Date of Award

12-2008

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Legacy Department

Applied Economics

Advisor

Maloney, Michael T

Committee Member

Dougan , William R

Committee Member

Warner , John T

Committee Member

Lindsay , C M

Abstract

Wholesale auto auctions are convenient structures for economists as they attempt to observe the marginal effects of quality changes on the market-clearing price. However, what may be categorized as a quality change might rather be a market signal of an environment with adverse selection. This dissertation analyzes the effects of seller type and tests their sensitivity to econometric model specification.
General hedonic attributes and their various applications are reviewed. This dissertation explores the basic auto auction environment and dispels inaccurate notions about the auction structure. Following Bartik's (1987) analysis, multi-market data are used to produce hedonic estimates for seller, mileage and other attributes. A section is devoted to the peculiarities of the auction environment; namely, the winner's curse, adverse selection, and variations in auction structure.
A three-part literature review covers adverse selection, the various technicalities of auction structure, and the econometric issues regarding hedonic regressions. A section presents the data and the econometric models with their results. Concluding remarks discuss areas for further research.

Included in

Economics Commons

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