Date of Award

8-2017

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science (MS)

Department

Electrical and Computer Engineering (Holcomb Dept. of)

Committee Member

Dr. Richard Brooks, Committee Chair

Committee Member

Dr. Richard Groff

Committee Member

Dr. Rajendra Singh

Abstract

Unintended side-channel leaks can be exploited by attackers and achieved quickly, and using relatively inexpensive equipment. Cloud providers aren’t equipped to provide assurances of security against such attacks. One most well-known and effective of the side-channel attack is on information leaked through power consumption. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) can extract a secret key by measuring the power used while a device is executing the any algorithm. This research explores the susceptibility of current implementations of Circuit Garbling to power analysis attacks and a simple variant to obfuscate functionality and randomize the power consumption reusing the garbling keys and the garbled gates. AES has been chosen as an example. The first task is to implement the garbled variants of basic logic gates in hardware (RTL design) using Circuit Garbling. The second task is to use the above created gates and create an RTL implementation of AES using Verilog HDL. The next task is to perform a Differential Power Analysis(DPA) on this circuit and evaluate its resilience to attack.

Share

COinS