt that the UN forces were capable of defeating the North Korean Army and, if they chose, eventually occupying all of the Korean peninsula.

On October 7, 1950 the UN General Assembly by a 47-5 vote, endorsed a U.S. proposal that stated that the UN's objective was to establish a "unified, independent democratic government" in all of Korea. A week later the Chinese Army crossed the Yalu River and prepared to attack approaching UN forces.

On October 15th, at the request of President Truman, a meeting was arranged between the President and General MacArthur on Wake Island. Among the items discussed was whether the Chinese would massively intervene on the side of North Korea. MacArthur considered it unlikely given the logistical problems the Chinese would face in such an undertaking. Other items discussed were the anticipated peace treaty with Japan, and aid to rehabilitate South Korea. Not discussed was Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government on Taiwan and the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet. President Truman considered the conference as "very satisfactory."

At the end of October the presence of large People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces in Korea was confirmed when Republic of Korea (ROK) troops and later UN forces were engaged and defeated near the Yalu River. Chinese intervention by an estimated 300,000 (volunteers), later growing close to one million, was successful in retaking Pyongyang, North Korea's capital.

As the Chinese advanced toward the 38th parallel recriminations abounded as to who was responsible for the retreat, as well as numerous, unfounded, rumors concerning morale of UN forces. To block the communist advance in depth defense positions were established by General Matthew Ridgeway, now commanding the Eighth Army. A stable line was established near the initial border between the two Koreas.

On December 30th General MacArthur outlined his plans to salvage the Korean debacle. Proposals included a blockade of the China coast, attacks on China's industrial centers, accept ROC forces in Korea and support Chiang Kai-shek's attacks on mainland China. These proposals were rejected in Washington.

The continuing, off heated, disagreements between MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo and Truman advisors in Washington came to an end on April 11, 1951 when Truman relieved MacArthur of his command, a decision that had wide support in Europe but evoked a firestorm of criticism in the United States. Supporters of MacArthur included much of the mainstream press, a majority in Congress, as well as wide support by American citizens. There
were calls for the impeachment of President Truman and, at the same time, a swelling of public support for MacArthur as President. On his return to the United States MacArthur was invited to address a joint session of Congress.

While Truman is given deserved credit for his use of the atom bomb against Japan and his European policies, his policies in the run up to the Korean War were treated less kindly by historians.
CHAPTER II

Chiang Kai-shek (Republic of China) – 1953 – 1961
Mao Zedong (People’s Republic of China) – 1953 – 1961

As part of a campaign pledge (“I will go to Korea”) made in the 1952 presidential campaign, President Elect Eisenhower visited South Korea in December 1952. His chief purpose was to determine a means to end the Korean War, a war increasingly unpopular with the American public. Adding to this political unrest was the stalemated truce talks that had been ongoing since July 1951. A main problem in this respect was the repatriation of war prisoners. Many People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Korean People’s Army (KPA) prisoners refused repatriation to their respective countries. The UN Peace Mission was adamant in refusing to apply force with respect to repatriation.

Continuation of the conflict was taking a heavy toll on the PLA, not only in casualties but continuing logistical problems including transport that was under constant UN air attacks. Re-supplying military hardware and other war materials, including food, clothing and other necessities for the individual soldier, was difficult even under the best of conditions. War weariness among communist political leaders was also taking a toll.

Fighting came to an end with the July 27, 1953 armistice, one that included a statement calling for a continuation of peace talks between the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and North and South Korea. A panel of neutral nations was tasked with solving the repatriation problem. A two and one half mile wide demilitarization zone (DMZ) was established roughly along the 38th parallel dividing the two Koreas. And while fighting had ended in Korea, the Chinese Civil War continued unabated.

Less than a month after his inauguration President Eisenhower reversed President Truman’s Taiwan Straits policy. No longer would the U.S. Seventh Fleet neutralize the Straits. In many quarters this new policy was interpreted as “unleashing Chiang Kai-shek” in his quest to retake mainland China. A strongly pro ROC policy, one that included military aid, and continued discussions within the Eisenhower administration about the use of nuclear weapons, undoubtedly played a large part in pressuring Mao to accept the July 1953 armistice.

The Nationalist Government on Taiwan was quick to applaud Eisenhower’s election. Together with Republican control of both houses of Congress; with the American public solidly in support of the new Taiwan policy; a firm commitment by Eisenhower that the Nationalists retain their UN membership while denying Red China admittance to that organization; increased military aid, and a pro ROC American press, was read by Chiang’s government as tacit support for attacking and retaking mainland China. It was a serious misreading of American policy in the Western Pacific.
It soon became plain that the Eisenhower Administration was unwilling to support a
Nationalist invasion of the mainland with the possibility of involving the United States in a
war with China. Military aid to defend Taiwan was conditioned on a pledge by Chiang not to
use American supplied military equipment, in particular fighter jets, to attack Mao's China.
Together with Chiang's agreement to respect American wishes and a general consensus among
American military leaders that Chiang did not have the present or near future military
capability to invade the Mainland, quieted any fear that the United States could be drawn into
a war with the People's Republic of China.

As 1953 came to an end, and while not stated publicly, there was a significant amount of
criticism and a general unhappiness with America's new Taiwan policy. In the Nationalist's
view, it was a return to the Truman administration's "Two China" policy. (4)

With the Nationalists retreat to Taiwan mainland China's offshore islands became areas of
conflict between ROC forces and the People's Liberation Army. The two islands most in
contention were Quemoy and Mazu, both located about 100 miles to the west of Taiwan.
Chiang had heavily fortified both islands intending to use them as a springboard for an
invasion of the mainland. By August of 1954 the Nationalists had in excess of 70,000 troops
on Quemoy and Mazu which, in turn, lead to heavy shelling of the islands by the PLA in
September.

The policy of the Eisenhower administration continued to be one of support for Taiwan
independence but at the same time avoiding all out war with China, Taiwan being considered
a major part of a defense line running from South Korea south to Australia. To implement this
strategy, the United States took the lead in creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) which included the United Kingdom, France, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia,
New Zealand and Pakistan. The treaty was signed on September 8, 1954 and became
operational in February 1955. Headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand, the treaty considered an
attack on one member to be a major concern of all members. To the extent that member states
would commit forces should such an attack occur was an open question. As a part of this
strategy and a warning to the PRC (including the threat to use nuclear weapons) the United
States Congress on January 1955 passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the Eisenhower
administration to use force, if necessary, to defend the ROC and islands held by the ROC.
This resolution was followed by a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the
Republic of China. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 9, 1955.

In May the PLA ceased shelling Quemoy and Mazu. For the next three years the ROC and
PLA continued to build up their forces on their respective sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the
United States, President Eisenhower was preparing his 1956 bid for reelection. Following his
election to a second term, the President continued his support for Taiwan independence as
being necessary to contain the spread of communism and subversion in Asia.

In August of 1958 the PLA resumed its shelling of Quemoy and Matzu. This time is was a
massive, 24 hour a day attack. The ROC response was costly in terms of casualties and it
became plain that they were overmatched and in need of American military assistance. Under
terms of the 1954 mutual defense treaty, Eisenhower responded by ordering the U.S. Seventh
Fleet to secure supply lines from Taiwan to the offshore islands. Military assistance included
replacing ROC artillery with more modern American howitzers, equipping ROC fighter planes
(F-86) with sidewinder air-to-air missiles. This capability proved decisive is providing ROC air
cover over the contested islands. It is unclear whether Mao asked for Soviet intervention in
addition to the MIG fighters already provided. Probably the oft-stated U.S. threat to use
nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan counted large in Soviet policy with respect to its role as an
ally of the PRC. In October the PLA, faced with a standoff and a diminished military
capability, bombardment of the two ROC held islands slackened and for all intent and
purpose ended the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on American terms.

In 1959 the United States proposed a 19-point economic development plan with the aim of
making Taiwan less dependent on American aid. The plan called for improved opportunities
for capital ventures, increased savings by the Taiwanese people, reform of the tax structure and
modernizing the banking system. The plan was approved by the Nationalist Government in
January 1960.

Toward the end of his second term in office, President Eisenhower made a number of foreign
visits. Two of these were to Asia. In June of 1960 the President made official visits to Taiwan
and the Philippines. In Taipei, capital of the Republic of China, he was warmly greeted by
large, enthusiastic crowds, reviewed and honor guard with President Chiang Kai-shek, that was
followed by a state dinner hosted by President and Madam Chiang Kai-shek. His legacy in the
Western Pacific was a free and democratic South Korea, a Taiwan, while still under military
law, but one evolving into a capitalist and more free society, and a People's Republic of China
showing a continued interest in better relations with the United States.
When John F. Kennedy was inaugurated the 35th President of the United States American military and economic policy in the Western Pacific included:

- A firm American commitment, supported by both political parties, to defend the ROC on Taiwan and its seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Large increases in economic and military aid to be continued.
- A Chiang Kai-shek government determined to retake mainland China, hopefully with American military assistance and blessing.
- An increasingly unstable People's Republic of China government following Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward program. Consequences included a severe food shortage of raw materials and, most important, a mismanagement of the country's emerging manufacturing base.

In April of 1959 Mao resigned as Chairman of the PRC but continued as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Another result of the failed Great Leap Forward policy was chaos in the management of the defense establishment that ended with "hard liners" in charge of military policy.

- A continued ideology and foreign policy split between the PRC and the USSR. In mid 1959 the Soviet Union had cancelled almost all of its economic and military aid to the PRC. The Nationalists on Taiwan viewed this split between the two communist powers as being favorably significant with respect to Chiang's "retake the mainland" policy. It did not, however, change the Eisenhower policy of restraining Chiang's ambitions, i.e. American military aid to the ROC was designed to defend Taiwan, not to increase the military capability of Chiang to attack the mainland.

President Kennedy continued the Eisenhower policy of containment with respect to the two Chinas, that is, make it perfectly clear that the PRC (and the Soviet Union) understood that the United States would continue to supply military and economic assistance and would defend the ROC from a direct attack by mainland China. Also understood that the Unite States would basically limit its arms assistance to defense type weapons (as if was that clear with respect to the difference of what weapons were offensive and defensive).

As the new Kennedy administration fell into place, some in the administration pushed for a reconsideration of American policy with respect to the People's Republic of China. Notably,
open disarmament talks as between the ROC and PRC, selectively issue visas to PRC officials, and not impede UN recognition of the People's Republic of China.

Those in the Kennedy administration that, at one time or another, sought some sort of dialog with the PRC included Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, Chester Bowles, Walt Restow, Director of State Department Policy Planning, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. (5) President Kennedy, however, did not want to risk pressuring Chiang Kai-shek to the extent that the Nationalist Government might become unstable leading to outcomes not consistent with U.S. policy in the Western Pacific. The President's policy was to continue maintaining the status quo.

It was generally known that many within the ROC Government, probably including Chiang Kai-shek, had a latent distrust of official Washington remembering the antagonism between Chiang and U.S. General (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell in 1942-43 and President Truman's conciliatory policy toward the PRC until the PLA entered the Korean War on the side of North Korea.

In 1961 two major problems arose as between Chiang Kai-shek and President Kennedy. The first was Nationalist irregulars staging hit and run attacks against the PRC from bases along the borders of Thailand, Burma and Laos. These irregulars numbered somewhere between eight and ten thousand, including civilians, and were supported by ROC airdrops of military supplies.

In February 1961, Burma pilots shot down two ROC aircraft taking part in the re-supply effort. This side war of the "war to retake the mainland," was not acceptable to the Kennedy administration, noting Burma's sovereignty and the real possibility of a wider conflict in Asia. The always present threat of decreasing or ending military aid to the ROC convinced Chiang to end the air drops and make arrangements to return the irregulars to Taiwan or for them to remain in Burma as peaceful inhabitants of that country.

The second issue arose when Soviet dominated Mongolia applied for admission to the United Nations. The Nationalist Government on Taiwan insisted that Mongolia was a part of China and that the ROC as permanent member of the UN Security Council would veto the application.

At this time the communist bloc nations had begun a major diplomatic effort to replace the ROC in the UN with the PRC. The Kennedy position that was made clear to Chiang Kai-shek was that should the ROC veto Mongolia's application, there was a real possibility that the ROC would lose its seat in the UN. The compromise proposed by President Kenney was (1) the United States would support Mongolia's application, (2) the ROC would not use its veto power to block the application, and (3) a back channel promise by President Kennedy to use the United States' veto to block the PRC's admission to the UN. In December 1961 Mongolia's application, supported by the U.S., was approved.
While Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly accepted America's wishes with respect to ROC irregular forces and Mongolia's application to the UN, he never gave up his goal of retaking the mainland China. The escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, in his view, made a strong case for American support to end communism in Asia. Undoubtedly noted by Chiang was President Kennedy's increase in the number of American advisors and special forces in South Vietnam; the proposal of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem to use ROC forces against the communists in areas with large Chinese populations, and the signing of the Sino-North Korea Mutual Aid and Cooperation Agreement.

In early 1962, Chiang again proposed joint ROC-U.S. action against the People's Republic of China, specifically air drops of ROC paratroops on the Mainland. If, however, airdrops were to be successful it would require cargo planes like the American C-123s. Discussions in Washington and Taipei continued over the extent to which the United States would participate in these airdrops, mainly providing sufficient numbers of C-123s. One proposal was that the U.S. would provide two C-123s, flown by ROC pilots, but deny other offensive weapons, e.g. landing craft. Chiang's response was that he was prepared to go it alone without American assistance. Rhetoric, notwithstanding, it was well understood in Taipei that without U.S. aircraft, a paratroop offensive could not succeed. And while two American C-123s were prepared for delivery, a condition was that the U.S. be a party to ROC military planning, i.e., be in a position to "convince" Chiang that the United States would not participate in a second major war in Asia. American wishes prevailed, in effect ending Chiang's plans to retake the Mainland.

In summary, it could be fairly said that Eisenhower's policy of containment together with the understanding that the United States would defend Taiwan from any attack by the PRC, became, with many bumps along the way, the policy of the Kennedy administration.
CHAPTER IV


Upon taking office, President Johnson was no stranger with respect to the Kennedy Administration's policies toward Taiwan. In 1961, then Vice President Johnson visited Taipei, capital of the Republic of China (Taiwan). His visit, among others from official Washington, was meant to show continued Administration support with regard to American economic and military aid as well as support for ROC membership in the United Nations.

President Johnson inherited Kennedy Administration policies with respect to Taiwan and South Vietnam at a time when there was a movement, in and outside of Washington, for a more tolerant American policy toward the People's Republic of China in spite of PRC support of North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in its attempt to unify Vietnam by infiltration and military aid from the PRC and Soviet Union. In 1963, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey visited Taipei for the same reasons as the Johnson visit in 1961.

During President Johnson's second term (January 20, 1965-January 20, 1969) the Vietnam War became an increasingly American war. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization nations contributed relatively little in the way of economic aid and military forces, while the Republic of China became a de facto ally of South Vietnam and the United States. ROC assistance to South Vietnam included air transport support, special reconnaissance missions and providing military training units. Economic and technical assistance was primarily focused on increasing South Vietnam's agricultural output.

In May of 1967 the Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of China (Yen Chia-kan) was welcomed to Washington by the Johnson Administration. During this visit President Johnson restated his support of the Military Assistance Agreement of 1951, an agreement under which a wide range of military supplies was provided to the ROC, and the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 by which the United States would commit its military forces should the People's Republic of China undertake to invade Taiwan. The two-day meeting was cordial and complimentary with both sides agreeing on the urgency of halting communist aggression against South Vietnam.

In the election year of 1968 the Vietnam War had become increasingly unpopular in the United States with demonstrations nationwide, the most publicized being at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. A mostly hostile American media prone to reporting North Vietnam successes while downplaying or ignoring American achievements, convinced President Johnson not to seek another term in office.
In this same year the Republic of China on Taiwan had become progressively stronger in both economic and militarily terms. Chiang Kai-shek, while still firmly in control of Taiwan's military and economic policies, continued to embrace market and political reforms. One indication of Taiwan's growing prosperity was the phasing out of direct American economic aid, such being replaced by a ROC-American fund whose aim was to further advance economic and social programs such as health and literacy.
As Vice President in the Eisenhower Administration, Richard Nixon was probably the best-informed and most knowledgeable Vice President in American history with respect to foreign affairs and world leaders. In this regard it was President Eisenhower's policy to send his Vice President on "fact finding" missions around the world.

In October 1953 Vice President Nixon made state visits to Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Burma, India and Iran.

On July 8, 1956 Vice President Nixon met with President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China in Taipei. During this meeting the Vice President summarized American policy with respect to the Asia Pacific region, in particular, the People's Republic of China's attempt to replace the ROC in the United Nations. In turn, Chiang reiterated his views with respect to communism in Asia. His main point (to be conveyed to President Eisenhower) was that American policy with respect to the PRC should remain firm and uncompromising, despite the PRC and Soviet Union's attempt to convey a softer and less threatening foreign policy in the region. Chiang's position was that trade and official visits to mainland China would undermine the relationship between the United States and ROC as allies in containing communism in Asia and that admitting Red China to the United Nations would be a disaster of the first magnitude.

In the United States, American casualties in Vietnam, in the neighborhood of some 27,000 (6); a growing movement to end the war, including many violent demonstrations, was enough to make President Lyndon Johnson reconsider any plans for seeking reelection.

President Nixon's first goal after assuming office was to end the Vietnam War. In his 1968 presidential campaign he stressed the concept of "peace with honor," a goal that turned out to be easier said than done. President Nixon's strategy to end the war was to "Vietnamize" the conflict by gradually withdrawing U.S. forces, while at the same time strengthening South Vietnam's military capabilities.
On July 25, 1969, during a press conference in Guam, President Nixon stated his policy (Nixon Doctrine) with respect to foreign military commitments:

1. The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
2. The United States will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nations directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Coupled with Vietnamization was a policy of seeking détente with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. It was hoped that such a détente would pressure North Vietnam to end the war or negotiate a cease fire. It was a vain hope. North Vietnam's view that withdrawing American forces would leave a weakened South Vietnam, ultimately ending in a North Vietnam victory.

President Nixon's response to this intransigence was a massive bombing attack on North Vietnam military targets and ultimately mining Hanoi's harbour. Together with the above and a major NV military defeat in March of 1972, convinced the North to modify some of its conditions for a cease fire, i.e. allowing South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu to remain in office. (8)

In some instances U.S.-North Vietnam negotiations did not include the Thieu government, a policy that required constant renegotiations and amendments to any cease fire agreement that would be acceptable to South Vietnam. In January 1972 it was agreed by all sides, including a reluctant Nguyen Van Thieu, to begin negotiations leading to a cease fire. These negotiations ended with the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, approximately four years after President Nixon took office. The Accords called for the withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam.

The Nationalist Government on Taiwan role as a *de facto* ally of the United States in containing communism in Asia ended in July of 1971 when President Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, made a secret and unofficial visit to the People's Republic of China. This meeting with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai laid the groundwork for the President's later visit to the PRC on February 21st 1972 (8).

In April 1971, prior to the Kissinger visit, Chairman Mao Zedung invited the U.S. table tennis team to visit the PRC. Mao considered the invitation and visit as the beginning of better relations with the United States.
The weeklong visit of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger with CCP Chairman Mao addressed a number of outstanding issues between the two countries. Included were:

- PRC concerns about a renewed Japanese expansion in the Western Pacific, i.e. increasing influence over South Korea and Taiwan. Included was the PRC’s grave concern over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
- Continuation of American forces withdrawal from Taiwan.
- A United States pledge not to support any attempt by the Nationalist Government on Taiwan to seek independence. (9).
- A pledge that the United States would support the PRC should the continuing border clashes between the PRC and Soviet Union turned into a wider aggression action by the Soviet Union.

The visit concluded with a joint communique (Shanghai Communique) in which the two leaders agreed to work toward a normalization of diplomatic relations.

President Nixon’s 1972 visit to the PRC was not without consequences. It left behind a bitter Chiang Kai-shek who felt betrayed by Nixon’s “One China” policy in spite of attempts by the President to mollify Chiang, reiterating that the long standing cooperation between the two governments was not affected by his visit to mainland China and the follow up Shanghai Communique (10).

In May 1972 an ageing and ill Chiang appointed his son, Chiang Ching-kuo as Premier. While Chiang remained the titular head of the ROC, Chiang Ching, for all intent and purpose, was the ROC’s political leader.

Leaving a mistrustful Republic of China in the wake of the Shanghai Communique, President Nixon concentrated on domestic issues and a policy of easing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In May 1972, at the invitation of Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon made an historic visit to Moscow followed by two visits to the United States (1973 and 1974) by Secretary General Brezhnev. The 1972 visit saw the signing of the oft-delayed Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), an agreement that included the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and a limitation on the number of inter-continenetal ballistic missiles (ICBM).

With respect to Asia, President Nixon’s main legacy was the beginning of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China.
CHAPTER VI

President Gerald Rudolph Ford, Jr. – August 20, 1974–January 20, 1977
Chiang Ching Kuo (Republic of China) – 1972–1977
Zhou Enlai (People’s Republic of China) – 1951–1977

Following the resignation of President Richard Nixon, Vice President Gerald Ford was sworn in as the 38th President of the United States. In his short term of office the two individuals that had a major influence on American policy in Asia for over 50 years, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chines Communist Party, died within a year of one another. It marked the end of an era.

During President Ford's term in office the Nationalist Government on Taiwan continued to represent China in the United Nations. At the same time Ford continued President Nixon's policy of normalizing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and his policies of "Vietnamization" with respect to South Vietnam, i.e. continue withdrawal of American forces while continuing military assistance to the Thieu government.

President Ford's familiarization of the Western Pacific began with a 1974 visit to Japan, being the first American President to visit the country. A year later, in October of 1975, the President was host to Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako in Washington.

On November 29, 1975 President Ford embarked on an Asian tour that included the Philippines, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China. During his five day visit to the PRC he met with Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Ten Hsiao-ping. Ford considered the visit significant, friendly, candid and constructive.

1 Chiang Kai-shek died on April 5, 1975 after three years of declining health. His son, Chiang Ching kou became the political leader of the ROC on Taiwan in 1972.

2 In 1951, Mao Zedong appointed Zhou Enlai as Acting Premier of the PRC and Premier on the PRC in 1965. As in the case of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao's failing health left much of foreign policy relations in the hands of Zhou, in particular with respect to the Kissinger visit to the PRC in 1971.
On April 10, 1975, with NV troops ready to enter Saigon, Ford ordered the evacuation of American and high ranking South Vietnam officials. As far as the President was concerned the role of the United States in Vietnam was over. (11)

During his term in office President Ford did not visit Taiwan probably because the Nationalist Government continued to make known its displeasure, if not hostility, with respect Ford's visit to the PRC and his continuing policy of normalizing relations with that country.

Across the Taiwan Strait the Republic of China in 1975 was a far different country than the one inherited by President Eisenhower in January of 1953. It was recognized as one of Asia's four economic tigers along with Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. In 1975 the country had a population of over 16 million; an average GDP growth rate of over 7 percent and a per capita GDP of $890.00. (PRC at the time was $329) (12) The country was in the beginning of an economic transition from an almost agricultural base to a manufacturing one. Its military capability was also impressive given the size of the country, its more sophisticated components being provided by the United States, e.g. fighter aircraft.

Unlike the Eisenhower years when the Nationalist Government on Taiwan was committed to retaking mainland China, its role now was to defend the country from any PRC aggression. A important consideration in this respect was the Nixon Doctrine.
CHAPTER VII


Not since the early years of President Harry Truman (1945-50) was there an American President more dedicated to normalizing U.S.-People's Republic of China relations than President Jimmy Carter. In a run up presidential candidate debate in the 1976 election, Democrat Presidential Candidate Carter was quoted as saying the United States "frittered away" opportunities for better relations with the PRC. In his response President Ford, aware of Republican support for America's World War II ally and the still considerable political clout of the "China Lobby," took a more cautious approach to normalizing relations.

On May 1, 1977 American and PRC officials began talks leading to full diplomatic relations between the two countries. Noting the political rocks and shoals with respect to disregarding Taiwan security, President Carter made the point that the United States opposed a People's Liberation Army attack on Taiwan. In return, the U.S. would accept a "One China" policy, agreeing that Taiwan was a province of China. The response of the PRC was that it would not give up the right to use force against Taiwan, the U.S. should withdraw all of its forces from Taiwan and abrogate the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.

In a September 9, 1978 meeting the stated U.S. conditions for full diplomatic relations with the PRC were (a) The United States to maintain commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan, (b) seek a peaceful resolution to the PRC-ROC dispute, and (c) the United States would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan.

On December 15th the U.S. and PRC agreed that the United States would sever formal relations with Taiwan, end the mutual defense treaty, and withdraw all its forces from Taiwan. On January 1, 1979 full diplomatic relations were established between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

President Carter's normalizing relations with the PRC and the price paid did go unnoticed in the Congress. To return some balance with respect to U.S. Taiwan relations, the Congress overwhelmingly passed HR 2479, the Taiwan Relations Act. The vote count in the House was 339 for and 85 for in the Senate. While the President was undoubtedly against the legislation he was advised to graciously accept the will on Congress noting that a veto would most likely be overridden.

On April 10, 1979 President Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act. In signing the President noted, with approval, that the Act established an American Institute on Taiwan, a non government entity (under contract to the U.S. State Department) that would oversee U.S.
commercial and cultural interests in Taiwan. Likewise, the people of Taiwan will be represented in the United States by the Coordination Council for North American affairs. A summary of the act can be found in Appendix D of this study.

In addition to a Congress wary of his China policy, President Carter had to contend with a number of vexing domestic and international problems. Included was a stagflation and inflation economy, the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and the attendant U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, severe criticism of his decision to turnover the Panama Canal to Panama, reinstate registration for a military draft, and a motivated challenge by liberal left Senator Kennedy for leadership of the Democrat Party. Most important, however, to a Carter reelection in 1980, was the 1979-81 Iran hostage crisis, a crisis in which radical Iranian students and other anti-American groups stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking and holding 52 American employees hostage for over a year. (November 4, 1979-January 20, 1981) (13)

The taking of American hostages and the President's failed military attempt to free them, played a large part in the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States and a Reagan Administration more sympathetic to Taiwan’s security and interests.
When President Reagan was inaugurated in January 1981 it was a different world with respect to U.S.-ROC-PRC relations than that of his predecessors. The People’s Republic of China had become a trading partner with much of the Western World. Both the United States and the PRC recognized the benefits of increasing trade between them. The ROC had evolved into the ROC on Taiwan and ultimately, Taiwan. Taiwan’s earlier off-stated goal of retaking of mainland China was now a question of to what extent will the U.S. provide the Taiwan government military aid.

In a 1980 campaign speech in the runup to the November elections (Reagan vs Carter) Reagan expressed his support of Taiwan but later sent his running mate, George H W. Bush to Beijing to reassure a near hostile China that Reagan’s foreign policy was not the hard line as depicted by the Carter campaign.

China’s main concern was the continuing arms sale by the United States to Taiwan, a grievance made very plain by Premier Zhao Ziyang. As a bystander to the US-PRC negotiations, Taiwan sought assurance from the Reagan Administration with respect to the continuation of military sales to the island.

In mid 1982 the Reagan Administration gave the following six assurances to Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo.

- The United States would set no specific date for ending arm sales to Taiwan.
- The United States would stand clear of any PRC-Taiwan mediation talks.
- The US would not bring any pressure on Taiwan to reach an accommodation with the PRC.
- The US would not modify the the Taiwan Relations Act.
- The US would not change it position regarding sovereignty of Taiwan. It would acknowledge the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué which stated that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.
- If China did not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, any commitment by the United States to end arm sales to Taiwan would become null and void.

By August of 1982 President Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shulz and his team of negotiators had reached an agreement with the PRC. A joint communiqué was issued by
which the United States agreed to limit arm sales to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China would agree to seek a "peaceful solution" to the Taiwan issue.

President Reagan’s overwhelming reelection in 1984 assured that there would be little, if any, change in Sino-US relations and US-Taiwan relations during his second term of office.
President George H.W. Bush came to the Office of President of the United States with probably the most extensive political resume of any previous American President. It included:

- Chief U.S. Liaison Officer to the People's Republic of China, 1974-75. At this time the United States recognized the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, hence liaison officer instead of ambassador
- Head, United States Central Intelligence Agency
- Chairmand, Republican National Committee
- American Ambassador to the United Nations

Furthering his experience with the People's Republic of China was a trip made to that country as Vice Presidential nominee on the 1980 Reagan-Bush presidential ticket. On February 25-26, 1989 the newly elected American President visited China.

Early in his presidency, President George H.W. Bush was confronted with the Tiananmen Square Massacre in which at least 1,000 individuals were killed and possibly many more. Tanks and armored cars were used to suppress this pro democracy demonstrations. On June 5, 1989, one day following the massacre, President Bush announced major sanctions against the People's Republic of China. The massacre and the American response was the low point in U.S-PRC relaltions during the Bush administration.

If East Asia did not pay as prominent a role in American foreign policy during the presidency of George H.W. Bush it can be understood in the light of major world and national concerns elsewhere.

During the first year of his presidency Bush met with Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during a time when the old Soviet Empire was crumbling. (The Berlin Wall fell on November 9,1989). It was imperative that an understanding/ agreement between the two powers be reached with respect to arms control, especially nuclear weapons. After almost a year of negotiations the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SALT) was signed on July 1, 1991.

On December 1989, President Bush ordered American forces into Panama (Operation Just Cause) to end the reign and capture of Panamanian dictator, Manual Noreiga who had been previously indicted by the United States on drug smuggling, money laundring, and
racketeering charges. Noreiga surrendered on January 9, 1990 and was taken to the United States for trial.

Throughout his time in office, President Bush, Canada's Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari negotiated an expansion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement to include Mexico. It was signed into law on January 1, 1994 by President William Jefferson Clinton.

On August 2, 1990 the forces of Iraq Dictator, Suddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait, a small Persian Gulf state. In 1991, lead by the United States, American and UN forces freed Kuwait from Iraq occupation. American and UN forces, however, stopped short of invading Iraq, leaving the Suddam Hussein government still in power.

On December 4, 1992 following his defeat for a second term, President Bush addressed the nation on humanitarian conditions in Somolia, a lawless state on Africa's East Coast. Earlier, under a UN resolution, peacekeepers were sent to assist in the distribution of international aid but were hindered by widespread tribal warfare, including attacks on UN peacekeepers. On December 6th a United Nations backed military force, led by the United States, landed in Somalia. The purpose was to stabilize the country and insure delivery of humanitarian aid.(14)

Taiwan Issues:

- Taiwan's application for membership in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was supported by the United States but opposed by the People's Republic of China.
- Continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. e.g. Sale of F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992. In response, the PRC threatened to withdraw from
During his term of office, President Clinton, in addition to navigating the rocks and shoals of a U.S. China policy, also had to survive an impeachment by the House of Representatives and commit American planes and ships to a NATO led war in Bosnia. (15)

In chronological order are listed the main issues with respect to American foreign policy in East Asia.

On November 19-20, 1993 Chinese leader Ziang Zemin and President Clinton met informally at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Seattle, Washington. The meeting was cordial but with very little matters of substance discussed.

In April of 1995 the Taiwan government requested a visa for its President Lee Tung-hui to visit the United States. The purpose of the visit was to allow Lee to attend a ceremony in his honor at his alma mater, Cornell University. Lee graduated from the University with a PhD in Agricultural Economics.

Largely on the advice of the State Department, the visa was denied. Reasoning was that such a visit would complicate efforts by the United States to enlist China's support in convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. As in many previous cases, the State Department misread or ignored the influence of Taiwan in the United States Congress.

Following the visa denial, Congress passed a resolution supporting Lee's visit that not only included the Cornell ceremony but also for Lee to attend the annual USA-ROC Economic Council meeting in Alaska. The concluding statement of the resolution stated.

"the United States will welcome a private visit by President Lee Tung-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University and will welcome a transit stop by President Lee in Anchorage, Alaska to attend the USA-ROC Economic Council Conference."

The Resolution was overwhelmingly passed by Congress; 91-1 in the Senate and by 396-0 in the House. An embarrassed White House, an embarrassment that should never have occurred, now reversed its position and the visa was approved on May 22, 1995. When the new American position was known, Chinese officialdom reacted as might be expected. Several official visits were cancelled; one led by the Chinese air commander and another by the Chinese Minister of Defense.
Between July 21-26 1995 the People's Republic of China fired missiles into Taiwan waters. It was seen as a warning to Taiwan not to participate in a U.S. led regional missile defense system and also a measure of its displeasure of the U.S. granting Lee Tung-hui a visa to visit the United States. At the time there was no indication that Taiwan wanted to participate in any regional missile defense system. In response to this provocation President Clinton ordered additional naval ships into the area.

In March of 1996 the United States sent two carriers task forces—USS Nimitz an USS Independence—near the Taiwan Strait, a clear message that the United States took seriously its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

By November of 1997, the visa dispute had become muted which allowed Chinese leader Zianag Zemin to make a state visit to the United States. Both President Clinton and Ziang considered the visit a success. The Ziang visit was returned in June and July of 1998 when President Clinton completed an eight day visit to China in which he reiterated his support for one China, not one Taiwan, or "two Chinas" and did not support Taiwan's efforts to be included in any international organization whose members are sovereign states.

Later in April, 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongi, at the invitation of President Clinton made an official visit to the United States. Like Ziang before him, the purpose of the visit was to expand U.S.-PRC cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

In July of 1999 the United States announced a $550 million sale of new arms to Taiwan. Included were spare parts for fighter aircraft and the sale of two E-2T Hawkeye survailance aircraft. China warned of the serious consequences of continued arms sales to Taiwan. The American reply emphasized the United States responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act to insure that the island had a sufficient self defense capability.

President Clinton, unlike the last Democrat President, James Carter, was willing to seek compromises in both domestic and foreign affairs. With respect to China-Taiwan relations he was solid in his support of a one China policy. On the other hand he was unwilling to abandon the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act whose purpose was to insure a sufficient enough defense capability to bring pause to a country that had never renounced the use of force to unite Taiwan with mainland China.
In his 2000 campaign for president, George W. Bush criticized what he considered the ambiguity of U.S-China policy, mainly never making the American position clear to either party with respect to a China threat to, or actually invade, Taiwan. Also during the 2000 campaign Bush stated that he would help Taiwan if attacked. "It's important for the Chinese to understand that if there is a military action we will help Taiwan defend itself." However, a hard line statement about American action was always followed by a more conciliatory pronouncement that the United States supports a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. In summary, the Bush position was to deter the People's Republic of China from using force, and deter Taiwan from declaring independence.

Three months into his first term in office, President Bush was asked if the U.S. was obliged to defend Taiwan if attacked by the People's Liberation Army. His response was "Yes we do, and the Chinese must understand that."

A particular problem for the new Bush Administration was the generally hard line position and statements of Taiwan President Chen Shu-bian favoring independence, a position not consistent with U.S. policy.

In December 2003, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jia-boa visited the White House. Official statements respecting the conversation of the two leaders conveyed a message to the Taiwan president was to back off and tone his rhetoric about an independent Taiwan. Taiwan elections in December of 2004 indicated the general public favored a more moderate approach to the independence issue. (16)

Always in the background of U.S-China relations was the question of U.S. policy with respect to normalizing trade relations with China. The issue was increasingly important as China became an important trading partner with the world, in particular with Western countries. The Bush position in this respect was threefold. First, trade with China will further the case for democracy in that country. Second, normal trade with China is necessary to establish a lasting framework for trade in East Asia and worldwide, recognizing that sooner, rather than later, China will become a member of the World Trade Organization. (WTO) The Bush position was that both Taiwan and China become WTO members. Third, trade with China serves America's economic interests, in particular export of agricultural products. Normal trade relations with China would be an opportunity to negotiate cuts in China's present high import tariffs. Also at this time was movement toward establishing trade, transportation and communications ties between Taiwan and the PRC.
A major stumbling block to normalizing trade with China was the increased attention given to the Cox Report of 2001. The report issued by Christopher Cox, Chairman of the House Select Committee on National Security, accused the Chinese of espionage and also criticized security measures at a number of high technology laboratories, institutions that required a high level security clearance for their employees. The report also recommended major changes in U.S. export controls, in particular export controls to China. While the espionage charge was taken seriously by the Bush Administration and the Congress, movement toward normal trade relations with China continued.

During his eight years in office, President Bush was consistent in his interpretation of the Taiwan Relations Act, mainly that should China move aggressively against Taiwan, the United States would help them defend themselves. He was also in favor of normalizing trade with China but with strict export controls. (17)
CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSION

What has changed since the Nationalist Government was established on Taiwan in 1949? (18)

- The military balance of power as between Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. In the 1950s neither the ROC or PRC had the military capability to win a cross Taiwan Strait conflict on its own. In 2014 the People's Republic of China is overwhelmingly the greater military power and is only restrained from invading Taiwan by the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (Section 3301 (b) 4,5,6), a growing cross strait trade with Taiwan, and the United States as a major market for PRC exports.

Comparative military power as between the PRC and ROC--PRC active duty forces 2.2 million, ROC 300,000 active and approximately 3.8 million reserve. Combat aircraft--PRC approximately 2,000, ROC 375.

- United Nations recognition. Until 1979, the Republic of China was recognized as the government of China. In 1979 the PRC replaced the ROC in the United Nations and became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In 2013 only 24 UN member states, relatively small countries, recognized the ROC.

There is no dual recognition. If a nation recognizes the ROC, it is not recognized by the PRC. (19)

- Comparative Economies. In the 1950-70 period the ROC's economy in terms of manufacturing and technology was well ahead of the PRC. In 2013 the PRC has not only a manufacturing and technology based civilian economy but also a highly advanced military and space technology capability, while the ROC largely depends on the United States for advanced military hardware, e.g. F-16 fighter aircraft and missile defense weaponry.

In terms of military expenditures as a percent of Gross National Product: People's Republic of China 4.30 percent; ROC 2.20 percent. This imbalance has been criticized by both military and high ranking civilian officials in the United States. One ROC response is for the United States to sell Taiwan advanced F-16 C/D combat aircraft.

- Nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of China is a major nuclear weapon power, including a long range ballistic missile capability. The Republic of China/Taiwan accepts the principles of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
• *Participation in international organizations.* The United States and the PRC position is that the ROC cannot be a member of any organization composed of sovereign states. International organizations in which the ROC is a member include the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Asia Development Bank and the World Olympic Organization. In the case of the latter, the ROC participated in the 2014 Winter Olympic Games as "Chinese Taipei."

What has not changed since 1949 is the territory under control of the Republic of China/Taiwan. See Appendix A.

It must be noted that while the Taiwan Relations Act pledges the United States to defend Taiwan if attacked by the People's Republic of China, in reality, the sitting American president at the time will determine the extent of U.S. intervention, if intervention at all.
1. At the end of World War II Berlin was governed by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and France. Geographically, Germany's once capital city was located deep within the Russian zone with no contiguous border with any Western power.

2. In 1946 the Truman administration attempted to broker a peace treaty between the long time warring Communists and Nationalists. The attempt was led by General George Marshall. His mission failed since neither side was willing to make the needed concessions.

3. The division of the Korean peninsula began with the end of World War II. The Soviet Union accepted a Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel while the United States accepted a similar surrender in the south. With the beginning of the "Cold War" in Europe, the 38th parallel became the de facto border between a Soviet sponsored government in the north under Kim Il Sung, a former officer in the Soviet Army, and a South Korean government headed by Syngman Rhee, a strident advocate of Korean unification.

4. Undoubtedly, Chiang Kai-shek and his advisors remembered the U.S. military's support for an American general officer to command allied forces in China, including Chinese forces, and also to control American military aid. Washington's choice was General Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stillwell. Almost from the beginning Chiang and Stillwell were at odds over Allied policy in Asia, particularly after the loss of Burma. Nor was General Stillwell hesitant to criticize Chiang's army and some of his generals. The relationship between the two leaders became increasingly acrimonious with respect to American military aid and where and how it was to be used. After continuing back and forth debates between Washington and Chongqing the issue was resolved when President Roosevelt, in 1943, recalled Stillwell. Chiang Kai-shek was named commander in chief of all allied forces in China.

And not forgotten by Chiang and his staff was Truman's willingness in 1949 to recognize the People's Republic of China and its claim to Taiwan. In their view American military aid was again made contingent on the Nationalists accepting Washington's policies in the Western Pacific and Taiwan's place in the scheme of things.

5. Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Walt Rostow, Deputy Special Assistant to the President. Chester Bowls, Under Secretary of State (Replaced by George Ball) Ambassador to India. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.

6. U.S. Vietnam war casualties, 1955-75 were KIA 58,286, WIA 153,303, and MIA 2,646/
7. Nguen Van Thieu was elected President of South Vietnam in 1967 and re-elected in 1971. Thieu agreed to the Paris Accords under extreme pressure from the United States. The Accords left large parts of South Vietnam under control of the North (NV). For these concessions, South Vietnam was promised continuing military assistance.

8. The 1971 meeting between Henry Kissinger, Chairman Mao and PRC Premier Zhou Enlali was not the first contact between Washington and Beijing. Earlier U.S. and PRC officials met at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The conference was attended by representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China. The purpose of the conference was to settle issues relating to the two Koreas, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Numerous meetings took place between representatives of the United States and PRC.

9. A small group of native born Taiwanese led by Peng Meng-min, a former diplomat in the Nationalist Government and former teacher, actively supported the concept on an independent Taiwan. The movement ended with the arrest of Peng. After serving six months in prison, Peng was released due to international pressure, primarily from sympathizers in the United States. Later, a U.S. visa was granted to Peng.

10. Two stories on the internet tend to support Chiang's charge of betrayal by President Nixon with regards to his policy of normalization of diplomatic, trade and visitor relations with the People's Republic of China. One is a 1972 story by columnist Jack Anderson stating that Chiang helped finance Richard Nixon's 1950 bid for the Senate (California) with American dollars. This story can be found in any newspaper carrying Anderson's columns. A second story is a claim that Chiang sent a suitcase of unmarked American dollars in 1968 in support of Nixon's presidential campaign. See Archieves for "Books"Category " The Soong Axis, Forgotten Dynasty. This author could find no reliable sources to substantiate the above allegations.

11. In December of 1975 Cambodian forces (pirates?) seized the American flag ship Mayaguez. President Ford ordered American Marines to rescue the crew. The mission was successful but unfortunately at a cost of several casualties.

12. Figures are approximate being arrived by different statistical methods.

13. The hostage crisis could be said to have begun in 1977 with a growing dissatisfaction with the rule of Shah Mohmmad Reza Pahlavi. Iranian grievances included a hatred and fear of the Shah's secret police (SAVAK), a growing disparity of income, a demand that the Shah adhere to the Laws of Islam (Much Western culture was acceptable under the Shah's rule), large numbers of unemployed, an end to martial law, and allowing peaceful demonstrations.

Major strikes and growing demonstrations against his rule forced the Shah to leave the
country in January of 1979. He was granted asylum by the United States but instead accepted sanctuary in Egypt. Without doubt, this was a major rationale for the storming of the U.S. embassy in November of 1979.

14. In 1992 Somolia was a lawless state on the northern East African coast. A starving and disease ridden population was estimated to be in the tens of thousands—lacking in food, water and medical supplies. Rivalries among different factions made distribution of international assistance almost impossible. In response to the situation, the United Nations passed UN Resolution 794 whose purpose was, with the assistance of UN peacekeepers, to guarantee delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid. As the situation worsened, the mandate became impossible to fulfill. UN Resolution 837 authorized the use of force, if necessary, to enforce UN resolution 794. Armed intervention followed on December 6th.

In addition to the United States, 26 nations contributed to the UN effort, including all major European powers. It is estimated that 100,000 or more lives were saved by "Operation Restore Hope."

15. The Bosnian War began with the breakup of Yugoslavia, a country populated by Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the successor states being Bosnia and Herzeqovina. The Serbia leader, Slobodan Milosevic, had dreams of creating a Greater Serbia. To this end Radovan Karadzie, leader of a renegade Bosnian army, began "cleansing" large areas of Bosnia of non Serbs. In April of 1992 Bosnian Serbs laid seige to Sarajevo, a seige that lasted almost a month and half and resulted in over 10,000 deaths. Croats and Serbs not interested in a Greater Serbia resisted Bosian Serb attempts to consolidate and hold its already occupied territory. Deaths from "cleansing" and conflict were in the tens of thousands. In February 1992 NATO nations urged all the belligerents to accept UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) as authorized by the UN Security Council. It proved ineffective as peace keeping instrument. A UN no fly zone was established over Bosnia-Herzeqovina as well as UN imposed sanctions. On August 30, 1995 NATO ordered large scale bombing of Serbian targets. In November the belligerent parties signed the Dayton (Ohio) Accords peace treaty.

16. Chen Shui-bian, leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) favored a policy of independence from China. Lee Tung-hui, nominal leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union Party (TSUP) was more moderate in its approach with respect to Taiwan-PRC relations. The DPP controlled the Taiwan government through 2008.

17. In addition to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, encouraging democracy in China while normalizing trade relations, President Bush had to deal with the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, and manage major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
18. At the time of publication of this project (April 2014) President Barrack Obama still had over two and one half years remaining in his second term in office. For that reason his term in office cannot be summarized as in the case of previous presidents. However, events occurring between January 2009 and April 2014 are noted in the project’s concluding chapter.

19. Those nations recognizing the Republic of China include Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Belize, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Guatemala, Paraguay, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Vatican City, Panama, Swaziland, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Haiti, St Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia.

Some states have informal relations with states they do not formally recognize. In the case of the Republic of China, a number of major powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom have reciprocal consular services. Membership in the United Nations does not mean all members recognize all other states. For example, Israel is not recognized by 32 UN member states, while the State of Palestine, with no land under its control, is recognized by over 130 United Nations member states.
APPENDICIES
APPENDIX A

Figure 1. Map of Republic of China/Taiwan
Figure 2. Map of the North East Asia
Chiang's early years were those of an unstable China; one of continuous fighting between Chinese warlords. His formal military education was in Japan followed by service in the Japanese Imperial Army (1909-11). In 1911 he returned to China, took part in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty, became a member of the Kuomintang (KMT) party and a trusted friend of Sun Yat-sen, a major revolutionary leader in the period 1916-24.

In 1924 Sun established a national government whose purpose was to unite China under the KMT. In that same year, Sun appointed Chiang Commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and in 1926 Chiang became Command-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, and later, in 1928, head of the Nationalist Government. Chiang's expulsion of the communists in 1927 was the beginning of China's Civil War. The expulsion was followed by a purge of the communists and their sympathizers. Some historians claim this purge resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

As leader of the Nationalist Government, Chiang continued his war against the communists and, in 1934, came close to annihilating the Chinese Red Army. But close was not enough. Forewarned, the army was able to escape (the so called "Long March," a journey of 6,000 miles) into Northwest China where they established a new base of operations.

With the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese war and during World War II, an uneasy truce prevailed between the Communists and Nationalists and there was some cooperation in fighting the Japanese. At no time, however, did Chiang abandon his goal of defeating the Chinese Communists once and for all. In the retreat of the Nationalist Army across China to Chiang's final capital, Chong Quing, a policy of scorched earth was followed. And while this may have slowed the advance of the Japanese Army, it took a heavy toll on Chinese civilians with a corresponding drop in support of the KMT.

The role of the Nationalists Government in World War II was to maintain a second front against Japanese forces in China. Chiang was named Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in China. At the end of World War II his government was recognized by the Soviet Union, was a charter member of the United Nations and member of its Security Council.

Following the 1946 attempt of General George C. Marshall to broker a truce between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government, China's Civil War continued. The long war against the Japanese had weakened the Nationalist Army. Despite American military and economic aid, corruption, low morale and a disorganized chain of command took its toll. While the Nationalists initially maintained control of the cities, the countryside belonged to...
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) whose message was land reform and an end to government corruption. By 1949, the PLA, led by Mao Zedong, prevailed.

China's long Civil War, however, was not over. A Nationalist Government on Taiwan, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, vowed to return. Establishing a Nationalist Government on Taiwan was not, however, without its problems, a main one being the hostility to the KMT by many native Taiwanese. This hostility was considered by Chiang as being pro communist and resulted in the imprisonment of over 100,000 civilians. A main argument for the policy was that the ROC was still at war with Mao's mainland communist government and that an invasion of Taiwan by the communists was a continuing threat.

The role of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan during and leading up to the Korean War is described in Chapter I.

Given one party rule Chiang was reelected President of the Republic of China in 1954, 1960, 1966 and 1972. Under the protection of an American protective umbrella and the threat of a Chinese invasion receding, Chiang's attention turned to encouraging industrial development, particularly in the export sector, which in turn became the foundation of Taiwan's economic successes. e.g. In the 1970s Taiwan was recognized as one of Asia's Four (economic) Tigers along with Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore. Later, a popular Land Reform Act, a gradual recognition of civil and economic freedom, mending relations with the native Taiwanese, and the establishment of political parties, cemented Chiang's reputation as a effective leader in the United States, Europe and East Asia.

Following his death in 1975, many of Chiang's autocratic, and sometimes harsh policies were forgiven and his contributions recognized by historians and the Taiwan people.
Mao Zedong (26 December 1893–9 September 1976)

Mao's early education was as a teacher and librarian, a background that not only enabled him to read and comprehend Chinese history but to grasp and understand China's current economic and political issues. In this he was influenced by the economic and political writings of Karl Marx, an early critic of capitalism as an institution. There is little doubt that his study of Marx influenced his decision to become as founding member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty (1616-1924, 1916) there was no effective central government, or for that matter, any stable regional governments. Instead control of Chinese territory rested with various warlords, particularly in North China. China's ports, for the most part, were controlled by Western nations, Russia and Japan. In this environment (circa 1923) it made military and political sense for an alliance between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Party in an effort to unify China under a central government. The alliance met with some successes but ended in 1927 when the then leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek, ended communist participation in the nascent national government. This expulsion was followed by a vicious and uncompromising purge of communists and their sympathizers. The end result was that the Nationalists faced a dedicated CCP and Red Army, one eventually led by Mao. It was the beginning of China’s long civil war.

At the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and throughout World War II there was temporary and uneasy truce between the Communists and Nationalists as both groups fought the Japanese. At the end of World War II hostilities resumed between the CCP, led by Mao, and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. In 1946 an attempt by the United States to broker a truce between the warring parties failed. In 1949 a Communist victory ended Nationalist rule on mainland China but a Nationalist government on Taiwan survived.

The Korean War, which began in 1950, caused an about face with respect to American policy as between Taiwan and mainland China. In 1949 the Truman administration viewed Mao in a more or less favorable light. And while its two China policy was ambiguous, he had no intention of taking sides in the continuing Chinese Civil War. All this changed when Mao’s China entered the Korean War on the side of Kim Il Sung and his Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Mao's role in the Korean War is discussed in Chapter I under the Truman administration's Korean War policies.

Following the end of the Korean War, Mao turned his attention to domestic issues. His two attempts to reshape Chinese society—the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958 and the "Cultural Revolution" in 1966 ended in failure. The aim of the former was to increase agricultural and
industrial production. The failure of the agricultural program ended in the deaths of millions of civilians.

The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to once and for all end any form of dissent which included a war on China's centuries old culture. The program, supported by youthful fanatics (Red Guard) was a political disaster. Civilian deaths in this culture purge were estimated to be over one million. By 1967, resistance to the program in China's populated areas became widespread and was only contained by the Red Army. At no time, however, was Mao's rule threatened. Partly in due to the failure of the Cultural Revolution, in 1965, Mao appointed Zhou Enlai Premier of the PRC while Mao remained Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the 1970s Mao took a more conciliatory position toward the West and Japan, a policy that was welcomed in Washington as a means of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. This "better relations" policy, engineered by President Nixon's Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, culminated in a 1972 visit to China by President Nixon. This thaw in U.S.-China relations, with occasional blips and saber rattling, continued until Mao's death in 1976.
Abstract

Section 3301
Policy

It is the policy of the United States-

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts and or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) to provide Taiwan arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.

Section 3302

(b) Determination of Taiwan's defense needs

The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and the quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by the United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
Section 3303

Application to Taiwan of laws and international agreements

(d) Membership in international financial institutions and other international organizations

Nothing in this chapter may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

Section 3305

The American Institute in Taiwan

(a) Conduct of programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to Taiwan

Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through-

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a non profit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or

(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the "Institute."

Section 3313

Congressional Oversight

(a) Monitoring activities of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee and other Congressional committees

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representative, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor-

(1) the implementation of the provisions of this chapter;

(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;

(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and
(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Committee reports to their respective Houses

Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.
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