Date of Award
Master of Science (MS)
Electrical and Computer Engineering (Holcomb Dept. of)
Dr. Richard Brooks, Committee Chair
Dr. Richard Groff
Dr. Rajendra Singh
Unintended side-channel leaks can be exploited by attackers and achieved quickly, and using relatively inexpensive equipment. Cloud providers aren’t equipped to provide assurances of security against such attacks. One most well-known and effective of the side-channel attack is on information leaked through power consumption. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) can extract a secret key by measuring the power used while a device is executing the any algorithm. This research explores the susceptibility of current implementations of Circuit Garbling to power analysis attacks and a simple variant to obfuscate functionality and randomize the power consumption reusing the garbling keys and the garbled gates. AES has been chosen as an example. The first task is to implement the garbled variants of basic logic gates in hardware (RTL design) using Circuit Garbling. The second task is to use the above created gates and create an RTL implementation of AES using Verilog HDL. The next task is to perform a Differential Power Analysis(DPA) on this circuit and evaluate its resilience to attack.
Bommakanti, Venkata Lakshmi Sudheera, "Reusable Garbled Circuit Implementation of AES to Avoid Power Analysis Attacks" (2017). All Theses. 2751.